REPORT ON THE FINDINGS
OF THE INVESTIGATION OF
MEDIA ALLEGATIONS THAT
DEFENCE STAFF INVESTIGATED THE
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE

Prepared by
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May 2009
REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF MEDIA ALLEGATIONS THAT DEFENCE STAFF INVESTIGATED THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE AND RELATED MATTERS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. On Thursday 26 March 2009, The Canberra Times published a front page story titled ‘How Defence officials spied on Fitzgibbon’, authored by Philip Dorling, Richard Baker and Nick McKenzie. The article claimed that officials in the Department of Defence had conducted a covert investigation into the Minister and his relationship with Ms Helen Liu. It also made a number of other allegations of improper activities by Defence, including by the Defence Signals Directorate. The same allegations appeared in Fairfax Press newspapers and subsequently in other newspapers, in radio and TV reports and on the internet.

2. On 26 March the Secretary directed the Defence Security Authority to ascertain whether there was any substance to the allegations. The Authority completed an initial assessment that day of the veracity of the allegations and found no evidence to support them. The results of that initial assessment were released by the Secretary on 27 March. On completion of the initial assessment the Authority started a more detailed investigation. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation provided independent best-practice guidance on the investigative methodology employed.

3. The investigation found that there is no evidence in Defence to support the allegations.

4. Specifically, in regard to the allegation that ‘Defence’ had conducted a covert investigation into the Minister and his relationship with Ms Liu, the more detailed assessment now completed confirms that:
   a. the Department of Defence, including the Defence Signals Directorate, has not undertaken any investigation of the Minister for Defence;
   b. the Department of Defence, including the Defence Signals Directorate, has not undertaken any investigation of Ms Helen Liu;
   c. the Department of Defence, including the Defence Signals Directorate, has not infiltrated the information technology systems or personal communications of the Minister for Defence, his staff or Ms Liu;
   d. in the course of undertaking its information security function the Defence Signals Directorate has not accessed any information relating to the Minister for Defence’s relationship with Ms Liu; and
   e. no official from the Department of Defence’s security and intelligence areas has raised any concerns, either with senior officers in the Department or with other parts of Government, about the Minister for Defence’s relationship with Ms Liu.

5. Furthermore:
   a. The investigation involved 1721 people from across Defence. 1368 statutory declarations have been signed by Defence officers, including senior officers in the Defence intelligence and security areas, which state that no officer undertook the activities alleged in the media articles or has any knowledge of anyone else doing so.
b. The investigation found no information to support speculation in the media that an investigation of the Minister for Defence, or of Ms Liu, may have been carried out by ‘rogue individuals’ in the Department, including in the Defence Signals Directorate.

c. The investigation confirmed that no Defence investigative authority or intelligence agency was aware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March. None of the 1721 people involved in the investigation indicated any awareness of Ms Liu, and searches of the Defence intelligence and security databases revealed no reference to the Ms Liu who was the subject of the media articles.

6. The findings outlined above in relation to the Defence Signals Directorate have been reached on the basis of the work done within Defence as part of this investigation. While I have a high level of confidence in them, it is worth noting that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security is continuing his independent investigation and, because of his wider powers, is undertaking a more comprehensive range of checks.

7. In the absence of any information available to this investigation to substantiate the allegations I conclude that there is no basis for Defence to refer the allegations to either the Australian Federal Police or the Commonwealth Ombudsman at this time.

F. X. ROBERTS
Chief Security Officer

14 May 2009
REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF MEDIA ALLEGATIONS THAT DEFENCE STAFF INVESTIGATED THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE AND RELATED MATTERS

BACKGROUND

1. On Thursday 26 March 2009 The Canberra Times published a front page story titled ‘How Defence officials spied on Fitzgibbon’, authored by Philip Dorling, Richard Baker and Nick McKenzie. The article claimed that officials in the Department of Defence had conducted a covert investigation into the Minister and his relationship with Ms Helen Liu. It also made a number of other allegations against Defence of improper activities, including allegations against the Defence Signals Directorate. The same allegations subsequently appeared in Fairfax newspapers, then in other newspapers, in radio and TV reports and on the internet.

2. On 26 March the Secretary directed the Defence Security Authority to ascertain whether there was any substance to the media allegations. The Authority completed an initial assessment that day of the veracity of the allegations. The Authority consulted with relevant external security intelligence and law enforcement agencies (the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Australian Federal Police, Australian Crime Commission and NSW Police) and relevant parts of Defence, in particular the Defence Signals Directorate, Defence’s investigative authorities (the Inspector-General’s Division, the ADF Investigative Service and the Service police) and the Chief Information Officer Group. The report of the Initial Assessment found no evidence to support the media allegations.

3. On completion of the initial assessment, the Defence Security Authority started a more detailed investigation.

4. On 27 March the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security announced that he would inquire into media allegations that the Defence Signals Directorate improperly accessed the Minister’s information technology equipment, and related matters.

Aim

5. The aim of this document is to report on the findings of the investigation into media allegations that a Defence member or contractor covertly investigated the personal information and affairs of the Minister or Ms Liu, and related matters.
INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY

Approach

6. Given the serious nature of the allegations which, if true, would have involved criminal behaviour by members of the Department of Defence, the Secretary considered referring the allegations to the AFP or the Commonwealth Ombudsman. He judged that in the absence of any information to substantiate the allegations made in the media such a referral would be premature. He decided to await the results of the Defence investigation before reaching a final decision.

7. The Defence Security Authority led the investigation with the assistance of investigators from the Inspector-General Division and the ADF Investigative Service. The Chief Information Officer Group conducted technical information technology checks.

8. ASIO provided independent best-practice guidance on the investigative methodology employed. To address conflict of interest concerns the members of each Defence investigative authority were interviewed by staff from another authority. On 2 April the Acting Commonwealth Ombudsman was briefed on the allegations and the actions being taken as part of the Defence investigation.

9. The major actions taken in the investigation were to:
   a. identify those parts of Defence encompassed by the allegations;
   b. interview individuals in the relevant parts of Defence who, by virtue of their day-to-day duties, were of particular interest to the investigation;
   c. ask individuals in the relevant parts of Defence with specific investigative skills, access to related sensitive information or privileged information technology access, to complete a statutory declaration covering any involvement in the alleged activities;
   d. interview anyone who declined to complete a statutory declaration;
   e. issue a general notice to all Defence staff requesting anyone with information relevant to the investigation to come forward;
   f. check the Defence Restricted Network for any unauthorised access to the Minister’s Defence Restricted Network account;
   g. check Defence information technology gateways and internal phone records to establish whether there has been contact between Defence computer or telephone services and the authors of the media articles; and
   h. identify any related previous Defence activity that could fall within the scope of the allegations.

10. To avoid any conflict with the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security’s inquiry, the Defence Security Authority scoped its activities to focus principally on the allegations as they related to the remainder of Defence. In relation to the allegation against the Defence Signals Directorate, the Defence Security Authority drew on the work undertaken by the Directorate to provide its input to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security’s independent inquiry. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security agreed to the Directorate providing this information to the Defence Security Authority noting...
that his inquiry and the Defence Security Authority’s investigation, while undertaken separately, were complementary activities.

11. Defence considered approaching The Canberra Times to seek a copy of any documentation or other information relevant to the media allegations in the newspaper’s possession. The Secretary decided not to do so as the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security decided to seek this same information from the journalists involved.

### Nature and Scope of Allegations

12. The investigation focused on allegations made in the media that:
   a. officials in Defence had been investigating the Minister and his relationship with Ms Liu;
   b. the Defence Signals Directorate ‘hacked into’ the Minister’s information technology systems, or acquired information about his relationship with Ms Liu as part of its activities to secure Government information systems;
   c. officials from Defence’s security and intelligence areas passed on their concerns about the Minister’s association with Ms Liu to ‘top brass’ within Defence but the matter did not go further; and
   d. Defence officials may have alerted the Government, in particular the Prime Minister’s office, to security concerns regarding the Minister’s relationship with Ms Liu.

13. The nature of the activities alleged in the media is such that anyone carrying them out would have needed skills, knowledge and access not widely available throughout Defence. As such, the allegations could not reasonably be considered to encompass all Defence staff. The Defence investigation gave highest priority to:
   a. staff in the relevant areas of the Defence Signals Directorate;
   b. staff with access to holdings of security or other intelligence;
   c. staff of the Defence investigative authorities with intelligence gathering or management responsibilities;
   d. staff with information technology access;
   e. staff with access to the Minister’s Defence phone accounts; and
   f. Defence staff working in the Minister’s office.

14. The investigation also covered people with skills, knowledge and access less relevant to the allegations, defined as:
   a. Defence Restricted Network system administrators;
   b. other staff of the Defence investigative authorities who lacked routine access to relevant information or knowledge; and
   c. staff who, by virtue of their routine duties, had some involvement in other matters mentioned in the media allegations, such as health issues and consideration of mining leases on Defence land.

15. To encourage all Defence staff to report any relevant information, the Secretary released an email on 30 March to all staff.
A similar email to all Defence staff was sent on 31 March on behalf of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

The Chief Security Officer emailed Group Heads and Service Chiefs on 30 March asking them to provide details of teams or individuals in their Group/Service with skills, knowledge and access relevant to the allegations not already identified by the Defence Security Authority.

Using the criteria set out above and information provided by Group Heads and Service Chiefs, the Defence Security Authority assessed the areas in Defence requiring closest attention to be:

a. the Intelligence, Security and International Policy Group, namely the Defence Signals Directorate, the Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation, the Defence Security Authority, International Policy Division and Business Management-Intelligence Branch;

b. the investigations branch of the Inspector-General Division;

c. the ADF Investigative Service, Service Police and other ADF organisations involved in intelligence and counterintelligence activities;

d. Defence Restricted Network system administrators and communications services staff in the Chief Information Officer Group and the Defence Materiel Organisation;

e. the Directorate of Ministerial and Parliamentary Liaison Services;

f. the Defence Science and Technology Organisation; and

g. Defence staff working in the Minister’s office.

Staff from the Joint Health Command and the Defence Support Group were also covered, as the issues raised by the media also touched on their responsibilities.

Interviews and Statutory Declarations

Investigators from one of the Defence investigative authorities interviewed people in the high interest category as defined in paragraph 13, except Defence Signals Directorate staff. Staff of the Directorate were interviewed by their management, and it is understood that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security will follow up with his own interviews as necessary or appropriate.

Staff in the categories of interest were asked to complete a statutory declaration relating to their involvement in or knowledge of the alleged investigation of the Minister or Ms Liu. Defence’s General Counsel cleared the statutory declaration before its use. An authorised investigator contacted anyone who declined to complete the statutory declaration or asked to speak to an investigator. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security sought statutory declarations from key Defence Signals Directorate staff, and followed up by seeking information from a number of other Directorate staff by means of notices issued under section 18 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986.

Other staff identified by Group Heads and Service Chiefs, or who came to the Defence Security Authority’s attention during the course of the investigation, were also interviewed and/or asked to complete a statutory declaration.
23. The investigation did not cover former Defence staff.

Information and Communication Technology Checks

24. A range of information technology checks involving the Defence Restricted Network were conducted.

25. Defence provides some office equipment in the Minister’s Parliament House, Sydney and Cessnock offices. There is no Defence information technology equipment in the Minister’s Cessnock or Canberra residences. The investigation reviewed access to the Defence information technology equipment in the Minister’s offices, and those responsible for its management completed a statutory declaration. Information technology equipment returned to Defence from the Minister’s offices was passed to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security for checking.

26. The Defence investigation did not encompass Parliament House information technology systems or phone records, or any non-Defence equipment in the Minister’s offices. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security agreed that any checks of that type would be left to his investigation.

Intelligence and Database Searches

27. As part of the actions to address the allegation that Defence was investigating Ms Liu, the Defence Signals Directorate, the Defence Intelligence Organisation and the Defence Security Authority were also asked to search their databases for any reference to her. The Defence Intelligence Organisation also audited its databases to identify whether anyone had conducted a search on Ms Liu.

INVESTIGATION RESULTS

28. 641 interviews and 1368 statutory declarations were completed, involving 1721 people from across Defence. All but two staff contacted agreed either to be interviewed or to complete a statutory declaration. Two individuals refused to complete a statutory declaration or be interviewed. Senior managers subsequently confirmed that neither individual warranted closer attention, as the unwillingness to participate was based on an in-principle objection to completing a statutory declaration or being interviewed rather than a wish to conceal involvement in the matters under investigation. The Defence Security Authority was unable to contact a small number of people relevant to the investigation as they are overseas or on long-term leave. The Authority assessed these people to be of low interest to the investigation.

The Defence Signals Directorate

29. The Defence Signals Directorate asked its Computer Network Vulnerability Team, Top Secret Accreditation Team and security section to provide details of any dealings they may have had with the Minister’s offices or work that related to the Parliament House.
information technology systems. The Computer Network Vulnerability Team was the only section to have done so. This involved providing advice, assistance and material support on matters related to information technology security and technical investigations. At no time did any staff access any information that related to the Minister’s relationship with Ms Liu.

30. The Directorate informed the Defence Security Authority of circumstances surrounding one occasion in July 2008 when it was asked by the Minister and his then Chief of Staff to examine memory sticks that had been given to them while overseas. During this analysis the Directorate found the Chief of Staff’s memory stick to be empty and the Minister’s stick to contain a personal file titled ‘Sophies reference.doc’. The Directorate informed the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of this matter and subsequently opened and read the document in the presence of the Inspector-General’s staff. This examination confirmed that the document is a reference for Sophie and does not mention Ms Liu. This is the only occasion that the Directorate has accessed a personal document of the Minister.

31. The Directorate confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March. It also confirmed that there is no reference in any of its databases to the Ms Liu who was the subject of the media articles.

32. As noted earlier, as part of his inquiry, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security has received statutory declarations from relevant staff. The Inspector-General has also issued notices under Section 18 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, to a range of staff within the Directorate.

Other Elements of Intelligence, Security and International Policy Group

33. All of the Defence Security Authority’s Senior Executive Service officers, Executive Level 1 and 2 officers and key security intelligence, investigations and vetting staff completed a statutory declaration. Senior Executive Service officers, staff in the security intelligence and counterintelligence teams, the security investigation unit, the managers of the Defence Security Authority’s ACT and NSW regional offices, the vetting executive and those responsible for conducting the top secret (positive vetting) of ministerial staff were also interviewed by investigators external to the Authority. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations.

34. The Authority confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March. There is no reference to Ms Liu in any of its databases.

35. All Senior Executive Service and Executive Level 1 and 2 officers in the Defence Intelligence Organisation completed a statutory declaration. In addition, staff on the Defence Intelligence Organisation’s China Desk and the agency security manager completed a statutory declaration and were interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations.

36. The Defence Intelligence Organisation confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March. A search of its databases did not reveal anything relevant to the media allegations. In particular, there is no reference in its databases to the Ms Liu who was the subject of the media articles. The
Organisation also confirmed that there have been no searches of its databases for a ‘Helen Liu’. This check went back as far as November 2007 and covers all users of the Organisation’s databases. This includes all professional intelligence officers in Defence, not just those in the Defence Intelligence Organisation.

37. All Senior Executive Service and Executive Level 1 and 2 officers in the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation completed a statutory declaration and the agency security manager was interviewed and completed a statutory declaration. No issues of concern were identified during the interview or in the statutory declarations. The Organisation confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March.

38. Because of their frequent interaction with the Minister and his staff, all staff in International Policy Division were asked to complete a statutory declaration. All but 12 agreed, with 11 of these agreeing to be interviewed. One individual declined to complete a statutory declaration or to be formally interviewed. The individual’s senior manager subsequently confirmed that the unwillingness to participate was based on an in-principle objection to completing a statutory declaration or being interviewed rather than a wish to conceal involvement in the matters under investigation. The staff of the North Asia section were interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations. The Division confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March.

39. All but eight of the total staff of the Business Management-Intelligence Branch completed a statutory declaration and five were interviewed. No issues of concern were identified in these statutory declarations and interviews. The eight officers not interviewed are on long-term leave and were assessed to be of low interest to the investigation. The Branch confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March.

40. Deputy Secretary Intelligence, Security and International Policy and all staff in his office completed statutory declarations. No issues of concern were identified.

Other Defence Organisations

41. 46 members of Headquarters Joint Operations Command, including the intelligence staff, completed statutory declarations and 37 were interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations. The Headquarters confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March.

42. 12 staff in the Inspector-General Division, including the Inspector-General, completed a statutory declaration and four of these people were also interviewed by investigators from another part of Defence. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations. The Division confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March.

43. 15 staff in the ADF Investigative Service were interviewed by non-ADF Investigative Service investigators, and 14 of these people completed a statutory declaration. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations. The Service
confirmed that it was unaware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the
media article on 26 March.

44. 44 members of the Service Police and other Service organisations involved in
intelligence and counterintelligence activities completed a statutory declaration and 19 were
also interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the
statutory declarations and there was no indication that any of these organisations were aware
of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March. One
individual declined to complete a statutory declaration or to be formally interviewed. The
individual’s senior manager subsequently confirmed that the unwillingness to participate was
based on an in-principle objection to completing a statutory declaration or being interviewed
rather than a wish to conceal involvement in the matters under investigation.

45. 492 Defence Restricted Network system administrators with privileged information
technology access (Chief Information Officer Group and the Defence Materiel Organisation)
completed statutory declarations and 46 were interviewed. No issues of concern were
identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations.

46. 18 Chief Information Officer Group communications services staff completed a
statutory declaration and were interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the
interviews or in the statutory declarations.

47. Two staff from the Vice Chief of the Defence Force Group completed statutory
declarations. No issues of concern were identified.

48. Seven staff from the Strategy, Coordination and Governance Group completed
statutory declarations. No issues of concern were identified.

49. Two staff from People Strategies and Policy Group completed statutory
declarations and three were interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations.

50. 15 Joint Health Command staff completed a statutory declaration and two were also
interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations.

51. 46 Defence Support Group staff completed a statutory declaration and one was also
interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the interview or in the statutory declarations.

52. Four Defence Science and Technology Organisation staff completed a statutory
declaration. No issues of concern were identified.

53. 19 Defence Materiel Organisation staff completed a statutory declaration. No issues of
concern were identified.

54. All Defence Committee members completed a statutory declaration. No issues of
concern were identified.

55. The Defence staff who have worked or now work in the Minister’s office, except for
two now employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act, completed statutory
declarations and were interviewed. No issues of concern were identified during the interviews or in the statutory declarations.

56. 58 Defence Ministerial and Parliamentary Liaison Services staff completed a statutory declaration. No issues of concern were identified.

57. Nine other people identified as being of interest during the investigation completed statutory declarations. No issues of concern were identified.

**General Notice to Staff**

58. The Defence Security Authority received three responses to the email sent from the Secretary to all Defence staff seeking information related to the media articles. Two of these respondents were interviewed and no issues of concern were identified. The nature of the third respondent’s comments was not relevant to the allegations, and therefore did not require follow up.

**Information Technology Checks**

59. The Chief Information Officer Group did not detect any unauthorised access to the Minister’s Defence Restricted Network account. Communications checks did not indicate any activity relevant to the allegations.

60. A number of the Defence staff interviewed indicated that they had access to Defence information technology systems that may have afforded them the ability to access Defence email accounts, telephone accounts and/or electronic data of Defence users, including the Minister’s accounts. This work included payment of telephone accounts, resetting of IT network passwords, computer access and network fault rectification. All these staff were interviewed and completed statutory declarations. All said that they did not have any unauthorised access to the Minister’s information technology accounts. A number of staff said that they can see phone costs and anomalies like calls to 1900 numbers but do not review any other information relating to the Minister’s computer or phone accounts. They confirmed that any checks are only conducted from a billing, rather than an investigative, perspective.

**OTHER MATTERS**

**Alleged Contact with External Agencies**

61. The Defence Security Authority asked the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation whether it had received any request from Defence about Helen Liu, or any request for information on anything related to the investigation. The Organisation stated that it was unaware of the source of the media allegations and had not received any request from Defence on any matter relating to them. It briefed the Attorney-General on 26 March in these terms and on its knowledge of Ms Liu. On 27 March the Attorney-General issued a press statement stating that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation had advised
him that it had no information regarding Ms Liu that would give rise to any security concern regarding her activities or associations.

62. On 26 March, the Australian Federal Police confirmed to the Defence Security Authority that it was unaware of the source of the media allegations and had not received any request from Defence or anyone in Defence on any matter relating to them.

63. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet has confirmed with the Prime Minister’s office that there is no record of Defence or anyone in Defence referring security concerns about the Minister to the Prime Minister or his staff, as was alleged in some media reports.

Other Defence Security Investigations

64. The Defence Security Authority has conducted nine investigations involving checks of Defence’s information technology gateways and internal phone records since the Minister assumed office. On no occasion was the content of any communication to or from the Minister or his staff accessed, nor was any specific search carried out which would have enabled identification of the Minister’s lists of contacts.

65. In one of these investigations, into the leak of a document in March 2008, the Defence Security Authority asked Parliament House security staff to conduct a limited search to see if the relevant document had left the Parliament House information technology network. This was done with the agreement of the Minister’s then Chief of Staff. The Parliament House security team subsequently advised the Defence Security Authority that the limited search conducted had not revealed evidence that the document had left the Parliament House information technology network. Parliament House staff advised that their investigation had examined only email and fax gateway tracking logs.

ASSESSMENT

66. The investigation found that there is no evidence in Defence to support the allegations.

67. Specifically, in regard to the allegation that ‘Defence’ had conducted a covert investigation into the Minister and his relationship with Ms Liu, the investigation confirms that:

a. the Department of Defence, including the Defence Signals Directorate, has not undertaken any investigation of the Minister for Defence;

b. the Department of Defence, including the Defence Signals Directorate, has not undertaken any investigation of Ms Helen Liu;

c. the Department of Defence, including the Defence Signals Directorate, has not infiltrated the information technology systems or personal communications of the Minister for Defence, his staff, or Ms Liu;

d. in the course of undertaking its information security function, the Defence Signals Directorate has not accessed any information relating to the Minister for Defence’s relationship with Ms Liu; and
e. no official from the Department of Defence’s security and intelligence areas has raised any concerns, either with senior officers in the Department or with other parts of Government, about the Minister for Defence’s relationship with Ms Liu.

68. Furthermore:
   a. The investigation involved 1721 people from across Defence. 1368 statutory declarations have been signed by Defence officers, including senior officers in the Defence intelligence and security areas, which state that no officer undertook the activities alleged in the media articles or has any knowledge of anyone else doing so.
   b. The investigation found no information to support speculation in the media that an investigation of the Minister for Defence, or of Ms Liu, may have been carried out by ‘rogue individuals’ in the Department, including in the Defence Signals Directorate.
   c. The investigation confirmed that no Defence investigative authority or intelligence agency was aware of Ms Liu or her relationship with the Minister before the media article on 26 March. None of the 1721 people involved in the investigation indicated any awareness of Ms Liu, and searches of the Defence intelligence and security databases revealed no reference to the Ms Liu who was the subject of the media articles.

69. The findings outlined above in relation to the Defence Signals Directorate have been reached on the basis of the work done within Defence as part of this investigation. While I have a high level of confidence in them, it is worth noting that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security is continuing his independent investigation and, because of his wider powers, is undertaking a more comprehensive range of checks.

70. In the absence of any information available to this investigation to substantiate the allegations I conclude that there is no basis for Defence to refer the allegations to either the Australian Federal Police or the Commonwealth Ombudsman at this time.

F. X. ROBERTS
Chief Security Officer

14 May 2009