HEADQUARTERS AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

REVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

REVIEW OF ADF COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS

INTRODUCTION

1. Current ADF command and control arrangements were implemented in 1997 and were developed in a strategic environment where the major threats were perceived as arising from conventional military forces. Since that time the ADF has had a high operational tempo and the Command and Control arrangements need to be tested for effectiveness, relevance and currency in the light of that experience and the contemporary strategic environment.

BACKGROUND

2. The 1997 arrangements were developed with an understanding that operations in Defence of Australia would be conducted in the north of Australia and that the area was vulnerable. Command and control arrangements and infrastructure were located to accommodate this perceived vulnerability.

3. The current strategic environment encompasses a continuum of warfare that extends from traditional warfighting to warlike operations and to military operations designed to influence and shape regional and world views.

AIM OF THE REPORT

4. The aim of this report is to provide recommendations to CDF for a refined ADF Command and Control arrangement at the Strategic and Operational levels.

CDF DIRECTION

5. In providing direction for the review, CDF indicated any organisational changes should be as simple as possible and should result in an organisation that was flexible, adaptable and more efficient. Any new structure would be smaller rather than larger and CDF saw that the recommendations would be able to be implemented in the short-term and well before the new collocated headquarters at Bungendore was completed.

REVIEW CONTEXT

6. The Review found there are a number of contemporary issues that shape any command and control arrangements. Those issues include:
   a. the growing interest of Government in tactical activity, and
   b. the potential effects of technology on command and control and the passage of information.

IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES

7. The assessment of operational experience and the conclusions drawn from the interview process identified four key issues:
a. the tension between Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) staff and Strategic Operations Division (SOD) staff,
b. the lack of a jointly manned deployable headquarters,
c. the tension between the divergent demands of commanders and staffs who have responsibility to Commander AST (COMAST) for operations and to their Chiefs of Service for raise, train and maintain (RTM) functions, and
d. the considerable time before the current HQAST Project delivers a joint staff facility.

8. Additionally, the following two supplementary issues were noted:

a. the lack of a coherent joint exercising and evaluation program, and
b. the high demand for the small numbers of quality, qualified staff.

9. Other issues identified, but not addressed in detail included:

a. the effectiveness of the arrangements for Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG),
b. the need for a review of the relationship between AST Joint Intelligence Centre (ASTJIC) and Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) when ASTJIC is located in the Canberra region, and
c. progress on the recommendations of the Defence Efficiency Review (DER) and Post Operation Report (POR) from Timor relating to the structure of ADHQ.

KEY ISSUES

HQAST/SOD tension

10. The Review:

a. Found that there was tension between HQAST and SOD.
b. Confirmed the necessity for SOD role.
c. Noted that under current arrangements Head of Strategic Operations Division (HSOD) has no operational command function but recognised that there are perceptions that SOD has involved itself in activities that could be considered as command like.
d. Accepted that service culture and physical proximity influence the relationships between and the effectiveness of senior staff.
e. Accepted that compartmentalisation as currently practised aggravates the tension between HQ.
f. Concluded that the amalgamation of HQAST and SOD in the one locality under the command of a three star officer would minimise tension between staff and facilitate more effective use of staff resources.
The lack of a jointly manned Deployable Headquarters

11. The Review accepted the compelling need for a truly joint deployable HQ and that such a HQ should be based on the existing Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) with significant additional staffing contribution from Navy and Air Force. The staff of that HQ should form the basis of any deployed operations staff.

12. The Review noted:
   a. the land centric nature of the DJFHQ but recognised that the Navy and Air Force contributed to this nature by failing to fill already established billets in the HQ, and
   b. the continued parallel role of staff undertaking both joint operational and 1st Division activities can cause resource allocation tensions and reduced effectiveness in each role.

13. The Review noted that the DJFHQ (Maritime) suffers from problems arising from their dual roles and the Review noted that while there is no formed Air Force element whose role is to support deployed operations, the Air Force is planning to correct that deficiency.

14. Although providing a valuable role there is evidence that suggests that the resource currently allocated to HQ Northern Command (HQNORCOM) might be better employed in other elements of the C² spectrum.

Raise Train Maintain (RTM) at the Operational Level

15. The current dual-hatted arrangement employed in the environmental commands where the Commanders and their staffs serve both their Service Chiefs for RTM and COMAST for operations are at odds with the principles of unity, clarity and simplicity in command arrangements.

16. The dual role circumstance has been justified by accepting that there are insufficient resources to separately manage the operational level command and RTM functions. However, a rationalisation of the number of HQ and a refocussing of manpower allocation across the spectrum should remove this justification.

17. A casualty of the current ‘double hatted’ arrangements has been the slow development of the operational art and the fidelity of the processes needed to support that art. If the ADF is to achieve the goal of effectiveness superiority that has been espoused in recent White Papers, the lack of expertise in commanding joint operations can not be allowed to persist.

18. The Review found the ADF does not fully exploit the joint and collective training opportunities in the Program of Major Service Activities. The Review determined the current exercise schedule could be focussed in a more effective way and perhaps more radically, the mechanisms for joint and collective training could be overhauled.
HQAST collocation timing

19. The Review concluded that the planned collocation of the operational level headquarters would provide significant benefits. These benefits might be shown in some manpower savings, but the Review concluded that the more likely effect would be that the command and control of the ADF would be considerably enhanced.

20. Recognising these benefits are likely, it is difficult to justify waiting until late in the decade when the Joint Project (JP) 8001 Collocated HQ is due to become operational and the joint staff realise the synergies of collocation. There is a compelling case to bring forward the timing of collocation.

Skilled manpower resource limitation

21. There is evidence that the corporate C² manpower bill exceeds the availability of appropriately trained and experienced staff and that there are clear deficiencies with the existing C² HQ manpower augmentation processes.

Overseas practice

22. Comparison of the ratio of the numbers of staff in headquarters involved in the command and control of operations at the strategic and operational level when compared to the numbers of personnel deployed on operations found that the ADF had more staff than either Singapore or the UK.

Joint collective training and evaluation

23. The Review accepted that current joint and collective training and evaluation arrangements were deficient. They are ad hoc, lack coherency and are not set against joint warfighting objectives.

Effects on the existing HQAST project

24. Acceptance of some of the recommendations of the Review will require substantial changes to the existing HQAST Project (JP8001). The handling of those changes will require acknowledgment of the political realities relating to the progress of JP 8001.

RECOMMENDATIONS

25. The Review recommends that CDF:
   a. Note that existing command and control doctrine remains suitable in the context of the changed strategic environment. However there might be a need to recognise compression in the traditional strategic, operational and tactical command and control concepts.
   b. Agree that the ADF security control process for compartmented planning adopt a vertically integrated methodology.
   c. Agree to recommend to the Minister for Defence that the rank level of COMAST be increased to three star.
d. Agree that HSOD come under COMAST for command purposes and the operational staffs of HQAST, the component command staffs and SOD should collocate in a single environment.

e. Agree that the single operational and strategic HQ should be known as Headquarters Joint Operations.

f. Agree to change the title of COMAST to CJOPS.

g. Agree to merge DJFHQ and HQNORCOM.

h. Agree to separate the joint operational command elements of the existing DJFHQ from the functions relating to the command of the 1st Division.

i. Agree that the amalgamation headquarters should be formed at Larrakeyah Barracks under the name of DJFHQ.

j. Agree to separate the command of operations functions from the raise, train and maintain functions at the operational level.

k. Agree that the current two star environmental commanders remain responsible for the RTM functions and that the operational level component commanders be at the one star level (Option 3, Annex C).

l. Agree to the establishment of an Operational Command Group for the provision of advice to Commander Joint Operations (CJOPS).

m. Agree that the synergies of collocation should be achieved before 2007.

n. Agree to stand up a Headquarters Joint Operations (HQJOPS) in the Canberra region as soon as practicable.

o. Agree to investigate the options for building or leasing a suitable facility to collocate up to 320 joint staff in a developmental facility by December 2004.

p. Note that the establishment of a commonly informed operating picture managed at a single site and distributed for consumption by authorised subsidiary uses could satisfy all ADF 24/7 situational awareness requirements at the strategic and operational levels.

q. Note that the current ADF ratio of headquarters staff to tactical forces is greater than either Singapore or the UK.

r. Note that COSC Agendum 12 / 03 will address the issue of evaluation of joint and combined training in the ADF.

s. Agree that the ADF could benefit from a more rigorous joint and collective training program.

t. Note that the evaluation of operations and exercises is a necessary step in refining command organisations and processes.

u. Agree that the evaluation of ADF operations and exercises be conducted by one organisation and that the capture of those lessons be a necessary step in reviewing and testing doctrinal concepts relating to the command and control of the ADF.

v. Note that bringing the Joint Movements Group under the CJLOG command umbrella could be beneficial.
w. **Note** that a separate review of the arrangements for the delivery of intelligence at the strategic and operational levels should be completed before ASTJIC relocates to the Canberra environment.
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INTRODUCTION

1. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is an institution subordinate to the authority vested in the Government by the Australian people. This subordination of the Defence Force to the Government, and the Government to the people, is fundamental to Australia’s political culture. The ADF will lose the confidence of the Government and the people if it fails to act legitimately when force is used on behalf of the Government. Commanders and their subordinates at all levels serve the Government and the people.


3. The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) as the principal military adviser and the Secretary as the principal civilian defence adviser to the Government, develop and implement plans and programs that give military substance and effect to the guidance from the Government. The ADF command and control arrangements are a fundamental element in the effective delivery of the required outcomes: They must be unambiguous, flexible and effective to ensure the successful, legal achievement of missions in a broad range of contingencies and activities.

BACKGROUND

Command and Control

4. Command and control is the system that empowers designated persons to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for the accomplishment of missions and tasks.

5. Command is a purely military concept. It lies at the very heart of the military profession and is central to success in battle. Military commanders have the authority to commit soldiers; sailors and airmen to battle in circumstances that may endanger their lives. Military commanders have the onerous responsibility in these circumstances and military commanders will be held accountable for their actions and inaction.

6. Command can only achieve legitimacy when it is exercised in the context of acting in response to a lawful direction from the Government.

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1 Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) Agenda 27/01 para 3
2 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication - Joint Operations Command and Control (ADDP – JOCC)
CDF commands the ADF and normally exercises command of operations through the Commander, Australian Theatre (COMAST). COMAST is the CDF's principal adviser on all matters concerning the conduct of campaigns and operations. The Service Chiefs command their respective Services and are responsible for raising, training and maintaining (RTM) forces for operations. The Service Chiefs are the CDF's principal military advisers on Defence policy, military strategy, and the employment of their Service's force elements.

The ADF command and control system must be effective in both times of conflict and peace and should:

a. meet the requirements of government;
b. provide for the lawful delegation of authority;
c. allow commanders at all levels to achieve their mission through their initiative and the application of the art and science of war;
d. facilitate the identification and treatment of risks that may arise;
e. facilitate the effective and efficient employment of capabilities and resources; and
f. be adaptable to any military operation the ADF might be required to execute.

The current and immediate past CDFs, in a number of authorised doctrinal publications and the draft ADF Warfighting Concept, have identified seven fundamental principles of command and control. The Principles are:

a. Unity of Command - a single, recognised command authority at all times. This principle ensures clarity and simplicity in command arrangements, so that command can be exercised effectively.
b. Span of Command - commanders should not be overloaded beyond their capacity to operate and command effectively.
c. Clarity - the key principle is that there should be an unambiguous chain of command.
d. Redundancy - alternative commanders and headquarters (as appropriate) must be nominated at all levels of command to provide redundancy in time of war.
e. Delegation of Command - at all levels of command, subordinate commanders should be given necessary directions and resources to enable them to conduct the tasks required of them.
f. Control of Significant Resources - command and control of designated resources is normally retained at the highest practical level.

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3 The term raise, train and maintain is used in ADDP D Para 7.17, but the more common usage is raise, train and sustain.
4 ADDP-JOCC para3
5 ADDP-D para 7.16
g. Obligation to Subordinates - ADF commanders are obligated to consider the interests of subordinates. This includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

Command

10. When applied to a military command and control system, command is defined as, The authority, which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.6

Control

11. When applied to a command and control system, control is defined as, The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.7

TERMS OF REFERENCE

12. At CDF Directive 5/2003, I was directed to examine the strategic and operational level command and control arrangements of the ADF that have been in place since 1996 and recommend any changes that might be made to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the current structures8. Recommendations were to accommodate developments in the command and control of the ADF over the next decade. The Terms of Reference (TOR) are provided at annex A.

CDF Guidance

13. In providing direction, CDF indicated that he anticipated that acceptance of recommendations of the Review would resolve tensions that had been apparent between the strategic and operational levels of command in the ADF. He saw that any organisational changes would be as simple as possible. He further saw that any changes would result in an organisation that was flexible and adaptable and that any changes would result in an organisation that was more efficient than the current structure. Any new structure would be smaller rather than larger. He foresaw that any new arrangements would exploit present technology and be capable of absorbing future technology.

14. CDF noted that the new arrangements could have a three star officer responsible for operations. That officer would be based in the Canberra region. That officer could split his time between Russell offices and the new headquarters location

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6 ADDP JOCC para 6
7 ADDP JOCC para 7
8 The Review needed to account for developments in command and control over the next decade.
in Bungendore, but Bungendore would primarily be run by a chief of staff. CDF saw that the recommendations would be able to be implemented in the short term and well before the new collocated headquarters at Bungendore was completed.

15. CDF initially indicated that the Review should not involve the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ). But in authorising the TOR he included DJFHQ and HQ Northern Command (HQNORCOM) in the scope of the Review.

AIM OF THE REPORT

16. The aim of this report is to provide recommendations to CDF for a refined ADF Command and Control arrangement at the Strategic and Operational levels.

METHODOLOGY

17. The Review examined the applicable ADF command and control doctrine. The Review also noted a range of other reviews relating to command and control that had been completed in the period since 1996. An extensive range of interviews was conducted with key stakeholders including all senior military officers in the command of operations chain and others in key staff appointments. The interview list also included retired officers who had held key command and staff appointments since 1996. Further, interviews were conducted with some key officials in defence and with officials of other departments and in the offices of the Minister of Defence and of the Prime Minister. The intent of interviewing these members was to identify any perceived deficiencies in the delivery of ADF effect to government and any influence of officials on the process of command. The interview technique was iterative and took into account the views of the interviewee and an assessment of responses of the interviewee to a range of possible command structures. Additionally the Review took the opportunity to allow key commanders to outline how they saw their organisations working and what unwritten commitments that they had to their superiors.

18. At the same time the Review collected data from the existing headquarters structure including current directives and charters to commanders and the establishment and organisational tables.

19. The Review sought advice from overseas defence forces specifically, Singapore, Sweden, New Zealand, United Kingdom, the United States Marines, with a view to determining organisational structures for armed forces of equivalent size and role. The intent was to baseline the current and any recommended structure against the world practise.

20. The Review then examined a range of the operations that had been completed by the ADF since the establishment of the 1996 arrangements. The post operation reports and other documents were examined with a view to drawing common threads from their recommendations. ADF Activities Analysis Database System

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9 ADFP and ADFP
10 Interview list is at annex B
11 Not all directives were current or available to the Review
(ADFAADS) was used as another source of lessons learnt from the operations over the intervening six years.

21. The Review did not examine recent operations in Iraq in detail. Rather the Review drew from the Interim Report From an Evaluation of the Performance of the Strategic Command Level of the ADF in Current Operations 30 April 03, hereafter referred to as the Interim Molan Report\(^{12}\), of that operation. The Review was provided with an advance copy of the report on 30 April and folded those common recommendations into the Review. Any points of variance have been noted.

22. The Review also sought submissions from key stakeholders and interested parties in the ADF.

23. Finally the Review consulted closely with the Headquarters Australian Theatre Project Board of Governance and Project Team. The intent was to avoid duplication of effort and to gather baseline data for that project.

24. The examination of the foregoing allowed a comparison of the expected outcomes of the 1996 implementation and the operational experience. The Review then developed a range of options.

25. These options were then presented to key members of the Chiefs of Service Committee. That work acted as a boundary test of the acceptability of the changes proposed by the Review.\(^{13}\)

THE REVIEW CONTEXT

26. The Review looked at the changes that have occurred since 1996 in the way that they affect command of ADF operations. The Review noted that the key drivers were strategic circumstances, legacy command and control arrangements, and government influence on ADF operations and technology.

Strategic context

27. Current ADF command and control arrangements were implemented in 1996 and were developed in a relatively stable strategic environment where the major threats were perceived as arising from conventional military forces. There was an understanding that the principal function of the ADF was to defend Australia and that responses to other threats, although possible, were not likely.

28. The paradigm of 'Structure for War, Adapt for Peace' predominated in 1996. Command and Control arrangements were developed with an understanding that operations in Defence of Australia would be conducted in the north of Australia and that the area was vulnerable. Command and Control arrangements and infrastructure were located to accommodate this perceived vulnerability.

\(^{12}\) Interim Molan Report of 30 April 2003

\(^{13}\) This report is a combination of fact and comment, but the thoughts expressed are those of the Review team.
29. Today's strategic environment, as characterised in *Defence 2000* and *Australia's National Security, a Defence Update 2003*, is one where the traditional military threats remain but are compounded by asymmetric threats that arise out of terrorism and a globalised world of international relations. This new environment is leading to the development of revised warfighting concepts that encompass a continuum of warfare that extends from traditional warfighting to warlike operations and to military operations designed to influence and shape regional and world views.

30. The Review has been advised that since *Defence Update 2003* was published the propensity for ADF contribution to coalition operations is likely to increase.

31. Although the paradigm of 'Structure for War, Adapt for Peace' remains valid, today's asymmetric threats create an environment where the paradigm may not predominate and where the north of Australia is no more or less vulnerable than the rest of the continent except in the context of conventional military attack.

**Existing C^2 arrangements**

32. The CDF commands the ADF and is supported by the Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ). CDF may elect to command operations directly, but normally exercises command of ADF operations through COMAST. COMAST is CDF's principal adviser on all matters concerning the conduct of campaigns and operations. COMAST is responsible to CDF for the operational level planning and conduct of ADF campaigns, operations and other activities, unless another operational level commander is appointed. COMAST may delegate operational authority over forces assigned to him to subordinate commanders.

33. CDF directs the Service Chiefs to assign forces to COMAST for operations as theatre commander.

34. The Service Chiefs command their respective Services and are responsible for raising, training and maintaining forces for operations. The Service Chiefs are the CDF's principal military advisers on Defence policy, military strategy, and the employment of their Service's Forces.\(^{14}\)

35. Strategic Operations Division (SOD) supports the CDF. COSC\(^{15}\) defined the role of the then Strategic Command Division as, *Support of CDF in the command of ADF operations*. This support is twofold: upward, by the provision of advice, the monitoring of current operations and by keeping the Minister and ADF informed; and downward, by the clear dissemination of strategic guidance and CDF direction. HSCD is CDF's senior staff operations staff officer and is responsible to ensure clear military direction is passed to the operational level.

36. However, doctrine\(^{16}\) defines the role of SOD in the following terms, *SOD assists CDF in the command and control of the ADF at the strategic level of operations by providing military staff advice, especially with regard to initial strategic options and the development of military strategic plans*. SOD also coordinates the strategic-level command

\(^{14}\) ADDP-JOCC  
\(^{15}\) COSC Agendum 27/01  
\(^{16}\) ADDP-D para 7.22
and control of ADF joint and combined operations, and monitors the conduct of, and provides staff advice on, ADF operations from a strategic perspective.

37. The Review noted the slightly different interpretations of the role of SOD.

38. The ADF has embraced the construct of component command. This means that specialist single service officers have the responsibility for advising a joint commander on the peculiarities of their service and of directly interpreting the intent of the joint commander for the purposes of producing the effect required by his concept of operations.

39. The component command philosophy has relevance at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. For example, should a Joint Task Force (JTF) be established for the use of the ADF in operations then normally that JTF commander would give effect to his command through the component method. The size of the component command organisations is determined by the operational requirement. The application of the joint component method to the lower tactical level is a distinctive element of joint operations in Australia.

40. While the direct command\textsuperscript{17} philosophy can also be used, the separation of necessary component advice from that control chain should never occur.

41. Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) is commanded by COMAST and comprises a joint staff and four components (Maritime, Land, Air and Special Operations). Each element provides operational advice to COMAST.

42. The DJFHQ is established for the control of joint forces in deployed operations\textsuperscript{18}. That headquarters is normally a tactical-level headquarters but may be tasked to operate at the operational level, especially if deployed overseas. It is currently a land-centric organisation that is augmented by maritime and air staff when necessary.

43. HQNORCOM is an integrated joint headquarters that is commanded by Commander Northern Command (COMNORCOM) and normally functions at the regional operational level in northern Australia. From time to time, HQNORCOM has been tasked with tactical-level functions.

Effect of Government on the command of operations

44. Since 1996, there has been a clear change in the appetite of Government for the detail of operations. While operations since 1996 have been limited in scope, the Government requirement has developed because these types of operations have encompassed tactical decisions that can have unintended strategic effects. For example the contact between Australian and Indonesian forces on the East Timor border during INTERFET could have had ramifications for the strategic relationship between the two nations, a relationship that was already under some considerable tension. Another example of tactical action that has strategic effect, was the ‘Certain Maritime Incident’.

\textsuperscript{17} ADDP-D para 7.17
\textsuperscript{18} ADDP-JOCC
45. The Review was advised that Government is less interested in how the passage of information occurs in Defence than the rapid delivery of key information that Government deem to be strategic. The ADF is not attuned sufficiently to the types of information that Government needs. Consequently, the ADF has to pass almost all tactical level incident information to Government. Until the ADF is fully attuned to Government needs, Defence needs to be able to condense the time from incident to advice to Government. The ramification is that information needs to be passed from the tactical to the strategic level very quickly.

46. As a result, any proposed command and control arrangements need to cater for this rapid passage of advice to Government. Advice of an incident at the tactical level passing to the strategic level through layers of intermediate headquarters is no longer valid. Information needs to be rapidly passed in parallel to the strategic level with intermediate headquarters levels offering supporting or clarifying advice when they deem it necessary. Modern technology allows the passage of information rapidly, but there is still a need to advise Government before the information comes to them from the media or other sources.

Technology effects on command and control

47. The impact of technology will not alter the fundamental responsibilities of command. The ability to rapidly collate and convey information will result in greater visibility vertically and horizontally. Technology will continue to increase the ability to convey information, thus offering the opportunity to change the nature of command relationships through greater involvement of senior commanders down lower in the chain of command. This should be a positive outcome but will need discipline to avoid micro-management and interference into tactical matters from the political/strategic level. Technology will offer the opportunity to streamline the passage of information yet still permit value adding when necessary.

48. This shared and increased level of situational awareness could become the catalyst to allow self-synchronisation of activities. Improved battlespace management will require headquarters staff to perform control functions across a wider spectrum. A potential technology outcome could be fewer intermediate HQ or smaller HQ.

49. The ability of the media to provide battlefield detail to their news services using portable satellite equipment has been shown in the Iraq campaign. The impact of that technology on the traditional serial passage of information through the layers of military headquarters has been profound. As a result written advice to the Minister and his staff now occurs quickly. While the exact facts and detail of any incident may be unclear, the fact that something has occurred is passed to the strategic level from the tactical level at a speed comparable to that achieved by the media.

50. In the view of the Review, the tradition that the military will provide measured advice to the strategic level only when the picture is clear has gone from normal operations and will not return.

51. An additional effect of technology on command and control is a compression of the decision making cycle. Key western powers are using computing resources to
display accurate Commonly Informed Operating Pictures (CIOP) and using software aided decision tools to develop possible courses of action. While this technology is immature, it is progressing at a rapid rate. In the future the simultaneous transmission of situation pictures to all levels of a command chain will mean that commanders have an unparalleled ability to see what is happening in the battlespace.

52. Therefore it appears that command intervention in tactical operations has the potential to increase. Should current operational pictures be provided to the government, then there is a potential that government intervention in tactical actions may also increase.

53. These two newly emerging capabilities compel flatter structures for command and control. Several authors have addressed this matter, but interestingly all comparable western military organisations are responding to both changes. So far, the ADF has responded by altering process rather than structure.

54. The Review sought advice from experts in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation and other areas of the ADQ\textsuperscript{19} regarding the likely effects of technology on command and control arrangements. The advice received was that the experts could not see the application of any technology on the near term horizon that would fundamentally change the way that the ADF commands operations. The trend to network centric warfare will not be complete within the next ten years and the automated decision support tools that are in development in the United States are unlikely to arrive in substantial numbers in Australia in the next ten years.

THE REVIEW

Doctrine

55. The Review examined endorsed ADF capstone and a selection of keystone doctrine.

56. The capstone document, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP-D), was developed to overcome deficiencies identified in the conduct of ADF operations (eg Operations Warden/Stabilise) in the contemporary world environment. CDF authorised that publication in September 2002. The national context of the document is contemporary and articulates how the ADF will support the national strategic policy across the full range of approved ADF operational response options (Defending Australia to Peacetime National Tasks).

57. The interim Joint Operations Command and Control (JOCC) document was approved by the then CDF in December 2001. The JOCC provides the agreed C\textsuperscript{2} terminology and definitions; it is relevant and current as a keystone doctrinal publication.

\textsuperscript{19} Interviews with the Chief Defence Scientist, Dr Chessel, Dr Whitbread of Defence Science Organisation, Chief Information Officer, Mr Hannan, and Head Electronic Systems Division, Ms McKinnie
58. Coalition issues are addressed throughout the ADDP-D. ADDP.00.3 (Coalition Operations) is approved and is both current and relevant. ADFP 09 (the extant ADF Planning Doctrinal Guidance) remains relevant.

59. The Review found that the capstone doctrinal document, ADDP-D, is both relevant and current. However, the supporting keystone and application documents are still being developed from the current ADFP range of doctrinal publications. Although there is a sound platform of supporting single service publications the process of accreditation is far from complete.

Recommendation

60. Note that existing command and control doctrine remains suitable in the context of the changed strategic environment. However there might be a need to recognise compression in the traditional strategic, operational and tactical command and control concepts.

Operational review and interview

61. The results of the interview process and the analysis of post operational reports identified the following four key issues:

   a. the tension between HQAST staff and SOD staff,
   b. the lack of a jointly manned deployable headquarters,
   c. the tension between the divergent demands of commanders and staffs who have responsibility to COMAST for operations and to their Chiefs of Service for RTM functions, and
   d. the considerable time before the current HQAST Project delivers a joint staff facility.

62. Additionally, the following two supplementary issues were noted:

   a. the lack of a coherent joint exercising and evaluation program, and
   b. the high demand for the small numbers of quality, qualified staff.

63. The Review also noted that the level of Government interest in the detail of ADF activities/operations will require the rapid passage of information on operations to Government.

HQAST / SOD STAFF TENSIONS

CDF Direct Command

64. There is a common perception that HQAST has been “sidelined” in the command of some recent operations. While the perception is not backed by fact, the use of command lines other than through HQAST was evident in Operations Warden,
Spitfire and Concord / Stabilise and Tanager. Similarly, direct access to CDF by deployed commanders was sustained during Operations in Afghanistan and during Operations Slipper, Bastille and Falconer.

65. General Baker\textsuperscript{20} confirmed that he intended that HQAST would only be involved in campaigning for the defence of Australia and Australian led operations in the region. He contended that HQAST would have little role in coalition activity because there were minimal command and control requirements. Since the establishment of HQAST, ADF operations have primarily involved coalitions.

66. Doctrine allows that CDF can command operations other than through AST\textsuperscript{21}. However doctrine implies that the normal method of commanding operations will be through COMAST. That notion was reinforced when the construct of Theatre Command was agreed by the Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC)\textsuperscript{22}.

67. There have been various reasons put forward to explain why CDF has chosen to command operations directly. In the case of Timor, Admiral Barrie indicated that the compelling rationale\textsuperscript{23} was that coalition governments would be loath to provide forces to an operation that was not commanded at the highest military level of the lead nation. In the case of ADF operations in Iraq, in Operations Bastille and Falconer, CDF viewed the operation to be of sufficient national importance for him to take a direct command role. Major General Molan in his Interim Report From an Evaluation of the Performance of the Strategic Command Level of the ADF in Current Operations 30 April 03, concludes that while the CDF became involved in detail it was necessary to exert this level of control to ensure that the ADF maintained the political confidence of the Government.

68. The Review agrees with the Molan conclusion that the doctrinal emphasis on Directive Control is an essential part of a modern command philosophy and that there is no reason to think that the level of control will be any less in the future.\textsuperscript{24} The ramification is that the strategic understanding of the lower levels in the ADF will need to mature for this model will be effective.

69. In the period since 1996, there have been numerous operations\textsuperscript{25} that COMAST has commanded or has delegated to the component commanders to command. Since 1996, it appears that COMAST has commanded operations when they were small, established for some time or were not of high interest to the Government.

70. The relationship of the operation to the national interest is probably the most important element in the decision for CDF to control elements directly and not through COMAST.

\textsuperscript{20} General Baker interview
\textsuperscript{21} ADDP-D para 7.17
\textsuperscript{22} ADDP-JOCC para 31
\textsuperscript{23} Notes of Air Vice Marshal Clarke 1999
\textsuperscript{24} Interim Molan Report of 30 Apr 03 para 40.c
\textsuperscript{25} Operations Belisi, Coracle, Cranberry, Damask, Gaberdine, Gold, Guardian, to name a few
Role of SOD

71. SOD responds to Government on behalf of CDF by providing advice, monitoring current operations and keeping Government informed and during the planning stages of military intervention and it provides initial strategic options for any ADF role in a whole of government response to a crisis or event. SOD also coordinates strategic-level command and control of ADF joint and combined operations as well as supporting CDF in his command function by the clear dissemination of strategic guidance and CDF direction.

72. The Review confirmed the necessity for SOD roles.

73. There is no command function for Head of Strategic Operations Division (HSOD) in this role but there are perceptions that SOD has involved itself in activities beyond the above remit.

74. The conundrum faced when CDF undertakes direct control of any elements of an operation is that his operations staff, SOD, has a direct role in the day to day running of an operation. SOD is not structured to undertake all the roles required in the exercise of that control. The conundrum is exacerbated when SOD staff are required to leverage from the staff in HQAST to provide the necessary support to CDF’s command of operations. When this occurs, the AST staff feel marginalised, and confused about the role of their commander and they become frustrated. Issues related to culture, access and compartmentalisation contribute to the level of frustration between the staff.

Culture

75. CDF’s decision to command or control directly exacerbates the tension between COMAST and HSOD and consequently creates tension between their staffs. The view of the Review is that this tension results not from the personalities of the two incumbents, but rather from their Service culture. The review concluded that the CDF of the day tends towards more trust in a person he has selected. That individual then naturally continues to nourish that trust by providing an extraordinary service to the CDF. In attempting to provide that service he may impinge on the responsibilities of other commanders.

76. The performance and levels of physical access of the incumbent COMAST and HSOD can reinforce the level of trust. According to the interviewees, since the inception of HQAST, the relationship between COMAST and CDF was better than the relationship between HSOD and CDF, for only two periods. The Review observed that the background and training of senior Army officers makes them more likely to become the centre of CDF confidence on operational matters.

Access

77. The level of physical access confirms the level of trust by CDF. In spite of the best efforts of an officer remote from CDF, that officer is unable to match the access.

26 There is no criticism of individuals intended in this observation; officers from all services are without doubt highly motivated and dedicated professionals who have done a superb job.
of one whom is collocated. The sense that the collocated officer has more influence than the one who is separated is a consistent theme outlined in many of the interviews. The current doctrinal command relationship through COMAST only works as intended when the officer collocated with CDF deliberately subjugates himself to the one who is remote.

**Compartmenting**

78. Another source of tension occurs when, for reasons of security, CDF directs that planning occur in a compartment. In most circumstances the reaction is to limit the compartment to the strategic level and to do contingency planning using the resources of SOD. Interviewees from the operational level noted that their exclusion often resulted in sub-optimal constraints on force structure or resources, because key criteria were confirmed by Government before the operational level was consulted.

79. The Review understands that the United Kingdom (UK) has a different model that appears to circumvent this problem and successfully deal with operational security. The Review understands that when the UK compartments an operational matter, the compartments are vertically integrated. For example the maritime planning advice will come from key personnel at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. In the initial stages, each level is limited to a few individuals (three or less), and they provide detailed advice to the strategic level planners. Importantly, staff who are regularly used in the compartment process have the capacity to add up to two more personnel into the compartment for the purpose of gaining sufficient planning granularity to achieve the strategic objectives.

80. It would appear that there are significant advantages to the UK model.

**Recommendation**

81. *Agree* that the ADF security control process for compartmented planning adopt a vertically integrated methodology.

**Solution**

82. In response to the issues identified as causing tension between SOD and HQAST, interviewees presented a consistent solution: make the COMAST superior in rank to the HSOD ie make COMAST a three star. In a hierarchical structure like the ADF, the junior officer should defer to the senior officer on significant matters. However, unless the three star officer has greater physical access to the CDF, the Review believes that some level of tension will still remain.

83. The Review concluded that if COMAST were a three star and located in the same environment as the CDF and if HSOD reported to the three star rather than direct to CDF then all of the issues identified above would be resolved. When the new collocated headquarters is finished COMAST will have more direct access to CDF, but until that time the situation will continue to be difficult to manage. The recommendation is outlined as Option 1 at annex C.²⁷

²⁷ The Review has shown the range of possibilities cascading from COSC decision points and provided them as Options in the annexes.
84. A subset of Option 1 is to use the two star HSOD billet as an offset for a two star Deputy Commander of Joint Operations (DCJOPS) at the new HQ. The existing one star Director General Joint Operations and Plans (DGJOP) would undertake the HSOD functionality. It has been suggested that a one star officer would not have the rank appropriate to effectively operate in the ADHQ and political environments. The Review is not persuaded by this opinion because the Review considers that in such circumstances the one star would act with the authority of the three star and if necessary, a two or three star officer could attend. Additionally, a two star DCJOPS would result in an unambiguous command arrangement at the new HQ. The Review notes that this approach saves a one star position. The arrangement of a two star Deputy Commander and a one star Head Strategic Operations is carried through subsequent options (annex C). The Interim Molan Report argues similarly.

85. The Review notes the Interim Molan Report recommendations have the single service offices only as advisers to the commander. Acceptance of that model could move the ADF towards an integrated rather than component structure.

86. It would be possible but less effective to allow HSOD to remain out of the COMAST command chain, this option is presented as Option 1A. Option 1A is not further developed in the decision chain on the basis that sub-options that derive from Option 1A are similar to those derived from Option 1.

87. On the assumption that either Option 1 or Option 1A will be pursued the Review recommend changes to the title of COMAST to Commander of Joint Operations (CJOPS). This new title is used in the presentation of subsequent Options.

Recommendations

88. Agree to recommend to the Minister for Defence that the rank level of COMAST be increased to three star.

89. Agree that HSOD come under COMAST for command purposes and the operational staffs of HQAST, the component command staffs and SOD should collocate in a single environment.

90. Agree that the single operational and strategic HQ should be known as Headquarters Joint Operations (HQJOPS).

91. Agree to change the title of COMAST to CJOPS.

THE LACK OF A JOINTLY MANNED DEPLOYABLE HEADQUARTERS

DJFHQ

92. In 1997 GEN Baker directed the then COMAST to develop a single DJFHQ based on the staff of HQ 1st Division. The HQ was to be capable of deploying throughout and beyond the Australian theatre to command joint and combined operations.
93. COMAST took this DJFHQ concept further in his paper *Concept for Command of the Australian Theatre*\(^{28}\) in May 1999. The theatre concept paper described the DJFHQ as the only viable potential major JTFHQ in the ADF. The paper acknowledged that to perform effectively, DJFHQ needed augmentation to its joint and component staffs. Maritime, Air and Special Operations (SO) staff would need to be attached as required to meet the task. It further stated that with this augmentation it could deploy as:

a. a joint manoeuvre force HQ for operations in or near Australia (AS);

b. a Combined Force HQ for AS led allied and coalition activities in the region; or

c. the Australian HQ component, supporting the designated commander as the AS National commander and possibly Deputy Force Commander in other allied and coalition activities.

94. COMAST envisaged that the three designated JTF Commanders\(^{29}\) would take broadly equivalent roles as major JTF Commanders in a campaign. COMAST went on to observe that major exercises, command post exercises (CPX) and operations have proven the inability of the ADF to staff such a structure with appropriately trained and experienced warfighters.

95. The Review confirmed the requirement for a truly joint DJFHQ that is capable of deploying throughout and beyond the region.

96. The DJFHQ manning is heavily land centric and in spite of the best intentions of the maritime and air components is rarely manned in a truly joint or balanced way. The Services apply different priorities to the manning of DJFHQ.

97. Notwithstanding, an augmented DJFHQ performed a pivotal role in operations in Timor. Without the use of a formed, trained and operating deployable headquarters, the ADF would have been sorely pressed to meet the deployment time line and professional requirements of that operation. But there have been few opportunities since the inception of the headquarters for it to function in a truly joint manner.

98. In the view of the other Services, there are two key disadvantages of the current DJFHQ construct:

a. the land centric nature of the staff manning, and

b. the land centric nature of the residual raise train and maintain roles of the headquarters in the Divisional arrangements.

99. In interviews with current and past commanders\(^{30}\) of the headquarters they confirmed that around 80% of their time is spent on meeting the readiness requirements for the Brigade formations under their direct command.

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\(^{28}\) HQAST 261-8-2 Pt 1 – Concept for Command of the Australian Theatre

\(^{29}\) Commander DJFHQ, Commander NORCOM, and Commander Flotillas

\(^{30}\) Major Generals Evans and Molan
DJFHQ (Maritime)

100. A DJFHQ (M) comprised of Commander Flotillas (COMFLOT) and a small staff has also been established to provide the basis of a Naval Component Headquarters for the DJFHQ and an embryonic maritime JTFHQ. This headquarters does not act on a day to day basis, but rather is stood up from the COMFLOT staff when required.

101. COMFLOT and his sea training staff, in their naval RTM role are responsible for fleet unit collective training. Under current arrangements the RTM role predominates.

Headquarters Northern Command (HQNORCOM)

102. HQNORCOM was conceived as a geographic command. The formation of a geographic command in 1996 was argued on the understanding that the defence of Australia would be based in the north of the country and it would be appropriate that a fully functioning headquarters would be a necessary precursor to generating an effective posture.

103. It has been a common perception since the formation of HQNORCOM in 1996 that it does not fit the functional model that applies to the remainder of the operations command chain. If the geographic rationale was accurate why have the majority of interviewees perceived HQNORCOM to be a headquarters searching for a role?

104. General Baker indicated that it was his intention that HQNORCOM would have first line forces assigned to it on a permanent basis. In that way the headquarters would be practising command of forces day to day and the ADF would have a standing JTF positioned in the north. The headquarters would develop joint defensive plans and would exercise those plans routinely. The headquarters would get to know the environment where any defensive activity would be located and would have a clear understanding of the potential opportunities and pitfalls of a range of defensive plans.

105. Unfortunately, there have been few force elements assigned to HQNORCOM and when the force elements have been assigned rarely have they been first line fighting units. Consequently the headquarters has been relegated to a secondary role and has been misused against its intended purpose.

106. Notwithstanding the original intent, HQNORCOM’s current peacetime role is to conduct surveillance operations and support civilian authorities in the assigned area of operations (AO), and to plan for the protection of vital assets in wartime. Its staffing and resources allow it to undertake these roles, and to oversee small JTFs raised for specialised military support tasks within and adjacent to the AO. In the event of regional conflict leading to an increased threat to northern Australia,

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32 Interview Gen Baker 10 March 2003, and Report of the Study into the ADF Command Arrangements March 1988 para 834
HQNORCOM’s forces would be supplemented to the extent required for it to conduct enhanced surveillance and response operations and to protect vital assets. But, should a major direct military threat to northern Australia emerge, major elements of the campaign such as sea control, air supremacy and strike operations, and land force manoeuvre to defeat the adversary’s main effort would be orchestrated by COMAST through his Component Commanders.

107. COMNORCOM would be tasked to support, but not to conduct this campaign and would remain responsible for civil-military liaison and for surveillance, response and protective operations in areas of lower threat in the AO, with the AO and assigned forces being adjusted appropriately.\(^{33}\)

108. In the case of HQNORCOM, maritime and air components meet their manning obligations. But the paucity of quality, qualified officers means that only on rare occasions does a Service provide HQNORCOM with completely suitable staff.

109. The Headquarters has been successful in fulfilling a significant role in the past few years with support to Operations Brancard, Spitfire, and Concord as well as the regular command of Operation Cranberry. The devolution of Operation Relex to COMNORCOM from the initial control by COMFLOT is also notable. However, the Review was told on a number of occasions that HQNORCOM does not do anything that could not be run by the J3 shop at HQAST.

**Lack of a formed deployable joint headquarters**

110. During the past few years ad hoc command teams have deployed for all operations other than for Timor. The flaw in this approach is that the ad hoc team takes a while to develop their operating procedures, relationships and infrastructure—they rarely hit the ground running. Given that the teams often deploy at short notice, this result is sub-optimal. The deployment of a partially formed team proved its worth in Timor. The coalition headquarters was based on the DJFHQ and the Commander was the commander of that unit. The principle that a formed, working headquarters should form the backbone of any headquarters structure was defining in the effectiveness of the coalition. The ADF has not adhered to that principle in any other operation.

**Solution**

111. A way to achieve an effective jointly manned deployable headquarters could be to merge the existing DJFHQ and HQNORCOM into one joint headquarters. It is important to note that accepting the merger of these two headquarters implies that the RTM activities of the HQ 1\(^{st}\) Division would not be done by DJFHQ. The amalgamation could achieve some joint staffing synergies. These synergies could be used to cover the residual RTM responsibilities for the HQ 1\(^{st}\) Division and there may be some billets to return to the single service manpower pool.

112. The Review envisages that a two star (rotational position) would head the Joint Deployable Headquarters. The Review proposes that the commander be named

\(^{33}\) COMAST Directive 27/02 to Commander Northern Command
the Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Comd DJFHQ). The HQ would include:

a. a joint HQ element of approximately 90 to manage standing joint operations (staffed from current DJFHQ and HQNORCOM resources);
b. a Maritime Component of approximately 20 based on the DJFHQ (Maritime) organisation, headed by a Naval one star officer (currently Deployable Joint Force Commander (Maritime));
c. a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) of approximately 20, led by a one star officer (staff resource is currently unidentified); and
d. a Land Component of approximately 20, led by a one star officer (Chief of Staff Land HQ) and staffed from current DJFHQ Single Entitlement Document.

This arrangement is portrayed as Option 2 (annex C).

113. The functions currently performed in HQNORCOM could either be conducted by HQJOPS or allocated to the new headquarters. The location of this new organisation could be either in Larrakeyah, Enoggera or a green-field site.

114. If the new DJFHQ were located at Larrakeyah there would be certain advantages:
   a. Because Darwin remains a most likely location for a Forward Mounting Area a standing headquarters would prove as useful as it has in recent history.
   b. The construct of a standing headquarters prepared to host any Defence of Australia activity that was initially outlined in the formation of NORCOM would be sustained.
   c. The existing Defence Force Aid to the Civil Community arrangements for the northern areas of Australia would be sustained.
   d. The Headquarters would continue the role of a regional engagement focus for Indonesia and for Timor in the future.
   e. The Federal Government's commitment to positioning Defence assets in the north would be sustained.
   f. Links with the Northern Territory (NT) Government that have been developed would be sustained and improved if the commander of the new arrangement were to remain at the two star level.
   g. The existing building would be utilised.

115. The current DJFHQ relies heavily on support (1 Joint Support Unit (JSU)) to meet its functional targets. If the headquarters was based in the NT, then the move of the JSU may be seen as automatically following. However, the moving additional manpower in the north and the cost of moving the JSU would need to be reviewed against the necessity of collocation of the JSU with the new deployable headquarters.
There are many other ADF units who provide direct support and which are not collocated with the supported organisation.

116. One alternative is that the new DJFHQ could remain at Enoggera. The removal of HQNORCOM from the NT environment would require careful management and the transfer of any key regional responsibilities to the Commander 1st Brigade.

117. While there are advantages in DJFHQ remaining in Enoggera, in the view of the Review the disadvantages outweigh them. The disadvantages include:

a. The existing facility at Enoggera would require work to accommodate a truly joint organisation;
b. There would be the necessity for a new facility to house the residual raise train and maintain functions for the 1st Division;
c. The ability of the DJFHQ to separate from their residual RTM responsibilities would be compromised in the Enoggera location.

118. The Review did not consider a green-field site because there is no financial allocation for development of such a facility and the timing of collocation should be earlier than would be allowed by the construction of a purpose built facility.

Recommendations

119. **Agree** to merge DJFHQ and HQNORCOM.

120. **Agree** to separate the joint operational command elements of the existing DJFHQ from the functions relating to the command of the 1st Division.

121. **Agree** that the amalgamation headquarters should be formed at Larrakeyah Barracks under the name of DJFHQ.

122. The Interim Molan Report comes to a different conclusion to the arrangements for joint deployable operational level HQ. While Molan also recommends that the RTM functions of the current DJFHQ be separated, he also recommends that the DJFHQ remain as a land-centric major JTF headquarters and invokes the CDF directive\(^{34}\) to the Service Chiefs to guarantee joint manning.

123. The Interim Molan Report further splits HQNORCOM leaving a local liaison body in Darwin and distributes the remaining manpower throughout the command and control system.

**RAISE TRAIN MAINTAIN AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

124. The 1996 arrangements formalised CDF as the commander of all ADF operations and effectively removed the Service Chiefs from the command of

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\(^{34}\) The Review is unable to locate reference to this requirement in current charters for Service Chiefs.
operations chain. The Service Chiefs still remain closely engaged in operations, and are regularly consulted in fora like the Strategic Command Group (SCG). The Service Chiefs retain full command of their respective services with command responsibility that is commonly referred to as the Raise, Train and Sustain responsibility.

125. At the operational level the delegates of the Service Chiefs are the Maritime, Land, Air and Special Operations Commanders. In this role they ensure that single service individual and unit training activities meet the directed level of capability.

126. In a parallel arrangement, the same officers act as component commanders for COMAST. In this role they remain firmly in the operational command chain and in some cases command operations as delegates of CDF or COMAST. For example the Land Component Commander has responsibility for command of Operation Belisi in Bougainville.

127. From a doctrinal command perspective this ‘double-hattedness’ of the operational level commanders has the potential to create conflicts in the discharge of their responsibilities and some limited tension was confirmed by interviews with the current commanders. While this tension is manageable in the case where operations are small, it would be exacerbated considerably should the force be involved in any campaign.

128. The principles of command espoused in doctrine are at odds with the ‘double hatted’ arrangement at the operational level. The principle of unity requires clarity and simplicity in command arrangements. Double-hattedness does not meet this criterion.

129. The rationale for the dual role circumstances has been justified by accepting that there are insufficient resources to separately manage the operational level command and RTM functions. Further, three of the current operational level commanders expressed a view that it was beneficial to have the operational commander aware of the key sustainment and training issues that faced the forces allocated for a specific operation.

130. To examine the validity of the argument on resources, it should have been instructive to look at the work that was done to justify the establishment at the new collocated HQAST at Bungendore. Unfortunately the principle of separation of the two functions was not uniformly applied to the components joining those arrangements. In reviewing the anticipated component staffing allocation it appears that a ‘come as you are’ approach was adopted.

131. In discussion with the operational level component commanders they all agreed that it would be theoretically advantageous to separate the two functions. Three of the four suggested that initial organisational steps had been taken to separate the RTM functions from the operational command function in their HQs. This work may result in internal reorganisations in the near future and would be useful in determining if the resources are available to split the two functions.

35 ADDP-D para 7.16
132. While the component commanders agreed it might be advantageous to separate the operational command functions from the RTM functions, the majority was ambivalent about taking the step. While acknowledging that they already had taken steps to separate the responsibilities for their own management purposes, they were reluctant to separate themselves from standing astride both RTM and operational command chains. It was suggested in one case that the synergies of collocation would confirm the resources to separate the functions, but until that time there was insufficient evidence to prove that the separation was advantageous.

133. Interviews with the current component land and air component commanders and the commander of the 1st Division confirmed that approximately 80% of their day to day effort is spent on RTM issues. The Maritime Commander Australia (MCAUST) assessed that about 50% of his effort is spent on RTM issues.

134. The disadvantage of the current ‘double hatted’ arrangement is evident when the Review looked at the level of expertise that has been developed in operational level command over the period since HQAST has been established. If the operational level commanders are spending the majority of their time on RTM issues, they and their staffs have limited intellectual capital to provide to the development of operational level command concepts. As a result, the development of the operational level art in the ADF has proceeded at a slow pace.

135. The disadvantages of ‘double hatting’ have not only applied to the operational chain as it could be argued that the RTM process has suffered also. One of the disadvantages is that the nature of ad hoc Australian National Command Element (ASNCE) HQ used for a number of recent operations has meant that key personnel have been removed from their appointments to be deployed on operations. The vacancy has normally had to be carried by the donor unit. The suggested separation of responsibilities may contribute much to solving this issue.

136. If changes were to be made it would be necessary to determine if there is sufficient resource to separately cover both the RTM and operational level command functions.

Consequences of separation of RTM at the Operational Level

137. If the RTM functions were separated from the command of operations functions of the component commanders there would be a number of advantages:

a. There would be more intellectual horsepower to devote to the development of the joint operational level art and the staff would be focussed on the command of operations issues.

b. The possibility of a joint headquarters actively controlling a joint and collective training program would considerably enhance the joint warfighting ability of the ADF.

c. The RTM headquarters would have a sufficient resource to permit a more effective prosecution of their functions.
138. There is a collective view that the ADF does not fully exploit the joint and collective training opportunities in the Program of Major Service Activities (PMSA). These exercises have been modified little since 1996 and essentially arose from the single service exercise schedule that predated the 1996 changes. The management team in HQAST that oversees the PMSA appears focussed on the coordination of events rather than the effect of the events on the AST Operational Preparedness Requirement (ASTOPR) or on ADF joint readiness. While the Theatre Commanders review the program and it is endorsed at COSC, it could be possible for a refocussing of the effort in this regard.

139. The Review determined the current command post exercise schedule could be focussed in a more effective way and perhaps more radically the mechanisms for joint and collective training could be overhauled.

140. To achieve a regular schedule, force elements that have met the single service readiness objectives could be either assigned to CJOPS under Theatre Command (TCOMD) for the purposes of joint collective training or assigned to CJOPS on an as required basis to conform with a revamped joint exercise schedule. The assignment of force elements to joint and collective training could be linked to current readiness criteria. For example, for maritime units on the completion of their Operational Readiness Evaluations, for air units when they are at readiness less than say 10 days and for land units a unit that is on a readiness of 30 days or less.

141. Another issue to address relates to the appropriate rank level for operational level commanders and the RTM commanders. Given the weight of RTM effort it would make more sense if the current operational level component commanders remain responsible for RTM (Option 3, annex C). The result is that the HQJOPS component commanders would be at the one star level. Based on the scale of 90% of the operations that have been undertaken since 1996, the Review believes that rank is sufficient.

142. An alternative is splitting the one star officers from their current component commander bosses and having them become the RTM components in the single service chain (Option 4).

143. If the current two star operational level component commanders were removed from the command of operations chain and allowed to focus wholly on the RTM functions, it would be necessary to develop a process whereby their advice was integrated into the command chain. The establishment of an Operational Command Group (OCG) with similar functions as the SCG, at an operational and/or campaign level, would ensure that the RTM component commanders and other commanders such as Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG) were able to contribute to the operational command process. CJOPS would chair the OCG.

Recommendations

144. Agree to separate the command of operations functions from the raise, train and maintain functions at the operational level.
145. **Agree** that the current two star environmental commanders remain responsible for the RTM functions and that the operational level component commanders be at the one star level (Option 3, Annex C).

146. **Agree** to the establishment of an Operational Command Group for the provision of advice to CJOPS.

147. As a continuation of Options 3 and 4 the Review also developed Options 5 and 6 where the operational HQ component staffs are replaced by Joint staff branches. Two and one star position savings would arise from implementation of Option 5 or 6.

148. The Interim Molan Report\(^{36}\) concludes that the one star officers from each Service and the Special Operations provide advice to COMAST rather than act as component commanders.

### HQAST COLLOCATION TIMING

149. Based on the schedule provided by the HQAST Project, the new operational level collocated headquarters facility at Bungendore will not be completed until early 2007. The COSC has previously considered the form and function of the headquarters and approved an organisational structure and manning level for collocation\(^{37}\). Typically, any functional synergies\(^{38}\) would not be evident until eighteen months to two years after the building was occupied – say around 2009: It appears hard to justify a wait until that time. The advantages of collocation seem clear, and a delay until 2009 seems unnecessary, especially when the development path for true operational level command competencies will be protracted in any event. Simply put the ADF should not wait that long to achieve joint combat command and control improvements.

150. The Review noted the work that defined the organisational arrangements and numbers of personnel for the Bungendore facility has been continually refined since the COSC consideration of the headquarters form and function in September 2001. 1042 personnel are currently planned to work in the headquarters when it is fully augmented. 883 are to be full time in location.

151. As recommended in the RTM section\(^{39}\), the Review believes that it is important to separate the command of operations functions from the RTM functions at the operational level. Consequently the Review analysed the latest advice on numbers and has assessed that the full time command of operations numbers in a collocated operational level headquarters should be in the order of 555\(^{40}\). Augmentation positions would bring that requirement to 650. This number is supported by independent analysis from the Interim Molan Report.

\(^{36}\) Interim Molan Report of 30 Apr 03 para 40.

\(^{37}\) COMAST Minute 22/2000 provided updated advice to COSC on the numbers of personnel to be bought to the collocated headquarters and was approved out of session.

\(^{38}\) Synergies may not be in the form of manpower savings. Rather the Review concludes that the existing manpower could be more effectively distributed. The result would be a positive effect on the ADF development of joint warfighting.

\(^{39}\) Para 144 above

\(^{40}\) Annex C Option 3 table outlines the Review analysis.
152. The Review sought advice\(^{41}\) on acceleration of the development of the collocated facility from Infrastructure Division in the Corporate Support Group of the Department of Defence. The Review was informally advised that that even at the revised size, the only way a facility could be built faster than the current Bungendore headquarters, was for it to:

- cost less than the threshold for the Parliamentary Works Committee,\(^{42}\) and
- be built on Defence land where elements of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and other construction requirements could be waived.

Advice was that it would be possible to meet these criteria, but that the maximum numbers of staff that could be housed in a secure facility at a cost under the threshold was in the order of 320.

153. Given the rationale to collocate the new CJOPS as near as possible to the CDF, the Review also investigated the possibility of changing the site of the new collocated headquarters from Bungendore to a location that was more central to Canberra\(^{43}\). Infrastructure Division also advised that to build on a new site unless it was on Defence land would result in a completion date after 2007. The requirement for an EIS, site engineering and other associated work would be extant and that work was already underway for the Bungendore site and could not be switched to a new location in a timely manner.

154. The Review noted that US forces have recently developed a number of deployed collocated planning and operations centres for their operations in Iraq. According to US sources\(^{44}\) the facility in Doha was built in two months and populated with information technology for a total cost of around US$25-30m\(^{45}\).

155. The Review also explored the lease of a suitable facility in the Canberra region. The requirements for a secure compartmented area in the facility limits the range of lease options available, but such buildings do exist. Additional work would be required to determine if a facility of suitable size could be found to suit the purpose.

156. The Review recommends that the ADF develop an inexpensive developmental command headquarters that can be used to determine the synergies of collocation, help to define the information systems necessary to support planning and operations and to develop the procedures and staffing of a collocated headquarters organisation. That facility should be in the Canberra region. Based on initial analysis, it would appear that approximately 320 collocated personnel could achieve the synergies faster

\(^{41}\) DGIAD Minute 40/2003 of 8 May 03
\(^{42}\) The Review was advised that any facility development proposal that has a cost greater than $6m would need to progress through the Parliamentary Works Committee.
\(^{43}\) There were a number of possible sites, but none in the Eden Monaro electorate were considered useable.
\(^{44}\) Interview with AIRCDRE Green relating to his tour as Air Attache in Washington and discussions with Kellog, Brown and Root Pty Ltd.
\(^{45}\) Advice from Kellog Brown and Root Pty Ltd.
than the current Bungendore proposal. Information relating to the development of such a facility is at annex D.

157. The intention in forming this facility is that it would become the operations and planning centre for the ADF and replace those staffs in AST, all components and in SOD. It is important to note that the raise, train and maintain functions of the components would not be located in the environment.

158. This facility should become the only operations information centre of the ADF. While it could be duplicated as a contingency measure, the risk of a single point of failure might be acceptable in the short term, if a purpose built facility in Bungendore or some other location were to replace the functionality at a later date. Were a replacement facility to be built, the developmental facility could be the back up command and operations centre that the ADF is currently seeking as a later Phase of JP 8001.

159. A HQJOPS would provide a number of other synergies. The tensions between SOD and HQAST staff would be removed; the new CJOPS would have increased physical access to the CDF by being permanently in the Canberra region, and the relationship between himself and the HSOD would become more stable. The Review concludes that the tentative organisational steps taken to separate the RTM functions from the command of operations functions that had been occurring at the operational level could be accelerated without significantly prejudicing either function.

160. An outcome of a collocated headquarters in Canberra is that Canberra will become the centre of gravity for key operational staff officers. The numbers of key personnel in the Canberra environment may be advantageous from the posting stability perspective, but may exacerbate separation rates unless the tasks and responsibility offered to these officers is commensurate with their experience and their ability to match the workload.

161. There are a number of ancillary issues that need to be addressed if a facility was to be accelerated. Relocation of a large number of senior staff to Canberra would place significant stress on the Defence Housing Authority at the least. The political understanding that the Eden Monaro electorate has the prospect of significant Defence investment is also an issue in choosing the site and in building any developmental facility. If the developmental facility were to become the permanent headquarters, the local regulatory, building, occupational health and safety requirements, staff entitlements and security arrangements would be substantially different. Similarly there needs to be work done to determine if Defence can lease an existing building in the region to allow developmental work done to achieve earlier synergies.

162. The Review notes an as yet unfunded proposal to build an alternate facility to back up the new operational level headquarters. When the permanent facility is completed, a development facility could fulfil that role. If the recommended facility were to become the back up it should not be located on the Bungendore site.

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46 Annex D has been developed in consultation with Infrastructure Division
163. The Review anticipates that the information systems in a new facility could be drawn from those already in place in the HQAST and component headquarters and might be plugged together to form the initial networks and operations centre. However, given the developmental nature of the facility, there needs to be an allocation in the Defence Capability Program to allow the evolutionary development of information infrastructure to support the synergies gained by experience in overseas operations and those changes deemed necessary as a result of experience in collocation. JP 2080 could be an appropriate funding source.

164. Given such an approach, if a purpose built facility were constructed, it would appear prudent to draw on the existing Defence Capital Program allocation for the collocated HQAST Project (JP 8001 Ph 2). If a suitable facility in the Canberra region could be leased, then lease costs would be an unfunded pressure on the operating budget for the next few years.

Incremental approach

165. Separating the RTM from the command of operations chain is a prerequisite for the longer term arrangements that the Review recommends. If the COSC does not endorse the RTM and command of operations separation, then the size of the collocated headquarters will be substantially larger than the 555 permanent positions proposed by the Review. Accelerated collocation is not possible if the numbers increase, unless the ADF adopts an incremental approach.

166. One incremental approach would be to accept that a developmental facility would be of limited size, say 320. The choice of staff to collocate first would be driven by an understanding of the areas where most synergy in joint operations planning and execution could be achieved. Necessary ancillary staff could be accommodated in the 320, but the core should be the joint and component plans and operations staff, and the SOD staff. Additionally the watch room functions from AST and SOD should be merged in the developmental facility. The remainder of the operational level component and joint staff could remain in their current locations until the permanent collocated facility was complete.

Recommendations

167. Agree that the synergies of collocation should be achieved before 2007.

168. Agree to stand up a Headquarters Joint Operations in the Canberra region as soon as practicable.

169. Agree to investigate the options for building or leasing a suitable facility to collocate up to 320 joint staff in a developmental facility by Dec 2004.

170. The Interim Molan Report notes a pressing need for the early implementation of the collocated HQAST. He suggests the headquarters be made up of about 650 staff and that housing these staff in a ‘Doha’ warehouse would, Bring ‘infinite’ flexibility to command facilities and allow ‘form to follow function’ for every command situation that the ADF faces, now and into the future and The reduced size of the HQ and the simplicity of style for facilities allows the collocation to occur earlier than currently planned for AST, which was – operational by Feb 07.
171. Molan indicates that his new arrangements may be ready for operations by Jan 05 and that savings of at least $66m from the original estimate of the collocated HQAST could be made.47

SKILLED MANPOWER RESOURCE LIMITATION

172. The Review received advice and a written submission48 that indicated that the ADF would never have sufficient staff officers of sufficient quality and experience to man the current number of headquarters effectively.

173. The submission argued the base pool of those officers was too small and the attrition rates during their service careers was too high. As an example, the critical path for Navy was the development of seaman officers. In Navy’s case there are approximately 16 O-5 commands at sea, four aviation squadrons and two other O-5 positions which can be designated as ‘seagoing operational’ experience positions. Some 22 operationally qualified officers are produced every two years. While many are promoted immediately on completion of their commands, this pool is all that is available for the wide range of O-5 position required by the joint and navy organisations49.

174. The submission indicated that these structural limitations result in a shortfall of qualified and experienced staff when measured against the multitude of organisational requirements. The outcome is that key personnel are under constant pressure for the delivery of results. They become physically and emotionally exhausted and given the paucity of the numbers the system becomes susceptible to single points of failure as their performance drops under severe pressure.

175. The submission further argues that any new organisation developed for the command and control of the ADF should not be set by some theoretical doctrinal construct, but rather by the numbers of qualified skilled staff to do the work. It is difficult to refute that logic.

176. The Review has had insufficient time to conduct a thorough analysis of this contention, but noted this issue was canvassed in General Baker’s 1988 report50 when the full time strength of the ADF was in the order of 70 000. In his report, General Baker indicated that Air Force and to some extent Navy would need to increase the training and throughput of key officer categories in order to achieve the necessary numbers of skilled personnel to man the structure he proposed.

177. The Review has only had the resources available to test our options for human resource efficiency down to the one star level. However, it is difficult to avoid the

47 Interim Molan Report of 30 Apr 03 para 45j.
48 DGMS/OUT/2003/19 dated 31 Mar 03
49 These figures relate only to the Seaman (Executive) stream and do not consider the Logistic, Intelligence and Engineering streams. Therefore the analysis is relevant to the J3 and the J5 organisations and for the J00 and J01 positions but not the J1, J4, J6 and other specialist departments. However, the Review suspects that these specialist streams are also expertise limited.
50 Report of the Study into the ADF Command Arrangements March 1988 para 327 and para 720e
conclusion that fewer critical staff skills must result in fewer headquarters and that the Review needs to recommend amalgamation of some functions to achieve a match of resources and tasks. The Review proposals to amalgamate HQAST and SOD, and DJFHQ and HQNORCOM, follow that logic.

Staffing augmentation

178. The principle of augmentation is one that the ADF has relied on for some time. The size of the ADF and day to day workload do not justify most headquarters manning to sustain routine 24/7 operations. The concept of augmentation is still necessary as is evidenced by the augmentation requirements of a number of headquarters during the Iraq campaign.

179. The need for augmentation principally arises because of two reasons. Firstly, where the operational tempo rises to a level where the situational awareness (SA) requirements of Commanders cannot be met in a timely or effective manner by existing staff resources. Inevitably, a commander implements a 24/7-watchkeeping arrangement to satisfy his SA requirements. Secondly, where the scope and tempo of operations is so diverse and/or rapid that existing operational, planning, logistic or other staffs are unable to satisfy the needs of their decision makers at existing staff manning levels. The result is that there is a need to provide additional staff to allow for increased workload or for extended hours of operation.

180. The Review notes that at least eight separate SA watchkeeping arrangements have been put in place for recent operations. This seems a waste of critical manpower. The establishment of a commonly informed operating picture being managed at a single site and distributed for consumption by authorised subsidiary users could meet this SA demand. At the same time the ‘one picture for all’ paradigm would ensure that all commanders and senior staff are operating from a common situation picture.

181. Augmentation of operational staffs by experienced and trained staffs is much more problematic.

182. In 1996 the Joint Exercise Plans Staff (JEPS) organisation was used as the source of manpower to establish a more robust arrangement at the ADF Joint Warfare Establishment (later ADF Warfare Centre (ADFWC)). The intent of the 1997 restructure was that this new organisation would work on doctrine and joint training during peacetime and in operations would provide the trained and skilled manpower reserve for the augmentation of existing headquarters. In practise the services have been resource constrained in the provision of skilled manpower to the ADFWC and as a result the concept of augmentation has lacked the type of focus that could have provided a true command and control augmentation capability. Initially staff were shadow posted to positions in HQAST and in other headquarters, but that process has not been sustained.

183. COMAST notes that the current means of augmentation is ad hoc. Requests for augmentation come from HQAST to other formed HQ, the environmental commanders and then out to units. There is little checking of staff skill sets or

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51 HQNORCOM, MCC, LCC, ACC, SOCC, HQAST, SOD, and CJLOG
52 COSC Agendum paper 12/03
command support system familiarity to match the requirement. The Review notes that there is no common database of staff skills to allocate specific individuals to appropriate augmentation positions. As a result, augmentees initially rarely fit the billet they occupy and the headquarters receiving the personnel do not function effectively at the augmented level. Indeed there is an initial drop in productivity as the incumbent personnel take up the training and task allocation load of incorporating the augmentees.

184. The Review notes that pools of reservists and/or of retired military under contract with annual update training in the form of a command post exercise would probably result in a better augmentation option. The advantages of using military-experienced contracted civilians for the more mundane tasks in headquarters would also relieve serving officers for more relevant tasks.

Recommendation

185. Note that the establishment of a commonly informed operating picture managed at a single site and distributed for consumption by authorised subsidiary uses could satisfy all ADF 24/7 situational awareness requirements at the strategic and operational levels.

Overseas practise

186. The Review sought advice from selected overseas forces on their command and control arrangements and sought to test that advice against the existing and proposed ADF structures. Advice was received from the United Kingdom, Sweden and Singapore. The intent was to see if the ratio of the numbers in command headquarters to the numbers of deployed forces was similar to that of the ADF. The comparison work done by the Review was of necessity simplistic and did not attempt to do more than identify orders of magnitude of the ratio of staff to deployed forces.

187. Timor was the most demanding ADF operation since 1996. The ADF deployed approximately 5700 personnel to Timor and at that time had about 1000 the operational and strategic headquarters. The ADF staff to deployed forces ratio for Timor was around 1:6.

188. The UK information indicated that at the operational and strategic level they have a system that mirrors to some extent that which exists in Australia. The strategic support to the Chief of the Defence Staff is a small staff with the joint operational level encapsulated in the Permanent Joint HQ United Kingdom (UK). That headquarters includes a deployable element and houses an organisation that is responsible for developing a coherent exercise schedule and for evaluating the UK command and control system in exercises and operations. The tooth to tail ratio is difficult to determine, as the scale of operational forces deployed is much larger than is the case for the ADF. However, the operational and strategic level has only around 450 personnel. The current operation in Iraq has some 44 000 UK personnel deployed. Based on those numbers there is one operational and strategic command and control staff member for each 97 deployed personnel; 1:97. Note that this

53 While the Review approached the US for information, the Review has not yet had any response that is of use to this analysis
analysis does not include the component staffs who do clearly contribute to the UK command and control structure.

Sweden

189. The Swedish Defence Force provided information to the Review that outlined their approach to networked command and control. In spite of requests through the Australian Defence Attache responsible, the Review was unable to ascertain any detail of the staff to deployed forces ratio for Sweden.

Singapore

190. The Review received three papers from the Singapore Armed Forces. They outlined the organisational arrangements, but did not provide any indication of the numbers of staff in the operations and planning directorates. Separate sources indicated that the ratio of staff to deployed tactical level forces was in the order of 1:100.

Conclusion

191. The ADF ratio of staff to deployed forces for the most demanding operation since 1996 is one order of magnitude greater than the UK or Singapore. Given the imprecise nature of the benchmarking process, one conclusion that could be drawn is that the current numbers of staff in headquarters is too great for expected level of operational activity of the ADF.

Recommendation

192. Note that the current ADF ratio of headquarters staff to tactical forces is greater than either Singapore or the UK.

JOINT COLLECTIVE TRAINING AND EVALUATION

193. The Defending Australia and Defence of Australia 97 White Papers identified the presumption that the ADF possessed superior technology and superior training and therefore fought above it’s weight. The Review believes that the theoretical basis for ADF superiority in joint operations cannot be proved or improved until an effective test and review cycle is in place.

194. The foundation of ADF warfighting is that operations will be planned, executed and supported as a joint force, where joint means that more than one Service is actively involved. Joint warfighting success in future operational environments will depend on an ADF joint culture. This culture arises from mutual trust between the Services and this trust can only grow from ongoing joint exercises, training and education. The Services will need to experiment, exercise and train together in order to generate and develop operational warfighting concepts that are fully endorsed and supported by each.

ADDP – D.4 draft of 3 Mar 03
195. As outlined in the section dealing with RTM, there is a strong view that the ADF does not fully exploit the joint and collective training opportunities in the PMSA. The Review suggests that there is scope for existing forces to be assigned to CJOPS for the purposes of joint and collective training. Further the Review indicates that the PMSA needs to be refocussed and that some joint and collective training should be managed by the new fully joint DJFHQ.

196. The Review was advised that joint and collective training seems to be ad hoc and that the exercises are not set against joint warfighting objectives. The ability of the force to regularly exercise alongside those components most likely to be matched for certain scenarios is necessary to give the ADF the sort of collective jointery that has been espoused as the ADF combat edge. The command and control staff need to be part of that exercise and evaluation process and indeed may be more important to the joint orchestration process than the relationships between the force elements.

197. The JEPS organisation had two essential functions - plan exercise activity and review and evaluate the performance of the ADF in those exercises. In the 1996 changes the former function was allocated to COMAST and is managed by the HQAST J7 while the ADFWC is responsible for the latter.

198. Evaluation is a critical step in validating changes in structure and performance of organisations and individuals in the command of operations. There have been evaluations of most major operations since the formation of HQAST. But the formation of those evaluation teams has been ad hoc and the reports seem to focus more on the success of the ADF tactical performance than on the effectiveness of the operational and strategic level command and control arrangements.

199. One senior officer put the lack of focus on assessing the joint command and control systems in this way, *The ADF can have the best tactical forces in the world, but the ADF is unable to exercise joint command effectively.* A number of others indicated that the ADF’s joint command and control arrangements at the operational and strategic levels were a key vulnerability in our ability to successfully prosecute Government objectives. Others have indicated that our journey towards practical jointery has stalled in recent years as the key officers cope with other organisational change. It appears that, based on the current modus operandi, the ADF will be unable to successfully move its command and control arrangements in the right direction because it is unable to test them effectively.

200. Who should do the exercise testing? The Interim Molan Report suggests that the Commandant of the Australian Defence College is well placed to control an organisation with responsibilities for joint training and evaluation of the operational chain of command. Without canvassing the entirety of that proposal, it does appear that it would be useful to have a construct where an organisation responsible for testing changes to the command and control structure was based outside the direct command chain. Conversely, COMAST proposes that a single organisation be tasked with developing and validating doctrine and as well as evaluation of operations and exercises and that it is inefficient to separate the various roles. COMAST argues

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55 Interview with Major General Abigail
56 Interim Molan Report of 30 Apr 03 para 40 cc
57 COSC Agendum 12/03
that ADFWC is a separately commanded unit and therefore has sufficient separation from the command of operations chain to be used for evaluation purposes. The Review notes both of those positions have supporting argument, but that neither is compelling.

Recommendation

201. Note that COSC Agendum 12/03 will address the issue of evaluation of joint and combined training in the ADF.

ADF Activity Analysis Database System (ADFAADS)

202. ADFAADS is a process whereby lessons learned or problems arising from exercises or operations are entered into an electronic database. A search of ADFAADS for the major operations since 1997 indicated that there was a focus on detail and the system did not appear to be appropriately used by senior commanders or their key staff. Consequently, not all the lessons were being entered in the system. For example there are few strategic or operational lessons for the Timor operation that have been captured in ADFAADS. ADFAADS is a much-needed vehicle, but it appears to be less than suitable for capturing the thoughts and ideas of senior commanders and their key staffs.

Recommendations

203. Agree that the ADF could benefit from a more rigorous joint and collective training program.

204. Note that the evaluation of operations and exercises is a necessary step in refining command organisations and processes.

205. Agree that the evaluation of ADF operations and exercises be conducted by one organisation and that the capture of those lessons be a necessary step in reviewing and testing doctrinal concepts relating to the command and control of the ADF.

ISSUES NOTED BUT NOT ADDRESSED IN DETAIL

Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG)

206. Operations do not function without logistic support. The initial planning of logistics for operations in Timor were deficient and resulted in a range of recommendations presented to COSC in Agendum 27/01\(^{58}\). The CJLOG position has been established in Melbourne.

207. The Review team discussed the logistics support arrangements for operations in interviews with relevant personnel.

\(^{58}\) Agendum 27/01 mentioned that the Defence Committee (DC) had endorsed CJLOG as the Strategic J4. The Review was unable to determine if DC reference is correct.
208. In broad the current arrangements have CJLOG as a two star military officer sitting astride the operational and strategic levels. CJLOG is an invited member of the SCG and his Chief of Staff is responsible for the delivery of logistics support to operations. CJLOG epitomises the compression of the operational and strategic levels where he acts as the chief logistics adviser to the CDF on one hand and directly manages the delivery of support to deployed forces on the other. Indeed this model reflects the compression of strategic and operational level headquarters proposed by this Review.

209. As a consequence of the recency of the current arrangements and the success of logistics support to operations in Iraq, the Review does not recommend any significant changes to the CJLOG arrangements at this time.

210. Should COSC accept that the operational level RTM and command of operations be separated, then it makes sense to review the organisations that currently report to COMAST. The Joint Movements Group (JMOVGP) is one that has arisen historically and been collocated with AST. CJLOG has suggested that JMOVGP should be commanded by his organisation because he currently provides a delivery service of goods to an agreed point in the deployment pipeline, but does not actually deploy the troops to task. Connection of these two elements could result in efficiencies for both organisations. While accepting this possibility, the Review has placed JMOVGP under HQJOPS in Option 3.

Recommendation

211. Note that bringing JMOVGP under the CJLOG command umbrella could be beneficial.

212. The Interim Molan Report recommends that CJLOG should become part of the new collocated headquarters.\textsuperscript{59}

Intelligence

213. The AST Joint Intelligence Centre (ASTJIC) is part of HQAST and is located at the Maritime HQ. It responds to requests for information (RFI) levied by the AST Joint Staff, Component and HQNORCOM Intelligence staffs. The ADF Intelligence Centre (ADFIC) is part of ADHQ and is collocated with SOD. It is an outpost of the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and responds to SOD and other strategic level RFI. Embedded intelligence staffs in HQAST, Component HQ and HQNORCOM do intelligence assessments.

214. There has been little review of the potential relationships between DIO and ASTJIC when the latter is collocated in the Canberra region. The Review has had advice that there may be synergies between the organisations after ASTJIC relocates, but their focus is essentially different. For example, in the recent operation in Iraq, DIO's primary focus was on supporting the CDF and Government with a secondary focus on providing support to COMAST. Conversely the ASTJIC in the Timor operation provided the responses to RFI from the deployed operational headquarters.

\textsuperscript{59} Interim Molan Report of 30 Apr 03 para 45.i
215. In the very least the need for outposted liaison officers from Defence Imagery Geospatial Organisation, Defence Signals Directorate and other intelligence agencies that are in the ASTJIC would need to be assessed when both DIO and ASTJIC are located in the Canberra region.

216. The Review has not had time to analyse the suggestion that ASTJIC and DIO functions be reviewed. Intuitively, the Review feel that ASTJIC and ADF Intelligence Centre should combine, collocate and serve the new combined strategic and operational HQ.

217. The Review notes that the Interim Molan Report has included an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Adviser element in his proposal.60

Recommendation

218. Note that a separate review of the arrangements for the delivery of intelligence at the strategic and operational levels should be completed before ASTJIC relocates to the Canberra environment.

Australian Defence HQ (ADHQ)

219. The Review noted in the comments of many interviewees on the ADHQ arrangements, that the recommendations of the Defence Efficiency Review61 and the POR from Timor have not yet been fully effected.

220. Given that those recommendation regarding the role of VCDF and of reorganisation of the ADHQ have been to the Defence Committee after endorsement by COSC, the Review does not intend to canvass those matters again.

EFFECTS ON THE EXISTING HQAST PROJECT

221. There are a number of elements of the existing HQAST Project that would be substantially affected by accepting the recommendations of this Review. These have been developed in consultation with Infrastructure Division (ID) of the Corporate Support and Infrastructure Group:

   a. The numbers of personnel in the new headquarters – para 165
   b. The source of funding for any facility – para 164
   c. The timing for delivery of the collocated permanent facility – para 149
   d. The location of a facility – para 153
   e. The development of the information infrastructure to be used in the new headquarters – para 163
   f. The management of the development of the new facility.

60 Interim Molan Report of 30 Apr 03 para 40y.
61 The DER paper 3
g. The timing of the move of personnel from the Sydney environment to the Canberra environment.

h. The expectations of the Yarrowlumla Shire Council.

222. Annex E outlines the ramifications of any changes to the existing HQAST project.

223. Early establishment of the new headquarters would mean the operational experience gained in the Iraq campaign will be used. Similarly any opportunity to leverage off the technology and facilities that have been developed in Qatar by the United States it needs to be investigated as a matter of urgency. The HQAST project team would be the ideal vehicle to manage either option.

224. The funding for the recommended facility would be an additional pressure on the Defence Capability Program or be drawn from the existing allocation to JP 8001. The Review recommends that funding for a facility be drawn from JP 8001. The Review notes that it may be useful to slow or delay the development of the intended Bungendore facility to await the synergies that would be developed from the recommended facility. It is possible that operations from the recommended facility may result in a substantially smaller footprint and possible that the final cost would be substantially cheaper than currently foreshadowed.

225. The Review notes that the Interim Molan Report recommends that a new Doha style facility should be the permanent facility.62

CONCLUSIONS

226. The strategic and operational command and control arrangements for the ADF have been reviewed in the light of recent operational experience. The Review concluded that there were four key issues that needed to be addressed. The Review further found a number of peripheral issues that needed to be addressed in the light of proposals for the future.

Doctrine

227. The Review found that the capstone doctrinal document, ADDP-D, is both relevant and current. However, the supporting keystone and application documents are still being developed from the current ADFP range of doctrinal publications. Although there is a sound platform of supporting single service publications the process of accreditation is far from complete. Acceptance of recommendations made in this Review will inevitably require an evolution of doctrine. Specifically, there might be a need to recognise compression in the traditional strategic, operational and tactical command and control concepts.

62 Interim Molan Report of 30 Apr 03 paras 45.j, k and l
HQAST/SOD tension

228. The Review:
   a. Found that there was tension between HQAST and SOD.
   b. Confirmed the necessity for SOD role.
   c. Noted that under current arrangements Head of Strategic Operations Division (HSOD) has no operational command functions but recognised that there are perceptions that SOD has involved itself in activities that could be considered as command like.
   d. Accepted that service culture and physical proximity influence the relationships between and effectiveness of senior staff.
   e. Accepted that compartmentalisation as currently practised aggravates the tension between HQ.
   f. Concluded that the amalgamation of HQAST and SOD under the Command of a three star officer in the one locality would minimise tension between staff and facilitate more effective use of staff resources.

The lack of a jointly manned Deployable Headquarters

229. There is a compelling need for a truly joint deployable HQ and that such a HQ should be based of the existing DJFHQ with significant additional staffing contribution from Navy and Air Force.

230. However, the Review noted:
   a. The land-centric nature of the DJFHQ, but recognised that the Navy and Air Force contributed to this nature by failing to fill already established billets in the HQ.
   b. The continued parallel role of staff undertaking both joint operational and 1st Division activities cause resource allocation tensions and reduced effectiveness in both roles.

231. Similarly the DJFHQ (Maritime) suffers from problems arising from their dual roles and the Review noted that while there is no formed Air Force element whose role is to support JTFs, the Air Force is planning to correct that deficiency.

232. Although providing a valuable role there is evidence that suggests that the resource currently allocated to HQNORCOM might be better employed in other elements of the C^2 spectrum.

Raise Train Maintain at the Operational Level

233. The current 'double hatted' arrangement employed in the environmental commands where the Commanders and their staffs serve both their Service Chiefs for RTM and COMAST for operations are at odds with the principles of Command. The principle of unity requires clarity and simplicity in command arrangements. Double-hattedness does not meet this criterion.
234. The rationale for the dual role circumstances has been justified by accepting that there are insufficient resources to separately manage the operational level command and RTM functions. However, a rationalisation of the number of HQ and a refocussing of manpower allocation across the spectrum should remove this justification.

235. A casualty of the current ‘double hatted’ arrangement has been the development of the operational art and the fidelity of the processes needed to support that art. If the ADF is to achieve the goal of effectiveness superiority that has been espoused in recent White Papers, the lack of expertise in commanding joint operations can not be allowed to persist.

236. The ADF does not fully exploit the joint and collective training opportunities in the PMSA. The Review determined the current exercise schedule could be focussed in a more effective way and perhaps more radically, the mechanisms for joint and collective training could be overhauled.

**HQAST collocation timing**

237. The Review concluded that the planned collocation of the operational level headquarters would provide significant operational process improvements. These benefits might be shown in some manpower savings, but the Review concluded that the more likely effect would be a considerably enhanced effectiveness for the command and control of the ADF.

238. With recognition of the likely benefits that would emerge, it is difficult to justify waiting until late in the decade to realise them. There is a compelling case to look for opportunities to advance collocation.

**Skilled manpower resource limitation**

239. There is evidence that the corporate C^2 manpower bill exceeds the availability of appropriately trained and experienced staff and that there are serious deficiencies with the existing C^2 HQ manpower augmentation processes.

**Overseas practise**

240. Comparison of the ratios of the numbers of staff in headquarters involved in the command and control of operations at the strategic and operational level when compared to the numbers of personnel deployed on operations found that the ADF had a poorer ratio than either Singapore or the UK.

**Joint collective training and evaluation**

241. The Review accepted that current joint and collective training and evaluation arrangements were deficient. They are ad hoc, lack coherency and are not set against joint warfighting objectives.
Effects on the Existing HQAST Project

242. There are a number of elements of the existing HQAST Project (JP8001) that would be substantially affected by accepting the recommendations of this Review.

RECOMMENDATIONS

243. The Review recommends that CDF:

a. Note that existing command and control doctrine remains suitable in the context of the changed strategic environment. However there might be a need to recognise compression in the traditional strategic, operational and tactical command and control concepts.

b. Agree that the ADF security control process for compartmented planning adopt a vertically integrated methodology.

c. Agree to recommend to the Minister for Defence that the rank level of COMAST be increased to three star.

d. Agree that HSOD come under COMAST for command purposes and the operational staffs of HQAST, the component command staffs and SOD should collocate in a single environment.

e. Agree that the single operational and strategic HQ should be known as Headquarters Joint Operations.

f. Agree to change the title of COMAST to CJOPS.

g. Agree to merge DJFHQ and HQNORCOM.

h. Agree to separate the joint operational command elements of the existing DJFHQ from the functions relating to the command of the 1st Division.

i. Agree that the amalgamation headquarters should be formed at Larrakeyah Barracks under the name of DJFHQ.

j. Agree to separate the command of operations functions from the raise, train and maintain functions at the operational level.

k. Agree that the current two star environmental commanders remain responsible for the RTM functions and that the operational level component commanders be at the one star level (Option 3, annex C).

l. Agree to the establishment of an Operational Command Group for the provision of advice to CJOPS.

m. Agree that the synergies of collocation should be achieved before 2007.

n. Agree to stand up a Headquarters Joint Operations in the Canberra region as soon as practicable.

o. Agree to investigate the options for building or leasing a suitable facility to collocate up to 320 joint staff in a developmental facility by Dec 2004.

p. Note that the establishment of a commonly informed operating picture managed at a single site and distributed for consumption by authorised
subsidiary uses could satisfy all ADF 24/7 situational awareness requirements at the strategic and operational levels.

q. **Note** that the current ADF ratio of headquarters staff to tactical forces is greater than either Singapore or the UK.

r. **Note** that COSC Agenda 12/03 will address the issue of evaluation of joint and combined training in the ADF.

s. **Agree** that the ADF could benefit from a more rigorous joint and collective training program.

t. **Note** that the evaluation of operations and exercises is a necessary step in refining command organisations and processes.

u. **Agree** that the evaluation of ADF operations and exercises be conducted by one organisation and that the capture of those lessons be a necessary step in reviewing and testing doctrinal concepts relating to the command and control of the ADF.

v. **Note** that bringing the Joint Movements Group under the CJLOG command umbrella could be beneficial.

w. **Note** that a separate review of the arrangements for the delivery of intelligence at the strategic and operational levels should be completed before ASTJIC relocates to the Canberra environment.

K.F. CLARKE
Air Vice Marshal

09 May 03
Terms of Reference

You are to examine the strategic and operational level command and control arrangements of the Australian Defence Force and recommend any changes that might be made to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the current structures.

In conducting that examination you are to:

a. Review the ADF Doctrine for command of combined, joint and single service operations both in the Defence of Australia and as part of coalition forces.

b. Examine the rationale and expected outcomes relating to the establishment of Headquarters Australian Theatre, Northern Command, Deployable Joint Force Headquarters and Strategic Operations Division.

c. Review the command arrangements used by the ADF for Operations in the period since the establishment of the operational level.

d. Benchmark world’s best practice in command of operations for armed forces of equivalent size and role.

e. Compare the expected outcomes from the establishment of the operational level with the command arrangements used in actual operations and the benchmark.

f. Recommend any changes that may arise from that work

g. Deliver an implementation plan for effect of those changes.

h. Recommend any consequent change to the Headquarters Australian Theatre Project.

In developing recommendations you are to ensure they are resource efficient. Any recommended changes to existing structures should be simple, and result in an organisation that is responsive, flexible, and adaptable. The recommended arrangements should exploit current technology and be capable of exploiting future technology over the next decade.
RESTRICTED

Reporting

The following are deliverable from the Review by the dates indicated;

a. circulation of draft by 5 May 03,

b. Chiefs of Staff Committee Agendum in May 03,

c. Defence Committee Consideration in Jun 03, and

d. Cabinet Submission in Aug 03.

You are to keep myself and VCDF informed of progress of the review and inform us of any contentious issues that may arise.

Resources

You are to establish a full time team of up to five, based in Canberra to support you in the review.

Funding for this review will be drawn from the CDF budget. Financial and additional administrative support you may require is to be coordinated through CDF’s Chief of Staff.

Consultation

You are to consult with relevant stakeholders; particularly myself, Ministerial Staff, the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, the Chiefs of Service, Head of Strategic Operations Division, Commander Australian Theatre, Commanders at the Operational level and with officers who have experience in those appointments where you deem it is appropriate to the terms of this directive.
**List of Persons Interviewed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Position / Role</th>
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<tr>
<td>MAJGEN P. Abigail</td>
<td>Past LCC</td>
<td>22 Apr 03</td>
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<td>GEN John Baker</td>
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<td>Mr A. Behm</td>
<td>Past FASIP</td>
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<td>RADM M. Bonser</td>
<td>COMAST, Past COMNORCOM</td>
<td>23 Apr 03</td>
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<td>BRIG R. Brown</td>
<td>Project Officer Collocated HQ</td>
<td>13 Mar 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr S. Carmody</td>
<td>DEPSEC S and P, Past HIP</td>
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<td>MAJGEN J. Connolly</td>
<td>Past COMAST</td>
<td>22 Apr 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN P. Cosgrove</td>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>18 Feb 03</td>
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<td>MAJGEN P. Dunn</td>
<td>DER Recommendations</td>
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<td>MAJGEN M. Evans</td>
<td>Comd DJFHQ</td>
<td>31 Mar 03</td>
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<td>RADM R. Gates</td>
<td>MCAUST</td>
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<td>MAJGEN K. Gillespie</td>
<td>HSOD, Past ASNCE Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CDRE J. Goldrick</td>
<td>DG MS</td>
<td>04 Apr 03</td>
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<td>AIRCDRE D. Green</td>
<td>Comdt ADFWC, Past DJOPS</td>
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<td>Mr Alan Henderson</td>
<td>DEPSEC Corporate Services</td>
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<td>MAJGEN P. Haddad</td>
<td>CJLOG</td>
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<td>Mr P. Hannan</td>
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<td>Mr A. Hawke</td>
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<td>AM A. Houston</td>
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<td>MAJGEN D. Hurley</td>
<td>LCAUST</td>
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<td>Mr P. Jennings</td>
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<td>Capt P. Jones</td>
<td>Commander CTG 633.2.1 – MEAO</td>
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<td>AVM J. Kindler</td>
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<td>Mr M Kinnaird</td>
<td>Head DMO Review</td>
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<td>LTGEN P. Leahy</td>
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<td>Mr F. Lewincamp</td>
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<td>MAJGEN D. Lewis</td>
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<td>AM McCormack</td>
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<td>VADM C. Ritchie</td>
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<td>Mr M Roche</td>
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<td>Mr M. Scrafton</td>
<td>Past Head EM Task Gp/Min Adviser</td>
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<td>VADM R. Shalders</td>
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<td>Mr A Shearer</td>
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<td>Mr R. Smith</td>
<td>Secretary, Dept of Defence</td>
<td>07 Mar 03</td>
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<tr>
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<td>AVM A. Titheridge</td>
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<td>26 Mar 03</td>
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<td>AIRCDRE S. Walker</td>
<td>COMNORCOM</td>
<td>29 Apr 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr P. Whitbread</td>
<td>DSTO C^2 Research</td>
<td>12 Mar 03</td>
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<td>Mr H. White</td>
<td>Past DEP SEC S&amp;I</td>
<td>01 Apr 03</td>
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#### STAR TABLE

**CDF**

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**CJOPS**

- **3**

**Head Strat OPS**

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**ADDENDUM**

COMAST to 3* and renamed VCDF (OPS)

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#### STAR TABLE

**CDF**

- **4**

**CJOPS**

- **3**

**Head Strat Ops**

- **2**

**ADDENDUM**

Adds SOD to existing Structure

COMAST to 3* and renamed VCDF (OPS)
OPTION 2

D 1 - 3* CJOPS
SOD/AST

D 2 - Combines HQNORCOM/DJHQ
   Creates a Comd DJFHQ (2*) and uses
   COMFLOT
   and new positions of JFACC, LCC
   Separates HQ 1 Div from DJFHQ

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**OPTIONS**

**RTM**
- CDF
- 4*

- CN
- 3*
- 3

- Mar Comd
- 2

- Comd CSG
- 1

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**D1 - SOD/AST**
- Combines HQNORCOM/DJHQ
- Creates a Comd DJFHQ (2*) and uses
- COMFI OT and new positions of JFACC, LCC
- Components to 1*
- Moves COMD 1 DIV to RTM

**D2 - RTM with 2**
D1 - SOD/AST
D2 - Combines HQNORCOM/DJHQ
    Creates a Comd DJFHQ(2*) and uses
    COMFLOT and new positions of JFACC, LCC
    Separates HQ 1 Div from DJFHQ
    Maintains 2* component level
D3 - Removes RTM from op comd chain at 1* level
    (Except Land)
OPTION 5

OPS

D1 - SOD/AST
D2 - Combines HQ NORCOM/DJHQ
    Creates a Comd DJFHQ (2*) and uses
    COMFLOT and new positions of JFACC, LCC
    Separates HQ 1 Div from DJFHQ
    Replaces components with joint staff
D3 - Removes RTM from op comd chain
    Operational level RTM @ 2*

RTM

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OPTION 6

D1 - SOD/AST
D2 - Combines HQNORCOM/DJFHQ
  Creates a Comd DJFHQ (2*) and uses
  COMFLOT and new positions of JFACC, LCC
  Separates HQ 1 Div from DJFHQ
  Replaces components staff with joint staff
D3 - Removes RTM from op comd chain
  Operational level RTM @ 1*(except Land)

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RESTRICTED
A DEVELOPMENTAL HQJOPS

1. The Review sought advice on acceleration of the development of the collocated facility from Infrastructure Division in the Corporate Support Group of the Department of Defence, they provided a range of formal and informal advice. They advised that even at the revised size (reduced from 1042 to 650 staff positions), the only way a facility could be built faster than the current Bungendore headquarters, was for it to:
   a. cost less than the $6M threshold for the Parliamentary Works Committee consideration, and
   b. be built on Defence land where elements of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and other construction requirements could be waived.

2. The Review was informally advised that it would be possible to meet these criteria, but that the maximum number of staff that could be housed in a secure facility at a cost under the threshold was in the order of 320.

3. Initial analysis indicates that early establishment of a 320 position-capped, developmental HQJOPS in the Canberra environment would be possible. The Developmental HQJOPS would become the operations and planning centre for the ADF and replace those staffs in AST, all components, and in SOD. The staff would function as a combination of the AST, component operations and planning staff, and SOD operations and plans staff. It is important to note that the raise, train and maintain functions of the components would not be located in the collocated facility.

4. Establishment of the developmental HQ would facilitate the following beneficial outcomes:
   a. allowing the relationships between COMAST and HSOD to develop,
   b. allowing the form and function of the collocated HQ to be tested and refined,
   c. determining the synergies of collocation,
   d. helping to define the information systems necessary to support planning and operations, and
   e. allowing the development of the procedures and staffing of the collocated headquarters organisation.

5. The Review team's assessment is that such a facility could be established for about $50M. Possible Sites are at HMAS HARMAN or at RAAF FAIRBAIRN.

Indicative staffing is:

| VCDF OPS and personal Staff | 10 |
| Joint Staff                | 120 |
| Component Staffs           |    |
| MCC                        | 40 |
| LCC                        | 40 |
| ACC                        | 40 |
COSC Agendum No 11/2003

Secretary
VCDF
CN
CA
CAF
DEPSEC SP

COSC AGENDUM: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ADF

Please find enclosed COSC Agendum 11/03, Command and Control of the ADF, which will be taken at COSC at 1000hrs on Monday 19 May 03 in the Defence Committee Room.

S.D. KIMBER, AM
Wing Commander
Secretary
CHIEFS OF SERVICE COMMITTEE

2 May 2003

Enclosure:
1. 11/03 Command and Control of the ADF
RESTRICTED
Committee in Confidence
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED DECISIONS
COSC Agenda 11/03

ADF COMMAND AND CONTROL REVIEW

Key Judgements

The Review identified four key judgements:

- the tension between HQAST staff and SOD staff,
- the lack of a jointly manned deployable headquarters,
- the tension between the divergent demands of commanders and staffs who have responsibility to COMAST for operations and to their Chiefs of Service for raise, train and maintain (RTM) functions, and
- the considerable time before the current HQAST Project delivers the synergies of a collocated joint staff facility.

Recommendations

COSC agree:

- to amalgamate Strategic Operations Division and Headquarters Australian Theatre into one headquarters in the Canberra environment – the staffing ceiling for this headquarters would be 555 permanent and 650 including augmentation.
- to seek MINDEF endorsement to appoint a three star officer as Commander Joint Operations (CJOPS) to command this collocated headquarters;
- to appoint a two star officer as Deputy Commander Joint Operations (DCJOPS);
- to the establishment of an truly joint Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) using elements of the existing DJFHQ, Headquarters Northern Command (NORCOM), Navy and Airforce resources and locate the new headquarters in the existing NORCOM facilities at Larrakeyah Barracks – the permanent staffing ceiling of this headquarters would be 150.
- that the new DJFHQ be commanded by a rotational two star appointment and that the commander would be named the Commander DJFHQ.
- to the separation of the current operational level RTM functions (Land, Air, Maritime, Special Operations and 1st Division) from the command of operations at that level. The operational arrangements would then mirror the strategic level arrangements relating to the command of operations.
- to retain the respective two star component commanders as the commanders of the RTM functions.
- to the standing up of a collocated HQJOPS (as soon as possible) and an expanded DJFHQ (within 12 months).
- that the current two star environmental commanders remain responsible for the RTM functions and that the operational level component commanders are at the one star level.
REVIEW OF ADF COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AT THE OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVELS

Reference:

INTRODUCTION

1. Current ADF command and control arrangements were implemented in 1997 and were developed in a strategic environment where the major threats were perceived as arising from conventional military forces. Since that time the ADF has had a high operational tempo and the Command and Control arrangements need to be tested for effectiveness, relevance and currency in the light of that experience and the contemporary strategic environment.

BACKGROUND

2. The 1997 arrangements were developed with an understanding that operations in Defence of Australia would be conducted in the north of Australia and that the area was vulnerable. Command and control arrangements and infrastructure were located to accommodate this perceived vulnerability.

3. The current strategic environment encompasses a continuum of warfare that extends from traditional warfighting to warlike operations and to military operations designed to influence and shape regional and world views.

AIM OF THE AGENDUM PAPER

4. The aim of this Agendum is to provide recommendations to CDF for refined ADF Command and Control arrangements at the Strategic and Operational levels.

CDF DIRECTION

5. In providing direction for the review, CDF indicated any organisational changes should be as simple as possible and should result in an organisation that was flexible, adaptable and more efficient. Any new structure would be smaller rather than larger and CDF saw that the recommendations would be able to be implemented in the short-term and well before the new collocated headquarters at Bungendore was completed.
REVIEW CONTEXT

6. The Review found there are a number of contemporary issues that shape any command and control arrangements. Those issues include:
   a. the growing interest of Government in tactical activity, and
   b. the potential effects of technology on command and control and the passage of information.

IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES

7. The assessment of operational experience and the conclusions drawn from the interview process identified four key issues:
   c. the tension between HQAST staff and SOD staff,
   d. the lack of a jointly manned deployable headquarters,
   e. the tension between the divergent demands of commanders and staffs who have responsibility to COMAST for operations and to their Chiefs of Service for raise, train and maintain (RTM) functions, and
   f. the considerable time before the current HQAST Project delivers a joint staff facility.

8. Additionally, the following two supplementary issues were noted:
   a. the lack of a coherent joint exercising and evaluation program, and
   b. the high demand for the small numbers of quality, qualified staff.

9. Other issues identified, but not addressed in detail included:
   a. the effectiveness of the arrangements for CJLOG,
   b. the need for a review of the relationship between ASTJIC and DIO when ASTJIC is located in the Canberra region, and
   c. progress on the recommendations of the DER and POR from East Timor relating to the structure of ADHQ.

KEY ISSUES

AST / SOD tensions

10. The Review:
   a. Found that there was tension between HQAST and SOD.
   b. Confirmed the necessity for the SOD role.
   c. Noted that under current arrangements Head of Strategic Operations Division (HSOD) has no operational command function but recognised that there are perceptions that SOD has involved itself in activities that could be considered as command like.
d. Accepted that service culture and physical proximity influence the relationships between and the effectiveness of senior staff.

e. Accepted that compartmentalisation as currently practised aggravates the tension between HQ.

f. Concluded that the amalgamation of HQAST and SOD in the one locality under the command of a three star officer would minimise tension between staff and facilitate more effective use of staff resources.

The lack of a jointly manned Deployable Headquarters

11. The Review accepted the compelling need for a truly joint deployable HQ and that such a HQ should be based of the existing DJFHQ with significant additional staffing contribution from Navy and Air Force. The staff of that HQ should form the basis of any deployed operations staff.

12. The Review noted:

a. the land centric nature of the DJFHQ but recognised that the Navy and Air Force contributed to this nature by failing to fill already established billets in the HQ, and

b. the continued parallel role of staff undertaking both joint operational and 1st Division activities can cause resource allocation tensions and reduced effectiveness in each role.

13. The Review noted that the DJFHQ (Maritime) suffers from problems arising from their dual roles and the Review noted that while there is no formed Air Force element whose role is to support deployed operations, the Air Force is planning to correct that deficiency.

14. Although providing a valuable role there is evidence that suggests that the resource currently allocated to HQNORCOM might be better employed in other elements of the C spectrum.

Raise Train Maintain (RTM) at the operational level

15. The current dual-hatted arrangement employed in the environmental commands where the Commanders and their staffs serve both their Service Chiefs for RTM and COMAST for operations are at odds with the principles of unity, clarity and simplicity in command arrangements.

16. The dual role circumstance has been justified by accepting that there are insufficient resources to separately manage the operational level command and RTM functions. However, a rationalisation of the number of HQ and a refocussing of manpower allocation across the spectrum should remove this justification.

17. A casualty of the current ‘double hatted’ arrangements has been the slow development of the operational art and the fidelity of the processes needed to support that art. If the ADF is to achieve the goal of effectiveness superiority that has been
espoused in recent White Papers, the lack of expertise in commanding joint operations can not be allowed to persist.

18. The Review found the ADF does not fully exploit the joint and collective training opportunities in the Program of Major Service Activities. The Review determined the current exercise schedule could be focussed in a more effective way and perhaps more radically, the mechanisms for joint and collective training could be overhauled.

**HQAST collocation timing**

19. The Review concluded that the planned collocation of the operational level headquarters would provide significant benefits. These benefits might be shown in some manpower savings, but the Review concluded that the more likely effect would be that the command and control of the ADF would be considerably enhanced.

20. Recognising of these benefits are likely, it is difficult to justify waiting until late in the decade when the JP8001 Collocated HQ is due to become operational and the joint staff realise the synergies of collocation. There is a compelling case to bring forward the timing of collocation.

**Skilled manpower resource limitation**

21. There is evidence that the corporate C² manpower bill exceeds the availability of appropriately trained and experienced staff and that there are clear deficiencies with the existing C² HQ manpower augmentation processes.

**Overseas practise**

22. Comparison of the ratio of the numbers of staff in headquarters involved in the staff or command and control of operations at the strategic and operational level when compared to the numbers of personnel deployed on operations found that the ADF had more than either Singapore or the UK.

**Joint collective training, evaluation**

23. The Review accepted that current joint and collective training and evaluation arrangements were deficient. They are ad hoc, lack coherency and are not set against joint warfighting objectives.

**Effects on the existing HQAST project**

24. Acceptance of some of the recommendations of the Review will require substantial changes to the existing HQAST Project (JP8001). The handling of those changes will require acknowledgment of the political realities relating to the progress of JP 8001.
RECOMMENDATIONS

25. The Review recommendations that COSC:
   
   a. **Note** that existing command and control doctrine remains suitable in the context of the changed strategic environment. However there might be a need to recognise compression in the traditional strategic, operational and tactical command and control concepts.
   
   b. **Agree** that the ADF security control process for compartmented planning adopt a vertically integrated methodology.
   
   c. **Agree** to recommend to the Minister for Defence that the rank level of COMAST be increased to three star.
   
   d. **Agree** that HSOD come under COMAST for command purposes and the operational staffs of HQAST, the component command staffs and SOD should collocate in a single environment.
   
   e. **Agree** that the single operational and strategic HQ should be known as Headquarters Joint Operations.
   
   f. **Agree** to change the title of COMAST to CJOPS.
   
   g. **Agree** to merge DJFHQ and HQNORCOM.
   
   h. **Agree** to separate the joint operational command elements of the existing DJFHQ from the functions relating to the command of the 1st Division.
   
   i. **Agree** that the amalgamation headquarters should be formed at Larrakeyah Barracks under the name of DJFHQ.
   
   j. **Agree** to separate the command of operations functions from the raise, train and maintain functions at the operational level.
   
   k. **Agree** that the current two star environmental commanders remain responsible for the RTM functions and that the operational level component commanders be at the one star level (Option 3, annex C).
   
   l. **Agree** to the establishment of an Operational Command Group for the provision of advice to CJOPS.
   
   m. **Agree** that the synergies of collocation should be achieved before 2007.
   
   n. **Agree** to stand up a Headquarters Joint Operations in the Canberra region as soon as practicable.
   
   o. **Agree** to investigate the options for building or leasing a suitable facility to collocate up to 320 joint staff in a developmental facility by Dec 2004.
   
   p. **Note** that the establishment of a commonly informed operating picture managed at a single site and distributed for consumption by authorised subsidiary uses could satisfy all ADF 24/7 situational awareness requirements at the strategic and operational levels.
   
   q. **Note** that the current ADF ratio of headquarters staff to tactical forces is greater than either Singapore or the UK.
r. **Note** that COSC Agendum 12/03 will address the issue of evaluation of joint and combined training in the ADF.

s. **Agree** that the ADF could benefit from a more rigorous joint and collective training program.

t. **Note** that the evaluation of operations and exercises is a necessary step in refining command organisations and processes.

u. **Agree** that the evaluation of ADF operations and exercises be conducted by one organisation and that the capture of those lessons be a necessary step in reviewing and testing doctrinal concepts relating to the command and control of the ADF.

v. **Note** that bringing the Joint Movements Group under the CJLOG command umbrella could be beneficial.

w. **Note** that a separate review of the arrangements for the delivery of intelligence at the strategic and operational levels should be completed before ASTJIC relocates to the Canberra environment.

*Original Signed*

**K.F. CLARKE**  
AVM  
HCS  
9 May 03

**Enclosure:**

1. Review of Australian Defence Force Strategic and Operational Level Command and Control Arrangements, May 03