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The Managing Editor
Defence Force Journal
Building C Room 4-25
Russell Offices
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A SCIENTIFIC LOOK AT TACTICAL TRAINING

Dear Sir,

Colonel G.H. Hellyer, R.A.E. is to be congratulated for his excellent article, "The Study of Tactics", published in the January-February 1983 issue of the Journal. It is refreshing to study such a paper because it is written from a scientific point of view and that is the proper and only approach to the subject of Tactics. The study of Tactics is exclusively an intellectual process of reasoning. It is not a mechanical process of memorising, such as for instance Principles of War, to repeat parrot fashion when these principles have to be applied.

In his opening remarks the author said with truth: "We rush into our study of tactics, examining specific problems, without understanding either what 'tactics' really means or what its study should entail." Indeed, the scientific study of Tactics involves the study of them theoretically, historically and practically on the ground, as the subject was once studied with advantage and understanding by the members of the Manchester Tactical Society. Tactical skill is not an innate skill and it is not one that is learnt by "sitting next to Nelly". It is learnt by a combination of sustained intellectual labour and the building up of considerable practical experience of the ground and in map reading. Map reading too, it should be noted, is not a skill which is acquired by the mere attendance at a C.O.'s lecture on the subject. Even Marshal Joffre was said to have been a poor map reader and Haig, in his conferences with him during the War of 1914-18, used to substitute for maps sand-tray models of the areas under discussion. Monash, on the other hand, read a map and studied area photographs with much the same ease as he read the pages of a book.

Elsewhere the author has pointed out that: "An otherwise sound tactical plan, which is too complex for the abilities of the staff and units tasked with executing it, is a poor plan." It was in this sphere that Field-Marshal Montgomery excelled. His plans, as issued, were simple, crystal clear and intelligible to all concerned. He had the ability also of being able to explain his plans, orally, with great clarity, to all ranks concerned with their execution.

Colonel Hellyer analyses Tactics into decision-making and procedure. This analysis adds up, in one word, to Management.

Although one sees at times distinction made between Management and Administration, Management is in fact the current fashionable name for Administration. During my service in the Army, Administration was the term in use and it denoted a subject greatly despised by some seeking marshal's batons. In retrospect I can see that these ambitious officers had no systematic training in the subject and their conceptions of its content and purpose did not rise much above that of the duties of an orderly room sergeant and these ambitious officers certainly did not associate Administration with Tactics which to them was something not to be soiled by association with administration. Decision-making in tactical operations does not differ, in its processes, from decision-making in other spheres of an officer's work. He needs knowledge matured by its application in practical experience to make good decisions. But knowledge and experience alone, like patriotism as Nurse Cavell pointed out, is not enough. They must be complied with a temperament which endows an officer with the urge and the courage to make decisions which are timely.

The author, in a discussion of Appreciation, indicated that: "It should always be made clear to students that the written appreciation is only a poor reflection of the mental appreciation which it summarises." It should be noted in this context, however, that an appreciation introduces two special and sometimes overlooked factors, namely that of trained observation and that of an ability to record objectively in writing, with skill, clarity and brevity, what one observes. Obviously, a gunner officer walking through a hospital ward with an R.M.O. does not see there what the R.M.O. sees. Clemenceau once made an important distinction when he said "to look is not always to see." Again, one does not learn to write appreciations, at a standard required in modern
warfare, by attending a half-day course on the subject.

Some important comments have been made by Colonel Hellyer on battle experience and he has pointed out that because of the magnitude and variety of modern world wars participants cannot have universal experience. Nevertheless, battle experience is, like all other kinds of military experience, not an end in itself and so it is well to remember the story about Frederick the Great’s mules. Experience is only of value if lessons are drawn from it to improve future performance. This is a trite saying that has been repeated often. What is not trite nor often repeated is that the drawing of lessons from experience is an intellectual process and so it is usually only scientifically trained persons with higher standards of general education who draw useful lessons from experience. Another factor to consider when evaluating battle experience is one that may be best be illustrated by an example. When the German Army went to war in 1914, its officers and other ranks at the regimental level had no previous battle experience. The German Army had not previously been on active service since the close of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Even Ludendorff had no previous active service experience when he went to war in 1914. Yet this lack of previous battle experience did not seem to affect the high standard of sustained performance of the front-line officers and other ranks in the War of 1914-18. The systematic training for war of the German Army before August 1914 more than compensated for its lack of previous active service or battle experience when war came.

The author referred to the important subject of definitions of terms. Definitions can of and in discussions become, sometimes, time-wasting. But these are not valid reasons for neglecting them altogether, either in tactical instruction or in other branch of military training where comprehension and clarity demand them. An officer should be able, at least to his own satisfaction, to define the terms he uses in his professional work. The days of the officer, trained exclusively in the practical school of Field-Marshal Blucher, have long since vanished.

Many people who use the terms Strategy and Tactics, nowadays, are probably unable to define them or to explain their differences with the clarity and brevity that General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley did in The Operations of War. There he said, with great vividness and succinctness: “The theatre of war is the province of strategy — the field of battle is the province of Tactics.”

Towards the end of his article, Colonel Hellyer sounded a note to attract the attention of his readers to the importance of a systematic and comprehensive study of Military History. This is a big subject in itself. Indeed, tactical training without a wide and scientific knowledge of Military History is akin to studying Astronomy without looking at the stars. This deficiency in knowledge of Military History and the want of a scientific approach to tactical training may explain why Tactics has in the past been sometimes so badly taught.

WARREN PERRY
Major, R.L.


DRILL IN THE ARMY

Dear Sir,

I wish to comment on the article “Drill in a Modern Australian Army” from Defence Force Journal No. 39 March/April 1983. There are specific sections with which issue should be taken and also I will make some comments about the general principles raised. By these comments I would hope to stimulate questions and discussion about the place of drill in modern military organizations.

There is certain irony in the article quoting from T. E. Lawrence, who was certainly not renown for his love of orthodox military routine. The quotation itself is appropriate for the purpose of this letter — “if we must fight there is little excuse for not fighting well.” To this end, every aspect of military endeavour must be exposed to thorough questioning and constructive criticism. Unfortunately, the questioning of the orthodox military in many cases on their practices, tends to receive the reply that this practice works, it achieves the desired effect, so why change it? This attitude ignores the question of whether the practice is the most efficient, the most cost effective in terms of men and material.

The article’s reference to Pavlov and the type of experiment on conditional reflexes that he performed, seem contradictory. Parade
ground drill is very much in the nature of conditional reflexes.

Drill itself is not an efficient method of exercise and will not produce benefits in cardio-pulmonary fitness. Long repetitious marching on hard surfaces may, however, induce and exacerbate certain forms of arthritis. Purely from an exercise point of view, the troops would benefit more from an obstacle course or other exercise such as canoeing, cycling or swimming.

The firm declaration of the intrepid qualities of the British soldier do not entirely ring true. In World War One many of the British units were held in low esteem by the ANZACs. In North Africa in World War Two it was noted that British soldiers lacked initiative in comparison to the German troops who fought on despite losing their officers and senior NCOs.

The quotation from Robert Jackson could well be used to dispute a basic assumption made by the article. The drills prescribed then were appropriate for the warfare of the time, while the drills apparently extolled by the article are a residue from the previous wars of centuries ago.

In the days of Wellington and Washington the drills that were done on the battlefield then are similar to the drills now done on the parade ground. However, the style of warfare has changed dramatically. In those days most infantry units fought as a tightly grouped body. The modern infantryman is usually expected to be relatively dispersed and show a much higher degree of individual resourcefulness and self discipline.

While it is true that many units that have performed very well in combat this century have also been amongst the best drilled units on the parade ground, it is also obvious, if one cares to study even a cursory history of modern conflicts, that some of the most motley, illkept and badly drilled soldiers have made the best combat troops.

In looking for prominent examples one need go no further than the ANZACs. They had a justly deserved reputation for being poor in discipline, slovenly in appearance, having little regard for rank. Indeed many would only salute those officers they personally respected and at the same time they were among the best combat assault troops in the world. This was never more obvious than during World War One.

Indeed to many Australian soldiers it seemed that they bore the brunt of the fighting while the more polished, better drilled British units in action consistently performed below the standard expected.

Some of the very best combat soldiers such as the SAS have a well known dislike for parade ground drill which makes an interesting reflection on the articles “Terrorist Example”. There is certainly a large amount of historical evidence to support the contention that smartness in parade drill is either immaterial or even in some ways not desirable in efficient fighting soldiers.

The article made many assertions about fighting qualities such as aggression and precision timing having their origins in parade drill. It also contended that “the most important basic principle in soldiering is drill”. These concepts are presented as articles of military dogma without proof or reasoning to support them. It would be more correct to say the most important basic principle of soldiering is discipline. One only has to consider the irregular soldiers who fought so successfully in the various twentieth century conflicts without ever seeing a parade ground to appreciate that such dogma cannot be accepted if one is to consider combat effectiveness.

There are more dangerous aspects of over emphasis on parade ground drill. It becomes an inefficient use of time which could be better spent in training for combat itself.

Perhaps as importantly, drill becomes a ritual procedure and in such cases produces a false impression of security and a sense of complacency. It becomes almost a panacea, producing the appearance of efficiency and order without necessarily being related to combat or primary duty efficiency. It induces senior commanders into a complacent attitude that if the troops drill well and are neat in appearance, everything else will fall into place, and they will all automatically become efficient in all aspects of their duties. On such a complacent, false presumption have many of the British military disasters been partly based.

Drill helps to induce the habit of unquestioning obedience; and this is seen by many as a desirable trait in the military. In modern warfare the emphasis has, however, increased for the individual to be self reliant, self disciplined and flexible. NCOs and junior (continued on page 42)
Conflict Resolution Through Organizational Development

By Flight Lieutenant R. G. Vansetten, RAAF

INTRODUCTION

Within complex organisations, many tools of management are available to transform those organisations into more effective and efficient places of work. One tool, Organisational Development (OD), is an extremely valuable managerial concept using behavioural analysis techniques which are designed to improve decision making, interpersonal relationships, and the ability to adapt to environmental change. OD programs have been used widely by commercial enterprises for many years, yet apparently such sophisticated programs are rarely used within the Military Service. Rather the Services tend to manage personnel on ad hoc principles, without seeking the guidance of external agents or utilising the variety of successful personnel development practices available to them.

This presentation describes an OD program, devised by the author, which shall involve only two sections (in this case) operating within the same department. These two mythical sections have been severely troubled by inter-personal problems, overt rivalry and tension over a substantial time period. This type of situation is present in real life situations, exemplified by union - management conflict, rivalry between and within the Services, or any two sections within a department which are striving towards the same ultimate goals, (i.e. achievement of organisational objectives) yet fail to attain complete fulfilment because of the conflict which exists. Friendly rivalry generally enhances esprit-de-corps and the will to win. Should this rivalry develop beyond a critical point, dysfunctional consequences on the organisation as a whole will result.

The program relies heavily on the effective use of an intermediary known as an “interventionist.” The person undertaking this role of the interventionist or change agent ought to be an industrial psychologist who is experienced in the fields of behavioural analysis and organisational development. In the Service environment where conflict exists, a neutral “umpire” may be quite appropriate to resolve differences. His prime role is to conduct and control the course or program in an orderly fashion, whilst leading the participants towards the successful attainment of program objectives. Two essential characteristics of the change agent are his ability to communicate effectively and a knowledge of the total environment in which he has to operate.

AIM

The aim of this presentation is to describe a program of activities designed to resolve the differences and create harmony between at least two sections or units within a department. Included in the description will be an explanation of the purpose and relevance of each activity. Furthermore, and implicit in the program will be a brief description of how the interventionist should be introduced to the groups, the problems he may face as an “alien” i.e. an interventionist trying to solve someone else’s problems, and the important personality traits that he must possess if ultimate success is to be assured.

To preserve neutrality, this presentation will not detail specific situations or organisations, but will refer to inert terms whilst specifying the steps of the program. One area that will be common to all organisations employing a change agent to solve internal problems though are the contingencies the interventionist will have to face when he first starts his program.
THE INTERVENTIONIST — AN OUTSIDER LOOKING IN

One crucial factor to the success of any OD program is the introduction and acceptance of the interventionist by management, the employees, and, if applicable, the unions. The problem is exacerbated if the consultant is completely foreign to the company. Argyris offers a very tactful introduction, where the department head would introduce the interventionist, saying: “We know that a problem exists, and both sections seem to want to resolve the conflict. One thing I like about the interventionist’s approach is his insistence that if he joins us, it must be at the invitation of all of us as a group. That means if something is started, it will be because all of us want it.”

The effect of this introduction on groups wanting to find a solution will be to lower some of the hostility barriers — an air of cooperation will begin to develop. However, even though the interventionist may have been partially accepted by the groups, a certain amount of distrust and suspicion will still pervade. The manner in which the consultant handles the groups both as individuals, as teams and as groups will be another vital factor to successful implementation of any OD program.

The interventionist must not have a threatening style of personality. The intention of his OD program is to involve everybody in all aspects of the program equally, that is, in the introduction, design, execution, feedback and evaluation of all aspects of the program. To achieve that goal, the interventionist should allow participants to test and confront him. Therefore the interventionist must be a person of high integrity and great strength of character, as well as a true professional. His power over his subjects, due to his professional competence, is equalised by his encouraging them to question him and the entire program. The feedback to the participants, not only during this testing time, but also at any stage of the program will relax them, develop better interpersonal communications, and allow a mutual trust to grow. The interventionist must permit and encourage these developments to take place if he is to maximise the effectiveness of his program.

Throughout the entire program, the interventionist must maintain a totally professional role. Participants may try to elicit information, intentionally or otherwise, such as asking what other people have said, what will be the next strategy, and so on. The consultant must deal with the situation quite resolutely, answering in a manner that is both neutral and that will dissuade further questions along these lines.

In summary, the interventionist must always be as visible and approachable as possible, he needs to preserve confidentiality, and accept, but not concede efforts to manipulate him.

STUDYING THE ORGANISATION

Even if the interventionist is a member of the organisation in question, he needs to study in depth the environment in which the two sections (in this case) operate. A formal organisational structure, describing formal lines of authority and perhaps formal lines of communication would almost certainly exist, irrespective of the type of organisation.

Of much greater interest though is the informal structure of the organisation. For example, we are all well aware of the maxim “It’s not what you know, but who you know” when personal favours are needed. The interventionist will be keen to compare the informal with the formal structure, noting particularly the extent to which informal authority and the informal lines of communication are used. He will be further interested to discover if sections within the department use a distributive approach of an integrative approach to decision making when sections are faced with inter-sectional conflict or problems.

A PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES

Introduction

In this scenario, the two sections in conflict have been noted as adopting the distributive approach (the groups look after their own individual interests only) to inter-sectional problem solving. The two sections, who strive to achieve their individual goals, are experts in their relative fields. Whenever a decision or change needs to be made that will involve both sections, resistance to each other’s suggestions and ideas, a strengthening of rules and a lack of trust develops. Now the sections devise deceptive tactics and maintain an air of secrecy — one would hardly think they were working for the same department or organisation!

Basic strategy

The basic strategy used in this program is derived from M. Parker-Follett’s “Construc-
tive Confrontation" program (refer to Table One). Constructive Confrontation is a process whereby integration is sought by having the parties directly engage each other and focus on the conflict between them. This technique, if well managed, does resolve conflict, overcome resistance to change, and improve communication—all of which are applicable to the two sections. The technique is most useful when insufficient time is available for other techniques such as sensitivity training and attitude surveys. However, it shall be assumed that there is no specific time constraint for this OD program: it is envisaged to run for two or more weeks.

CONSTRUCTIVE CONFRONTATION—RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance</td>
<td>Significant power held by each party where one or both will not face conflict.</td>
<td>Lack of action on some matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>Good deal of power held by one party; little by the other.</td>
<td>Victory for one, submission of the other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Significant power held by each party.</td>
<td>Each gives up something valuable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Mutual desire to achieve a completely satisfactory solution.</td>
<td>Both parties satisfied.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table One

The program has two functional characteristics:

a. it is organic, internal, and related to the culture of the organisation; and
b. it is designed to accomplish basic behavioural change.

The Plan—Step One

The first step towards integration is to have the participants reveal something of themselves, their job roles (as they see them), the organisation, and the interpersonal relations as they are perceived at the moment. The most useful way of obtaining such information is by a written questionnaire that ought to be anonymous. A sample of useful questions is at Annex A. The answers can be compared to what the organisation expects of an individual. For example, does a person interpret his role in the same way as that laid down in the formal organisation structure?

By using an anonymous questionnaire, several things are achieved:

1. an anonymous questionnaire will be tend to make participants more open and truthful when answering questions, thereby producing much more useful information;
2. a questionnaire avoids the need for spoken communication at a time when doubt and mistrust towards the interventionist may still exist; and
3. by allowing ample time to write responses, a questionnaire provokes thought, enables the respondent to clarify his own role within the organisation, and he may be able to put into perspective more clearly the conflict between the two sections.

The other viable alternative is for the interventionist to discuss questions individually with employees. However, the information obtained may not be as useful, for the following reasons:

1. at the early stage of the program, participants may not have developed sufficient trust in the interventionist;
2. irrational or poorly thought-out responses may be given;
3. the respondent is immediately identifiable, and fear of retaliation from management for statements made out of place is likely to be high (this is especially true of the Service environment); and
4. the chance of encountering a reticent participant is also high.

One further advantage of the questionnaire (whether written or by interview) in relation to the Constructive Confrontation model is that the tactics of avoidance and domination (refer Table One) have been delayed if not bypassed.

The Plan—Step Two

By this time the interventionist has studied all the response to the questionnaire, and compared responses to formal organisational requirements (for example comparing perceived roles with formal roles). The next step in the program involves actual confrontation between members of each section.

The interventionist pairs off each member with a member of the other section, (on a random basis, to avoid favouritism, although members should be of equal status if possible). He provides each two man team with a questionnaire which may be the same as previous one. Each team will then discuss the questions for an appropriate amount of time, before
returning to the central meeting place such as conference room.

The aims of this step are:
1. it enables a member of one section to discuss his environment as he sees it, whilst enabling the other to appreciate the plight of his partner, and vice versa; and
2. the use of avoidance and domination tactics will be diminished significantly, and the tactics of compromise and integration should begin to emerge.

There is perhaps a danger that a personality clash will develop between the members of a pair, or that the formal rank of participants will obstruct progress. Should either situation develop, the interventionist must act promptly to settle the conflict, by swapping partners if necessary. However strong rivalry is unlikely in this situation, because natural leaders tend to derive much of their dominance from those around them. Here, they have only themselves to rely on.

The Plan — Step Three

All groups should be recalled to the central meeting place, and split into their respective sections. At the invitation of the interventionist, one team discusses problems they have had in performing jobs, including intra-group problems, as well as problems at the interface with other sections in the organisation. While they do this, the other group listens, they observe the interaction and make notes, but otherwise do not participate. The two groups then reverse position and roles.

At the completion of this discussion, individuals are again paired off to discuss problems that have emerged from each group’s discussions. Each pair tries to solve the implications of the problems and develop solutions. After a suitable time, both groups reassemble to hear the solutions proposed, and for general discussion.

Again any possibility of the use of avoidance and domination tactics has effectively been minimised. Both groups have had the opportunity of airing their grievances and of listening to those of the other section, whilst interaction between the two sections has occurred only on a small scale. By this stage then, individuals have been able to put into perspective not only their own and section problems and shortcomings, but also those of the other section.

Another aim of this step is to observe interpersonal behaviour of participants whilst groups are discussing their problems. Of particular interest is the interaction between individuals and identifying the natural (informal) leaders within the group. Dominant personalities, radicals as well as the submissive and reticent should be noted to give a clear picture of the power structure within the group. The interventionist, being the professional consultant would most probably recognize these personalities easiest and use that information most effectively. This knowledge would be used mainly in Step Four.

The Plan — Step Four

It is at this stage of the program that both groups openly discuss the conflict that exists between them. A high degree of tactful control needs to be exercised by the interventionist because initially at least, some very heated debates may arise. The tactics of avoidance and domination are very likely to be used, and it is the interventionist’s responsibility to lead both teams firstly to compromise and finally to integration.

Both teams have measured the actual situation. They now need to compare it to an optimal situation. The interventionist may distribute a questionnaire with statements about specific practices and managerial strategies as a basis for discussion. The groups then decide the real obstacles to progress and why they are obstacles. What is achieved if the obstacle is removed? What specific action is required to remove and overcome obstacles?

Although heated discussion may frequently emanate, participants will come to know each other intimately through their encounters over the intensive period of the program. They usually learn and accept criticism in an atmosphere of constructiveness and caring, because they begin to see it as evaluation or reaction that is intended to help them gain insight into themselves and to become more effective. With a cohesion based on objectivity and candor, participants may well find that they can work together effectively both during the program and in the future.

Therefore through careful manipulation, the interventionist can lead both sections to total integration, so that future problems and decisions may be discussed in an atmosphere of uninhibited dialogue, trust and friendliness.
Feedback

Throughout the program, the interventionist must strive to provide maximum feedback to both the participants and management. However this program calls for detailed feedback only after the diagnosis of the conflict. Feedback on the program is important for the following reasons:

1. It helps management and participants explore the meaning and effectiveness of the results;
2. It allows them to question the validity and completeness of the results; and
3. It will implicate if not specify action required by management such as the need to:
   a. define organisational goals more clearly and in terms that employees can relate to;
   b. spend more time on conflict resolution and team building;
   c. enable workers to have a greater say in the planning of operations; and
   d. define individual responsibilities more clearly.

Feedback to the interventionist from both participants and management is equally important. It provides a validity check on tactics used by the interventionist, it will provide a more accurate diagnosis of the problems, and if negative feelings about the diagnosis emerge, the feedback will enable the interventionist an opportunity to create a climate in which the negative feelings can be brought out.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The ultimate aim of this program is to develop an effective organisation. Certainly it is necessary to have high morale, but an organisation would be short sighted if it strove to achieve just that. Instead, an organisation should be committed to building a strong organisational structure that seeks objectivity, openness and candor in all relationships. People need to confront each other to resolve conflict, rather than avoid it. It means too that individuals must be honest with each other by demanding that the objectives of the organisation are met fully. Furthermore, organisation members must continue to instil inter-personal competition, for only whom both competition and conflict are brought out into the open and dealt with objectively in an atmosphere of supportive trust can they be helpful to the individual and the company.

Although the program described in this article is not detailed, it does outline a strategy that the author believes will achieve effectiveness in an organisation troubled by interpersonal problems and tension. If the program is to be successful, the use of an external change agent is paramount. Although he will encounter difficulties initially, his professionalism in the field, his experience and his personality should allow him to achieve the goal of resolving conflict and developing a lasting cohesion and unity of purpose between the two parties.

A FINAL WORD

Once conflict is resolved, and each section returns to its daily routine, management must adopt a follow-up program to reinforce lessons learned, and to capitalise on the effectiveness of the program. The interventionist too, must continue to offer and receive feedback, to ensure continuing success of his program and to assist in solving problems that may arise later. In this way, a lasting cohesion will be assured.

NOTES
1. C. Argyris "Intervention Theory and Method" (Addison-Wesley 1973) p 231.
2. Finch Jones-Litterer "Managing for Organisational Effectiveness" (McGraw-Hill 1976) pp 237-8. A distributive approach is where groups look only after their own needs, and neglect the needs of the total organisation.
3. Finch Jones & Litterer loc cit. An integrative approach is where groups work in co-operation, seeking not only to meet their own needs, but also the needs of the total organisation.
4. Finch Jones & Litterer loc cit.
7. The Conference Board — the case study "Stemburg's, Ltd".

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rydges (October 1980 issue) "Double Return from Internal Consultants" p 78 ff.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS (ANNEX A)

Below is a sample of questions that may be used to discover the intricacies of an organisation and personal feelings about a subject's own role and his working environment.

1. How would you describe your job? What do you experience to be important aspects of your job?
2. What, if any, satisfaction do you experience at work?
3. What factors tend to facilitate your effectiveness on your job?
4. What factors tend to inhibit your effectiveness on your job?
5. What do you see as your set during the next three to five years? What do you see as the next step in your career?
6. If you were hiring someone for a job like yours, what would you look for?
7. How would you describe your relationship with your subordinates?
8. How would you describe your relationship with your boss?
9. How would you describe your relationship with your peers?
10. Is there anything that you have done in the past year that you would consider novel?
11. What, if any, dissatisfactions do you experience on the job?
12. If you look back over the people who were promoted during the last year, what qualities seemed to lead to success?
13. Do you have any idea about your superior's feeling about your work effectiveness?
14. How do you think your subordinates evaluate your work?
15. Is there anything about your job that you would like to see changed?
16. How do you evaluate your superior in terms of:
   a. openness to new ideas and information?
   b. risk taking?
   c. trust?
   d. conformity to pressure from above?
17. How would you evaluate yourself in the same characteristics?
18. Is there any conflict among top management? If so, how is it handled?
19. If you could alter one thing about your boss's behaviour, what would that be?
20. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of top management?
21. What do you see to be the impact of product planning and program reviews?
22. What do you believe to be the most important unsolved problems of this organisation?
23. How would you describe your leadership style?
24. If you were to advise me on what to look for if I am to truly understand your organisation, what would that be?
THINK SYSTEMS
OR
WHAT DO THEY KNOW OF SYSTEMS WHO ONLY TRAINING SYSTEMS KNOW?

By Major B.D. Copeland, BA BEd St RAAEC

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, mankind has begun to study the concept of systems. Systems, as such, came into existence thousands of years ago when men and women first gathered in groups. Ancient armies were organized into systems. For centuries, the Chinese civil service had administered the ‘Middle Kingdom’ by an elaborate bureaucratic system. Scholars have argued for years over the question of whether or not feudal society was organized into systems.

Modern man, through his study of the concept of systems has come to recognize systems in all areas of life. He has ‘discovered’ planetary systems, social systems, blood systems, ecosystems, computer systems, kinship systems, value systems and training systems. Children at school learn about aspects of ‘systems’ through ‘sets and logic’ in modern mathematics.

A system has been taken to be an organized whole, consisting of interrelated parts, operating according to a set of principles.

In other words, the systems have always been there but we are only now beginning to study their existence, to classify these and to apply the principles of systems to other areas of human endeavour.

It will be contended that our new awareness of systems should be applied to Training in general and to the New Technology in particular. It will also be contended that Course Designers should become students of ‘systems’ so that they can frame or modify courses in terms of specific technical, tactical, or administrative systems. From this, they should be able to compare system types and establish insights to enrich Training and Education in support of training.

Aim
The aim of this article is to establish the need for those in Training to ‘think systems’.

Background
This article has been prepared in conjunction with four (4) articles that have appeared in the Defence Force Journal. These are:
- ‘A Framework for Education and Training’ Defence Force Journal No. 32 Jan/Feb 1982; and

These articles have been written to demonstrate aspects of the process of ‘thinking systems’ and of preparing courses to maximize effectiveness in passing skills to student personnel.

Each article proceeds from a recognition of the value of a Systems Approach to Training as promoted by the services of the Defence Force.
Further submissions will explore the application of 'thinking systems' to Course Design related to Computer Assisted Instruction.

Why Systems?

Why is 'thinking systems' important to the conduct of Training and Education? The following benefits are suggested:
- The integral relationship of Education to Training should become obvious, together with the ways in which the links can be made.
- An inventory of skills may be established to support the most effective rationalization of courses.
- Those involved in analyzing, designing and validating training courses may become more aware of the mechanics of integrating the component skills into a working whole.

Skills and courses may be organized in the most effective way for future preparation and use of computer soft ware.

System Types

There are three system types as follows:
- Determined Systems,
- Probabilistic Systems and
- Self Organizing Systems.

A scale may be drawn with the Determined Systems at one end, Probabilistic Systems in the middle and Self Organizing Systems at the other end. As we move from the Determined Systems to the Self Organizing Systems, the number of independent variables will increase. At the same time, the component of human action increases while the predictable technical and administrative supports decrease. All Decision Making may be categorized along this scale.

**Dependent variables increase**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETERMINED SYSTEMS</th>
<th>PROBABILISTIC SYSTEMS</th>
<th>SELF ORGANIZING SYSTEMS</th>
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**Independent variables increase**

**Determined Systems.** The input and output in such systems are completely predictable. It is predictable that a correctly designed engine will operate. It is equally predictable that an incorrectly designed engine may not operate. Such systems may include the operation of:
- an engine,
- a radio,
- the computer system, and
- an animal nervous system.

**Probabilistic Systems.** All technical, tactical and administrative systems involve human Decision-Making for design, operation, maintenance, repair and evaluation. It is 'probabilistic' that a mechanic will repair an engine correctly or that a letter will be passed through a mail system from Point A to Point B. The task of personnel at each point in a system is to ensure the highest probability of success in operation. Systems may include all those in the Defence Force which involve input by a member of the service.

**Self Organizing Systems.** Within the systems of human relations, there is a wide range of variables. Such systems may operate within or without the work situation and may or may not be conducive to harmony and work efficiency. Such systems may be identified and applied to the design of courses in leadership. These may include:
- value systems,
- kinship systems, and
- social systems.
Decisions as Input

The operation of many systems involves the input of Decision Making. The complexity and effect of the decision will depend on the type of both decision and system. A computer operator may have the option of only the ‘Yes/No’ decision. A car mechanic may be required to locate a fault in the operation, maintenance, repair or design of a vehicle. This may involve a complex and extended operation. A leader will make decisions across a range of system types involving the tactical, technical and administrative systems as well as the formal and informal human systems.

Ripples in a Pond

Any system operates as a complex series of inputs and outputs. The student of systems should be able to identify the operation of the ‘ripples in a pond’ effect, with rows upon rows of causes and effects leading to and spreading out from, any given action.

There is a ‘whole’ within the context of Decision-Making. The ‘ripple’ effect requires us to view Decision-Making as operating within technical, tactical, administrative and human systems.

At a particular level, a soldier may be required to understand the operation of the system involved in a warehouse. At a higher level of command, there would be the requirement to understand the system of supply in a theatre of war. Each ‘whole’ is ‘part’ of another ‘whole’.

Organization of Courses

It should be possible within any organization, for Training to proceed in terms of a clearly defined ‘whole’, divided into ‘parts’ and allocated to personnel responsible for analyzing, designing and validating training courses. The ‘whole’ would be provided by a master map prepared to promote ease of reference and to facilitate an effective division of labour.

If any organization is intent on introducing computers into Training, then it is necessary for that organization to determine whether or not rationalization can occur in the organization of the skills developed on any given range of courses.

A possible approach is the organization of courses in terms of the skills of Decision-Making which would provide the framework for the subject specific skills and for any future computer programmes.

New Technology

The world is experiencing an explosion of knowledge in computer technology. At present, there is a critical shortage of skilled professionals. All governments in the world are faced with the problem of promoting computer technology through both Education and Training.

Even before computers were introduced within any organization, there were steps that could have been taken to support a smooth transition.

Mode of Thought

The operation of computers demands a particular mode of thought. A number of techniques is available to facilitate this requirement, including Network Analysis, System Theory and Decision Making.

An organization may then promote such techniques across all courses. There are very few decisions that may not be translated to a simple flow chart. Every Course Designer should be able to apply Network Theory to the planning of any task to be promoted on a given course.

Every training programme should run with regard for the logic and efficiency of a computer programme.

Every exercise on every course should be prepared and presented as if there were a plan to prepare a computer programme in the following week. This means that exercises should be prepared in terms of:

- simple to complex;
- relevant Decision Making Skills (2); and
- mastery learning (3).
Effective Course Design
The Course Designer has much to learn from the systems analyst, the computer programmer and the effective teacher. Computer Assisted Instruction is becoming an important mode of passing skills both to students and instructors. The following skills are involved in effective design of courses for Computer Assisted Instruction:

• Analysis of the system, sub-systems and processes under study;
• establishment of tasks;
• arrangement of tasks in logical order;
• systematic development of tasks for 'mastery learning';
• establishment of the components of each task; and
• extraction of any skills common to all tasks to be developed separately and integrated into the finished programme.

Study of Systems
Personnel involved in promoting Training should be encouraged to study the operation of systems. The types of systems that predominate in a given organization will affect the running of that organization. On the sea, a 'ship' system predominates. Similarly an 'aircraft' system dominates in the air. So too, the system of command in an artillery battery will be influenced greatly by the weapon systems in operation. All involve personnel operating 'Determined Systems' with an expected 'probability' of success.

In an infantry battalion, the Commander will strive to develop a 'human fighting system'. The essential feature is that the basic components consist of people and each component has the capacity to make decisions. (The wing of an aircraft has no such capacity).

The Commander must also promote the 'self organizing' systems to the extent that soldiers in combat must have a degree of initiative and self reliance to complement their ability to act in 'determined' ways. If in Training, all possible aspects are identified then many 'self organizing functions' can be developed as 'determined functions'.

An infantry battalion, unlike a ship or an aircraft, has a 'self organizing' capacity. An aircraft may crash. A ship may sink. However, the loss of an important component of an infantry battalion need not mean the automatic loss of the battalion. The remnants of two battalions may amalgamate on the battlefield. However, the amalgamation of two damaged ships is a different matter.

The Captain of a ship must centralize authority and control to a greater degree than does the Commander of an infantry battalion. Different system types predominate.

Defence System
Within the Defence System, there is a network of interlocking sub-systems. These include the sub-systems of operations, logistics and manpower/personnel. Within the manpower/personnel sub-system are further sub-systems involving recruiting, employment and training.

A Body of Theory
It is possible for a body of theory to be compiled and prepared for the benefit of those involved in Training. Information would then be made available for the following areas:

• System theory;
• Decision Making; and
• Network Analysis.

Organizations may need to assess the support given to their Training personnel to determine whether or not such personnel are left too much to their own devices in analyzing, designing and validating courses.

Recommendations
For any organization faced with the onset of New Technology, the following recommendations are made:
that the computer ‘mode of thought’ be introduced to all courses;
• that emphasis be placed in Training Courses on skills of Decision Making; and
• that Course Designers be trained to apply with skill the perspectives of a systems analyst, a computer programmer and a classroom practitioner.

Conclusion

The present ‘state of the art’ in computer technology involves us all in ‘thinking systems’ as a daily event in our lives. Systems have long been important units in the industrial and economic world. We have become involved with a systematized approach to training. However, this does not mean that we are skilled in application of technical, tactical and administrative systems particularly in relation to Course Design. We, in Training and Education, must learn to ‘think systems’ and to teach students to do so as well.

NOTES


REFERENCES


Major Copeland has had a number of articles printed in the Defence Force Journal. His interest has been in showing possible links between Education and Training and the techniques that may be applied towards effective Course Design. He is at present posted to the Education Section 3 Training Group, Broadmeadows, Victoria.

AWARD: ISSUE NO 40 (May/June, 1983)

The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article in the May/June issue (No 40) of the Defence Force Journal to Captain D.E. Lewis for his article The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon.
This article examines the sentencing of military offenders in light of recent criticism levelled at that aspect of the criminal law. The article briefly considers the signposts and legislative guidance proffered the civil judicial officers, and then discusses comparable features in the Army disciplinary system. Some proposals relating to sentencing criteria contained in the second draft of the Defence Force Disciplinary Code are considered. The training and preparation of military commanders for the task of sentencing are examined separately. Finally the article as noted draws conclusions from the examination of these issues.

'A military trial should not have a dual function as an instrument of discipline and as an instrument of justice. It should be an instrument of justice and in fulfilling this function, it will promote discipline'.

General W. C. Westmorland

MILITARY law in general, and the application of military law in the Army, is not a widely researched subject in Australia. Within military circles, interest has been confined to persons with overall responsibilities for the functioning of the Army, or to persons with particular expertise. Complaints are often heard about technicalities and ponderous processes, but rarely is anything written by persons either subject to military law, or intimately concerned in its application.

In the public forum, in the United States, the Vietnam conflict generated a multitude of articles, mostly critical, about various aspects of military justice. The same cannot be said about Australia. Only one book has ever been published in Australia on the subject of military law, and very few articles have ever appeared in University journals. This situation could change in the present climate of heightened defence interest, but it would be unlikely to be more than supportive of the cyclical interest pattern referred to by an eminent United States Lawyer, Professor Joseph W. Bishop, in a book published in 1974.

He explains, 'The history of military law and particularly, military justice in the United States is one of long periods of quiescence, interrupted by cyclical bouts of intense public interest and reform, occasioned by war and the conscription of great numbers of civilians... if history is a guide, and with the draft at an end, the interest of the public and politicians will now abate'. The situation in Australia can be shown to be similar, although a greater emphasis could be placed on public 'quiescence'.

Immediately following the conclusion of World War II, the Minister for the Army ordered an inquiry into the trial and punishment of offences against military law. The inquiry was headed by Mr Justice Reed and
his report was presented in late 1946. From that time until 1965, approximately eleven Bills were prepared for presentation to Parliament, but none came to fruition. In 1965 a decision was taken to produce a uniform disciplinary code for the three Services. In April 1974, the 1973 Working Party Draft on the Defence Force Disciplinary Code was presented to Parliament. A second draft was subsequently prepared but, to this stage, in 1980, legislation has not been passed.

In these circumstances, it behoves the military to continually indulge in critical self-examination of the substantive and procedural matters involved in military law. It is arguable that such internal examination is likely to be self-serving unless done on a comparative basis, and, quite clearly, community standards should provide the basis for such a comparison. It is a trite statement, but worthy of repetition, that ideals and standards in the military must reflect the aspirations of the community it represents.

Within the constraints imposed by the purpose of military law, serious attempts have been made to ensure that an accused soldier is given all the protections available to him under the civil law. Thus it is that boasts by proponents of the court martial, that no fairer court system exists, are often countered by complaints from the field that it is so ponderous that commanders cannot possibly have the time to apply it.

In recent months, no less a body than the Federal Law Reform Commission has provided the Army with an opportunity to measure one aspect of the disciplinary process, that of sentencing offenders, against the perceived weaknesses of the equivalent process in the civil criminal law. In May 1980 a Federal Law Reform Commission Interim Report entitled, 'Sentencing of Federal Offenders', was tabled in Federal Parliament. In responding to the considerable media interest, the Chairman of the Commission, Mr Justice Kirby, said, 'Experienced judges, daily engaged in the business of punishing convicted offenders, frequently confess that the longer they perform the task of sentencing, the less confidence they have that they know what they are doing.' In expanding upon the response by judges and magistrates to a national survey conducted by the Commission, he said that sentencing was described as the most 'painful' and 'least rewarding' of judicial tasks. He continued, 'Critics assert that this is so because judges are given few sure signposts, little legislative guidance, and totally inadequate preparation and training for the task of sentencing. Serious, knowledgeable and responsible critics... chastise the disparities that exist in sentencing, (They) describe the process as a “random lottery” depending too much on capricious and inconsistent factors and on the personality and the idiosyncratic views of the particular sentencing judge.'

The aim of this article is to examine the sentencing of military offenders in light of the criticism levelled at the aspect of the criminal law.

The article will briefly consider the signposts and legislative guidance proffered the civil judicial officers, and will then discuss comparable features in the Army disciplinary system. Certain proposals relating to sentencing criteria contained in the second draft of the Defence Force Disciplinary Code will also be considered. The training and preparation of military commanders for the task of sentencing will be examined separately, and, finally, the article will draw conclusions from the examination.

BACKGROUND

A man does not lose his status as a citizen merely by joining the Army. With a few exceptions, which are not relevant in this context, the soldier's position under the general law of the land remains unaltered. If he offends against the criminal law of a State or Territory, or of the Commonwealth, as a soldier, he may be tried and punished as if he were a civilian. However, at the same time, by joining the Army, the citizen subjects himself to military law.

The 1941 edition of the Manual of Military Law describes military law as '... an entirely distinct code... which governs the members of the Army and regulates the conduct of officers and soldiers as such at all times and all places...'. The current Army Law Manual, puts forward two objects of this code: 'to provide for the maintenance of discipline and good order among the troops...', and, 'to provide for administrative matters...'. This article is concerned with the first of the two objects and the disciplinary provisions to which it relates.
The disciplinary provisions of this code of military law are contained in the Defence Act 1903 and the Australian Military Regulations made under that Act. In addition the provisions of the British Army Act of 1881 (and the rules of procedure made under that Act), in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Defence Act, and in so far as they have been adapted and modified by the Australian Military Regulations, also form a part of that code. The effect is that a military disciplinary code exists as part of the statute law of Australia, and, with the considerable difference that so much of it as relates to discipline is administered by Army tribunals and not by civil judges, it is construed in the same manner and carried into effect under the same conditions as to evidence and otherwise as the ordinary criminal law of England, as modified by the Australian Military Regulations.

SIGNPOSTS AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE

The 'signposts' that the judicial officers seek are in themselves difficult to define. The search for a more precise phrase reaches back to the very raison d'être of the criminal law. The Law Reform Commission of Canada has stated, 'Criminal Law, . . . primarily has to do with values. Naturally, for crime itself is nothing more nor less than conduct seriously contrary to our values . . . Crimes are not just forbidden, they are also wrong. As such — as wrongful acts — they demand response'.

The question really becomes, 'what type of conduct so offends societal values as to attract criminal sanctions?', and, having decided on the requirement for sanction, 'what particular sanction does society require be imposed?' The answer to the first question will be initially established by executive decision, and as a question of degree and of societal attitudes, will be reflected in the sentence imposed by the judiciary. Societal attitudes can be ambivalent (witness the public debate concerning the possession and use of marijuana) and are certainly in a constant state of change. It is this ambivalence and flux which creates difficulties for the judiciary. As to the second question, society demands that sentences imposed reflect humanitarian ideals, retribution, prevention, deterrence and rehabilitation. Clearly, it would be a brave man who would categorically state the attitude of society to conduct across the range of human activity. Equally clearly, it is quite impossible to say that, in any sentence, the requirements of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation, have been successfully combined.

What guidelines are offered the judicial officer? In Australia, as in England, 'Criminal statutes generally authorise terms of imprisonment far longer than are normally imposed in practice, and Parliament, in creating an increasing variety of non-custodial sentences, has generally been content to establish relatively broad conditions of eligibility without requiring sentencers to use particular measures in any specified class of case . . . The shaping of sentencing policy is entrusted substantially to the judiciary . . . ' The judiciary is left with a discretion and a considerable body of case law has developed on the application of this discretion. The process and the inherent difficulty involved in this system is described by D. A. Thomas: 'While in certain contexts the court articulates a principle, or series of principles, in a systematic manner, it is frequently necessary to identify the operative principles from the examination of a considerable number of cases, none of which specifically identifies the relevant criteria, but which, when viewed collectively, clearly conform substantially to a pattern which can be described.' (emphasis added)

Notwithstanding the existence of a describable pattern, the task of the judicial officer remains an unenviable one. Within the spare legislative framework he must impose a sanction which reflects difficult to define, and, at times, conflicting societal attitudes. In exercising his discretion he must have regard to broad principles, the application of which will vary according to the nature of the crime, the age of the offender, the likelihood of his rehabilitation and a wide range of other equally important factors.

The Military 'Signposts'

What signposts and legislative guidelines are provided for the military commander in his sentencing task? The answer centres around an understanding of the requirement for discipline.

Historically, large bodies of armed men have been regarded as uncertain beasts, which must
be carefully leashed. The preamble to the original British Mutiny Act of 1689 reflected this fear.

'...And whereas noe Man may be forejudged of Life or Limbe, or subjected to any kinde of punishment by Martial Law, or in any other manner than by the Judgement of his Peeres, and according to the Knowne and Established Laws of this Realme. Yet, nevertheless, it being a requisite for retaining such Forces as are or shall be raised during this Exigence of Affaires, in their Duty an exact Discipline be observed. And that Soldiers who shall Mutiny or stir up Sedition, or shall desert their Majestyes Service be brought to a more Exemplary and speedy Punishment than the usuall Forms of Law will allow...

The preamble recognised the basic precepts of the common law but sanctioned a departure from those precepts in the interests of an exact discipline. A part of the reason for such discipline was the protection of the community itself, but the purely military interest was succinctly put, some 200 years later, by Deputy Judge Advocate Colonel Robert Carey, CB, who wrote, 'Those Corps in which the strictest discipline has been maintained in times of peace will always be found to be the most efficient in times of war or on occasions of emergency, the men having learnt the advantages of discipline will perform their duties better, with a greater facility to themselves, with less labour and fatigue, and therefore with a proportionate gain in power. The country, as well as the Army, will derive benefit from all ranks having acquired the habit of attending with the greatest exactitude to all those minute details of military life which, irksome, unnecessary, or trivial as they may appear, will be found to be vital portions of the whole military system. Soldiers who have thus acquired habits of regularity and order will maintain their efficiency unbroken, and will do good service in times of disturbance or when thrown in exceptional and difficult positions.'

Discipline clearly embodies the idea of regulation of individual conduct to ensure the efficiency of the whole body. In sentencing a military offender, in the interest of discipline, the military commander has a number of distinct advantages over his judicial counterpart. In the first place, discipline in a military body is recognizable. In the second place, the regulation of conduct in a group of men of similar age and training is far narrower than the conceptual relationship of the criminal law to societal values (ranging across all age groups and vocations). Third, the commander who sentences a soldier for breaking the military rule is also responsible for the discipline of the unit in which the offence occurred. He is vitally interested in conduct which impairs the efficiency of his unit, and, in order to deter or prevent such conduct, he combines what amounts to an executive and judicial authority (a feature quite alien to the civil law).

His first recourse is to leadership, which is defined in the Army Handbook on Leadership as 'the art of consistently influencing and directing men in tasks in such ways as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect and loyal co-operation.' The same handbook carefully relates this definition to the definition of discipline, 'a state of mind that produces a readiness for willing and intelligent obedience.' Subsequent paragraphs go on to distinguish discipline from punishment, pointing out that the latter is one of the means which can be used to influence the actions of men by correcting and preventing the recurrence of faults.

In the military then, punishment, or response to a military offence, is simply a tool of leadership. The military commander seeks to regulate conduct rather than promote adherence to a difficult to define set of values. His signpost is the day-to-day efficiency of his unit and this will be clearly visible in the enthusiasm and bearing of his men, and in the manner in which tasks allotted are completed.

Legislative Guidance in the Military

The question of legislative guidance on the imposition of sentence then arises. Like the civil system, no particular punishments are specified for particular offences.

At the summary disciplinary level (from subunit, through unit commander to formation commander) a limited range of punishments are provided under the regulations but no regulatory guidance is given on how these punishments should be imposed. One answer to that implied criticism is to assert that the level of punishments are low and commensurate with the nature of the offence dealt with
at summary level. (If seven days detention, 14 days confinement to barracks and a 40 dollar fine can be considered low.21 In addition, a soldier will, in certain circumstances, have the option to elect trial by court martial rather than by his commanding officer. Further, the sentence could be reduced by a superior authority who would, in theory, be concerned to ensure that the punishment awarded was the least possible consistent with discipline. There are difficulties with all three assertions, but, particularly in relation to the third, a transcript of proceedings is not available for perusal by the superior authority, thereby severely restricting his consideration of the matter. This situation provides a foundation for claims of disparity in sentencing based on personality and idiosyncratic views.

At the court martial level, Australian Military Regulation 321 details certain general principles upon which consideration of sentences should be based, but they are both broad and outdated (AMR 321 is reproduced at Annex B). Sub-regulation 321 (11) provides suggestions for usually sufficient punishments, but the guidelines are few and totally inadequate. A greater range of punishments is available to the court martial, but the lack of clear sentencing criteria, together with the fact that courts martial are constituted on an irregular basis, and will often be composed of different officers on each occasion, ensures that there is no thread of consistency to be seen in the application of punishments.

The sketchiness of provisions relating to sentencing have long been recognized, and were taken up by the 1973 Working Party on the draft Defence Force Disciplinary Code. The Report of the Working Party states: "Sentencing criteria have been included... Although an innovation in this country, we regard the relevant provisions as a significant feature of the legislation. In the military context where command and discipline have for so long been closely interrelated, we believe it essential that there be provisions which clearly indicate the purpose of particular punishments and the principles by which they should be imposed."24 Section 79 of the draft, dealing with sentencing criteria, is reproduced at Annex C.

The provisions are quite comprehensive although an unusual feature is the failure to provide criteria for reduction in rank, a punishment which, in the case of a warrant or non-commissioned officer, falls between dismissal and fine (both of which have criteria) in the scale of punishments. No reason is given for this failure. A possible reason is the fact that reduction in rank, or forfeiture of service for the purposes of promotion, are peculiarly military punishments, with no counterpart in the civil law, and which may therefore be regarded as matters clearly within the experience of a military tribunal. Such reasoning would be in serious error, but further speculation is unwarranted. To the extent of this deficiency the provisions of the draft code do not measure up to the ideal presented in the report.

One final comment on the draft criteria involves Section 77(i) (g) which is to the effect that where an offence before a military tribunal has a similar civil counterpart, the tribunal shall have regard to the practice of the civil courts. The provision serves an excellent function in drawing on the ideals and experience of the civil community but it is ironic that military tribunals should be related in this manner to civil practice, when critics and judicial officers have such grave misgivings regarding the basis of that practice.

In summary, under the present disciplinary code, the military commander is in no better position than his civil counterpart. His powers of punishment are established by legislation, but he is given little guidance as to the dispositions of punishments. The problem becomes more acute as the seriousness of the offence increases and the range of punishments expands in the hierarchical disciplinary system. The problem has been recognized, and innovative steps have been taken to rectify the situation. Some doubt exists as to whether the proposals contained in the draft Defence Force Disciplinary Code are sufficiently detailed and to that extent the sentencing criteria should be re-examined in light of the ideal stated in the Report of the Working Party.

TRAINING AND PREPARATION FOR THE SENTENCING TASK

Again, the writings of Colonel Carey (a man of unusual perception) draw together the strands of command and discipline and indicate the knowledge and qualities required of the sentencer.
Discipline and efficiency can only be secured by a careful study of individual character, by attention to the most minute details of all that concerns the health, comfort, or necessities of soldiers, by impartiality, by experience, and by a determination to enforce obedience to all the rules and regulations of the service. To a certain extent this can only be attained by punishment, and at times by severity, it is, however, not only necessary to know what punishment can legally be awarded, but also to discriminate and to decide what punishment ought to be awarded, when punishment can be dispensed with, or when it must be resorted to, and when the object desired to be attained will be best secured by a slight or severe award.

The thrust of Colonel Carey's comment is to the effect that discipline is achieved through leadership and that one of the leader's tools is discriminatory punishment. That summation approximates the extent of the coverage given the relationship of discipline and leadership in the Australian Army Handbook on Leadership. A detailed consideration of this relationship is beyond the scope of this article, however, a few words are necessary. In general terms, in the Officer Corps, there is no distinct leadership training in the Army. Part of the reason is that some officers doubt that 'leadership' can be taught, or, if they do so believe, they do not understand how it can be taught. The difficulty is that leadership is an abstraction. Man, on the other hand, is real and can be moulded, educated, provided with skills and presented as a leader. The success of this leader, that is, his ability to provide leadership, then depends upon the application of his character and education to the training and directing of men. (In the case of the new officer graduate, the character is often embryo, and the education related more to principles of minor tactics and economics than to sociology.)

Some few officers teach themselves to understand their own sociological strengths and weaknesses, and those of their men, and are then able to apply their skills in leadership. Others stumble across a successful combination of vigour and authority and still others rely solely on their authority. All are forms of leadership, in descending order of usefulness, the latter resulting in what was described by Colonel Carey as '... a poor sort of discipline which would not stand any severe strain'.

The fact is that, in the Army today, leadership is expected to be learnt by practical experience. The scornful comment of Bismarck springs to mind: "Fools say they learn by experience. I prefer to learn by other people's experience." This being the case, it is instructive to briefly examine the training given to officers in the management of the disciplinary tool of punishment.

The first instruction in military law is given in the officer producing institutions of Dunrobin and Portsea. The aim of instruction at Portsea is to give cadets sufficient knowledge of military law to enable them to carry out their duties as junior officers. The terminal objectives of the course require that each cadet must be able to:

- identify the sources of military law,
- locate references for military offences and redress of wrongs,
- frame a charge report,
- apply arrest and suspension procedures, and
- state procedures to be followed in the investigation of a charge.

This extremely limited course provides for eight lectures, thirteen study periods, six syndicate discussions, one demonstration and two periods of examination. During the subsequent four or five years, the new officer learns by experience, and under the now obsolete examination system would then be required to sit a three hour examination covering all aspects of military law. The examination system has now been replaced by a Junior Staff Course designed to prepare officers for staff appointments in the rank of captain.

The military law aspect of this 10 week course will be contained, for the most part, in the Unit Administration module and will train officers for particular practical problems they face as junior staff officers. Notwithstanding the practical level of instruction, the course in military law is an ambitious undertaking considered in light of the duration of the course, and the fact that military law is only one aspect of one of five modules. It is unlikely, in such a compressed course, that the instruction could be pitched at any level beyond a mechanical review of the regulations. During the remainder of an officer's career, there is no further instruction in the application of military law.
In this situation the emphasis must be on experience. In order to obtain a rough guide as to the level of experience in disciplinary matters in the Army, a brief and limited survey of officers attending the 1980 Staff College course was conducted. The results appear at Annex D. The majority of officers surveyed have now completed the years of service where continual direct contact with soldiers was involved. In the normal course of events they will fill staff appointments and their next command will be at unit level (carrying with that responsibility, expanded powers of punishment). Considering their level of training in military law to that stage, they will rely heavily on their experience.

Of the Staff College students surveyed, the experience across the arms and services involved an average of one point six two years service (1.62) as a sub-unit commander (that is, an officer having limited powers of punishment), one appointment as an officer under instruction at a court martial, and an average of less than one appointment for each of defending officer, prosecuting officer, and member of a court martial. In an average figure of 14 years service in the Army, this level of experience can hardly be regarded as either extensive or adequate.

An important rider should be attached to the above comments. The comments should not be taken as indicating that the overall military experience of an officer in sentencing a military offender counts for nothing, but rather as indicating that a very important aspect is missing from that experience.

On the whole, the military commander is in no better position, with regard to preparation and training for the task of sentencing, than his judicial counterpart in the civil law. While the purpose of punishment itself may be clear, the development in officers of an understanding of the relationship of command and discipline, their training in the scope and jurisdiction of military law, and their authority and responsibilities under it, and the existing level of experience in the application of the disciplinary provisions, leave much to be desired.

**CONCLUSION**

The concern of the legal profession and of judicial officers at the lack of sure signposts and legislative guidance and at the totally inadequate preparation and training, should be of equal concern to the military in the application of the military disciplinary provisions. The military, clearly, should reflect the ideals and standards of the society it represents.

Of the three criticisms considered, the matter of lack of sure signposts, or direction, is of least concern to the Army. The object of the disciplinary provisions of military law is clear and does not produce the difficulties inherent in the relationship of the criminal law to ambivalent and difficult to define societal values. Discipline in a military unit is recognizable, and, should it falter, the military commander has both the executive and judicial authority to rectify the situation.

On the other hand, like his civil counterpart, the military commander is given little legislative guidance as to how he should best approach that task. The military has recognized the deficiency and has taken steps in the draft Defence Force Disciplinary Code to lay down sentencing criteria. The draft provisions are quite detailed but a serious deficiency appears in the limiting of specified sentencing criteria to punishments of imprisonment, dismissal, detention, and fines. The criteria ignore the middle range of punishments dealing with forfeiture of service and seniority and with reduction in rank. This matter should be reconsidered in light of the ideal put forward by the Working Party on the code.

An examination of training in military law and of the extent of experience in its application provides the greatest cause for concern. As in the civil law it is quite inadequate. If the Army is to promote effective leadership then it must pay careful attention to all the resources of the leader, including his ability to promote discipline through the award of punishment, where necessary, in a just and impartial manner. Like Bismarck, the Army should be scornful of men who prefer to learn by experience and should, instead, place the experience of others in the hands of its commanders.

**ANNEX A**

**MELBOURNE AGE, 23 MAY 1980**

Fairer Courts Call

CANBERRA — Radical changes to Australia's legal system have been recommended by the Law Reform Commission in a bid to end the 'random lottery' of criminal punishment.
The commission has called on the Federal Government to provide judges and magistrates with publicity available guidelines spelling out the criteria they should consider when sentencing criminals.

This follows widespread criticism of inconsistencies caused by courtroom deals and the different personalities of judges and magistrates.

Judges have also confessed to the Law Reform Commission that they lack confidence in their ability.

The chairman of the commission, Mr Justice Kirby, said yesterday: "Experienced judges, daily engaged in the business of punishing convicted offenders, frequently confess that the longer they perform the task of sentencing, the less confidence they have that they know what they are doing."

In a report tabled in Parliament, the commission also calls for:

- Abolition of parole for Federal offenders, describing the system as a charade.
- A new deal for victims of crime.
- A review of Federal Government penalties and study of alternatives to jail.

The commission's interim report, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, is being considered by the Attorney-General, Senator Durack. A final report will be prepared following public hearings.

Although the report affects Federal jurisdiction, all States are expected to consider closely its recommendations.

The report follows Australia's first study of Federal crime and punishment.

Justice Kirby said nearly 80 per cent of judges and magistrates had responded to a national survey by the commission. He said the replies gave a "fascinating insight".

"Sentencing was described as the most "painful" and "least rewarding" of judicial tasks.

"Critics assert that this is so because judges are given few sure signposts, little legislative guidance, and totally inadequate preparation and training for the task of sentencing," he said.

"Serious, knowledgeable and responsible... chastise the disparities that exist in sentencing."

"(They) describe the process as a "random lottery" depending too much on capricious and inconsistent factors and on the personality and the idiosyncratic views of the particular sentencing judge."

The commission urges the Federal Government to establish a national sentencing council to prepare guidelines on sentencing, spelling out criteria which judges should consider.

"They will replace the hurried conversations in the corridor and other idiosyncratic considerations which all too frequently affect the current practice of sentencing and punishment," it says.

The Council would also review Federal penalties, and the charging and prosecuting practices, monitor prison conditions and provide the judiciary with training facilities and information on sentencing.

The proposed council is similar to a body envisaged in legislation now before the United States Congress.

The commission says it found evidence of "significant and enduring" cases of disparity and inequality in sentencing. Reform was justified.

There were inconsistencies at the charging, prosecuting, pleading, sentencing and appeal stages. This, and problems caused by State agencies handling some Federal responsibilities, led to "well-established and persistent differences in the levels of imprisonment and lengths of prison terms imposed in different parts of the country".

"Sentencing is too important a matter to be left in its current unco-ordinated state," the commission says.

Because of Australia's geography and institutional arrangements, there were greater opportunities for disparity and unfairness in punishment of offenders.

On parole, the commission says it causes justifiable resentment and injustice, and has many failings.

Its failings included promoting uncertainty in punishment, the assumption that conduct could be safely predicted.

"It is a charade," the commission says. "The spectacle of a long sentence of imprisonment no longer deceives the community, which knows that the offender will serve a much shorter period in prison before being released on parole."

It was preferable to return to a system by which judges imposed sentences meant to be served, less standard and uniform remissions for good behaviour and industry.
The commission says keeping prisoners is costly — more than $20,000 a year for a married man — and contribute to continuing criminality.

More research into alternative punishment was needed, and jail should be used as a last resort. Some Australian prisons were inhuman, degrading and substandard.

The commission also urged the Government to establish a tribunal to award compensation to victims of violent crime. It says that in the long term victims of non-violent crime should also be compensated.

**ANNEX B**

**EXTRACT FROM AUSTRALIAN MILITARY REGULATIONS**

**Regulation 321**

1. When passing sentence, a court martial should have regard, not only to the nature and degree of the offence, to any extenuating or aggravating circumstances disclosed by the evidence, and also to the previous character of the offender as provided in evidence, but also the nature and amount of any deprivations which (by the operation of any Act or regulations or otherwise) he will suffer, by reason of the finding or sentence, in addition to the punishment imposed by the sentence. When awarding imprisonment or detention the court should keep in view the locality and climate in which the offender will have to undergo his sentence. Sentences should vary according to the requirements of discipline, but in ordinary circumstances, and for the first offence, a sentence should be light. Care should be taken to discriminate between offences due to youth, inexperience, temper, sudden temptation, or unaccustomed surroundings and those due to premeditated misconduct.

2. All convictions, whether by a civil court or a court martial, for offences (except offences which by direction under these regulations have not been entered in a regimental conduct sheet) committed by a soldier since his first enlistment, including those incurred in a state of desertion, should be given in evidence after a finding of guilty.

3. When attention has been called in orders issued in the command or military district to the unusual prevalence of the offence of which he has been found guilty, a court martial should also have regard to the fact that such warning has been issued.

4. If the accused has elected to be tried by court martial instead of submitting to a summary award, his punishment could never, on that ground, be increased, and in ordinary circumstances, the court should not award a heavier punishment than could have been awarded summarily.

Note: See A.M.R. and 0.403 (7A).

5. Discharge with ignominy cannot be imposed for an offence committed when not on war service or with a sentence of detention.

6. Discharge may be imposed for an offence committed, whether on war service or not.

7. A soldier who is convicted of an offence against A.A. 17 or 18 (4) or (5) or 41 or A.M.R. 203 (1), (xxviii), (xxxii), or (xxviii), unless in the opinion of the court there are special reasons to the contrary, should, if liable to be sentenced to imprisonment, be so sentenced. In other cases, imprisonment should not usually be inflicted, except when, in the opinion of the court, it should be accompanied by discharge or discharge with ignominy. A soldier convicted of a purely military offence who, at the expiration of his sentence will return to military duty, should not usually be sentenced to imprisonment; but this direction does not apply to offences committed on war service when, in the opinion of the court, the requirements of discipline necessitate a sentence of imprisonment, though discharge or discharge with ignominy is not inflicted.

8. Detention was introduced into the scale of punishments in order that soldiers who are convicted of offences which do not call for discharge need not be subject to the stigma attached to imprisonment.

9. When an offender is convicted of two or more charges, the sentence should be that which is considered adequate for the gravest of the offences, with some addition for the other charge or charges.

10. Dismissal is usually advisable only in the case of a voluntarily enlisted soldier who has been twice previously convicted of desertion or fraudulent enlistment, or for an offence against A.M.R. 205 (1), (a), or for an offence falling within the descriptions contained in sub-regulation (11) (c) of this regulation. Dismissal should not usually be inflicted on war service.

11. The punishments mentioned in the following table will usually be sufficient when not on war service:
### Offences and Punishment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offences</th>
<th>Detention</th>
<th>Imprisonment</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. In the absence of a previous conviction or of aggravating circumstances, or of antecedents appearing to require a severe lesson, or of an unusual prevalence in the unit or garrison of the species of offence forming the subject of the charge. First desertion within first six months' service and when not under orders for embarkation. Leaving guard or post. Offences of sentries. Insolent or threatening language. Disobedience not of a grave nature. Resisting escort, not involving an attempt at serious injury. Breaking out of barracks. Neglect of orders. Absence. Failing to appear at parade. Being out of bounds. Drunkenness. Release of person or allowing person to escape (not wilfully). Escaping from custody. Losing by neglect under A.M.R. (1) (xiii). Irregularity or omission in regard to returns (not fraudulent). Conduct to prejudice, etc (not of a grave nature).</td>
<td>Not exceeding 28 days</td>
<td>Not exceeding 89 days</td>
<td>An addition of from 7 to 28 days' detention may appropriately be made in the case of each previous conviction, whether for a similar, or any other offence, or of any circumstances that aggravate the gravity of the offence, provided that the full detention does not exceed 89 days.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Striking a superior officer. Disobeying a lawful command (graver cases). Desertion other than under sub-par. (a). Fraudulent enlistment. False evidence. False accusation. Conduct to prejudice, etc (graver than under sub-par. (a)).</td>
<td>Not exceeding 89 days</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ordinary theft. Frauds. An offence under par. (a) of A.M.R. 205 (1). Gross violence to superiors. Disgraceful conduct under par. (xxxiii) of A.M.R. 203 (1).</td>
<td>Not exceeding 89 days</td>
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</table>

12. (Omitted)

13. An officer cashiered or dismissed will not thereby be relieved from liability to serve in the ranks under Part IV of the D.A.

14. This regulation shall not limit the discretion of a court martial to pass any lawful sentence which in the opinion of the court is necessary.

15. In respect of articles, the value of which are not stated in the charge, a court martial should not include in their sentence any order for payment or stoppages.

16. A sentence under D.A. 97 (c) should be in or to the effect of the following form:

To pay the sum of — to make good expenses occasioned by the offence mentioned in the charge.
the loss of
damage to
the following articles, viz:— (here set
out the articles
and the individual amounts required to
make the loss or damage
17. (Omitted)

ANNEX C
DEFENCE FORCE DISCIPLINARY CODE
SECOND DRAFT
1. A service tribunal in determining the
appropriate sentence to pass on a person
convicted by it of an offence shall have regard
to:
   a. the rank, age, maturity, character, per-
      sonal history, physical health, mental
      condition, circumstances and responsi-
      bilities of the person;
   b. the nature, circumstances and conse-
      quences of the offence;
   c. any mitigating factors including any
      substantial grounds which, though fail-
      ing to establish a defence, tend to excuse
      the conduct of the person;
   d. the need to deter the person or others
      from committing similar offences;
   e. the prior convictions, if any, of the
      person, whether by a civil court or a
      service tribunal, and whether or not the
      tribunal which so convicted him made
      an order discharging him without pen-
      alty;
   f. the direct or consequential effects of
      any possible sentence, and
   g. the practice of the civil courts where the
      offence is a civil offence or where at
      least one of the essential elements of the
      offence is of such a nature that the
      person could have been tried in respect
      thereof by a civil court, or
   c. where it is of the opinion that no other
      sentence is appropriate,
and, in every case where the tribunal does
impose a punishment of imprisonment, it shall
state its reasons for so doing.
4. A service tribunal shall not impose a
punishment of detention:
   a. on any member under the age of eight-
      teen years, or
   b. on any other member on whom it is
      also imposing the punishment of dis-
      missal from the Defence Force, unless
      it is of the opinion that no other
      sentence is appropriate,
and, in every case where the tribunal does
impose a punishment of detention, it shall state
its reasons for so doing.
5. Subject to sub-section 6, a service tribunal
shall make an order suspending any punish-
ment of detention imposed by it for an offence
of which it has convicted a member unless:
   a. there is undue risk that during the
      period of suspension the member will
      commit a further offence;
   b. to do so would not give due weight to
      the seriousness of the offence;
   c. the member has previously been sen-
      tenced to a punishment of detention the
      period of which was not totally sus-
      pended;
   d. the member was at the time he com-
      mitted the offence subject to a punish-
      ment of detention, whether or not the
      period thereof was totally or partially
      suspended;
   e. the offence was committed in connec-
      tion with operations against the enemy, or
   f. the maximum punishment for the off-
     ence is imprisonment for a period of or
      exceeding 2 years,
and, in every case where the tribunal does not
make an order suspending a punishment of
detention, it shall state its reasons for so not
doing.
6. A service tribunal which:
   a. convicts a member of more than one
      offence, and
   b. imposes, in respect of one of these
      offences, a sentence of detention which
      it does not suspend,
shall not make an order under sub-section 5, in respect of any of the remaining offences.

7. A service tribunal shall impose a punishment of dismissal from the Defence Force:
   a. on an officer on whom it is also imposing the punishment of imprisonment, and
   b. on a member when in the opinion of the tribunal:
      (1) the seriousness of the offence or the maintenance of discipline of the Defence Force so requires, or
      (2) he is not capable of rehabilitation in the Defence Force, and
      (3) his offence or conduct has been of such a nature that his discharge should be marked as dishonourable and attended by the consequences thereof, and, in every case where the tribunal does impose a punishment of dismissal from the Defence Force, it shall state its reasons for so doing.

8. A service tribunal shall not impose a punishment of fine upon a person unless:
   a. the person is or will be able to pay the fine, and
   b. the fine would not prevent the person from meeting any reparation orders the tribunal may wish to make.

9. In determining the amount and method of payment of any fine it may wish to impose on a person, or of any reparation orders it may wish to make against him, a service tribunal should have regard to the financial resources and responsibilities of the person and the nature of the burden the payment would impose.

10. In determining whether or not to make any reparation order against a person convicted of an offence from which he derived pecuniary gain, in favour of any other person who sustained loss of damage through or by reason of the offence, a service tribunal may have regard to such circumstances as it considers relevant, but ordinarily should make a reparation order if the person convicted has not already fully compensated the other person.

11. In determining the sentence of a person convicted of an offence, through or by reason of which another person sustained loss or damage, the tribunal should accord weight in favour of a lesser sentence to the fact that the person convicted has already voluntarily compensated, or will by order of the court compensate, the other person.

NOTES
3. Lewis, A. N. Australian Military Law. (Published by the author.) Hobart, 1956. The only university journal article seen by the writer was contained in a very early volume of the Federal Law Review. It concerned Courts Martial in Australia and was written by Kep Enderby.
4. Since the 'Bowral Incident' a number of articles have appeared in periodicals such as the Pacific Defence Reporter. The articles, although not directly concerned with military law, are concerned with the rights and liabilities of servicemen in the performance of their military duty under the general law.
6. An interesting feature of Canadian military practice is the appointment of an officer in the Judge Advocate General Corps to liaise directly with the Law Reform Commission of Canada.
7. The constraints imposed by the fact of service are not always recognized. A concise example is contained in the Report of the 1973 Working Party on the Defence Force Disciplinary Code at page 159. 'Sect 136 provides for trials by courts martial and magistrates to be public but it is impossible to convey either legal officers or the public to a summary trial in a ship at sea. The most that can be done is to provide that summary trials shall be held as openly as the exigencies of service permit.'
8. The Report, at time of writing, has not been published but should appear during September 1980 as Report Number 15.
9. The material quoted appeared on page 1 of the Melbourne "Age" on 23 May 1980 under the heading "Fairer Courts Call". The article is reproduced at Annex A.
10. See generally paragraphs 1D and 2 of Chapter 1 of Manual of Military Law 1941 (Australian Edition) and note 2 on page 2 of that reference which quotes Sir John Mansfield, CJ, in Burden v Abbott (1812) 4 Taunt, 401. 'It is, therefore, highly important that the mistake should be corrected which supposes that an Englishman by taking upon him the additional character of a soldier puts off any of the rights or duties as an Englishman.'
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**Books**


**Reports, Articles, Lectures**

- Army Law Manual, Volume One
- Australian Edition of Manual of Military Law, 1941
- Australian Army Handbook on Leadership, 1977
- Australian Military Regulation 215. The punishment quoted is the maximum available to a commanding officer.
- Officer Cadet School Syllabus — Military Law. United States Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-100

ANNEX D

SURVEY OF DISCIPLINARY EXPERIENCE OF OFFICERS ATTENDING STAFF COLLEGE 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No of Persons Surveyed</th>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Average Years Service with Disciplinary Powers as Officer Commanding</th>
<th>Total Years Service with Disciplinary Powers as Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Total of Times as Officer Under Instruction</th>
<th>Defending Officer</th>
<th>Prosecuting Officer</th>
<th>Member of Court Martial</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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**TOTALS**

50                                                                                     81                                           12                                           59                                           46                                           23                                           31

**Average Figures per Officer**

- 14

- 1.62 years
- 24 years
- 1.18
- 0.92
- 0.46
- 0.62

**Totals for 'teeth arms' RAAC, RAA, RA Inf**

- RAAC
- RAA
- RA Inf

- 3.0
- 25
- 20
- 11
- 12

**Average Figures per Officer for 'teeth arms'**

- RAAC
- RAA
- RA Inf

- 0.86 years
- 1.0
- 0.8
- 0.44
- 0.48

Lieutenant Colonel Rolfe graduated from RMC in 1968. He served in Vietnam as a platoon commander. In 1975 he was admitted as a Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of the ACT. He attended Staff College in 1980 and is currently attending the Judge Advocate General’s School in Virginia, USA. This article first appeared in the Fort Queenscliff Papers.
Vernon Ashton Hobart Sturdee was born on 16 April 1890 at Frankston, Victoria. There was little doubt that he would become a member of the Armed Forces. His father, Colonel Alfred Hobart Sturdee, CMG, was a well known doctor and Citizen Force officer who was to serve with the Australian Army Medical Corps in the Boer War and later at Gallipoli and in France.

Vernon Sturdee's uncle was to become Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt, GCB, GCMG, RN, the victor of The Falkland Islands battle of 1914 when he destroyed the German Pacific Fleet commanded by Admiral Graf von Spee. In passing, it is interesting to note that Sir Doveton Sturdee's flagship was HMS "Invincible" which later was sunk at the battle of Jutland. The second HMS "Invincible" played an important part in the 1982 Falkland Islands campaign and at one time there was some prospect of it becoming Flagship of the Australian Fleet.

Two other uncles, on his mother's side of the family, were also prominent members of the Citizen Forces. They were Colonel Sir Charles Merrett (after whom Merrett Rifle Range at Williamstown, Victoria is named) and Sir Charles's half-brother Colonel Harry Perrin who was a well known Artillery officer.

Sturdee was educated at Melbourne Church of England Grammar School and after leaving there served his apprenticeship with Jaques Bros engineering firm in Richmond, Melbourne. As soon as he was old enough he joined the Corps of Australian Engineers. Colonel Foott (later Brigadier-General C. R. Foott, Chief Engineer of the Australian Corps, 1st AIF in France) encouraged young Sturdee to sit for the Permanent Force examination. He did so, passed and was commissioned on 19 October 1908.

By October 1914, Sturdee was a Captain in the 1st AIF and he embarked for the Middle East as Adjutant, 1st Division Engineers. He and his father who was commanding a Field Ambulance, served together at Gallipoli.
as instructor in Military Engineering and Survey. His next appointment was Staff Officer “G” Branch, 4th Division.

In May 1929 he was posted to the General Staff at the War Office, London for two years’ exchange duty prior to commencing a course at the Imperial Defence College in January 1931. After graduating from that course he was appointed Australian Military Representative at the Australian High Commission in London.

This period of more than four years in London gave Sturdee very useful practical experience in dealing with War Office staffs at all levels. He made lasting friendships there with some of the officers who in another ten years or so were to become prominent British Army leaders in World War 2.

In February 1933 he was appointed Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I) at Army Headquarters, Melbourne. As Sir Sydney Rowell has recorded, the General Staff Branch then was a very small organisation having only two Directors under the Chief of the General Staff; namely DMO&I and DMT (Director of Military Training). In essence, DMO&I dealt with everything except training matters and as there was no DCGS in those days, the DMO&I was expected to serve as principal adviser to the CGS on a multitude of subjects.

As DMO&I, Sturdee was convinced that the main threat to Australia would be most likely to come from Japan. Although this was not a popular view at that time, he maintained his advocacy for the need for planning to meet such a contingency. He was not all convinced in his own mind that Singapore was impregnable even though this was a cornerstone of Imperial Defence policy of the period. It is known that whilst at the Imperial Defence College and in War Office circles, Sturdee had shown the courage to be outspoken regardless of whether or not his opinions were well received.

By early 1938 it was evident that the volume of General Staff functions other than training then being handled at Army Headquarters, Melbourne was too great for the one Directorate. To relieve the pressure on DMO&I it was decided therefore to establish a Directorate of Staff Duties.

Because of his already proven ability, his War Office experience and his own choice, Sturdee was appointed as the first Director of Staff Duties in the Australian Army. Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Rowell (later Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell) succeeded him as DMO&I. Later, Rowell was to write (Australian Army Journal, August 1966, page 6) as follows:

“...To those of us working with him then, Sturdee displayed those characteristics which he retained all his life. He had a very precise mind — he had a great sense of the need for priorities — he saw the problem very clearly — he was able to give orders which left no one in doubt as to what was wanted and he then left people to get on with the job ...”

“When it came to the answer he was kindly and constructive in criticism. But he didn’t suffer fools gladly and told them so, while, at the same time he was unerring in picking out the one who was dragging his feet and who needed encouragement or something stronger. But above all he knew how to laugh, and thus was a great help to people ...”

At this time Lieutenant-General Squires was seconded from the British Army to become Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces. Some of the older and more senior officers at Army Headquarters opposed this appointment. There was resistance too to some of the reforms recommended by Squires; changes he had proposed in the Army’s best interests. Fortunately Sturdee could see the need for these reforms so he did his best to persuade senior officers to accept the reorganisation proposals. His influence in the Army at that time was of considerable help to Squires.

Shortly afterwards, General Squires was appointed Chief of the General Staff and it then became his responsibility to implement the reorganisation he had designed. Part of this involved a much needed reshuffle of senior appointments in the Army and included upgrading the ranks of the General Officers Commanding Eastern and Southern Commands to the level of Lieutenant-General.

General Squires having been impressed by Sturdee when he had been at the War Office, appointed him GOC Eastern Command in October 1939 thus elevating him from Colonel to the rank of Lieutenant-General in the one promotion — undoubtedly a record for the Australian Army.
GOC Eastern Command

The new GOC faced a most daunting task in Eastern Command because of the need for swift expansion of the Army to meet the requirements of the 2nd AIF as well as creating a local defence capability. Practically overnight, there developed an enormous sense of urgency to try to make up the leeway of an Army that had been starved of finance and equipment for so many years and to bring up to usable condition many of the Defence facilities that had been allowed to run down. These problems were very evident to Sturdee when he took over his appointment. He set about his task with tremendous drive and enthusiasm in a manner that was to have an almost electrifying effect on the Command.

The writer who was serving then at HQ Eastern Command, witnessed what seemed to be an immediate and invigorating change in the attitude of staff officers, commanders and units following the arrival of their new GOC. Lieutenant-General Sturdee gave the highest priorities to raising, accommodating, training and equipping AIF units. General Rowell was to comment later on this vital work in these terms: "Eastern Command was the example to all other Commands in giving priority to the AIF’s requirements and in rapidly fitting them out for overseas service."

The magnitude of the task of preparing the AIF for overseas operations was almost unbelievable — except to those serving at that time who had a clear realisation of all the gigantic difficulties involved in having to convert a grossly neglected peace-time Army to a war footing in extremely compressed time. Sturdee’s untiring efforts throughout this period came to the notice of political figures such as Menzies, Spender, Kent Hughes, Curtin and Dedman, a fact that was to stand him in good stead a few years later.

GOC 8th Division

Following the death of Lieutenant-General Sir Brudenell Squires in March 1940, Lieutenant-General Sir Brudenell White was recalled from retirement to fill the appointment of Chief of the General Staff. Meanwhile Sturdee had been appointed GOC 8th Division, 2nd AIF to get which he readily took demotion in rank to Major-General. He bought to this posting the same enthusiastic drive and dedication he had demonstrated in Eastern Command.

His time with the Division however was to be limited due to a tragic aircraft accident in which Sir Brudenell White and three Government Ministers were killed. Sturdee had served for only two months with 8th Division before he was appointed Chief of the General Staff on 30 August 1940.

It was with some feeling of disappointment that he moved to the CGS appointment. Although gifted and well qualified as a thoroughly experienced staff officer, he was much more interested in command. He had looked forward eagerly to training 8th Division and leading it in combat overseas. Furthermore, he did not especially relish the prospect of having to spend his war years at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne knowing that in that position, inevitably he would have to become involved with politics and politicians.

Chief of the General Staff

Rowell has mentioned that Sturdee had been selected very early in his service, as an officer who was to be groomed for top appointments in the Army. It is clear from Sturdee’s subsequent career that every effort was made to ensure that he would be properly trained and well equipped eventually to fill the CGS post with success.

Now all of this preparation was to be put to the test at a critical time in Australia’s history. Sturdee had many valuable talents to enable him to undertake the challenge. Importantly he had the ability to remain calm in an emergency, a quality that had become apparent to many of his staff and subordinates. Perhaps he had inherited this trait.

It had been said of his uncle, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Doveton Sturdee that “no man had ever seen him rattled.” Having given his orders to engage the German Fleet in The Falkland Islands in 1914, the Admiral deliberately retired to his cabin for breakfast before battle commenced ("Coronel and Falkland" by Geoffrey Bennett, page 140).

Vernon Sturdee was still young and physically strong enough to cope with prolonged stress. Furthermore he had the confidence to know that his military knowledge lacked nothing. He therefore set out quickly to assume the responsibilities and trials of the top Army job in Australia, including all those responsibilities he had for the AIF overseas.

Some of Sturdee’s major problems on assuming the CGS appointment were:
a. Raising and maintaining forces for the Middle East, Malaya and Islands of the South West Pacific Area;

b. The expansion, equipping and upgrading of the Militia (Citizen Military Force);

c. Expansion of the industrial war potential (Sturdee had tried to foster this in the mid 1930s; he had recommended production of the 25 pdr gun in Australia at that time);

d. Planning Australian defence to meet the threat of a Japanese thrust southwards;

e. The rapid development and expansion of coast and anti-aircraft defences at major ports; and

f. Initiation of massive works programmes for the rapidly expanding Army.

There was to be little rest or relaxation for Sturdee for the next two years. There was so much to be done and so few assets available. The cream of the nation's young men were being trained to be sent overseas and the equipment situation was lamentable.

Much time had to be spent in educating politicians on the needs for manpower, finance, production and other resources and policies that had to be geared to the escalating war effort, particularly as the situation with Japan deteriorated. Sturdee had been a "front runner" in forecasting conflict with Japan and his judgement was soon to be confirmed.

He was most concerned about the very serious lack of munitions production capability. Up to the outbreak of war, Australia was almost entirely dependent on supplies of warlike stores from overseas. Most of the guns and ammunition then available were World War 1 stocks brought back from Europe. The General has never been given enough credit for his policy of encouraging and making demands on industry for the manufacture in Australia of war equipment requirements. He firmly believed in the theory of self sufficiency especially in munitions production. He also had a keen appreciation of the significance of logistics.

On becoming CGS he appointed Major-General T. R. Williams as his Chief Military Adviser to the Ministry of Munitions. Williams was one of Sturdee's close friends and confidants. He did much to ensure that essential needs were met from Australian sources.

Perhaps it was Sturdee's own earlier engineering production training that provided the basis of his understanding of the importance of local manufacture and its vital bearing on the defence of the country; a fact that was to become very clear to many others as the Japanese threat materialised.

The General gave every encouragement to Essington Lewis who had been loaned from BHP to become Director-General of Munitions Production and also to Mr Laurence Hartnett (later Sir Laurence) Director of Ordnance Production. These two men were to play an important role in the production of the multiplicity of warlike stores by Australian manufacturers.

Sturdee was particularly pleased and grateful for the excellent results that were being achieved at such a desperate time when practically nothing could be obtained from overseas. Although pressed for time he could always fit into his busy schedule visits to see some new Ordnance factory complex or to look at some new item of major equipment being produced for the first time in Australia. He welcomed these opportunities to get away from the Victoria Barracks "grindstone."

It is of no credit to the Australian Government of that time that Sturdee was the only Australian member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. His colleagues were British senior officers seconded from the RN and RAF. A more short sighted policy is hard to imagine now. The excuse has been made that there were then no suitable RAN or RAAF officers available. This made it difficult for Sturdee because even with the best of intentions, the other Chiefs were oriented to UK policies and requirements. This problem became even more pronounced later when British and Australian interests diverged over the return of the AIF to Australia; a dispute which became a major policy conflict between Churchill and Curtin.

As the war with Japan appeared to become inevitable, Sturdee was pressing the Government to take major steps in restructuring the Australian defences and organisation. Up to this period, the whole emphasis had been given to the forces overseas, including the RAN and RAAF. The flower of Australia's youth were abroad, leaving only an ill equipped, inadequate Militia for the land defence of the mainland.

Sturdee had persuaded the Government to call up the Militia; but this had taken time and patience. As Sturdee told Rowell and
others later, he was "nearly thrown out of the Cabinet room" for his trouble!

A decision was made to recall some senior officers from the Middle East. One was Major-General Sir Iven Mackay, GOC 6th Division, who was appointed GOC-in-C Home Forces. However as Ivan Chapman states, Sir Iven was still subordinate to Sturdee in this appointment.

Sturdee and Mackay were good friends of long standing and respected each other and Sir Iven was a frequent visitor to the Sturdee home in this period. It is true to say that Mackay relieved Sturdee of much of his burden.

Brigadier S. F. Rowell (later Sir Sydney Rowell) who had been Brigadier General Staff of HQ 1st Australian Corps, Middle East had replaced Major-General John Northcott (later Lieutenant-General Sir John Northcott) as DCGS. Sir John, a most capable officer, had been striving earnestly to carry out all the duties of DCGS as well as GOC 1st Armoured Division, but it just was not practicable for one person to perform properly both appointments simultaneously. Sturdee and Northcott were well acquainted and they knew each other's abilities very well.

In the latter half of 1941 the urgency for defence preparations went from crisis to crisis with several new emergencies arising almost daily. Some politicians became decidedly concerned about the approaching Japanese threat, even though they had been warned much earlier and often by the CGS. In fact, he had never wavered from his beliefs of the mid 1930s, that Japan might be tempted to launch an attack on Australia if Britain ever became preoccupied militarily elsewhere.

Fortunately, Sturdee found the new Curtin Government more receptive to his recommendations and his personal relationship with Curtin was good. Some of Curtin's Ministers did not forget the value of Sturdee's work at this time of crisis. Dedman in particular and Chifley, were to remember his performance later when they had the task of selecting a post-war CGS.

The balance sheet of Australian defence readiness when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Malaya, showed that:

a. HQ and Corps Troops, 1st Australian Corps, together with 6, 7, 8 and 9th Divisions were on active service abroad;
b. The great bulk of the RAN were serving in overseas theatres;
c. RAAF personnel, after training in Canada, were serving mainly in UK and other theatres with the RAF;
d. In summary, the elite of Australia's forces were engaged in operations overseas; and
e. Munitions production in Australia was still deplorably small, but was increasing.

On the credit side there were meagre strengths of Army, Navy and Air Force personnel in various stages of training in Australia; but they were deficient in warlike stores and other essential equipment. These troops had little hope of providing effective defence against any determined enemy attack on Australia.

Even after Malaya was invaded, the vast majority of the Australian population thought that the Japanese would be well and truly stopped by the "impregnable" defences of Singapore. This line had been fed to them so consistently in the pre-war and early war years, that they still believed it; and even the doubters wanted to believe it.

When Singapore did fall, the effect in Australia was one of great anxiety (if not alarm) and disbelief. Sturdee quickly deployed reinforcements to Rabaul and Timor in an attempt to delay the Japanese sweep southwards. Years after those perilous months, he was to suffer some criticism for this action, from a couple of military history analysts. But his reasoning at the time was that even untrained and poorly equipped troops would be better than none, and that if they could delay the enemy advance even a little, then desperately needed time would be gained for the task of strengthening the mainland's defences. Nevertheless, the Japanese advance pressed on relentlessly and with growing speed.

The collapse of Singapore and the capture of Java set the Government into a state of near panic, HQ 1st Australian Corps, 6 and 7th Divisions and Corps Troops were then en route from the Middle East to the Far East. Advanced elements of this force had landed in Java and were to be trapped by the advancing Japanese while the remainder of the returning 2nd AIF, codenamed "STEPSISTER" were still on the high seas scattered across the Indian Ocean.

STEPSISTER Force had not been loaded tactically on leaving the Middle East. Troops were embarked in passenger vessels converted into troopships and their heavy equipment,
guns and vehicles were loaded in slow moving cargo ships, hundreds of miles and more behind the units to which they belonged.

The writer, serving with HQ 1 Aust Corps and returning in the “Strathalan” was delayed in Colombo for five days while the destination of the force was decided. Little fighting equipment was held in that and in other ships; not even enough for deck training purposes.

Churchill at this time resolved to divert STEPSISTER Force to Burma to help hold the Japanese advance that was being made into that country. Accordingly he put this proposition to the Australian Government. It will be recalled that Churchill had sent Australian troops to Gallipoli, to Greece and now there was the prospect of another potentially disastrous deployment, this time in Burma.

Return of the AIF Middle East Forces to Australia

Having regard to the deplorable state of Australia’s defences and the dramatic advance by the Japanese towards the Australian mainland, carrying all before them in the islands to the north-west of the continent, it was clear to the CGS that unless Churchill’s proposition was rejected immediately and unconditionally, the AIF troops would be landed in Burma. On Churchill’s orders, issued before any official concurrence had been given by the Australian Government, they already were heading in that direction!

Sturdee concluded that it was imperative for STEPSISTER Force to be re-routed forthwith to defend Australia. By now some Government Ministers were showing their grave concern (and agitation) but there were observers at the time who reported that the CGS remained remarkably calm and decisive throughout this crisis — shades of his uncle in The Falkland Islands in 1914?

Some time later when the writer as a Lieutenant-Colonel, returned from the Middle East and reported for duty as HQ Home Forces, then located at the Ivanhoe Grammar School in Melbourne, he was told by Sir Iven Mackay in one conversation that during the exchange of critical communications between Churchill and Curtin, there were certain politicians who “lost their heads” whereas Sturdee had remained quite unruffled. His whole attitude had reminded Sir Iven (a pre-war Headmaster of a well known Grammar School) that Kipling could have had someone like Sturdee in mind when he composed his poem “IF” and wrote the lines:

“If you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you . . . .”

After a night of deep thought and consideration with little sleep (which Lady Sturdee at the age of 92 still remembers) Sturdee telephoned Curtin on the morning of 15 February 1942 to recommend that the STEPSISTER convoy be diverted to Australia without delay.

Sturdee was well aware of the frightful consequences if the AIF was not returned to defend Australia. He felt so strongly about this that he threatened to resign if the Curtin Government did not support his recommendation. Many years later the writer asked the General whether he would have carried out that threat, to which his most positive answer was “Most decidedly; there was far too much at stake!”

Shedden, Rowell and Berryman thought that this was the most important decision Sturdee had taken in the whole of his service. It was vital to the defence of Australia and the linchpin for the later checking of Japan’s thrust into New Guinea.

Curtin was under very great pressure at this time, but he decided to act on Sturdee’s firm recommendation. Japanese propaganda had boasted that the returning AIF would be torpedoed and decimated and Curtin being a compassionate man, was very worried about this possibility. He sought solace in his own room and cut himself off from interruption. Finally, his devoted Private Secretary Mr Fred McLaughlin who was a deeply religious man, managed to persuade Curtin to join him in prayer for the safe return of the AIF. According to McLaughlin, who previously had recounted this episode to the writer and did so again in 1982 in Melbourne, to the Reverend Williamson, Curtin thereafter was noticeably more at ease.

Note: Mr F. A. McLaughlin, known as the “Prince of Private Secretaries” was secretary to Prime Ministers Bruce, Curtin and Chifley. His last appointment was Assistant Secretary, Department of Defence, following long service as Secretary of the Defence Committee. After his retirement he assisted Shedden with the preparation of the Shedden papers.
Very properly, Curtin has gone down in history as the Australian Prime Minister who had the courage to cross swords with Churchill and to a lesser extent, with Roosevelt. What is more important, he won out on this vital matter which had the potential to be a terrible disaster for Australia, as well as for Burma.

Many years later that brilliant British historian Ronald Lewin had this to say (page 176 of "The Chief"; his biography of Lord Wavell):

"The crude and mundane facts are that even if the Australians had been allowed to disembark at Rangoon, they would have been swallowed up... in an inevitable catastrophe, thus embittering Commonwealth relations even further."

In a letter dated 15 May 1981 to the writer, Lewin wrote that when he was working on Slim’s biography, he became convinced that it would have been nonsense to even think of putting the Australian troops into Burma at that stage of the war.

Also, in the Official History, Lionel Wigmore in the "Japanese Thrust" (page 465) wrote:

"It is now evident that the 7th Division would have arrived only in time to help in the extrication from Pegu (near Rangoon, Burma) and take part in the long retreat to India. In that event it could not have been returned to Australia, rested and been sent to New Guinea in time to perform the crucial role it was to carry out in the defeat of the Japanese offensive which would open there in July.

The Allied cause therefore was well served in the sound judgement and solid persistence of General Sturdee who maintained his advice against that of the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington; and by the tenacity of Mr Curtin who withstood the well meaning pressures of Churchill and Roosevelt.”

As Curtin will be remembered as the Australian Prime Minister who stood up to Churchill and Roosevelt, so too should Sturdee be remembered as the Australian Chief of the General Staff who won out against the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington. Yet only Wigmore has seen fit to record this vital segment of Australian history.

The combined efforts of these two great Australian leaders contributed enormously to saving Australia in late 1941 and early 1942, the time of greatest peril in the nation’s history.

**Return of General Blamey as Commander-in-Chief**

In March 1942 General Blamey returned to Australia from the Middle East and was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the AMF. He decided at an early stage to abolish the Military Board and in fact accepted broadly Sturdee’s proposals for the reorganisation of
the Army. For the time, at Blamey’s request, Sturdee remained CGS. It is well known that Blamey and Sturdee always operated together harmoniously and although they had minor differences on some military matters, as Hetherington has written, “Blamey liked Sturdee and they worked well with each other”.

By July 1942, MacArthur, Curtin and Blamey were concerned about representation of the Australian Army in Washington. In close consultation with MacArthur, it was decided that a top Australian General should be sent to Washington to aggressively put Australia’s requirements to the US Defence machinery at the highest level. This would help MacArthur’s own requests particularly for manpower and material. Also major decisions were being made in Washington therefore Australia’s views needed to be stated firmly and authoritatively so that they would be properly taken into account.

It was agreed that Sturdee was the one Army officer who had all the essential qualifications for this task and he was asked by Curtin and Blamey to accept the appointment. MacArthur told Sturdee that he was glad about his selection for the post and offered to assist him with introductions and letters of recommendation to top ranking US Army officers.

At first, Sturdee was reluctant to accept the appointment as he was still hoping for an operational command in the AIF. However, he recognised the importance of the Washington assignment and when Blamey assured him that at the end of one year, he would be recalled to a field command, Sturdee agreed to go. Curtin confirmed Blamey’s promise.

MacArthur honoured his part of the arrangement and when Sturdee arrived in Washington he was very well received by the senior officers of the US Army. Their warm reception was to develop into valuable working relationships for the duration of his term in Washington.

Australian officers who served with Sturdee in Washington including Colonel Wilton (later General Sir John Wilton), spoke glowingly of the effectiveness of his dealings with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In that crucial period, Australia’s interests and requirements were forcefully represented by Sturdee who also established a right of direct access to General George Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, on matters of importance.

At the end of his service in the United States, Sturdee was informed by Curtin and Blamey that his mission had been highly successful, both from the Australian and American viewpoints.

**GOC First Army**

Sturdee returned from Washington to command First Aust Army, the most senior field command available. Blamey knew that Sturdee had the qualities of a good commander and equally important, that Sturdee was a loyal and trustworthy officer who would get on with the job he was appointed to do, without fear or favour to anyone.

Now Sturdee was in a position to serve what would be the last twelve months of the war in command of Australian forces in New Guinea, Bougainville and New Britain. His forces were adequate in strength and equipped to take the offensive.

He felt that he had reached his goal. As GOC of the top Australian field formation, he quickly set about his new task with the same dedication and zeal that had characterised all of his previous senior appointments.

Whilst he did not have the opportunity to exercise the deployment of large forces in operations in New Guinea — for that matter neither did any other Australian General — he performed his duties to the complete satisfaction of General Blamey and the Prime Minister. He had some difficulty with one of his senior subordinates who had been known on occasion to misinterpret instructions, but as Rowell was to write:

“Any assessment of his (Sturdee’s) worth as a commander in the field is best left to those who served with and under him. They tell of a wise and tolerant commander who gave clear orders and left his subordinate commanders to get on with the job whilst he did his utmost to see that they were adequately supported.”

After Blamey had accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces on behalf of the Australian Government, Lieutenant-General Sturdee took the surrender of Japanese forces in the First Army Area from General Imamura, Commander of the 8th Army Area and Admiral Kusaka, Commander South East Area Fleet, on board the British aircraft carrier HMS “Glory” at Rabaul on 6 September 1945. It is of interest to note that the two Japanese swords handed over in that surrender ceremony
At his desk as CGS (1945)

together with the sword worn by Sir Vernon, were presented to the Australian War Memorial by Lady Sturdee in February 1982.

General Blamey (later Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey) retired from the AIF in November 1945 having rendered most outstanding and distinguished service to Australia in two World Wars.

**Return to CGS**

Late in 1945 there was considerable discussion about the organisation of the Australian Army to meet peacetime requirements. The Chifley Government had given much thought to this subject and finally decided to reinstate the Military Board.

Careful consideration was given to the various contenders for the appointment of CGS as there was plenty of talent available; but as Rowell stated, Sturdee seemed to stand out as the one officer of high rank to whom no exception could possibly be taken. Furthermore, Chifley had been impressed by a steadfast Sturdee in the difficult times of 1941-42 and so also had Dedman the Minister for Defence, and other Ministers.

Sturdee therefore was appointed Acting C-in-C to replace Sir Thomas Blamey, with instructions to reestablish the Military Board as soon as possible.

He stated some years later that he would have preferred to go into retirement at that stage. He was 55 and had been offered some attractive directorships in industry. However, Chifley was eager to appoint as CGS, a man who could weld the post-war Army into a team without undue turmoil and to settle down some obvious rivalries which existed. Pressed by Chifley — there was always great respect and trust between them — Sturdee agreed to accept the position.

Although the war was over, there were many very important tasks awaiting the CGS’s attention, such as:

a. Demobilizing the Army;

b. Raising, organising and maintaining the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan;

c. Convincing the Government of the need to provide a suitable Regular Army and CMF for peacetime;
d. Disposing of surplus equipment stocks; but at the same time, persuading the Government to hold enough in reserve for any future emergencies;

e. Retaining an appropriate industrial capacity to provide for the Services' requirements;

f. Retaining and upgrading training establishments and facilities; and

g. Culling out surplus (and some elderly) officers.

For his second term as CGS, Sturdee served from March 1946 to April 1950 during which period the Government approved his plans for the post-war Army. In this time the Regular Army had been established and was functioning smoothly; the CMF had been launched; BCOF in Japan was performing with distinction under capable commanders; the Ordnance Depots were adequately stocked; and importantly, Sturdee had given his strong support to Joint War Production planning resulting in many wartime factories being retained and in some instances, new factories or annexes being set up to meet potential defence requirements.

The writer was the first Secretary and Executive member of the Australian Joint War Production Committee and is very aware of the part Sturdee played in the early stages of its work. It is to the discredit of later Governments that so much of that industrial war potential has been lost since that time.

Sturdee got on well with the many Army Ministers he served. Some he liked and respected — others the reverse; but always he recognised that the Minister's authority was paramount. Whilst he would argue for and vigorously push his own views, once any Ministerial decision was taken, the CGS then would do everything he could to implement it.

During Sturdee's 1946-50 term as CGS, the Army enjoyed much prestige in the eyes of the Government. This was brought about undoubtedly by Sturdee's own performance which Chifley admired, and also by the Army's outstanding work in BCOF and in the NSW coal strike of 1949. It will be recalled that Chifley was forced to call the Army into the mines to keep essential services operating. The Prime Minister was grateful for the CGS's unwavering support throughout that troublesome period.

Relations with Defence Department

In the mid 1930's Sturdee as DMO&l, commenced a long and close association with the Secretary, Department of Defence (the late Sir Frederick Shedden) which was to have a marked impact on the defence of Australia in World War 2. To the Government, Shedden was seen as a "strong man" and certainly the most influential person in all matters concerning Australian defence over a period spanning some twenty years. He has not been given sufficient credit for the excellent work he did, probably because he consistently shunned any from of publicity.

However, at one stage after the end of the war, some difficulties arose for the Chiefs of Staff in their relationship with Shedden which caused them to recommend to the Government that he be appointed Chairman of the Defence Committee. The Chiefs considered it necessary to make this request as a means of ensuring that their views once endorsed by Shedden as Chairman, would be presented to the Minister in the form intended by the Committee as a whole. By being thus committed to the collective decisions of the Defence Committee, Shedden then became less able to inject any of his own differing views, which at times he had done, in his capacity as Secretary of the Defence Department.

Shedden and Sturdee both of them exceptionally capable and of strong personalities, shared a high degree of respect for each other. This was evident particularly throughout the crisis times of early 1942 when Australia was in grave danger. Likewise, Sir Thomas Blarney and Shedden enjoyed a good working association with each other. It was widely known that Blarney had great respect for Shedden's powerful influence as well as for his competence.

The writer served as an Assistant Secretary and later First Assistant Secretary under Sir Frederick Shedden in the Department of Defence from 1949 to 1956. Then after Shedden's retirement from the Public Service, he had a close association again from 1956 to 1971 when Sir Frederick was researching and drafting his book (which was never published) at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. While compiling his papers, Sir Frederick often took the opportunity to reminisce with the First Assistant Secretary, about events and personalities of the war period.
On a number of occasions during these sessions, Shedden expressed his opinion that Sturdee's demand for the return of the 2nd AIF had been one of the most vital decisions taken during the war. He said that Sturdee had been unswerving in his determination to see it through. The CGS's steady demeanour at such critical times had its effect on those in contact with him, leading political figures included.

Shedden considered that Sturdee had been a brilliant CGS and a most capable commander, who had the facility to be diplomatic but firm in all of his dealings with the US and UK Armed Forces. Likewise, Sturdee was trusted by both political parties of the time because of his strict personal attitude of political neutrality.

Sturdee rated Shedden’s own wartime service as outstanding; and so did Blamey.

There is no doubt at all that the relationship which existed between Shedden and Sturdee enabling them to cooperate so closely, had a very great influence on Australian defence planning and the implementation of defence policy in the post-war years.

**Business Adviser Army**

It would be appropriate to record here the views of Colonel Sir Alfred Kemsley who was Australian Army Business Adviser with the status of a Principal Staff Officer, during the war and early post-war years. Sir Alfred was a loyal friend and adviser to Generals Blamey and Herring and he had known Generals Monash and White having served with them in World War 1. A sound businessman and a dedicated soldier, Kemsley was an ideal choice as Business Adviser.

He now enjoys a reputation of being somewhat of a sage for his personal knowledge of Australian Army commanders. At present he is chairman of the Shrine of Remembrance Trustees in Melbourne, Chairman of the Blamey Memorial Committee, member of the Herring Memorial Committee and he is still connected with activities of benefit to the Army and to ex-servicemen.

This is how Sir Alfred regarded Sturdee: “...I learned too how loyally Sturdee responded to the many requests that came back from the C-in-C Middle East — and
how loyal he was to Blamey again as CGS and GOC First Army. I mention this . . . because I am aware that some others failed in their duty to the C-in-C. Sturdee was able, commanded respect, (was) loyal, trustworthy and a gentleman.

Retrospect and Recognition

Others have told of General Sturdee’s ability as a soldier and some of his personal talents and strengths.

He was of medium height, well proportioned, very good looking with classical features, as will be seen in the photographs accompanying this article, taken when he was Chief of the General Staff.

In the main he was good tempered with a ready sense of humour — he enjoyed a hearty laugh. In the home environment he was calm in an emergency. He took little interest in sport either as a spectator or as a participant.

Away from the office he obtained relaxation and satisfaction in his well equipped workshop or in his splendid garden. He had great talent as a “handyman” who was always ready to help others in the manufacture or maintenance of equipment.

Whilst in a group of men, Sir Vernon had an impressive presence — he stood out as a leader.

Lady Sturdee, a cousin of Rear Admiral Harry Showers, RAN busied herself during the war years with the affairs of the AIF Women’s Association. Like her husband she was steeped in Army tradition, and even today she still displays a great interest in Army affairs and personalities.

The Sturdees had a son, a daughter and five grandchildren. Daughter Margaret inherited her father’s spirit of service and interest in the Army. During the war she served in the Chief Military Advisers Branch with Major-General T. R. Williams and Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant-General H. G. Edgar). She also retains her interest in the Army and she is always happy in an Army setting.

Sturdee reached retiring age in April 1950 by which time most of the tasks he had set out to achieve had been completed or were well under way. He was entitled to feel very satisfied with the manner in which his post-war Army had developed and would prove itself so splendidly in Japan and Korea. Also he could be pleased with the numbers and quality of well trained and experienced officers he had, as well as with the many training establishments that had been further developed. He had fought strongly against some powerful opposition to retain and improve some schools which he considered to be essential, and in this too, he had succeeded.

He had made visits overseas for discussions with Field Marshal Montgomery in London and with General of the Army Eisenhower in Washington. He was welcomed most cordially by both of these famous commanders of World War 2. Also his earlier service in Washington during 1942-43 gave him easy and friendly access to the many senior colleagues he had known in wartime.

Lieutenant-General Sir Vernon Sturdee died at the Repatriation Hospital, Heidelberg, Victoria on 25 May 1966. He was given a military funeral at which his respected friend Lieutenant-General Sir Edmund Herring was principal pall bearer.

Rowell wrote: “He will always be remembered by those who were privileged to work with and under him as a kindly, humble and simple man who carried out his great responsibilities with a minimum of fuss . . . Younger members of the Army and those who will follow, should find in his work an inspiration and an example of loyal, selfless and devoted service.” (Australian Army Journal, August 1966)

Yet, shame on the Army! ! Nothing has been named after him; apart from an LSM, MV “Vernon Sturdee” which was operated by a one time post-war Army Small Ships Squadron; and subsequently was decommissioned and sold.

Perhaps it is not yet too late for the Government to recognise Sturdee and his role in Australia’s history, especially in the times of wartime crisis, by dedicating some significant defence facility or activity in commemoration of his name and his deeds.

In conclusion, the writer makes no apology for repeating that some contemporaries have argued that Sturdee’s advice and determination on the return of the AIF to Australia in early 1942 was the linchpin for saving the country from invasion. On the evidence produced in this paper and elsewhere, it would be difficult to gainsay this opinion.

It remained for a great Prime Minister to accept and to act upon this forceful advice.
Then, with courage, single-mindedness and patriotism, John Curtin rejected the pressure of Churchill, Roosevelt and the Chiefs-of-Staff in London and Washington.

It is very sad that this statesman did not live to see the end of World War II in which he had played a role — indeed his early death was no doubt accelerated by his devoted and sustained service during the period of the greatest danger to the country.

One or two writers have since suggested that Australia was in "no danger of invasion in 1942". This was stated by the "Tiger of Malaya", General Yamashita when questioned about Japan's intentions after the war. Can one imagine the "Tiger" giving any other answer to his interrogators? On the other hand Admiral Yamamoto (the hero of Pearl Harbor) volunteered to lead the attack on Australia, but this was postponed until Burma was subjugated. It was also fortunate that the Battle of the Coral Sea ended in a serious setback for the Japanese thrust southwards.

Curtin lost nothing in prestige in the United Kingdom by his courageous battle with Churchill. His visit to London two years later was most successful, whether in Whitehall, Lords Cricket Ground or in the streets of London. He was always well received and treated with respect and goodwill. His dignity and simplicity made him a popular figure with civilians and service personnel alike. Likewise, his night time visits to distant airfields to see RAAF units starting out on raids over Europe and then awaiting their return was appreciated and welcomed by the air crews.

After the death of Mr. Curtin, a memorial service was held in his memory on 18 July, 1945 at Westminster Abbey. The famous building was over flowing with mourners from all walks of life, including the top political and establishment figures, who had gathered to pay homage to the Australian statesman. The writer was an usher at the Service and is aware of the genuine feeling of sorrow and the sense of loss displayed by the congregation — it was a...
worthy tribute to a great Australian in a far-off country.

This article set out to provide a short biographical sketch of General Sturdee; but the writer soon found that at the vital stage of Sturdee's service, his association with Curtin was at the peak of his achievements. For this reason it has been necessary to diverge to also pay tribute to the great Australian Prime Minister.

Australia owes much to Curtin and Sturdee for their leadership and dedication at the time of the nation's greatest peril. Perhaps it was their finest hour.

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"The Japanese Thrust"
Ivan Chapman
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THE AUTHOR, son-in-law of the late Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee, was a member of the 2nd AIF and Australian Regular Army having served in World War II in the Middle East, New Guinea and North West Europe. He attained the rank of Colonel at age 33. From 1949 to 1973 he was an Assistant Secretary and First Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defence.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (continued from page 4)

officers need at times to take command and not to be dependent on the umbilical word of the chain of command. Once the habit of unquestioning obedience, or for instance, the habit of smoking, becomes ingrained, it becomes the quick, easy response.

This is especially so in times of stress and a response in contradiction to the habit becomes difficult to implement; in some cases it becomes, in fact, impossible.

Drill does appear to have some benefits. It gives a sense of cohesion, of belonging to a unit. Many troops take pride in their smart appearance on ceremonial parades. Once again it is the question of the dichotomy between ostentation and efficiency; the soldier who is a competent soldier knows it and feels it in himself without recourse to ostentation.

Although one can find numerous historical works that could support this letter, there are two books that I strongly recommend to anyone interested in looking at the reality of this country's past military conflicts, and at the reasons for some of the great military mistakes of the past and thereby looking to avoid such things in the future. "The Broken Years" by Bill Gammage, Penguin Books, is based on the experiences of the Australian soldiers of World War One. "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" by Dr. Norman Dixon, Johnathon Cape Ltd. London, produces a scientific examination of some of the reasons for some of the great military disasters in British History. Dr. Dixon makes some relevant comments on drill. He mentions that it uses time and energy that would be better spent on more adaptive past-times. Ceremonial drill, like other forms of military ritual, becomes "excruciatingly boring for all those with more than the most mediocre intellect." (Page 178).

In summary, one of the aims of a military establishment should be to constantly strive for a true efficiency and not the appearance
of efficiency. To do this, one must retain an open and flexible mind, maintain the habit of constructive questioning and to always be seeking a better way of doing things. I hope that this letter will stimulate constructive thought and discussion with review of the place of parade ground drill in the modern military. Perhaps one facet of this should be look at our military traditions as Australians, and not as a subservient branch of the British Army; to look at the qualities that made the ANZACs the soldiers they were. Emulating more of our own traditions may hold some of the answers to the perpetual problem of maintaining efficiency in the Australian Armed Forces.  

FitLt B. J. WHITE MBBS

NEWS MEDIA AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

Dear Sir,

As a full-time journalist, part-time infantry officer and one-time Public Relations Service officer, might I make some comments on Lt. Col. Fitzgerald's article (DFJ Jan-Feb 1983), and particularly on his recommendations?

No doubt his conclusions will be vigorously opposed by the Army's PR officers but the conclusions are no less correct or urgent for that. The current system of taking journalists from the mainstream of media life (and sometimes, from some quiet and neglected backwaters), giving them a short DEO course and posting them to a Military District Headquarters is unfair on the individuals concerned and unwise for the army as a whole. It is unreasonable to expect these officers, no matter how individually diligent, to acquire the breadth of military experience necessary for such a demanding role. The more technical aspects of their employment, drafting press releases, arranging facility trips and the like, can be performed more than satisfactorily by any competent officer of any corps after the appropriate training.

Lt. Col. Fitzgerald sees the need for the Army to make "a firm commitment to developing sound relations with the media based on mutual respect and trust". I would argue that those relations would have more chance of success if the point of contact between the media and the Army (or any of the Armed Forces for that matter) is a career officer with a pride in his service rather than a former journalist in uniform. Rightly or wrongly, the working journalist will see the public relations officer as someone who has either failed to make the grade in, or opted out of, daily-weekly-electronic-what-have-you-journalism. The best that any public relations person, whether in industry, commerce, charity or the armed forces, can do for a journalist is to make available the best news source. In service terms, that might be a corporal or it might be the Chief of the General Staff. It is rarely, if ever, a PR Officer.

Military history, particularly World War II and beyond, is littered with examples of commanders who appreciated the value of good communications and relations with the Press — which is not quite the same thing as good public relations. Both Montgomery and Horrocks made a point of treating was correspondents as trusted confidantes and advisers. At a more junior level, the point is reinforced by the Late Lt. Col. H. Jones' relations with reporters before his death at Goose Green.

Development of an appropriate training programme for officers and soldiers should not be a mammoth task. There is, despite the attitude of some news organisations (not always of the sensational, tabloid, afternoon paper variety) a significant interest in, and sympathy for, members of the armed forces within the senior echelons of newspapers, radio stations and television channels. Both executives and working journalists would, I'm certain, be only too pleased to participate in, or advise upon, such a training program.

The media (if such a misleadingly homogenous noun might be applied to such a patently disparate group of organisations) must play its part. Few news organisations would be prepared to commit a reporter to a political round without clear evidence that he or she understood the political institutions, appreciated the difference between the parties and had a working acquaintance, however slight, with the principal participants. That degree of professionalism, basic as it might be, is singularly lacking in reporting of defence. It is significant that Lt. Col. Fitzgerald quotes both Denis Warner and Frank Cranston. It is difficult to think of many more journalists with an interest in reporting defence and the encouragement of their news organisations to do so. The practice of employing former officers, widespread in the UK, seems sadly uncommon in this country.

PETER CHARLTON
THE APPLICATION OF SOME CONCEPTS OF DETERRENCE TO AUSTRALIA’S MARITIME STRATEGY

By Lieutenant Commander J. M. Leak RAN

“Our force needs to include many capabilities, but principally it should have a clearly visible deterrent capacity...”

Sir Anthony Synnot

INTRODUCTION

In 1979 the Chief of the Defence Force Staff, Admiral Synnot, in a national magazine article enunciated once again the thrust of Government decisions on the concept of national security which, in part, governs the size, shape and future of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). He went on to say that “there should be elements of our force which are capable of counter-action against an enemy’s vital interests; threat of counter-action which would move him from the consequences of any aggression by him, and so deter him.

The principle of deterrence as the foremost element of our security policy is a relatively recent, yet none-the-less fundamental change in Australia’s perception of national security interests. The change coincides with the demise of American military influence in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific area since the end of the Vietnam conflict in early 1975.

The policy usually described as ‘forward defence’ which had involved Australian forces in wars, not necessarily of popular choosing, since the beginning of the century has given way to use of ‘defence of Australia and Australian interests’ as a national concept. With this change has come a recognition that greater self-reliance is a predominant requisite of the newly-styled ADF, not necessarily a self-reliance based on self-sufficiency, but one where the nation should have a capacity to operate as a unified Australian force. This force should be provided with local logistic support backed by a national repair and modernisation capacity. Australia should be capable of assisting neighbouring countries militarily and be able to join with allies if that is the Government’s decision.

These concepts of self-reliance, centralised control of the ADF and the projection of an independent responsibility for our own security are without dispute. The author’s concern is with the deterrent aspects of our defence policy. What is deterrence? How should we apply deterrence? What are the consequences of a predominantly deterrent posture?

The idea of deterrence is as old as war itself, however its emergence to a pre-eminent position in most modern nations’ defence strategies dates only from the early 1950s and the awareness that global nuclear war is now an everyday reality and possibility. Deterrence is a strategy for peace, designed to convince a potential enemy that aggression is the least attractive of all options available to him.

The definition given above is essentially the same as that accepted by the ADF and promulgated as doctrine. But where the author, Collins, goes on to emphasise the central issue of psychological restraint as part of a deterrent strategy in his book, the ADF doctrine centralises on force structure, intelligence and industrial base aspects in explanation of deterrent strategy.

This apparent obeisance to the technology aspects of the ADF as the national deterrent, without due regard to other elements which combine to deter potential aggressors permeates every public airing of defence issues. Parliamentary, media and public concern is over aircraft carriers, fighters, budgets and defence installations. Few people concern themselves with the fundamental issues of our strategy of deterrence and its meaning.

This article is an attempt to identify those aspects of deterrence which, if acted upon totally or in part, could comprise a deterrent maritime strategy. The concepts proposed form
only one part of maritime strategy, however. They are essentially a peace-time strategy since, should hostilities commence, then deterrence has failed.

In hand with a deterrent capability we must always have an ability to wage war offensively. As Rear-Admiral H. E. Eccles has said, 'Deterrence is certainly a very important aspect of strategy, but it by no means is its only element. But since it is a negative element, undue concentration on it may easily detract from the essential aspects of strategy.'

The author can take no credit for the concepts of deterrence espoused in this article. The concepts are drawn from papers published in the USA over the past six years. The papers reflect a growing concern that, despite the emergence of nuclear global holocaust as a distinct possibility, the proponents of deterrence as a grand strategy have failed to analyse deterrent theory since the days of the Cold War. Development of deterrent concepts for the prevention of conventional war or insurgency have been similarly neglected. My belief is that Australian experience is no better than that of the Americans.

CONCEPTS FOR MARITIME DETERRENCE

Credibility and Preparedness

Nothing encourages potential enemies quite so conclusively as a nation with its guard down. Low force levels and low operational readiness standards are but two of the factors which can precipitate adventurism in the camp of a potential aggressor. Coupled with preparedness is the aura of credibility which must accompany the international image of a nation’s military power.

In Australia, the vanguard of our national defence capability is maritime power. Despite our military alliance with the U.S., our credibility as a regional maritime power can only be established by an independent maritime strategy backed by a supportive maritime force. Australia must therefore have a maritime force with a capability of not only deterring potential aggressors, but one which can conduct operations to control our vital sea and air lines of communication. This concept recognises that the two most vital aspects of defence are the preservation of our sea-borne trade and the protection of the relatively densely populated and highly industrialised areas of our continent.

To lend credibility to the protection of Australia’s area of interest outside the continent, close defence ties with our neighbours in South-East Asia and the emerging island states of the South-West Pacific area should be developed. Our traditional defence ties with New Zealand should also be strengthened. The objective of these new regional policies should be to foster regional stability by demonstrating a willingness to exercise and co-operate with our defence partners and to display our will to support these neighbours should the requirement arise.

This objective is not attained by naval means alone. The development of a highly mobile, combat-ready, rapidly deployable task force is required to support the national objective. The archipelagic geography of our neighbouring states and, indeed, the similarity of some industrial and mining areas of Australia dictates that this force be highly conditioned to conducting its business from a sea base. Development of the Operational Deployment Force along US Marine Corps or Royal Marine lines as a fully integrated formation would provide effective evidence to our region that Australia is prepared to back its maritime policies with fire power from the sea, air or ashore.

Concerning deterrence of interference with our lines of communication, the naval and air forces must be equipped to provide visible and powerful evidence of our seriousness of intent. The development of increased capabilities of our F111 strategic strike force and the Submarine Arm is therefore of paramount importance. No country should be mistaken about the power of these weapon platforms. The capabilities of these strategic forces are also of prime importance in the maritime role. Our maritime capacity to strike at distant assembly points or to attack naval forces guarding strategic straits or ocean transit areas is a most powerful deterrent tool. Our ability to project air power at sea with the strategic strike force and aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm are central to control of sea lines of communication. The strategic value of the submarine force is undeniable.

Of equal importance is the quality of our other naval forces. The flexibility of roles inherent in the destroyers and frigates of the Fleet must be continued to provide not only
the deterrent qualities of sea power which accompany the role of the RAN in peace-time activities, but also provide for the capabilities required in war of sea denial and sea assertion. This applies to the RAAF fighter force as well. The presence of the F/A 18 in Australia, deployed to protect our coastal shipping and points of entry into this country is a deterrent unto itself. An additional capability to perform maritime strike operations or provide air support for coastal shipping is an advantage which should not be underestimated.

Credibility and preparedness are vital elements of our deterrent posture. Together, they provide the framework for the force structure required to achieve the national objective. Projection of that objective must be visible and continuous if credence is to be afforded it by regional power. That projection is a matter of national will.

National Will

National power is the product of national will and military force. In a strategy of deterrence the willingness to use that power must be seen as credible by an adversary. A key aspect of national will is the strength of political will to make crucial decisions when important national interests are at stake. This political will can be exercised in several ways. Whereas defence policies are inexorably tied to Australia’s foreign policies and to a lesser extent her trade relations with other countries, our will to deter war or international instability must be backed by concrete intentions of economic reward or punishment should regional stability be threatened. The political proclivity of protecting Australia’s economic interests at the expense of our relations with neighbours has gained few friends in the area and reflects poorly on our attempts to foster the image of a regional maritime power intent on protecting the region from unhealthy influence. Australia’s wheat deal with the USSR in 1980 following President Carter’s plea for Western support for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Afghanistan is but one example.

The continuation of a policy which promotes European, Soviet, North America and Japanese economic interests before those of the area in which Australia’s defence interests lie can only promote suspicion in the neighbourhood. This suspicion may well be reflected in the future by strained diplomatic relationships, increased bureaucratic stonewalling on warship and aircraft clearances and disinterest in combined exercising. A policy of isolationism as an expression of superiority is counter-productive to regional security.

The will of the people is essential in determining the political expression of national policy. Support for the ADF and particularly a recognition of the importance that the maritime forces play in supporting national interests is vital to the concept of national will.

The level of public debate on defence matters was covered in the introduction to this article. However, it is fair to say that if national interests, defence policies, defence capabilities and maritime strategies are shrouded in secrecy then the public is unlikely to give its support to a defence force it knows nothing about. Similarly, potential aggressors are unlikely to be deterred if our military capabilities is kept secret. This leads to the next element — the concept of publicity.

Publicity

The concept of publicity directly opposes the principle of war called surprise. The Government must therefore make important decisions on what intentions and capabilities should be communicated to the public, and therefore potential enemies and how that information should be communicated.

In the public forum, arguments have been made that government statements on defence aims do little to enhance public knowledge on the issues of the strategic basis for which vast amounts of the public purse are expended annually. Strategists believe that some politicians suffer from the same strategic ignorance and support some form of strategic basis statement being made available to the public from which informed debate might follow and from which public will might be gauged.

Such a statement could include a set of basic aims against which plans could be publically evaluated. The statement would act as a useful component of preparedness — a statement of intent providing a datum for warning potential aggressors about the conditions which we have established for the use of armed force.

This form of statement would be particularly useful in the maritime arena. The high cost of maritime capital equipment is inevitably subjected to public and parliamentary scrutiny. Quite often the loudest and most convincing
cries come from the least informed — the media. The power of the Fourth Estate cannot be ignored by the Defence establishment and greater efforts should be made to promote a better understanding of the issues involved in the annual appropriation of the defence budget. Only by providing better information can the true nature of national will be reflected in defence objectives.

Controllability
The complexities of selecting the proper courses by which Australia exercises her deterrent defence policy and the subtlety of change and uncertainty which surrounds the prospects of conflict, demand that those forces used to support our defence policy be highly controlled. Those forces most likely to be used initially in protecting our vital national interests are the maritime forces. A successful deterrent maritime strategy will therefore depend upon the orchestration of maritime weight and the mixture of all elements of national power to achieve Australia’s security interests.

The restructuring of the ADF and the Department of Defence in 1975, as well as the re-allocation of certain command authority from the Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of Defence Force Staff (CDFS), ensured that command of maritime forces in times of delicate international negotiation is vested at the highest defence level. But what of the principle of centralised direction (or command) and decentralised execution (or control) which is expounded as the philosophy for control of ADF operations?

Recognizing that in extreme cases diplomacy might sway the balance between peace and war, what is the degree of controllability which CDFS has over maritime forces? The answer to these questions lies in the command-and-control arrangements available to CDFS in Canberra. As military head of the ADF, CDFS must be in close contact with the Cabinet, the Minister for Defence and the operational elements of the ADF tasked with the deterrent mission. Undoubtedly those maritime forces will be constituted as a joint force as this is the only constitutional way in which CDFS can exercise direct command over operational forces.

The command-and-control arrangements presently available to CDFS consist of access to the Defence Communications Network and the support of staff in the Joint Military Operation and Plans Division (JMOP). Other central Defence support is available for non-operational matters, whilst the Policy and Plans Division provides the CDFS with ministerial departmental lines at working level.

JMOP is primarily concerned with day-to-day operational policy matters and the maintenance of contingency plans. The Division has little capacity to exercise CDFS command function. In this regard additional staff is required to supplement JMOP Staff if operational command is to be exercised.

Whereas any future conflict is most likely to involve the use of joint forces, or at least the conduct of joint operations, it is incongruous that CDFS has no permanent facility to exercise command. Military forces require the highest degree of control in tense situations because of their destructive potential and the attendant risk of escalation if that potential is realised. During crisis situation controlled military force may be the only adequate means of signalling true national interest and intent to allies and adversaries alike.

As part of our national strategy, the capability for the CDFS to exercise control as well as command over deployed deterrent forces is essential. Escalation is a very real possibility if that control is lacking. Uncertainty in a potential aggressor’s estimation of our ability to control forces in any delicate negotiation phase may well cause the aggressor to allow escalation to work to his advantage. On the other hand uncertainty can work for us as well.

Uncertainty and Negotiation
If credibility fails or flags then an aggressor’s uncertainty about our will to fight might be the final wall holding back the tide of escalation to conflict. Henry Kissinger in his book ‘The Necessity for Choice’ called this phenomenon ‘deterrence through uncertainty’. The concept deals with doubts concerning the probable outcome of any attack. The latitude for over-estimating friendly capabilities, under-estimating enemy capabilities and misinterpreting enemy intentions are contributing factors. Prospective aggressors may therefore be discouraged from adventurism.

In preparing any deterrent strategies, due weight must be placed on the concept of publicity as well as that of uncertainty. The
The conflict of interests is often removed by parliamentary means. The perceived inability of our national leaders to agree on most matters of national security casts uncertainty in the eyes of most Australians without having to consciously disguise our true intentions from potential aggressors. However, the concept of uncertainty cannot support deterrence without a concomitant concept for negotiation.

Bluff or brinkmanship is not dead in the world of conventional warfare. Australia’s credibility at the negotiating table must be backed by military capability and, once again, the maritime and strategic forces proved the power base.

Gunboat diplomacy in the control of the sea in our areas of interest is an important element in projecting our security policies. Where territorial or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) sea boundaries are in dispute, the subtle and diplomatic use of maritime forces to substantiate our claims for sovereignty or resource control are vital if we are to retain international credibility. However, bluff should never substitute for capability.

Our strategy should be to deploy sufficient maritime forces to those areas where national claims are likely to cause dispute including the Timor Sea, north-west Australian waters and the Great Barrier Reef. Diplomacy may no longer come from the barrel of a gun, however the sole use of patrol boats to conduct sensitive political missions cannot be regarded as a serious attempt to exercise our sovereign rights over these areas.

More muscle is required in the form of major fleet unit or task group deployments to demonstrate our national resolution. To achieve maximum effect in this regard requires a flexibility of employment of forces not previously envisaged.

**Flexibility**

The concept of flexibility is not new, indeed it is an accepted Principle of War. However, with respect to deterrence, little attention has been paid to what this concept entails.

Apart from the flexibility of employment built into naval ships as a result of lack of unlimited capital equipment funds, there must be an adaptability of employment for maritime forces acting in a static deterrent role. These maritime forces must be capable of switching to an active role should negotiation fail or escalation take place.

The flexibility of weapon platforms is well understood, however the concern lies with the adaptability and flexibility of personnel to perceive where deterrence has failed and where action should commence. The flexibility of strategists, planners and decision-makers, rather than equipment users, is the true problem area.

In the field of maritime strategy, interests usually lie with operational requirements or equipment procurement programmes based on force structure decisions and inter-service rivalry for the defence dollar; training is invariably aimed at the operational requirements; strategic thinking is offensively oriented; staff courses concentrate on management and defence capabilities.

Nowhere, as the author’s knowledge, is the art and strategy of deterrence defined, published or taught. To maintain a flexibility to practise deterrence as a peace-time role of the maritime forces and to convert to an active role when, and if, the occasion arises should be of vital concern to the Government.

It is the maritime forces which will carry the brunt of decisions made in Canberra when the situation demands a military reaction.

**CONSEQUENCES OF A DETERRENCE POSTURE**

In the introduction, the question was raised about the consequences of Australia adopting a principally deterrent posture. The question is only applied to changes which should take place in our maritime strategy if we are to pursue deterrence as a national security policy. To this end the consequences relate to Australia’s foreign policy, public statements, ADF organisation and force deployment strategy.

**Australia’s Foreign Policy**

In analysing foreign policy matters only broad issues will be discussed. The principal concern is that our foreign trade and diplomatic policies are seemingly not aligned to our stated defence policies. We seem to give more credence to nations outside our area of strategic interest than to those within it.

If we are to assert ourselves as a respected maritime influence in our region then bi-lateral trade and defence agreements should be...
brought into closer harmony. The consequence of not doing so is the loss of international standing in a regional community which believes in what it sees, not what it hears.

Public Statements
The Government has not shown any alacrity to widening informed debate on defence issues since the criticisms levelled at it over the general nature of the 1976 White Paper and the 1979 Ministerial Statement on Defence by Mr Killen. If deterrence is a key factor then the will of the people must be sought to gauge the degree to which the nation supports our defence policy.

Only by expressing national will can the Government pursue the deterrent line with any conviction that the nation is behind its policy decisions. Only by opening the debate to include comment on the strategic basis for the costly development and maintenance of a defence capability can this support be determined. The consequence is the loss of credibility as a nation which backs its security decisions with national will and potential force.

ADF Organisation
The delicacy and diplomacy which accompany a deterrent national security policy, requires that the highest order of control be held over those forces which represent the national policy. These are most likely to be maritime forces — particularly in peace-time.

The present ADF capability to successfully control these forces seems inadequate on two counts. Firstly, command-and-control arrangements are not geared to give the CDFS a permanent facility to exercise his command should the occasion be warranted. Secondly, the forces most likely to be involved in deterrent maritime operations have little training in the skillful use of deterrent diplomacy. This applies equally to strategists and planners.

The consequences of not correcting these deficiencies are the serious threat of escalation to conflict in delicate situations and the engagement of unprepared forces in dangerous bluff or brinkmanship of their own ignorant accord.

Force Deployment Strategy
The maritime strategy required to support a policy of deterrence differs from that required of a defensive posture. Elements of the maritime force must be used to effectively demonstrate the national will to protect Australia's sovereignty and resources.

Australia's strategy must therefore move away from its traditional ties to its super-power allies and exert a more independent influence on the area of strategic interest. This area includes the Australia EEZ and the waters of the South-West Pacific area, the India Ocean and South-East Asia.

Australia should be more evident in her defence ties, particularly maritime ties with our neighbours. This includes increasing our maritime exercising with ASEAN countries, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand forces and the deployment of major fleet units and elements of the RAAF more frequently to our areas of interest.

The consequence of our continuous close alliance with 'all things American' might be a growing disenchantment of neighbouring countries with Australia over the sincerity of our wishes for regional harmony and stability.

CONCLUSION
Nothing is stable in the world of national security issues and international relationships. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is stark, testimony that concepts of strategy can be valid today and be the 'lessons learnt' of tomorrow.

Australia is faced with changing strategic assessments of a scale more frequent than has been reckoned. In the future, the concept of deterrence as a principal security strategy might be replaced by one which returns the country to the super-power fold. While deterrence is the primary concern, the duty of the nation is to fully support that policy.

This philosophy is valid provided the theories, principles or concepts of deterrence are understood. There is little evidence to suggest that this is the case. Our pre-occupation with the material and operational aspects of maritime warfare has left a void in the thinking patterns of strategists, politicians and military planners alike.

Deterrence, in the national mind, is nothing more than the cost and composition of the force-in-being and the force-to-come.

This article has attempted to show some of the additional elements which comprise a deterrent strategy. Without the additional concepts of credibility preparedness, national will, publicity, controllability, uncertainty, negotiation
and flexibility that have been discussed, then force structure as a principal deterrent could be meaningless.

The essential concepts are those of credibility and national will. Without these concepts deterrence is a false goal. National will results from an identification and vindication of Government policies by the people. This is only achievable by frank discussion of the vital issues — our strategic aims. Flexibility, which is inherited through a basic understanding of the ground rules, can only be achieved in the maritime force if the concept of deterrence is understood and instilled in maritime decision makers.

A deterrent strategy is not the panacea for Australia's security problem. It is the watchdog for peace, but it must grow teeth should peace be forfeited. The delicate balance between these extremes can be tipped either way by the employment of deterrent concepts. Correctly used, these concepts may win reprieve from a war we may not yet be ready to fight.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND NOTES
2. Ibid, p 78.
7. Ibid, paragraph 87.
8. Synnot, A. M. op cit, p 79.

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Lieutenant Commander John Leak joined the RAN in 1959. He is a helicopter pilot specialist and has served in all RAN helicopter squadrons, with No 5 Squadron RAAF (1971-73) and with the RAN Helicopter Flight in Vietnam (1967-68). He attended Staff College in 1981. His current posting is Executive Officer HMAS Moresby.

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THE MILITARY OFFICER AS A PROBLEM SOLVER, DECISION MAKER, PLANNER AND POLICY MAKER

PROBLEM SOLVING AND DECISION MAKING

By Captain R.C. Furty, AA Psych Corps.

The problems encountered in a military situation are not unique to the military, therefore we should be encouraged to draw knowledge from the general field of problem solving techniques. The military is particularly good at formulating policy and procedures for dealing with routine problems. The military officer is tasked with ensuring that routine problems are dealt with using these policies and procedures and acting on the principle of exception: dealing with non-routine problems.

Most of us have been educated in systems where we were taught what to think (facts) rather than how to think (techniques). While officers are taught to use the process of clear thought and logical reasoning in making appreciations; this in itself is not enough. Over the years many useful problem solving techniques and management 'gimmicks' have been developed. The military officer who aspires to be a "good" problem solver should be aware of these. The following list is intended to serve only as a 'menu'. It is hoped readers will check the respective references to get detail on the techniques that interest them.

1. Planning/anticipation of problems
   a. Programme Evaluation-Review Techniques (PERT). The use of a network to depict graphically a project plan. The network has two basic components — events and activities. A network path is a series of sequentially related events and activities leading from the start event through the network to the end event.
   
   The method uses three time estimates: optimistic time, pessimistic time and most likely time. A major feature of the PERT plan is figuring time relationships of all of the activities in a total network so you finally achieve the time goals, set up realistic time goals, and see realistic relationships. PERT is an invaluable tool in detailed complex programming.
   
   b. Kepner and Tregoe (as described in their book "The Rational Manager.") A problem is defined as a "deviation from a standard of performance." The techniques involved identifying the problem; analysis to find the cause of the problem, and decision making — to Kepner and Tregoe a decision is always a choice between various ways of getting a particular thing done or end accomplished. Decision making involves stating clear objectives and carefully evaluating alternatives — all aimed at taking action. The Army has used the Kepner and Tregoe methods in its systems approach to training.

2. Cost Reduction
   a. Critical Path Method (CPM)
      CPM is based on a PERT network. A critical path is defined as the sequence of activities which has the least amount of 'slack'. Slack being the difference between the scheduled duration of the project and the length of the path. The definition of critical path not only assures that each activity will occur properly in time relationship to other activities, but is also a method of locating problem spots. CPM differs from traditional methods of network analysis in that planning is separated from scheduling (planning determines what tasks must be performed and the order of
their performance. Scheduling translates
the plan into a timetable and time and
costs are directly related (balances short­
er activity times against costs.)

b. Line of Balance:
An effective technique for measuring,
collecting, interpreting, and presenting
facts — time, cost, and accomplishment — all measured against a specific plan. It clearly identifies any element not proceeding according to plan and not only shows what has been done but also forecasts future accomplishment. It provides a means of communication and is based on the principle that any operation can be analyzed through a simple but orderly process of reduction. After this analysis has been done and the results stated in chart form, the controlling factors can be quickly and easily identified. The line of balance uniqueness arises from its concentrated attention on deviations from planned performance rather than upon continuous examination of the plan as a whole.

c. Work Simplification
In brief the method involves selecting
a job to improve. Getting the facts
about the job. Challenging details and
listing possibilities. Developing better
methods and installing improvements.

d. Zero Defects
In the programme defects or errors are
identified and classified, then the defects
are traced to causes (men, machines,
materials). From there lists are made of
possible causes for each class of defects.

3. Material modification
a. Attribute Listing
In this process the attributes or peculiar
characteristics of the item or idea that is
to be improved are carefully listed. Then step-by-step modification or change of these attributes is performed; hopefully resulting in something different and better.

b. Idea Checklists
Checklists can extend our intuitive ideas
supply by directly providing solution possibilities. Checklists can use such key concepts as adapt, modify, magnify, minify, substitute, rearrange, reverse, and combine.

4. Choosing from Alternatives
Operations Research
In O.R. a problem consists of an indi­
vidual who has the problem, an outcome
desired by the decision maker, at least
two unequally efficient courses of action
which have a chance of yielding the
outcome, a state of doubt as to which
choice is best and the environment of
the problem. The three classes of prob­
lem considered are certainty (the out­
come of any course of action being
known), Risk (probabilities of possible outcomes estimated or are known), and
uncertainty (probabilities of outcomes
are known). In O.R. optimal solutions
result from choosing the course of action which maximises expected value. The method uses mathematical models for representing the relationships between the probability of an action giving you what you want and the relative value of the outcome.

What constitutes a “good” problem solver?
He uses his head, thinks; he does not just
‘react’ to situations. He questions his basic
assumptions. This is the golden rule of problem solving — if we start off with wrong assumptions we cannot end up with satisfactory solutions. Once he has found a solution he looks for a better solution. He knows when to use

(a) A convergent thinking approach: laying
out a spectrum of alternatives and study­
ing the consequences of each using deci­
sion trees, etc. or

(b) A divergent thinking approach where
such questions are asked as:
Is the right questions being asked?
Example: The control of yellow fever eluded researchers for years because they
asked “How can we kill the germ
in the patient’s bloodstream” instead of “How does the germ get
into the blood stream”?
— Has the problem been correctly classified?
Example: During WWII the shipboard proce­
dure for dealing with floating mines
was to withdraw and detonate using
a rifle. On one occasion a duty
officer had to deal with a mine that
was too close to the ship to use the
usual procedure. The officer instant-
ly reclassified the problem and distanced the mine from the ship by directing a fire hose between the ship and the mine until the normal procedure could be used.

— What frame of reference is being used? Example: Tanks are so named because they get around using tracks. To solve a particular problem in a particular terrain this frame of reference might have to be altered to consider for instance a tank which rides on huge rubber-tyred wheels.

— Is there a critical factor involved? Example: Time, money, strength, speed, etc.

— Can some constraint be temporarily removed (time, expense, size) to allow reformulation of the problem?

— Can a more useful solution be obtained by a shift of attention?

— Can cause and effect be reversed? Example: Quick reaction aircraft not only have to get into the air quickly, they have to be protected when on the ground, which leads to the problem of getting out of hangars quickly. One solution to this problem was to get hangars away from the aircraft quickly by putting them on wheels and giving them their own source of propulsion.

The "creative thinker" is most likely to be the best problem solver. "The creative thinker actively examines, ponders, and speculates. He coordinates what he already knows with new incoming data, being continuously on the lookout for paradoxes or discrepancies and inconsistencies in the various sources of information. Moreover, the creative thinker spontaneously calls into question what he reads, posing for himself rhetorical questions which may lead to a significant restructuring of his current point of view. In short, the creative thinker attempts to construct his own meaning, rather than be the passive recipient of someone else's interpretation."

**PLANNING AND POLICY MAKING**

It is difficult to treat planning as an entity on its own. This is because there is no agreed upon definition of what planning is. Some authors narrow down the field by defining planning as the linkage between knowledge and organised action, emphasising that it is a professional activity and a social process. Others take the easy way out by defining planning as rational decision making. For the purposes of this article I prefer to define planning as the organised anticipation of action. Whatever definition is used it is obvious that planning is not something totally discrete as would be indicated when people talk about the management process as planning, organisation, management and control. We cannot divorce planning from organisation theory, and any organisation theory will be no better than the underlying assumptions made about human behaviour.

Variables to look at in formulating and evaluating a policy:

— its clarity
— its internal consistency
— its compatibility with other policies
— its comprehensiveness (in terms of the variety of activities it deals with)
— its operationability.

The real test of policymaking is its effect on real situations. The first question to be asked about a policy is "What are its chances to affect reality" — how good a policy looks may not have much to do with how good it is.

Getting others to understand what we understand so well — the question of shared expectations:

So often we see policy statements or directives we presume are the result of the process of clear thought and logical reasoning that all military officers are taught to master. Yet in so many cases these statements are difficult if not impossible to understand. I believe the main reason for the problem originates with the policy formulator in that he often fails to consider and question his basic assumptions and fails to take into account the effect of shared expectations.

Every policy maker has certain expectations based on previous experience. "Our expectations are rules derived from regularities which we abstract from experience." "Each view selects its own relevant facts, in relation to its own viewpoint, sometimes in its own language — as a sociologist, a rioter, a bystander and a policeman need to give different accounts of the 'same' riot."

The primary message I am trying to impart is that the first person to analyse a policy statement has to be the person who formulates
One way to accomplish this is with a structured format which encourages the policy maker to perform certain tasks as he formulates the policy. This structured format could take the form of a worksheet. The worksheet would be used to encourage the originator to list his basic assumptions; point out differences between the existing situation and the situation he is proposing, and list the anticipated consequences. Procedural devices could be used to help distinguish between personal assertion, fact and probability. I am proposing to use the following devices which while not universal by any means, could serve the purpose:

- Ferge 1893 'signpost' as used by Polanyi. "I believe — personal assertion.
- PO Intermediate impossible — the statement may actually be wrong but is being used as a stepping stone to new ideas.
- % Probability — The writer uses the % sign to estimate the probability of the statement being correct.
- F Indicates undisputed fact.

All procedural devices precede the statement they refer to.

The worksheet format is best illustrated by using it to complete this article. The headings that are double lined would be listed each time a worksheet is used.

**WORKSHEET**

**Basic Assumptions:**

1. F Every policy is formulated based on certain assumptions (implicit and explicit).
2. F Every policy is affected by antecedent events.
3. 80% Every policy contrasts a proposed situation with an existing situation after considering options available.
4. F Every policy is framed in a particular context (fixation of meaning).
5. F Policy statements are a collection of statements of fact, statements of belief (or personal assertion); probability statements and often conjecture (formation of opinion with sufficient grounds).
6. F Every policy will have resultant consequences (anticipated and unanticipated).

All of these assumptions are made with reference to, but not dependent on, the following model of expectations:

| PAST EXPERIENCES — EXPECTATIONS — ACTION — CONSEQUENCES — MODIFIED OR STRENGTHENED EXPECTATIONS |
| Relations with others biological, social cultural and physical environments | Perceptions of particular evoking situation competencies |

In the existing situation the policy maker assumes that his experience and thus his assumptions are immediately comprehensible to the reader.

In the proposed situation the policy maker makes his assumptions explicit (in the first instance to himself).

F In the existing situation the policy maker does not distinguish between what is fact, personal assertion and conjecture.

F In the proposed situation the policy statement is first written using procedural devices which distinguish what is and what is not fact.

**Anticipated consequences**

Policy statements will be more comprehensible and thus more readily accepted.

Policy statements will be easier to analyse.

Policy statements will take longer to formulate.

An expectation will be created that policy statements are the result of proper reasoning.

**Summary:**

It is the author's belief that problem solving, decision making, planning and policy making can be improved by familiarisation with universally accepted management and problem solving techniques (PERT, CPM, etc.).
With a view to facilitating the formulation and analysis of policy, a structured worksheet is proposed which lists:

1. Basic assumptions of the originator
2. Differences between an existing situation and the proposed situation
3. Anticipated consequences.

REFERENCES


CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which they appear are available through the Defence Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

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SOVIET SUCCESSION AND POLICY CHOICES. Hough, Jerry F. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov 82: 49-54 A view of policy choices that will be available to the generation who succeed to the Soviet Leadership during the late 1980s. The economic and political problems of the USSR are discussed and three main options examined: the 'do nothing' option, the introduction of a more repressive regime, and a move towards reform on the Hungarian model.
INTRODUCTION
It is a popular opinion of Navy Service personnel that industry and in particular the Dockyard are in the grips of the unions. What is of more concern is that the answers to our industrial problems are frequently seen as ‘bashing’ the unions or undertaking tasks with uniformed personnel when civilian staff withdraw their labour, slow down or disrupt work rates for various reasons.

The western industrialised world is now experiencing a period of rapid social and technological change and if managements in civilian or the service environment are to maintain effective control there is a need to understand and anticipate changing policy initiatives in ‘employer-employee’ relations, and not simply react to external pressure.

A prime vehicle for preparing the future senior officers of our Navy is the RAN Staff College (RANSC) where a current and comprehensive industrial relations appreciation should be introduced for middle ranking officers. The Chief of Naval Technical Services in question time following his address to the RAN Staff College on 13 May 1981, referred to the need for Naval officers to gain a better understanding of these matters. The present General Manager Garden Island Dockyard has also expressed firm opinions regarding the need for improved training of naval officers in industrial relations matters.

The purpose of this article is to examine the present RANSC course regarding adequacy of industrial relations training and propose variations to incorporate more appropriate training within the existing Staff Course syllabus.

AIM
The aim of this article is to propose effective industrial relations training for incorporation within the RANSC syllabus.

TRAINING OF SERVICE OFFICERS
Traditional Needs
The training of service officers has reflected the concept ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’. This preparation has meant procurement of equipment and logistic support, the provision of skilled manpower, the motivation of this manpower with purpose and a will to win, and the development of operational plans and tactical doctrine.

Training for war has emphasised efficiency in the immediate operational task and the training of subordinates for effective command if the commander is killed or removed as a result of military action. Military organizations reflect a wide range of training needs which are complicated by changes in technology and bring together both skill and collective operational needs, geared for differing emphasis on both government and higher military commands as they pass from a peace to a war footing.

There is a danger, however, in restricting training to the acquisition and use of military skills. It is apparent that the need for drawing on the experience and skills of other professions is being recognised but care is needed to ensure lessons learned are properly exercised. It is not sufficient to apply new skills and experience to military matters, the military must learn and apply new skills in their dealings external to the service, one such area is the field of industrial relations.

Service officers are primarily concerned with the leadership of fighting man which calls for qualities of command. At the more senior level an officer is involved where military affairs, politics, science, social and industrial matters overlap and he becomes a manager of resources rather than a leader of men. In this aspect ‘influence’ is more important than ‘command’ and although the management training offered by the Navy prepares in part for this, it fails to provide fully for dealing with increasingly
difficult industrial affairs which are bound to impinge more on the military in future.

The Imperatives of Change

The relationship between the military and society have been historically fundamental to the structure of our society. The military has had close links with the head of state and supported political power through patronage and force.

Today the military role is a specialization amongst many in our industrialised, technological and highly turbulent social democracy and has little or no influence on political matters.

The role of the armed forces in our society is basically to deter attack, and defeat it should it occur. It is necessary in war to maintain stringent discipline which effects civilians as they become more aligned with military type authority in form if not content through an ideology of common purpose.

In the current environment of rapid social and technological change there is an increasing need to ‘reverse’ the ideology of common purpose in time of peace. The services take their manpower from a more emancipated and dialectic society and return their manpower to a society which is continuing to change more rapidly than the services. There is a clear need to ensure that the services are in organisation and quality, a reflection of the society which they serve. Above all else there is the need to manage change and the inevitable conflict which it brings; to achieve revolutionary change at an evolutionary pace reconciling planning with democracy, the rule of law and legal reform. To foster this aim there is a need to know why things are done in industrial relations as well as knowing what to do.

The orientation of Australian defence administration reflects the roles of both service officers and civilians in the machinery for keeping in touch, and up to date with circumstances as they change. It is both the rate of change and economic pressures in our society which demand flexibility and understanding in order to operate efficiently and this is pertinent in the field of industrial relations. Inflation creates middle class discontent and it bends and sometimes breaks institutions, the Conciliation and Arbitration system is such a potential victim. Unemployment presents serious social, political and industrial problems; technological change exacerbates this situation. There is continuing turbulence and we must not confuse industrial passivity at times with industrial peace. The real challenge is through understanding, to find valid ways of reasserting that human labour is engaged in the enhancement of human beings and that conflict is not seen as a solution to short term disruption.

NAVY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (IR) TRAINING

Current Industrial Relations Training

No specific IR training courses are currently conducted by the RAN for middle ranking officers posted for duty in dockyards or as Commanding Officers where they will interact with industrial areas. Facilities exist through Department of Defence New South Wales Regional Office for:

a. a one-hour introduction to industrial relations for prospective Commanding Officers and Executive Officers in preparation for civilian force contact, and
b. a four-day course for both service and civilian personnel.

Garden Island Dockyard also runs industrial relations courses either utilising Regional Office, through the Dockyard Training Officer or by utilising consultants. None of the foregoing schemes, however, attempt to incorporate IR training within a comprehensive management course where it can take its place within the many factors which interrelate for effective management today.

The RANSC charter objectives require students to:

‘Comprehend the concepts and practices of modern management as applied to both industrial and defence resources.’

Within the RANSC study area one, the management techniques segment is programmed for 209 hours of study, some 28 per cent of the course total and the largest single element. This segment, however, does not display sufficient emphasis on understanding the industrial machinery, which impacts more on the services today and will increase in future for a number of reasons, these being:

a. increased militancy amongst a wide range of blue and white collar unions,
b. changing technology and social attitudes, and
c. a planned increase in Australian defence industrial participation which will result in increased civilian/service interaction and mutual reliance.

Means for Improved IR Training

Australian industrial relations is part of the complex area of management studies and is often misunderstood. The main elements of IR will be discussed later in this article, it is appropriate here to comment on the best means of introducing IR training and experience.

The RANSC aim is to ‘. . . . increase the professional knowledge, judgement and competence of selected officers normally of the rank of Lieutenant-Commander, thereby broadening their professional background and preparing them for command and higher staff appointments in both peace and war’.

The foregoing arguments indicate the need for senior Service officers to manage resources and operate more through ‘influence’ than ‘command’. It is inappropriate to expose officers bound for senior positions to an overview of IR in isolation from related aspects of management through which ‘influence’ can be achieved. Indeed Defence Regional Office (NSW) stressed that far from creating experts in this field, regions training has the following objectives:

a. In the one-hour introduction, the training aims ‘. . . to create in local supervisors an awareness of industrial relations, which it is hoped, will assist them in their day to day supervisory and time management activities.’

b. The four-day course aims ‘To provide service and civilian personnel with:

(1) A basic understanding of civil industrial relations as part of the total management framework.

(2) The basic knowledge and skills required to deal with industrial matters arising in normal day to day functions of units, bases and establishments’.

Meaningful IR training must occur at the right time and be complemented with the relevant supportive subjects. In the introduction to their book ‘Australian Industrial Relations’ Plowman, Deary and Fisher point out that there is some disagreement regarding the scope of industrial relations studies. Clearly the environment within which the system operates includes the state of technology, the prevailing economic conditions and the constitution which determines the division of industrial powers between Federal and State Governments.

Consideration of these elements shows that industrial relations focus on the vitals of living in an industrial society and that it takes its place within management studies as a branch of sociology. Careful selection of the situation for meaningful training is thus evident.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRAINING AS PART OF RAN MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

Training Content

In his book ‘Study of Industrial Relations’ A. J. Geare offers the following definition:

‘The field of study of industrial relations’ is thus defined as the study at either plant, firm, industry, national or international level of the interaction among and between three actor groups:

a. Managers and their organisations;

b. Workers and their organisations; and

c. The government as a legislative body and as government agencies, concerned with obtaining and regulating the formal and informal rules that regulate the work environment for the purpose of:

(1) Improved ‘labour-related’ productivity,

(2) Improving job satisfaction, and

(3) Achieving increased power in the work environment and how this interaction is affected by external variables (such as technology, economic conditions, power groups within society, personalities and personality differences).

Clearly this basis for study will fit well into the ‘Management Principles’ segment of the RANSC course as covered by the Charter, the RANSC Handbook para 109J and Study One
Handbook paras 25 to 31. Incorporation of the additional IR training will complement the main aims of the management section which does not at present complete the scope of matters defined by Geare at para 23.

Details of the training and suggested variation to the current course profile are presented at Annex A and for national, state and industry levels should include the following subjects:

a. Environmental influences.
b. Conflict.
c. Parties.
d. Processes.
e. Rules.

**Environmental Influences**

Environmental factors influence industrial relations largely as external inputs to the system and will include economic influences, the political context, the social setting, the legal environment, historical influences, the ecological context and the state of technology.

**Economic Influences.** Economic influences are important as the contract of employment represents an economic transaction. This factor is the basis of job regulation and an important component of industrial conflict. With the ebb and flow of resources in the labour market economic conflict is inevitable and this factor has resulted in machinery by which control is achieved. Economic conditions can create conflict regarding job security and result in union demarcation issues as each union tries to make the best of reduced employment opportunities.

**The Political Context.** In this sense the political context refers to the distribution of power in society and within political institutions as they are influenced by pressure groups (women’s liberation movements, anti sex discrimination in employment legislation etc). Also the division of political parties into labour and non-labour parties has seen legislation which achieves employment conditions not gained by industrial action (for example, shorter working hours, long service and recreation leave).

**The State of Technology.** Technology is an important external and internal influence as workers have to accommodate their practices to technology. The substitution of capital and automated plants can reduce the power base of major craft unions. Technological change undermines existing craft systems and may introduce a new technological elite with even greater bargaining power.

**Conflict**

For most people strikes and industrial conflict are one. It is important to properly understand conflict by examining the range of behaviour and attitudes in the industrial situation. The purpose of an industrial relations system is the regulation and control of industrial conflict and so it is necessary to look at the various forms conflict may take, review the major explanations of industrial conflict and look at strikes.

**The Parties**

The major actors or parties in the industrial situation are trade unions, employers and more particularly the Government both as an employer and as a ‘rule maker’, and the arbitrators, both the Public Service Arbitrator and the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. An understanding of the interplay is important to see industrial relations in proper perspective.

**Processes**

A range of processes or forms of interaction available for settlement of industrial problems from unilateral decision making by employers to workers’ control exists. The arbitration system converts a bilateral into a tri-lateral interaction should negotiations break down.

**Rules**

Underpinning the IR system is a set of rules which regulate conflict. These rules may take the form of statutes, orders and directions from industrial tribunals, the rules of organisations, awards, agreements, and custom and practice.

The present RANSC course offers some consideration of environmental influences through a study of the following subjects:

a. Human motivation.
b. Management styles.
c. Understanding human behaviour.
d. Computers in management (technology).
e. Understanding organisations.
f. Environmental factors in management.
g. Practical management.
h. Personnel reporting.
i. Management of change.
j. Contemporary Australian society.
k. The trade union movement.
To reinforce the learning process these management aspects are supplemented by syndicate tutorials, case studies, industrial visits and management projects but the all important exercise of integrating these aspects with the major issues of industrial relations is not attempted. It is important to remember Ruskin's dictum that 'not only is there but one way of doing things rightly, there is only way way of seeing them, and that's the whole of them.'

**Procedure for Achieving IR Training**

Recognising that the essence of senior management is 'influence' it will be appropriate to introduce the required balance of training not on demand but as a coherent part of staff training for middle ranking officers who will aspire to 'influence'. The RANSC offers a sound basis and with incorporation of the details at Annex A will suit the need.

Some support and advice can be solicited from DOD Regional Training Centre. The Regional Industrial and Compensation Officer — Manpower Branch has indicated that major participation by himself or his staff would not be practical. Details of Regional Office training schemes are in Reference D.

Basic course schedules and relevant content material from a course ‘Employee Relations for Middle Managers’ by W. D. Scott and Co. is in Reference E. This material contains:

- the course schedule, and
- brief biographies of guest speakers.

The foregoing information should be used as a guide for incorporation of additional lectures and exercises into the RANSC. This additional training should be incorporated during the management segment of the course and in view of the time available, at the expense of less valuable lectures or by combining the reducing areas in the management segments of the course. The IR component should come towards the end of the management segment and would require about ten hours of lectures focusing on the issues outlined at para 25 under the broad headings:

- Overview of Industrial Relations in Australia Today,
- Aims and Resources of Major Unions,
- Mainstream Issues in Coniliation and Arbitration,
- Industrial Relations in the Public Service.

The additional training would best be carried out by visiting lecturers, either current or new to the RANSC, with an appropriate industrial background, supplemented by a visiting union leader of national standing, an arbitration commissioner, and the public service area through Regional Office. With the information provided in the references this training can be assimilated into the RANSC course programme within twelve months.

**CONCLUSIONS**

A need exists to introduce current industrial relations training into the Navy for middle ranking officers. This training will by necessity have to complement an appreciation gained of modern management concepts as applied to both industrial and defence resources.

An appropriate venue for this training is the RANSC where with minimal addition of new material the necessary training can be implemented. The additional lecture time would be some ten current programmed areas of the management segment.

Key areas which are not adequately covered by the RANSC are the following:

- Environmental Influences.
- Conflicts.
- Parties.
- Processes.
- Rules.

Assistance can be given by the Regional Training Centre Industrial and Compensation Officer with the course content but manpower would only be available for very limited participation in conduct of lectures. The burden of lectures should be handled by visiting speakers representing:

- manufacturing industry, dockyards and academics;
- the trades union movement;
- conciliation and arbitration commission experience; and
- the public service area.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

This article recommends that:

- Industrial Relations training be introduced into the RANSC management segment syllabus within twelve months;
- the additional lectures be undertaken by visiting speakers representing appropriate areas of indus-
try, unions, academics, the Public Service, the Arbitration Commission; and

c. the Regional Office be requested to assist in the design of the additional training.

DETAILS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRAINING FOR INCLUSION IN RANSC

1. Overview of Industrial Relations In Australia Today. A lecture period of 1½ hours supported with ‘hand outs’ and based on the paper by Dr Brian Scott of W. D. Scott & Co., would be relevant. Details are shown in Reference A.

2. Aims and Resources of Major Unions; this should include both blue and white collar unions and reflects current practices and future trends in union training. Two lectures in total some 2½ hours should be required with speakers from the Australian Trade Union Training Authority (TUTA) and say the Federal Secretary of the Administrative and Clerical Officers’ Association to retain a balanced viewpoint. TUTA details are in Reference B.

3. Mainstream Issues in Conciliation and Arbitration. A lecture period of 1½ hours supported with ‘hand outs’. The speaker should be a Commissioner from the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The notes at Reference C are relevant.

4. Industrial Relations in the Public Service, which is particularly relevant to service officers interaction with the civilian work force and is covered by Regional Office material — see Reference D. This would require some 4 hours of lecture time and would include the following:

   a. Role of Public Service Arbitrator.
   c. Industrial Relations Machinery within Department of Defence.
   d. Union Membership.
   e. Delegates: Their Role and Their Rights.
   f. Local Management for the Prevention of Disputes.
   g. Industrial Relations at the Work Place.
   h. Management of Industrial Disputes.

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B. What is Trade Union Training? — A paper by Trade Union Training Authority
C. Mainstream Issues in Conciliation and Arbitration. Copy of an address given by Commissioner L. G. Mathews, C.B.E., Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission
D. Details of Regional Office NSW Industrial Relations Training Courses
E. Course Schedule and Content ‘Employee Relations for Middle Managers’ W. D. Scott & Company

Mr Evans started his engineering career in the United Kingdom with Hawker Siddley Dynamics. He arrived in Australia in 1972 and worked for a short period with the Australian Atomic Energy Commission at Lucas Heights. He has held a number of positions within the Production Division at Garden Island Dockyard on tasks associated with refit work. His current appointment is Assistant Manager Production-Staff, GID. This article first appeared in the Balmoral Papers.

Reviewed by Dr Ed Duyker, Dept. of Defence.

The publishers of this book claim that it is an “up-to-date” analysis of major political issues affecting the Indian Ocean region and that it examines “recent developments” in South Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Unfortunately, this fine collection of essays is far from “up-to-date” and many “recent developments” are blatantly absent. While nine of the papers included were originally presented at the International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies (held in Perth in August 1979) and another three were later invited to enable a wider coverage; one can only assume that publication difficulties prevented their release until late 1981.

The volatile and rapidly changing character of the region is, in fact, exemplified by the omissions in The Indian Ocean in Global Politics. Readers will be struck by references to incumbent Presidents Carter and Giscard d’Estaing, and to “Rhodesia”; conversely, they will search in vain for mention of the Iran-Iraq war.

The dilemma of scholars and analysts attempting to keep their formulations and publications abreast of change is, of course, nothing new. The work of Rouhollah K. Ramazani, for example (the contributor of the first chapter in Bowman and Clark’s collection), is a particular case in point. Those who may have read his earlier book The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979) will have realized that despite its very able scholarship and 1979 publication date, it suffers drastically from its pre-Iranian Islamic revolutionary perspective. While his contribution — on the Strait of Hormuz — to Bowman and Clark’s book is presumably something of a reassessment, it also suffers markedly from its failure to discuss the protracted Iran-Iraq conflict.

This is not to suggest that Ramazani’s analysis is in itself completely diminished by our hindsight. To be fair, he shows himself to be particularly perceptive on a number of issues. He argues, for instance, that one type of interstate conflict “that might render the oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz hazardous, would be armed conflict in the regions adjacent to the Persian Gulf area”.

Though, in this context, he refers initially to a possible Arab-Israeli war, he is ultimately accurate in his judgement that:

“Iraq’s denunciation of its 1975 Shatt-al-Arab agreement with Iran has the potential of reversing all the hopeful signs of accommodation among the Gulf states that had followed that agreement.”

On the whole, all the contributors to this collection show themselves to be remarkably aware of the profound tensions in the region and the complexity of its interlocking forces. Thus, Larry Bowman is certainly justified in his introductory claim that:

“Throughout the chapters there is a constant analysis of the military, strategic, political, economic and arms control issues that affect the behaviour of both regional and external actors.”

Structurally, the book is divided into three parts: Part I examines regional factors among the littoral states; Part II analyses the activities of three external powers (France, the U.S. and the USSR) in the Indian Ocean; and Part III assesses international attempts to stimulate arms control, demilitarization and the creation of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean.

It is unfortunate, however, that two of the more intensive regional studies included, which deal with India’s relations with the other Indian Ocean states, and India’s non-alignment in the face of super-power rivalry, do not adequately cover India’s own naval pretentions. Although India has, at present, only a limited capacity to project naval power into the Indian Ocean, and for some time to come will remain primarily occupied with maintaining naval supremacy over Pakistan, policy statements and concern for “regional stability” since 1977, together with recent acquisitions of British Leander class frigates and West German submarines, would tend to suggest that she is
seeking to build a substantial "blue-water" fleet by the turn of the century.

India has always been acutely aware that any power capable of interdicting sea lines of communication in the north-western Indian Ocean is in a position to seriously disrupt the Indian economy. The Indian's, therefore, no longer feel satisfied with merely emphasizing coastal protection. There is now a strong lobby in the Indian Navy which not only seeks to replace the ageing carrier Vikrant (already refurbished for Harriers) with a "sea control ship", but also argues for the purchase of a second such ship, in order to create two independent "carrier" based fleets.

While India is unlikely to be in a position to challenge the naval prowess of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean for many years, the emergent signs of a new Indian strategic naval doctrine and policy should be noted.

The International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies in 1979 was an event of considerable scholastic significance and the wider dissemination of some of its more erudite papers is indeed pleasing. The emphasis given to Australia, under Bowman and Clark's editorship of these papers, is also particularly satisfying. It is a pity, though, that Henry S. Albinski's discussion of "Australia and the Indian Ocean" does not focus more on the wider implications and possible threat to Australia posed by ANZUS and the presence of U.S. bases on Australian soil.

My only other major disappointment with this book is that, aside from Jean-Pierre Gomane's somewhat conservative analysis of "France and the Indian Ocean", very little attention is given to the history, culture and politics of the Island states of the Indian Ocean. In particular, the implications of radical political change in the Seychelles (as a result of the SPUP coup in 1976) and the rise of the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (M.M.M.) in Mauritius, are largely ignored. Territorial claims by Mauritius over Diego Garcia and Anglo-American duplicity towards its former inhabitants are also completely ignored. For example, the American scholar George W. Shepherd Jr., in his chapter, does not even question the U.S. claim that its "only base in the region, at Diego Garcia, is on an otherwise uninhabited island and does not violate the territory of any country". One has only to see the miserable displaced inhabitants of Diego Garcia in Mauritius, to know this U.S. argument is morally hollow. The fact that Diego Garcia was a Mauritian dependency and was handed over to the U.S. by Britain (the colonial power) against the wishes of the Mauritian and Diego Garcian people receives no attention whatsoever. I suppose I had better qualify my personal bitterness by stating that members of my mother's family were, in fact, former inhabitants of Diego Garcia. My Great Grandfather, the Mauritian Administrator of the island, narrowly escaped being charged with treason by the British for having welcomed the German cruiser Emden during the first few months of World War I; British indifference to the inhabitants of Diego Garcia being what it was, no one had even bothered to inform them that there was a war on in the first place!

These personal criticisms aside, The Indian Ocean in Global Politics is an important volume of collected research on an area of profound importance to Australia. Like all works of scholarship, those who refer to it in the future will make their own mental amendments in the light of current developments. Ultimately, its delayed publication will not detract from its obvious contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the region.

A SUITABLE PIECE OF REAL ESTATE. AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS IN AUSTRALIA. Desmond Ball: Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1980. 174 pps. $10.95.

Reviewed by Dr F. M. Cain, School of History, University of New South Wales.

D r Ball's book is of significant importance to the study of Australian History, Politics, Defence and Foreign Policy. The title is derived from the fact that because Australia is in a diagonally opposite location on the globe to the U.S., we are in an excellent position to be used to monitor the U.S. satellites which are photographing, televising or listening-in to radio and telephone communications mainly of the putative enemy countries of the U.S. that is, the Communist governed countries. The North West Cape in Western Australia, additionally, is in an excellent position to transmit VLF radio messages to the atomic powered U.S. submarines float-
ing about in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Our geographical position, therefore, as Robert Cooksey has remarked, earns our continent the apt title of a “Suitable Piece of Real Estate” from the Pentagon and Langley points of view.

Ever since British Naval Intelligence fished up the Europe-to-U.S. telephone cable from the sea bed and began to listen and decode German messages to the Americans in World War I, communication monitoring has become a very important weapon of war. Australia developed techniques in this area during the Pacific War when numerous listening and translating stations were established in Northern Australia with U.S. support and control. Monitoring and military communications fell into abeyance after the war but, in 1960, the U.S. Defence Department sought to establish a naval communication centre at North West Cape and six years later sought to establish satellite ground stations at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. Our Prime Minister Menzies was happy to agree to these requests for many reasons, not the least important of which was his belief that it would stitch the U.S. Government firmly into an unofficial defence alliance with us at a time when the Cold War was raging and Soekarno in Indonesia was indulging in Sabre rattling. It also gave him a stick with which to beat the Labor Party at the elections because they expressed disquiet about the proposals. Menzies and later Harold Holt were probably never given a full explanation of all the functions to which these U.S. bases would be put and, as Dr Ball shows, there remained much ignorance in the Australian Government of what activities and what plans for expansion surrounded these U.S. owned establishments.

The reader, however, is left in little doubt about what these establishments are used for and Dr Ball has usefully drawn from the wide variety of mainly U.S. publications to inform us Australians about what is happening in our fair land in this regard. He tells, among other things, about the amazingly huge cameras that are lifted into space and are thereafter controlled from Pine Gap and Nurrungar.

In the final forty pages Dr Ball discusses the implications of Australia’s involvement in this vast net of U.S. satellite and communication activity. The role of the highly secret C.I.A. and National Security Agency in these establishments are discussed, which means that very few Australians either in Government or in the Defence Department can ever be permitted to know what is happening in these establishments on a day by day basis. Dr Ball discusses the implications of this secrecy and the ramifications of having such U.S. bases in Australia and he argues that they are something we will all have to live with, but information about them must be publicly available and Australian Governments, of whatever persuasion, must be kept fully informed of all the ramifications of them being here. Australians must know as much about them as the Russians and Chinese do already, the author argues.

We are in Dr Ball’s debt for analysing this most important question in the Australian defence debate. The book touches the very hub of our modern defence and political life and because this, as well as its importance in the history of the Australian-U.S. relations, it deserves to be widely read by all Australians.


Reviewed by Richard Pelvin, DLO-A

In the course of World War Two Germany had, at varying stages of development, a wide variety of combat aircraft designs powered by either rocket or turbo jet. Of these, three were to reach operational status — the Messerschmitt Me 163 and Me 262 and the Arado Ar 234. “German Jets in Combat” describes the development of these aircraft, the problems to be overcome before their entry into service and their subsequent careers. Many operational missions are described in detail using both Allied and German sources to tell the story from both sides. The effectiveness of the aircraft in their roles is discussed and much detail provided on performance, weapons and tactics. In the case of the Me 262, a great deal of this information is presented in the form of an appendix based closely on a report produced by Allied Intelligence officers after post-war questioning of Me 262 pilots.

The “German Jets in Combat” is recommended reading for those interested in Second World War aviation history.
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