Mending Defence’s Broken Backbone
Nick Warner, Secretary, Department of Defence

The Weaponisation of Space: The Next Arms Race?
Air Commodore David Steele, RAAF

It’s Lonely at the Top:
Career Progression for Female Officers in the Australian Defence Force
Major Anne Goyne, AAPsych

Australian Defence Force Powers to Arrest and Detain Civilians
Dr. John Tarrant, University of Western Australia and RAAF Reserve

The Relevance of the Surface Warship as a Weapons System: An Australian View
Dr. John Reeve, University of New South Wales at ADFA

New Zealand’s Military and Policing Efforts in the Pacific
Dr. B.K. Greener, Massey University

Moving Beyond Manoeuvre:
A Conceptual Coming-of-Age for the Australian and Canadian Armies
Aaron D. Jackson, Flinders University and ARes

Decision Support Tools for Operations Planning
Brice Mitchell, DSTO

Twenty-First Century Chaplains and their Role in the Australian Defence Force:
Leaders, Innovative and Tough
Colonel Chris Field, Australian Army
GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS

The Australian Defence Force Journal seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters such as Strategic Studies, Security and International Relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the Journal does not pay for articles, but a $500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best per edition.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable. Length should be between 3,500 and 5,500 words (which allows a spread of articles per journal). Please spell check the document with Australian English before sending.

Articles can contain endnotes, bibliography and brief biography.

Endnotes are required in the style:


References or Bibliography in the style:


Tables, maps and photographs are also acceptable, but must be of high enough quality to reproduce. Photographs must be at least 300 ppi in TIF format and be directly pertinent to the article.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by an independent referee with some knowledge of the subject. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Managing Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and if accepted, will be published in the next Journal. Be advised, it may take quite a while from submission to print.

Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Managing Editor via Internet email at: <publications@defence.adc.edu.au>.

Authors accept the Editor may choose to make minor editorial adjustments without reference back to the author. The theme or intent of the article will not be changed.
# Australian Defence Force Journal

**ISSUE No. 177, 2008**

## CONTENTS

**CHAIRMAN’S COMMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mending Defence’s Broken Backbone</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nick Warner, Secretary, Department of Defence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Weaponisation of Space: The Next Arms Race?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Commodore David Steele, RAAF</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**It’s Lonely at the Top:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career Progression for Female Officers in the Australian Defence Force</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Anne Goyne, AAPsych</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Australian Defence Force Powers to Arrest and Detain Civilians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr John Tarrant, University of Western Australia and RAAF Reserve</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Relevance of the Surface Warship as a Weapons System:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Australian View</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr John Reeve, University of New South Wales at ADFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New Zealand’s Military and Policing Efforts in the Pacific**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr B.K. Greener, Massey University</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Moving Beyond Manoeuvre:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Conceptual Coming-of-Age for the Australian and Canadian Armies</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron P. Jackson, Flinders University and ARes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Decision Support Tools for Operations Planning**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brice Mitchell, DSTO</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Twenty-First Century Chaplains and their Role in the Australian Defence Force:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders, Innovative and Tough</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Chris Field, Australian Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BOOK REVIEWS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chairman’s Comments

Welcome to *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue No. 177. We conclude the year with a number of articles which I hope readers will find interesting and informative. I am particularly pleased that the Secretary has agreed that the *Journal* publish a speech he delivered to the Lowy Institute several months ago entitled ‘Mending Defence’s Broken Backbone’ which generated much favourable comment. In it, the Secretary discusses some of the challenges in managing the Defence portfolio.

This issue also covers such varied topics as space weapons, chaplains, manoeuvre warfare, and New Zealand Pacific policing. However, I want to particularly highlight two articles to readers—those by Major Anne Goyne and Dr John Tarrant. Major Goyne’s article on the career prospects for women in today’s Australian Defence Force and Dr Tarrant’s article on Australian Defence Force powers of arrest both tackle important issues and I urge members of the Australian Defence Force in particular to consider them.

The Board was faced with a difficult choice in awarding the $500 prize for best article as a number stood out. After much deliberation, Major Goyne was declared the winner with Aaron Jackson’s article highly commended.

I am delighted to announce that after much development and testing, the *Journal’s* new website is finally live and readers are encouraged to visit <www.adfjournal.adc.edu.au>. The website allows searches of all back issues and contains information to prospective contributors. I am sure it will become a valuable resource, particularly for those conducting research into defence and security matters.

Unfortunately, this edition will be the final for our Managing Editor, Air Commodore Mark Lax (Retd). Mark relinquishes that role after two years in the job and I and the Journal Board thank him for the many improvements he has made to the *Journal* during that time. We wish Mark all the best in his future endeavours.

I hope you enjoy this edition, the final for 2008.

James Goldrick,
Rear Admiral, RAN
Commander, Joint Education, Training and Warfare Command
Chairman of the Australian Defence Force Journal Board
Mending Defence’s Broken Backbone

Nick Warner, Secretary, Department of Defence

Speech presented at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 10 June 2008.

Now that I’m 18 months into my term as Secretary at Defence, I thought it was a good time to share my experiences of leading the Department and outline my agenda for the next 18 months.

Let me start with a story from nine years ago that sums up what’s great—and what’s not—about the Australian Defence establishment.

The intervention in East Timor in late 1999, led by the then Major General Peter Cosgrove, showed the skill, courage and professionalism of the ADF in dangerous circumstances. It was by any measure a brilliantly executed operation. But look a little deeper and you find the success of the operation came in spite of some real weaknesses, weaknesses that continue to bedevil the Defence establishment today.

There are numerous examples I could point to, some large and fundamental. But instead let me focus on just one small and seemingly inconsequential issue—256,800 paper hand towels.

The towels were purchased in 1999 for the troops deploying to East Timor. Sounds reasonable: peacemaking can be a messy business. Only they didn’t get to East Timor in 1999 or in 2000. For some reason lost in time they were found to be superfluous to requirements, and remained at the ADF’s main warehouse facility at Moorebank. Nor were they found necessary for the troops that deployed to Iraq in 2003; nor those I worked with in the Solomon Islands in 2004 and 2005; nor those sent to Afghanistan from 2001; nor those who deployed again to East Timor in 2006.

A surplus of 256,800 paper hand towels. So what? They matter because they are indicative of a much broader and deeper problem in Defence. Important parts of the business are ailing. The paper towels are just one tiny part of the broken backbone of Defence.

What do I mean by ‘broken backbone’? I mean the enabling, supporting parts of the business that it’s easy to take for granted, easy to ignore, easy to neglect—until something goes wrong.

You already know about some parts of Defence’s broken backbone: the long-running problems with our financial statements; big under-estimates in the personnel and operating costs of new capability; poorly written contracts. There’s more that I’ll cover later.

Australians are deservedly proud of the skill and courage of the men and women of the ADF. Since East Timor in 1999 and in subsequent deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Solomon Islands and in East Timor again, they have shown themselves to be amongst the best in the world. And let’s not forget—as my colleague CDF, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston so often points
out—that this professionalism is underpinned by fine work done quietly in the background by many thousands of Defence Force members and Public Servants.

But what worries me is this—unless the underlying weaknesses of Defence are fixed, over time our ability to deploy force successfully will slowly but surely diminish. These issues might not be sexy. They might not grab the headlines. But they are fundamentally important.

CDF and I understand this process of reform will be hard. But we are determined to deliver long-term, far-reaching, tangible and permanent change to Defence.

Because of the size and diversity of the Defence establishment, we’ve adopted a staged approach to fixing the ailing and broken bits. Over the past 18 months, we’ve identified where the problems lie, what they are, their causes and their scale. And we’ve begun the process of reform.

**The leviathan**

I know many of you here have a detailed understanding of certain elements of Defence—our policy positions, our capability, our operations.

But I’m not sure how many of you are familiar with some of the more ‘meat and potatoes’ elements of the place that go into supporting our deployed troops, and the ADF more generally. Let me give you a snapshot.

- A budget of $22 billion—and growing.
- $4.7 billion worth of general stores inventory, fuel and explosive ordnance.
- 64 significant bases scattered around Australia.
- Stewardship of 3.4 million hectares of land.
- Over 600 owned or leased properties.
- We’re one of the largest managers of feral animals and native species in Australia.
- We’re one of the largest hoteliers in the country.
- We’re probably one of the largest restaurateurs in Australia, serving 7.5 million meals in around 140 messes each year.
- We oversee the cleaning of 3.5 million square metres each week.
- And every year we make over 700,000 payments and 1.3 million credit card transactions to more than 300,000 active suppliers; and 2 million payments to around 90,000 staff.

Whichever way you look at it—and even before a shot is fired in anger—Defence is a large and complex business.
What Defence does well

Whenever I think of leviathan organisations like Defence, images of the Cold War Soviet Union come to mind—groaning bureaucracies known for their inflexibility and lack of responsiveness and creativity. Groaning bureaucracies that don’t do anything very well but exist.

That’s not Defence. Despite its size, there are important things Defence does extraordinarily well. We enjoy an enviable international reputation on operations and are first class intelligence collectors and analysts.

The DMO, the largest manager of projects in Australia; works tirelessly—and well—to support both the needs of the ADF on operations and Australia’s future Defence requirements.

We’ve also got first class environmental and estate managers and award-winning logisticians, executive assistants, scientists, occupational health and safety officers, engineers, and communicators.

And I want to pay tribute at this point to my predecessor Ric Smith, under whose leadership there were enormous improvements in Defence’s financial management. As a result of the improvements begun by Ric, I’m hopeful that our financial statements will be accepted without qualification this year. Ric’s tireless efforts in this area ensured that we now have accurate financial information on which to base our business decisions. Without that solid foundation, CDF and I couldn’t have hoped to undertake the reform program I want to outline to you today.

Ric also left me a cadre of first class and expert Deputy Secretaries—to whose ranks I’ve since added several more talented professionals—without whose commitment and dedication the hard work of reform would be impossible.

And at every other level, there are lots of very good people and a great deal of talent in the Defence establishment.

What Defence doesn’t do well

But unfortunately, important parts of our business aren’t first class.

Parts of our business are ailing or broken from neglect, from turf wars, from poor decisions in the past and from bad planning.

These parts of the business aren’t in the public eye, aren’t what Defence commentators dissect and analyse. But I believe they are as important to our warfighting capability as the high policy issues many of you spend your time thinking and writing about.

Whose fault is it that these parts of the business are broken? Nobody’s and everybody’s. Defence establishments are notoriously difficult to manage. My counterparts around the world are grappling with the same issues, for much the same reasons.
Apportioning blame for the things that are broken isn’t what matters, isn’t what I want to discuss and won’t get us anywhere. Eighteen months into the job, I’d hardly be taken seriously if I tried to do so. The problems are mine and CDF’s to solve—and solving them is what matters.

To begin explaining why, let me tell you about the consequences of, and more importantly, what we’re doing about, longstanding problems in just four areas—four out of a range of areas—our financial management; our inventory; our explosive ordnance; and our information systems.

**Financial management**

Financial management encompasses a lot more than our financial statements. But if those statements aren’t correct, it’s not only our reputation that suffers. If the underlying numbers are wrong, the business decisions we make on the basis of those numbers can’t possibly be the best decisions.

And the real problem is not actually the numbers themselves—it’s the flawed behaviour, systems and processes that produce the wrong numbers.

Ric Smith understood this and relentlessly drove home to Defence’s senior leaders the importance of getting the financial data right.

Once you have confidence in the data, you can begin reforming the way you actually manage your budget. CDF and I began that process in early 2007 when we decided—not altogether to popular acclaim—to take a much more hands-on, directive and centralised approach to Defence budgeting.

At least once a month we spend two or three hours with the Chief Finance Officer reviewing Defence’s financial position: how it’s changed since the last month, how we are tracking in terms of our budgeted outcome and, most importantly of all, scrutinising requests from the Groups and Services for increases to their internal budget allocations. In the months leading up to the Federal Budget, of course, this process intensifies, as does our scrutiny of—and often scepticism about—claims that more is needed to deliver the outcomes that Government requires.

Like the program to remediate our financial statements, this monthly scrutiny is designed above all to change attitudes and behaviour. It’s designed to drive home to Defence senior leaders some simple messages: funding can’t flow to one part of the Defence system without it coming from somewhere else; not everything is equally important; and leading and managing is as much about stopping less productive activities as it is about doing new things.

**Inventory**

And that takes me to inventory, a case-in-point of how getting the financial data right gives you critical insights into what you should, and shouldn’t, be doing.
It’s an area of our financial statements that was plagued with audit qualifications and the only area in which a qualification—in relation to pricing—remains.

A few months ago I visited a place where we store a huge quantity of inventory—the Defence National Storage and Distribution Centre at Moorebank.

Moorebank is the largest of Defence’s 24 significant stores and warehouses. It houses about 55 million items of ADF stock, worth in excess of $2.7 billion. These range from watercraft, small arms and communications equipment to combat rations, field kitchens and clothing—and yes, the paper hand towels.

The people I met—Public Servants, ADF, contractors—were first class.

The visit was fascinating. But not for the right reasons.

Because what it highlighted was that our inventory management is broken, through decades of neglect, poor practices and the lack of appropriate systems. While the financial statements told me this area had been overlooked, there was nothing like seeing it up close and personal to underscore the fact.

There’s a massive amount of obsolete inventory at Moorebank and across Defence that should have been disposed of years ago, decades ago, and now we’re playing catch up. Of the 295,000 active stock codes at Moorebank, 68 per cent of them (or 200,000) haven’t been used in two years and 29 per cent (or 82,000) have had less than two moves in the past two years. Some of that is reasonable and entirely understandable—it’s not every day you need a heater for the ANZAC frigates’ gas turbines in case they need to be used in extreme cold. But much of it is not.

Too many items are purchased in bulk and stored for years when it would be much cheaper—at no risk to our operations—to buy them as needed from the local hardware store.

And then there are the six street sweepers and nine 40-year-old fire trucks that, until we disposed of them in May, had been sitting around for anywhere between three and 12 years. Street sweeping, I think you’ll agree, isn’t core ADF business. And from what I’ve seen of the trucks, they would be better used as scrap metal than for fire fighting.

I also learned on my visit to Moorebank that too many items get to where they need to be via circuitous, time- and money-wasting routes. A good example, believe it or not, is toilet paper. Toilet paper for use on our ships is sourced in Adelaide, sent to Moorebank, and then distributed to Navy bases and ports of call all over Australia. This obviously adds unnecessary cost in terms of freight and contractor double handling.

It’s money we could be spending on something else. So there’s a lot of small stuff—and some big stuff—that we don’t need, that represents thousands of human hours wasted on stocktakes.

It also represents wasted space. A portion of our land at Moorebank is leased at over $200,000 per hectare, per annum. It’s money we are spending on leasing space to store things that
shouldn’t be there—money that would be better spent paying for goods and services that Defence genuinely needs.

In short, we unnecessarily waste time, money and effort at Moorebank that could be so much better used maintaining current capability or building the ADF of the future.

The static inventory at Moorebank does not reflect the quality of the people who work there. I can’t fault their efforts, or the efforts of a number of senior leaders in Defence who have helped in the identification of this problem and are now tackling it with vigour and determination.

The issues that manifest at Moorebank reflect outdated, inefficient business practices and lack of necessary systems—for example, a warehouse management system. They reflect unnecessary risk avoidance; confused and complicated accountabilities; and too many signatures needed to get simple things done.

So what are we doing?

We’re training our people in smarter purchasing practices—we need to worry less about stocking up for a rainy day and more about getting our quantities right. Where it makes sense to do so, taking a ‘just in time’ rather than a ‘just in case’ approach will save both time and money.

We’ve implemented an accelerated disposals program. Since April last year, the team I met at Moorebank has disposed of an average of 1,600 line items each month. In the past eight weeks, thanks to the focused effort of logistics staff all over Australia, they’ve disposed of over 8,000 line items. And we’re hoping to increase that to 10,000 a month from July.*

We’re also developing new business rules to ensure our stock is not criss-crossing the country but getting to where it needs to in the shortest possible time. So, where a supplier has operations across the country, we’ll source locally rather than sending things on a magical mystery tour.

Preparedness levels are the biggest cost driver of all when it comes to inventory. As commander of the ADF, Air Chief Marshal Houston has made it clear to his military leadership team that ensuring our forces are ready to deploy within the necessary timeframes doesn’t mean our equipment needs to be flown, driven, steamed or otherwise used to the limit all the time.

So we’re developing a new preparedness model that will ensure the ADF is not only superbly effective as a military force but also as efficient as it can be. The pay-off is that more resources will be available for new capabilities and our current equipment should last longer and cost less to maintain.

As you can see, issues around inventory are inexorably linked to the ‘sharp end’ of the Defence business. And those qualifications on our financial statements were about far more than a

* See postscript on page 15 for an update.
failure to adhere to stringent accounting rules—they were symptoms of the broken backbone I alluded to earlier.

**Explosive ordnance**

A related area of underperformance—and one that is clearly integral to our warfighting capability—is the security and broader management of our explosive ordnance—EO for short.

I cannot think of anything more likely to erode the confidence of the Government, the parliament and the Australian people than a perception that Defence is unable to secure and manage its explosive ordnance.

You all know the stories about M72 rocket launchers and other weapons and EO being stolen from Defence armouries. In the wake of the M72 thefts, we conducted a comprehensive audit of the security policies and practices applying to Defence weapons and EO. The audit found we needed to better secure our stock of rocket launchers and that our security regime didn't meet international best practice.

Separately—as part of our response to an incident in which a Defence employee was severely injured in a grenade accident at the Joint Proof and Experimental Unit in Victoria—we reviewed our policies and procedures for the broader management of EO. That review found that there was a need to improve our overall governance of EO to ensure Defence-wide accountabilities and processes were clearly identified and specified.

The inventory value of our EO is around $3 billion—a lot of money in anyone’s language—with potentially very serious consequences if it gets into the wrong hands; isn’t available when it’s needed; or doesn’t work properly.

Here, as with obsolete inventory, I want to make it clear I’m not blaming the people who work in this part of Defence for any underperformance. Rather, we haven’t given our logistics management system the priority it deserves and our stovepiped cultures have gotten in the way of comprehensive solutions.

Both reviews found that a lot needed to be done. And although conducted in response to separate concerns, both found shortcomings in our management, accounting and security practices. And in the case of EO, the recommendations came on top of dozens of previous reviews, projects and audits which—because of our previously stovepiped approach to these issues—were designed to fix parts of, rather than the whole problem.

So what are we doing about EO management?

Our key reform has been to streamline and strengthen accountability by making the Vice Chief of the Defence Force responsible for the oversight, coordination and assurance of the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall weapons and explosive ordnance system of management.
But we’ve also begun work on a range of activities including revising EO accounting procedures, improving physical security at weapons and EO storage facilities, and consolidating the myriad of publications in this area into a single, easily understood and accessed reference point.

I should also point out that Defence industry is a critical part of the EO story, and we are working with it to improve cost and schedule performance in the EO supply chain.

**Information systems**

I’ll turn now to our historically poor performance—in spite of some heroic individual efforts—in the area of information systems.

Defence’s information and communications technology network is one of the largest in the country. It’s a highly complex enterprise, spanning deployed systems to standard desktops to Blackberrys.

If the system doesn’t work properly, it affects not only productivity—a serious issue for any business—but also operational effectiveness. Here are just a few examples:

At the moment, our deployed forces operate on different systems to those used within Australia. This results in unnecessary training and makes the job of service delivery all the harder—in the field, where it matters the most.

Defence’s information systems are the repositories of vital knowledge on everything from environmental management to the procurement of complex weapons systems—but we don’t have an enterprise search capability.

Most large corporations run between three to five data centres. We’ve got 200, all of them power-hungry and giving us a large carbon footprint.

Our people in smaller depots don’t all have access to our IT systems, so not all of our workforce can access basic IT services like email, pay and leave databases. Nor can they participate in convenient and cost-effective on-line training.

We are one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the world—but the system we use to pay our Reserve soldiers and officers still uses 1980s style ‘Green Screen’ technology.

So how are we taking this forward?

Our strategy for fixing IT focuses on four key areas—improving service delivery; improving governance of the whole IT enterprise; reducing the time it takes to deliver new IT capabilities; and reviewing our sourcing strategies.

While this list is probably typical of any agency or corporation we have taken a deliberate 'back to basics' approach.
On the service delivery side, based on feedback from customers, our Chief Information Officer has identified the ‘top ten irritants’ that he and his people are working to resolve.

On the governance side, we’re overhauling the process of how we set priorities and assign resources—replacing a bottom-up, uncoordinated approach with one led by CDF and me that looks across the enterprise and takes the hard decisions about where investment will get the most return.

We’re reducing the time it takes to introduce new IT capabilities from literally years to 90 days. We simply can’t continue to deliver obsolete technology to support our war fighters or our business reform efforts.

And we’re trying to be much smarter about how we use our significant buying power. Over time, we’ll replace a multiplicity of IT contracts with a smaller number of larger, more cost-effective ones.

I believe that of all the challenges we face, improving our information systems is the one that promises the greatest reward. IT touches each and every person in Defence. When it works well, it enables great results. When it works badly, it frustrates, delays and can imperil success. It’s the ultimate example of why Defence can’t function properly with a broken backbone.

**Why it matters**

I’m talking about these things because I firmly believe they have a direct impact on Defence’s ability to do its core business. The unused paper towels; the view that new activities can’t be undertaken without additional funding; the confusion around EO management; the IT updates that are delivered years after the technology has become obsolete—are all symptomatic of problems that, if not fixed, will degrade our ability to develop and deploy effective military force.

But surely a ‘can-do’ organisation like Defence can rise above these mere bureaucratic distractions and concentrate on the real business of developing and deploying capability? Surely there’s not really that close a linkage between obsolete inventory and the defence of Australia and its national interests?

The linkage is that doing these things badly instead of well represents an enormous amount of time, money and effort that could so easily be spent on providing for our future defence needs.

These problems point to longstanding failings in the governance and accountability arrangements that we must get right if we are to perform to the highest level while also conforming with the law and government policy.

They demonstrate a lack of concern to ensure that every dollar is spent where it will have the most impact.
And they betray a worrying level of complacency about waste and inefficiency. Every dollar wasted represents a lost opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of our capability.

Waste and inefficiency is bad everywhere and always. But particularly so at a time when Defence faces enormous funding pressures—like personnel and operating costs that haven’t been properly budgeted for—while the Government is also trying to control inflation. And even more so in a year when we are developing for Government consideration a White Paper that will articulate the capability we need out to 2030—capability that certainly won’t come for free.

How it all fits together

But maybe what sounds like a tale of woe is in fact a happy coincidence. Maybe a determination to fix the seemingly small things while also advising Government on how to tackle the biggest thing of all—what is it we should be defending and what will it take?—is exactly the right combination of effort.

Timing, after all, is everything.

I think the stars have aligned and we now have a chance—perhaps for the first time—to advise Government not only on the warfighting capability Australia needs but also the Defence organisation it will take to support that capability over the next 20 years and beyond. Not only the naval, land and air power it will take to defend Australia and its national interests but also the optimal information technology, personnel initiatives, logistics systems, and living and working environments to support the delivery of that military power.

The White Paper will be the vehicle for advice about our future force structure.

Flowing from and inter-connected with the White Paper are four other key initiatives: the so-called companion reviews; the $10 billion savings program; an external audit of the Defence budget; and our ongoing program of reform.

Let me explain how these various initiatives knit together.

The initiative with which you will be most familiar is the new White Paper.

A lot has changed since the publication of the last White Paper: the events and ramifications of September 11, the rise of India and China, and increasing state fragility and instability in the South Pacific. With about 3,000 deployed overseas, the ADF continues to operate at a very high tempo. There are some very big projects in train, such as the LHDs, AWDs and Super Hornets. And some very big decisions needing to be made about our future capability, in areas like air combat and undersea warfare.

Most of you will know how a classic White Paper works. It will assess our strategic environment out to 2030 and, through a force structure review, recommend to Government the type and size of military forces that we will need in the future.
But the companion reviews are a first for Defence. Leveraging off White Paper judgments about the future ADF, the companion reviews will enable us to determine what is needed to ensure the Defence backbone is strong enough to support it. We’ll be looking at information and communications technology; industry capacity; the Defence Capability Plan; science and technology support; logistics systems; the integrated Defence workforce; the size and location of the Defence estate; and the way we estimate and manage personnel and operating costs.

We’re also reviewing our intelligence collection and assessment functions to ensure they most efficiently support our needs.

And David Mortimer’s Defence procurement and sustainment review will help ensure the valuable progress we’ve already made in these areas continues.

Together, these reviews provide an ideal opportunity to propose reforms of functions and processes, improve efficiency and generate long-term savings for reinvestment.

The companion reviews in particular will give us the chance to take an even closer, longer-term look at some of the issues I’ve been talking about—things like our ICT infrastructure, warehousing and logistics—which have been overlooked for too long.

We’re encouraging everyone involved in the companion reviews to think outside the square. We’re after creative, bold and innovative thinking. This is not the time to confirm the status quo. It’s an opportunity to challenge current processes, make improvements, and consider new directions.

While the various reviews will be looking for organisational reforms able to yield significant efficiencies and economies in the longer term, our Minister has also introduced a savings initiative to deliver $10 billion over the next ten years.

In his address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute earlier this year, the Minister reiterated the Government’s commitment to increasing Defence’s funding by 3 per cent real growth a year until 2015–16 since extended in the budget for another two years to 2017–18.

He also said that the future environment is likely to mean we’ll need that 3 per cent and more—with the ‘more’ needing to come from internal efficiencies and economies.

We’re looking at everything from inefficient practices and processes and duplicated activities to travel, conferences, unnecessarily expensive renovations and promotional items for internal audiences.

Only those aspects of Defence directly related to the preparation, deployment and reconstitution of our forces are excluded from the savings measures. In relation to everything else, we are looking hard at what we do, and how we do it, to decide whether the expenditure of public resources can be justified.

Defence has been generously funded in recent years. Most of the money has been well spent. Some has not. I know there is fat in Defence.
I’m reminded of this every time I see a coffee mug, mouse mat or glossy publication with the aim of promoting Defence to its own people. Small things—but again, highly symptomatic.

I’m reminded of this every time I speak to my colleagues in smaller policy-only Departments in which attendance at conferences is a luxury that can be afforded only for the lucky—or possibly unlucky—few.

Every government agency is delivering financial and human resource efficiencies and economies, and Defence is not immune—nor should it be.

So we’re now identifying lower priorities and testing their importance against new ones. We’re now taking the first steps towards developing a much stronger culture of efficiency and economy in Defence.

CDF and I have already identified, and the Minister has agreed, about $500 million in savings for 2008–09. We’re looking for another $500 million in 08–09 and have already begun examining efficiency and economy plans for the next nine years. I’m confident of finding the $10 billion the Minister asked for and considerably more—including through the deeper, longer-term, more strategic efficiencies likely to flow from the companion reviews.

The fourth key initiative is an external audit of the Defence budget. This will fulfil a Government election commitment to assess the true position of Defence’s finances.

The audit is an opportunity, not a threat, and one on which Defence needs to capitalise.

The audit will advise the Minister on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Defence budget and future risks associated with it. As such, it will provide external, independent validation of the deep reforms we expect to flow from the White Paper companion reviews and our savings program.

Defence’s ongoing program of reform supplements the other four initiatives. All of the agreed 52 recommendations of the Proust Review into Defence management will be implemented by the end of this year. The recommendations addressed several key areas of our business—governance and accountability, supporting our Minister and the Government, people management and business reform.

I’ve already touched on four areas of our business undergoing significant reform. More broadly, over the next 12 months, we’ll continue to roll out our new business model and governance framework, which will refine and improve our knowledge and risk management, customer-supplier agreements and performance reporting.

And a range of other initiatives are underway to ensure Defence delivers to Government the first class policy advice, and financial and business management, that I’ve been encouraging in my weekly messages to all staff.

I particularly want to highlight the major changes that I’ve made to the operation and membership of the Defence Audit Committee. My goal is to embed an integrated, uniform,
enterprise-level risk management approach across Defence. The committee will focus on our corporate risks and controls, compliance and assurance processes, and continue to review the financial statements to ensure the recent improvements are sustained and enhanced. The new Audit Committee’s breadth of view will make it central to reform in every area of our business.

The final point I want to make about reform is that it doesn’t have a beginning, middle and end. While full implementation of the Proust Review will be a significant achievement, we won’t be declaring victory.

For leviathan organisations like Defence, a culture of continuous reform is the only option.

**Change is now**

CDF and I acknowledge this is an ambitious agenda.

The development of a White Paper is a big enough job in its own right.

But it was clear to me after a short time in this job that a new White Paper, while absolutely necessary, would never be enough.

That if Government gave us the opportunity to provide a strategic view of how the whole organisation should be configured to support the future ADF, we should seize it.

That if Australia is to have the Defence establishment it needs and deserves we have to institute deep and sustained reform.

So, how many paper towels does it take to wipe the dust off those parts of our business that have been neglected for too long?

Not 256,800. They were sold and removed from Moorebank in mid June.

**Postscript**

Since the Secretary spoke at the Lowy Institute, the ‘accelerated disposals program’ has continued to gain momentum. At the time the speech was delivered we were beginning the long climb and at the Defence National Storage and Distribution Centre we had processed around 8000 lines of stock for disposal.

As at 19 September (15 weeks since) we have processed another 27,000 lines of stock at the Defence National Storage and Distribution Centre alone—and this is increasing. Yes, the fire trucks have departed as have the street sweepers, but joining them on the way out of the gate have been a Sonar Dome (Oberon Submarine), ships’ propellers, forklifts, clothing, anchors, mobile kitchens, mosquito nets, aircraft jacks and another 2.3 million paper towels.
In addition, the accelerated disposals program is extending its boundaries to include other major warehouses, with the intent to apply similar methodology and continue the clean up of our establishments. The Defence Materiel Organisation and the Joint Logistics Command are working together and with other Defence agencies to put in place immediate and long-term strategies to reduce the holdings of obsolete/surplus inventory.

Nick Warner was appointed as the Secretary of Defence on 4 December 2006. Prior to taking up this position he was the Senior Adviser (International) to the Prime Minister, a role he occupied from July 2005.

Mr Warner has held a number of senior positions, most recently as Deputy Secretary, in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. These have included First Assistant Secretary, South Pacific, Africa and Middle East Division (2003), First Assistant Secretary, South and South East Asia Division (1998–99), Acting First Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs and Consular Division (1997–98), Assistant Secretary, Parliamentary and Media Branch and Senior Spokesman (1997–98), Director, Central and Southern Africa Section (1990–91) and Director, South Asia, Africa, Middle East Trade Section (1988–89). In the Office of National Assessments, Mr Warner held the positions of Deputy Head, Current Intelligence Branch and National Assessments Officer for Africa (1979-88). Mr Warner worked in the Joint Intelligence Organisation (1973–77).

The Weaponisation of Space: The Next Arms Race?

Air Commodore David Steele, RAAF

Introduction

On 11 January 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test, successfully destroying an obsolete weather satellite with a kinetic hit from a projectile launched into space via a ballistic missile.¹ This missile was launched from a land-based mobile system located at the Xichang space launch facility in southwestern China. Some 1,600 pieces of debris were scattered through low earth orbit (LEO), constituting a hazard to other satellites. The test was not initially acknowledged by China but confirmed by United States Government sources one week later. On 23 January 2007 the Chinese acknowledged the test when a Foreign Ministry spokesperson made a brief statement stating that the ASAT test was 'not targeted at any country' and that China continues to oppose the weaponisation of space. However, no further information has been forthcoming despite international condemnation of the test.²

On 24 April 2007 General Michael Moseley, the then US Air Force (USAF) Chief of Staff, said that China’s ASAT weapon test was a 'strategically dislocating' event as significant as Russia’s launch of Sputnik (the first artificial satellite sent into orbit) in 1957. He went on to say that China’s bold activity in outer space, in conjunction with its program to expand the capability and lethality of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), indicates ‘this is a country … very serious about extending range, opportunity and capability with their air and space assets’, adding ‘they are getting the ability to go beyond just a Taiwan scenario’.³

Space, in relative terms, is a busy environment with approximately 11,000 objects currently large enough to be tracked. Around 3,000 of these objects are satellites, of which only approximately 700 are active. The remainder of these objects are debris ranging in size from expended rockets and defunct satellites down to orbiting paint flakes. The vagueness of these figures is due to the fact that most nations do not report the role or status (active or inactive) of individual satellites, particularly those satellites with classified military payloads.⁴

Satellites fall into six main groups depending on their role; namely weather, communications, navigation, surveillance, military early warning and scientific research.⁵ The division between groups is not clearly delineated, or even between those with military or civilian use as some satellites have dual or triple (as in military, commercial and scientific) roles. Further, as previously stated, nations do not declare all the roles of a satellite.⁶ Although space is ‘militarised’, it is not yet considered ‘weaponised’. That is, no country has deployed a destructive capability into space designed to destroy targets that are either space-based or ground-based. Also, disregarding the recent Chinese ASAT demonstration, no country possesses a ground-based capability that is designed to destroy other countries’ space-based assets.⁷

The US is the leader in the space domain, both military and civilian. From a military perspective, the US warfighter is heavily reliant on unrestricted access to US military space assets at all
levels of war; the strategic, operational and tactical. However, the implication that China may be developing an ASAT weapon capability has reverberated throughout the US.\textsuperscript{8}

Could this prompt a space arms race between the US and China? Could the US consider weaponising space to maintain its dominance in this domain? This article will discuss ASAT testing in an historical context, highlight the importance of space to the US warfighter and then outline the international legal framework and US policy that relates to space. The article will discuss trends in future space weapons and the space programs of Russia, India, Europe, China and explore the possibility of a future Taiwan Straits conflict scenario between China and the US. Finally, this article will discuss the strategies available to the US, and their implications, if the US is to maintain its dominance in the space domain.\textsuperscript{9}

Definitions

Throughout this article the following definitions apply:

Space. ‘Space’ (or ‘outer space’) is generally defined as the relatively empty regions of the universe outside the atmospheres of celestial bodies. However, there is no clear boundary between the earth’s atmosphere and space as the density of the atmosphere gradually decreases as altitude increases. For this article, space will refer to the region beyond the earth’s atmosphere.\textsuperscript{10}

Space Weapons. There is no agreed definition for ‘space weapons’. In 2002 the Canadian Government provided the definition of a space weapon as ‘any device designed or modified to inflict physical or operational damage to an object in space through the projection of mass or energy’. For the purpose of this article, the Canadian definition will be accepted. It should be noted that the definition does not extend to weapons that are based on earth and transit through space but do not achieve orbit; for example, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).\textsuperscript{11}

Previous ASAT tests: An historical context

The Chinese ASAT test, though unexpected by the international community, was not the first. The first reported testing of an ASAT occurred in 1959 by the US, just two years after the Russians launched Sputnik. This test involved the air launch of a missile from a modified B-47 bomber aircraft. The US continued developing its ASAT capability through the 1960s and was known to have deployed nuclear-tipped surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) as an operational ASAT system. The program was extended into the 1970s when the US used Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in an ASAT role. The Thor was reported as being able to intercept a satellite at an altitude of 1,200 kilometres. Later in 1985, the US launched a missile from an F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft successfully intercepting a satellite at an altitude of 525 kilometres.\textsuperscript{12}

The Soviets have also conducted successful ASAT tests. In 1968 a modified Scarp ICBM was used to demonstrate an ASAT capability. From 1968 to 1982 the Russians were reported to have made 20 ASAT tests with a variety of missile types. In 1992 unconfirmed reporting alleged
Russia was developing an air launched ASAT capability by utilising a modified missile carried by a MIG-31 Foxhound fighter aircraft. Similarly, the Chinese had also been reported as developing an air launched ASAT system based on a missile carried by an H-6 bomber aircraft.13

ASAT capability is not solely limited to either ground-based or air launched missiles. The US, Russia and China are all reported as developing ASAT technology based on either ground-based or air-based lasers from the mid 1980s. Such systems would be used to cause effects from temporary disruption (‘dazzling’) through to destruction. Reports from a body of US scientists indicate that in September 2006 a US satellite was temporarily taken out of action when ‘dazzled’ by a Chinese laser.14

The importance of space to the 21st century US warfighter

Space was first exploited by both the US and Soviet militaries during the Cold War in a somewhat benign manner. Satellites were deployed by both protagonists to observe each other’s military forces, their deployments, and monitor each other’s nuclear tests and missile launches. It could be said that such space capabilities during the Cold War contributed to peace by maintaining strategic nuclear stability and, towards the end of the Cold War, the progression of a successful arms limitation program. During this period, space was also increasingly used as a medium for communications, mapping, weather forecasting and scientific research to support ballistic missiles. In fact, both Cold War superpowers agreed that the mutual toleration of each other’s military space programs served their own interests.15

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has continued to increasingly rely on space to support military operations. The global positioning satellite (GPS) system is one such example. Precision strike weapons such as the GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), an air launched weapon, rely on GPS to provide an accurate tracking solution from its launch point to the target. JDAMs are termed a ‘smart’ weapon, in that they achieve an order of accuracy in several metres. When compared to the accuracy of unguided ‘dumb’ bombs which is in the order of tens of metres, JDAM is the weapon of choice for the warfighter as they have a high level of assuredness that a target can be successfully engaged first time and the risk of collateral damage can be minimised. GPS is also used for ‘blue force’ tracking, a system that monitors the position of friendly units and vehicles. This system enhances a commander’s situational awareness on the battlefield and reduces the chance of fratricide.16

GPS is but one example of the heavy reliance of space to the modern warfighter. In 1991, Operation Desert Storm was supported by 16 military satellites and five commercial satellites. These space assets provided a maximum transmission capability in the order of 200 megabits per second. Just over a decade later in 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom was supported by some 50 satellites with a transmission capability of some 2.4 gigabits per second.17

US joint warfighting concepts (Joint Vision 2020) call for ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ and state that space superiority, along with land, sea and air superiority are fundamental to achieving Full Spectrum Dominance. Such concepts go on to acknowledge that ‘the medium of space is the fourth medium of warfare’ and that ‘so important are space systems to military operations that it is unrealistic to imagine that they will never become targets’.18 US joint doctrine defines
four primary mission areas; namely space control, space force enhancement, space support and space force applications. The definition for ‘space force applications’ states that such ‘operations consist of attacks against terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapon systems operating in or through space’. It goes on to say: ‘Currently, there are no space force applications operating in space’. It would be fair to say that from a US warfighting perspective the weaponisation of space is under active consideration.

Space – the legal battlefield

Along with the advances made into space in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, considerable legal efforts were made to ensure the peaceful use of space. Today, there are five major United Nations treaties, conventions and agreements that concern the use of space. The most significant of these is the 1976 Agreement Concerning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST). Essentially, the OST prohibits placing ‘objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ in orbit or on celestial bodies and that ‘activities on the moon and other celestial bodies will be for peaceful purposes only’.

In addition to these UN arrangements, several other treaties relating to the militarisation of space have been proposed. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere and space. The 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) committed the former USSR and US ‘not to develop, test or deploy … systems for placing into earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kinds of WMD, including … orbital missiles’. This treaty was never ratified. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the former USSR proposed treaties to the US over ASAT testing. The outcome would have been limitations on the development of space-based ballistic missile defence systems and a ban on the use of manned spacecraft for military purposes. The US objected to these limitations.

More recently, China in conjunction with Russia, proposed a draft treaty to the United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament (CD) that was aimed at filling the obvious gap in which no treaty banned the testing or deployment of weapons that are not nuclear or WMD. The draft treaty went on ‘allow for self-defence of space assets and to accept the militarisation of space’ but prohibited ‘the deployment of any weapons in outer space’ and prevented ‘the use of force against outer space objects’. The UN CD did not progress this draft treaty due to legal arguments over definitions and disagreement between the US, China and Russia.

The US position

The US National Space Policy of 31 August 2006, while at the unclassified level and very general in nature, makes several statements worthy of consideration. The policy states that US space capabilities are vital to national interests and that ‘freedom of action in space is as important to the US as air power and sea power’. The policy also states that the US will ‘take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests’. What can be inferred from this policy is that the US is heavily reliant on space for national security and that it emphatically wishes to ensure that its access to these assets remains assured.
Future space weapons: DEW and KEW

Future space weapons can be divided into two general types. The first type is Directed Energy Weapons (DEW); they deliver destructive energy to their targets without transporting mass. The second type is Mass-To-Target Weapons or Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW); they must transport mass to their target in order to achieve the desired destructive effect. KEW can be further subdivided into two groups; those that rely on their own kinetic energy and those that deliver a conventional warhead for the destructive effect.26

DEW are characterised by propagation of destructive energy at very high speeds. However, while the speed of propagation may be impressive (the speed of light), the time to achieve the desired effect may not be as impressive. If the desired effect is destruction, then enough power must be focused on a critical component of the target for some time to heat it to a point where it no longer functions. However, the desired levels of effect of DEW range from short duration interference or jamming through to destruction. Candidate technologies for DEW range from chemical lasers through to weapons that transmit microwave energy.

DEW are constrained by physics. The effectiveness of the directed energy reduces in proportion to the square of the range to the target. Also, the energy would be distorted if it was to be directed through or into the earth’s atmosphere. This makes target acquisition and tracking problematic from a technical perspective. DEW require fuel, either as a stored chemical fuel or as electrical energy. Thus, such weapons have a finite number of firings and even a finite time between firings where they require refuelling or regeneration of energy.27 Despite these technical challenges, the US continues to progress research into DEW. The airborne laser prototype28 should be demonstrated in 2009 and research continues into the space-based laser concept.29

KEW are characterised by the use of either blast or direct collision to disable an adversary’s space assets. Candidate technologies for KEW cover a wide range of options; from simple technologies such as space mines in a micro-satellite through to high technology solutions such as guns that eject Mach 10+ projectiles known as ‘Rods from God’. Similar to DEW, challenges faced by scientists include target acquisition and tracking, energy generation for projectile acceleration and the extremes of heating encountered if the projectile was required to enter the earth’s atmosphere. Despite these difficulties, the US continues to research these technologies under the cover of funding lines such as ‘space control and counterspace technologies’. KEW have one critical limitation: if used in space they create debris fields which would pose a risk to not only an adversary’s space assets, but also one’s own.30

Advantages and disadvantages of space weapons

Pundits of space weapons cite advantages such as persistent global coverage and an ability to attack inaccessible terrestrial targets with rapid response times that would see an ICBM engaged either on the launcher or in its initial launch phase. Also, an argument exists that the employment of space weapons provides the basis for a new deterrence strategy that minimises the risk of a future nuclear confrontation.31 Space weapons also have several disadvantages beyond the immense technical and financial challenges facing those who would wish to
develop them. Satellites are not stealthy. Space-based weapons, similar to satellites, would be relatively predictable in their LEO orbits. Thus, a suitably equipped adversary would be able to target these weapons. Finally, the development of the ground-based command and control infrastructure that supports space weapons will prove to be problematic. Commanders of the future will have to be provided with almost instantaneous situational awareness that must be of such high fidelity that they can be assured that the use of these weapons can be authorised with absolute confidence.32

**US space competitors**

Future threats to US military space systems could stem from traditional groupings of state actors through to non-state actors.

Russia was a fierce competitor with the US in the space domain during the Cold War. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian space program has struggled. In 1992 the Russian space program budget was reduced by around 60 per cent of previous years. Also, access to launch sites was problematic as they were now located outside Russia.33 Russia has now modestly started rebuilding its space program, with a predominantly economic outlook. While some US$12 billion has been allocated for 2005–2015 space program budget, the program is still seriously underfunded. Russia is looking to opportunities to gain extra funding by providing launch facilities to commercial customers and also through an innovative space tourism program. From the military perspective, Russia has focused on developing new submarine-launched ballistic missiles that utilise multiple independently targeted nuclear warheads and increasing the capability of its early warning system through the use of satellite technology.34 Russia has no plans to develop space weapons and is actively pursuing international support on the non-militarisation of space.35

India is a relatively recent entrant into the space domain. India has developed its own launch facilities and maintains an indigenous imaging and communications satellite capability. These satellites would be dual use and thus support military operations. However, India has no overt plans to develop space weapons. It is focused on developing collaborative international commercial space opportunities as well as a commercial satellite launch facility.36

The European Space Agency (ESA) is an international organisation comprising 17 member states with France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Canada being the four largest states. Its charter is to shape the development of Europe’s space capability by coordinating the financial resources of its members and delivering capabilities far beyond the scope of any single European country. The ESA has no military objectives and is a strong proponent of the OST. Further, it has recently issued a resolution which, among other initiatives, reaffirms the ESA’s support for ‘the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes’.37

Despite the ancient Chinese inventing gun powder and developing a ‘black powder rocket’, Chinese efforts to develop rocket and space technology only commenced in the mid 1950s. However, by the early 1970s, the Chinese had launched their first satellite and developed ICBMs. In the 1980s and 1990s the Chinese space program continued at a modest pace but has more recently increased in tempo. In 2003 China launched its first manned space flight and in 2005 conducted a second. More recently, the Chinese have indicated that they will launch an
un-manned probe that will orbit the moon and land a robot on the lunar surface. The Chinese manned program continues with the launch in September 2008 of a *Shenzhou* rocket carrying three astronauts and plans for the building of a Chinese space station.\(^{38}\)

It should be noted that the Chinese space program is entirely run by the military (People’s Liberation Army (PLA)). Further, there is little open source material that refers to China’s military aspirations regarding space. China has embarked on a modernization plan to improve the PLA and take it from a peasant-based ‘people’s army’ to one that is capable of conducting off-shore operations. China has demonstrated offensive military space aspirations with the recent ASAT test; it would not be unreasonable to consider that China is discreetly progressing the development of other military space programs and capabilities that would support or replicate (at best) US warfighting concepts.\(^{39}\)

In the public arena, China continues to oppose ‘the militarisation of space, and seeks to prevent or slow the development of ASAT systems and space-based missile defences’. However, critics have highlighted that the Chinese tactic of attacking while negotiating (‘biantan bianda’) is being used and that the public rhetoric is very different from Chinese strategic thinking. A US Department of Defense report states that ‘China’s leaders probably view ASATs, and offensive counterspace systems … as well as space-based missile defences as inevitabilities’.\(^{40}\)

Since the commencement of the ‘Global War on Terror’, there has been little discussion on the possibility of non-state players acting in the space domain. While it is not feasible to envisage Al Qaeda directly interfering with US space assets, the ground-based parts of the US space system could be vulnerable to computer or conventional attacks. However, current thinking proposes that most terrorist organisations prefer attacking terrestrial targets that result in damaging images of casualties and mass panic. Such impact would not be achieved by damaging a satellite constellation’s support infrastructure through computer attack. However, this line of reasoning fails to acknowledge the substantial damage that could be rendered to an adversary’s financial and energy management systems as these systems are heavily reliant on communications through space in modern countries, particularly the US.\(^{41}\)

**The future threat to the US: a ‘space Pearl Harbor’?**

On 24 July 2000, *Xinhua*, the official Chinese news agency, published an article entitled ‘The US Military’s Soft Ribs and Strategic Weaknesses’ which analysed a future conflict with the US. The article suggests that developing countries could use information and electronic warfare and create a ‘space Pearl Harbor’, thus toppling a technologically advanced adversary. The article went on to state: ‘For countries that could never win a war with the US by using methods of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice’.\(^{42}\) Similarly, it has been proposed that any threat that the US faces now and into the future, can only be (by default) asymmetric in nature, as the US has become so dominant militarily.

In terms of national security, a threat is: a state player that possesses, or is developing, military capability and demonstrates intent to use that capability against another. China possesses (albeit a prototype) a capability that could threaten US space dominance while the ambiguous tactic of ‘biantan bianda’ could be being used to hide an emerging intent.
The possibility of a future confrontation between the US and China in the Taiwan Straits in the 2015–2030 timeframe is now being debated by informed commentators and is referred to as a ‘space Pearl Harbor’. Despite the predictions of continued growth in the Chinese economy and the modernisation program being undertaken by the PLA, China is still unlikely to have a military that could challenge the US in a traditional ‘force on force’ contest for several decades. However, the differential in terms of military power between the two countries will have decreased such that the advantage that the US currently enjoys may well be eroded and US forces could be vulnerable to some extent. China could use an ASAT weapon to defeat US space assets and deny the US situational awareness (albeit temporarily) in the Taiwan Straits. Significant casualties could be inflicted on the US by sinking an aircraft carrier or by striking US personnel based on Guam. China’s leaders could convince themselves that such a successful first strike would deter the US from considering entering into conflict. While such a proposition is highly unlikely, US strategic national security planners must take such scenarios, be they extreme, into account as they plan for the future.

Future US strategies

As highlighted above, while the US is not currently challenged in the space domain, this paradigm may well become increasingly challenged over the next few decades. Two major strategies or themes could be progressed by the US in order to preserve its space dominance and ensure that space is not weaponised.

The US could progress a strategy of ‘Space Assurance through Cooperative Measures’ to ensure that space remains a viable and reliable medium for all nations so that they can pursue global commercial activities and the peaceful exploration of space. Such a posture would require the prohibition of all activities that could be considered dangerous. This would include banning the flight testing of ASAT weapons and the operational deployment of all space weapons.

To successfully advance such a strategy, the US would have to continue to enjoy its relative superiority in terms of conventional and nuclear military capabilities. This fundamental element is essential to ensure that any potential adversary clearly understands that if they damage or destroy US space assets, the final outcome of any such conflict will not be altered; they will suffer unacceptable consequences. A second key element of a space assurance strategy is the ability of the US to maintain high fidelity space situational awareness to monitor the intent and research of adversaries in any areas that would adversely affect the space domain.

The cooperative measures that support such a strategy are already in place to some extent. As discussed previously, UN treaties currently exist that prohibit the placing of WMD in space and acknowledge that the exploration of space should be pursued for peaceful purposes only. However, the UN CD supported by the US, needs to expand and strengthen these treaties to ensure that space remains free from weapons. Unfortunately, gaining consensus in this 65-nation forum may well be problematic. In order to achieve these outcomes sooner, the US could progress an international code of conduct (commonly referred to as ‘rules of the road’) whereby responsible space faring nations would agree to notify one another of unavoidable dangerous activities in space and assist in debris mitigation and space traffic deconfliction. These ‘road rules’ could be progressed in the form of either bilateral or multilateral agreements and would hopefully lead UN CD debate.
The US could hedge against an attack in the space domain by decreasing the vulnerability of future satellites by improving hardening and redundancy characteristics and providing them with anti-jam and anti-dazzle capabilities. However, it should be noted that the US is already embarked on a hedging strategy in a terrestrial sense. The US possesses far superior conventional and nuclear military power than any other country and should continue to enjoy this advantage for several decades. If a country chose to attack a US space asset, this act of war could be overwhelmingly responded to in a conventional sense.48

Other elements of a US hedging strategy would include restricting research and development programs into space weapons to the laboratory environment only and complying with a ban on flight testing. This US restraint would be complemented by the US encouraging other nations to adopt a similar policy. However, the US could anticipate that potential adversaries would continue with their own space warfare programs. In anticipation, the US would ensure that it is positioned to quickly advance its own space weapons programs to the flight testing and operational deployment phases if an adversary did not demonstrate a similar level of restraint.49

The two US strategies discussed above are not mutually exclusive and should be considered as complementary if the weaponisation of space and a ‘space arms race’ are to be avoided. The last arms race was between two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, this race did not extend into the space arena. While both countries developed ASAT capabilities, development of space weapons was not progressed to the same extent as other weapons, particularly their respective nuclear strike forces. Both countries understood that to destroy the satellites of another country would have been a very dangerous act, one that could result in nuclear retaliation.

Today there is only one superpower, the US. China’s focus is primarily on economic growth. While China is undertaking an extensive modernisation program of the PLA, China cannot afford to bankrupt itself by entering into an arms race with the US. As stated previously, if China had a hostile intent, its strategy would focus on an asymmetric approach. It has been argued that China has already demonstrated an asymmetric approach to some extent with its recent ASAT test. Finally, neither China nor the US need to race to have the capability to dominate, or perhaps more accurately obliterate, space.50 A single nuclear detonation in LEO can inflict irreversible damage to an adversary’s space-based systems. Further, such an event impacts on all users of space.51

However, while an arms race in space is highly unlikely, both countries will continue to progress the development of military space capabilities. Current US strategic thinking as articulated in documents such as US National Space Policy and Joint Vision 2020 do not bode well for the US demonstrating constraint in the space domain and progressing initiatives such as an international code of conduct. If these strategies are not pursued, the US will inevitably weaponise space in an effort to maintain its space dominance.

Conclusion

China’s successful demonstration of an ASAT capability in early January 2007 sent shockwaves throughout the international space community, particularly the US. Initially China did not
acknowledge the test. When the US strongly remonstrated their concerns, China finally acknowledged that it had conducted such a test but went on to ambiguously state that it continued to oppose the weaponisation of space.

Space is a busy place with some 700 satellites supporting both government and non-government endeavours in the following fields; weather, communications, navigation, surveillance, military early warning and scientific research. In particular, the US military has become heavily reliant on space to support their future joint warfighting doctrine, entitled ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’. The US military has gone on to state that space is the fourth medium of warfare and that it is unrealistic to conceive that US space assets will never become targets. To counter this prospect, it is likely that the US will consider developing space weapons, at least to the concept stage.

Future space weapons fall into two broad categories; namely DEW and KEW. While technically feasible, space weapons present many challenges ranging from energy generation to target acquisition and tracking. Further, they will be immensely expensive. While countries such as Russia and India have active commercial and military space programs, China is the only country other than the US that is showing interest in the weaponisation of space. China will continue to grow substantially in economic terms, including its conventional military capability, over the next few decades. While it is highly unlikely that China could directly challenge the US in the space arena, an astute China could cause significant trouble to the US through an asymmetric campaign, a ‘space Pearl Harbor’.

The US is faced with the dilemma of how to maintain its dominance in space. Complementary strategies of ‘Space Assurance through Cooperative Measures’ and ‘Hedging Against Weaponisation’ have been proposed that support this theme and also attempt to prevent the weaponisation of space through initiatives such as an international code of conduct. However, these strategies are at odds with the current US National Space Policy and joint warfighting concepts and it is unlikely that they will be progressed in the near term.

Despite the modernisation of the PLA, China will not rival the US directly in a conventional military sense in the foreseeable future. However, it is certain that China will continue to progress the development of military space capabilities; the only uncertainty is the extent and intent of this development. While an arms race in space between China and the US is unlikely, China could significantly alter the balance of power through a nuclear detonation in space or the use of an ASAT weapon. Such an event would be a disastrous outcome for the international community. China’s ongoing aspirations in the space arena may well inevitably lead to the US weaponising space in order to maintain its dominance there.
Air Commodore Steele graduated from the RAAF Academy in 1980 with the Sword of Honour for leadership. After pilot's course, Air Commodore Steele flew a variety of aircraft types and is a Qualified Flying Instructor. He completed RAAF Command and Staff College in 1996 and a staff tour in Capability Development Division before being posted back as Commanding Officer No. 6 Squadron during the period 1999 to 2000. More recently, he served in Air Force HQ as Director Battlespace Management (Aerospace) and as the Officer Commanding 78 Wing where he was responsible for ‘fast jet’ training. In mid 2006 he was selected as the Defence Attaché at the Australian Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq where he served for six months. On his return to Australia in early 2007 Air Commodore Steele attended the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Australian Defence College before a posting to the Australian Embassy in Washington DC as the Air Attaché.

NOTES

1. Reference to ‘kinetic’ implies that the projectile carried no explosive warhead and that the destruction that occurred would have been through the kinetic energy of the collision between the projectile and the target.


5. Surveillance in this context includes Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, more commonly referred to as ‘ISR’.


8. ibid., pp 3–5.

9. The writer acknowledges the close relationship between ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defence (BMD) and space and future space weapons. However, due to constraints in length, this article will not discuss BMD. Furthermore, the predominance of the US in the space arena is assumed; as such, US space capabilities will not be described in any detail.

10. The Federation Aeronautique Internationale has established the ‘Karman Line’ at an altitude of 100 kilometres (62 statute miles) as a working definition for the boundary between the earth’s atmosphere and space.


13. ibid., pp. 26–27.
14. ibid.
17. ibid., p. 4.
21. Note that by this stage, treaties have only ever referred to nuclear weapons and WMD.
23. ibid.
27. ibid.
28. The airborne laser is being developed primarily to protect against ballistic missiles. However, it could be used against space assets.
30. ibid., pp. 20–21.
31. ibid., p. 51.
33. Kazakhstan is now paid around US$100 million per year by Russia for access to the Baikonur launch facility.
34. Some eight early warning radars are now located outside Russian territory in states which aspire to join NATO.


44. It should be noted that the decision by Argentina in 1982 to invade the Falkland Islands is at odds with this proposition. Also, the Japanese strike on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941 brought the US into WWII and Japan was subsequently defeated.


46. ibid.


50. The Soviets and the US conducted high altitude nuclear detonations in the early 1960s. One such test by the US was of a nuclear warhead some 400 kilometres over Johnson Island in the Pacific Ocean. This detonation produced artificial radiation belts that destroyed satellites and caused failures in electrical equipment some 1,300 kilometres away.

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It’s Lonely at the Top: Career Progression for Female Officers in the Australian Defence Force

Major Anne Goyne, AAPsych

For a woman as for a man, marriage might enormously help or devastatingly hinder the growth of her power to contribute something impersonally valuable to the community in which she lived.

Vera Brittain
Testament of Youth (p. 531)

Introduction

While the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is still a predominantly male organisation, the involvement of women in the Services has steadily increased over the past 20 years, especially amongst permanent force commissioned officers. In 1985 women comprised just 7 per cent of the permanent ADF officer pool, and yet by 2005 this figure had more than doubled to 15 per cent. As shown in Figure 1, the RAN (Royal Australian Navy) and RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) have recorded the highest increase in female representation, RAN tripling the number of female officers since 1985 and the RAAF doubling its female officer pool. In some rank groups, such as RAAF Flying Officer, women now represent more than a quarter of the rank group.

From a social equity perspective, these are encouraging figures and reflect a sustained effort within the ADF to develop a culture more welcoming and appreciative of the contribution women can make to Service life. Throughout Defence, employment opportunities for women have been increasing, especially in the RAN and RAAF, and females now share parity with men in all but the most combat oriented positions of each of the three Services. While it could be

![Figure 1: Representation of female officers in the permanent ADF since 1985.](image)
argued that the ADF has been forced down this road by the growing difficulty of attracting sufficient numbers of men to fill these roles, women compete with men for every officer position and gain selection based on merit not gender. Consequently, the increase in female representation appears to indicate the quality and number of female applicants as opposed to a reduced male selection pool.

In view of the greater presence of female officers in the ADF, their projected career progression is of increasing interest, both to the women themselves and to Defence planners. While it would be unrealistic to expect to see the same proportion of women achieving the highest ranks in the ADF based on their representation in the ADF today, it would be expected that the number of women rising through the ranks reflects the representation of women in the ADF when these women joined.

Figure 2 shows the representation of female officers by rank and Service as at August 2007. The results indicate that women are reasonably well represented amongst the various rank groups until the rank of LTCOL(E). In fact, considering that women only represented 7.21 per cent of the RAAF officer pool in 1985, the fact that there are now 12 per cent at the Wing Commander+ level in 2007 suggests they have progressed well. However, the figures indicate a sharp decline in female representation at the COL(E) ranks for all three Services, indicating that women are not reaching the highest echelons of the ADF at anything close to their representation in the organisation, whether at the time they joined or today.

It seems unlikely that when women join the ADF as officers they expect to limit their careers to MAJ(E) or LTCOL(E), raising the question of why this occurs. One could argue that the military is a hard life and that it is particularly physically hard on women, therefore more women may leave early for medical and other associated reasons before completing their careers (for a discussion of this issue in the ADF see Goyne, 2003, p. 92). Whether true or not, such an explanation fails to explain the precipitous decline in female representation between the LTCOL(E) and COL(E) rank and above. The fact that women are still well represented amongst the MAJ(E) group,
indicates they are still serving in the ADF in relatively large numbers. Nevertheless, for some reason, they do not progress upwards like their male peers.

Once it might have been credible to assume that some form of direct systemic discrimination against women in the ADF was responsible for this situation, but such an explanation needs to be understood within the context of a slowly evolving, tradition bound culture. To the public eye, the ADF has worked hard to encourage equal opportunities for women within its ranks, and this is arguably more so for officers than anyone else.

In the past, restrictions denying combat related employment to women limited their career progression within the organisation. This has changed for women serving in the RAN and RAAF, but many of these restrictions still apply to women in the Army. However, this alone still does not explain the absence of women generally at the COL(E)+ level within the organisation. Additionally, military women being what they are, determined, competitive, and generally able to match men in their careers, it seems unlikely that they are ‘necessarily’ perceived uncompetitive by the organisation itself.

Nevertheless, systemic discrimination is more often reflected in policy that may, at least superficially, seem equitable. For example, promotion requirements when applied to men can seem fair and reasonable, yet when applied to women they can form barriers to progression. The difficulty of maintaining competitiveness within one’s career is likely to be hardest felt for those women who need to take breaks in service due to childbirth. As a result, it seems likely that women in the ADF confront more hurdles to progression compared with their male peers, especially when they become parents.5

The purpose of this article is to investigate gender differences in terms of career progression, relationships and parenthood for military officers in the ADF. The article is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the impact of Service life generally, as this is well beyond the scope of the author’s resources, but it provides an opportunity to examine the balance between work and family for ADF officers as they progress in their careers. Given that the ADF is striving to greater equity within the organisation, it is probably timely to examine the impact of maintaining a Defence Force career for men and women within the organisation.

The balance between career and family

For those prepared to acquire professional qualifications, the importance of pursuing a rewarding career is often foremost in one’s mind. Arguably, this is accentuated for people who join the military as officer cadets, as they must also complete military and physical training that demands considerable personal determination and sacrifice. Generally, at the completion of this training, people feel a strong drive to excel in their careers, if only to justify the sacrifices made to get there. This certainly seems to be as true for women as men, and is supported by recent Army unit climate survey results6 showing that women are significantly more likely to identify with their careers and feel intrinsically motivated for the work they do than men.7

However, career is only one aspect of a person’s life. Most people also want meaningful relationships, to have children, to explore hobbies and interests, and to grow as human beings.
While the military is an unusual career because of what it demands from the individual, few would make the choice to join if they believed such a career would severely limit them having a well-rounded life.

The importance of maintaining a sound work–life balance has become the clarion call of modern ADF leadership, and whether or not this is necessarily achievable across all areas of the organisation, it seems to be a sincere leadership goal. However, it would appear that women who aspire to the senior ranks of the military are less likely to achieve a similar, perhaps conventional, work–life balance as their male colleagues.

Figure 3 shows the number of male and female officers who report they are either married or living in a common-law relationship for each rank group. The results indicate that while a similar proportion of ADF women are in permanent relationships at the LT(E) rank, the disparity between the genders grows considerably wider as they progress through the ranks. There is almost a 20 per cent gap between the number of female senior (LTCOL+(E)) officers who report they are living in a permanent relationship compared to the number of male officers of equivalent rank.

While this may well reflect the personal choices of each gender group, it would appear that senior female military officers are more likely to report that they are living alone as they progress in the military compared to men.

Figures 4 and 5 show the percentage of female and male officers who report they are in permanent relationships for each rank and Service. The results indicate that a similar percentage of senior female officers in the RAN seem to be able to combine marriage and career when compared to their male colleagues. However, this is not the case for female senior officers in the ARA and RAAF. While it is always possible that these women choose not to gain recognition for a permanent relationship for reasons unrelated to their employment, it also seems fair to speculate that their employment is, in some way, impacting on their relationship circumstances.
There are other differences between the genders when it comes to relationships. Women tend to marry within the ADF. As at October 2007, 958 per cent of ARA female officers, 57 per cent of RAN female officers, and 65 per cent of RAAF female officers were married to serving ADF personnel. Female officers also tend to marry other officers with close to 70 per cent of Service groups marrying someone of a similar rank.

As a consequence of the impact of juggling two military careers, it is possible that a greater proportion of military women, either formally or informally, nominate their husband’s career as the primary career. Once made, this decision is likely to have an ongoing detrimental

Figure 4: Percentage of female ADF officers in married/de facto relationships by Service and rank.

Figure 5: Percentage of male ADF officers in married/de facto relationships by Service and rank.
impact on a woman’s career, as the nominated career tends to be the one being ‘managed’. Of course, this is not to imply that by marrying a civilian such women would necessarily fare any better.

In view of the percentages shown in Figure 1, women could be forgiven for assuming that their military husbands have better career prospects than themselves, as this seems to be the case. However, whether many actually consider this when managing their own careers is open to speculation. Presumably when women enter the military they do so believing they have similar career prospects as men. In view of this, it is probably also fair to speculate that there is a considerable disappointment amongst female officers when their careers fail to progress as planned.

The impact of parenthood on work–life balance

In addition to having a permanent relationship most people, military or otherwise, also consider having children. While the decision to start a family is typically being delayed until women are older, only between 20–25 per cent are never likely to have children at all. For women in the military this is likely to be one of the most difficult choices, because to have a child will involve some time out of her career. While the ADF may have tried to reduce the negative career impact of childbirth in a woman’s career, there are still likely to be costs in terms of career progression.

Figure 6 shows the percentage of male and female senior military officers from each Service who have children. Once again the gender disparity is marked. Around 50 per cent of women of senior rank have had children, compared with 70–81 per cent of their male colleagues, a difference of between 20–30 per cent. The choice not to have children is obviously personal and is almost certainly influenced by many considerations other than career (for some medical

![Figure 6](image.png)

**Figure 6:** Percentage of LTCOL+(E) with children by Service and gender.
circumstances leave them with no choice). Nevertheless, the results suggest that having children is a factor in determining who progresses to the highest rank levels in the ADF for women, if only because women without children have avoided breaks in their career.

Perhaps the most obvious conclusion to be reached from these figures is that when it comes to making a choice between the demands of children and family, and the demands of work and career, military women appear to choose the former. This does not necessarily mean that female officers regard their careers as any less important than men, simply that finding a balance between these competing obligations and responsibilities comes down to the relative demands of each as children age and develop. However, what is interesting is that these statistics indicate that female officers, regardless of their talents or competitiveness with men, are still accepting the more conventional role of primary carer rather than their partner.

While it seems fair to conclude that the combined impact of a demanding military career and the responsibilities of caring for children are enough to drive female officers out of career competition, women may also be aware that attitudes to parenting are not equal in our society and/or the ADF. Where a woman might be forgiven for taking time out from her career to care for children, her male partner may be less likely to be treated with such consideration after a career break of this nature. Therefore the real issue may not be chauvinism amongst men about the career prospects of their wives, but a perception amongst both genders that a man’s career might be permanently damaged if they decide to take similar breaks to take care of their children.

It would be wrong to conclude that the impact of family is only an issue for military women. ADF Exit Survey results show that the desire for less separation from family is cited as the single most important reason for leaving the ADF for personnel of both sexes with more than five years of service. Consequently, the importance of family and the difficulties of combining a military career and family life is an important issue for Defence personnel regardless of gender.

The impact of overseas deployments

A further compounding issue for parents is the increasing demands of overseas deployments. Australia has experienced the longest period of almost continuous operational activity in its history. The potential impact of this on Service personnel generally, and women and parents in particular is, as yet, not well understood. However, it seems highly probable that the impact of deployment on families is a concern for women when considering their careers, especially those married to a serving member.

Figure 7 shows the percentage of deployed personnel reporting that they are either married or living in a de facto relationship. Figure 8 shows the percentage of deployed personnel who report they are childless. The results indicate that women are far less likely to be in permanent relationships when they deploy, and also less likely to have children, especially when serving in the RAN.
These results seem to indicate that married women, and more specifically women with children, are less likely to be deployed than men in the same situation. While further research is required to establish the significance of these findings, the results at least suggest that women are more likely to opt out of deployments, and possibly the military altogether, when they become parents. Given the high percentage of military women married to other military personnel, the probability that their partners will also be facing deployment is likely to be a factor in this decision.
Are career prospects better for women outside the military?

In an attempt to gauge the attitudes towards the career prospects of women in corporate management, Accenture Consulting surveyed some 1,200 male and female executives in eight countries including the United States, Canada, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Australia (Falk & Voigt, 2006). The results indicated, that just 30 per cent of women and 43 per cent of men surveyed reported that women have the same career prospects as men in modern workplaces. The authors concluded that this was evidence that a ‘glass ceiling’ still existed in corporate management.

Interestingly, both women and men reported around the same level of personal satisfaction with their careers, and women reported only slightly less security in their jobs than men. Perhaps the most revealing finding was that women in the United States and United Kingdom were the most likely to report that the greatest barrier to their success was not ‘individual’ or ‘company’ related, but reflected aspects of the society at large such as the availability of child care and other community support. By contrast, women in Canada and the Philippines were more likely to believe that corporate culture was a greater barrier to their success.

While these results suggest that women generally are still struggling to achieve corporate career parity with men, at least one study has shown that promoting women may be very good for corporate ‘bottom lines’. Adler (1999) examined the relationship between corporate profitability amongst Fortune 500 companies in the United States. His results showed that firms with a high proportion of female executives tended to outperform industry medians in terms of revenues, assets and stockholders’ equity. Moreover Adler (1999) concluded, ‘The firms with the very best records for promoting women showed the strongest record of profitability’ (p. 5), indicating that far from lowering profitability the presence of women is a net plus for company profits.14

Conclusion

This article suggests that a considerably smaller percentage of female officers will rise to the rank of LTCOL(E) than their male counterparts, let alone beyond this level. Of those who do, close to 30 per cent will not be living in permanent relationships, and close to 50 per cent will be childless. Given how lonely leadership can be for anyone who rises to the top, being amongst a tiny female peer-group also seems to be a potential negative, as women find themselves largely alone amongst a large pool of highly achieving married men.

These results raise questions about the attractiveness of an ADF officer’s career for women. However, military women presumably still reflect positively on their military careers despite a lack of career progression into senior leadership. In fact, to continue serving at all against such odds suggests these women experience a deep attachment to their Service careers that may even eclipse other important relationships in their lives.

As Falk and Voigt (2006) found amongst their civilian corporate sample, it seems likely that female military officers regard their careers as intrinsically rewarding for what they are able to accomplish rather than how many ranks levels they attain. For those who become mothers, but remain in the military at a lower rank, the ADF may even be a more favourable employment
option than other large corporations. Consequently, this article is only designed to inform about
the reality as we are able to measure it, and not to judge the value of the career choice itself.

However, the lack of career progression for women raises a number of concerns for the ADF.
Firstly, with an increasing number of young women filling junior officer positions, especially
in the RAN and RAAF, the long-term sustainability of these Services may come to depend on
how many women continue to serve in the longer term. For Army, the issues are somewhat
different. It is becoming increasingly evident that women are needed to boost officer numbers.
In their absence this Service risks carrying gaps in a range of leadership positions that will
never be adequately filled. Consequently, the problem of the ongoing participation of women
in the ADF is no longer just a social justice concern but may also impact the ongoing capability
and sustainability of Australia’s defence.

The absence of women in senior leadership also has costs in other ways, just as it has costs
for Australia generally. Women bring a unique perspective to the organisations in which they
serve. To lose this perspective, or worse to never have it at all, will ultimately weaken the ADF
and certainly reduce the attractiveness of a military career to young women.

Acknowledgment of the importance of the participation of women has recently been a focus
for the Army, with a Chief of Army Senior Advisory Committee briefing paper targeting this
issue (McKay, 2007). Barriers to the career progression of women was a component of this
paper with a number of recommendations put forward and accepted for reducing potential
unfairness in the current promotional system. This is an important step forward and it is
hoped that for Army at least, more women may rise through the ranks as a result. However, by
continuing to focus on this problem from a female perspective we lose sight of the increasing
pressure on men to also balance family and career.

Perhaps the most important issue for Defence is the impact of family and parenthood on the
overall attractiveness of a military career regardless of gender. Defence has attempted to
address this issue by working to increase locational stability for Defence members. However,
the extent to which this has succeeded is unclear. With economic pressure on families requiring
most women to work full-time, the need for Service members to change careers to enable
civilian spouses to gain career progression, or even to continue working at all, is also likely
to be an ongoing problem for Defence planners.

Barriers to career progression for personnel who need to take career breaks at some stages
in their careers can no longer be regarded as a ‘women’s issue’. The implications are already
being felt by men throughout the ADF, either because they have spouses with demanding
careers or because they too need to balance child care and other compassionate responsibilities
with Service life. Taking steps to develop more flexible career options, especially with respect
to promotion, is likely to enable a greater number of ADF personnel to continue with their
military careers. The flip side will be greater career parity between the genders thus ensuring
a more equitable workplace than currently appears to exist.

Editor’s Note

A report examining the career progression of female other rank personnel is under development
and should be available in the near future.
Major Anne Goyne joined the Australian Regular Army as a psychologist on 26 April 1983, after completing a Bachelor of Behavioural Science (Hons) at La Trobe University in 1982. Her early experience as a military psychologist focused on personnel selection where she first became interested in the process of adaptation to military life and the factors that enhance resilience. She has maintained an interest in stress and coping within a military context throughout her career, writing numerous research articles and being a joint editor of two books related to military stress issues. Major Goyne completed the Masters of Clinical Psychology program at the Australian National University in 2002, and over recent years has moved between clinical and research roles within Defence. She is currently the Section Head of Military Psychology Research at the Psychology Research and Technology Group in Canberra.

NOTES


4. The Army and to a lesser extent the RAN and RAAF still restricts the service of women in some direct combat roles, reducing the availability of positions for women.

5. For most senior promotions, personnel require three ‘consecutive’ annual reports recommending promotion. Taking a break during these years can slow down the promotion process. Such potential barriers to female progression formed part of a wider briefing paper relating to the participation of women in the Army discussed in a Chief of Army Senior Advisory Committee (McKay, 2007). This paper will be discussed later in this article.

6. ‘Climate surveys’ are command initiated assessments of overall unit functioning and performance. While morale is a focus it is regarded as an outcome of high unit performance and therefore reflective of a range of individual, group and unit factors.


8. These results also include personnel currently married but separated for Service reasons.


13. Data taken from Return to Australia Psychological Screens recorded since 2003.

14. This was the conclusion reached by Adler (1999), but it may also be the case that successful companies can afford to be generous and promote women rather than take the more traditional course of only investing in men.
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Australian Defence Force Powers to Arrest and Detain Civilians

Dr John Tarrant, University of Western Australia and RAAF Reserve

Introduction

There are a number of legislative provisions that provide powers of arrest relevant to the Australian Defence Force (ADF). These powers are found in various legislative provisions that have been enacted at different times for a variety of purposes. The most recent and wide-ranging powers were introduced in 2000. As a result ADF members can find themselves in a position to arrest or detain civilians in a number of circumstances.

The relevant legislative provisions create numerous areas or circumstances in which powers to arrest, detain or remove civilians apply. These include defence premises; special defence undertakings (such as Pine Gap); prohibited areas (such as the Woomera prohibited area); defence practice areas; and defence aid to the civilian authorities. In addition there are powers available in Australian and international waters. The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFDA) provides for powers of arrest for those who are subject to the DFDA. However, this article is only concerned with the power of ADF members to arrest, detain or remove members of the wider community and the powers of arrest under the DFDA will not be examined.

The purpose of this article is to examine ADF power to arrest, detain or remove civilians. Powers of search and seizure also exist in some circumstances but these are beyond the scope of this article and will not be examined. The article is divided into two parts. In Part One the powers of arrest, detention and removal are outlined. In Part Two the importance of ADF members strictly complying with the powers is examined with reference to relevant case law. The analysis shows that it is critical for ADF members to be aware of the difference in power conferred under different statutes because different powers apply to different areas and circumstances. That is, there are significant differences in the powers of arrest depending on what area the relevant person is located in. For example in some circumstances there are powers of arrest, in other circumstances there is only a power to detain, and in some circumstances there is only a power to remove a person or vehicle from an area. The consequences of acting without power, or not complying with a relevant power, will also be examined.

PART ONE: RELEVANT STATUTORY POWERS

Defence premises

Some legislative powers of arrest and detention apply widely to many defence premises whereas some provisions have a much narrower scope and are restricted to specific types of defence premises such as naval establishments. Some are even further restricted to specific times such as wharves used for departing troops.
General provisions

The power of ADF members to arrest persons on defence premises, or near those premises, depends on the type of premises and the type of offence alleged to have been committed. The most direct power of arrest on defence premises applies to defence installations which are defined in section 82(5) of the Defence Act 1903 (Defence Act) as any fort, battery, fieldwork, fortification, aircraft, air force establishment or aircraft material or any naval, military or air force work of defence. Section 82(1) of the Defence Act makes it an offence, without lawful authority, to make a sketch, drawing, photograph, picture or painting of any defence installation. It is also an offence under section 82(3) to trespass on a defence installation or any building or land used in connection with the administration or training of the Defence Force. Any member of the Defence Force may, under section 82(4), arrest (without warrant) another person where the defence member has reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed an offence under section 82.

In relation to defence premises the Defence Act only provides a power of arrest in the very limited circumstances outlined above. However, further powers of arrest that could be used in relation to defence premises are found in the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Public Order Act). But importantly ADF members do not have these powers of arrest. The Public Order Act relates to Commonwealth premises which are defined in section 4 to mean premises occupied by the Commonwealth. Accordingly premises occupied by the Department of Defence would be premises for the purposes of the Public Order Act. Section 12 makes it an offence when on Commonwealth premises to trespass, unreasonably obstruct vehicles and persons, behave in an offensive or disorderly manner or to fail to leave after being so directed. Section 22 provides that State or Federal police can arrest, without a warrant, persons for a breach of section 12 provided that proceedings against the person by summons would not be effective or the arrest is necessary to prevent the commission of further offences. If an arrest is necessary then it is critical that ADF members have any arrest effected by the police, as ADF members have no power of arrest in these circumstances.

Sections 89 and 89A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Crimes Act) provide powers to apprehend, and detain in proper custody, persons for trespass and for discharging firearms upon or over certain premises. Sub-section 89(1) makes it an offence to trespass or enter prohibited Commonwealth land without a lawful excuse. Prohibited Commonwealth land is defined in sub-section 89(5) as land occupied by the Commonwealth and upon which is posted a notice to the effect that trespassing upon the land is prohibited. If a person is found upon prohibited Commonwealth land and there is a reasonable ground to believe that they have breached sub-section 89(1) then they can be apprehended by a constable or an authorised Commonwealth officer. An authorised Commonwealth officer is defined in sub-section 89(5) to be a Commonwealth officer declared by a Minister to be an authorised Commonwealth officer. A Minister may declare members of the ADF to be authorised Commonwealth officers. Sub-section 89A(1) makes it an offence to, without lawful authority; discharge a firearm upon or over a prohibited area. A prohibited area is defined in sub-section 89A(4) to be an area occupied by the Commonwealth and upon which a notice is posted to the effect that shooting upon or over that land is prohibited. If a person commits an offence against sub-section 89A(1) they may be apprehended by a constable or an authorised Commonwealth officer. An authorised Commonwealth officer is defined in sub-section 89A(4) to be a Commonwealth officer declared by a Minister to be an authorised Commonwealth officer.
There are further powers of arrest in the Crimes Act that may be appropriately used on defence premises. Section 3Z(1) provides that any person may arrest another person without a warrant if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the other person is committing or has just committed an indictable offence. But the power of arrest can only be exercised if proceeding by summons would not be effective or the arrest is necessary to prevent the commission of further offences, or to protect evidence, or to preserve the safety or welfare of the person.\(^4\) It is critical that an arrest relate to an indictable offence which is defined in section 4G to be an offence against a law of the Commonwealth punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months.\(^5\) Therefore care must be exercised when relying on the power of arrest in section 3Z(1) of the Crimes Act as the alleged commission of an offence under a State or Territory law will not provide the basis for an arrest. However, if an arrest is effected under the Crimes Act then the arrested person, and any property found on them, must be delivered to the civil police as soon as practicable after the arrest.\(^6\)

**Naval establishments**

Pursuant to section 3 of the *Naval Defence Act 1910* a naval establishment includes any naval college, naval instructional establishment, ship, vessel or boat used for services auxiliary to naval defence, and any dock, shipyard, foundry, machine shop, work, office, or establishment, used in connection with naval defence. Under the *Naval Establishments Regulations* members of the Naval Police have powers in relation to naval establishments. Pursuant to regulation 101(1) a member of the Naval Police may, without warrant, detain and search any person who is in a naval establishment, or any bag, parcel, vehicle, or other receptacle which is in, or is being conveyed into, or out of, a naval establishment, or any ship, boat or aircraft in or alongside or in the vicinity of a naval establishment for the purposes of ascertaining whether an offence is being or has been committed or attempted at any naval establishment.

In addition regulation 101(2) provides for a power of arrest. If a member of the Naval Police has reasonable ground to believe that any person has committed, or attempted to commit, any offence in a naval establishment and that proceedings against the person by summons would not be effective, then he or she may, without warrant, apprehend the person and deliver them into the custody of the civil authorities.

**Naval waters**

ADF members also have a role in removing people who are not authorised to be in naval waters as defined in the *Control of Naval Waters Act 1918*. Pursuant to section 2 of the Act naval waters means waters that are proclaimed to be naval waters by the Governor-General under section 3B.\(^7\) Pursuant to section 3C the Governor-General may appoint a person to be the superintendent of proclaimed naval waters. Under regulation 4 of the *Control of Naval Waters Regulations 1922* the superintendent of naval waters may by notice prohibit or restrict access to naval waters. Under regulation 5 the superintendent may cause to be removed from naval waters any person who has contravened a notice issued under the regulations. Pursuant to regulation 35A the superintendent of naval waters may delegate any of his or her powers and functions under the regulations to an officer of the ADF holding a rank not below that of lieutenant commander, major or squadron leader.
Prohibited wharves and buildings

The *Defence (Prohibited Wharves and Buildings) Regulations 1950* allow the Minister for Defence to control access to wharves and buildings when it is necessary to do so for the defence of the Commonwealth. The ability to control access to a wharf is enlivened under regulation 3(1) if service munitions are to be stored or handled on the wharf or any ADF members are to embark or disembark at the wharf. The ability to control access to a building is enlivened under regulation 4(1) when service munitions are to be stored or handled in a building on or near a wharf. Under regulations 3(2) and 4(2) notices must be placed indicating that the wharf or building is a prohibited wharf or building. Any person who contravenes the regulations can be removed by any member of the ADF.

Airports

Pursuant to the *Air Navigation Regulations 1947* ADF members have the power to apprehend persons and remove them from specified areas in airports. Airports are defined in sub-section 3(1) of the *Air Navigation Act 1920* to be an area intended for use for the arrival, departure or movement of aircraft. Under regulation 129(3) of the *Air Navigation Regulations* any part of an airport can be made a prohibited area by a notice posted with the authority of the Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government. Any person in a prohibited area without authority can be apprehended and removed under regulation 129(2) by an authorised person which includes any ADF member.

Commonwealth explosives areas

Pursuant to the *Explosives Areas Regulations 2003*, two adjoining areas south of Eden in New South Wales have been declared as Commonwealth explosives areas for the purposes of the *Explosives Act 1961*. Regulation 5 provides that the Secretary of Defence must appoint an area manager for each Commonwealth explosives area. There is no requirement that an area manager be an ADF member. Pursuant to regulation 8(4) an area manager may remove any person from a Commonwealth explosives area who has entered the area without consent. Pursuant to regulation 5(3)(d) an area manager may carry out his or her duties with any assistance he or she thinks necessary. Therefore it is possible that an area manager may use members of the ADF to remove persons from a Commonwealth explosives area.

Special defence undertakings

*The Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952* (Special Undertakings Act) provides specific arrest powers in relation to special defence undertakings. Section 6 provides that a work or undertaking can be declared by the Minister as a special defence undertaking. A place used or occupied for the purposes of a special defence undertaking is a prohibited area by virtue of section 7. The Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap in the Northern Territory is a special defence undertaking. It is an offence under section 9(1) for a person to be unlawfully in a prohibited area. In addition it is an offence to make a photograph, sketch or plan of a prohibited area.
The maximum penalty for these offences is seven years imprisonment.\textsuperscript{9}

There are powers of arrest under the Special Undertakings Act which could involve ADF members. Under section 22 a person who is found committing an offence under the Special Undertakings Act, or is reasonably suspected of having committed, or having attempted to commit or of being about to commit, such an offence, may be arrested without warrant by a constable or a person in the same manner as a person who is found committing a felony may, at common law, be arrested.

Under section 23 a person who is in, or in the neighbourhood of, a prohibited area and is reasonably suspected of having committed, having attempted to commit or of being about to commit an offence under the Special Undertakings Act may be arrested, without warrant, by a Commonwealth officer,\textsuperscript{10} which includes an ADF member, and may be removed from, or from the neighbourhood of, the prohibited area and given into the custody of the civil police to be dealt with according to law.

The first prosecutions under the Special Undertakings Act occurred in 2007 more than 50 years after the legislation came into force. On 9 December 2005 four protesters using bolt cutters cut through the perimeter fence of the Pine Gap facility and entered the prohibited area. They were arrested and subsequently convicted in June 2007 and received fines between $450 and $1,200 each although they were facing the prospect of the maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment.\textsuperscript{11}

**Prohibited areas**

Section 124(1)(nb) of the *Defence Act 1903* provides that regulations may be made for the declaration of a place as a prohibited area including regulations providing for the removal of persons from prohibited areas. The Minister can declare a place to be a prohibited area under regulation 35 of the *Defence Force Regulations 1952*. There are limits on areas that can be declared prohibited areas. They must be either a work of defence or a place in which it is necessary or expedient in the interests of the safety or defence of Australia to carry out operations for the testing of war material.\textsuperscript{12} The Woomera Area in South Australia has been declared as a prohibited area under the regulations.

By virtue of regulation 35(3) a person must not enter or remain in a prohibited area if he or she does not have authority to enter or remain in that area. Regulation 35(8) provides that a person who enters or remains in a prohibited area in contravention of regulation 35(3) may be removed from the prohibited area by, or under the direction of, an Australian Government officer. An Australian Government officer includes any member of the ADF.\textsuperscript{13}

Although the penalty for being in a prohibited area is up to six months imprisonment\textsuperscript{14} it is critical to appreciate that under the regulations there is no power to arrest persons found in a prohibited area as defined in the *Defence Force Regulations 1952*. The only power available is to remove the person from the area. Any alleged offence would need to be referred to the civil police authorities.
Defence practice areas

Under regulation 49(1) of the Defence Force Regulations 1952 the Minister for Defence may declare any area of land, sea or air in or adjacent to Australia to be a defence practice area. Under regulation 51(1) all practice operations undertaken must be authorised by an appropriate member of the ADF and, pursuant to regulation 52, notice of all proposed practice activities must be given to the public.

Regulation 53(1) provides that a person is guilty of an offence if the person is in a defence practice area at a time specified in an instrument made under regulation 51(1) authorising a practice activity. Pursuant to regulation 54 a person who is in a defence practice area at a time specified in an instrument under regulation 51(1) may be removed from the area by or under the direction of a member of the ADF or the Federal or State Police.

Under regulation 53(2) a person is guilty of an offence if the person permits a vehicle, vessel or aircraft to be in a defence practice area at a time specified in an instrument made under regulation 51(1) authorising a practice activity. Pursuant to regulation 54 any vehicle, vessel or aircraft in a defence practice area in contravention of regulation 53 may be removed from the area by or under the direction of a member of the ADF or the Federal or State Police.

The regulations cover the time in which persons may be removed from a defence practice area. That is the time during which public notice has been given of proposed practice activities in that area. It is therefore critical that any ADF member exercising the power to remove persons from a defence practice area is aware of the published times of any authorised defence practice activity. Only during those times is the power to remove persons enlivened.

Aid to the civilian authorities

Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 provides extensive powers for the Federal Government to call out the ADF to assist civilian authorities. Part IIIAAA was introduced in 2000 with further amendments in 2006. The power is in part directed towards protecting Australians from violence within Australia. In addition the new powers of call out are specifically designed to protect critical infrastructure. The power to call out the ADF can be used to protect Commonwealth, State or Territory interests. Although these call out powers were first introduced in 2000 to provide potential powers for the Sydney 2000 Olympics they were not utilised at that time.

A call out of the ADF would generally be made by the Governor-General but can be made by the Prime Minister or other specified Ministers when there is a sudden and extreme emergency. When a call out is made the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) must, in accordance with section 51D, utilise the ADF for the purposes of protecting the interests specified. An order for call out may provide that special powers apply to ADF members. These special powers are found in section 51I of the Defence Act.

Section 51I provides special powers that can be used for the purposes of recapturing a location or a thing; preventing or putting an end to violence; or protecting persons from violence.
The special powers that may be included in a call out order include the power to detain. If an ADF member finds a person whom the member believes on reasonable grounds to have committed an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, the ADF member may detain the person for the purposes of placing the person in the custody of a member of a police force at the earliest practicable time. It is important to note that an ADF member has the power to detain a person solely for the purpose of placing them into the custody of the civilian police. It will be for the police force to determine whether the person is to be charged or released.

By virtue of section 51I(2) an ADF member must not take action or exercise any special powers, including the power to detain, unless an authorising Minister has in writing authorised taking that action. However, authorisation from the Minister does not apply if an ADF member believes on reasonable grounds that there is insufficient time to obtain the authorisation because a sudden and extraordinary emergency exists.

An authorising Minister may, in writing, declare that particular infrastructure, or part of particular infrastructure, in Australia or in the Australian offshore area is designated critical infrastructure. If such a declaration is made then ADF members utilised by the CDF to respond for the purposes of preventing damage or destruction to the infrastructure has specified powers in similar terms to those outlined in section 51I(1)(b) above.

**General security areas**

When the ADF is called out to assist a civilian authority an authorising Minister may declare part of a State or Territory to be a general security area. The declaration of a general security area has two consequences. It allows for premises, vehicles and persons within the area to be searched by ADF members. It also enables the creation of designated areas within a general security area where additional powers of the control of vehicles and persons can be exercised. These will be discussed below. If an area is declared as a general security area then a statement to that effect must be published in the Commonwealth Government Gazette and broadcast by a television or radio station so as to be capable of being received within the general security area.

**Designated areas in a general security area**

An authorising Minister may declare that a specified area, being the whole or part of a general security area, is a designated area. If an area is declared a designated area the authorising Minister must take reasonable steps to make the public aware of the declaration of the designated area and of its boundaries. Section 51R provides that a member of the ADF participating in a call out may do any one or more of the following in relation to a person in charge of a means of transport within a designated area:

- If the means of transport is in a part of the general security area that is outside a designated area – direct the person not to bring the means of transport into the designated area;
- Direct the person to take the means of transport out of a designated area;
• Direct the person to take the means of transport from a place in a designated area to another place in the designated area; and/or

• Compel a person to comply with any such direction.

A member may do one or more of the following in relation to a person (whether or not in charge of a means of transport):

• If the person is in the general security area but outside a designated area – direct the person not to enter the designated area;

• Direct the person to leave a designated area;

• Direct the person to move from a place in a designated area to another place in the designated area; and/or

• Compel a person to comply with any such direction.28

When exercising any powers under Part IIIA of the Defence Act a member of the ADF must wear their uniform and have their surname or other identifying numbers or letters attached to the front of their uniform.29 When exercising any powers, such as the power to compel a person to leave an area, members of the ADF may use such force as is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.30 If a person is detained by an ADF member then that person must be informed, at the time that they are detained, of the offence for which they are detained.31 The only exceptions are if the person should in the circumstances know the substance of the offence or the person’s actions make it impracticable for the member to inform the person of the offence.32 It would also be prudent to advise the person that in accordance with the Defence Act they are being detained so that they can be placed into the custody of the civilian police authorities.

The powers relevant to call out in aid of civilian authorities are the most likely to bring ADF members into contact with civilians away from defence establishments in circumstances where persons might be detained. The powers are also significant because they could be utilised over a largely populated area at very short notice.

**Protecting Australia**

As well as protecting places used by the ADF in Australia the ADF has a role in protecting Australia’s borders and resources. These roles include powers in relation to immigration, customs, quarantine and fishing resources.

**Illegal immigrants**

Pursuant to the *Migration Act 1958* there are five areas that give rise to different powers. These are the migration zone; the protected zone; excised offshore places; Australian sea installations and Australian resources installations.33 ADF members derive powers to detain persons under sub-sections 189(3) and 189(4) of the Migration Act. Section 189(5) provides
that an officer includes a member of the ADF for the purposes of sub-sections 189(3) and 189(4). Under sub-section 189(3) a person may be detained if an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in an excised offshore place is an unlawful non-citizen and sub-section 189(4) provides that a person in Australia, but outside the migration zone, may be detained if an officer reasonably suspects that the person is seeking to enter an excised offshore place and would be an unlawful non-citizen if they were in the migration zone.

To exercise their powers to detain persons lawfully ADF members must be familiar with the definitions of all five areas outlined above as well as the definition of unlawful non-citizen. Excised offshore places are defined in section 5 of the Migration Act and include Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands and Cocos (Keeling) Islands as well as both Australian sea installations and Australian resources installations. Also included are any areas prescribed in the Migration Regulations 1994 to be excised offshore places. Australian sea installations and Australian resource installations are essentially man-made floating structures, including some ships, and man-made structures on the seabed that are installed in the relevant area. For the precise definition of a sea installation it is necessary to refer to section 4(1) of the Sea Installation Act 1987. That definition has a number of exemptions including some ships and pipelines which requires reference to further Acts and regulations to arrive at a complete definition of a sea installation for the purposes of the Migration Act. The defined sea installations are deemed to be part of Australia by virtue of section 9 of the Migration Act. Such sea installations must be installed in adjacent areas or coastal areas as defined in section 5(1) of the Migration Act. Determining the extent of adjacent areas requires reference to section 5 of the Sea Installations Act 1987 and to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 and determining the extent of coastal areas requires reference to section 4 of the Customs Act 1901. In addition sub-sections 5(16) and 5(17) of the Migration Act have time limits on how long a sea installation must be in an area before it is considered installed in the relevant area. Therefore to determine the precise definition of an excised offshore place an ADF member needs to refer to no fewer then nine Acts and regulations.

Once the relevant area has been determined for the purposes of enlivening the power to detain under sub-sections 189(3) and 189(4) of the Migration Act an ADF member must ensure that the person being detained is an unlawful non-citizen. Such a person is defined in section 14 of the Migration Act to include a non-citizen who is not a lawful non-citizen as well as a person who was an illegal entrant immediately before 1 September 1994 as defined under the Migration Act in force at that time. Thus in addition to knowing the definition of an illegal immigrant in 1994 it is necessary to identify lawful non-citizens because all other non-citizens will be unlawful non-citizens. Under section 13 of the Migration Act a lawful non-citizen includes persons who hold a valid visa. In addition a lawful non-citizen includes an allowed inhabitant of the Protected Zone who is in a protected area to perform traditional activities. The Protected Zone is defined in section 5(1) of the Migration Act as the zone established under Article 10 of the Torres Strait Treaty signed with Papua New Guinea on 18 December 1978. An allowed inhabitant of this zone is a person who is a both a citizen of Papua New Guinea and a traditional inhabitant as defined in the Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984. The Minister also has the power under section 16 of the Migration Act to declare any person falling within this definition as being undesirable to be in Australia. In such circumstances they would cease to be lawful non-citizens for the purposes of section 189 of the Migration Act. Pursuant to section 13 of the Migration Act an allowed inhabitant of the Protected Zone is only a lawful
non-citizen if they are in the protected area in connection with the performance of traditional activities as defined in the Torres Strait Treaty. The protected area is defined in section 5(1) of the Migration Act to be an area that is part of the migration zone and is in, or in an area in the vicinity of, the Protected Zone. Under section 5(8) the Minister can, by notice in the Gazette, declare an area to be in the vicinity of the Protected Zone.

Accordingly to lawfully detain a person under sub-sections 189(3) or 189(4) of the Migration Act an ADF member needs to be aware of provisions in no fewer than 11 Acts, regulations and treaties as well as any declarations made by the Minister under the Migration Act and any notices published in the Gazette pursuant to the Migration Act. This clearly makes the task of identifying a person who can be lawfully detained to be somewhat complex.

In addition to the power to detain unlawful non-citizens there are also powers of arrest under the Migration Act. These powers exist only in relation to persons found on ships and aircraft. The Migration Act allows, in certain circumstances, a commander of a Commonwealth ship or a Commonwealth aircraft to request to board a ship or to request an aircraft to land. Commonwealth ships and aircraft are defined by reference to the Customs Act 1901 and expressly include ADF ships and aircraft. A commander expressly includes a commissioned officer of the ADF. There is also the power to chase foreign and Australian ships for boarding. When a ship or an aircraft is boarded under any of these provisions then the ship or aircraft may be searched by an officer in accordance with section 245F of the Migration Act. An officer is defined in sub-section 245F(18)(b) to include a member of the ADF. Pursuant to sub-section 245F(3)(f)(ii) of the Migration Act an officer may arrest, without warrant, any person found on the ship or aircraft in Australia where the officer reasonably suspects that the person has committed, is committing or attempting to commit, or is involved in the commission of an offence against the Migration Act. Where the person is found on a ship that is outside Australia similar provisions apply under sub-section 245F(3)(f)(ii). However the power to arrest is limited in the contiguous zone as defined in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973. Under sub-section 245F(4) any arrest made in the contiguous zone is subject to the obligations of Australia under international law, including obligations under any treaty, convention or other agreement or arrangement between Australia and another country or other countries. There is also the power to detain and move ships and aircraft under sub-section 245F(8). This may restrain the liberty of persons on those ships or aircraft. Sub-section 245F(8A) provides that such restraint on the liberty of any person is not unlawful and civil and criminal proceedings cannot be brought.

**Customs**

Members of the ADF have express powers of arrest under the Customs Act. Pursuant to sub-section 184A(1) the commander of a Commonwealth ship or Commonwealth aircraft may request permission to board a ship. Under section 184D there is also power to request an aircraft to land for the purposes of boarding the aircraft. Commonwealth ships and aircraft expressly include ADF ships and aircraft. A commander expressly includes a commissioned officer of the ADF. Pursuant to sub-section 185(2) officers have the power to board and search ships and aircraft. This power is available in relation to those ships defined in sub-section 185(1) which includes ships outside the territorial waters of Australia if: a request to board the ship was made under section 184A; or the ship is a foreign ship that has been chased.
pursuant to the power in sub-section 184B(3); or the ship is an Australian ship. The power is also available in relation to any aircraft that has landed in Australia after a request made under section 184D.

For the purposes of sub-section 185(2) an officer is defined in sub-section 185(5) to include any member of the ADF. In addition to the powers to board and search an officer may arrest without warrant persons found on the ship or aircraft. The type of person that can be arrested depends on the location of the ship or aircraft and the type of offence allegedly committed by that person. Under sub-section 185(2)(d)(i) a person found on a ship in Australia can be arrested if the officer reasonably suspects that the person has committed, is committing or attempting to commit, or is involved in the commission of, an offence against the Customs Act or section 72.13 or Division 307 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 or an offence against an Act prescribed by the regulations consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Similar provisions apply under sub-section 185(2)(d)(ii)(A) in relation to persons on ships found outside of Australia except that offences under the Customs Act are not relevant. In addition similar provisions apply to persons found on aircraft in relation to potential offences under the Customs Act or under section 72.13 or Division 307 of the Criminal Code.

As with powers of arrest under the Migration Act it is critical that ADF members are aware of the precise powers of arrest under the Customs Act. These powers vary depending upon the type and location of a ship or aircraft and the type of offence suspected of being committed.

Quarantine

The ADF has a potential role to play in responding to any epidemic in Australia. Pursuant to sub-section 5(1) of the Quarantine Act 1908 a national response agency for the purposes of the Act includes any arm or unit of the ADF that the Minister for Health and Ageing declares to be a national response agency. In accordance with sub-section 5(1AA) the Minister for Health and Ageing must consult with the Minister for Defence before making any such declaration. If an epidemic arises, or there is the danger of an epidemic in part of Australia, then the Governor-General under sub-section 2B(1) can declare the existence in that part of Australia of that epidemic or of the danger of an epidemic.

If the Governor-General does make a declaration under sub-section 2B(1) then the Governor-General can also declare that section 3 applies if an epidemic has the potential to affect an industry of national importance. Section 3 provides for coordinated response powers by national response agencies. Pursuant to sub-section 3(1) the Minister may authorise persons who are the executive heads of national response agencies to give such directions and take such action as the person thinks necessary to respond to the epidemic or the danger of an epidemic by taking quarantine measures. Accordingly the ADF will have a role to play under the Quarantine Act if the Governor-General declares the existence of an epidemic, or the danger of an epidemic, and the Minister for Health and Ageing declares part of the ADF to be a national response agency and authorises the ADF to act. If part of the ADF was authorised to act in response to an epidemic then quarantine measures can be taken in accordance with section 4 of the Act. These measures include the power to detain, segregate or isolate persons.
Protecting fish resources

ADF members have a role in protecting fish resources under two legislative regimes. Under both regimes there is a power to arrest and also a power to detain.

The first regime is the *Fisheries Management Act 1991* which has a number of objectives including the management of Australian fisheries and the meeting of Australia’s international obligations in relation to fishing activities of Australian-flagged boats on the high seas. To meet these objectives certain offences are outlined in the Act concerning the type of fish that can be caught and the methods that can be used. The Act gives express powers of arrest and detention to ADF members. Under section 4 an officer for the purposes of the Act is defined to include members of the ADF. Pursuant to sub-section 84(1)(j) an officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed an offence against the Act. In addition to this power of arrest there is a power to detain persons pursuant to clause 8 of schedule 1A. This power is available for the purposes of determining whether or not to charge a person with certain offences under the Act. However the power to arrest or detain is limited by section 87E of the Act which provides that the powers cannot be used in relation to boats of the nationality of a foreign country that is a party to the Fish Stocks Agreement unless certain conditions are met. Those conditions are outlined in sub-section 87E(2) and include the belief that certain offences have been committed and the notification of the appropriate authority of the country of nationality of the boat of that belief.

The second legislative regime is the *Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984* that is concerned with fishing activity under the Torres Strait Treaty with Papua New Guinea. Under section 3 an officer is defined to include members of the ADF. Under sub-section 42(1)(f) an officer has the power to arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offence against the Act and proceedings against the person by summons would not be effective. Under clause 8 of schedule 2 there is power for an officer to detain a person for the purposes of investigating and determining whether the person has committed certain specified offences.

PART TWO: UNLAWFUL ARREST

An arrest made by an ADF member under any of the statutory provisions outlined above may amount to an unlawful arrest if the arrest does not comply with the general law. The position under the general law is that a person being arrested must as a general rule be told of what act they are being arrested for. A consequence of making an unlawful arrest is that the person making the arrest can be liable for false imprisonment.

The recent New South Wales decision of *State of New South Wales v Delly* provides a useful example of the procedures required for a lawful arrest and the consequences of failing to meet those requirements. In *Delly* an argument started between a number of persons in an apartment. During the argument one of the men, Paul Harris, was murdered. Ms Delly was present in the apartment when Mr Harris was murdered but she was in her bedroom and did not witness the murder. After the murder, Ms Delly saw the body and helped clean the room after the body was removed by a number of men, including her partner, Mark Helmout. The
following morning the police arrived with a search warrant and arrested a number of people including Mr Helmout. Ms Delly heard the police make these arrests. Ms Delly was then informed by the police that she was going to be taken to the police station. Critically she was not informed that she was under arrest nor was she advised what she was being arrested for. However, in the trial for damages for false imprisonment it was common ground that she was arrested and taken into custody. Ms Delly was held at the police station from 8.30am until 12.30pm when she was released. In upholding the trial judge’s conclusion that the arrest was unlawful, the New South Wales Court of Appeal adopted the test for a lawful arrest set out by the House of Lords in *Christie v Leachinsky*.56

In *Christie*, Viscount Simon outlined the proposition that in ordinary circumstances an arresting officer must ‘inform the person arrested of the true ground of arrest’.58 An exception from this general principle arises ‘if the circumstances are such that he [or she] must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he [or she] is detained’.59 Lord Simonds held that ‘it is the right of every citizen to be free from arrest unless there is in some other citizen, whether a constable or not, the right to arrest him’.60 He went on to say that every citizen ‘should be entitled to resist arrest unless that arrest is lawful’.61 Like Viscount Simon, Lord Simonds recognised that there was an exception to the general rule. He said that there was ‘no need for the constable to explain the reason of arrest, if the arrested man [or woman] is caught red-handed and the crime is patent’.62 Lord du Parcq observed that the ‘omission to tell a person who is arrested at, or within a reasonable time of, the arrest with what offence he [or she] is charged cannot be regarded as a mere irregularity’.63

In *Delly*, in holding that the arrest was unlawful, His Hon Justice Ipp JA (Justice of the Appeal Court) held that the focus must be on the circumstances of the arrest.64 Importantly Ms Delly was arrested the morning after the murder and some time after she assisted in cleaning the apartment. She was not caught red-handed in any particular conduct. Accordingly the exception to the general rule outlined in *Christie* had no application in *Delly*. As Ipp JA explained, the fact that Ms Delly ‘may have known of the circumstances under which Mr Harris was murdered is irrelevant’ because that ‘was not part of the circumstances of the arrest’.65 Ipp JA concluded that the police ‘said nothing to her from which she could infer or deduce why she was being arrested’.66 Ms Delly was awarded $35,000 in compensatory damages, including aggravated damages, for her four hours of false imprisonment.

The decision in *Delly* shows that it is essential to inform a person of the reason for their arrest. That does not mean that the person must be told precisely what charge they might be facing.67 It is sufficient that the reason for their arrest be communicated to them. The only exception to this general rule arises where the circumstances of the arrest are such that the person must know why they are being arrested. However, given the consequences of making an unlawful arrest it would be prudent to communicate the reasons for an arrest even where they might appear obvious.

As noted in Part One it is a statutory requirement under Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act that a person detained during an ADF call out be advised of the offence that they are being detained for. It is similarly a requirement under section 3ZD of the Crimes Act that a person be informed of the grounds of their arrest. It would therefore be prudent for ADF members to advise a person being removed from a prohibited area under the *Defence Force Regulations 1952*, or from
a defence practice area, that they are being removed pursuant to the relevant powers under the legislation. Any person being removed should also be advised that they are not being arrested but they are being removed from the relevant area in accordance with law.

ADF members must also be aware that there can be serious consequences if persons escape from ADF custody. Under section 47C of the Crimes Act any Commonwealth officer (which includes ADF members) charged for the time being with the custody or detention of another person in respect of any offence against a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory who intentionally or negligently permits the other person to escape is guilty of an offence. The penalty is up to five years imprisonment.\(^{68}\)

**Conclusion**

This article has outlined the power of ADF members to arrest or detain civilians in certain circumstances. It is critical that ADF members are aware of the very different provisions that apply under different statutes. ADF members need to be critically aware of whether they are operating in a defence installation, Commonwealth premises, special defence undertakings, defence practice area, a prohibited area or some other location. They also need to be familiar with the types of offences that give rise to the power to arrest or detain. If ADF members are participating in a call out they need to know whether special powers have been included in the call out order which may include the power to detain. They also need to know the boundaries of general security areas and designated areas within any general security area.

These different provisions provide a complex environment in which ADF members operate. The consequences of making an unlawful arrest, or detaining a person without a legal basis, can expose both the Commonwealth and the ADF member to liability for false imprisonment unless there is a statutory restriction on such actions. The recent case of *State of New South Wales v Delly*\(^{69}\) demonstrates how simple errors can lead to a false arrest and significant financial damages for even a short period of false imprisonment.

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NOTES


2. See the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000 and Defence Portfolio Regulations Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Regs 2000 (No 1). Further amendments were made in 2006: see the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006.

3. Member is defined in section 4 of the Defence Act 1903 to include any officer, sailor, soldier and airman. The Defence Force is defined in section 30 of the Defence Act 1903 to comprise the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force.

4. Section 3Z(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914.

5. It should be noted that there is a different definition of indictable offence in section 23WA that only applies to Part ID of the Crimes Act 1914.

6. Section 3Z(2) of the Crimes Act 1914.


8. Section 9(2) of the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952.

9. Section 9(1) – 9(2) of the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952.

10. Section 4 of the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952.


16. Section 119 of the Australian Constitution.


20. Section 51I(1)(b) of the Defence Act 1903.

21. Section 51I(3) of the Defence Act 1903.

22. Section 51CB of the Defence Act 1903.

23. Section 51K(1) of the Defence Act 1903.


25. Section 51K(2) of the Defence Act 1903. By virtue of section 51K(2AA) a statement does not need to be published if it would prejudice the exercise of the relevant powers by members of the ADF.


27. Section 51Q(3) of the Defence Act 1903.

28. Section 51R(4) of the Defence Act 1903.

29. Section 51S of the Defence Act 1903.

30. Section 51T(1) of the Defence Act 1903.

31. Section 51U(1) of the Defence Act 1903.

32. Section 51U(3) of the Defence Act 1903.

33. These places are defined in section 5 of the Migration Act 1958.

34. Currently the Coral Sea Islands Territory is prescribed in regulation 5.15C(1) of the Migration Regulations 1994 to be an excised offshore place. In addition regulation 5.15C(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 provides that the following islands are prescribed as excised offshore places: all islands that form part of Queensland and are north of latitude 21° south; all islands that form part of Western Australia and are north of latitude 23° south; and all islands that form part of the Northern Territory and are north of latitude 16° south.


36. The definition of traditional inhabitant can be extended under the Torres Strait Fisheries Regulations 1985.

37. The definition of traditional inhabitant can be extended under the Torres Strait Fisheries Regulations 1985.

39. See section 16 of the *Migration Act 1958*.

40. See section 5(8) of the *Migration Act 1958*.

41. See section 245B of the *Migration Act 1958* and the definitions in section 245A of the *Migration Act 1958* and the *Shipping Registration Act 1981*.

42. See section 245E of the *Migration Act 1958* and the definitions in section 245A of the *Migration Act 1958* and the *Civil Aviation Act 1988*.

43. See section 245A of the *Migration Act 1958*; section 4 of the *Customs Act 1901*; and reg 1C of the *Customs Regulations 1926*.

44. See section 245B(12) of the *Migration Act 1958* and the *Defence Act 1903*.

45. See section 245C and section 245D of the *Migration Act 1958*.

46. See section 4 of the *Customs Act 1901*; and reg 1C of the *Customs Regulations 1926*.

47. See section 184A(14) of the *Customs Act 1901* and the *Defence Act 1903*.

48. Section 72.13 of the *Criminal Code* is concerned with the import or export of unmarked plastic explosives.

49. Division 307 of the *Criminal Code* is concerned with import and export offences.

50. Pursuant to reg 167 of the *Customs Regulations 1926* the *Fisheries Management Act 1991*, the *Migration Act 1958*, the *Quarantine Act 1908* and the *Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984* are prescribed Acts for the purposes of section 185(2)(d)(i) of the *Customs Act 1901*.

51. Section 3 of the *Fisheries Management Act 1991*.

52. The Fish Stocks Agreement is defined in section 4 of the *Fisheries Management Act 1991* to be the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.


54. *Christie v Leachinsky* [1947] AC 573 at 600. There are some statutory protections: see for example section 26 of the *Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952* and section 245F(9B) of the *Migration Act 1958*.

55. (2007) 177 A Crim R 538. An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was rejected: see *State of New South Wales v Delly* [2008] HCATrans 226 (13 June 2008).

56. ibid at 546.


59. ibid.
60. ibid at 591.
61. ibid.
62. ibid at 593.
63. ibid at 600.
64. (2007) 177 A Crim R 538 at 543.
65. ibid at 544.
66. ibid.
68. Section 47C(2) of the Crimes Act 1914.
The Relevance of the Surface Warship as a Weapons System: An Australian View

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Australia has a Defence White Paper in preparation. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has announced, in advance, the Government’s intention of expanding Australia’s naval capabilities over the next generation. This has given an important clue as to the Paper’s strategic outlook. The announcement referred to a context of economic and demographic growth within the Asia-Pacific, and of expanding regional force structures, particularly submarine and air forces. It flagged two particular operational missions for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN): the need to defend the sea lanes and to support land forces deployed ashore. The possible details of the White Paper, and the specific force structure issues implied, are not the direct focus of this article. But the apparently naval-maritime emphasis of its strategic policy, and the operational issues involved, form the basis and starting point for a discussion of the surface warship (specifically the surface combatant) as a weapons system and of its place in this agenda. This discussion will be pitched mainly at the strategic-operational rather than the tactical level, and with some regard to a joint maritime rather than exclusively naval context. Major General Jim Molan has written recently that the Australian military do not discuss war fighting issues sufficiently at the above tactical level. Further, naval forces are inherently strategic assets, because of their combination of great mobility with lethality. Finally, I have addressed the more tactical context of surface warship survivability in an article elsewhere.

Much history is contemporary history

The analytical approach adopted here will essentially be historical, because in significant ways strategic history constitutes a continuum down to our own time. The corollary is that it offers analogies which, when used with care and with respect to variable factors, can illuminate contemporary circumstances. A deeply learned example of this approach at the grand strategic level is Paul Kennedy’s famous study of the great powers. Moreover, in a more modest way, as this writer has put it elsewhere, history has advantages in strategic discussion because it is real, it is unclassified, and we know who won.

Maritime strategy in particular is no exception to the general relevance of historical understanding. Navies are creatures of time. In a human sense they share in the ancient traditions of warrior cultures. They have an abiding relationship to the nexus between geography and settled society, being guardians of what is still the most efficient means of heavy transport and trade—over water. This has been particularly true in the era since the close of the 15th century, the era of globalisation: a process of which the 21st century is the heir and the continuation. Navies as standing and effective military forces, moreover, are the creations of generations, even of centuries. The RAN, for example, a national service within a national defence force, is ultimately however an historical outgrowth of the British Royal Navy: one of the elite military forces of history whose emergence by the time of the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars was in turn the result of technological, infrastructural, administrative, cultural, strategic and tactical developments over the previous 150 years, and whose continuation into the modern age involved the leveraging of the later industrial revolution. The way in which navies, especially those of true maritime (as opposed to continental) powers, have done business over time, at the strategic and even the operational levels, affords us insights into how they can do so today and may do in the future. Julian Corbett, widely acknowledged as the pre-eminent thinker on maritime warfare, laid the foundations of his insights by exploring, in a long series of historical works, the course of British maritime policy in relation to diplomacy from the age of Drake onwards. His one theoretical work, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, published in 1911, was the last of his major writings but one, and was therefore predicated upon profound historical learning.5

One aspect of maritime strategy, the efficiency of defending trade by means of convoy, illustrates the value of historical knowledge and precedent. Despite the celebrated exploits of the Elizabethan sea dogs, Spain's treasure fleets from the Americas sailed in convoy and were very well guarded. Spanish–American silver was subject to enemy capture on only a handful of occasions between the 16th and the 18th centuries. Britain learned the lesson, and by 1793 had mandated the convoying of merchantmen by law. Between then and 1815 less than one per cent of British ships in convoy had been taken.6 Convoy was, however, perceived as inordinately defensive by the Royal Navy's officer corps by the early 20th century, and the lesson had to be re-learned. Convoys, advocated by Corbett and as used in the earlier period, were re-instituted to defeat the U-boats in 1917–18. The lesson was again forgotten, a process assisted by the Admiralty's classification, and then destruction on the eve of the Second World War, of its own technical history of the anti-submarine campaign of the First World War.7 The shutting down of the Admiralty Historical Section on the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 did not help either.8 Re-adopted during the Battle of the Atlantic, convoys were again effective. The classic post-war naval staff history The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939–1945 concluded that there was a remarkable continuity in the efficacy of convoy as a strategic tool—despite technological changes in warships and weaponry and the shift from a surface raider to a submarine threat—from the age of sail through to the two world wars of the early 20th century.9 This is far from being an exceptional theme. Certain operational lessons of British anti-submarine warfare during the Second World War, such as the theory of search and screening, were still valid at the end of the 20th century.10 Historical ignorance and bad strategy are frequently related, and bad strategy not only endangers the national interest: of course it kills.11 The same things are true, by extension, of operational methods and force structures.

Sea lanes, submarines and archipelagic stability

The Prime Ministerial announcement of an enhanced naval-maritime capability rings true in two senses. It is, firstly, entirely consistent with the strategic history of the wider Asia-Pacific over the course of the last five centuries. This has been deeply conditioned by a geographical context which I have elsewhere termed maritime-littoral, and which is characterised by a land–sea interface bordered to east and west by great oceans and involving great distances.12 This has long been a highly commercialised region, in which sea transport has been critical. It has also been an arena of great power rivalry involving internal and external players. The
strategic implications have included the importance of sea lanes and choke points, as well as of maritime leverage and joint power projection against the land. Secondly, contemporary and foreseeable future circumstances appear consistent with these mega-historical trends. Global economic growth, and therefore energy needs, will be centred on the Asia-Pacific and the expanding economies of China and India. Global energy competition has been termed the new Cold War. There is an emerging strategic literature dealing with oil in particular as a source of international rivalry and intra-state instability. Resource diplomacy and conflict will naturally be linked to rivalry amongst Asian powers—including one which US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has termed a resident power, Australia’s major security partner, the United States. China, it has been predicted, will project maritime power south and west into Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, areas critical to its resource supply lines, and will thus encounter rising Indian maritime power.

Australia is bound up with this regional strategic framework not only by the US alliance, but also by international trade, especially as a purveyor of commodities essential for growth. The ability to use the sea for transport is fundamental to its economic, financial and strategic survival. The inescapable implication is the need to defend that transport with naval-maritime power. As Nelson put it two centuries ago, while defending the interests of another commercial maritime power, ‘I consider the protection of our trade the essential service that can be performed.’ Australia’s economy and strategy were notably sensitive to attacks on shipping during the last regional war in the Asia-Pacific during the 1940s. This would be even more the case today, in the event of conflict, given the greater globalisation of the international economy and the relatively small amount of nationally flagged shipping upon which Australia can rely. As with other maritime powers, Australia’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are of fundamental military as well as economic importance. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, understood this, hence his desire to cut them off in 1942. He understood that it is not necessary to invade an island to defeat it or indeed to render it strategically redundant.

This is the regional and national context in which the development of Asian naval force structures must be understood. While Australia has no declared threats or enemies, of particular relevance to strategic planners concerned with the security of commercial shipping is the proliferation of submarine forces. China has almost 60 tactical submarines and the development of sub surface warfare appears the current focus of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This is, however, a wider regional phenomenon, which is remarkable for the emphasis on new diesel-electric boats. Their combination of stealth, firepower and ability to operate in shallow littoral waters proximate to sensitive sea lanes makes them a major strategic issue. It also underlines how anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, long neglected by Western powers since the end of the Cold War, must receive renewed attention. Australia’s strategic circumstances mean that it must participate fully in the reinvigoration of ASW.

Australia must add other maritime operational requirements. These include, in particular, the ability to deploy joint forces in the archipelagic environment to the north, together with the ability to protect, supply and evacuate them as necessary. The ‘inner arc’ has been intrinsic to Australia’s national security since at least 1914 and the seizure of the German Southwest Pacific possessions. Its states and societies are today challenged in varying degrees by instability which cannot be in their own, or Australia’s, interests. Since the Australian-led East Timor operation
of 1999–2000 the arc has been a more or less constant area of Australian Defence Force (ADF) stabilisation operations. This necessary close attention to the immediate neighbourhood must be balanced with a wider outlook. Jeffrey Grey has observed how generations of Australian Defence planners have appreciated the need to contribute to coalitions and deal with threats at a distance.24 Today, Australia’s interests, and its actual and potential areas of operations, take in a very wide geographical tract from the Gulf and Afghanistan to East Asia. In anticipation of the White Paper, the Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has affirmed the wider regional, as well as the local and domestic nature of Australia’s strategic requirements.25 SLOC defence, joint operational deployments, and a capacity for wider involvements, all at different levels of operational intensity, have as a common denominator the ability to use the sea while graduating the use of force. In the words of General Peter Cosgrove when Chief of the Defence Force, ‘the forces we have must be able to operate in a maritime and littoral environment. We are a maritime nation.’26 It is the contention of this article that the surface warship, with its flexibility and reach, is an indispensable force structure requirement of this strategic-operational agenda, as it has been in the wider Asia–Pacific for centuries since the Portuguese first rounded the Cape in 1498.

Sea control, maritime operations and the test of war

The fundamental relevance of the surface warship to these key operational missions is in its relationship to sea control. Sea control is, in short, the established dominance of the maritime environment sufficient for the use of that environment for one’s own purposes and, as necessary, for the denial of it to other forces or powers. Sea control is an historical as well as a complex phenomenon. Moreover, like so many practical and outcome-based applications, it has always been, and remains, a matter of degree. For centuries it had no real theoretical dimension. The Royal Navy in the age of sail understood, from experience, the strategic principles involved in defence of the realm and of trade, as well as of interception of the enemy and blockade. These included falling back upon the central position of the ‘Western Squadron’ in time of uncertainty or emergency.27 The concept of command of the sea came out of the late 19th century navalist theory advanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan and others. Over the course of the next hundred years it evolved into the less doctrinaire and more measured notion of sea control.28 Sea control has always been effectively indispensable to Australian military strategy and operations, whether far flung expeditionary or near regional, since before the national era. (Today it is, more than ever, a function of joint and frequently coalition capabilities, resting as it does upon an integrated and networked architecture of sea, land, air and other assets such as intelligence.) The defence of our northern approaches by sea denial, for example, is—like all exercises in sea denial—implicit in the capacity for sea control.29 There is, of necessity, an element of tautology in the definition of such control, which means having sufficient dominance to do what is needed, such as defeat an attempt at invasion, at a particular place and time. Sea control is no less real for that. Corbett was emphatic on the role of command of the sea, predominant or disputed, in defeating any attempt to invade an island nation such as Britain.30

Sea control is likewise the pre-requisite for defence of trade. As Vice Admiral Sir Hastings Harrington, Chief of the Naval Staff in the mid 1960s, put it in the Australian context: ‘Without control of the sea our economy stops’.31 The classic modern historical case study of trade
Anti-submarine warfare was then, as it is today, very much a joint and systemic operational capability. But the surface warship—with the leveraging of technology for improved detection and strike capability, as well as with developed tactical doctrine—was a key ingredient in the establishment and exploitation of sea control so as to win the battle. The statistical evidence for the growth in the number of escorts coincides exactly with the timing of operational and strategic success, and contrasts sharply with the inadequate numbers of vessels in the early stage of the battle. Operational research established that enhanced surface escort forces reduced the number of merchantmen sunk per attacking U-boat by almost 10 per cent, and that doubling of convoy escort strength from six to 12 units more than halved losses. A comparable situation obtained, in reverse, in the Pacific. The fleet actions of Coral Sea and Midway are often rightly regarded as turning points, enabling the Allies to seize the initiative. But in terms of the correlation of forces, they led to an approximate parity of naval power in the Pacific such that the Guadalcanal campaign was hard fought between fairly evenly-matched opponents. American industrial might afforded cumulative and exponential growth in the number of US naval units over the next three years, leading to a critical mass which could not ultimately be gainsaid. Thus the war followed the course which Yamamoto had predicted and feared. In this context, while there was something of a variable in terms of the general lack of emphasis on anti-submarine warfare in the Imperial Japanese Navy, the success of the US submarine blockade was greatly empowered by the advantages of sea control, and by the chronic Japanese shortage of escorts. This contrasts sharply with the Allied achievement in building up the Atlantic escort force. While the Japanese submarine threat off eastern Australia was of a lesser order than in the Atlantic, the RAN’s escort building program and its introduction of coastal convoys were in the same vein. The ability to sustain sea communications, critical for mounting the Allied counter-offensive in New Guinea for example, was directly related to the availability of naval surface vessels.

The same relationship between sea control, mass, and the central force structure relevance of the surface warship can be discerned in the US Navy’s successful amphibious power projection and task force operations against the breadth of Japan’s Pacific perimeter. Allied amphibious operations in the northern archipelago were underpinned likewise by the possession and exploitation of sea control, for which cruisers and smaller surface combatants such as destroyers and frigates, together with land-based air power, were essential. Joint force deployments, then as now, took place in an indivisible maritime battlespace or area of operations. Within this context, cover against enemy naval forces and defence of supply lines against submarine attack
were—and are—as intrinsic to the support of land forces as reconnaissance, minesweeping, transport, supply, preliminary bombardment and continuing naval gunfire support as troops moved inland. The denomination of warships as ‘escorts’ in such operations is somewhat misleading, given the multifaceted nature of their contribution. Unsurprisingly, given the same archipelagic context, there were distinct echoes of these operations in the East Timor deployment of 1999–2000, in which RAN and coalition warships provided surveillance, cover and deterrence as well as logistic support and technical expertise.

Change, continuity and the lessons of history

The credibility of the naval history of the Second World War as strategic-operational evidence rests—for our purposes—ultimately upon its duration, degree and, in the case of the Pacific War, its geographical location. Its campaigns remain (apart from the relatively brief Falklands War of 1982) the most recent examples of sustained high intensity warfare in the maritime environment. Their length in time (the World War at sea has been termed ‘The Longest Battle’) arguably adds substance to the strategic principles which were played out and tested during the conflict. The campaigns encompassed episodes in trade defence and anti-submarine warfare, failed as well as successful, as well as in joint power projection in the Pacific archipelagic environment. They incorporated the roles of sea, land and air power, as well as signals and other forms of intelligence. They are very well documented and have verifiable outcomes. In such ways they might be considered the gold standard of modern maritime strategic evidence. It would be foolish to dismiss their lessons, for discontinuity is rarely, if ever, so absolute, and modern history is littered with examples of strategic commentators suggesting (as it turns out, wrongly) that it is.

In terms of anti-submarine warfare, it may be objected that the modern diesel-electric boat is significantly more capable in terms of firepower (able to fire and control up to four torpedoes simultaneously) than its Second World War antecedent. Yet military technology is still a ruthless conversation, and defensive capabilities such as those of warships have also advanced in turn. Further, technology, we should remember, is only one of many factors influencing warfare. To think otherwise is to fall into the trap of mono-causality. Naval operations have always been an interface between human beings and technology. Training, doctrine, morale and deterrence (an important element of anti-submarine warfare) remain vital. On the broader canvas, the political and economic factors conditioning strategy and conflict, such as the critical importance of SLOCs, remain remarkably constant. Even at the level of tactics, the battle between the stealth capability of the diesel submarine, on the one hand, and the presence of the surface combatant allied, for one thing, with the velocity of the maritime patrol aircraft, on the other, has stayed recognisably the same.

Conflict in the 21st century Asia–Pacific might see differences of scale from the convoy battles of the Second World War. But then again—with the region’s expanding economies and force structures and its potential flashpoints—it might not, at least at crucial times. Even if it does, the differences may be more of degree than kind. The strategic principle of sea control, valid for centuries, is likely to remain so. The operational merit of convoy (if convoy were employed), based upon a mathematical formula relating to the perimeter of water to be watched, is unlikely to vary greatly. And tactical lessons such as the effectiveness of escorts in achieving submarine
kills while securing shipping, and such as the dependence of hunter–killer forces on special intelligence cueing, may well endure.\textsuperscript{44} At the most general level, it would be well to remember some fundamental lessons. The authors of \textit{The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping} made the point in their concluding paragraph that ‘sea lines of communication’ remain an abstraction, and that the threat was to actual ships and their human and material cargoes.\textsuperscript{45} There is also a cultural point, admittedly better grasped by most naval than other military services. The officer corps of the Imperial Japanese Navy saw the defence of shipping as insufficiently alluring, and without the kudos of serving in the battle line.\textsuperscript{46} Strike warfare, as always, is a means to an end however, and the ability to use the sea is still the fundamental issue.

\textbf{The surface warship as a weapons system: Past, present and future}

How do we conclude on the merits of a weapons system? This is potentially the subject of a separate article. There is of course an issue of definition. Artillery pieces and small arms can be considered ‘weapons systems’.\textsuperscript{47} The collective weaponry and propulsive power of warships, like those of armoured vehicles or aircraft, suggest that they might be better termed ‘composite weapons systems’. Moreover, the effectiveness of such systems depends not only upon technology, but also its application. Sailing warships did not alone constitute sustained global maritime power projection, nor did tanks, in and of themselves, constitute \textit{blitzkrieg}. The early modern artillery fortress and the inter-continental ballistic missile, for example, offer further variables.\textsuperscript{48}

In judging the effectiveness or otherwise of a composite system such as the ocean-going warship, we might posit various tests involving its broad relationship to the complex subtleties of warfare itself. Does it have a demonstrable ability to adapt to and lever technological change, to sustain a conversation between the offensive and defensive, and to harness the interface between human and material factors in war? Can it survive the friction implicit in all military operations? Can it graduate force, and transcend eras of cold, limited and total war? Does it have utility for political powers of different magnitudes: great, medium and small? Does it have versatility within the different dimensions of its battlespace such as, in the case of the surface warship, oceanic, archipelagic and littoral areas? Can it endure as a strategic instrument and joint operational enabler because it has fundamental relevance to that environmental battlespace and therefore offers something irreplaceable? In the case of the warship, we can answer all these questions in the affirmative. In the last resort, we might ask whether the system has changed history. The surface warship enabled the creation of global strategy and international relations, and was the vehicle for the building of the greatest empire the world has ever known, as well as of its successor which still depends on maritime power. The warship has capitalised on every phase of technological development from the advent of gunpowder weapons to nuclear power, satellites and electronic warfare, and is poised to exploit laser weaponry.\textsuperscript{49} Its value is proven, not merely predicted, because it has been vindicated by time. It is certainly one of warfare’s most successful composite weapons systems, perhaps the most successful, and it is still in business.

History suggests, as we have seen, not only the merits of the surface warship but its relevance to the 21st century Australian strategic case. The ability of the contemporary surface combatant to provide presence in the maritime environment, with its operational capability in four
dimensions—on, over (as air warfare and aircraft platform) and under the sea and in the electro-magnetic spectrum—make it essential, in adequate numbers and within a balanced, networked and joint force context, for the control and use of the sea. Such control has been historically, and still is, fundamental to SLOC defence and joint force deployments. This continues to be demonstrated by the roles of naval task forces, in peace as well as war, in episodes such as Timor in 1999–2000 and the opening phase of the Iraq War in 2003. The capacity for sustained reach, as far as the Gulf for example, is also part of the reason the RAN’s surface force has become a niche capability valued by our allies. In the ANZAC frigate Australia effectively has its own littoral combat ship, deployable virtually anywhere. A change in the grand strategic agenda, to a soft power program along the lines of the Nye/Armitage Report for example, could be supported by the surface combatant’s ability to graduate force and act in benign operational roles. All of this is remarkably consistent with the conclusion reached by Corbett a century ago: that fleets have three functions: to support or obstruct diplomacy, to protect or destroy commerce, and to support or obstruct land operations.

It is to be hoped that the recent Prime Ministerial announcement presages the adequate replacement, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of the RAN’s surface combatant force, with a careful and proper balance maintained between the equally important surface and submarine fleets. As well as the necessary replacement of the ANZAC frigates under the SEA 5000 program, there is a case for the acquisition of a fourth air warfare destroyer, making more AWDs available for operations at a given time: a 50 per cent gain in capability, it has been calculated, for a 33 per cent increase in investment. In naval task group terms, having two destroyers rather than one in an area of operations also increases surveillance and strike capabilities disproportionately. As General Cosgrove observed when Chief of the Defence Force, the AWDs will afford freedom of action in our maritime environment by enabling the protection of shipping, naval or commercial, when and where required. While the defence of commercial shipping can generally be expected to be undertaken in conjunction with friends and allies, this will be an invaluable, even indispensable, national strategic asset.

Defeat, not victory, is the teacher in the history of warfare, and to learn from the losses of others is one of the aspects of wisdom. We should not forget the fate which befall another maritime power, Imperial Japan, in a war in our region which is still within living memory. Unable to defend the shipping upon which it depended, Japan was deprived of vital resources, saw its economy crippled, forfeited the advantages of interior lines of communication, lost strategic options, and was brought to the brink of surrender. Blockade is a terrible weapon, and better it is not used successfully against us.

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NOTES


9. ibid., p. 231.


11. I here paraphrase Colin Gray’s pithy and useful saying; ‘Bad strategy kills’.


33. ibid., p. 425.

34. This analysis is significantly indebted to an excellent piece of historical research: M.D. Hoffman, ‘The American and German Submarine Campaigns of the Second World War: a Comparative Analysis’, BA honours thesis, UNSW@ADFA, 1998.

35. This has been observed by H.P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies February to June 1942, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1983, p.xii.


43. It was recognised halfway through the Battle of the Atlantic that the perimeter to be watched increased only as the square root of the number of merchant ships in a convoy, thus making escort of larger convoys more effective. Howarth and Law (eds), *The Battle of the Atlantic 1939–1945: the 50th Anniversary International Naval Conference*, p. 455.

44. ibid., p. 580.


51. The Nye/Armitage Report on restoring US global influence was prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, and can be found at: <www.csis.org>.


54. General Peter Cosgrove, address to the Australian–Israel Chamber of Commerce, 2003.

New Zealand’s Military and Policing Efforts in the Pacific

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New Zealand’s disciplined forces have had active roles in the Pacific region for many years in terms of disaster relief, the monitoring of exclusive economic zones (EEZs), infrastructural development and training of Pacific personnel amongst other tasks. What is relatively new, however, is the changing face of that presence, particularly in terms of increased policing involvement. In places such as Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands, New Zealand Police personnel have played a key part in sustaining post-conflict efforts. This article discusses some of the issues arising from New Zealand’s current military and policing efforts in the region, focusing in particular upon the balance between the two forces and the roles they currently play in contributing to a ‘whole-of-government’ response.

The Pacific has long been an important consideration in the development of New Zealand’s foreign and security policies. However, the region has arguably become even more central to those policies in recent times. Growing concerns over the current and future status of a number of countries in the Pacific in terms of pressing social, political, economic and environmental issues have seen an increased level of engagement across a number of different states and in a number of different ways. Indeed the way in which New Zealand has engaged with the region has altered in the last few years in line with attempts to respond to the complexity of challenges posed. There has been a move towards institutionalising more of a ‘whole-of-government’ approach towards New Zealand’s engagement with the region, an approach that is supposed to involve a multitude of agencies working together to fulfil common goals of security, stability and prosperity. The institutionalisation of this idea can be seen in a number of concrete initiatives. It is represented by the development of new agencies such as the Pacific Security Coordinating Committee which was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) to assess and respond to security vulnerabilities, gaps and risks in the South Pacific, and to then evaluate those responses. This whole-of-government approach is also mirrored in the multifaceted nature of the Inquiry into New Zealand’s Relationships in the South Pacific which came up before the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee as of May 2007, as this Inquiry is (as at the end of 2008) currently investigating:

...the role New Zealand plays and can play in assisting Pacific Island Forum nations (excluding Australia) to develop sustainable economies, with particular attention to the following:

• identifying New Zealand’s key interests and responsibilities in countries belonging to the Pacific Island Forum;

• identifying strategic threats to New Zealand’s relationship with Pacific Island Forum members;

• identifying opportunities to advance New Zealand’s relationships with governments and peoples in Pacific Island Forum countries;
• identifying current and potential actions to encourage sustainable economic development in, and two-way trade with, Pacific Island Forum countries;

• identifying the strategic objectives for expenditure of New Zealand aid in Pacific Island Forum countries; and

• identifying the appropriate level and type of aid.¹

Though the emphasis is on developing sustainable economies there is broad mention of strategic threats and more general forms of relationships, and other official documents mirror a similar whole-of-government approach. Key to this approach is the complementary workings of the two main security actors in a New Zealand setting—the military and the police.

The questions that this article seeks to address is: where does the involvement of New Zealand’s disciplined forces (here referring to military and police involvement) in the Pacific currently fit within this deeper and broader engagement?—What kinds of roles are they playing and what are some of the issues arising?

New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) involvement in the region

In the Defence Policy Framework 2000 the New Zealand Ministry of Defence asserted that:

New Zealand’s primary defence interests are protecting New Zealand’s territorial sovereignty, meeting shared alliance commitments to Australia and fulfilling obligations and responsibilities in the South Pacific. The wider Asia–Pacific strategic environment, of which we are a part, is also relevant… New Zealand has special obligations to Pacific neighbours to assist in maintaining peace, preserving the environment, promoting good governance and helping achieve economic well being. We want a secure neighbourhood and we must work towards that. East Timor and Bougainville have demonstrated that New Zealand has a role to play in helping keep the peace in our region. The Government believes that this role extends beyond the provision of military support. It also includes assisting peace processes through diplomacy and mediation.²

In fulfilling its part of these obligations and responsibilities in the South Pacific, the NZDF is involved in a number of initiatives. First, the NZDF has been involved for a number of years in the Defence Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP). MAP provides training assistance to PNG, Fiji (though this relationship is currently suspended), Tonga, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Samoa, and the Cook Islands with a focus on leadership, staff and resource management training, officer promotion, and technical and trade training courses.³ MAP is currently undergoing some revision with an eye to longer-term strategic planning so as to address regional needs in a more systematic and enduring fashion. In addition to this program there are a number of NZDF personnel posted around the Pacific with: one NZ Army WO1 in Tonga as a Technical Adviser (mechanical); one Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) chief petty officer (recently withdrawn) as a communications/IT adviser to Samoa; one NZ Army engineer officer at the Vanuatu Mobile Force engineer platoon in Port Vila; one chief petty officer acting as technical adviser for the patrol boat in the Cook Islands; and one NZ Army staff sergeant is currently posted to the Vanuatu Mobile Force engineer platoon as the Foreman of Works in Port Vila.⁴
Secondly, the NZDF maintains a presence in the Pacific in terms of regular efforts such as ongoing surveillance of exclusive economic zones, involvement in exercises (such as *Croix du Sud* and the engineering/medically focused *Tropic Twilight* exercises) and port visits, as well as undertaking other more ad hoc activities such as search and rescue, disaster response, evacuation and humanitarian relief efforts. One example of such efforts was the late 2002 rapid assistance to the Australian Defence Force in Operation *Bali Assist* by an Air Force C-130 Hercules and the New Zealand Aeromedical Evacuation Team in the wake of a terrorist bombing in Bali. More recently the NZDF helped with tsunami relief in the Pacific in 2007.

Thirdly, the NZDF has contributed to a number of regional operations in Bougainville, East Timor, Tonga and Solomon Islands. In the recent past, the NZDF was heavily involved in the peace process in Bougainville from 1997. The NZDF supported initial peace talks through the provision of secure, neutral territory for representatives of opposing groups to meet. Later the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG—later the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG)) came under New Zealand command and was notable for the fact that the NZDF observers were unarmed. There is currently no NZDF presence in Bougainville.

The initial operation in East Timor from 1999 to 2002 was the NZDF’s largest operation since the Korean War. During this mission over 4,000 New Zealand troops were involved in securing East Timor’s border with the west and in ‘ensuring local people are free from the threat of pro-Indonesian militia forces’. The deployment involved up to three Royal New Zealand Navy vessels, an Army Battalion Group, and an Air Force element of around 130 personnel along with up to six Iroquois helicopters, two C-130 Hercules and one Boeing transport aircraft at any one time. In the case of East Timor, the NZDF were also operating under a UN Chapter Seven mandate that called for a ‘higher intensity of operations than peacekeeping alone’, and therefore ‘pre-deployment training for East Timor required personnel to shift their thinking from a focus on policing to a combat role in a hostile and unknown environment’. Here there was strict guidance as to who could be detained and as to general rules of engagement. New Zealand later returned to East Timor following a request for help in May 2006 in the wake of major civil disturbances. In this instance the NZDF only redeployed after much diplomatic negotiation between Australia and East Timor and reassurance that such a deployment would have UN backing. This effort involved the initial deployment of a Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) B-757, a Hercules C-130 and 124 infantry personnel, and was later further supported by another 123 troops, military police and additional planning personnel based in Australia. In September 2007 the NZDF had 142 troops and 32 personnel supporting the helicopter detachment under the Australian-led international security force, as well as two military observers and military training advisers in country.

From 16 November to 2 December 2006, after an official request from the Tongan Government, the NZDF led a combined task force of 150 troops (72 NZDF personnel and additional Australian troops and police) to support the Tongan Service and Tongan Police Force in the wake of riots following pro-democracy protests. The taskforce was tasked with reopening Fau’aman to allow flights into and out of Tonga, and with conducting limited security patrols in Nuku’alofa. Aside from the warrant officer (mechanical) mentioned above, there is now no NZDF presence within Tonga.

Following a request by the Solomon Islands Prime Minister for external help in returning a situation of law and order to his country in 2003, the NZDF initially deployed four helicopters,
an infantry company, a small medical group and logistics, communications, engineers and support staff as part of the Australian Federal Police-led Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI). This mission was scaled back through early to mid 2004, although troubles following the riots of mid April 2006 then saw 125 military and additional police personnel from New Zealand operating in country once more. Once the situation calmed, these numbers were scaled back. As at September 2008 the military part of the deployment sits at 46 with a mandate for up to 50. Indeed, what both this latest deployment and other involvements in the Pacific have done is to highlight the increasing importance of the use of police alongside military in these kinds of international deployments.

New Zealand’s policing involvement in the region

In some contrast to the longer-standing involvement of the NZDF in regional engagement, the New Zealand Police (NZPOL) have had a fairly substantial leap in terms of the numbers of officers and tasks undertaken in the Pacific in recent years. Again some of these are consistent patterns of longer-term involvement, others more ad hoc, and yet others are related to specific peace support operations.

In terms of the ongoing training, mentoring and other support relationships NZPOL have in the Pacific, one of the most important (and quietly successful) programs underway is the Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme (PPDVP). In demonstrating the kind of multi-agency approach mentioned at the start of this article, the PPDVP is a joint initiative between the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), NZPOL and the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP). It focuses ‘primarily on building the capacity of Pacific police services to prevent/respond effectively to domestic violence’ and encompasses regional and national components. Similarly the Pacific police dog program that operates in Samoa, the Cook Islands and Tonga has involved a number of complementary programs to provide a comprehensive and sustainable exchange system. Here the New Zealand Police are involved in breeding dogs, instruction/training, refresher courses, quarantine systems, and veterinary support to help support the operation of drug detector dogs at airports. Other more specific training programs in the Pacific tend to be operationalised through institutions such as the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative previously based in Suva and now in Brisbane.

In terms of involvement in peace support, reconstruction and/or reform efforts, the Bougainville Community Policing Project (BCPP) has been an important part of a peace process instituted after nearly a decade of secessionist violence. The BCPP began in 1999 as a joint AusAID/NZAID project. The first phase lasted from late 1999 to late 2001 and was primarily focused on identifying and training suitable men and women to serve as community police. Since 2004 the BCPP recommenced some operations funded solely by NZAID and was intended to:

- Audit and provide refresher training for community auxiliary police;
- Extend community police training across the country;
- Build local capacity to enable local police to further develop community policing;
• Support improved relations between the local community, community police and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC); and

• Provide logistical support.\(^{17}\)

In September 2007, the police bid to expand this involvement to further support the regular police to complement the changes wrought for the auxiliary police was approved. In undertaking this expansion NZPOL has encouraged more participation in the project from the region, and in addition to this involvement in Bougainville, NZPOL have also supported peace operations in East Timor, Solomon Islands and Afghanistan.

In East Timor NZPOL were deployed as part of the UN peacekeeping operation which, under Resolution 1272, was mandated to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor. NZPOL were therefore involved in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in efforts to help: establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.\(^{18}\) Ongoing involvement continued under the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) mandate and in July 2006, NZPOL contributed 25 personnel to the new international effort to stem recurrent outbreaks of violence in the country. In September 2007 Cabinet approved these 25 officers to stay on for another year in line with the extension of the UN mission and mandate. Moreover, this return of NZPOL to recently wound-down operations has also occurred in Solomon Islands where New Zealand Police first deployed in larger numbers in 2003 as part of RAMSI.

NZPOL deployed as part of RAMSI aimed at rebuilding faith in the ability of police to maintain public safety, and initially undertook more targeted law enforcement operations that identified trouble spots and the worst offenders.\(^{19}\) General tasks for the NZPOL contingent when they first arrived were:

• Protection of key Solomon Islands Government figures;

• The arrest and prosecution of Harold Keke and his followers;

• Establishing law and order in Honiara;

• Recovering of Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) and privately-owned firearms; and

• Establishing law and order in the provinces.

The final tasks included the reform of the Solomon Islands police whose members had at times themselves been corrupted or had been involved in violent and illegal acts.\(^{20}\) New Zealand maintained 35 staff with RAMSI, though this was upped after the April 2006 riots for a short time with an additional two rotations of 30 extra staff. The current number of NZPOL staff serving in the Solomons (as of September 2007) is 35 with another three embedded within the Solomon Islands Police Force (SIPF), including a Deputy Commissioner, their key focus being on capacity building.
In terms of longer-term involvement in institutional change NZPOL are undertaking a development program within the Cook Islands where a NZPOL officer is currently—after an open bidding process—seconded as Police Commissioner. Most recently a trilateral effort has seen New Zealand and Australia engaging with Tonga to undertake police reform at a fundamental level. Here recruitment, training, education, promotion and so on have been identified as possible reform areas. Lastly a number of ad hoc initiatives are created on a needs basis—such as the provision of security advice at the South Pacific Games in September.

Recent changes

New Zealand’s governmental and bureaucratic systems are efficient and coherent. In particular, in terms of how this new focus on unprecedented police involvement sketched above fits in with a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to security in the Pacific, much of the coordination between military and police regarding peace support operations at the strategic level occurs within the ‘Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination’ (ODESC). Officially, ‘ODESC is the committee of government officials charged with providing strategic policy advice on security and intelligence matters’ and consists of: the Chief Executives from Foreign Affairs and Trade; the Defence Force; the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS); the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB); the NZ Police; the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management; Treasury and others when necessary. In addition to the ongoing work of such bureaucratic bodies, other strategic-level changes have been occurring elsewhere to further help coordinate the work of these agencies—such as the Pacific Security Coordinating Committee mentioned at the start of this article. Most important, however, has been the recent establishment of the NZPOL International Service Group (ISG) as a clear and constant point of contact for all of the international aspects of these police operations outlined above.

Within NZPOL there have been a number of major changes in the last few years. In 2005 it was recognised by NZPOL that the New Zealand Government:

...is committed to combat terrorism and to strengthen post-conflict capacity in a number of parts of the world. Whereas the defence force has traditionally been the primary focus for deployment in these roles, attention has increasingly turned to using civilian police, recognising the need for a stable law and order environment for the achievement of other civil infrastructure development, including aid delivery.

Investment in strengthening police capability through police’s International Services Group to manage these requests will assist more effective responses to regional security operations when deemed desirable by government, as in Bougainville, Solomon Islands, and Afghanistan.

The United Nations is increasingly seeking civilian police contributions from New Zealand for its missions because of the professional and community focused style and skill NZ Police add to such deployments. The Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands is considered a model internationally demonstrating how countries can work together in a near-failed state to establish a basis on which recovery can be effected.
In response to such unprecedented emphases on police interest in overseas affairs, NZPOL has therefore seen a number of complementary changes over the last few years. Most notable has been the establishment of the International Service Group.

The ISG is a fledgling organisation. Formally established on 1 December 2005 it was created to better manage New Zealand’s growing international policing commitments and was set up following much consultation with outside experts and research into best practice models. The group was created to manage international deployments and to provide other governmental agencies ‘such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), NZAID and NZ Defence Force with a single point of contact, making liaison between agencies and responses to international requests more efficient’. Within the ISG the Manager: International Strategy and Policy personifies that ‘single point of contact’ through maintaining a five-year plan for the ISG and building relationships with those stakeholders. Alongside this position an Operational Manager ensures that these strategic and policy directives are then translated into action: coordinating the scoping, training, selection, deployment and contract side of such deployments. The ISG has also attempted to develop a Deployment Pool Concept. Initially the focus was on providing a pool of 150 officers available for international operations (this would allow for an effective force of 50 officers in the actual field at any one time), and since then additional efforts have been made to further increase this size to 270. At the present time, however, this concept has yet to be realised, though the ISG are still aiming to support around 100 staff abroad at any one time—both sworn and non-sworn.

In terms of how NZPOL are operating at the more tactical level in country, given the fairly high levels of autonomy involved in policing there is good scope for adaptation and flexibility when it comes to liaising with other groups. Contingents have a nominated leader who is able to make decisions on situations as they arrive, though in the event of a major crisis there would undoubtedly be much more coordination back home to the ISG in Wellington. In addition to this, it is also important to note that ongoing efforts are made to ensure that each individual within the agencies knows their counterpart/most important contact in the other agencies both when on deployment and when back in Wellington.

Potential effects?

These changes and the improved synchronisation of relationships between New Zealand’s contemporary military and policing involvement have three main effects on thinking about the nature of New Zealand’s involvement in this particular region.

1. First of all this spreads the administrative, logistical, personnel and other burdens across the different Ministries within New Zealand—potentially allowing for more involvement in a greater number of areas.

Size and capability is always an issue for a country of four million people. Budgets for operations in the Pacific are often tight. In increasing the involvement of another security agency in peace support and other operations in the region such budget constrictions may be stretched a little further. In the case of police deployments overseas there are, admittedly, some complications. In New Zealand the police budget is primarily made available for domestic activities, and
international deployments have had to be funded either wholly or partly (or sometimes even completely outside of) this limited police purse. Moreover, support for involvement in international deployments can depend upon the interest of the Minister of Police at the time. After all, NZPOL are first and foremost responsible for maintenance of public order at home, not abroad. However there are some mitigating factors. A strong argument can be (and has been) made that such offshore deployments prevent criminal elements from operating and therefore—particularly in the case of nearby locations—such deployments prevent criminal elements from impacting upon New Zealand before they could potentially reach our shores. Other ways to bolster this involvement is through the selective funding provided by NZAID for particular projects, as in the case of the Bougainville project, or through another new medium—the Pacific Security Fund. Here the Fund, established in the wake of the Pacific Plan, has seen a number of projects funded out of a pool dedicated to Pacific projects. One example where this has further encouraged a whole-of-government approach was in 2007 where a police project to improve conditions at the Tongan Police Force armoury involved much cooperation with the NZDF, in this case utilising NZDF engineering expertise to carry out the improvements.

In other practical terms, an increased use of police allows for some ways around possible personnel issues with regards to finding suitably experienced people, and provides useful on the ground training in different cultural contexts that is an invaluable addition to the experience of such personnel. Additionally, the availability of specialised police groups or equipment (such as staff trained in riot control) is also very useful in augmenting the options open to those involved in peace support operations.

2. It allows for a re-establishment or reassertion of the differences between military and policing roles, and a reinvigoration of the police as primary players in internal security issues—something of great importance in the region.25

The advent of second generation peacekeeping, the rise of the importance of international humanitarian law (and indeed all legal aspects of military activity), and the concomitant ‘militarisation’ of the police through the move to special tactics groups and specialist equipment, some scholars have suggested, had meant that the dividing lines between military and policing spheres and domestic and international spheres had blurred.26 In some ways we could hold this to be true. After all, in 2002 the then New Zealand Chief of Defence Force, Air Vice-Marshal Bruce Ferguson claimed that:

The future NZDF will be a multi-mission capable joint force… The future NZDF will be capable of helping others to restore lost peace and security where enemies are actively searching for peaceful means to resolve their conflict… On such operations, the force will have flexible self-protection that can be extended to non-combatants… It will be equipped with a range of non-lethal force options to defuse crises with minimal casualties. The future force will have a balance of combat service support capabilities to assist communities broken by war to start rebuilding their lives.27

These emphases on ‘helping others to restore lost peace and security’ and the possibility of using ‘non-lethal force options’ to help others ‘rebuild’ sounds similar to the kinds of emphases used in policing. Indeed, during the mission to Bougainville, NZDF personnel were unarmed.
Moreover, the demands of a renewed counter-terrorist agenda plus those that have come about through the results of globalisation, have meant that the lines between internal and international security issues are also not so clear anymore.

However, in practice, New Zealand’s military and policing elements still function in very distinct ways, and this is underlined when those forces are juxtaposed alongside one another in the same operation. For example, in Bougainville the roles carried out by military and policing personnel were very different in practice—with community policing clearly not constituting part of the unarmed observers’ tasks. What this means, then, is that the increased use of police in peace support operations throws the roles of police and military into sharp relief, re-clarifying the nature and roles of these agencies. This can only be of relief to military personnel who, we have been told, must concentrate on warfighting first and foremost and whom should avoid policing. After all ‘policing’ is inherently political.

More specifically in terms of the Pacific, this is an important issue given the determination to encourage a more demilitarised, civilianised and rule of law approach to security affairs. Further, the efforts at police reform and the emphasis on bolstering police status and functions within the Pacific is a balancer of sorts in terms of raising such police forces up from the status of ‘poor cousin’ in those countries in the Pacific where the military has tended to take precedence (indeed there is a strong argument here for a similar MAP program for police as well as the NZDF). And at times the use of police personnel in terms of international deployments may be possible where military involvement is not.

Moreover, given the different but complementary nature of their tasks, the deployment of both agencies improves a mission’s chances of success for they leave less room for ‘gaps’ to emerge.

A more seamless ‘whole-of-government’ approach is made possible in line with broader policy aims.

At the beginning of the 21st century, a number of scholars identified the problem of various ‘gaps’ in international operations—particularly peace support operations. Scholars such as Michael Dziedzic believe that the military is only capable of ‘imposing a most basic, rigid form of order. An intervening military force can attempt to deter and limit loss of life and destruction of property, but that is about all’. Yet at the same time the situation on the ground may not be secure enough for civilian police to begin operations. This ‘deployment gap’ was thus identified as being temporal in nature—a point in time where public security is highly vulnerable. An additional ‘enforcement gap’ was also identified as a major problem in complex peace operations. Here, when international operations struggled to deal with serious domestic lawlessness, it was said that they were experiencing a gap in ‘function’. More often than not specialised law and order forces such as riot police, special tactics groups and so on have not been part of the peace mission. Further, a gap arises between enforcement of the peace agreement (that could entail a military response) and enforcement of local laws. Lastly, an ‘institutional gap’ arises whilst the local government remains incapable of providing public order. Until this occurs a gap of a ‘political developmental’ nature remains.

However, with the move towards a more integrated approach that draws on a well-coordinated relationship between military and police there is the possibility that such gaps will be lessened.
The increased use of police abroad early in conflicts provides a different instrument for helping to prevent the emergence of a security vacuum, and also increases state–society interaction at crucial phases of operations (both in terms of providing security and in terms of providing avenues for employment and development). As police and military look increasingly set to deploy alongside one another in a variety of operations, it would be hoped that improved communications and management systems would necessarily result—therefore increasing chances of success as a more robust and well-rounded approach would also eventuate.

Conclusion

New Zealand has a long history of involvement in the Pacific, though much of this past involvement was largely military in nature when it came to the roles played by security agents. Recently the police have become an important part of New Zealand’s contributions to the Pacific. This has resulted in a step towards a more holistic whole-of-government approach but, as emphasised here, is also significant because of the beneficial effects of this balancing of police and military efforts. The increased use of police not only spreads the financial load of peace support operations across a wider range of sources but it also means the addition of new and vitally important skills that can be used to good effect in challenging situations. It also engenders a re-drawing of the military–police divide, raises the status of police within the Pacific, and, at the same time, allows for a more seamless approach to operations whereby various ‘gaps’ previously encountered may perhaps be better overcome. The increased use of the police in these kinds of operations demonstrates a commitment to a whole-of-government approach by the New Zealand Government and provides a greater range of instruments for use within the Pacific. However, two questions remain: to whom do such deployments serve and for what purpose—both in short- and long-term strategic thinking—that must also be constantly asked of New Zealand’s involvement in the region.

Editor’s Note

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9. ibid., p. 63 and p. 66.


Moving Beyond Manoeuvre:  
A Conceptual Coming-of-Age for the Australian and Canadian Armies  

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The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have fostered general agreement that while the fundamental nature of warfare remains constant, its characteristics are rapidly evolving. By necessity, this evolution has brought with it a change in the way Western militaries conceptualise military operations and the strategic environment in which they must undertake them.

Operationally, the contemporary environment is characterised by ‘complex irregular warfare’ that ‘reflects the consequences of globalisation, which has created and empowered a diverse range of enemies of the West; and US conventional dominance, which has caused those adversaries to seek asymmetric arenas and unconventional means with which to confront the West’. To negate the conventional advantages in military technology that the United States and its allies possess, particularly superior sensing and information gathering technologies, the enemies encountered during the so-called ‘War on Terror’ have moved into complex terrain.

Analysing current military operations, one can draw several conclusions about the characteristics of contemporary warfare. First, land forces, and especially soldiers (as opposed to platforms), are the primary military element that will determine success or failure in contemporary conflict. While navies and air forces still have a significant role to play in maintaining the strategic balance-of-power through their ability to dominate ‘the commons’, in Afghanistan and Iraq they have been relegated to a supporting role. Second, the military alone cannot prevail in Afghanistan and Iraq. Due to the ambitious state-building required in these locations, the military is frequently required to work alongside other branches of government and with non-government organisations.

Third, military operations across the entire spectrum are occurring simultaneously in Afghanistan and Iraq. Essentially, the ‘blocks’ have been removed from the ‘three-block war’ concept advanced by Krulak in the late 1990s, and militaries now need to instantaneously transition between humanitarian operations, peace enforcement and warfighting. Finally, the enemy now frequently appears with little or no warning, strikes and then quickly disperses into complex terrain to avoid retaliation. As a result, friendly forces now need to be capable of absorbing a first strike and retaliating quickly enough that the enemy does not have time to disperse, and accurately enough that vital infrastructure and civilians in close proximity are not harmed.

Of course, none of these observations are particularly new. Even before coalition forces were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, the emergence of these trends had been noticed by astute observers. The effect of Afghanistan and Iraq has been to force military and strategic planners at all levels to respond to these trends. Due to the scale of these conflicts and their importance as part of the War on Terror, defence planners can no longer afford to concentrate on developing...
‘revolution in military-affairs’ (RMA) technology for a future major interstate war while treating all other forms of conflict as a side-show. In the United States Department of Defense, the military-strategic shift between the ‘transformation’ program of the late 1990s and the 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review is indicative of a broader change in institutional thinking.\(^6\)

However, the United States military is not the only military operating in this environment. All countries that have contributed forces to the coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq have also had to adjust to the nature of conflict in these theatres. In some cases, adjustments have been quite innovative. This article examines two such cases—the Australian and Canadian armies. Even prior to the War on Terror, the Australian and Canadian armies were similarly sized and shared a similar history, and both armies have responded similarly to operations in the War on Terror.\(^7\) What is surprising is that adjusting to the recent operations has brought about unique conceptual innovations within both armies.

Although these innovations have their lineage in the operational experience of the late 1990s,\(^8\) it is only since the commencement of the War on Terror that Australian and Canadian army conceptual thinking has yielded unique results. In the case of the Australian Army, its initial conceptual response to the changing characteristics of warfare was the Complex Warfighting concept paper, released in 2004.\(^9\) This was followed in 2006 by the promulgation of a second concept paper, entitled Adaptive Campaigning.\(^10\) In 2004, the Canadian Army published a Force Employment Concept (FEC),\(^11\) which was followed in 2007 by the dissemination of a second, more detailed concept paper. Importantly, the 2007 paper contained a Canadian-designed operational concept for prosecuting complex irregular warfare, entitled Adaptive Dispersed Operations.\(^12\)

These developments are significant because they represent a substantial break with tradition. Whereas in the past both armies have readily adapted the conceptual developments of other militaries (particularly the American and British) to suit their own circumstances, recent developments indicate a more proactive and genuinely innovative approach to overcoming operational challenges. This article examines the factors underlying this new-found innovation, positing that current operational demands and a lack of recent allied conceptual innovation have coalesced to trigger a conceptual ‘coming-of-age’ within both armies.

Conceptual innovation during the 1990s: embracing manoeuvre

Australian and Canadian army conceptual development during the 1990s was primarily characterised by an embrace of manoeuvre warfare theory. In the Australian Army, this embrace began before the 1990s, with the concept first appearing in doctrine in 1985.\(^13\) Progressively, Australian Army doctrine has developed the concept within the Australian strategic context, with the 2006 edition of the Army’s keystone doctrine declaring that ‘the Army has embraced manoeuvre theory’.\(^14\) In the Canadian Army there has been a more prominent debate about the utility of the concept in the Canadian context,\(^15\) although it has nonetheless been incorporated into operational level doctrine and, as a result, it has influenced operational thinking.\(^16\)

Yet manoeuvre warfare is not Australian or Canadian in origin. Although it has commonly been associated with Second World War German military-strategy,\(^17\) manoeuvre warfare found its
way into the lexicon of the Australian and Canadian armies by way of more recent American and British developments. Ideas developed by academics and practitioners in America and Britain during the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were first disseminated through Service journals and subsequently incorporated into doctrine. Australian and Canadian army thinking about conflict was shaped by these developments, indirectly through engagement with the academic debate and directly through doctrinal and conceptual exchanges at America, Britain, Canada, Australia (ABCA) meetings.18

Manoeuvre warfare has been broadly acknowledged as highly suitable to the Australian and Canadian armies because it is designed to destroy an enemy’s will to fight through the careful application of force against critical vulnerabilities at decisive moments.19 In other words, manoeuvre warfare provides a means for the Australian and Canadian armies to compensate for their small size while capitalising on their relative technological superiority. While this may be the case, the development of manoeuvre warfare theory in the Australian and Canadian armies nonetheless conforms to the historic trend of adapting foreign thinking about conflict to their unique circumstances.

One of the interesting questions underlying this trend is: why has it occurred? At first glance, it appears reasonable to assume that the trend is related to the relatively small size of the Australian and Canadian armies and related resource constraints. Yet the adaptation of foreign concepts to suit their unique circumstances (as opposed to simply importing conceptual developments wholesale) demonstrates that the Australian and Canadian armies are both capable and willing to undertake domestic conceptual development where required. The trend of embracing and adapting foreign concepts is more likely to have come about due to a combination of the desire to achieve interoperability with larger allies,20 and a coincidental convenience that foreign concepts such as manoeuvre warfare, once adapted, have suited the Australian and Canadian armies quite well.

**The impact of recent operations**

During the 1990s, when manoeuvre warfare theory was being incorporated into Australian and Canadian army doctrine, both armies were in different operational positions. Despite deployments to Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda early in the decade,21 the Australian Army remained mired in ‘the long peace’ that followed the withdrawal from Vietnam. The national ‘continental defence’ strategy devoted priority to the Navy and Air Force, with the Army’s role limited to repelling enemy forces should they manage to cross the ‘sea–air gap’ to Australia’s north without first being destroyed by the Navy or Air Force. While manoeuvre warfare was ideally suited to this strategy, by the late 1990s the Australian Army was suffering from a serious lack of operational experience.

This situation changed dramatically beginning with the deployment to East Timor in September 1999.22 This operation was the Australian Army’s largest since the Vietnam War, and since its commencement the Army’s operational tempo has continued to increase. By early 2008, the Australian Army was conducting four major operations—in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor and Solomon Islands.23
In contrast to the Australian Army, the Canadian Army was overstretched throughout the 1990s, deploying contingents of varying sizes to Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and East Timor. In the early 2000s the high tempo continued, with deployments to Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Haiti. Yet by 2008, these deployments had been eclipsed by a far more prominent operation in Afghanistan.

While deployments to locations such as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and East Timor gave early indications about the emerging nature of post-Cold War conflict, it is only since the commencement of the War on Terror that an accurate vision of contemporary warfare has been widely agreed upon. The result of this has been the emergence of a general consensus within the military profession about the character of contemporary warfare, something that proved elusive throughout the 1990s. For the Australian and Canadian armies, the War on Terror has removed any remaining uncertainty about the nature of contemporary warfare, bringing about instead a widespread acceptance of complexity as its defining characteristic. This shift in thinking has been of fundamental importance, as institutional agreement about the character of warfare is a vital precondition for conceptual innovation regarding its prosecution.

The nature of contemporary Australian and Canadian army operations has also been important, as they have significantly varied from past operations. In the Australian Army’s case, it has for the first time been required to sustain a military leadership role in the South Pacific. Since the beginning of the deployment to East Timor in 1999, the Army has provided operational command (and the bulk of the logistic support) to ongoing operations in East Timor and Solomon Islands, a role it had hitherto left to larger coalition partners.

Further afield, the Australian Army has deployed in its own ‘areas of operation’ (AOs) in Afghanistan (in Oruzgan Provence) and Iraq (first in Al Muthanna then in Dhi Qar). Although this is not historically unprecedented (the Australian Task Force in Vietnam deployed to its own AO in Phuoc Tuy), it has both allowed and required the Army to apply its own strategy and develop its own operational methodology. This is significant because it has required individual officers to actively think about how to best overcome the challenges presented by contemporary operations.

Arguably, the Canadian Army has undertaken one of the most dangerous roles in Afghanistan. Since February 2003, it has deployed under the auspices of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), initially assuming responsibility for security in Kabul. In 2005, the Canadian contingent relocated to Kandahar, where its force of approximately 2,500 troops has been exposed to heavier insurgent violence than exists in most other parts of the country. Given the small size of the Canadian contingent relative to American and British contributions to coalition forces in Afghanistan, the high number of casualties it has suffered (87 fatalities at the time of writing) is indicative of the threat level in its AO.

Importantly, Canadian forces have played a more ambitious role than on previous operations. For example, they conducted the primary information gathering and analysis role while in Kabul, and disseminated intelligence to allied forces, including the Americans. This more extensive role, combined with the dangerous nature of the Canadian Army’s mission, has coincided with the emergence of innovative Canadian thought about how to overcome operational challenges.
Manoeuvre and the ‘War on Terror’

Given the concept’s prevalence in doctrine at its outset, it is unsurprising that manoeuvre warfare theory has retained a highly influential role in conceptual thinking about how to prevail in the War on Terror. There have, however, been two noteworthy changes in the nature of this thinking.

First, the scope of manoeuvre thinking has been significantly broadened, to the extent that it is now in vogue to refer to ‘the manoeuvrist approach’ rather than to ‘manoeuvre warfare’, as the use of the term ‘warfare’ in the latter phrase implies a limitation that is no longer practical. Beyond simply considering the military consequences of military action, the manoeuvrist approach now needs to take into account civil–military relations and the (often strategic level) ramifications that military actions may have outside the military realm. In other words, targeting an enemy’s critical military vulnerability may deliver a military gain, but may also generate a detrimental non-military effect that outweighs the military gain. For example, the Canadian Army in Kabul received intelligence that a local warlord was planning a rocket attack against their camp. However, they did not act militarily to neutralise the threat as the political ramifications of removing the warlord from the local area would have been more detrimental to their mission in the long run than the rocket attack itself.32

Second, the emergence of complex irregular warfare has exposed to scrutiny several previously unchallenged concepts on which the manoeuvrist approach is based. For example, the ‘levels of conflict’, which first found their way into American doctrine in 1982,33 and which subsequently filtered into Australian and Canadian army thinking, are no longer clearly defined. Instead, it has frequently been observed that actions at one level of conflict increasingly have ramifications at the other levels. This is particularly true of strategic ramifications of tactical actions and vice versa, leading to declarations that the operational level of war is being ‘squeezed out’.34

Overall, it can be said that the manoeuvrist approach has been challenged by current operations, both conceptually and in terms of the requirements of its application in a non-traditional warfare setting. This has led to the further refinement of the concept to suit contemporary conditions. Blaxland, for example, developed a possible Australian manoeuvrist approach to counter-insurgency operations in the War on Terror, which took into account several of the shifting factors discussed above. In conclusion, he asserted that the manoeuvrist approach ‘needs to be expanded and more widely agreed to by Army’s key partners … on its own, the Army can take little of the “manoeuvrist” action required’. Instead, prevailing in contemporary counterinsurgency operations, ‘while involving the Army, requires a whole-of-government response’.35

The diminished role of allies

Although the characteristics of warfare are currently evolving in unique ways, the evolution of warfare itself is not unique. Indeed, no two wars have ever been the same, and armies, including the Australian and Canadian armies, have had to learn, assimilate and adapt in perpetuity in order to prevail. Furthermore, prior to the War on Terror, the Australian and Canadian armies had already adapted manoeuvre warfare to suit their unique national circumstances. The
vital difference between past and present, therefore, is that the War on Terror has involved a sustained high operational tempo for both armies, and in Afghanistan (and Iraq in the Australian Army’s case), the Australian and Canadian armies are fighting wars (as opposed to conducting peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations). These factors have arguably had the effect of speeding the pace and scope of Australian and Canadian army conceptual development.

Another important shift has been the diminished role of allies, particularly America and Britain, in driving conceptual thinking. As noted above, the Australian and Canadian armies have traditionally tended to adapt American and British conceptual developments to suit their own circumstances. Since the commencement of the War on Terror, however, American and British conceptual development has occurred relatively slowly. The reasons for this vary between countries. In the British case, the experience of counterinsurgency operations in Northern Ireland positioned the British Army relatively well from the outset of the War on Terror, and as a result its doctrinal and conceptual development has undergone only minor adjustment. Hence, there have been few new ‘ground-breaking’ British conceptual developments since the commencement of the War on Terror.36

The American case is more complex. Regarding the US Army, it has been argued that its large size has brought about what could be termed ‘institutional inertia’, and as a result of this the US Army has been slower to adapt to complex irregular warfare.37 Others have taken this argument a step further, asserting that factors stemming from a cultural bias within the US Army towards conventional warfighting have inhibited attempts to adapt to complex irregular warfare.38 Regardless of which (if either) of these views is accurate, the US Army has been slow to respond conceptually to complex irregular warfare. The US Marine Corps, which does not appear to suffer from the same challenges as the Army, has nonetheless been only marginally faster in adapting conceptually.39 In short, the Australian and Canadian armies have not been able to draw on allied conceptual developments since the beginning of the War on Terror, since there have been few developments to draw upon.

Regardless of this, it must also be noted that Afghanistan and Iraq are big countries, and what works in one province or area may not work in another.40 Since the Australian and Canadian armies are operating in their own AOs, their tactical experiences of complex irregular warfare have been unique. This has provided an additional incentive for them to develop their own operational and tactical concepts, regardless of allied conceptual developments (or lack thereof).

**Adapting to ‘complex irregular warfare’: Australian and Canadian army responses**

The result of this coalescence of recent developments has been a conceptual coming-of-age within the Australian and Canadian armies. This has been underpinned by a widespread willingness to accept the shift to complex irregular warfare, and accompanied by broad debate about how to address the problems it poses. Eventually, debate has resulted in an institutional embrace by both armies of newly developed operational concepts.

Among the ABCA armies, the Australian Army has been credited with being ‘the first to publish a comprehensive analysis of the new conflict environment and its implications’,41 releasing
Complex Warfighting in May 2004. While the timing of the concept paper’s release indicates that it was influenced by the pre-War on Terror deployment to East Timor, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly had a substantial influence over its content.

Examining numerous tactical developments, Complex Warfighting adapted several existing concepts and developed others that were more original in nature. A force structure that maintained flexibility and adaptability was deemed central to operational success in a complex environment. Building on this, a ‘capability concept’ established that forces must be ‘optimised for versatility, agility and orchestration’. These three factors were identified as critical force multipliers in complex irregular warfare, and were discussed at length in relation to six ‘combat functions’ (know, shape, strike, shield, adapt, sustain) that had been previously identified in the Army’s keystone doctrine. Finally, a ‘Chief of Army’s Development Instruction’ (CADI) established eleven ‘design rules’ to guide subsequent developments. As can be deduced from the CADI, it was not intended that Complex Warfighting constitute a conceptual end-state. Rather, it provided a starting point for further institutional thinking about complex irregular warfare.

It is the subsequent development of the ‘adaptive campaigning’ concept, released in late 2006, which represents a watershed in Australian Army conceptual thinking. Although the concept’s official definition is mundane, it is innovative because it established and enumerated at length five ‘lines of operation’ and developed a model explaining their relationship to each other within the broader political and military context (see Figure 1). An ‘adaption cycle’ (which appears to have been based upon the format of Boyd’s ‘OODA loop’) was created as a model to encourage rapid adaption within a complex irregular warfare setting (see Figure 2).
Furthermore, it was established that:

[T]he key to the Land Force’s success will be its ability to effectively orchestrate effort across the five lines of operation. As a result, the Land Force must have an inherent ability to quickly shift its main effort within a line of operation, and across the five lines of operation, in response to and in anticipation of a rapidly changing environment.48

Importantly, this concept has constituted a shift in the conceptual framework guiding operational thought within the Australian Army.

In the Canadian Army, conceptual approaches to complex irregular warfare have their lineage in the ‘transformation’ program that commenced in 1999. This process was based on a ‘three horizon construct’, which delineated between the ‘Army of Today’, the ‘Army of Tomorrow’ and the ‘Future Army’. While the first of these categories described the force in existence, the last facilitated discussion about general themes relating to force development ten to 30 years into the future. The Army of Tomorrow, which referred to the desired force structure five to ten years into the future, became the primary focus of structural and operational planning. However, it was also determined that the Army of Today needed ‘an intermediate milestone for conceptual and doctrinal design’.49 This led to the production of The Army Strategy and Force Employment Concept, released in 2002 and 2004 respectively.

Although both documents contributed to the establishment of a general direction for subsequent conceptual development, The Army Strategy contained little philosophical or conceptual discussion. Instead, it established a strategy consisting of four core objectives, and set five and ten year goals to enable the Army to reach each objective.50

The FEC, by contrast, had a similar effect to the Australian Army’s Complex Warfighting paper, in the sense that it provided a starting point for further developments. Based on lessons learned during operations in the former Yugoslavia as much as (if not more than) Afghanistan, the FEC substantially refined and developed an existing concept, determining five ‘operational functions’ (command, sense, act, shield, sustain). These were intended to provide a ‘framework for conceptual and combat development’.51

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**Figure 2:** The Adaption Cycle.
Meanwhile, the program for transformation from the Army of Today to the Army of Tomorrow focused on establishing ‘a command-centric and knowledge-based organisation’. It was also determined that ‘the Army of Tomorrow is to be a mix of medium-weight and light, information age Army that is capable of using the five operational functions … across the full spectrum of conflict’. Over the next few years, the Directorate of Land Concepts and Design (DLCD) developed a FEC for the Army of Tomorrow.

Importantly, the conceptual development process itself represents an innovative and uniquely Canadian approach. In addition to releasing a conceptual thought-piece for public debate, a fictional text set in the year 2025 was released to accompany it. The official publication of a fictional text to generate debate about the changing characteristics of warfare was originally a Canadian initiative, in this case resurrected after a lull of over 15 years. Subsequently, studies, workshops, war games and seminars were conducted, with the eventual outcome being the development of the Adaptive Dispersed Operations (ADO) concept. Significantly, ADO is an internally-derived Canadian Army contribution to conceptual thinking about land warfare.

The document that promulgated ADO, *Land Operations 2021*, initially established a conceptual framework consisting of several functional and enabling concepts (see Figure 3). Although these were mostly adaptations of existing concepts, including the five operational functions developed in the FEC, ADO itself was unique, envisaging:

> Employing highly adaptive land forces dispersed – in terms of time, space and purpose – throughout the width and depth of the battlespace in order to create and exploit opportunities, control the tempo of operations and overwhelm the adversary’s understanding of that battlespace.

![Figure 3: Adaptive Dispersed Operations: Functional and Enabling Concepts.](image-url)
The concept called for forces to aggregate and disperse throughout the AO as required, with the intent of shaping their environment. Essentially, ADO was designed to exploit the facets of the contemporary operational environment and manipulate them to the advantage of friendly forces, as opposed to simply adapting to them. Because of this conceptual approach, ADO constituted an innovative way to wage complex irregular warfare.

**Implications and ramifications**

Recent conceptual innovations in the Australian and Canadian armies are unique. Although the manoeuvrist approach remains a valid paradigm, and was taken into account during the development of the adaptive campaigning and ADO models, the models nonetheless represent a move beyond manoeuvre thinking in both armies. This is an important development as it will shape how each army conducts operations over the coming years, and will also play a role in the development of military-strategy. Indeed, conceptual development is already linked to the Australian Army’s ‘hardened and networked army’ (HNA) project and the Canadian Army’s transformation program. In effect, this signals a broader linkage between conceptual developments and force structure and acquisitions, and Australian and Canadian conceptual innovations are already beginning to influence force development projects within both armies.

Another important ramification is the potential impact these conceptual developments may have on alliance relationships, especially within ABCA. Whereas traditionally, American and British developments have flowed into the Australian and Canadian armies, recent developments have partially reversed this trend, with the International Institute for Strategic Studies noting that ‘large portions of the new US future land warfighting concept appear to have been drawn directly from the Australian Complex Warfighting doctrine’. Since conceptual developments often act as a catalyst for force planning and acquisitions, the US decision to incorporate Australian ideas into its own conceptual development will help ensure ongoing interoperability. Furthermore, the decision is indicative of an enhanced Australian Army reputation in senior US military circles. This reputation yields broader alliance benefits for Australia, including intelligence sharing and access to US military technology, benefits that, inter alia, enhance the Australian Army’s capabilities.

Finally, it should be noted that both the adaptive campaigning and ADO concepts call for prosecution by highly mobile, well-armed (and armoured) and ‘networked’ forces. Such forces are expensive, however, and sufficient funding is a key requirement for the successful implementation of both concepts. Preferably, funding will also need to be accompanied by supportive strategic policy. Fortunately for both armies this environment exists at present. In Australia, the HNA and Enhanced Land Force (ELF) projects (costing a total of $A5.6 billion) are accompanied by a strategic policy focus on a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to security challenges, which aligns with the Army’s perceptions of its role in prosecuting complex irregular warfare. In Canada, strategic policy has emphasised an approach labelled the ‘three-Ds’—diplomacy, development and defence—which incorporates military and other agency contributions in an overall approach to contemporary operations. Furthermore, the Harper Government has been generally supportive of the Army’s transformation program.
Of course, such funding and policy support is not guaranteed forever, and a change in the political climate could easily bring about an end to the implementation of contemporary Australian and Canadian army conceptual developments. Whether this would be accompanied by a return to the traditional pattern of adapting foreign concepts to suit local needs, or whether Australian and Canadian army conceptual innovation would continue, albeit in a different direction, remains to be seen.

**Conclusion**

Since the beginning of the War on Terror, there has been general agreement about the changing characteristics of contemporary warfare. These characteristics include a move into complex terrain and the need for joint and inter-agency approaches to overcome complicated operational challenges. In short, the contemporary operational environment is characterised by the existence of complex irregular warfare. In this environment, operational demands on the Australian and Canadian armies have driven institutional thought about how best to overcome contemporary operational challenges.

Conceptually, both armies have an historical tendency to adapt foreign concepts to suit their own needs, the ongoing development of the manoeuvrist approach providing a prominent example. In recent years, however, operational demands have coalesced with a lack of allied conceptual developments to generate a situation that has encouraged the Australian and Canadian armies to innovate conceptually in an unprecedented manner. The result of this conceptual coming-of-age within both armies is the development of operational concepts which are now beginning to guide broader force development projects and, as a result of the flow-on effect of their impact on operational thought, the prosecution of current operations themselves.

In the Australian Army’s case, this model is adaptive campaigning. In the Canadian Army’s case, it has developed ADO. Although the concepts have some similarities (as they are both responses to the contemporary operational environment), both nonetheless remain unique. Of equal importance, particularly in the Canadian Army’s case, the concepts are the result of a development process that has been innovative in its own right.

Importantly, the subsequent implementation of conceptual innovation has been made possible by conducive strategic policy and funding for acquisitions. Both armies are presently fortunate enough to be in a situation where strategic policy and funding support are usually forthcoming. Should this environment change, it will be interesting to see whether the recent level of conceptual innovation continues or whether a return to the traditional pattern of adapting foreign concepts to suit the unique circumstances of both armies resumes. If this were to happen, it would be a pity, as recent conceptual developments in the Australian and Canadian armies represent important milestones in the broader development of both as effective, modern military forces.
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NOTES


2. It should be noted that ‘complex terrain’ is characterised by complex geography, especially in an urban environment, and also by complex human and information terrain. In other words, beyond geography, the concept of ‘complex terrain’ refers to the presence of enemy combatants, civilians, aid workers, the media and other groups within close proximity (and usually to a difficulty distinguishing between them), and to a lack of control over information flows through an area of operations. Note also that while the term ‘War on Terror’ is used herein for ease of reference to the post-September 11, 2001 era, in Australia the term is no longer in vogue (having been unofficially superseded to an extent by the ‘The Long War’), while in Canada the term ‘campaign against terrorism’ has been more popular from the outset.


8. In particular, these operations were East Timor for the Australian Army and the former Yugoslavia for the Canadian Army.


11. Canadian Army, Purpose Defined: The Force Employment Concept for the Army, (no place of publication or publisher given), 31 March 2004.


18. The ABCA Armies’ Standardisation Program was established in the aftermath of the Second World War to ensure interoperability levels obtained during the war were ongoing. Although the program has had a ‘hit-and-miss’ track record, ABCA meetings have nonetheless remained an important forum for the exchange of ideas between the American, British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies (the latter being given formal membership status in 2006). Richard A. Cody and Robert L. Maginnis, ‘Note to File – Coalition Interoperability: ABCA’s New Focus’, Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 86–90.


32. ibid., p. 44.


37. ‘Complex Irregular Warfare’, p. 418.


39. ‘Complex Irregular Warfare’, p. 419.


41. ‘Complex Irregular Warfare’, p. 418.


43. ibid., p. 19.


46. Adaptive campaigning is simply defined as ‘actions taken by the land force as part of the military contribution to a whole-of-government approach to resolving conflicts’. This definition could be
applied to virtually any concept involving land forces. See: Department of Defence (Australia), Australian Army Concept, *Adaptive Campaigning*, p. 4.


51. Canadian Army, *Purpose Defined: The Force Employment Concept for the Army*, p. 13. The five operational functions are a refinement of the six combat functions model previously developed by the Canadian Army. Notably, the Canadian Army’s six combat functions are identical to the six operational functions used by the Australian Army, the Canadian-originated concept having been dispersed via ABCA sometime around 2000 or 2001.


55. This Canadian tradition dates back to the later part of the 19th century, although the most recent official publication prior to the release of *Crisis in Zefra* was *Counterstroke*, published in 1989/90. See: Andrew B. Godefroy, ‘Fictional Writing and the Canadian Army of the Future’, *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 93–98.


57. Source for Figure 4: Godefroy (ed.), *B-GL-310-001/AG-001 Land Operations 2021*, p. 11.


59. ibid., pp. 18–22.


61. ‘Complex Irregular Warfare’, p. 419. Note that although the International Institute for Strategic Studies refers to *Complex Warfighting* as ‘doctrine’, it is actually a concept paper.

62. This reputation has been confirmed by several military and other sources. See, for example: Greg Sheridan, *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US–Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2006, esp. pp. 161–171.


65. Although the election of the Rudd Government in November 2007 brought about a change in the Australian political climate and some cuts to Australian defence spending, the Rudd Government has committed to provide sufficient funding to allow the Army to continue the implementation of the HNA and ELF initiatives. See: Mark Dodd, ‘Defence Cuts “Endanger 4th Destroyer”’, *The Australian*, available online, posted 24 March 2008, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23420309-31477,00.html>, accessed 12 July 2008.

66. Since the first draft of this article was produced, the Australian Army has released a new edition of its keystone doctrine, *Fundamentals of Land Warfare*. This edition continues to maintain that ‘the Army has embraced manoeuvre theory’, although it also incorporates a discussion of ‘adaptive action’ and the ‘lines of operation’ that the adaptive campaigning concept detailed. This inclusion indicates a more formal acceptance of adaptive campaigning as a core component of the Australian Army’s approach to contemporary operations. See: Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, 2008, esp. Chapter 4.
Decision Support Tools for Operations Planning

Brice Mitchell, DSTO

Introduction

Motivated by the need for systematic and analytically rigorous support to operations planning, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) has developed modelling and analysis concepts, tools and techniques that support and enhance operations planning, doctrine development and training. Research and experimentation has been conducted through observation and participation in a variety of planning activities in conjunction with organisations such as the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC) and Headquarters 1st Division (HQ 1 Div), formerly the Deployable Joint Force HQ (DJFHQ). This has enabled DSTO to gain requirements for tools that support the operations planning process. Experiences and interactions obtained have been used to develop, test and refine prototype tools that support the planning process. The outcome for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is an enhanced capability for operations planning, doctrine development and training. This article outlines the operational level planning process, including reference to the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP), a decision-making process that guides military staff in producing an operational plan. A number of tools have been developed to support this process by adding analytical rigor through a ‘quick and easy’ graphical interface.

The operational level planning process

An operational level planning process enables staff officers to generate a plan for a military operation. The Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP)\(^1\) is the doctrinal decision-making process that guides military staff in producing an operational plan. The JMAP comprises four consecutive and iterative steps as illustrated in Figure 1: Mission Analysis, Course of Action (COA) Development, COA Analysis, and Decision and Execution. All JMAP steps are supported with intelligence update activities provided by the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process and is usually preceded by a Preliminary Scoping activity to analyse the superior headquarters’ intent and guidance to set the context for operational level planning.

The planning support tools

Increased operational tempo combined with an increased complexity of operational requirements, has provoked the need for software tools to be developed to not only reduce the time spent planning, but also to enhance planning and provide insight into various situations. To enhance the operational planning process, a suite of tools has been developed which enables the user to develop an Operational Plan, in particular supporting Centre of Gravity (COG) analysis and COA development activities. These tools provide analysis capabilities to aid the decision-making process of the planner.
The tools have been designed to support the current doctrinal JMAP process but are also flexible to variations of the JMAP if the planners do not have time to do a JMAP or have Standard Operating Procedures that require a different process to be followed. The tools do not aim to provide support for all steps on the JMAP, but can easily be integrated with other tools due to the underlying data storage. The analysis capabilities enhance the process by adding rigour and providing in-depth analysis of the COG and COA.

Joint planning and analysis system

In order to support the military planner, DSTO have designed a flexible framework called the Joint Planning and Analysis System (JPAS) to enable various individual JMAP applications to be integrated. By flexible I mean that the system is flexible to the type of planning being conducted and it does not require the user to complete every step in a process or steps in any set order. This framework is made up of a number of components including a graphical user interface (GUI), a web service, a storage area and a number of analysis engines. Currently, some components must be installed on a DSTO network due to restrictions of the Standard Operating Environment (SOE) on the defence network. However the graphical user interface can be accessed via any internet browser on a terminal within the Defence or DSTO network. This enables the technology to be used and evaluated by the military. Since the tools are currently prototypes for the purpose of eliciting requirements, only basic security functions have been provided. Military users are aware of these limitations.
The JPAS architecture is depicted in Figure 2. Information is captured and displayed in the GUI. The system is controlled by the web service which controls flow of information to and from the GUIs, the data storage and analysis engines. Once analysis has been conducted, the results are sent back to be displayed in the GUI. A user can retrieve the stored data from any terminal on the Defence network. There are a number of advantages achieved by using the system described above. One of these is that any new features can be immediately deployed onto the system to users by changing the version within the web service. The next time the user loads this particular page, they will be using the new version without the need to ‘update to the latest version’. Also, any data which is stored on the server side can be easily accessed and updated to conform with the latest version of the tool. Last of all, the system allows distributed sharing of information with military staff located in different areas, as long as there is network access.

**ScratchPad technology**

To support the framework described above and have a solution that can be immediately used on the Defence network, DSTO has developed a technology called ScratchPad. The ScratchPad technology is a user-friendly graphical web-based application which allows military staff to develop planning products and outputs ‘quickly and easily’ including COGs and COAs. In particular, the ScratchPad technology allows the user to develop graphical models using a network visualisation which assists a user’s understanding of the problem. As the formal accreditation process for defence applications can take some time due to policy constraints and testing procedures, DSTO developed a system that contains the core functionality of the analysis module but is capable of running on the current SOE. The ScratchPad interface is written in
JavaScript programming language which is supported by the standard version of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. Though JavaScript is somewhat limited in programming functionality, as compared with other languages, it still provides the functionality required and users can access the tools from the more restrictive SOE on the Defence network.

As the technology is intuitive, the ScratchPads require minimal training which greatly facilitates use for both training and operations. The advantage of having a common ScratchPad interface for a number of tools is that once a user is familiar with one tool, they can easily learn how to apply the other tools.

In this article we will discuss three types of ScratchPads developed including the Centre of Gravity (COG) ScratchPad, the Course of Action (COA) ScratchPad and the Course of Action Scheduling Tool (COAST) ScratchPad. There are a number of analysis engines associated with each ScratchPad which consist of mathematical algorithms that have been developed to analyse the military planning domain. These three ScratchPads are discussed in the following sections.

**COG ScratchPad**

The COG ScratchPad supports parts of the JIPB, Mission Analysis and COA Development JMAP steps, in particular the development and analysis of the enemy and friendly COGs. The COG ScratchPad facilitates a rigorous and systematic approach to COG development and analysis, and enhances this process by allowing the user to conduct a relative Critical Vulnerability (CV) analysis. This vulnerability analysis is a valued element as it identifies the CVs which will have

![COG ScratchPad](image-url)
the biggest impact on the COG. Models are graphical and hierarchical, and allow the user
to easily brainstorm elements in the model and specify dependencies between elements via
drawing of an arc as shown in Figure 3. To assist the user in viewing the model, an automated
layout can also be applied which dynamically updates the positions of the nodes using various
predefined algorithms.

The COG ScratchPad allows effective development of the COG model, based on the quick and
easy interface discussed previously. COG models are typically structured like the one shown
in Figure 3, the COG node at the highest level is dependent on nodes representing high-level
Critical Capabilities (CCs), which are dependent on Critical Requirements (CRs), which are
further dependent on Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs). The COG ScratchPad captures and graphically
displays development of the COG/CC/CR/CV relationship structure via a causal network and
allows a functional decomposition of the centre of gravity to identify its influencing elements.
This type of decomposition ensures that the direction of influence travels up the hierarchy. In
other words, targeting a CV at the bottom of the hierarchy produces an effect on all related
elements higher up in the hierarchy.

To add further fidelity to the model, a user can overlay subjective weights which allows the
user to specify which elements are more important. This is achieved by adding weights to
links in each section of the model. In the Figure 3 example, Force Projection is supported by
Strike Capability and Amphibious Forces. The weight refers to the relative importance of Strike
Capability to Force Projection in comparison with other nodes contributing to Force Projection
(i.e. Amphibious Forces). Once a model is developed in the COG ScratchPad, the information
can be sent for impact analysis to determine which CV will have the biggest impact on the
COG. This utilises the underlying COGNET analysis engine which in turn uses the Hugin
Bayesian Belief Network software for COG analysis. Results are displayed through an ordered
list of influential CVs (see Figure 4). A common eXtensible Markup Language (XML) schema
allows information to be exchanged between the ScratchPad tools, in particular, CVs which
are identified to be targetable. When a possible/allowable effect can be achieved on this CV,
this effect/CV pair can be imported as a task into the COA ScratchPad.

Figure 4: The Critical Vulnerability Analysis.
COA ScratchPad

The COA development phase of the JMAP involves defining, selecting and sequencing tasks, under constraints, to meet desired objectives or end-states. The COA ScratchPad allows users to capture and graphically display the development of detailed Decisive Points (DPs) and Lines of Operation (LOO) as shown in Figure 5. It allows the user to develop broad COAs as a diagram consisting of DPs sequenced into LOO. It also allows the user to use standardised shapes, arcs, and font sizes, which saves time and gives greater consistency over the use of Microsoft Office products for this purpose. By using the COA ScratchPad, the information is not only captured graphically, but also formally, so the information can be used in other tools within the JPAS. The information can also be output into various forms such as a DP Matrix and Synchronisation Matrix within a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.

The COA ScratchPad utilises the same quick and easy functionality described earlier, and someone who has used the COG ScratchPad previously will already be familiar with most features of the COA ScratchPad. The COA ScratchPad enables the identification of tasks that contribute to achievement of DPs. Through the identification of these tasks, and the capturing of them formally in the COA ScratchPad, the user can easily import these tasks into other tools within the JPAS, including the COAST ScratchPad (see next section) which allows further details to be added to the COA and analysis to be conducted. The COA ScratchPad allows multiple tasks to be added which could visually clutter a LOO diagram; hence one feature allows tasks to be contracted to visually simplify the picture.

Figure 5: The COA ScratchPad.
The COA ScratchPad also allows consideration of the analysis conducted on friendly and enemy COGs. Critical Vulnerabilities that have been identified in COG ScratchPad can be imported into tasks in COA ScratchPad. This enables users to consider how to defeat or protect the COG through the COA. A number of approaches exist for both determining the DPs and how LOO diagrams are represented. A benefit of this tool is that it is flexible and does not enforce a single process that the user must implement. This means that the use of the tool is not restricted to users who want to follow the JMAP, or any other military planning process, step by step. As with the COG ScratchPad, the XML schema allows information entered into the COA ScratchPad to be used in the COAST ScratchPad. In particular, the tasks which have been identified can be detailed with more information so that they can be automatically sequenced and scheduled using an analysis engine in the JPAS. This transfer of data avoids the need to enter the data twice.

COAST ScratchPad

In the COA development phase of planning, a military planner must consider a large number of military tasks which must be defined, resourced, and sequenced in order to achieve a desired end-state. There exists complex causal interdependency among these tasks induced by effects that need to be achieved, and there are potential conflicts in resource requirements that must be addressed for any feasible COA. All of these factors contribute to making planning a complex business. This is the motivation behind the development of an automated scheduling tool such as the COAST ScratchPad. While the COA ScratchPad saves time on an existing process, the COAST ScratchPad is a decision support tool that aims to support COA Development by providing a mathematical representation of the COA which allows mathematical rigour through the quantitative analysis of the COA. The COAST ScratchPad allows the user to logically define the detailed description of military tasks (required conditions, resulting conditions, resource requirements, duration) while the mathematical formalisms remain hidden to the user. Through integration into the JPAS framework, broad COAs can be imported from the COA ScratchPad, and tasks can be automatically sequenced into a feasible schedule using an automated scheduling algorithm developed using a custom built Coloured Petri Net analysis engine.4

The COAST ScratchPad formally captures and graphically displays (see Figure 6) a set of tasks to be performed in a specified order through the effects that need to be achieved. The term ‘effect’ here refers to (1) the required conditions for the task to execute, and (2) the conditions that arise as a result of the execution. Other task information that can be specified includes task duration, and resource requirements. These tasks are formally represented in XML which enables quantitative COA analysis through automated planning and scheduling algorithms. This analysis determines whether the defined tasks have a logical sequence to the end state and whether it is feasible with the resources available. The result provided includes GANTT chart schedules for tasks, descriptions of how effects are achieved and whether phase timings are in line with earlier estimates. This information can also be output into a Synchronisation Matrix format which can be loaded in Microsoft Excel. It is anticipated that outputs such as the Synchronisation Matrix and GANTT Chart from the COAST ScratchPad would input into the COA Analysis (war game) part of planning.
The ScratchPad suite of tools and the JPAS have also been designed so that they can be easily integrated with other applications. One of the applications with which this system has been integrated is the Joint Planning Tool (JPT), also known as the JMAP Planning Tool. The JPT was developed to meet the requirements of distributed and collaborative planning environments at HQ 1 Div and has been used in both exercises and operations.

The JPT is a collaborative authoring tool that allows distributed and simultaneous planning. JPT encompasses JMAP’s principles and guidelines in each of the planning stages and allows users to step through the process using the tool. Multiple users can contribute to the planning process at the same time, which is particularly useful during the Mission Analysis phase when a large amount of data needs to be captured from multiple sources. Information entered into the tool is captured in a structured way and allows the information to be sent to various outputs including Microsoft PowerPoint and Word. Integration of the JPT into the JPAS enables ready access to the ‘quick and easy’ functionality and analysis capabilities of the ScratchPad tools and allows products developed in the ScratchPads to be automatically generated into documents and briefs.

Figure 6: The COAST ScratchPad.

JMAP planning tool

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Conclusion

DSTO has developed a suite of mathematically based operations planning support tools which provide analytical rigour to COG and COA development and analysis while the underlying
mathematical formalisms remain hidden to the user. These tools enable the planner to quickly and easily develop planning products through the user-friendly ScratchPad interface. The system allows the tools to be integrated and avoids duplicated data entry and effort. These tools are continuously evolving through evaluation at ADFWC courses, HQ 1 Div exercises, and HQJOC interactions. The prototype tools combined with the feedback received during experimentation also provide requirements and encapsulate many years of experience and expertise that are informing the Joint Command Support Environment (JCSE) JP2030 project which is delivering future joint operations planning capabilities. Although the prototype tools are still under development, the framework applied does allow the tools to be used in their current form for ADF activities.

Editor’s Note

*Internet Explorer, Microsoft, Microsoft Office, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft PowerPoint and Microsoft Word* are registered trade marks of the Microsoft company.

Brice Mitchell is a science and technology officer in the Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Division at the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). He joined DSTO in 2000, as a Systems Modeller and Analyst, and has since worked on the design and development of prototype software tools to support military operations planning. In his current position, he is investigating new methods and processes for intelligence support to full spectrum operations planning. His educational background includes a Bachelor of Science in Mathematical and Computer Sciences at the University of Adelaide in 1999, and a Bachelor of Applied Science (Honours) in Industrial and Applied Mathematics at the University of South Australia in 2002, with Thesis titled ‘Formal Specification and Initial Analysis of an Operational Planning Process using Coloured Petri Nets’.

### NOTES


Twenty-First Century Chaplains and their Role in the Australian Defence Force: Leaders, Innovative and Tough

Colonel Chris Field, Australian Army

Father Glynn Murphy, the Senior Chaplain of the 1st Australian Division (1 Div), recently asked the author to think about, and discuss, his expectations of unit level chaplains in the 21st century Australian Defence Force (ADF). In particular, Father Murphy informed the author that he was seeking a commander’s view on what makes chaplains helpful and what makes them unhelpful, with the view to inculcating ADF chaplains with good habits early in their service.

As the author thought about the issues put to him by Father Murphy, the author decided to concentrate on three universal expectations that he has formed about chaplains during 20 years of commissioned service, for seven of which he was a commander, at various levels, in Australian Army infantry battalions. These three universal expectations are recommended for ADF chaplains to ensure they are always leaders, innovative and tough.

In this Long War, it is critical that ADF chaplains are part of the overall warfighting capabilities of the ADF. Chaplains are not a luxury, and chaplains are not employed in the ADF for decoration. The ADF needs chaplains to contribute directly to tactical success in complex warfighting environments. The application of these three universal expectations will, in the author’s view, enhance the ability of ADF chaplains to support and empower ADF personnel in this physically, mentally, and morally demanding fight in which the ADF is engaged.

Leaders

Australia does not have a strong religious heritage. We do not have Australian equivalents of the American Pilgrims or Puritans. Instead, the Australian character, both male and female, tends to overlook religion in favour of hardiness and self-reliance in a tough unforgiving physical environment.

An ADF chaplain therefore, never gets a free ride. Experienced chaplains will know that making oneself relevant is a challenge in ADF units, especially units training for combat which tend to be dominated by ‘blokey’ and macho cultures. Chaplains will find that ADF units are not dominated by a single religion, but are fragmented into the major world religions, minor religions, and non-believers. All of these people need to be embraced, usually by a sole chaplain, in increasingly busy and operationally focused ADF units.

A chaplain needs to be part of the leadership team of the unit. The chaplain needs to be connected to the commanding officer and his or her key staff, and connected to the other hierarchies within a unit. The chaplain wears an officer’s rank, and on occasion may need to enforce that rank, but a chaplain is a chaplain first, and an officer second.
The chaplain’s leadership needs to embrace all members of a unit, especially those members outside the formal unit hierarchy. In an Australian unit, almost everybody, except perhaps the most junior member of the unit, has a strong opinion about how to best run the organisation and in which direction the unit should take. These strong opinions are in fact the kernels of leadership that thrive in a unit environment, and these kernels form the basis of much of the ADF’s warfighting success.

The chaplain should be positioned to nurture these kernels of leadership. The chaplain is another leader in the unit and, importantly, like other non-military sourced professionals such as the unit doctor, nurse, and resource manager, can see and harness leadership and the leadership qualities inherent in other people, through different eyes. The chaplain’s eyes are influenced by years of religious study and experience. The chaplain understands the unique style of leadership required of religious ministries. And a good chaplain will impart that leadership, often in a seemingly secular manner, to help grow more leaders for a unit and for the ADF.

Innovative

Innovative

A chaplain in an ADF unit has one person for whom he or she is directly responsible—themself. This is appropriate and deliberate. This lack of direct responsibility gives the freedom to be responsible, in a general sense, for every person in the unit, and often for people outside the unit.

Innovation will distinguish a chaplain not only from other chaplains but, importantly, from the other officers, and the hierarchy, of a unit. Innovation for a chaplain comes in many forms. Innovation may be based on a chaplain’s unique religious skills such as links to local churches, festivals or counselling services, or on leading the unit preparation or response to welfare issues, emergencies, stressful situations, or traumatic events. Innovation may be based on how the chaplain connects with people in a non-religious manner, through sport, through special interests, and through participating in the everyday working lives of people.

Innovation may also be the manner in which a chaplain leads the other support services available to units. Chaplains can help synchronise the effects of unit medical support, philanthropic services, physical training specialists, cultural leaders and trainers, and welfare personnel into a powerful single entity that has the primary goal of supporting people in a unit.

A good chaplain will directly assist a commanding officer by independently coordinating personnel issues in a unit. A good chaplain can be like a 7th Company Commander, meaning that a chaplain may be so trusted as to be considered as an additional commander, or an additional leader, in supporting the objectives of a commanding officer.

The author experienced one chaplain fulfilling, in a welfare matter, the de facto role of a company commander when a soldier was identified by the chaplain as having some significant psychological issues. The chaplain took the soldier into his care and, while keeping the chain of command aware of his actions, was instrumental in having the soldier diagnosed, treated, counselled, supported, and finally transitioned to civilian life. By fulfilling these actions, the chaplain was able to relieve the actual company commander of a series of responsibilities.
related to the soldier’s wellbeing, while ensuring that the best interests of the soldier, and the ADF, were maintained.

Such innovation is time consuming and, arguably, outside the pure role of a chaplain. But, the 21st century ADF is too busy to have the luxury of a chaplain who cannot take the lead in a unit environment. No one in the ADF can be a single-shot system, or a stove-piped effect, or unable to be innovative, or incapable of synchronising with other unit and non-unit capabilities. A chaplain is no different. In the words of Brigadier Neil Weekes, AM, MC, who was a platoon commander at the Battle of Fire Support Base Coral in Vietnam in May 1968, all people in a unit, including chaplains must be prepared to ‘lead, follow, or get out of the way.’

A chaplain who wants to positively impact a unit, should actively seek innovative ways to add value to that unit. A chaplain should not wait for opportunities but seek to be involved in all aspects of unit life and use their unique training and life experiences to enhance support for people in the unit. A chaplain should also look at the unit needs through the eyes of a person who is fundamentally a chaplain first and an ADF officer second.

**Tough**

The ability to be tough may be a unique requirement of military chaplains. ADF personnel will need the support of a chaplain, and they will need to be encouraged and guided by caring and sensitive religious ministers. ADF personnel also need chaplains who are able to put realism in their lives. As noted, a good chaplain will be part of the leadership of a unit, but will be clearly outside the formal hierarchy of that unit. A good chaplain gives people, particularly people who feel vulnerable or disempowered, an option for support and counsel. Equally important in a chaplain’s repertoire is the ability to show a tough side to the people within a unit. It may be that a chaplain is best placed to tell people to ‘wake up to themselves’ and take responsibility for their own actions. This ability and skill is extremely important, particularly in the current societal climate of political correctness. Sometimes a chaplain will be the only person in a leadership position in a unit who is trusted enough to hear a person’s confidential thoughts and issues. The chaplain must use exceptional judgment to ensure that this position of trust and influence is utilised in a manner that is best for the person, the unit, and the ADF.

Sometimes a chaplain will need to give a person, ‘hard love’. ADF service is not for everyone. The ‘Long War’ requires a tough fight and, understandably, not all Australians are suited to the demands of fighting an elusive and innovative enemy in complex environments. The operational tempo of the ADF is such that many people have now deployed overseas on three or four occasions, or more, and, quite understandably, families feel that they need attention above the requirements of the ADF. A chaplain must be able to identify the signs in people who have had enough, and need a change. Needing a change may lead to people leaving the ADF, or changing their professional lives within the ADF.

A chaplain who is mentally strong and morally confident is able to deliver tough advice; not only to people who need a change, but to unit leadership, including the commanding officer.
A tough chaplain with moral fortitude and courage will save lives. No unit can ask for more from their chaplain.

A chaplain must also be physically and emotionally tough. Just like any leader, the chaplain will be fallible, have fears, and at times feel unsure or uncertain. Like any leader the chaplain must overcome these points of friction and, above all other duties, continue to lead within the unit and the wider ADF.

This type of perseverance requires a physically and mentally robust person. The best chaplains will possess and harness this toughness. A good chaplain can expect to have forthright discussions with all members of a unit, from the sailor, soldier, or airman or airwoman who has a personal issue to the commanding officer who has a policy that is dangerous or simply just wrong.

**Conclusion**

The task of a unit chaplain is not for everybody, just as leading people is not for everybody. Chaplains of any religious background who apply the three universal expectations of being leaders, innovative and tough will find that they enjoy their experience serving with a unit, and that they make a difference to the lives of people.

Making a difference is a key role for a good chaplain, and the 21st century ADF needs chaplains who are leaders first. Such leadership will continue to support ADF warfighting capabilities throughout this ‘Long War’.

*Colonel Chris Field, is the Director Combat Development, Future Land Warfare, Army Headquarters, Canberra. He has commanded in 1st, 2nd, and, 2nd/4th Battalions of The Royal Australian Regiment. He has served with the Australian Army in Malaysia, East Timor, and Solomon Islands; the US Army in Kuwait and Iraq; and, with the United Nations in Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. He is a graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy; Royal Military College, Duntroon; US Marine Corps Command and Staff College; US Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting; and, Australian Institute of Company Directors.*
NOTES

1. A ‘unit’ in the ADF is defined as an organisation commanded by a lieutenant colonel (equivalent), and may be designated as a: ship; shore-establishment; battalion; regiment; air force squadron; or air force wing.

2. The role of the Royal Australian Army Chaplaincy Department is:
   a. provide religious and pastoral support to commanders at all levels in accordance with established policy and guidance;
   b. collectively, provide a religious ministry and character development program to all elements of the Army; and
   c. denominationally, provide religious ministry to denominational members.


   'With its formal embrace of the term “long war,” the Bush administration has turned a simple descriptive phrase into an official name for the war on terrorism, and possibly catapulted it into the ranks of such other era names as “Cold War” and “World War.” The phrase has a long history. It has been applied to the 15-year war between the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire that started in the 1590s. It also was a name proposed by University of Texas law professor Philip Bobbitt to cover a collection of 20th-century conflicts, from World War I to the Cold War, which resulted in democracy triumpthing over communism and fascism.

   Its recent rise to rhetorical prominence in the U.S. military, according to several military officers, began in 2004 with General John P. Abizaid, the Central Command chief who oversaw military operations in the Middle East. Abizaid invoked the phrase to underscore the long-term challenge posed by al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups.'

4. The Official Website of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, available at: <http://www.sec.state.ma.us/cis/cismaf/mf2.htm>, accessed 4 September 2007. The Pilgrims, seeking religious freedom, set sail for North America in 1620 and established their colony in Plymouth. There they set up a democratic government in accordance with the terms of the famous ‘Mayflower Compact’, an agreement binding all to conform to the will of the majority. In spite of great hardship, the Pilgrim settlement prospered … and in 1621 the first Thanksgiving was observed.

   The Puritans, who were also determined to find a place where their religious views and practices would be free from persecution [left England for Salem by ship] in 1628 led by John Endicott.

5. This analogy is somewhat parochial, indicating that an Australian Army Infantry Battalion has, currently, six Companies. Rather than Company Commander, titles such as Divisional Officer or Squadron Commander may be used by other ADF Services, or other non-Infantry Army units.
Book Reviews

CHINA’S ENERGY STRATEGY: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies

Edited by Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William S. Murray
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2008
ISBN: 978 1 59114 330 7

Reviewed by Andrew Forbes

This is an important book, not the least because Australia is in the process of developing a new Defence White Paper, and the information, analysis and conclusions are relevant to its authors as well as other regional defence planners.

The economic growth of China, and its emerging strategic clout through the use of soft power has regional and global ramifications that will increasingly impact on Australia. From an Australian perspective, Japan and China are amongst our largest trading partners, and we also have considerable trade with South Korea and Taiwan; thus in an economic sense, North Asia is critical to Australia’s wellbeing and should assume greater strategic importance in national security planning. Yet there are deep historical and cultural tensions in North Asia, where some states do not like or trust each other. This is further compounded by disagreements over maritime boundaries and access to seabed natural resources, a resurgent and unpredictable Russia, as well as the continued role of the United States (US) in the region. All this makes Australian foreign and defence policy development difficult.

Energy security is an emerging issue in strategic studies and will remain so for a considerable period. This book, the published proceedings of a conference at the US Naval War College, makes a major contribution in the field. It examines how China perceives its energy requirements and security, Chinese policies to ensure supply, the maritime dimensions of these policies and what this may mean for the US. Importantly, the book is not a stereotypical US rant against the threat of China. It is a detailed analysis of the issues by policy makers with decades-long experience with China, and from the younger academic contributors, an analysis of Chinese thought using Chinese language primary sources.

China’s energy demand is growing and the Chinese Government is concerned with ensuring continued supplies, as well as matching future global production with its needs; of course this is complicated by forecast growth in demand from the rest of the world, particularly from India. A number of chapters examine energy demand and supply issues, including the active steps the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is taking to decrease its fuel usage. Other authors examine China’s developing relationships with a variety of countries and regions where Chinese
oil companies are investing in local oil and gas industries; of course it is not evident that such purchases will necessarily ensure supply, unless there is 100 per cent ownership. Australia is not immune to this policy, with Chinese companies attempting to buy into Australian resource companies, not only to ensure ongoing supply but also perhaps to force down prices. This increased Chinese involvement in what are predominantly developing countries around the world affects the operations of the United Nations Security Council where China occasionally vetoes some resolutions that may impact on these energy contracts. Of course this is nothing new as all members of the Security Council have cast a veto to suit their national interests.

There are a number of aspects of China’s energy strategy that are directly relevant to Australia. The most important is what has been termed the ‘Malacca Dilemma’, where elements within the Chinese Government and academia see the continued US protection of global sea-lanes (which has benefited China greatly), as a strategic vulnerability if the United States were to blockade Chinese energy imports transiting the Malacca Strait. It certainly isn’t clear that this option is under policy consideration in the West, whereas as a practical issue, the identification and targeting of ships transporting fuel to China would be difficult to determine (not least because cargoes can be sold many times while the ship is in transit). But it appears the Chinese perceive this as a distinct possibility, so the West needs to counter this view, while incorporating the perception into its strategic assessments, and foreign and defence policies.

China is responding in two ways to this threat: increasing the size of its tanker fleet, and modernising its navy. Looking first at the tanker fleet, it currently transports only about 20 per cent of China’s oil imports, but some advocate it should carry about 80 per cent by 2020. While this has economic benefits of increased shipbuilding and employment, it also has a defence dimension where the PLA Navy (PLAN) would then be able to convoy its tanker fleet if necessary—a state can only convoy ships under its flag. What is less clear is whether the growth in the PLAN is linked to energy security and ensuring the safety of energy imports, to provide forces that can threaten Taiwan and/or Japan, or whether it is the natural maritime assertion of a continental power with a very long coastline. The short and most difficult answer is—it is a mixture of all of the above. Across a number of chapters, the modernisation of the PLAN is considered as well as its possible use in a number of scenarios.

An option for China is that it focuses more on the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait to protect its energy imports, rather than tackle the US Navy in the Pacific Ocean. With the creation of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in New Delhi in February 2008 to provide a forum for Indian Ocean rim maritime forces to discuss relevant maritime issues, and the clear implication in Indian Maritime Doctrine that China is not welcome in the Indian Ocean, strained relations between India and China could ensue. Australian defence planning may become more complex given our increasingly strategic relationship with India, notwithstanding Australia’s current refusal to supply them with uranium.

This book is a must read for those interested in energy security and in Chinese naval developments. It should also be of interest to those involved in Australian defence and security planning for the insights it provides on Chinese thinking and actions. Highly recommended.
DUTY FIRST: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment

Reviewed by Colonel Chris Field

Purchasing, in 1990, the first edition of Duty First: The Royal Australian Regiment in War and Peace, as a 25 year old lieutenant, I was struck by the toughness, heroics, and valour of my Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) forebears. While I enthusiastically absorbed the RAR's history, I felt that the book’s title ‘in War and Peace’ applied a dichotomy to the Regiment; the stories of Korea, Malaya, Borneo, and Vietnam, related to ‘War’, and the service of post-1972 members of the RAR, related to ‘Peace’.

It is therefore pleasing to note the subtle change to Duty First’s title that the original editor David Horner, now accompanied by Jean Bou, has made to this important history, which simply states: Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment. For, importantly, the dichotomy that seemed to exist for the RAR in the 1970s, 80s, and most of the 90s, has largely gone. The soldiers of the RAR now frequently uphold the toughness, heroics, and valour of their forebears in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, and Solomon Islands.

As editors, Horner and Bou faced, I suspect, a tough job. They had to edit a book of approximately 400 pages (edition 1, 413 pages and edition 2, 427 pages), while adding another 18 years of RAR history. And these 18 years of history defy simple descriptions, covering RAR operations in: Somalia; Cambodia; Rwanda; East Timor; Iraq; Afghanistan; and Solomon Islands. The editors have managed to keep all 13 original chapters, and have adjusted Chapter 14, An Individual View, by removing some articles that have been amply covered in other biographical works, while adding four new Individual View articles.

Unfortunately, space has meant that Duty First, edition 2, has deleted Appendices that cover: RAR prisoners of war in Korea; brief outline of actions earning regimental battle honours; and, Unit Citations. This is understandable, but seems to offer an opportunity for the RAR to consider publishing a ‘Duty First – Part 2’, which would seek to supersede the, usually somewhat outdated and not widely available, RAR Standing Orders. Duty First – Part 2 could be available to the general public, and members of the RAR alike, and could include the deleted Duty First, edition 1, Appendices, combined with information on RAR Regimental alliances, mascots, unique forms of dress, customs and traditions.

Significantly, while toughness, heroics, and valour of my RAR forebears, and contemporaries, still resonate throughout Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment, a golden thread of modernisation also runs through this volume. In short, the modernisation of Army parallels the modernisation of the RAR. The pages of Duty First demonstrate that when Army has tried...
to change in the face of strategic and operational needs, the RAR has been at the forefront of those changes.

As with edition 1, the strength of *Duty First* remains with the quality of individual chapters, which are carefully woven together by the editors. The authors, some with military backgrounds, some with RAR backgrounds, and many without either, develop a convincing narrative that describes hardships, challenges, victories, and disappointments of the RAR since inception.

This book is an important update that describes the regular conventional infantry capabilities maintained by the Australian Army. That said, and as *Duty First* amply demonstrates, the RAR has never fought alone, and all members of the ADF and Army will find lessons to be gleaned from this operationally focused volume.

The final word on this comprehensive history must go to the late Major General A.L. Morrison, who, as Colonel Commandant of the Royal Australian Regiment, wrote the timeless preface to the 1990 edition of *Duty First*:

> The key to the success of the regiment has been the good leaders, good non-commissioned officers and good soldiers. I am sure that our soldiers are, and have always been, second to none and this history is a stern testimony of that.

### 3 PARA

Patrick Bishop  
HarperCollins, 2007  
ISBN: 978 0 00 725780 5

**Reviewed by Dominic Katter**

The former foreign correspondent Patrick Bishop’s monograph *3 Para* focuses on the fierce battles in the remote Afghanistan province of Helmand. Bishop’s non-fiction work provides a well-researched insight into the British Regiment (3 Para) in its Afghanistan deployment.

It was Sir Winston Churchill who articulated the idea of a permanent airborne force for the United Kingdom. Bishop in this work explains that, ‘the new regiment was intended to bring together the fittest, most motivated and resourceful men available’. Its purpose was to cause the maximum damage to the enemy with minimal or no support. It was expected to operate behind enemy lines undaunted by overwhelming superior enemy forces. Its spirit is summed up in its motto, *Utrinque Paratus*—ready for anything. Since the Regiment’s creation in World War II, 3 Para has developed a reputation for bravery and resilience.
In 2006, a 3 Para battle group was deployed to the remote and arid Afghan province of Helmand. It is this deployment which is the primary subject of Bishop’s research. Bishop details what could be described as a ‘classic’ 3 Para mission, well behind enemy lines, with ‘faint’ supply routes, in an area that is remote and exceptionally dangerous. His account of the constant fighting (138 contacts in three months) also expresses the ‘frontier’ that is Helmand and the daily danger faced by the troopers.

All indications are that Bishop was given considerable access to information and stories by members of the battle group. He has provided detail that allows the reader to consider the individual trooper’s existence. His book also deals with life ‘in camp’, relations with local villagers and the impact of battle upon the Regiment generally.

Further, the author illustrates the limitations of modern military technology. Despite superior weapons, training and resources, the Regiment as part of a combined force was challenged in its ability to control physical territory. In this context, it has been alleged that one of the former commanding officers of 3 Para resigned after his deployment to Afghanistan, due to ‘poor pay, lack of equipment and medical treatment’.

Generally, 3 Para is a comprehensive account of the latest chapter in the history of a distinguished regiment. It is a detailed description and a fascinating account of a truly remote front of the war in Afghanistan, while being a confronting reminder of the ongoing challenges faced in Afghanistan by coalition forces.

**JOURNEYS WITH THE BLACK DOG:**
Inspirational stories of bringing depression to heel

Edited by Tessa Wigney, Kerrie Eyers and Gordon Parker
Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2007
ISBN: 9781741752649

Reviewed by Alayne Russell

This is a book about depression, largely written by people who have suffered, or are still suffering from the disease. The ‘Black Dog’ of the title refers to how Sir Winston Churchill thought about his experience of depression. The compilers have collected thoughts from many people, under different headings, to try to make depression more generally understood in the community.

Each chapter heading describes a step in the progression of the disease, and the diagnosis and recovery of the sufferer. The book takes the reader from an introduction of what depression is, through the symptoms and experiences, to some sort of recovery and subsequent management of the problem. In the process it also attempts to help the carers and those around the sufferer to understand and give support, and bring some positive thoughts into the whole.
The three compilers are all associated with the Black Dog Institute, and obviously have gathered the thoughts that are published here from people with whom they have come into contact in the course of their work.

As a person who has suffered from depression, I found it both highly engaging, and deeply difficult to read. I agreed with many of the comments made by the sufferers, but it was very hard to let myself remember the emotions of depression brought up by my reading.

This book would be a helpful tool for anyone who is trying to understand a loved one’s experience of depression. If you are suffering without help, the book will let you feel that you can ask for that help. And if you are a sufferer, it will give you some relief to know you are not alone, and provide some positives to help you to recover. At the very least, the front and back cover illustrations will make you smile! I highly recommend it.

THE AIRMEN AND THE HEADHUNTERS:
A true story of lost soldiers, heroic tribesmen and the unlikeliest rescue of World War II

Judith M. Heimann
Harcourt, Inc., Orlando, Florida, USA, 2007
ISBN: 978 0 15 101434 7

Reviewed by Jerry Bishop

I found this a rather strange book to be asked to review for the Australian Defence Force Journal (ADFJ). What, I wondered, was its relevance to members of the Defence community in 2008?

Firstly, it was about United States Army Air Force (USAAF) and United States Navy (USN) air crew shot down over Borneo in 1944 during attacks on Japanese shipping and facilities in the vicinity of Brunei Bay. Of what relevance was this to the readership of the ADFJ?

Secondly, it was also about the tribesmen and women (Dayaks) and Dutch colonial officials who harboured and protected the survivors of two downed American aircraft in seriously inhospitable surroundings—both natural and military. The crimes by the Japanese against such people are well documented so what more needs to be said? As it turned out—quite a lot.

Although not quite a text book on survival and leadership in difficult and trying circumstances, Judith Heimann has written an engrossing story in the style of a novel and the participants’ reconstructed thoughts and conversations are used widely to keep the narrative flowing.

Judith is [or was] an American career diplomat who first heard the story she tells while living in Borneo. At that time, she was researching another book about a British Army Officer, Major Tom Harrisson, who led a group of Australian and New Zealand special forces personnel tasked
with trying to locate and repatriate downed airmen as well as gather intelligence prior to the allied liberation of Borneo. She decided the story of the airmen deserved a book of its own—and she was right.

Although much of her narrative must be regarded as speculation, it is also backed up by extensive research and interviews with the surviving airmen, tribesmen and their descendants.

It turns out to be a ripping yarn and the pace of the story kept this reader engrossed and wondering what was going to happen next. The survivors of the crews of the two aircraft which were shot down on different missions do not meet up until quite late in the narrative. In the meantime, the author gives us some idea of their struggle to survive, the ethical dilemmas posed for the tribesmen who have embraced Christianity when asked to defend them, and the risks to all concerned for sheltering the airmen from the Japanese.

Indeed, it becomes obvious that the only reason the tribesmen did not deal harshly (or indifferently) with the airmen was that the missionaries with whom they had had contact (all subsequently murdered by the Japanese) were themselves Americans. Americans who had treated them with respect, kindness and courtesy.

During the months following their downing the USAAF personnel were constantly on the move, being clothed, fed and cared for by the hospitable Dayaks and the local Dutch colonial District Officer (DO) (Mr William (or, more likely, Willem) Makahanap)—who happened to be Javanese. Not surprisingly, the Japanese, aware that American aircraft had been shot down, decided that not enough was being done by the tribesmen or the DO to capture and hand over the airmen so they sent in the troops.

Some of the USN personnel who were trying to make for the north coast found themselves among less hospitable people.

Likewise, the Japanese troops and officials sent to find the USAAF personnel had to face the protective measures being taken by the Dayaks and the DO. The Dayaks were well aware of the brutal treatment their missionaries received at the hands of the Japanese so things get quite gruesome at times, but the Dayaks maintained their respect for their ancient customs and rituals even though they were dealing with the very people who had murdered the missionaries.

Finally, Major Harrison and his group are parachuted in to the east of the island and the situation changes dramatically. The Americans now know what is happening in the outside world and what the Allied plans are for Borneo. Furthermore, those who are up to it become part of Harrison's team.

The narrative contains a number of instances where leadership is lacking and others where it is present in full measure. It also reveals some instances of people thinking that leadership skills flow from rank rather than ability. To this reviewer, Major Harrison falls into the former category whereas the Javanese DO shows character, ability and leadership skills far beyond his calling and falls into the latter category. Mr Makahanap was a true leader who stuck to his principles despite the very real danger that doing so posed to both him and his family.

As a story of leadership, courage, endurance and determination in the face of adversity, I recommend this book.
Essays on morality, politicalisation, ‘guideposts’, principles, codes, creeds and values are not the expected reading material for an intelligence analyst. Indeed, such a collection of ethics-based writings is a most unlikely feature of the profession’s tradecraft. Yet, intelligence professionals face the dilemma of acting ethically but at the same time engaging in what some have portrayed as an unethical business—spying.

By-and-large, intelligence analysts are recruited with academic backgrounds in such fields as sociology, criminology, anthropology, psychology, history, political science and the military sciences. While obtaining their professional credentials analysts are likely to have been indoctrinated in the philosophy that they must be ethical—for instance, to take responsibility for the mental, emotional and physical wellbeing of those they research.

The question that therefore arises is: ‘Should intelligence analysts be bound by the same ethical guidelines as their social and behavioural science brethren’? If so, how does one reconcile being asked to carry out secret intelligence research where the welfare of the researched is not only removed from the fore of the analyst’s considerations but is unlikely to even feature anywhere in their research methodology. Likewise, how do analysts restrain their personal opinions from making their way into a formal assessment? How do they guard against presenting their own beliefs in the intelligence product? How do analysts maintain professional distance and not attempt to influence policy makers through their analytic product?

Then there are the questions at the opposite end of this ethical issue, exemplified by what the Australian Government was accused of doing with intelligence assessments on Iraq. These intelligence products were purported to have been qualified to reflect the ambiguity of the situation in that country prior to the war. However, former intelligence analyst with the Office of National Assessments, Andrew Wilkie, alleged that the Howard Government skewed these findings by taking the ambiguity out of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue and presenting what appeared to be a clear-cut situation to the public (p.188). How does an analyst deal with this type of problem?

Given the breadth and scope of these dilemmas, what guidelines should intelligence professionals follow?

Goldman, who teaches ethics and intelligence at the Joint Military College in Washington DC, has edited a book of readings on the moral dilemmas inherent in intelligence work—collection, analysis and covert operations. The Ethics of Spying is an insightful collection of
open-source and recently declassified articles, essays and speeches on professional integrity, ideals, standards and guidelines.

Goldman has arranged the readings into four parts with the first examining the issue of ethics within the intelligence community in its widest context—he says, ‘…“truth” is a goal, yet deception, secrecy and morally troubling compromises are often necessary’ (p. x). Whether it is collecting data by deception, or, say, coercing criminals into becoming informants, the effects of such actions on intelligence officers can be profound. Having to decide what is ‘right’ can result in self-inflicted psychological damage as well as suffering the real-world consequences from actions taken (reflect on what Mr Wilkie risked by blowing-the-whistle on the Iraq war and WMD).

Part Two focuses on intelligence collection and analysis. Of particular interest to analysts will be the declassified speech by the then Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, in the CIA auditorium in March 1992. Gates discusses how politicalisation manifests itself in different ways—from deliberately distorting analysis and judgments to suit the preferred line of thinking, to forcing intelligence products to conform to policy makers’ preconceived views. He also talks about how management can apply pressure to ‘...define and drive certain lines of analysis and substantive view points’ (p. 172), or to alter the tone or emphasis of the product or the process that created these products, or to limit alternative viewpoints expressed within.

The points made by Gates were given new currency when they were echoed in the Report to the President of the United States by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (31 March 2005). This report pointed out the key intelligence briefings to White House personnel and senior executives were skewed. The report said that these intelligence products demonstrated ‘...attention-grabbing headlines and drumbeat of repetition, [that] left an impression of many corroborating reports where in fact there were very few sources. And in other instances, intelligence suggesting the existence of weapons programs was conveyed to senior policymakers, but later information casting doubt upon the validity of that intelligence was not. In ways both subtle and not so subtle, the daily reports seemed to be “selling” intelligence in order to keep its customers, or at least the First Customer, interested' (WMD Commission, 2005: p. 14). It’s interesting that Gates’ insights preceded the Commission’s findings by some 13 years—it highlights how short corporate memories can be for ‘lessons learned’.

Part Three addresses intelligence operations—overt action—by field operatives. This section is not just a rehash of the anti-intelligence literature that abounded some years ago but literature that stimulates meaningful debate. James Barry’s article on ‘Managing Covert Action: Guidelines from Just War Theory’ is outstanding in this regard (pp. 248–265).

Barry argues that creating a framework based on Just War guidelines could prove a credible basis for mounting paramilitary operations as well as those involving various forms of coercion and violence in its different manifestations. Although it goes without saying that it would be unrealistic to think such an approach on its own would eliminate the controversy surrounding covert action; nonetheless, Just War Theory is a credible platform for announcing the fact that a government is interested in the issue of ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’ and addressing it in an atmosphere of openness and transparency (and in doing so, making sure that this important policy option is still viable).
Part Four looks at the ethics in some selected parallel professions that have been associated with intelligence gathering—sociology, anthropology and business. Darren Charters’ article on the challenge of ethical competitor intelligence (or as it is termed in some countries—business intelligence) is worthy of note (pp. 362–377). In this article he provides a ‘tool’ for gauging whether one’s actions could be deemed ethical or not. His tool—is particularly helpful for analysts who are operating in an environment that does not have formal policies or guidelines in place.

Using the acronym CHIP, Charters constructs a four factor process by which an analyst can weigh the gravity of their proposed actions—Community virtues, Harm, Individual as end, and Personal virtues. Using a matrix approach CHIP compares ethical theories by considering the planned competitor intelligence activity from the perspectives of Utilitarian, Kantian, and virtue ethics. Though one could argue CHIP is not a substitute for ethical training, the model does offer a realistic means for benchmarking ethical competitor intelligence activities. Its use would certainly encourage quality and consistency in order to avoid violating professional standards (as well as legal statutes—lest we forget Watergate…).

Overall, *Ethics of Spying* is a significant contribution to the literature of intelligence. The collection of writings forms an intellectual springboard that prompts executives to formulate ethical codes for both research analysts and field operatives. It also induces managers and practitioners to work through the issue of ‘doing the thing right’ when confronted with the dilemma of ‘doing the right thing’. But the readings that Goldman has compiled also show that in reality the distinction between these two paths should be made with some temperance. One must always be conscious that the final judgment will be grounded in what the people and their constitutionally elected representatives consider ‘necessary and proper’ in the context of the threat (thinking particularly of international terrorism and transnational crimes such as the trafficking in arms, drugs and humans).

For intelligence practitioners who have from time-to-time wrestled with their inability to reconcile what they learned in their academic training with the expectations placed on them by their industry (and those that will…), this is a book that will inspire. It is a ‘must read’ for every military, law enforcement and private sector intelligence professional.

**STRATEGIC COUSINS:**
**Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British and American Empires**

John C. Blaxland
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006
ISBN: 9780773530355

Reviewed by Brian Bertosa

*Strategic Cousins*, by the Australian Army’s Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland, is a book delivering, in the main, exactly what the sub-title promises: an historical overview of the
military contributions of Australia and Canada in light of the two countries’ relationship with their primary security benefactor—Britain, supplanted in the mid 20th century by the United States. Beginning in the 19th century, the narrative unfolds chronologically, with chapters dealing with the two world wars, the Cold War and the so-called ‘War on Terror,’ among others. Over half of the 231 pages of main text deal with the period after World War II. Those with an interest in current affairs, then, are as suitable a readership for this book as those with a more historical focus.

Mainly published—as opposed to archival—works, both primary and secondary, went into the making of this monograph, and the author feels a need to defend this practice in his introduction. This is not surprising, given that the book likely stems from the author’s PhD work at Canada’s Royal Military College (Kingston, Ontario) earlier this decade. However, a synthetic history such as this—that is, one that synthesises the histories of two different countries and their armies over the span of their existence, noting their similarities and differences along the way—is no place for a document-based approach. That being said, there can be very few works of importance—whether books, journal articles, theses, and much else besides—missing from Blaxland’s bibliography, which impresses by its depth and range. Running to 30 pages, it can serve as a valuable research short-cut for students of military history, foreign affairs or defence policy in either country.

Interesting elements of Blaxland’s presentation are his forays into what he calls ‘plausible alternative scenarios’ (p. xxi). Struck by the magnificent results obtained by Australian and Canadian troops fighting side-by-side at Amiens in 1918, the author chooses at various junctures in the text to speculate on what might have happened had the two countries’ forces collaborated at other times. The results can be stimulating. For example, from World War II comes his suggestion that:

[together, if they [Australia and Canada] could have agreed to cooperate in the use of their forces, be it in Singapore, New Guinea, or elsewhere, they would have been of ‘European great power proportions’—as their combined feat of arms in August 1918 had once demonstrated. (p. 99)]

If by ‘European great power proportions’ is meant numbers, then Colonel Blaxland’s suggestion appears unrealistic, as can be determined from his Chart 6, ‘Commonwealth military strengths, Second World War’ (p. 96). There, it is clear that the combined forces of Australia and Canada in that conflict amounted to no more than a quarter those of the UK, to say nothing of US forces. More interesting still is his suggested location for the combined effort. While Australians may, with some justification, have disparaged the Canadian Army’s role in guarding the UK while the former were gaining valuable combat experience in North Africa, Britain was still very much the ‘mother country’ for most English-speaking Canadians. This sentiment, coupled with (among many other concerns) the sinking of shipping in the St. Lawrence River by German U-boats, would have ensured a speedy demise for any suggestion that Canada devote all of her effort to the Pacific. One might just as plausibly have asked the Australians to send the entire 2nd AIF to help garrison the UK, or participate in the Normandy landings, while the Japanese were in New Guinea and bombing Darwin. With there being no question (after Australia brought her troops home from the Middle East) of either country splitting her army between the two oceanic theatres, the concentration of Australian forces in the Pacific and Canadian forces in Europe was, in my view, the only plausible scenario.
The chapter dealing with the most recent period, ‘Responding to the Long War on Terrorism,’
highlights the hazard of bringing one’s analysis too close to the time of writing—namely, that
one’s interpretation, or even just the overall tone of the writing, may be overtaken by events.
This is well illustrated by Blaxland’s approach to the operations in Iraq of 2003. (While events
from 2006 are alluded to, e.g., the election of Stephen Harper’s Conservatives in Canada, it
appears that the bulk of the research for this book was completed before the end of 2003.)
Unmistakably in favour of his country’s participation in that venture, he quotes from an
Australian Government source expressing concerns about weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq—with no indication that WMD proved to be arguably the biggest canard among the
justifications for intervention. The author cites articles, all but forgotten now, by right-wing
Canadian journalists chastising their country for staying out of the war, and we are even treated
to nauseating sermons on ‘values’ by Victor Davis Hanson. Writing qua military historian,
Blaxland would have done better to confine his efforts to periods that have had sufficient
time for mature reflection, but qua political scientist (the methodologies of both disciplines
are employed in this work), he of course has to engage with current events as best he can.

Following the main body are 45 pages of appendices consisting of charts and tables comparing
the two countries and their militaries, an historiographical essay well illustrating the dearth
of previous work on Blaxland’s topic, and Appendix Eight, ‘Exploring the Parallels between
Australia and Canada,’ arguably the most provocative part of the book. Here, Blaxland cuts
to the heart of the phenomena both of Australia’s relative bellicosity and Canada’s relative
complacency (relative to each other, that is) in military affairs, and it should not make
comfortable reading, particularly for Canadians. Among many examples, his identification
of the electoral importance of the province of Quebec, the traditionally isolationist stance
of Quebecers, and the efforts of successive federal governments, particularly Liberal ones,
to accommodate defence policy to this mindset, holds particular explanatory power. That
being said, the surprisingly muted response of Quebecers to the recent deaths of some of
their soldiers in Afghanistan, contrasting greatly with the histrionics of some members of the
Quebec elite during the world wars, suggests that a less anti-military outlook may have lain
unsuspected there for a considerable time now.

If any theme in Strategic Cousins could be said to be a preoccupation of the author, it is that
there has been so little cooperation between the Australian and Canadian militaries over the
course of their histories. On that subject, I have to side with those who ‘may contend that there
must be good reasons why this state of affairs has been so enduring’ (p. 221). For the period
of World War II, I have already provided some likely reasons. For the present day, Blaxland
himself (acknowledging the contribution here of his fellow PhD candidate, Robert Addinall)
provides an explanation in Appendix Eight. After explaining how Australia’s geo-strategic
isolation forces it to take defence seriously, we are told that:

Canada’s strategic position has also tended to make it a complacent ally that Australians have
not considered worth pursuing vigorously as a close security partner, beyond their shared
membership in quadripartite (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada) and other
U.S.-led fora. (p. 275)

Difficult stuff for a Canadian to read, but more difficult still to refute. Nevertheless, perhaps
a more satisfactory explanation, valid for both countries, would be that the militaries of both
Australia and Canada are simply too small to be serious strategic partners. With the demise of the British Empire in the middle of the last century, the United States is really ‘the only game in town’. Isolated as they are on the edge of Asia, the Australians are keen to court the biggest security benefactor in the Anglosphere, and to maintain their goodwill. The US fulfills the same role for Canada by geographic default. Perhaps Australians are simply puzzled, maybe even envious, that Canadians largely take for granted that for which Australians feel they have to work so hard.

This book is unfortunately marred by numerous niggling errors that, for the most part, could not reasonably have come from the pen of a senior army officer; as just one example of many, in Appendix Three, ‘Military Hierarchy Terminology,’ naval ranks appear under the heading of ‘Air Forces,’ and vice-versa. However, since these occur mostly in the charts and tables, i.e., in material that would have received a going-over by the staff at McGill-Queen’s, I feel the blame must lie squarely at their feet. Colonel Blaxland’s writing is tight, his narrative brisk and confident. Given the breadth—thematic, geographic and chronologic—of material he discusses, it is difficult to imagine a person on either side of the Pacific who would not gain something from Strategic Cousins.

THE BATTLE AT NGOK TAVAK:
A bloody defeat in South Vietnam, 1968

Bruce Davies
ISBN: 978 1 74175 064 5

Reviewed by Jim Truscott

When I first starting reading this book, I had never heard of this bloody defeat and its place in the overall war. I actually found it tedious to wade through the background information. For such a small engagement it is thoroughly well researched, with almost too much detail for a reader such as myself who is not so much interested in the technical discrepancies between official reports and individual memories. Clearly such gaps are a fact of life when men in the same battle and on both sides often have different recollections of events before, during and after.

But then everything changed and I quickly realised that while the prelude was full of detail, it was also totally necessary. This is an incredible tale of small unit action that has to be told because it is a unique part of Australia’s military history. It is a blow by blow account of a Vietnamese indigenous reconnaissance company with Australian company and platoon commanders supported by a US Marine artillery platoon in an isolated and run down French fort on a knoll in the path of the 2nd Division of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). What an incredible combination of units and circumstances in late March 1968 brought on by the lack of NVA success with the earlier Tet offensive.

The reconnaissance company was located about seven kilometres away from a battalion size US Special Forces (USSF) base at Kham Duc to patrol forward to the border with Laos. The
problem was that the reconnaissance company was not designed for static defence and it was very much out of role. It was a portent of things to come that some of the indigenous troops deserted two of the Australian Army Training Team (AATTV) platoon commanders while on a patrol away from the fort. When subsequently reinforced by a Marine artillery detachment it simply put them further in defensive posture. To make matters worse the Marines were not jungle troops and the two guns made the hill a much more attractive target for the ensuing attack by the 40th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment led by Major Mai while the remainder of the 2nd NVA Division focused on Kham Duc.

Everything that could have gone wrong is then played out over 12 hours from the assault beginning before dawn through to early morning reinforcement failure and subsequent early afternoon abandonment, evacuation and helicopter extraction. The attack starts with some of the indigenous Vietnamese troops showing their true colours as traitors and turning on the remainder of the company. The battle chapter is racy and courageous. There are descriptions of the different groupings of indigenous troops shooting each other. There are accounts of all manner of local counter attacks. The early morning reinforcement is a total debacle with two helicopters shot down. There are dead and dying everywhere on both sides before the decision is made by the VC to withdraw and subsequently for the reconnaissance company to abandon the position against the desires of their higher US command. In retrospect and many years later Captain White, the Australian officer in command who was 25 years old at the time, blames his youth and lack of experience for not standing up to his American superiors and allowing the company to be used as VC bait.

It then gets worse as one of the US artillery officers, who flees clinging to a medical evacuation helicopter skid, falls to his death. The landing zone then becomes blocked leaving the company with little choice but to move well off the knoll and seek helicopter extraction elsewhere. This action is itself a close run event with the helicopters having to ditch all loose items just to be able to lift off the ground. Then to top it all off Kham Duc camp containing the US battalion base is abandoned two days later anyway.

The unilateral decision by Captain White to abandon the knoll leads to schism between the AATTV and USSF which clearly had significant tactical ramifications across Vietnam at the time. There is also a head-shaking explanation about the decision by Australian authorities not to award a bravery medal to Captain White because his brother was also serving in Vietnam at the time and had just been decorated.

The after action analysis is riveting reading especially as the battle was not necessary for the NVA, the indigenous troops were clearly not suitable in defence and the artillery were not ready for an infantry battle. These four pages are all important, all too short, but absolutely brilliant. The book does not end there. There is an agonising chapter with accounts of family notifications in the US and multiple unsuccessful searches for bodies all too long after the war. There is an entire chapter on the obsession to look for the dead and the obstacles of American politics in coming to terms with the Vietnamese victors. It is not until 1998 that some excavations enable DNA analysis of some body remains and closure for some American families.

It is fitting that the book finishes with Captain White meeting with Major Mai on the knoll in 1995 for the first time and realising that they were only five metres apart at the height of the battle. This book is a must read for junior and senior combat commanders alike in Special Forces, Infantry, Artillery and Aviation.
The Australian Defence Force Journal seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters such as Strategic Studies, Security and International Relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the Journal does not pay for articles, but a $500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best per edition.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable. Length should be between 3,500 and 5,500 words (which allows a spread of articles per journal). Please spell check the document with Australian English before sending.

Articles can contain endnotes, bibliography and brief biography.

Endnotes are required in the style:

References or Bibliography in the style:

Tables, maps and photographs are also acceptable, but must be of high enough quality to reproduce. Photographs must be at least 300 ppi in TIF format and be directly pertinent to the article.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by an independent referee with some knowledge of the subject. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Managing Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and if accepted, will be published in the next Journal. Be advised, it may take quite a while from submission to print.

Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Managing Editor via Internet email at: <publications@defence.adc.edu.au>.

Authors accept the Editor may choose to make minor editorial adjustments without reference back to the author. The theme or intent of the article will not be changed.
Mending Defence’s Broken Backbone
Nick Warner, Secretary, Department of Defence

The Weaponisation of Space: The Next Arms Race?
Air Commodore David Steele, RAAF

It’s Lonely at the Top:
Career Progression for Female Officers in the Australian Defence Force
Major Anne Goyne, AAPsyct

Australian Defence Force Powers to Arrest and Detain Civilians
Dr John Tarrant, University of Western Australia and RAAF Reserve

The Relevance of the Surface Warship as a Weapons System: An Australian View
Dr John Reeve, University of New South Wales at ADFA

New Zealand’s Military and Policing Efforts in the Pacific
Dr B.K. Greener, Massey University

Moving Beyond Manoeuvre:
A Conceptual Coming-of-Age for the Australian and Canadian Armies
Aaron P. Jackson, Flinders University and ARes

Decision Support Tools for Operations Planning
Brice Mitchell, DSTO

Twenty-First Century Chaplains and their Role in the Australian Defence Force:
Leaders, Innovative and Tough
Colonel Chris Field, Australian Army