

**INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT INTO THE DEATH OF 8299931
PTE JEREMY PAUL WILLIAMS FORMERLY RAINF INITIAL
EMPLOYMENT TRAINEE SCHOOL OF INFANTRY, SINGLETON ON
2 FEBRUARY 2003**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document is the original Executive Summary from the Investigating Officer's Report, however it has been modified for this public release to include privacy deletions, where appropriate, and the Army's plan for what action is to be taken as a result of the recommendations. The modifications to the original Executive Summary are shown in blue italics.

Background

1. PTE Jeremy Williams committed suicide by hanging at the School of Infantry (SOI), Singleton, shortly after midnight on Sun 2 Feb 03. He was a 20 year old Initial Employment Trainee (IET) who was widely described as friendly, supportive and good-natured. He was known to have consumed alcohol on a regular basis. He had performed well at Army Recruit Training Centre (ARTC). He had sustained an injury to his lower limbs on Wed 22 Jan 03 while conducting a pack march during the first week of the Infantry IET course. After a series of tests, he was diagnosed with a stress-related condition, but was cleared of stress fractures. On 28 Jan 03 he was removed from training and transferred to Rehabilitation and Discharge Platoon (R&D Pl) in order to recuperate.
2. There is evidence that he commenced a steady emotional decline from the moment of his injury until his death. Despite advice to the contrary, he perceived that he had stress fractures in his legs and that he would most likely be discharged. He was also very upset about having to leave training as well as having to enter R&D Pl. After he made a distressed phone call to **XX** on the evening of 28 Jan 03, **XX** rang the Singleton RAP on Wed 29 Jan 03 to determine the nature of **XX** injury and to ask that he be given reassurance. He also asked that **XX** not be informed about his call. He spoke to the RAP **XX**, **XX** who subsequently called PTE Williams to the RAP and reassured him that his injury was not serious. At some stage PTE Williams became aware of **XX** call to the base and as a result, made an angry phone call to **XX** on the evening of 29 Jan 03.
3. On Sat 1 Feb 03 he went to Singleton on day leave and commenced drinking at a hotel at about 1130 h. During the course of the day and evening he is known to have consumed a large amount of alcohol (his post-mortem showed a blood alcohol level of **XX**), had an upsetting and unresolved text message conversation with **XX** and had been involved in two altercations with other IETs. One of these altercations may have involved violence. Following the altercations, at about 2200 h, his mood changed significantly from being happy and in good spirits, to being tearful and distressed. He caught a taxi from Singleton and arrived back at the barracks at about 2310 h. He was last seen by a friend shortly before midnight, walking in a slow and depressed fashion. He was found hanging from a tree behind the R&D lines at about 0010 h on Sun 2 Feb 03.

Allegations

4. Members of the Williams family have since made a number of allegations related to PTE Williams' death, the conditions and culture at SOI and, to a lesser extent, the culture at ARTC. They have been grouped in the report under 26 'specific allegations'. The allegations and conclusions that are considered to be the most significant are detailed below.

- a. **Allegation – Inadequate Briefing and Care.** PTE Williams Received Inadequate Advice on his Injury, Inadequate Advice on His Future and Non-Timely Medical Care.

Conclusion. PTE Williams received a comprehensive briefing on his injury by an MO and an appropriately reassuring briefing by XX. He was told his injury was treatable and that he was likely to be back in training in a couple of weeks. His treatment was timely, thorough and appropriate. The allegation is not proved.

Army's Actions. Army accepts the IO's conclusion.

- b. **Allegation – Breach of Confidentiality.** The RAP staff failed to keep confidential the fact that XX had contacted the base.

Conclusion. The Investigating Officer is unable to establish that a breach in confidence occurred as Mr Williams has alleged. However, in an attempt to allay the fears of XX, XX did breach the confidence of PTE Williams.

Further evidence may be identified as part of a separate Service Police Inquiry into issues related to this allegation.

Army's Actions in Response. This matter is the subject of a current Service Police inquiry.

- c. **Allegation – Failure to Act on Warning.** Having been warned of PTE Williams' anxiety, XX failed in his duty of care to appropriately reassure PTE Williams.

Conclusion. XX acted appropriately and addressed PTE Williams' major concerns regarding the severity of his injury and the likelihood of his return to training. The language used was specifically chosen to ensure a clear understanding. The allegation is not proved.

Army's Actions. Army accepts the IO's conclusion.

- d. **Allegation – Inadequate Supervisory Staff.** R&D PI was inadequately staffed given the large number of IETs in the PI.

Conclusion. R&D PI was inadequately manned in 2002 and during the period Jan – Apr 03. As a result, IETs did not receive an appropriate level of leadership and support. The allegation is proved.

Army's Actions in Response. All staff positions are now filled; the platoons will remain the highest priority for manning at SOI, with a minimum ratio of one section commander per 15 trainees.

- e. **Allegation – Inadequate Medical Treatment and Rehab Support.** The nearest non-emergency doctor is in Williamstown. The Singleton base does not have the facilities to care for injured IETs.

Conclusion. There was no MO at Singleton during the time PTE Williams was at SOI. There is also general acceptance that Singleton is not well established for the long term rehabilitation of injured trainees. There is now an MO at the RAP. There are also plans to establish a rehab facility linked to IHSB in Sydney for SOI personnel. The allegation is proved.

Army's Actions in Response.

- *Army will ensure that the MO position at Singleton will always be filled by either a civilian or Army MO.*
- *All long-term, injured trainees are now being treated at the newly-established rehabilitation facility at IHSB.*

- f. **Allegation – Culture of Denigration at ARTC.** There is a culture that denigrates the injured at ARTC. Activities include the use by staff of derogatory terms and practices designed to degrade those who are out of training.

Conclusion. There is a widespread use of negative reinforcement to motivate recruits under training. This includes disparaging and negative comments about Weary Dunlop and Digger James Pls (discharge and rehab/remedial training respectively). While the intentions of staff are commendable, in many cases they are using the wrong methods to achieve their aims. The use of the denigrating term 'Window Licker' (primarily in reference to Weary Dunlop Pl) is part of Training Pl lexicon but does not appear to be used widely with malicious intent.

The allegation of a culture of denigration is not proved, however it is believed that there is a culture of negativity towards Weary Dunlop and Digger James Pls.

Army's Actions in Response.

- *Army will include in the Recruit Instructor Development Course specific instruction on the effect of negative terms and behaviours have on recruits, especially when this is used to motivate them to stay in training.*
- *Action has been taken to stop the use of the term 'Window Licker' and the use of the existence of Weary Dunlop and Digger James Platoons to motivate recruits to stay in training.*
- *A focussed campaign to develop positive forms of encouragement that can be used through activities involving aggression, urgency, intense physical demands and when recruits are struggling to meet the demands of the course is to be developed.*

- g. **Allegation – Culture of Harassment and Denigration at SOI.** There is a culture of harassment and denigration towards the injured and ‘back-squadded’ that results in SOI failing to treat its men with dignity, respect and sympathy.

Conclusion. There is a strong negative feeling among both staff and IETs against some IETs who are getting discharged and those IETs who are perceived as using injury or failure as a way to avoid hard training. At the time PTE Williams was at SOI, most of these IETs were located in R&D Pl, along with all other injured IETs. There is also a perception that many of those in the Pl are ‘weak’. As a consequence, all members of the Pl were subjected to widespread denigration and harassment from both staff and IETs still in training.

Following recent intense command focus and a number of changes put in place by COMDT CATC in Apr 03, this culture is no longer apparent. It will require constant attention to ensure it does not re-emerge. When assessed against the time that PTE Williams was at SOI, the allegation is proved.

Army’s Actions in Response.

- *Every soldier leaving the SOI from Depot Coy will complete a questionnaire to anonymously record instances by staff that contravene the TC-A Code of Conduct. The validation will occur after soldiers leave SOI so that they are not intimidated or fearful of retribution by staff. Reports are to be provided to Comd TC-A every month.*
- *CO SOI will include in his annual staff induction package briefings on how an inappropriate culture can develop and specific instructions on staff responsibilities to deal with unacceptable behaviour, offensive language, negative motivation and the use of threats of violence.*
- *A Directive providing advice on the range of counselling and support services available to trainees will be included on all TC-A courses.*
- *Army is investigating the feasibility of establishing central Army Transfer and Discharge Centres where all trainees waiting for discharge or Corps transfer are sent, where focussed processes can quickly administer soldiers and where the officer in charge is an authorised discharge authority. The Centre would be permanently staffed and have easy access to support services.*

- h. **Allegation – Use of Offensive Language.** There is the widespread use during training of the most foul, derogatory and insulting language.

Conclusion. Use of extremely offensive language is common at SOI. It is considered to be excessive and inappropriate. The paradox is that the universality of its use appears to have diminished its impact on both IETs and staff. This allegation is proved.

Army’s Actions in Response.

- *Army is developing a focussed campaign to counter the culture of excessive swearing at the SOI.*

- *Consideration is being given to the inclusion in the organisation of HQ TC-A a Training Standards Team to monitor and report on the implementation of the Army Training System and the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct across TC-A.*

i. **Allegation – Threats of Physical Violence.** There is a culture of bullying, intimidation and standover tactics used by staff against IETs.

Conclusion. The one case that generated this allegation is currently the subject of an MP inquiry. The staff member involved was also the subject of an additional allegation. One other allegation of threats of violence was made. Two cases of actual physical violence on IETs were also reported. Details have been passed to the MPs. These are considered to be isolated cases. The allegation is not proved.

Army's Actions in Response.

- *The MP investigation into the specific allegations that have emerged continues.*
- *Army will direct that all reports of violence are to be managed by the chain of command, and appropriate disciplinary action initiated by staff.*

j. **Allegation – R&D PI was Treated as a Low Priority.** XX and XX believe that their role is to train soldiers, not recuperate and discharge.

Conclusion. While XX acknowledges that there is now a heightened emphasis on R&D PI, he has always seen it as an important part of SOI. XX admits that he sees the interests of R&D PI having to take second place to the task of training riflemen. In respect of XX, the allegation is not proved. In respect of XX, the allegation is proved.

Army's Action in Response.

- *Army is investigating the feasibility of establishing a central 'Army Transfer and Discharge Centre' where all trainees waiting for discharge or Corps transfer are sent, where focussed processes can quickly administer soldiers and where the officer in charge is an authorised discharge authority. The Centre would be permanently staffed and have easy access to support services.*
- *Army is investigating the feasibility of establishing an 'Army Rehab Centre' permanently staffed and resourced along the lines of the newly-established facility at 1 HSB.*
- *XX is to be the subject of administrative action.*

k. **Allegation – Inaction by Chain of Command.** After advising XX and XX of concerns regarding unacceptable behaviour at SOI, they did nothing about it.

Conclusion. XX cannot recall a number of these allegations being made. XX, meanwhile undertook a QA and found no cause for concern. XX was unable to investigate while the incident was the subject of civil and service police investigations. The option for subsequent investigation was

overtaken by COMDT CATC's QA and this inquiry. The allegation is not proved.

Army's Actions in Response. Army will examine and report on the adequacy of current instructions to clarify the roles of unit commanders and Service Police in the conduct of investigation upon the sudden death of a member.

Other Inappropriate Behaviour - SOI

5. There was evidence that a number of staff members were targeting specific IETs for failure. The evidence available suggests that this practice is not widespread and therefore does not amount to a culture. In accordance with the TOR, therefore, these allegations were referred to the Appointing Authority for separate action.

Army's Actions in Response. Army will appoint an Investigating Officer to formally inquire into the allegations that staff targeted trainees for failure.

Command and Control - SOI

6. Span of Responsibility.

- a. It is believed that CO SOI is overtasked and under resourced. This conclusion is based on the scale of his training task, his geographical isolation, the lack of an on-site superior HQ to undertake AAR responsibilities, the size and profile of the Corps for which he is DHOC, the lack of corps specific trials and development staff elsewhere in Army, and the burden of a significant and high profile task such as AASAM. This span of responsibility sets him apart from other TC-A COs. The evidence suggests that AAR, DHOC and ASSAM tasks take up about 50% of his time.
- b. It is also believed that OC Depot Coy is over tasked during periods of high training tempo. His span of command during these periods is more akin to a small Bn than a Coy.

Army's Actions in Response.

- *Army will review the workload of the CO SOI with a view to relieving him of some of his additional responsibilities, including those related to development and AASAM.*
- *Army will consider providing additional staff support to CO SOI to assist with his AAR functions.*
- *Army will restructure the SOI, replacing Depot Company with a Rifleman Wing comprising two separate training companies and a support platoon, in order to reduce the OC's span of command.*

7. **Responsibility for Culture at SOI.**

- a. *XX*, *XX* and *XX* were not aware of the culture at SOI. It is believed that the culture was a legacy from previous years that was not identified by members of the chain of command or by the advisory network upon which commanders rely. It is also believed that the level of tasking for both *XX* and *XX* contributed to this situation. This does not negate *XX's XX* responsibility for all issues that occur within *XX*. It is believed, however, that *XX's* sanctioned span of responsibility significantly diminished *XX's* opportunity to be fully effective in *XX*. *XX* has always seen R&D PI as being an important part of *XX*. *XX's* very focussed *XX* interest in R&D PI issues gives confidence that the best interests of all IETs at *XX* will be ensured for the remainder of *XX's* appointment.
- b. It is not believed that *XX* is suited for *XX's* current appointment. This conclusion is based primarily on the fact that despite all that has happened in recent months (suicide, QA, this inquiry), *XX* still believes that the interests *XX* must take second place to the interests of *XX*. It is also believed that *XX* is not an advocate for a number of changes introduced by *XX* following *XX's XX*. While *XX* was not aware of an inappropriate culture, it is believed that *XX's* attitude helped create an environment where it could develop. It is therefore believed that *XX* would require ongoing and close supervision to ensure that *XX* provides appropriate leadership to both staff and IETs.

Army's Actions in Response.

- *Army will formally counsel XX and XX.*
- *Administrative action will be taken against XX.*

Previous Inquiry Into Inappropriate Behaviour at SOI

8. An investigation was completed in 2001 following a submission to the Minister regarding the alleged mistreatment of PTE *XX* at SOI in 2000. The investigation identified a culture at SOI with distinct similarities to that described in this report. It also noted that as a result of changes in 2000/01, there was a far more professional and positive attitude at SOI. These changes and the apparent resolution of the problem also bear a remarkable similarity to the findings of this report.
9. The Appointing Authority of the 2001 investigation directed that CATC establish a remedial staff training program at SOI. This was acknowledged by COMDT CATC in 2001, along with the added assurance that sufficient monitoring measures were in place. The current COMDT CATC and CO SOI, both of whom commenced their appointments in 2002, had not heard of the *XX* case, nor were they aware of the subsequent remedial measures that had been put in place.
10. **Conclusion.** Either the changes and remedial action identified in 2001 were not followed through by the chain of command in 2001, or they were lost in the space of a single posting cycle. This is considered to be a failure in the system of control.

Army's Actions in Response.

- *Army will initiate an investigation into the reasons that 2001 investigation were not followed through.*
- *Army has directed initiatives to substantially improve the level of supervision and leadership at SOI in order that staff at the School not default to the type of culture that lead to the inappropriate cultures in 2000 and again in 2002/2003.*

PT Regimes

11. Current Defence policy for PT and Injury Prevention lacks clarity and guidance for commanders. The PT regimes at ARTC and SOI conform with current policy.

12. The COSC endorsed Injury Prevention Strategy has not yet been fully implemented. Despite this, SOI has undertaken a number of initiatives that meet the intent of this strategy.

13. The All Corps Soldier Training Continuum, in particular the continuum of physical training, is still being developed and was unavailable for review. It is believed that this analysis, when undertaken, will address a number of the Williams Family's specific questions relating to the appropriateness of the PT continuum between the completion of ARTC and the commencement of training at SOI.

Army's Actions in Response. *A continuum of physical development is being produced along with the All Corps Soldier Training Continuum to Private that is now being developed within Training Command.*

Contributing Factors to the Death of PTE Williams

14. Factors that are believed to have contributed to PTE Williams' suicide, and the extent to which they are believed to have contributed (using a scale of very low / low / moderate / substantial / high / very high), are detailed below:

- a. Excessive alcohol consumption – very high.
- b. Physical problems and the associated change to the concept of self – high.
- c. The inappropriate culture and environment at SOI – substantial.
- d. The specific stressful events of 29 Jan 03 and 1 Feb 03 (angry phone call with **XX**, unresolved argument with **XX**, altercations with other IETs) – substantial.
- e. PTE Williams' perception of the nature of his injuries and the likelihood that he would be discharged – moderate.
- f. Inability to learn the lessons of the **XX** inquiry – moderate.
- g. The inappropriate culture and environment at ARTC – low.
- h. Inadequacies in R&D Pl manning – low.

15. The investigating Officer does not believe that any single factor was the sole cause of PTE Jeremy Williams' death. Three issues are considered to be critical: his sense of despair and depression (brought on by a number of contributing factors), the specific stressors he encountered on 29 Jan 03 and on the night of 1 Feb 03, and the excessive quantity of alcohol he had consumed. Had just one of these stressors been absent, it is believed that he would not have taken the action he did. Unfortunately they culminated in the late hours of 1 Feb 03 in an overwhelming emotional pain against which he had no protection.

Army's Actions in Response.

- *The Comd TC-A has carefully considered these important conclusions and believes that Army must now take immediate and strong measures to make enduring changes wherever Army contributed to PTE Williams' death.*
- *One of the most important matters that has come from the Investigation is the need for an enduring solution to the existence or re-emergence of a culture of denigration and harassment especially towards injured soldiers and towards soldiers who are not able to continue training (at the School of Infantry). This problem was severe at the time that PTE Williams took his life and has previously been evident. The problem has existed in a milder form at the Army Recruit Training Centre.*
- *While there are many parts to the culture at the School of Infantry, behaviour towards injured trainees at the time that PTE Williams took his life was not well controlled for a range of reasons that have been comprehensively covered by the Investigating Officer. Culture and attitude will only change when the behaviour that created it is stopped or replaced by other behaviour.*
- *The cycle of unacceptable behaviour re-inforcing the culture will be broken by a strong three-pronged approach; First, by leadership that eliminates the habits of disrespect (such as abuse, excessive swearing and physical threats) through high-example and close supervision supported by education, disciplinary action and re-training when unacceptable behaviour occurs. Second, by placing those soldiers who cannot take part in infantry training in a dedicated rehabilitation or transition centre, away from the School of Infantry. Third, by making sure that those in positions of leadership are given the time and capacity to exercise that leadership.*

Recommendations

16. Of the 47 recommendations made in the report, the most significant are detailed below.

- a. Take action to ease CO SOI's span of responsibility (specific recommendations for both immediate and longer term actions provided in report).
 - *Army is reviewing the CO's workload, responsibilities and staff support.*

- b. The current ratio of manning in R Platoon and D Platoon remain and not be diminished to accommodate future increases in training tempo.
- *Army will ensure that R Platoon and D Platoon will remain the highest priority for manning at SOI.*
- c. A review be undertaken on the resource allocation, in particular manning, for Holding Pl/R&D Pl type functions in all TC-A TEs. If resourcing is found to be inadequate, it is recommended that a balancing exercise be undertaken with an understanding that training throughput may be reduced.
- *Army will review resources for Holding Pl and R&D Pl across TC-A and will ensure that all are adequately manned and resourced.*
- d. All long-term SOI rehabilitation patients and those requiring regular specialist medical support, be managed at a suitable facility in line with the 1 HSB initiative.
- *Army has established a trial rehabilitation facility at 1 HSB and is investigating the feasibility of creating separate rehabilitation centre that will improve the rehabilitation of injured soldiers.*
- e. A review be undertaken into the manner, scale, control and impact of HOC tasking across all DHOCs in TC-A.
- *Army will undertake such a review.*
- f. ARTC staff be counselled on the findings of this investigation, the reasons behind how such a culture can develop and their responsibilities to deal with the type of inappropriate behaviour identified in this report. It is further recommended that key issues be incorporated into annual staff induction programs.
- *Army is amending the RIDC, attended by all prospective instructors, to include specific instruction on these issues. All current staff will be counselled on the findings of the investigation.*
- g. The ARTC chain of command take action against the inappropriate practices identified in this report.
- *Army has taken action to ban negative motivation at ARTC, is amending the RIDC and will develop a focussed campaign to develop positive forms of encouragement.*
- h. A formal control measure, along the lines of the recent TC-A 'Code of Conduct Audit', be established to monitor the well being of IETs at SOI, in particular those in R Platoon and D Platoon. Additional related recommendations are:
- (1) The control measure be supervised by COMDT CATC.
 - (2) COMDT CATC have in his annual Commander TC-A Directive the requirement to report the results of this control measure to HQ TC-A.

- (3) HQ TC-A puts in place measures to ensure that all new commanders are aware of the results of significant investigations relevant to their command.
- *All soldiers leaving Depot Coy will complete questionnaires to identify contraventions of the TC-A Code of Conduct. COMDT CATC will report regularly on the results of these questionnaires, and COMD TC-A's annual Directive for the COMDT CATC will include this requirement.*
 - *Army will review all recent TC-A investigations to confirm that their recommendations have been properly implemented and any continuing actions are included in appropriate Directives to TC-A commanders.*
- i. SOI staff be counselled on the findings of this investigation, the reasons behind how such a culture can develop and their responsibilities to deal with the type of inappropriate behaviour identified in this report. It is further recommended that key issues be incorporated into annual staff induction programs.
- *Army will ensure that the findings of the investigation will be briefed to all SOI staff. Annual induction training for all staff will include briefings on how an inappropriate culture can develop and specific instruction on staff responsibilities to deal with inappropriate behaviour.*
- j. Both *XX* and *XX* be counselled on issues identified in this report (specific recommendations provided).
- *Army will ensure appropriate counselling is conducted.*
- k. *XX* conduct a risk assessment based on the information provided in this report, to determine whether it is appropriate for *XX* to continue in *XX* current appointment.
- *Army will review the appropriateness of *XX* continuing in *XX* current appointment.*
- l. Further investigations be conducted into the following issues:
- (1) IET on IET violence.
 - *Army has initiated a formal investigation into incidents of trainees fighting trainees.*
 - (2) The reasons for the failure of the control mechanisms that were put in place following the *XX* investigation.
 - *Army will appoint an investigating officer to formally investigate the reasons for the apparent failure of the control mechanisms put in place following this earlier investigation.*
- m. There is no need for any further investigation by the Service Police into the conduct of any individual beyond those whose details have already been provided to the SIB.

- *The Service Police investigations continue and any necessary disciplinary action will be taken once these investigations are complete.*

GLOSSARY

AAPsych	Australian Army Psychology Corps
AAR	Army Area Representative
AASAM	Australian Army Small Arms Meeting
ACMC	Army Capability Management Committee
ACSTC	All Corps Soldier Training Continuum
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
AHQ	Army Headquarters
ARTC	Army Recruit Training Centre
ATHS	Air Transportable Health Squadron
BAC	Blood Alcohol Content
BFA	Basic Fitness Assessment
Bn	Battalion
CA	Chief of Army
CATC	Combat Arms Training Centre
CFA	Combat Fitness Assessment
CI	Chief Instructor
CMS	Critical Incident Mental Health Support
CO	Commanding Officer
COL COMDT	Colonel Commandant
COMDT	Commandant
COSC	Chief of Staffs Committee
COY	Company
CSIG	Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group
DCO	Defence Community Organisation
DGLD	Director General Land Development
DHOC	Deputy Head of Corps
DIPP	Defence Injury Prevention Programme
DPE	Defence Personnel Executive
DPI	Discharge Platoon
DSTO	Defence Science and Technology Organisation
ECN	Employment Codes Number
FIC	Fundamental Inputs to Capability

HDPE	Head Defence Personnel Executive
HOC	Head of Corps
HQ	Headquarters
HSB	Health Support Battalion
IET	Initial Employment Training
JHSA	Joint Health Support Agency
LCOMD	Land Command
LHQ	Land Headquarters
LWDC	Land Warfare Development Centre
MECRB	Medical Employment Categorisation Review Board
MO	Medical Officer
MP	Military Police
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NOK	Next-of-Kin
NTL	Net Training Liability
OC	Officer Commanding
OH&S	Occupational Health and Safety
PI	Platoon
PMF	Performance Management Framework
PTI	Physical Training Instructor
QA	Quick assessment
R PI	Rehabilitation Platoon
R&D PI	Rehabilitation and Discharge Platoon
RAA	Royal Australian Artillery
RAE	Royal Australian Engineers
RAInf	Royal Australian Infantry
RAP	Regimental Aid Post
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment
RIDC	Recruit Instructor Development Course
RN	Registered Nurse
SCMA	Soldiers Career Management Agency
SED	Single Entitlement Document
SFTC	Special Forces Training Centre
SIB	Special Investigations Branch
SOI	School of Infantry

TC-A	Training Command - Army
TE	Training Establishment
TMP	Training Management Package
TMS	Transition Management Services
TOET	Test of Elementary Training
TOR	Terms of Reference
TY	Training Year