Lessons from Operation URGENT FURY—Grenada, 1983

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Introduction

On 25 October 1983, a US military force of 20,000 descended on Grenada to evacuate foreign citizens, remove the Communist presence, and establish conditions for subsequent elections. The ‘sledgehammer’ of Operation URGENT FURY overwhelmed some 2000 Grenadines and Cubans, and successfully achieved its objectives by dusk on 27 October. During the operation, 19 American personnel and at least 94 Grenadines and Cubans were killed, with many more wounded.

A breakdown in law and order on the island, following a coup, as well as concerns about the potential threat to American shipping lanes and neighbouring Caribbean islands, precipitated the US intervention. Some have contended that the US also saw an opportunity to demonstrate that American power was not a ‘paper tiger’. However, despite overwhelming strength and ultimate success, the operation was so beset by problems that it arguably ‘came within a hairsbreadth of being a military disaster’. Domestic and international opprobrium resulted, and the operation’s difficulties were a catalyst for major reforms to the US military.

Insights from Operation URGENT FURY are valuable for the ADF, as the operation was an expeditionary joint combat operation similar to those expected of the ADF in the near region. It is particularly relevant since the ADF has not experienced combat as an Australian joint force or held operational-level command during joint combat operations since 1945. URGENT FURY provides insights that the ADF should heed because, as Graeme Dobell cautions, ‘the lesson to take from East Timor in 1999 was not how well it ended, but how dangerously it started’.

Drawing on five key observations from URGENT FURY, it will be argued in this article that the ADF’s current doctrine and capabilities posture it to avoid the operation’s major mistakes. However, it will be contended that the ADF needs to bolster its operational-tactical interface capabilities, otherwise it risks repeating some of URGENT FURY’s mistakes by relying on ad hoc command arrangements. The ADF’s deficiency in this area is particularly concerning because Australia cannot compensate through mass as the US did during URGENT FURY.

The media and multinational forces

Systemic weaknesses in US military engagement with other actors undermined URGENT FURY’s unity of effort and effectiveness in achieving political objectives. The weaknesses manifested themselves in ineffective use of the media and multinational forces at the operational level. These problems undermined URGENT FURY’s narrative, which was crucial in publicising America’s military victory and enhancing its legitimacy through multinational participation.

Vice Admiral Metcalf, the commander of URGENT FURY’s Joint Task Force 120, initially banned the media from Grenada. This policy remained until the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey, forced a change three days after the invasion. Even then, the media felt manipulated. The relationship deteriorated to the point that Metcalf’s forces threatened to sink a boat carrying journalists seeking to land on Grenada. When subsequently questioned about what would have transpired had the boat not turned around, Metcalf replied ‘we would have blown your ass right out of the water’. Metcalf’s attitude reflected a media adverse culture stemming from experiences during Vietnam and the failed 1979 Iranian hostage rescue.

Vessey’s imposition of strict planning compartmentalisation amplified this bias, as it resulted in the exclusion of public affairs staff from the planning process. The censorship furore subsequently prompted
Vessey to describe media management during URGENT FURY as a ‘huge mistake’, noting that ‘we missed a
great opportunity to have the American people get reports about how well the Rangers and Marines
operated’.12

Operational-level failures to grasp the importance of multinational participation also weakened URGENT
FURY’s international legitimacy. The Reagan Administration repeatedly emphasised that the basis of its
actions was, in part, a request to intervene from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.13 This
political legitimacy was to be buttressed operationally by the involvement of a Caribbean Peacekeeping
Force in a ‘visible but relatively safe role … [from] early on’ in the operation.14

However, despite specific guidance from Vessey to Admiral McDonald, the commander of Atlantic
Command and Metcalf’s superior, the requirement to integrate the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force was
not addressed in operational plans. McDonald contended that he received written direction on the
afternoon prior to the invasion, by when it was too late to integrate the force. Metcalf attempted to meet
the force’s commander on 24 October and left instructions for it to be airlifted to Grenada. But poor
planning at Atlantic Command meant Metcalf stood little chance of integrating the force in the time
available. As a result, the US could not generate a multinational narrative to counter the international
perception, including among its allies, that URGENT FURY was an example of superpower bullying.

The ADF’s doctrinal position that media engagement and multinational operations are important in
building a dominant narrative reduces the likelihood of repeating URGENT FURY’s mistakes. ADF
doctrine emphasises media engagement at the operational level as part of generating and disseminating
an effective narrative to support its strategic objectives, asserting that ‘the media is fundamentally
important to strategic communications and must be comprehensively and effectively engaged’.15 The
doctrine further posits that strategic communication is a deliberate, multi-agency activity that
‘establishes the dominance of the narrative … [which] is central to convincing … audiences that our aims
and actions are valid and beneficial, and to winning their support’.

The prevalence of positive narrative guidance in ADF doctrine, along with recommendations such as
synchronising joint task force headquarters with ‘key morning and evening broadcasts’, reinforces this
view of media engagement as a key operational-level instrument. This flows from the recognition of the
narrative’s centrality in the contest of perception at the heart of many political objectives, albeit care
needs to be taken to ensure that this doctrinal view of the media as an instrument to be exploited for
military purposes does not weaken the ADF’s narrative through perceptions of insincerity.16

The ADF also regards the ability to ‘operate effectively in coalition with other nations when required’ as
one of its foundation warfare concepts.17 This doctrine was evident in Australia’s successful leadership of
coalition forces in East Timor, reinforcing that ‘multinational engagement will be the primary context for
[any] military intervention in the forthcoming decades’.18 Importantly, the ADF appreciates that the
principal value of multinational participation may be its narrative impact in bolstering the perceived
legitimacy of any operation, which is precisely what URGENT FURY lacked because of its failure to include
regional-state participation. Indeed, ADF doctrine notes that:

The primacy of unity of effort in [multinational operations] is such that less efficient organisational
options that nevertheless optimise unity of effort may be selected over options that in other respects are
more efficient.19

**Power projection capabilities**

US airborne and amphibious projection capabilities provided the operational-level manoeuvre necessary
for its forces to succeed in Grenada. Both capabilities demonstrated their strengths, weaknesses and
complementarity. US Army elements depended on air transport provided by the US Air Force,
predominantly C-130 medium transport aircraft and larger C-141 transports. The rapid build-up of
American forces and materiel on the island—more than 5000 members of the 82nd Airborne Division
were present after three days—highlighted air transport’s ability to rapidly insert forces.20

However, two limitations were also apparent. Initial planning for the airborne insertion of Ranger
battalions to capture Point Salines airfield, using only C-130 aircraft, potentially limited the assault to 250
Rangers.21 The employment of such a small force raised concerns that the Rangers may not have been
able to achieve the necessary decisive superiority to capture the airfield. The commitment of C-141 aircraft ultimately enabled a larger assault but the difficulties encountered by this larger assault in securing the airfield suggest a smaller force would have indeed failed, highlighting the capacity limitations of air transport.

A further limitation of relying solely on air transport evidenced itself in the lack of vehicles for US Army units.22 This deficiency, which was due in part to poor logistics management, played a role in delaying the advance of Army forces beyond the airfield. The Army's ponderous movements contrasted starkly with the Marines, which were able to advance swiftly around the northern half of the island, facilitated by the mobility and protection afforded by vehicles and tanks delivered from ships offshore.

The Marines' reliance on amphibious logistics support also provided superior flexibility in the early stages of the operation. They could insert and withdraw vehicles, supplies and personnel at will, while avoiding the large logistics footprint of air-dependent Army elements, which is an important consideration for evacuation operations. Further, sea-based helicopters provided invaluable transport, fire support, reconnaissance and medical evacuation.

However, the absence of ammunition for the Marines' tanks highlighted an important aspect of amphibious logistics—it was on the ships but could not be readily accessed, as the vessels had been 'administratively' loaded for an already-planned move to Beirut. As the next available Marines unit would have taken six more days to reach Grenada, diverting the Beirut-bound Marines and inserting Army forces by air were the only realistic options for getting US forces quickly into the theatre.

The ADF's enhanced operational-level manoeuvrability enabled by C-17 heavy transport aircraft and the Canberra-class amphibious ships marks the end of what has been termed 'Australia's strategic dissonance', by aligning capabilities with Government expectations.23 With three times the payload of a C-130, the C-17 allows the ADF to insert larger forces faster, vastly improving the ADF's ability to concentrate forces decisively. Similarly, the amphibious capability enabled by the Canberra-class ships has been described as Australia's 'capability of first resort', through its ability to provide a persistent and flexible Australian presence throughout the region.24

This contrasts with the ADF's inability in 1987 to provide viable options for Operation MORRIS DANCE, after a military coup in Fiji, because of the lack of amphibious power projection capability. Both ADF entries to East Timor were similarly constrained by limited amphibious capacity. The 1999 operation was heavily reliant on access to intact dock facilities while, in 2006, a lack of dock facilities resulted in all three of Australia's amphibious ships taking three days to land an infantry battalion group and supporting vehicles. A single Canberra-class could reportedly land the same cargo across a beach in three hours, with significantly greater vehicle and helicopter capacity, highlighting the ADF's dramatically-improved capability to project and sustain decisive power.

**Strategic-operational interface**

Ambiguity and dysfunction in the command hierarchy above the Joint Task Force hampered performance at the operational level during URGENT FURY by confusing the operation's objectives and diffusing effort. The order to capture the Grenadian barracks at Calivigny by dusk on 27 October best illustrates the level of dysfunction. The order was annotated with 'the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct', although Vessey denied issuing the order; subsequent investigations suggest it came from over-enthusiastic staff officers at Atlantic Command.25 While there were concerns on the ground that the hasty timeline increased the risks to the assaulting forces, for no appreciable benefit, it proceeded at the cost of three US dead, 15 wounded and three helicopters wrecked.26

Problems such as Calivigny arose because no authority below the Secretary of Defense could overcome inter-Service politics to provide unified, clear direction. Atlantic Command's authority was repeatedly undermined by interference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff but the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not arbitrate because Vessey's authority depended on consensus amongst the four Services. This was exemplified by the Marine Corps' insistence on the inclusion of its elements in the initial assaults—every military Service wanted to be involved and there was no authority that could counter this drive.27
Accordingly, operational objectives were subordinated to inter-Service political priorities. For example, the decision to deny special forces the advantage of darkness by delaying their assault until 0500 hours was in part driven by the political need to ensure Marines were among the first to set foot on Grenada. Similarly, simultaneous and isolated operations by Marines, Army units and special forces on the first day, against targets of little military value, illustrated the complexity that confronted Metcalf in ensuring that each Service ‘had a piece of the action’. Metcalf’s inability to effectively incorporate the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force and media is more understandable in light of this complexity.

Atlantic Command was nominally the key strategic-operational interface for URGENT FURY. But its lack of expertise in joint operations and inability to coordinate effectively undermined its credibility. Atlantic Command’s peacetime focus on maritime operations in the Atlantic, with predominantly Navy and Marine staffing, meant it lacked air and land expertise, as well as knowledge of the Caribbean. McDonald and his staff were also unfamiliar with the coordination needed for joint operations, while McDonald’s parochialism was illustrated by his welcoming comment to an Army liaison officer that ‘we’ve got a tough job to do and we don’t need the Army giving us a hard time’. Together with General Vessey’s imposition of strict operational security, these factors saw crucial supporting agencies—such as intelligence agencies, logistics and communications experts—excluded from the planning process. Atlantic Command’s failure to optimise the involvement of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force also exacerbated the intelligence impacts by denying the Joint Task Force access to local intelligence that would have filled many gaps, including the accurate location of American medical students needing to be evacuated.

McDonald also engaged URGENT FURY’s assigned and supporting elements in isolation and opted not to boost his command’s air and land expertise by standing up air and land component commands. Atlantic Command’s lack of credibility as the centre of planning effort was underlined by the insertion of Vessey into the chain of command on 21 October to coordinate Atlantic Command’s activities with the Services. Little wonder that Metcalf allocated half of his scarce headquarters staff to managing up. The problems, particularly at Atlantic Command, underpin the observation that ‘the real issue in preparing the intervention was not so much the lack of planning time but the lack of quality planning in the time available’.

The ADF’s clear strategic-operational command arrangements mitigate the risk of URGENT FURY-style dysfunction. The Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) is solely responsible to the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) for the command and management of ADF operations. The three Service chiefs retain advisory roles but their authority is largely restricted to force-generation matters. The decision in 2007 to make CJOPS a three-star rank further enhanced the position relative to the Service Chiefs. CJOPS’ rank and ownership of the preponderance of ADF planning resources should also negate the need for CDF to command operations directly, as occurred in 1999 and 2003. The CDF’s individual command authority and direct link to CJOPS also means decisions do not require broad consensus, further limiting the Service Chiefs’ leverage. This clarity establishes a firm foundation for unity of effort and purpose in pursuing political objectives at the operational level.

A doctrinal and pragmatic emphasis on joint and interagency cooperation in the ADF complements these command arrangements by fostering unity of effort across elements. This is symbolised by CJOPS’ genuinely joint staff and its collocation with air, maritime and special forces command elements, as well as an array of agency and departmental liaison personnel at Joint Operations Command’s dedicated facility. This collocation is complemented by the policy of ‘dual-hatting’ individual officers as CJOPS’ specialist advisors, while simultaneously managing force-generation activities on behalf of their respective Service Chief.

For multi-agency operations, unity of effort is facilitated through a series of committee arrangements from the peak National Security Committee of Cabinet down through inter-departmental committees to liaison arrangements such as those at Joint Operations Command. ADF doctrine recognises that ‘few security challenges can be resolved by the application of military force alone’ and acknowledges that, in many instances, the ADF’s will be a supporting effort. Well-practised inter-departmental and joint coordination arrangements at the operational and strategic levels give effect to the ADF’s emphasis on
multi-agency cooperation and provide firm foundations for unity of effort across departments, complementing the vertical unity through command structures.

Domain and functional unity

URGENT FURY was a loosely-federated set of activities by independent task forces rather than unified joint action. The disunity was particularly evident among ground forces, with a Marine officer purportedly considering the 82nd Airborne Division a greater threat than Grenadian soldiers. Marine, Army and special forces units spent considerable time planning in isolation to capture the same objectives. Another example is that a Marine colonel initially refused to transport Army soldiers in Marine helicopters to enable the soldiers to evacuate American students from the Grand Anse university campus.

Metcalf’s adoption of a hands-off command approach prudently recognised his headquarters’ limited expertise in non-naval operations. But it had its drawbacks. His decision not to invite Marine or Navy representatives to a command conference with Army commanders on the morning of 24 October because ‘he knew how they operated’ suggests he initially saw little value in coordination below his level. However, his appointment of a deputy commander as de facto land component commander on 26 October indicates he quickly grasped the problem. Metcalf’s initial approach may have facilitated flexibility but was not complemented by the structures, such as component commanders, necessary to synchronise domains and functions.

URGENT FURY’s air and logistics efforts were also handicapped by poor unity of effort arising from the lack of a single controller to coordinate and prioritise activities. Metcalf’s failure to coordinate task force-level logistics led to inefficiencies and unprecedented demands on the 82nd Airborne Division. The air bridge to Grenada was degraded by the absence of a single controller to prioritise demand and control cargo flow. This led to individual Services requesting and receiving airlift directly, with loaded aircraft departing the continental US heading for Point Salines. The lack of air bridge control meant personnel at Point Salines did not know what each aircraft carried so aircraft landed on a first-come, first-served basis. Exacerbating this was Point Salines’ inability to unload more than one aircraft simultaneously.

These two factors combined resulted in the diversion of many critical cargoes while other payloads, such as visiting Atlantic Command staff officers, made it to Grenada. Point Salines’ limited capacity was principally due to poor airfield management, resulting from the lack of clear authority to control and prioritise air assets including airfields. Aircraft from the Air Force, Navy, Marines and Army all operated independently from each other, with only ship-based aircraft and a limited selection of Air Force assets actually subordinate to the task force. The absence of a unifying air commander also contributed to poor fire support, including an incident in which a Marine fire support coordination team inadvertently directed a Navy aircraft strike onto a brigade headquarters of the 82nd Airborne Division.

The need to fully integrate elements from different Services into a seamless, joint team is a prevalent theme throughout current ADF doctrine. Indeed, a ‘seamless force’ is a key goal in the ADF’s future vision. ADF doctrine recognises the need for functional and domain unity within joint task forces through component commanders, in operations of sufficient complexity, including a logistics component commander alongside the traditional environmental commanders. This innovation is complemented by the establishment of Joint Logistics Command as the central authority for logistics movements and arrangements in support of ADF activities.

Operational-tactical interface

The US military’s command and control capabilities were not ready to project ‘leadership to the unit in battle … [nor] bring order and unity to the chaos and isolation experienced’ during URGENT FURY. The Joint Task Force’s difficulties in integrating forces at short notice illustrate how ad hoc arrangements can hinder operational success.

What makes the bungling worse is that neither Atlantic Command nor the Joint Task Force should have played the role they did because an existing Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved contingency plan, OPLAN 2360, specified that US Forces Caribbean Command would be in overall command with XVIII Airborne Corps as
the on-scene headquarters. Moreover, both these organisations had recently conducted exercises based on an URGENT FURY scenario. Caribbean Command had representation from all four Services, as well as Caribbean expertise and relationships, while XVIII Airborne Corps brought land operations expertise. It also managed logistics for deployments, was collocated with special forces, and practised joint integration.

In the event, most of the coordination between 82nd Airborne Division and special forces during URGENT FURY was due to informal prompting from the XVIII Airborne Corps commander rather than McDonald. Yet McDonald, perhaps because like many of his staff he was unaware of OPLAN 2360 and exercises, excluded Caribbean Command and XVIII Airborne Corps from URGENT FURY. Instead, he opted to manage the operation from his own poorly-suited headquarters and use Metcalf’s Second Fleet as the Joint Task Force, seemingly because it was collocated with Atlantic Command in Norfolk.

Metcalf’s ability to command and control his force was further constrained by communications problems and headquarters capacity. His staff was limited to 17 personnel once aboard the USS Guam off Grenada, demonstrating one of the drawbacks of afloat command. Moreover, half of this capacity was dedicated to keeping the superior headquarters informed, further reducing his capacity to integrate subordinate task forces. Metcalf could only speak to McDonald via the radio channel to which every ship in the fleet could listen and did not have radio communications with Army forces on Grenada.

In turn, Army forces did not have direct radio links to Navy and Marine ships and aircraft, or Marines on the ground. These communications problems stemmed from poor collaboration at Atlantic Command but also from failures to build interoperability into Service capabilities. Some ad hoc arrangements in short-notice operations are inevitable but URGENT FURY’s command approaches introduced avoidable friction that degraded the operation’s unity and purpose. Metcalf’s claims that URGENT FURY demonstrated the US military’s readiness to conduct ‘come-as-you-are’ operations beggar belief. A more accurate characterisation would be that US soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines succeeded despite the command and control arrangements.

The ADF arguably risks re-learning this lesson from URGENT FURY because it lacks the joint, high-readiness command and control capabilities necessary to provide the operational-tactical interface on short-notice joint combat operations. The key problem is organisational focus and resource investment, particularly personnel. The ADF doctrine on joint teamwork implicitly acknowledges the issue, contending that ‘at the tactical level a foundation is built through regular exposure by tactical elements to the joint environment’. However, URGENT FURY demonstrated that a ‘foundation’ and ‘exposure’ were insufficient without proficient command to build unity.

The ADF’s command and control systems have been strengthened by an increased emphasis on joint integration, particularly the growing status of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, further reducing the likelihood of technical issues that occurred on Grenada. But proficient, focused teams are necessary to enhance unity of effort to exploit technical capabilities. And the ADF’s pool of proficient people is limited because joint operations training throughput is small and the content focused on strategic-operational interface rather than the operational-tactical. Also Joint Operations Command is unlikely to directly command expeditionary operations because of its immobility and broad responsibilities.

ADF doctrine instead posits the Joint Task Force as the primary means of commanding specific operations. However, a high-readiness, genuinely joint headquarters does not exist. The resulting reliance on ad hoc arrangements threatens to negate much of the work done to improve the ADF’s doctrine and capabilities for short-notice operations. The ADF’s existing Deployable Joint Force Headquarters is unsuited, as it is not collocated with Joint Operations Command, and remains a predominantly Army headquarters. Its amphibious responsibilities have enabled it to become more joint but this effort is focused on the specifics of amphibious lodgement rather than joint warfare, resulting in limited Air Force participation and limited consideration of afloat command’s drawbacks for broader joint operations.

The Deployable Joint Force Headquarters’ peacetime duties as Army’s 1st Division also militate against it leading short-notice contingencies. The headquarters led the longer lead-time operation in East Timor in 1999 but not the short-notice reinsertion in 2006, suggesting that the ADF’s investment is at the wrong end of the contingency scale.
David Horner and Bob Breen have argued that reforms at the operational-tactical interface are the last piece of the puzzle in the ADF’s evolution towards a genuinely joint force. Breen suggests forming a complete standing Joint Task Force under CJOPS to overcome limited warning time that history suggests, according to Breen, will be less than four weeks. But this approach would be costly and may limit ADF force structure flexibility.

A more flexible and cost-effective approach, addressing the specific issue of operational-tactical interface friction during short-notice operations, would be to establish a genuinely joint standing deployable headquarters within Joint Operations Command. A focus on the operational-tactical detail of applying the ADF as a joint combat force within a multi-agency and multinational context, using domain and functional expertise, would enable this headquarters to provide the nucleus for a rapidly-constructed Joint Task Force.

Such an organisation would also address concerns about the ADF’s joint culture by providing a focal point for detailed joint integration. Collocation with Joint Operations Command would also foster interagency collaboration by placing the task force at a key centre of Australian government coordination. It would also address some of the compartmentalisation issues encountered during URGENT FURY.

Horner cautions, probably correctly, that such an arrangement’s implementation is unlikely until tested. But that attitude ignores the lessons from URGENT FURY and Dobell’s warning at the head of this article. In the absence of a standing headquarters, the ADF will be forced to rely on ad hoc arrangements that degrade the ADF’s ability to exploit its doctrinal and capability strengths, while introducing avoidable friction. Many of the problems arising during URGENT FURY stemmed from an ad hoc approach. An American sledgehammer won the day in Grenada. But the ADF does not have that option.

Conclusion

The ADF’s current joint, multi-agency and multinational doctrine and capabilities posture it to avoid many of URGENT FURY’s mistakes.

The prominence of the narrative and multinational operations in ADF doctrine mitigate the risk of the ADF operating in a manner as occurred in Grenada. Australia’s acquisition of the Canberra-class ships and C-17 aircraft gives the ADF complementary operational-level manoeuvre capabilities with which to pursue Government objectives in Australia’s region. The ADF’s strengthening of joint authority and investment in joint enablers mitigate the risk of Australian forces lacking interoperability. Clear command arrangements at the strategic and operational levels also provide a strong basis for unity of effort within the ADF and across Australian Government departments.

However, the ADF’s ability to exploit these doctrinal and capability strengths remains untested in short-notice joint combat operations. Weaknesses in the ADF’s operational-tactical interface portend problems similar to URGENT FURY, because the ADF lacks a suitable high-readiness, genuinely joint headquarters to provide the nucleus for executing short-notice joint expeditionary combat operations.

It has been argued in this article that a headquarters should be established within Joint Operations Command to capitalise on the ADF’s existing strengths and serve as a focal point for joint integration and culture. URGENT FURY’s ad hoc command arrangements degraded unity of effort and political effectiveness. The US mitigated this risk through mass but this is not an option for Australia. The ADF should address this deficiency to ensure its capability and doctrinal strengths can be translated into an effective, unified effort in pursuit of Australian policy.

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Notes

1 This is an edited version of a paper, titled ‘Analyse the 1983 Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada from an operational level of war perspective ... What observations would you make regarding current ADF joint, multinational, and whole of government doctrine and capabilities?’, submitted by the author while attending the Australian Command and Staff Course in 2015.


10 Cited in Belknap, The CNN Effect, p. 5; also Ward, Urgent Fury, p. 15.


14 Foraker, Operational Command and Control, p. 11.

15 Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0 Campaigns and Operations, Department of Defence: Canberra, pp. 2-17.

16 Albert Palazzo, ‘The Future of War Debate in Australia: Why has there not been one? Has the need for one now arrived?’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 189, 2012, p. 11.


19 Department of Defence, ADDP 00.3 Multinational Operations, Department of Defence: Canberra, pp. 2-5.


29 Huchthausen, *America’s Splendid Little Wars*, p. 85.


36 Department of Defence, *ADDP 3.0 Campaigns and Operations*, p. iii.


