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This issue of the *Australian Defence Force Journal* (ADFJ) is my last as Commander of the Australian Defence College (ADC) and Chairman of the Board of Management of the *Journal*. As I said in issue 164, the *Journal* is in a new phase of its production. The ADFJ is now published quarterly. It has a new format and thematic layout. Articles are being submitted from the Service studies centres, and professional research notes have been included.

As always the *Journal* aims to provide an avenue for members of the defence community to make a contribution to the debates on a range of issues including; strategy, tactics, logistics and related defence topics. The ability to sustain the *Journal* is obviously reliant on the availability of quality articles. I therefore once again urge you all to participate in shaping the future by submitting articles or alerting the editor to articles you have seen elsewhere that you believe could be reproduced.

In a sense the *Journal* has similar aims to the ADC. The *Journal* aims to inform and promote discussion on important issues of national and international defence and security matters. The College aims to produce graduates with the critical thinking skills necessary to work in the modern security environment. Like the *Journal*, courses at the College embrace the lessons of history, including reflection on the performance of commanders, leaders and managers.

The application of military power, in the modern security environment, requires officers and officials who can think beyond training and doctrine. Traditional subject based teaching has limitations and more active learning, especially problem based learning, is now vital in teaching officers and officials how best to provide advice and take decisions. The ADC has established learning methods that place increasing emphasis on ‘how to think’ rather than ‘what to think’. I am sure that future submissions to the *Journal* will embrace this same philosophy. I look forward to reading them.

In closing I would like to thank the members of the Management Board and the editorial staff of the *Journal* for their support and efforts in reinvigorating the ADFJ. While the job is always ongoing, I am confident that their efforts will ensure its continued success in the future.

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Personality Type and Military Culture in the Anglo-West

Lieutenant Colonel H. Bondy, Canadian Forces Army

Introduction

The correlation between personality and military leadership in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and the US (CANZUKUS) has usually been explored within the cultural tradition of the Anglo-West. This approach is dominated by modernism, the presumption of a meritocracy within an egalitarian social order, the notion of a fair social contract, and a social science research program based on pragmatic functionalism. This has produced familiar advice that allows institutional problems to persist for generations.

As an alternative, this article uses the critical discourse of continental philosophy to question Anglo-Western culture and arrive at more innovative options for reform. Many mainstream academics in the Anglo-West, of course, have long incorporated much of the continental tradition, including postmodernism. As a result, post-Vietnam, non-military social scientists, especially anthropologists, became increasingly aware that they belonged to a war discipline. They largely ceded the field to the error-prone, military sub-discipline (McFate 2005). My analysis attempts to find a more moderate view of military culture that uses continental philosophy to critique veiled social dynamics, divisions and ulterior behaviour (Ingram 2002).

The article focuses on executive category officers at the rank of colonel and the four grades of general. Besides their demonstrated success at getting promoted, executive officers control the most salient factor shaping institutional culture—selection for promotion (Watkins and Snider 2002). Attention is also limited to CANZUKUS militaries because they have much in common regarding culture, organisational design, key personnel policies and the interaction between executive officers and the rank-and-file. Militaries elsewhere, even in the West, differ sufficiently to require a separate discussion.

Institutional problems in Anglo-Western militaries

There is substantial literature cataloguing the shortcomings of CANZUKUS militaries as learning and problem solving institutions. Much has also been written about an erosion of trust and confidence within the ranks toward executive category officers. In Canada, a series of high profile internal Canadian Forces (CF) studies from 1949 to 1999 reported persistent problems and a continuing crisis in leadership (English 2001: 68–71). In a recent CF Army climate survey, only 32 per cent of respondents disagreed with the statement ‘Leaders in the Army above my unit’s chain of command are prepared to do unethical or immoral things to further their career’ (Bradley et al. 2004). Executive officers themselves reported that the CF human resource system was “‘fragmented”, “in crisis”, in “free-fall”, with policies that are conflicting, anachronistic and unfair” (Catano, Jackson and Macnamara 2000: 12). According to James (2000) and Warn (2001), the Australian Defence Force (ADF) suffers from learned helplessness that has failed to address institutional shortcomings for more than 25 years. Jans and Schmidtchen (2002)
criticise ADF selection policies for promoting conformist, cautious tactical officers in lieu of reflective institution builders. In the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), executive category officers have perennial problems implementing reforms (Carruthers 2002). There is inter-Service rivalry, a dysfunctional materiel acquisition process and misconduct related to media leaks and partisan politicking (Carruthers 2002; Financial Review 2000–01). Executive officers in the UK attempt to dismiss evidence of soldier brutalisation, prisoner abuse and bullying (Bourke 2005; Irwin 2005). A survey of military ‘leavers’ also pointed to a significant decrease in trust within the ranks. They felt that leaders were not honouring the social contract, had ‘hidden agendas’ and made decisions that were ‘politically driven’ (Higate 2001: 26). In the US, Spinney (2001: 373) calls the successive failures to construct a viable post-Cold War military strategy a ‘defence death spiral’. A US forces-wide research project found that selection continues to reward behaviour aimed at ‘short-term, career enhancing accomplishments at the expense of long-term institutional needs’ (Dorn et al. 2000: 70). The project report added that many well-informed officers and non-commissioned officers ‘expressed disappointment in their senior service leaders’ and that just over a third could agree that their senior leaders were honest and trustworthy (Dorn et al.: XXII)

Research on generals in Germany, the US and Canada found that the rate of promotions for executive officers depended on political skills in ‘working the system’ rather than any other personal competency (Cotton 1997: 4). Cotton (1997: 7, 10) calls National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa a ‘battle ground… open to abuse by the “dark side” of leadership and narcissistic personalities’.

An inability to adapt generates undesirable secondary effects and wasteful externalities. The long-standing dissatisfaction expressed by the rank-and-file toward executive officers points to structural alienation and a lapse in ethics.

**Anglo-Western culture and selection**

Regarding the role of modernism in the Anglo-West, Gergen and Thatchenkery (1996) explain how it affects culture much more deeply than the application of simple management or scientific techniques. Modernism presumes that truth and knowledge are obtained through rational individual behaviour, observation, empirical data and egalitarian debate through objective language. Modernist management systems, they counter, are not the result of value-neutral optimisation but inherently benefit insiders in authority thereby generating costly externalities. Burrell and Cooper (1988) maintain that so-called management science is based on anthropomorphic cultural biases. Modernism is often deeply submerged as a basic cultural assumption, moreover, especially in non-adaptive organisations where it is unavailable for analysis and criticism. The legitimacy of modern leadership largely depends on the modernist assumption that centralised, hierarchical selection systems will promote the most rational, qualified and meritorious individuals for the common good of everyone in the institution.

The belief in an egalitarian meritocracy presupposes a just social contract as evident in the Anglo-Western philosophy stretching from Hobbes and Locke to Rawls and Nozick. At the same time, communitarian moral codes emphasise duty to others in the form of patriotism and self-sacrifice (Ingram 2002). A society based on the maximising-individual of classical economics,
Furthermore, presumes conscious, self-directed behaviour. Self-interest is usually lauded as a positive actor in Western civilization necessary for bureaucratic meritocracies, optimising markets, democracy and even the attainment of Protestant virtue (Huntington 1996). Taken together, these beliefs legitimise the CANZUKUS selection systems, which are supposed to be based on fair, egalitarian competition.

Research on selection within CANZUKUS emanates from a relatively small group of academics specialising in military social science separate from the larger academic community (Ouellet 2005). Morris Janowitz, often viewed as the founder of modern military social science in the US, asserted 'society is served by armed forces', 'military roles simply adapt to geopolitical events', and 'the human will of soldiers' is subordinated 'to the interests of societal elites' (Ouellet 2005: 7). In general, military sociology's philosophy follows a linear analytic technique, deals with a limited range of issues and emphasises variations on the idea of a social contract.

This confluence has produced military selection systems reliant on systematised performance appraisal procedures, centralised rating schemes, simplistic models of self-interested motivation and clearly delineated career paths. These industrial age techniques have become a key characteristic of military personnel policy since they were introduced in the US during the Progressive Era (Vandergriff 2002). Mechanistic selection practices, however, do not survive contemporary scientific review. Murphy and Cleveland (1995) describe how both raters and ratees actively distort appraisals. Over half of any performance score varies according to a long list of submerged factors, such as personal likeability, shared personality traits, idiosyncratic ideas about performance, stereotypes, prejudice, self-interest, factionalism, and variations in work context. Selection for special mentoring, for example, has always included a strong element of intuitive personal attraction (Martin et al. 2002). Comparable analyses are available from Bernardin, Cooke and Villanova (2000); Lefkowitz (2000); and Tziner and Murphy (1999). Vandergriff (2002), for example, details a set of problems that have persisted since 1947 through nine major versions of the US Army performance appraisal and comparative rating system. Even innovations like 360-degree reviews contain fatal flaws that conflict with the institution’s mission (Coens and Jenkins 2000).

Coens and Jenkins (2000) warn that appraisal techniques often backfire by causing psychological damage to the majority of people and worsening hierarchical relationships. Tillson (2001) notes that organisations in the private sector have wisely begun to abandon the attempt. Dorn et al. (2000) believe that ‘modernising’ military authorities simply made a mistake when they sought to introduce a ‘scientific’ selection system.

Concepts of personality type and leadership

Attempts to find correlations between personality and leadership have not fared much better despite being one of the most heavily researched issues in the social sciences. It remains poorly understood and highly disputed (Pike, Hills and MacLennan 2002). Pike et al. (2002) recommend caution in applying this research because of contingent and culturally biased experimental designs affecting the selection of personality traits and measures of leadership success. According to Bradley, Nichol, Charbonneau and Meyer (2002), for example, the range of traits to be found in the population of executive category officers is limited by self-selection.
to recruit and the effects of promotion. They also argue that attempts to relate personality traits to the actual requirements of a position, rather than to a prior rationale, would produce lower correlational coefficients.

Pike et al. (2002) found that many questionnaire items associated with good leadership, such as honesty and integrity, and more recently stress tolerance and emotional intelligence have not been reliably tested and developed for use in surveys. In related research on moral development, individuals usually self-report that they have achieved a state considered more attractive than their actual behaviour (Darley and Batson 1973). Behaviour tends to conform to group norms (Bandura 1991). Tett, Jackson and Rothsten (1991) are suspicious of easily faked questions derived from espoused moral codes. They can only recommend comparing rates of dissemblance among groups thought to have varying degrees of motivation to fake good.

Faulty arguments related to personality and leadership are common. Paparone (2003) criticises the tendency in much of the research to confuse cause and effect. It is often assumed that if executive category officers are promoted, then their personality traits are the cause. Career success, furthermore, is confounded with institutional effectiveness. Even personality testing psychometrics do not reliably predict career success (Rothstein and Goffin 2000). Meanwhile, Coens and Jenkins (2000) found that group effort is the most important factor in institutional performance whereas the contribution of individuals is not even measurable. This makes the disproportionately high volume of research devoted to leadership appear misguided and no doubt influenced by the Western bias for individual agency. Rather than blame bad leadership, the chronic institutional problems delineated earlier are more likely due to bad group effort.

It may be that the link between personality and executive officers is simply too complex and shrouded to yield a credible conclusion (Pike et al. 2002). That might be true, at least, when using linear analysis and remaining faithful to the cultural assumptions predominant in the Anglo-West. In contrast, a more complete continental problematisation offers promising alternatives. Although analytic and pragmatic functionalism remain valuable approaches, especially in mature science, continental philosophy challenges the more debatable ‘goals, methods, assumptions, research programs and conclusions of social scientists’ (Schroeder 1998: 617).

**Promotion and insider/outsider relationships**

Continental philosophy maintains that the formation of the self and self-interest is highly mediated by a social milieu, basic cultural assumptions, and various practices and policies that benefit insiders at the top of the hierarchy. As a result, individuals deceive themselves regarding their sense of autonomy and self-identity. More realistically, their selves ‘must be understood in a context of habits, institutions, and operative rules of thumb’ (Schroeder 1998: 622). Postmodernists, in this case, see a relationship of insider domination through power-knowledge systems that leave the outsider sub-group with little room for resistance (Patton 1998).

Jackall (1988) has developed a compelling metaphor that compares late modernist organisations, like militaries, to a collection of competing fiefdoms (Gephart 1996). An executive (liege) extracts fealty from employees in the form of team player (vassal) behaviour. Jackall depicts the team player as a courtier without strong convictions, an optimist who never refuses a
task, and a loyalist devoted to satisfying milestones—appropriate or not. More importantly, the team player must never compromise the impression that the fiefdom is well managed. Fief superiors, on their part, are constrained in how they can reward and control team players. Under constant pressure to reduce costs and commodify benefits, promotability becomes the most important mechanism of domination (Jackall 1988; Gephart 1996). Promotability, nevertheless, is sufficient to ensure conformity and hierarchical power (Coens and Jenkins 2000: 31).

In the military, more visibly than elsewhere, highly coveted promotions 'have the greatest impact on demonstrating and teaching the values of an organization' (Bell 1999: 3) and are the primary 'power levers for changing or maintaining culture' (Dorn et al. 2000: 70). A US Army Colonel complains that '[W]e have institutionalized a system where the only reward, the only measure of success, is promotion, and that’s dumb, because we can’t promote everybody’ (Rehberg 2001: 36).

Insider domination, founded on promotability, plays out within a local network of selection practices and policies (Foucault 1980; Wickham 1986). To subvert these processes to its interests, a sub-group must hoard tacit information on getting ahead (Goh 2002). Inevitably, insider sub-groups must know how to work around the explicit, espoused practices of the organisation. If the official rules are known to every competitor and everyone follows the rules, after all, no sub-group would have an advantage. As a key point in my argument, Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) demonstrate that the insider’s informal network normally forms according to personal similarities and likeability. Insider group effort is effective, certainly, but it inexorably subverts the expressed goals of the organisation.

In the self-selected and demographically homogeneous CANZUKUS militaries, personality type emerges not only as a crucial aspect of performance appraisal but also as a necessary condition for inclusion in the insider sub-group. Personality, therefore, serves to organise subversive group effort more than it helps to identify or develop individual leaders or to relate to institutional effectiveness.

**Executive officer personality type**

Executives in any organisation tend toward homogeneity in personality type and shared cultural assumptions (Agyris 1997). In the military, likewise, executive category officers are less diverse by personality type than junior officers (Walker 1997). Research on what that type might be is scarce but generally flattering. Given the pragmatic and functional nature of military social science, complimentary material that fits the bias for individual agency is more likely to be accepted and applied. Conformity to the war discipline narrative can never be too excessive. One of the most often cited figures, David P. Campbell (1996: 175), is ‘grateful’ to the US generals who exhibit the ‘decisive warrior’ or ‘aggressive adventurer syndrome’. He maintains that one reason why ‘the world is a dangerous place is that other countries also have their share of men with this personality syndrome…’ (173). Other cultures, unfortunately, lack the ‘ameliorating influences of higher education’ and ‘the benefits of 200 years of democracy’ (173). Campbell downplays unflattering observations and trends evident in his sample. He worries whether aggressive adventurer generals can understand ‘the concept of achieving world peace without bloodshed’. If they had not self-reported high scores for social responsibility
and personal integrity, Campbell would characterise them as simple ‘warmongers’ (167). Despite the circular logic often surrounding surveys, and notwithstanding psychometric shortcomings discussed earlier, Campbell nevertheless found that Myers–Briggs Type Indicator patterns for executive officers indicate inflexibility and a lack of concern for the human element. In the California Psychological Inventory, the strongest traits among generals were dominance, self-acceptance, inflexibility, and achievement via conformity. Indeed, Campbell comments that these scores were so far above the norm that they imply shadow traits such as pathological obsessions with aggression, being overly demanding, and possibly self-centredness. The FIRO-B survey revealed that generals wanted to be the focus of warm emotions but did not want to reciprocate. Strong–Campbell Interest Inventory, finally, indicated that generals’ answers overwhelmingly conformed to the masculine stereotypes associated with ‘militarist activity’ and that they were ‘repulsed by artistic, literary, musical, and nurturing activities’ (167). Still, Campbell wanted ‘to close on a positive note’ and remarked that his subjects were ‘personally delightful as well as extremely competent’ (175).

Dixon (1976) uses an ethnographic technique to build a psychological profile that echoes these selected points from Campbell. Without a trace of deference, Dixon deduces that military officers are commonly anxiety prone and failure fearing; seek highly visible status and certain promotion through dishonesty and expediency; and tend toward meticulous, obsessive-compulsive routines on both small and important matters. He saw a mental orthodoxy contributing to faulty, non-adaptive decision-making and careerist behaviour. This predominant type does not really have ‘any sincere devotion to work’ and are not true achievers, because their promotions depend more on conformity and obedience rather than taking risks that can add real value (244). Similarly, a survey of executive category officers who left the CF found that ‘this group did not expect further promotion and felt they would be merely filling a slot until retirement’ (Wild 2001: iv, v).

**Personality type and insider subversion of selection**

Ethnographic analyses can also be used to demonstrate how insiders subvert actual selection systems. Infiltrating observers would likely have the best opportunity to reveal the “actual situated behaviours” of the “underlife” of organisations (Gephart 1996: 42). First, I will consider the CF Army, in which I currently work. The career succession planning policy (Land Force Command Order 11–79 2003; Logistics Branch Bulletin 2000) permits executive officers to select insider initiates very early in the latter’s career. Senior insiders then manage the initiate’s career along an ‘A team’ path by controlling access to a limited supply of ‘A type’ credentials and postings. Insiders then oblige central selection boards to use these ‘qualifications’ as the primary criteria for promotion. Promotability becomes a covert, closed loop and a self-fulfilling prophecy. Initiates are included or excluded from the succession plan according to subjective and intuitive assessments from one or more influential senior officers. As discussed earlier, the few performance appraisals available at this point would also be biased according to similarity and likeability. Thus, personal attraction; tacit social networks; and even a chance exposure to an executive, such as an opportunity to act as an aide-de-camp, are a necessary and often sufficient condition for promotability. Lieutenant General (ret) and Canadian Senator, Romeo Dallaire (2003: 28),
expresses it this way:

In every regiment of the Canadian Forces, there is an informal council of elders—senior or retired officers who remain intimately connected to the life of the regiment. These elders determine a regiment’s individual culture and character. One of their key responsibilities is to select the so-called streamers; the young men or women who the elders believe have the right stuff to become future generals. There is never any official announcement or acknowledgement of this process, but once you are chosen, it’s as if an invisible hand is reaching out to guide you, nurturing your career through a carefully selected series of command and staff positions…

In practice, the guiding hand is not always invisible. Insiders are usually told they have been chosen. Outsiders, meanwhile, are not told they are outside the succession plan or that selection boards must discount their ‘B type’ credentials. The appearance of promotability remains an effective motivator even in the absence of the promotion itself.

Similar systems exist in other CANZUKUS militaries. In the ADF, Jans and Schmidtchen (2002: 100) describe an annual career ‘tournament’ that creates ‘winners’ who get continued access to career enhancing but relatively easy generalist positions. More challenging tasks are assigned to outsider ‘losers’ upon whom the future performance of the ‘winners’ depend. New Zealand also has an ‘A team’ and a ‘B team’ where inclusion and exclusion is tacit and uncontested (Carruthers 2002). Likewise, Tillson (2001: 85) criticises the US Army for ‘its many wickets required for career success’ that force ambitious officers ‘to focus on their careers rather than on their units’. Officers vie for a few career-enhancing opportunities that enable superiors to punish dissent and reward sycophancy so that most officers eventually become ‘organisation men’ (Vandergriff 2002: 96).

Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) detailed systems of structural causality by which insiders accrue various forms of capital in stages that provide insurmountable competitive advantages. In the same manner, for non-executive officers outside the CF Army succession to qualify for further promotions, they would have to start over as lieutenant recruits. CANZUKUS selection systems fit Foucault’s (2003: 107) description of the ‘tricks’ and ‘traps’ used by insiders as ‘instruments of power’ that dissimulate limits on their self-interest when there are actually no effective constraints. Despite being outsiders, the rank-and-file still define their working selves by the promotability system designed for insiders. Dussel (1985) would urge the naïve to liberate themselves by accepting that they are irreversibly outside the dominant culture. Regarding ethics, if executives are blind to the separate identity of the rank-and-file, then they are not authentic leaders as defined, for example, by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999).

The resulting insider military culture

Executive cadres selected for dominance, inflexibility, and conformity have shaped CANZUKUS militaries into ‘strong, covert’ and ‘non-adaptive’ cultures. These terms are from Egan (1994). Such cultures, he explains, are shared by a critical mass of actors, consistently drive behaviour, are not officially acknowledged, fail to correctly read the environment, react to events rather than take the initiative, emphasise rigid obedience, cling to the
wrong elements of the past, and prefer trendy reengineering processes. This culture offers a credible explanation for the chronic institutional problems catalogued earlier.

The applicability of Egan’s cultural profile to CANZUKUS militaries might appear to be an oversimplification and overgeneralisation. Note that the typology need only apply to a critical mass and emphasises obedience. Counter examples would certainly exist, but a ‘few good apples’ defence is not a convincing trapdoor.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it would be surprising if executive military officers launched substantive reform. If fiefdom management also exists in government, they too would be satisfied with a status quo and pliant team players. More broadly, Anglo-Western cultural assumptions ensure that most stakeholders accept the legitimacy of modern management techniques and hierarchical authority. With remarkable forbearance, they see no alternative but to await better leaders. Even the unpromoted rank-and-file hope that better superiors will finally respect the social contract within a unitary profession.

Nevertheless, if a politician, executive officer or an association representing the rank-and-file decides otherwise, they should begin with the selection system. That would require an understanding of the source of military strength in the Anglo-West and a sweeping cultural transformation affecting personnel policy, force structure and the military ethos (Bondy 2004a, 2004b).

Lieutenant Colonel Harry Bondy develops cultural concepts to provide options for personnel policy reform for the Canadian Forces. As part of its transformation agenda to become more effective, efficient and adaptable, Canadian Forces leadership encourages research in military culture, especially if it is controversial and generates debate. Lieutenant Colonel Bondy has degrees in English literature, business administration, (BComm, MBA), and is currently studying for a doctorate in alternative research methods for organisational culture at the Georg-August University at Göttingen, Germany. Lieutenant Colonel Bondy has done military work with Canada’s Special Service Force, at a remote atmospheric research station in the high Arctic, as a military observer with MINURSO in the Western Sahara, and as a personnel staff officer in National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa.
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A Comparison Between the Private Sector and Military Approaches to Organisational Principles and Values

Brigadier Peter Acutt

Ideas are more powerful than commonly understood, the world is ruled by little else.

John Maynard Keynes

The ideas that underpin the policies and practices of any organisation have immense influence in determining success or failure. They have the capacity to inspire through motivation and inspiration or undermine by encouraging the degeneration of ethical behaviour and cynicism. These powerful ideas are the values that dictate organisational behaviour, a small number of essential and enduring tenets that act as general guiding principles. While values have for some time been given attention in military organisations, industry is now looking to programs for ‘change’ based on value-driven initiatives as they are ‘earning a reputation as a business tool for driving high performance’.

This article compares the current private and military approaches to organisational values to determine improvements that might be available to the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) through adoption of effective private sector practice. The focus will be at the leadership level because, as Bean describes, ‘Every enterprise is driven by its leaders’ individual and collective values, whether those values are consciously understood or unconsciously influential, spoken or unspoken, written or unrecorded’. Goleman goes even further to suggest that a leader’s behaviour drives the behaviour of everyone else, literally being contagious throughout the organisation.

Values matter

Before making a comparison between private and military organisations, it is important to understand the key concepts that underpin a values-based approach. First is the recognition that values-based organisations outperform the competition. Highly structured policy and procedure controlled organisations have not been successful and alternatives are being sought. It is recognised that organisations need to develop agility and flexibility through empowering their personnel. The values-based approach provides the ‘beacons’ of behaviour and decision-making within the organisation down to the lowest levels.

The second concept is about how empowerment is achieved through the alignment of values. Evidence suggests that the alignment of values within organisations is not common. Explicit values may not be the actual values dominating; ‘unofficial cultural and sub-cultural norms, will override the impact of officially espoused, unembedded, values’. A famous example of this phenomenon is the Enron collapse, where the company espoused commitments to communication, respect, integrity and excellence, but in effect had a culture that stretched
ethical conduct in pursuit of the next big success.\textsuperscript{11} Linked to this explicit/implicit difference is the associated dislocation of stated and real values caused by the behaviour of leaders. Cynicism results if leaders do not adhere to espoused values.\textsuperscript{12} The simple conclusion is that there must be alignment between espoused values, leadership behaviour and employee beliefs and execution.

Finally, a key component to the values-based approach is how it is communicated. This may not always be effectively done. The espoused values of an organisation are often communicated as single words: integrity, service, communication, etc. Research has shown that in the majority of cases they are seen as ‘unexceptionable common sense’\textsuperscript{13} and so lack the intended impact. Linked to this is the practice of developing vision and value statements, publishing the results and then not reinforcing these instruments. These values, regardless how strong, will not be inculcated and will not have the desired effect.

Comparison between the private sector and the military

The first theme of the previous section is about the credibility of the value-based approach in improving flexibility and performance. Lencioni reports that in 2002, ‘80% of [companies in] Fortune 100 tout their values publicly’.\textsuperscript{14} Private companies rarely commit resources on internal initiatives without the belief of a return on investment. It is clear that there is a broadly held view that the power of values cannot be ignored and must be pursued in order for a private company to remain competitive. As Collins and Porras describe it, ‘Companies that enjoy enduring success have core values and core purpose’.\textsuperscript{15}

From a military perspective the importance of values has long been held. This is perhaps why it has not been given the same priority as has been seen currently in the private sector. Much of the work on values within the public sector would seem to be generated from within the civilian dominated sectors of the economy.\textsuperscript{16} The concern from a military perspective is that the role of values may have been restricted to a broad ‘code of conduct’ rather than ‘beacons’ of behaviour and decision-making: the power and potential of a values-based approach is thus subordinated to a historical perception of what is right.

The second theme points to the need for the alignment of values between those espoused, exemplified by the leadership, and accepted by the members of the organisation. Successful companies dedicate considerable effort to value formulation and see it as a function of the leadership team. These values are then lived through the decisions made (particularly when the company is in crisis) and the behaviour expected and fostered. An often-quoted example is Hewlett–Packard whose founding members established the ‘HP Way’\textsuperscript{17} and used a set of values to guide the company for more than 50 years.

While there have been successes, there is an ample number of examples of the reverse result. Murphy and MacKenzie in their article report on a large utility company that had spent two years introducing a values-based program. Employees in the company reported that they saw the values as ‘self-evident truths or counsels of perfection’, ‘the company’s rhetoric did not match its perceived behaviour’ and ‘the pressure on employees to be productive was perceived as superseding the enactment of the official values’.\textsuperscript{18} These insights are consistent with the
majority of evidence of poor implementation of values programs. Ethics play a large role in this. The corporate dilemma of profit making versus adhering to values is often evident. The key observation that runs counter to current practice is that explicit single word values like integrity and teamwork have not been effective. The other main factor, which is intuitive, is that the behaviour of leaders in relation to espoused values remains decisive.

From the military perspective the findings in relation to single word value statements is of concern as they currently dominate the military value landscape. Unless there is an incongruence between private and military personnel thinking, then the current role of single word values that we see employed in the Services could be dramatically misplaced. The Royal Australian Air Force is an indicator that the need to change has already been recognised: it has recently moved to a statement style set of values. If the Air Force’s move is linked to the private sector findings, then there is a case for Defence as a whole to urgently investigate its current values’ effectiveness in terms of alignment.

In relation to the other factor of the need for leaders to exemplify espoused values, the situation would seem to have at least equal concern. Firstly, let us look at the alignment of Defence values to senior leadership. Just taking two examples, ‘innovation’ is an ADO value, but as Jans points out in his report on the higher levels of the ADO, ‘innovation in Defence is often tortuous and inconclusive’. The other example is that of ‘teamwork’. Here Jans finds that the ‘functional network at the top of Defence is diverse and pluralistic and lacks a common set of values’. While many other examples are available, the message is that the values espoused are not those being demonstrated; instead, it seems that ideas like authority, hierarchy and power tend to dominate. Evidence from the corporate world suggests this is counter-productive.

The other issue of alignment is that of the perception of the leadership team by the many men and women serving in the ADO. The previous paragraph would point to a possible credibility gap and there is certainly recognition of that by the previous Secretary of Defence, Dr Allan Hawke, when he pointed to a ‘poor climate of trust towards senior leaders’. This is perhaps not so surprising when the leadership strongly emphasises the responsibility to government and the remainder of the ADO believes they are contributing to far more altruistic goals like ‘serving the nation and its people’. Whether an accurate perception of actual behaviour or not, continued emphasis on governmental responsiveness cannot help but invoke thoughts of careerist motives. In short, unlike successful corporate organisations, the ADO has not been successful in the alignment of values, leadership and people.

The final area of consideration is that of how values are communicated. Do they form part of the organisation’s language and dialogue or are they wall decorations? Are they living or dead? Looking to the corporate arena, successful values-based organisations continually communicate and reinforce their values throughout the organisation. Nordstrom is an example, ‘during non-store hours, managers read customer comments, both positive and negative, over the intercom’ in relation to the company’s core value of customer service. Values are also lived and communicated through the decisions the company makes. This is particularly the case during a crisis. The outcome is a realisation by employees ‘that the organizations they work for and represent are ethical and walk the talk of their values’.
In the military case, the communication and reinforcement of values does not begin to match how successful values-based organisations operate in these areas. From the previous discussions on values, it would seem that the reason for this limitation is not one of omission, but more due to the role and type of values that dominate the ADO. If they are self-explanatory and reflective of what is actually occurring, how can they become active agents guiding the organisation’s future?

Conclusion

Despite the ADO’s predisposition to seek process or structural solutions to its challenges, industry is showing that this has not been a successful course. Instead, successful private sector companies are seeking to use the power of ideas, through values, to propel their organisations forward. The question is whether the ADO is prepared to take the risk and follow.

Ideas are powerful. By deciding on a course that appeals to values and principles rather than adopting policies and procedures, an environment is selected with great potential, but also significant danger. The broad ‘take-up’ of this approach in industry provides an opportunity to analyse the effectiveness of this initiative and compare it with what is currently in military practice. This has shown that while some corporate organisations are getting it right, those that are getting it wrong tend to be more reflective of the ADO approach. The values of the ADO would seem to be ‘sustaining’ in nature and not providing ‘beacons’ for the future.

The ADO needs to re-examine its approach to values. If it agrees with the corporate world that this is the way forward, then it will need to change. First, the leadership must redevelop the organisation’s values, changing their form away from single word statements. Second, the way in which the values, leadership and personnel are aligned needs to be formulated. Finally, this alignment must be linked to an effective arrangement for communication and reinforcement.

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NOTES

16. The majority of values in the military of many nations have been long held and changed as can be seen in the sources provided in the bibliography. There has been considerable movement in the civil side of the ADO, e.g., Australian Department of Defence, ‘Maintaining a values-based and ethical Defence Organisation’, *Ethicsmatters*, Iss. 10, January 2004.
19. The use of single word values dominates the value systems of the majority of militaries and Lencioni states that in 2000 '55% of all Fortune 100 companies claim integrity as a core value, and 40% tout teamwork', Patrick Lencioni, 'Make Your Values Mean Something', <i>Harvard Business Review</i>, July 2002, p. 115.


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Human Factors and the ‘can-do’ Attitude: Strength or Weakness?

Boyd Falconer

Since 1965 the ADF has incurred the loss of 229 aircraft due to aviation accidents, and in the period from 1990 to 2004 inclusive, ADF aviation destroyed 35 aircraft in aviation accidents, resulting in more than 40 fatalities and 30 serious injuries amongst its personnel. Lives and aircraft have also been lost in the first few months of 2005.

Despite being described by using numerous iterations of the phrase ‘the most significant issue in air safety’ in both Australian civil and military aviation literature (Lee, 1996; McCormack, 1999), trying to assess the true level of understanding of human factor issues in Australian military aviation remains difficult.

Human factors awareness

Operational ADF aviation personnel including RAAF then-Squadron Leader Williams (1995), and ADF psychologists Fellows (1998) and Lee (1999) have suggested that the somewhat underdeveloped understanding of human factor issues in ADF aviation is attributable to mission-focus. More specifically, these commentators argue that the Australian military’s history of mission-orientation appears to create a precedent for intolerance amongst ADF personnel towards human constraints that might be perceived as hindering the mission.

An indication of awareness of human factor issues, both in general terms and in terms of those human factor threats and mitigators specific to ADF aviation, is provided by the results of the survey of flight management attitudes by the Directorate of Strategic Planning and Personnel Research (DSPPR, 2001) and recent work relating to ADF Crew Resource Management training by Australian Regular Army psychologist Lieutenant Colonel Peter Murphy (2004). Braithwaite (2001) also surveyed ADF personnel in his research of Australian aviation safety, although the study was limited to a relatively small group of RAAF transport aircrew and is based on data collected five years earlier than the DSPPR study. The DSPPR and Braithwaite studies will be examined in greater detail in the first section of this article as they highlight that human factor issues, and the can-do mentality in particular, provide many challenges to the continuance of safe military aviation in Australia. Murphy’s (2004) study appears in Spotlight 04/04 published by the ADF Directorate of Flying Safety and hence will not be described further in this article.

The ADF Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire

Based on the Flight Management Attitude Questionnaire (FMAQ) developed by the University of Texas, DSPPR (2001) gathered attitudinal data on numerous aspects of flight management, as well as on operations management and broader issues such as career satisfaction. A comprehensive description of the development of the FMAQ is provided by Helmreich and Merritt (1998), and hence will not be described further here.
More than 900 ADF aircrew returned the DSPPR survey (N = 913), including aviation personnel from the Navy (N = 112), Army (N = 145) and RAAF (N = 656).

The results of the DSPPR (2001) study exposed several significant human factors associated with the influence of the ADF organisation. Indeed, the DSPPR study cites low morale, distrusted management, a ‘can-do culture’ and poor inter-personal communications as noteworthy negative findings related to human factors within ADF aviation. A more specific finding of the DSPPR worthy of further examination here relates to respondents’ ranking of ten (given) ‘risk factors to ADF aviation’. The DSPPR survey asked respondents to rank ten risk factors in the order of highest to lowest risk. Table 1 lists the accident risk factors as ranked by ADF aircrew. Akin to Braithwaite’s (2001) survey, examined in the following section, the DSPPR survey results present an interesting insight into human factor risks in ADF aviation, at least as perceived by ADF aircrew.

Table 1 suggests a mixture of human factor priorities for ADF aviation safety and hence a challenging research agenda. For example, the DSPPR (2001) explanatory notes for the results presented by Table 1 cite maintenance issues and behaviour of some senior ADF aviation managers as ‘common issues’ reported by respondents with regard to ‘Other’. Table 1 also shows that the ADF respondents report high workload and lack of experience in approximately

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADF Aviation Risk Factor</th>
<th>Respondents (N) Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Workload</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of experience</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatigue</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Situational Awareness (SA)(^1)</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of currency</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Press-on-itis’</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of continuation training</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient time to prepare</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure from SOPs</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing military airspace</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Accident risk factors in ADF aviation according to ADF aircrew (adapted from DSPPR, 2001).
equal numbers. The apparent juxtaposition of a high overall workload and lack of experience being simultaneously reported by ADF aircrew is clearly worthy of further investigation. Such a co-existence of risk factors could exist for only a brief duration because the need for individuals to undertake a ‘high workload’ would naturally lead to a rapid increase in their experience. However, such a view is based on the assumption that the same personnel report these factors. Another interesting observation of the results presented in Table 1 relates to situational awareness (the fourth-ranked factor). Situational awareness (SA) describes a person’s ability to fully understand their current environment and project this understanding toward a likely future scenario. Interestingly fatigue (the third-ranked factor) is known to significantly impede situational awareness (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Would the lowering of fatigue levels commensurately reduce the risk of ‘poor’ SA? Table 2 lists the risk factors according to Army, Navy and Air Force categories in an attempt to elucidate any differences in perceptions across the three Services. Somewhat surprisingly, the magnitude of RAAF respondents vis-à-vis Army and Navy respondents does not appear to have influenced the ‘total’ ADF-wide results (see Table 1) to any great extent. Additionally, the issue of ‘Press-on-itis’ emerges within the ‘top five’ risks only as a result of the tri-Service categorisation.

Two key aspects of human factor problems within ADF aviation are highlighted by the categorisation presented in Table 2. Firstly, the potential for human factors and/or cultural issues to be non-aligned across the three Services is clearly evident. Secondly, any differences that exist within human factor data should be fully investigated with a view to establishing the evolution of the differences (in this case, the risk factors to ADF aviation). Indeed, an important question emerges: what are the leading risk factors reported by other key sub-groups of the ADF population, such as rank or squadron? This question has potential implications relating to the highly regarded cultural research of Hofstede (1980, 2001), particularly his measure of the hierarchical influence within cultures: power-distance. The question also has important implications for risk mitigation strategies and potential research, particularly noting that an analysis of the effect of rank upon respondent attitudes was not conducted by the DSPPR (2001) study. The potential for new research in this area is considerable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARA Risk Factors</th>
<th>RAN Risk Factors</th>
<th>RAAF Risk Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High workload</td>
<td>High Workload</td>
<td>Lack of experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatigue</td>
<td>Lack of experience</td>
<td>Fatigue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of experience</td>
<td>Lack of currency</td>
<td>Loss of SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overconfidence</td>
<td>Loss of continuation training</td>
<td>Lack of currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of continuation training</td>
<td>Insufficient time to prepare</td>
<td>'Press-on-itis'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Accident risk factors in ADF aviation according to Army, Navy and Air Force respondents (adapted from DSPPR, 2001).
A case study of Australian aviation safety

In a survey of attitudes conducted amongst RAAF transport aircraft aircrew in 1995 (Braithwaite, 2001) respondents were asked what they would do if faced with a new rule that they considered to be unsafe. The question was designed to explore the effects of hierarchy upon employee attitudes towards safety context, and is reproduced in Figure 1.

Question: A senior officer introduces a new operating rule you consider to be unsafe; which of the following statements best describes your actions?

1. I would simply ignore the new rule; it’s my life
2. I would complain about the rule to my colleagues
3. I would complain about the rule to my Wing Commander
4. I would complain directly to the officer responsible for the rule
5. I would obey the rule as it is my job to obey the rules

Figure 1: Braithwaite’s (2001) question designed to measure the influence of hierarchy upon RAAF aircrew.

The results recorded by Braithwaite are dichotomous, and are presented in Figure 2. Approximately half of the respondents report that they ‘would complain directly to the officer responsible for the rule’, and are therefore arguably not ‘influenced’ by rank. In contrast, a similar proportion of respondents seem to be strongly influenced by rank, or perhaps the military culture more generally. These respondents reported that they ‘would obey the new rule…’ despite considering the new rule to be unsafe. Interestingly, Figure 2 also shows that four per cent of the ADF aircrew surveyed ‘would simply ignore the [senior officer’s] new rule’.

Figure 2: Response from RAAF Transport aircrew to the question, ‘A senior officer introduces a new operating rule you consider to be unsafe, which of the following best describes your actions?’
While these results appear significant, it should be noted that Braithwaite’s analysis did not include an examination of the statistical significance of the differences reported by survey respondents—an important component in establishing the validity of attitudinal differences.

**Unanswered questions**

The results of Braithwaite’s (2001) case study raise an important and fundamental question: do senior officers of the ADF influence operational aviation personnel to the extent that the safety of ADF aviation is threatened? Indeed, does the reportedly strong willingness to obey unsafe rules suggest poor initiative or a strong discipline and commendable mission-focus? Conversely, does the small percentage of respondents reporting a willingness to simply ignore a new rule from a superior officer suggest the presence of a small, but nonetheless hazardous, indifference towards safety in the ADF? Do any attitudinal differences relate to the organisational attributes of the parent organisation?

**What does safety cost?**

Both researchers and commentators note that over both the short and long term, such accidents incur significant direct and indirect financial and human factor costs. These costs are noted in both civil (Paries, 1995) and military contexts (Soeters & Boer, 2000) and are examined briefly in the following sections.

**Financial cost**

According to data from the Australian Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE, 1998), each fatality and serious injury of an Australian citizen in an aviation accident incurs a financial cost of $AU 1.5 million and $AU545,000 respectively. These figures take into account aircraft accident investigation, airframe recovery and repair, as well as personal injury, hospitalisation and rehabilitation, and lost working hours. It is important to note here that these sums should be regarded ‘as a minimum’ (BTE, 1998) due to both the conservative nature of the costing algorithms applied by the BTE, and in recognition that the BTE analysis is based on cost recovery data calculated in 1996. The conservatism of the BTE costs is also evidenced by more recent data from the FAA (2000) citing a much higher cost of $US2.7 million per aviation fatality.

**The human factors cost**

Unlike the traceable and self-evident nature of financial costs associated with aviation accidents, the human factors ‘cost’ to system performance relates to the less tangible, yet widely influencing and arguably more costly social impact of accidents. Indeed, many researchers over the past decade have suggested that the interpersonal aspects of human performance such as morale and group cohesion are poorly captured by current safety analysis methodologies. For example, for several decades researchers including Herzberg (1959, 1968), Hofstede (1980, 2001) and Soeters and Boer (2000) have asserted that human factors such as motivation and
morale are critical to the performance of employees in sociotechnical systems, including military aviation. Indeed, in the specific context of ADF aviation, morale is widely accepted as an anecdotal indication of the ‘operational capability’ of military personnel. This relationship is summarised by RAAF psychologist Fellows (1998) as: ‘You perform largely as you feel’. Hence if morale is low, human performance and, thus, system performance will not be maximised. In light of the ADF’s aviation accident history, it is interesting to note that recent Australian Government survey research shows that there is a common perception amongst ADF personnel that the safety, morale and proficiency of the ADF are low (DoD, 2001). With regard to ADF aviation specifically, the DSPPR (2001) study found that 42 per cent of ADF aircrew surveyed agreed with the statement ‘Pilot/crew morale is high’.

**ADF aviation safety challenges**

There are at least three key obstacles that reinforce the great challenge of improving the bottom line of ADF aviation safety: a high operational tempo, rapid tempo change and the can-do culture.

*High operational tempo*

The frequent recognition of a ‘high operational tempo’ within ADF and Defence Department literature should be highlighted here. Operational tempo is used frequently in ADF and Department of Defence literature in a context synonymous with ‘taskload’ in human factors literature. ADF usage of operational tempo vis taskload attempts to emphasise a (restrictive) time component (See McCormack, 1999; Patching, 1999 and DSPPR, 2001). The frequent use of the term by both operational personnel and defence strategists suggests that ADF aviation may be operating at unsafe levels. For example, DFS-ADF (2000) cites ‘low aircrew numbers and high operational tempo’ as a primary contributing factor towards the crash of a RAAF F-111 in Malaysia in 1999. Such aviation safety issues are not restricted to the RAAF. The Commander of the Australian Navy Aviation Group, Commander Geoff Ledger (2004), recently stated: ‘…I have noted an increasing trend of human factors related incidents. In particular, analysis of the Aviation Safety Occurrence Report database has revealed an increasing trend in supervision, human inattention and violation of procedures as causal factors in reported incidents.’

*Rapid tempo change*

In addition to the ‘simple’ uni-dimensional issue of tempo, a complicating element of rapid tempo change also influences the safety bottom line. Paries (1995), Amalberti (2001) and Braithwaite (2001) assert that the rapidity of changes in operating and organisational priorities often degrades safety margins, and that safety precursors are tied to the instability created by rapid management, operational and cultural changes. This notion is also established in the DoD (1998) report entitled ‘Review of ADF Aviation Safety Management’. Indeed, the review acknowledges that due to rapid management change, ADF aviation safety is dependent on a relatively small number of adequately qualified and experienced aviation supervisors and
Commanding Officers. DoD (2001) regards this risk as a state of ‘operational over-stretch’ for Australian military aviation.

Noting both the cost of unsafe events within ADF aviation and the importance of the specific human factors context to improving safety performance in ADF aviation, new research would clearly be beneficial. Yet there is a significant challenge associated with undertaking such research: the can-do culture.

The can-do culture

Group Captain Col Patching (1999), then-Director of ADF Flying Safety asserts that the ‘can-do’ culture requires personnel to ‘do their best and advise Management when they cannot meet the task’. Moreover, both DFS-ADF and DSPPR assert that a ‘can-do mentality’ has evolved within ADF aviation that is so strong that a mentality of ‘must do’ (DFS-ADF, 2001) seems to have evolved, ‘…causing high workloads and safety concerns’ (DSPPR, 2001). Acknowledging that attitudes towards safety are significantly influenced by individuals’ power and pride (Maurino, 1999, 2000) is particularly relevant here. Indeed, these specific aviation cultural features are described by military aviation practitioners as being ‘fundamental’ to the cohesiveness of military personnel (Flight International, 1994).

Against this background it is worthwhile noting that research examining cognitive biases and time stress in team decision-making within military aviation (Prince & Salas, 1993) shows that as time stress increases, humans often use a decision-processing strategy that is less effective than the strategy they were trained to use. Other research, including the retrospective analysis of aviation mishaps by Merket, Bergondy and Salas (1999) attempts to link team performance errors with operational issues in military aviation. The work of these researchers highlights an apparent paradox of the can-do culture relating to individuals’ conviction to safety: how can a safety culture and can-do culture co-exist?

Yet in ADF terms, there is a much more localised and hence significant question to ask: if a can-do attitude is ‘fundamental’ to military aviation, and has evolved into a more entrenched ‘must-do mentality’ in the ADF, why is the concept not incorporated into the many aviation training syllabi?

Safety culture

Despite frequent assertions that ‘the ADF has a safety culture’ and that human behaviour ‘is of vital concern to ADF aviation’ (McCormack, 1999), without a demonstrable commitment to safety through continual critical examination of ADF aviation’s current practices, it is reasonable to suggest that operational aviation personnel will not be convinced of the importance of safety over other organisational issues. Indeed, it seems reasonable to question whether any organisation has a safety culture ingrained as a human factor, rather than in a set of standard procedures. Equally important questions concern whether organisations are aware of relative strengths and weaknesses, and whether their organisational culture is accessible for measurement by independent assessors. It is therefore paradoxical that while military
personnel readily acknowledge that the ‘can do’ attitude is an important aspect of the military psyche (DSPPR, 2001; Philips, 2001), the ADF’s can-do culture may also foster complacency towards safety. A potential effect of a poor commitment to safety is that the combination of task saturation and peer pressure, related to the ‘can-do culture’ will impede or even over-ride individuals’ willingness to express an inability to complete a task. In a worse-case scenario, ADF personnel may become ‘blinded’ to the extent that they overlook vital indications of safety performance and hence could lose operational capability—‘or in the worst case, lose lives’ (Williams, 1995).

Conclusion: A grey area for our grey matter

Many organisational and human factor issues have significant negative implications for aviation safety in the Australian military. These aspects present valuable research opportunities, yet these opportunities exist alongside sizeable impediments to new research, including the seemingly pervasive ‘can-do culture’. The questions arising from the findings of limited, but nonetheless valuable, research by DSPPR (2001) and Braithwaite (2001) demonstrate the need for a focused campaign of scientific research relating specifically to ADF aviation. Also noteworthy is the existence of a paradox based on the perceived benefit of the ADF’s can-do culture, whereby a complacency towards safety may be fostered that hinders the willingness of individuals to express an inability to complete a task. This position is particularly hazardous in recognition of the influence of ‘rank’ described earlier in the article. In a worse case scenario, this influence may incubate the accident preconditions that create new aviation fatalities in ADF aviation.

This article has described how the ‘can-do’ attitude may be a great strength, but how it may equally be a great weakness, and in addition how our understanding of this ‘fundamental’ military attitude is notably poor. Like most grey areas of science, the effect of the ‘can-do’ attitude upon safe system performance is sure to lie somewhere between being a strength or a weakness. What does your grey matter tell you?

Boyd Falconer is a lecturer and consultant in aviation human factors and aerospace safety at the University of New South Wales. His PhD research describes a psychometric analysis of preconditions to safety in aviation populations. Boyd is a former RAAF pilot and Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) and holds a Commercial Pilot Licence and civilian instructor rating. Boyd also holds a Science Degree in Mathematics and an Aviation Degree in Human Factors. He has been awarded the Sir Richard Williams Scholarship and the Spitfire Memorial Defence Fellowship. He can be contacted via e-mail at <b.falconer@unsw.edu.au>.
NOTE

1. Situational awareness (SA) describes a person’s ability to fully understand their current environment and to project this understanding towards a likely future scenario. Pilots, of course, must have particularly good SA. Note that fatigue (the third-ranked factor in Table 1) is known to significantly impede SA (Helmerich & Merritt, 1998). It is highly likely that the lowering of fatigue levels would commensurately reduce the risk of ‘poor’ SA, but to be certain about cause and effect in this area, new and more sophisticated research data is required.

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Military Heroism: An Australian Perspective

Tony Vonthoff

It is an unfortunate and, to me, tragic fact that, in our attempts to prevent war, we have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier.

General George S. Patton, Jr., 6 June 1944

Introduction

General Patton was rather obviously referring to what he believed to be a failure of the American people to adequately acknowledge the heroic qualities of their fighting men on the battlefield. Patton’s words could, however, be quite easily applied to the Australian experience. In the short history of this country, there has developed a curious relationship between the military and the society that it serves. The Australian people’s distrust and resentment (at least at times in the past) toward the standing military can be traced to the genesis of our society, and is largely responsible for the traditionally poor standing of the permanent Army within Australia. There has been a long-standing belief in this country that soldiering as a profession is unworthy. The myth of Anzac has led our society to believe that the battlefield is easily mastered by the citizen soldier who, being a rugged individual from the Australian bush, possesses in abundance all of the qualities required to win victory. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the recent deployment of a large part of the Australian Defence Force to East Timor is that it appears to have raised the profile of the military considerably in the eyes of Australians. In particular, the public interest shown in General Peter Cosgrove on his return to Australia is noteworthy.

In this article, I examine the place of the military hero in Australian society. I will argue that in Australia, heroism in battle has been viewed as the domain of the citizen soldier and is taken very much for granted. Australia’s wars have been fought and won by citizen forces rather than by a standing army. Courage, it is believed, comes naturally to the Australian citizen soldier and as such, is not particularly unique. While other nations honour their wartime military leaders, men like Patton, Rommel, Montgomery and the like, Australians honour the stereotypical Aussie digger. Specifically, Australians honour the legend of Anzac above the deeds of any individual. I argue that the citizen soldier, the Anzac, with his reputation for a rebellious, anti-militaristic nature and cool, level-headed performance on the battlefield, embodies the Australian definition of heroism. I further argue that Australians admire selflessness above all other qualities. When individuals are honoured, Australian society places the virtue of selflessness above bravery in close combat. Significantly, the treatment of Cosgrove by the media (who focused on his selfless performance of duty and in the process made him extremely popular with the Australian public) fits neatly into the Australian perception of heroism.

The legacy of ANZAC

Any examination of the place of military heroism in Australian society must, in my estimation, be driven by the events of the First World War (WWI). The Great War of 1914–18 gave birth to the
legend of Anzac and the consequent belief that heroism in battle came naturally to Australians. Importantly, these heroic traits were attributed more to the rugged Australian environment rather than any perception of discipline and skill taught within the military. The Australian digger of WWI was, and still is, viewed as a citizen who donned a uniform out of necessity. Once the fighting was over, he would return to his home and resume his ‘normal’ life. There was never a perception that being a professional soldier offered any real advantage in war. Indeed, the standing army was a tiny one by any standard and was used throughout WWI almost exclusively at home. This led to a situation where men wanting to fight did not join the Army but rather a citizen expeditionary force. It was difficult for regulars to get into the fight due to the rapid expansion of the expeditionary force and the need for the manpower of the regular force to be used for staff work and training.

It is this distinction between peacetime soldiers and citizens at war that helped to shape the unique attitude of Australians to the military and to military service. The lowly opinion of Australian society toward the military continued throughout WWI and beyond. A veteran of the Second World War in a conversation summed up the feeling particularly well. Speaking with historian Bill Gammage, the veteran produced an advertisement depicting Australians at war, which the Army was using to appeal for recruits. ‘They didn’t fight the war’, he said, ‘we did’. The Army’s presumption had offended him greatly. As further example of the Australian attitude to its permanent force, Bill Gammage relates how Great War veterans in the 1960s were puzzled at why the Army took part in Anzac Day services. They did not see the Australian Army as custodian of the Anzac tradition. This perception of the permanent Army very much reinforced the belief that our history of heroic performance in battle has been shaped by the citizen soldier. Additionally, it helps to explain why the traditional military virtues of discipline and soldierly bearing, outwardly expressed by smart appearance and snappy salutes, do not sit well with Australians. These virtues may have been desirable in large standing armies, but were deemed unnecessary to the men of the 1st AIF who, as legend has it, showed their worth on the battlefield rather than the parade ground.

The anatomy of an Australian hero

It is apparent that very few Australian soldiers or officers have been singled out and celebrated because of their performance in close combat. Descriptions of Australian fighting prowess tend to be collective. British war correspondent Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett’s description of the landings at Gallipoli serves to reinforce this view. ‘Not waiting for orders, or for the boats to reach the shore’, he wrote, ‘they sprang into the sea, and, forming a sort of rough line, rushed at the enemy’s trenches.’ Ashmead-Bartlett’s account of the landing at Gallipoli is entirely complementary and all-inclusive. Australians at home eagerly lapped up these compliments, particularly given that they came from a British observer. Over time, less complimentary comments from British observers regarding the ill-discipline of Australians out of the line came to be cherished as much as any regarding performance in battle. I contend that this trend supports the view of the ‘typical’ digger from an Australian perspective. A man ‘hard as nails’, he is a natural fighter. He is completely loyal to his mates, and entirely selfless. In particular, he is scornful of authority placed in the hands of men who, in his opinion, had done little to earn the respect of their subordinates. Given the stereotypical image of the ‘average’ Australian soldier, a man needed to be unique indeed to be singled out for heroic qualities, particularly in battle.
Perhaps this notion of ‘natural ability’ on the battlefield, a myth that has gained momentum over the years, leads Australians to largely ignore feats of individual heroism. I suspect that many Australians have never heard of Albert Jacka or Tom Derrick. Jacka in particular became a national hero in Australia following his WWI exploits, and was described in death as ‘Australia’s greatest front-line soldier’,5 yet his name means little to contemporary Australians. In so glorifying the legend of Anzac over 90 years, the heroic feats of individuals have become less significant. Perhaps an emphasis on the egalitarian nature of Australian forces has made it less acceptable to single out individuals for their feats. This distinctly Australian trend is in stark contrast to the great pride taken in celebration of individual heroism in the United States. There, names such as Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson, Robert E. Lee, George Armstrong Custer and George Patton Jr are, I suspect, instantly recognisable to today’s average American.

Significantly, there was a time when Albert Jacka personified the Anzac legend. On his return to Australia in 1919 he was hailed by the Melbourne Herald as ‘the symbol of the spirit of the Anzacs’.6 Indeed, Jacka represents an excellent example of the archetypal Australian soldier. Although he possessed a surprisingly good tactical mind, Jacka’s success as an officer was due to the tremendous respect he had gained for the troops from his performance in battle. Jacka’s failure to progress beyond the rank of captain was said to be due to his ‘frequent disputes with his superior officers’.7 The official historian, C.E.W. Bean, also lauded Jacka, who perfectly supported his thesis that the rigours of bush life in Australia made men natural soldiers. In Albert Jacka, the public saw the embodiment of the Anzac legend. A citizen soldier from the bush. A man with tremendous bravery, earning the respect and devotion of his men. A man scornful of commanders lacking ability. Arguably, so well did Albert Jacka embody the Anzac legend that, over time, his individual exploits on the battlefield were subsumed by it.

As surely as the heroism of Albert Jacka faded in the national awareness, a different type of hero emerged. This man exemplified the selflessness of the Australian digger. Not a fighting man, he nevertheless bravely faced danger without regard for his own safety. Such a man was John Simpson Kirkpatrick, better known to Australians as ‘Simpson’ or ‘the man with the donkey’. The legend of ‘Simpson and his Donkey’ survives in Australia to this day, in stark contrast to the faded legend of Albert Jacka. It is here that a distinct trend emerges, for Simpson is not the only Australian hero honoured for selfless devotion to others. World War II produced a pair of individuals in the same mould. They were Edward ‘Weary’ Dunlop and Nurse Vivian Bullwinkle.

Both Dunlop and Bullwinkle exemplify what is arguably the most revered Australian quality—devotion to the care of others. I contend that Australians value this quality above all others, including bravery in combat. I think that the reason for this strikes deep into the Australian psyche. Firstly, Australians do not see themselves as a warlike people. Australia has always gone to war at the behest of other nations, or in order to maintain coalitions. As a result, the Australian hero is more likely to be an individual who performs acts of selfless devotion to others, rather than the soldier efficiently killing his enemy on the battlefield. Heroes like Weary Dunlop and Vivian Bullwinkle, both described at their respective funerals as representing the Anzac tradition, appeal to a wide cross-section of the Australian public, many of whom remain uncomfortable with the concept of honouring battlefield killers.
Secondly, aside from the bombing of Darwin during World War II, Australian has never fought an enemy on its own soil and its shores have rarely been threatened. The vast majority of Australia’s war dead lie in distant lands, men and women who died defending someone else’s homeland. Australia’s military history is rich but it is a history of service to others, rather than the defence of our country. No Australian cities have ever lain in waste due to the ravages of war. The Anzac legend is underpinned by selfless devotion to others so it is hardly surprising that our heroes are people like Simpson, Dunlop and Bullwinkle, individuals whose deeds best exemplify that quality. This selfless quality is one that can be freely admired by all Australians; even those opposed to the participation of Australians in war.

It is significant that Australia’s latest military hero, General Peter Cosgrove, is a man cast in this mould of selfless devotion to others. Cosgrove’s obvious desire to avoid bloodshed and willingness to work closely with all agencies in establishing a peaceful environment in East Timor was well received by the Australian public. Cosgrove was cast as an unassuming professional who willingly shared the hardships endured by his troops. Indeed, Cosgrove did an admirable job in East Timor, and achieved his mission without significant Australian casualties. He played his part well and managed to capture the imagination of the public like no soldier has done for many years. Although Cosgrove earned a Military Cross for bravery in combat in South Vietnam, he has been labelled as a ‘hero’ not for his performance in battle in East Timor, but for bringing peace to a people whom Australians felt were ‘owed’ our assistance. Service under these circumstances is far more palatable to Australians than battlefield violence.

**Conclusion**

Australia, still a comparatively young country, nevertheless enjoys an excellent record of success on the battlefield. The strong support of Anzac Day memorial services demonstrates a public acknowledgement of the importance of our military heritage. Yet unlike many other peoples of the world, Australians have a generally low opinion of the military as a profession. Australia’s enviable record of battlefield success under the most difficult of circumstances was built by a citizen army—an expeditionary force. The glowing praise heaped on the prowess of the Australian soldier by men like Ashmead-Bartlett and C.E.W. Bean led to the creation of the Anzac myth; a belief that the Australian digger is naturally brave and does not require military discipline to become a good soldier.

The belief that battlefield heroism was a common trait of the Anzac led to an eventual devaluation of the deeds of the individual warrior. All Anzacs were considered heroes; therefore the need to single out individuals was effectively negated. The emphasis placed on the egalitarian nature of Australian forces served to exacerbate this trend. In contemporary Australia, when individuals are honoured for their heroic qualities, they are almost invariably described as symbolising the spirit of Anzac. It appears that Australians are generally uncomfortable in honouring individuals without reference to Anzac, for fear of weakening the legend in some way. Additionally, many Australians are fundamentally opposed to war, and are therefore uncomfortable with the notion of honouring the battlefield exploits of individuals. Honouring a ‘legend’ is a less confronting concept.
Although Australians have fought on battlefields all over the world, the Australian continent has largely escaped the ravages of war. As a result, the assertion that Australians have always gone to war in the defence of other peoples has always been readily accepted by Australian society, as it was when offered by the Prime Minister as justification for our involvement in East Timor. It is for this reason that the quality of selflessness is held in such high regard in Australia. Australian forces only fight when no other option exists and always in defence of those unable to fight for themselves. This is the image that Australians prefer to embrace. The individual deeds of the battlefield warrior, men like Albert Jacka and Tom Derrick, are representative of the conventional image of Anzac, and have been swept up in the legend. When we honour heroism, Australians prefer to honour courage that has been manifest in the tradition of selfless assistance to others. Simpson and his donkey, Weary Dunlop, Vivian Bullwinkle, and most recently Peter Cosgrove, show a face that is less confronting and of wider utility within a broadly peace-loving society. It is the quality of selflessness, not battlefield courage, which best represents the Australian definition of heroism.

Tony Vonthoff was commissioned from the ranks in 1995 and instructed at RMC Duntroon in his first appointment. He then held a range of Regimental appointments within the 2nd Cavalry Regiment including Adjutant and S2. After completing Command and Staff College Queenscliff in 2000 he returned to 2nd Cavalry Regiment, commanding B Squadron. At the completion of his sub-unit command Tony left the Army to pursue a career in business. After three years working with Saab Systems Australia Tony transferred to Sweden and is now working in Saab’s Marketing and Sales Division based in Stockholm Sweden.
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3. ibid. p. 16.


7. ibid., p. 320.

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A Principal Role for the Army Reserves: A Capability for Australian Homeland Defence

John Donovan

Introduction

On 1 March 1901, the Australian Army came into being, when the Governor-General transferred control of the new nation’s military forces from the states to the federal government. The Defence Act 1903 established the legal basis for the new force, and specified that personnel must specifically volunteer to serve outside Australian territory. This essentially limited the function of the Army to the defence of Australian territory.

The arguments between the government of Prime Minister Edmund Barton and a committee of senior officers established to draft the Defence Bill are canvassed fully by John Mordike. Suffice to say that the government strongly rejected any proposals that would have permitted the automatic deployment of the Army on Imperial tasks. This restriction stood until 1950, when the Defence Act was amended to provide for the raising of infantry units in a Regular Army whose members all volunteer for unrestricted service. However, the government refused to modify the section in the Defence Act requiring other members of the Army to volunteer individually for overseas service. This position was not changed in relation to the Army Reserve until further amendments were made to the Defence Act in 2001.

Since World War II, the balance between regulars and active reserves (part-time citizen soldiers) in the Australian Army has moved decisively towards the regulars. These changes, well documented by Albert Palazzo, were inevitable, as an essentially part-time force could not meet the demand for forces to be available for deployment at short notice on collective security operations. However, what is also clear from Palazzo’s work is the extent to which, since World War II, the Army Reserve was allowed (indeed, probably at times encouraged) to decline in strength and military capability, and has gradually been excluded from a specific role in national defence. This is not necessarily an optimum solution for Australia. David Horner has noted the need for the ‘flexibility of thought … not always found in the professional soldier’. Horner also notes the benefit that militia (Reserve) officers gained as they ‘honored their organisational and leadership skills in the hard school of commerce and industry’. The availability of simple numbers is also an important issue. On 4 August 2005, CDF told the Senior Leadership Group that Defence needs to ‘concentrate on some of the very demanding longer-term demographic issues here in Australia’.

In essence, for the first half of its history the Army, which was then essentially a part-time force, was intended primarily to defend Australian territory. Specific forces were raised for each overseas operation. Following changes to the Defence Act in 1950, while the Regular Army also had a territorial defence function, it was available to contribute to, and was used in support of, collective security arrangements. However, almost to the present day, the Army Reserve and its predecessors remained committed primarily to the defence of Australian territory.
Aim

This article reviews current arrangements for the ground defence of the Australian people and territory, and proposes changes to strengthen them, while still keeping forces available for collective security in collaboration with Australia’s allies and the United Nations. An article in a forthcoming issue of the *Australian Defence Force Journal* will discuss proposals for one greater use of Reserves by the Australian Army for homeland defence.

Strategic guidance

Strategic guidance was set out in the 2000 Defence White Paper. This states that the:

priority task for the ADF is the defence of Australia. ... The second priority for the ADF is contributing to the security of our immediate neighbourhood. ... The third priority for Australia’s forces is supporting Australia’s wider interests and objectives by being able to contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our immediate neighbourhood. ... In addition to these core tasks in support of Australia’s strategic objectives, the ADF will also be called upon to undertake a number of regular or occasional tasks in support of peacetime national tasks ... as well as ad hoc support to wider community needs.*

To a large degree, the priority for the defence of Australia has remained consistent since 1901. The Army was established originally as a territorial defence force, which could not readily be deployed overseas. While collective security was seen as the critical factor in postwar defence planning, the requirements of territorial defence remained important even when the Regular Army was established.*

Even when the government began to give more emphasis to collective security, following the publication of the 1997 Defence White Paper,* the tasks listed on page 29 of that document remained in essentially the same order, as ‘[d]efeating attacks on Australia, defending our regional interests, and supporting our global interests.’ However, the 1997 White Paper also advised, on page 41, that ‘preparedness levels will be determined more by the requirements of regional operations and deployment in support of global interests ... than by the needs of defeating attacks on Australia.’

An effect of this somewhat contradictory qualifier was to provide a reason to re-emphasise the readiness of the full-time force, and give the Reserves the role of supporting the Regular Army in regional operations and deployments in support of global interests. This change has probably been to the detriment of both territorial defence and an expansion base.

The 2000 White Paper moved the focus of the ADF further away from expansion, emphasising that we ‘need to be realistic about the amount of warning we might receive of the need to use our armed forces.’ The White Paper states that ‘except in the case of a major attack on Australia we cannot assume that we would receive enough warning ... to significantly expand existing [capabilities]’. For that reason, White Paper guidance is to ‘maintain in fully developed form the capabilities that would be necessary to achieve key tasks’, but ‘we do not need to keep our forces constantly at the highest pitch of readiness for operations.’*


Recent developments in government guidance have continued this process. The 2003 Defence Update accepted that ‘the threat of direct military attack on Australia is less than it was in 2000 … [but] the strategic advantage offered by our geography does not … protect Australia from the scourge of terrorism.’ The Update sees ‘ADF involvement in coalition operations further afield as more likely than in the recent past’, and seeks a ‘more flexible and mobile force, with sufficient levels of readiness and sustainability to achieve outcomes in the national interest’.

Defence against what?

While there has been a consistent thread in strategic guidance that gives priority to the defence of Australian territory, there has also been an ongoing debate about the scale of threat to be countered. In 1889, Major General Sir James Edwards proposed that the Australian colonies should be able to collectively field a force of ‘30,000 to 40,000 men [who] could be rapidly concentrated to oppose an attack, upon any of the chief cities.’ Clearly, a force of this size was intended to repel a limited invasion of some part of Australia. However, by 1902, the [British] Colonial Defence Committee expressed the belief that the only real threat to Australian security was raids against centres of population and commerce. In 1904, the Colonial Defence Committee confirmed its earlier opinion, basing it on the maritime dominance of the Royal Navy.

This advice set in place one of the constants of Australian strategic guidance and military objectives—the objective of controlling the maritime environment (‘sea–air gap’ since the 1980s) as a means of limiting the scale of threat to Australian territory. It also set in place another constant, as the commander of the Commonwealth naval forces, Captain Creswell, argued for an enhanced naval capability, at the expense of the Army, to ensure the defence of Australia. This advice set in place one of the constants of Australian strategic guidance and military objectives—the objective of controlling the maritime environment (‘sea–air gap’ since the 1980s) as a means of limiting the scale of threat to Australian territory. It also set in place another constant, as the commander of the Commonwealth naval forces, Captain Creswell, argued for an enhanced naval capability, at the expense of the Army, to ensure the defence of Australia.

During the 1920s and 1930s, defence planning in Australia was largely based on the Singapore strategy, which proposed that the Royal Navy, operating from the new base at Singapore, would ensure the security of the continent from invasion. The Army’s leaders doubted the value of this strategy from the beginning, and ‘continued to make defence against invasion their primary planning and training priority’. There were controversies when some senior soldiers challenged the dependence on foreign naval power. However, the government stood by the strategy, and emphasised that the priority was for defence against raids rather than invasion.

The criticisms of the Singapore strategy (particularly concerns that the Royal Navy might be occupied with a European war when needed, and thus unable to deploy to Singapore in appropriate strength) had validity. In the ultimate, however, Australia’s security from invasion during World War II was ensured by maritime power, albeit by the United States Navy at the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, not by the Royal Navy operating from the Singapore base. While major Australian land forces were prepared and deployed across the continent during World War II, their capability to defend Australia against invasion was not tested.
Since World War II, concerns about a major invasion of the continent have not formed part of strategic guidance. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the one country that might have been able to ‘sponsor’ a regional nation in developing an invasion capability, confirming that there is no current requirement to prepare forces to meet a large-scale invasion of Australian territory in either the short or medium term. The likely levels of attack discussed in strategic guidance essentially focus on raids of varying strength, not major invasion.

While the terminology used has changed over the years, the different possible levels of raids can be related to the descriptions set out in some detail in the Dibb Review. These ranged from air harassment and minor incursions or raids of up to company strength on isolated communities (avoiding direct military confrontation with Australian forces) to a possible attempt at a lodgement on Australian territory. To these must be added the enhanced threat of terrorist attack by individuals or sub-national or non-state groups, following events since September 2001.

The raids or harassment by state forces postulated by Dibb would have been limited largely to the northern parts of Australia, because of the realities of geography. Now, the threat of terrorist attack, particularly by non-state forces, extends across the whole nation, with major centres in southern Australia generally offering more attractive targets. The asymmetric form of terrorist threats means that protection must be provided for these targets. In the early 1970s, a British officer described a function of homeland defence as follows:

> ‘defend[ing] the homeland against foreign aggression’ … is taken to mean the prevention of any person not of British [read ‘Australian’] nationality entering [the] country in any form of military, or para-military, organisation, and using force of arms to interfere with the daily life of the citizens of the country.

The term homeland defence has a wider meaning than territorial defence, but is probably more apposite following events since September 2001. Homeland defence will be used in this article when referring to the proposed future roles of the Army, and particularly the Army Reserve.

In addition to defence against the threat or actions of the armed forces of foreign governments, homeland defence also includes the provision of aid to the civil power. This aid is activated only when the problem cannot be managed within the resources normally available to the civil police. It does not include responding to the activities of criminal individuals or organisations, but is limited only to those circumstances where foreign individuals or organisations act in ways that threaten the security or stability of Australia and its people.

Military and police functions must be distinguished clearly when identifying a role for the Army in homeland defence. It is possible to end up defining everything as a police task (indeed, Baynes discussed and rejected this option) but there is a valid military role in homeland defence. In simple terms, while the ethos of the police is to arrest the miscreant, that of the military is to kill the enemy. (However, the Australian police services are currently the only professional bodies in Australia authorised to use lethal force in the performance of their daily duties without reference to a higher authority.)
These two functions need to be kept separate, to avoid having police who are too quick to shoot or soldiers who are reluctant to squeeze the trigger. Military force should be used only where the task goes clearly beyond criminal activity. Baynes emphasised that:

a body must be of some size, or have a military aim, before its entry becomes a defence problem.

Three gangsters entering the country purely in search of loot do not constitute a defence threat; on the other hand, three highly-organised [terrorists] bent on destruction … would constitute such a threat.25

Work by the Israeli author Martin van Creveld supports this approach. He sees the attempt by states to monopolise ‘official’ violence faltering, with nation states decreasingly able to fight each other. (The capacity of most states to fight the United States on a conventional battlefield is even more limited). In van Creveld’s view, this points to low intensity operations as the future of warfare.26 He considers conventional military organisations ‘hardly even relevant’ for this predominant form of contemporary war.27 In particular, van Creveld sees the ‘professional’ model of armed forces as little better than a prescription for defeat.28 The form of warfare foreseen by van Creveld is likely to have more in common with medieval or tribal warfare than with conventional war, particularly where non-state forces are involved.

Van Creveld is by no means the first to suggest that the nature of warfare is different to that for which major armies have prepared. As long ago as 1974, the retired French General Andre Beaufre concluded that ‘we are very far from a return to the conventional warfare of the pre-atomic period … The natural modern form of conventional war is the limited war’ (emphasis in original).29 Similarly, the retired British General Sir Frank Kitson concluded in 1987 that ‘conventional forces exist in the nuclear age mainly for the purpose of gaining time for negotiation rather than to win wars. … it is still possible for a country to pursue its interests by fostering insurgency’.30 The same possibility applies to non-state organisations using terrorism.

The thesis that conventional war is no longer a viable instrument of policy has had a long gestation, but the evidence in its support is mounting. That the 1991 Gulf War followed the writing of van Creveld’s book might be considered to invalidate the thesis that conventional warfare may be ‘at its last gasp’.31 This is not necessarily so. Rather, the Gulf War might have been a final example of large-scale conventional war, just as the Battle of the Surigao Strait in October 1944 was the last clash of big-gun warships, adding a footnote to the story of the battleship’s effective removal from the first line of battle by 1942, after Taranto, Pearl Harbor and Midway.

Certainly, the patterns of conflicts since 1991 in the Balkans, Africa and Asia have been closer to those forecast by van Creveld than to the World Wars or the 1991 Gulf War. The capability for conventional operations will linger on, but its usefulness, particularly against members of the Western alliance system, is likely to be limited. In the 2003 Iraq War, the scale of conventional clashes between the Coalition forces and Iraqi forces, even the ‘elite’ Republican Guard, was very limited, again suggesting that likely opponents have recognised the futility of attempting to prevail on the conventional battlefield. It is perhaps noteworthy that since 1973, the Arab ‘front line states’ have avoided battlefield confrontation with Israel. They may have been the first to move to ‘post-modern’ warfare.
The development of modern conventional strategy took place at the time that crew-operated weapons began to dominate operations in the field.\(^{32}\) These weapons have now evolved into the multi-million dollar helicopters, tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery pieces of modern armies. The cost of purchasing and operating these weapons in militarily significant numbers now places them beyond the reach of all but a few major powers, leaving the lesser powers to develop different forms of warfare. Van Creveld forecasts a move away from today’s large, expensive, powerful machines.\(^{33}\) He expects that future weapons will be less sophisticated, and that the belligerents may be intermingled with each other and with the civilian population.\(^{34}\)

Events following 11 September 2001 in the United States have shown a clear need for large numbers of trained personnel for homeland defence against the kinds of warfare postulated by van Creveld. The high cost of full-time personnel, and the need to use more broadly trained full-time personnel as mobile reaction or pre-emption forces, indicates that these numbers will not be available from the Regular Army. As well as reductions in available numbers as Australia’s demography changes, there is also apparently a growing reluctance to serve for extended periods in full-time forces, leading to proposals such as that recently mooted to recruit Pacific Islanders, effectively as mercenaries.\(^{35}\) While there might be a need to retain the capability for conventional operations, it is debatable whether this should be the first priority or be at the highest level of readiness.

The total homeland defence function is not appropriate for the police; therefore some personnel for it must be drawn from military organisations, including Reserve forces. The relevant level of operations should be within the capabilities of Reserves, who in many cases will also have the advantage of knowing the area in which they fight, and that they are defending their families and homes. These personnel do not need to be organised to fight conventional operations.

To meet the demands of the White Paper, they will have to be available in the form of fully developed units. These units might, however, be substantially different to the current Reserve organisation. The emphasis could be on infantry, light reconnaissance, field engineer, construction, and communications roles, but with limited logistics support (as they might usually operate in their local area or in a major Australian centre of population).

Strategic guidance has made it clear that, to use the words of a former Chief of Army, the Army does not need to prepare for a ‘100 year flood’.\(^{36}\) However, to continue the weather analogy, strategic guidance does support preparations against a cyclone or thunderstorm.

**Arrangements for the defence of Australian territory since World War II**

For the first half century of its existence, the legislated role of the Army was territorial defence. Troops could be deployed beyond Australian territory only after specifically volunteering for a contingency. When the postwar Regular Army was established, it included a full-time brigade group, while the part-time Citizen Military Forces (CMF) element (predecessor to the Army Reserve) had a force structure of two infantry divisions, an infantry brigade group, an armoured brigade group and selected corps units.\(^{37}\)
Although the Chief of the General Staff (CGS, now CA) of the time had intended the CMF formations to be available for overseas deployments (collective security), the government refused to make the necessary amendments to the Defence Act, perforce confining them to territorial defence. Only the Regular brigade group was to be immediately available for unrestricted service. After the withdrawal from Vietnam, the end of National Service, and the return of the last Regular battalion from Malaysia, priority for over 25 years moved from collective security towards self-reliant territorial defence.

Thus, during the period from the Korean War until the withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972, the Regular Army (supplemented by K Force in Korea and National Service in Vietnam) provided Australia’s contributions to collective security, while the CMF and later the Army Reserve remained bound by legislation primarily to the defence of Australian territory. In 1988, changes were made to the Defence Act to allow callout of the Reserves short of a defence emergency, but legislation to protect their employment was not passed, reducing the usefulness of the change.

There seems little evidence, however, that specific plans were made to use the CMF/Army Reserve formations for territorial defence before the late 1980s. For most of the 1950s, those formations were heavily involved in the National Service Training Scheme, while the government’s defence policy remained one of forward defence until the early 1970s. There is almost a sense that, for the CMF in the 1950s and 1960s, it was a case of ‘we’re here because we’re here’.

After the 1976 White Paper, when the Minister announced that the government would no longer base its security policy on the expectation that Australian forces would serve overseas in support of another nation’s military effort, there might have been the expectation that specific plans for territorial defence would be prepared, and exercised. Again, there seems little evidence of this happening until the late 1980s, when, following the Dibb Review, vital asset protection became for a time the primary focus of Army’s planning for its Reserves. However, this function does not seem to receive much emphasis now.

The Army’s current limited focus on territorial defence is surprising, in view of its long-standing interest in the subject (which amounted at times during the 1930s to insubordinate defiance of government directions). During the 1930s, senior Army officers regularly challenged Australia’s reliance on the Singapore strategy, and at least one officer was transferred to a more junior position for publicly doing so.

Implications for the Army of strategic guidance and recent events

The principal strategic reasons for the increased emphasis on the Regular Army since World War II are the second and third priority tasks set out in strategic guidance, contributing to the security of our immediate neighbourhood and supporting Australia’s wider interests and objectives. The short notice likely for these tasks (exemplified by East Timor and the War on Terror) effectively mandates that the initial response must be made primarily by fully trained forces. For that reason, there is an ongoing requirement for a Regular Army of significant size. However, some redistribution of functions between the Regular and Reserve elements of the Army might be appropriate.
A review in the later 1980s looked at the functions to be performed by the ADF. The Wrigley report\textsuperscript{45} considered that ‘sovereignty defence’ forces drawing on community support might be appropriate for Australia. These forces would include ‘a core of military professionals who provide the military planning and management expertise, direct the training, and carry out most of the peacetime constabulary tasks which arise.’\textsuperscript{46}

While Wrigley proposed that ‘peacetime and constabulary tasks could be met … by full-time regular forces’,\textsuperscript{47} it would be a retrograde step to move away from a system that permits Reserves to be used to supplement and support Regular forces deployed on collective security activities. There are clear roles for Reserves in these activities. Indeed, some specialists whose skills cannot be maintained readily in the full-time forces may be required for early deployment (specialist doctors are an example). There is also a valid role for the Reserves in providing rotation forces.

Palazzo’s book has used the East Timor experience to ‘raise, once again, the question of the ultimate purpose and utility of the reserve organisation.’\textsuperscript{48} This was in the context of the Army not having deployed any formed Reserve units in East Timor. However, this suggestion ignores the ongoing priority in strategic guidance for a homeland defence force. If the Regular Army is to focus principally on short notice collective security tasks, some other force must focus on homeland defence. Reserves are the obvious choice.

Under strategic guidance, the priority task for the ADF (including the Army) remains the defence of Australia, as it has since 1901. The 2000 White Paper sets out clearly the requirement for land forces:

> that can operate as part of a joint force to control the approaches to Australia and respond effectively to any armed incursion on to Australian territory (emphasis added). These forces will also have the capability to contribute substantially to supporting the security of our immediate neighbourhood and to contribute to coalition operations further afield, in lower intensity operations.\textsuperscript{49}

A conventional attack on Australia is currently very unlikely. Responding to an armed low-level incursion on to Australian territory, particularly by non-state terrorist groups, and providing security against the threat of terrorist action, are tasks that suit Reserve forces. The level of threat is unlikely to be equivalent to that which would be met in a conventional war, and there is a range of tasks in homeland defence that can be carried out with less initial training than that received by full-time forces, which must be ready for short notice deployment to high threat areas.

These tasks could be assigned to Reserve forces as a primary role, or on initial call out while they complete their training to unrestricted deployment standard. Within a few months after call out, there should be no remaining distinctions in training standards between Regular and Reserve units.

**The Problem**

No democracy has shown itself able in recent years to maintain full-time forces of sufficient size to meet all likely contingencies, both on cost grounds, and for lack of people willing to
spend extended periods of full-time service waiting for the occurrence of a contingency. For example, the 1987 Canadian Defence White Paper concluded that Canada’s all-volunteer full-time force had become too expensive. Our principal allies have all concluded that there are definite roles for part-time forces, at a range of readiness levels. These forces both support full-time forces on short notice deployments and prepare for less likely or less demanding contingencies, at a reasonable cost.

John Donovan worked in the Department of Defence for over 32 years, principally in the fields of intelligence, force development and resource management. He also served for several years in the Australian Army Reserve, rising through the ranks from Private to Lieutenant.
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15. ibid., p. 119.

16. ibid., p. 168.

17. ibid., pp. 167 and 168.


19. ibid., p. 118.


24. ibid., p. 15.

27. ibid., p. 20.
28. ibid., p. 191.
32. ibid., p. 208.
34. ibid., p. 212.
38. ibid.
46. ibid., p. 499.
47. ibid., p. 501.
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Information Warfare:
Can the Concept be Applied to the War-on-Drugs?

Dr Hank Prunckun

Heroin trafficking is a criminal threat of billion dollar proportions, where drug traffickers exercise international influence. Australian policy makers therefore need to reconsider the framework on which current policy rests. If the so-called ‘war-on-drugs’ is couched in those terms, then it makes sense to explore a warlike approach—the use of information warfare to defeat drug traffickers’ information processes that are vital to supporting their worldwide financial networks as well as their command and control arrangements. This article promotes discussion about a drugs policy that focuses on attacking the source of the illicit drug problem.

The drug problem

Illicit drug use is a global concern. According to the United Nations:

Illicit drugs have profound effects on individuals and societies worldwide. For individuals drugs jeopardise health, livelihood and security. At the national level, their osmotic relationship with crime can make them both cause and consequence of conflict, weak governance and underdevelopment. (UN, 2004:1)

Although drugs have been used for centuries, addiction has grown rapidly over the last five decades and the current estimate is that there are 185 million drug users worldwide. This is almost 5 per cent of the population aged 14 to 65 years (UN, 2004:8). In Australia, the illegal importation of heroin has been estimated to net organised criminals over $2 billion per year. This figure does not include other drugs such as amphetamines and ‘party drugs’ (Prunckun, 1998).

Australia is one of many countries that have responded to the need for drug control through its participation in various international conventions. These conventions are in turn supported by national and state legislation—prohibition. The aim of Australia’s drug prohibition is to make drugs scarce, expensive, and risky to supply and obtain.

The policy options

Although Australia’s drugs policy is in the main a prohibition policy, it includes other integrally related strategies such as demand reduction and harm reduction measures, and police work closely with the health sector in managing these programs. The supply reduction element of prohibition includes law enforcement measures that criminalise importing drugs and offering them for sale. The risk of apprehension causes drugs to become scarce and has the added effect of reducing demand by driving users into treatment (Weatherburn and Lind, 1999).

The demand reduction component of law enforcement includes measures that criminalise the purchase, possession and use of illegal drugs, and if these measures were successful, would
result in a decrease in the illicit drug trade. Both the supply and demand components of the law enforcement approach are intended to impact on user demand—law enforcement supply strategies attempt to drive prices up (by making drugs scarce) and its demand strategies make illicit drugs risky to obtain and possess.

Ultimately, the main emphasis of the war-on-drugs, and the logic of criminalisation from which it flows, is placed on the suppliers of illicit drugs; the basic premise is that availability is at the heart of the problem. By stopping the flow of illicit drugs into and within [Australia] the problem will disappear. (Boyd and Lowman, 1991:116)

A warlike approach

Beginning with President Nixon’s 1971 proclamation that his country was embarking on a ‘war-on-drugs’, other Western nations have since followed suit. In November 1997 the Howard Government stylised the international war-on-drugs theme by calling it ‘Tough-on-Drugs’. The Commonwealth Government’s Tough-on-Drugs philosophy now forms the cornerstone of the current National Drug Strategy and its supporting National Drug Strategic Framework (Australian Government, 2004).

This war metaphor is more than just a political ploy, it is a way people can visualise both the seriousness and enormity of the problem. If one accepts this metaphor, it then makes sense to explore warlike policy options. Hypothetically, these options include direct intervention using superior military forces to carry out crop eradication-type programs, or the use of smaller numbers of forces to carry out secret operations (i.e. unconventional warfare) against the production, infrastructure and transportation networks of drug traffickers in source and transhipment countries. (These options assume that such operations would be approved in some way by the source countries’ government and carried out with their cooperation.)

There is also the option of using information warfare techniques in what is now seen as key in fighting today’s wars—Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). 4GW uses methods that differ substantially from the usual modes of operating. 4GW is characterised by forces (that can be other than military) that attack the infrastructure which allows an enemy to plan and execute strategies rather than on locating and destroying the actual combatants (Vest, 2001).

In regard to the war-on-drugs, information warfare options include attacking drug traffickers’ IT-based systems and the systems of their financial facilitators (i.e. money laundering arrangements). Arguably, these are absolutely vital to the command and control function of this stateless network of organised criminals. Information warfare could also include engaging in psychological operations (psyops) against key organisational personnel (both horizontally, across its operations, and vertically, within its operations) and third-party supporters (i.e. those who aid and abet drug traffickers).

Illicit drug trafficking

Historically, illicit drug trafficking has been popularised by the media in such films as *The French Connection* (based on Moore’s 1969 factual book). Such accounts show large amounts
of drugs being smuggled into various countries in cargo ships by ‘Mr Bigs’. In the 1960s, the efforts of the New York Police Department’s Detectives Eddie Egan and Sonny Grosso (who were responsible for discovering ‘The French Connection’) resulted in what were at the time some of the largest heroin seizures in US history. This clandestine operation by organised criminals formed what could be described as a ‘pipeline’ for heroin from major narcotic-producing countries (McCoy, 1991:65–70).

However, the illicit drug trafficking problem Australia faces is different to the pipeline metaphor of ‘The French Connection’. McCoy, who pioneered scholarship in this area some 25 years ago, argued that Australia’s ‘...drug supply systems are many and complex’ (McCoy, 1980:255). At that time he observed that rather than a pipeline, there existed a ‘reservoir’ fed continuously ‘...by streams of varying size and regularity, [Australia’s] reservoir of heroin supply is kept at a constant level by sources ranging from the kilogram “body packs” to the multi-kilo lot brought in through private aircraft or concealed in commercial cargo’ (McCoy, 1980:255).

More recently, the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, the Australian Federal Police and the National Crime Authority all confirmed McCoy’s earlier observations. Intelligence assessments by these agencies found that most of the heroin that entered the country was shipped via body-packs, cargo containers, and through the mail system (ABCI, 1996:60; ABCI, et al., 1997). They also found that there were no Mr Bigs (Bevan, 1991).

More recent still, the Australian Crime Commission (2005:4) found that the largest number of detections (approximately 95.2 per cent) were numerous small weights interdicted by Australian Customs Service and Australia Post. In practical terms, this reservoir of heroin has remained in place for at least three decades, making it very difficult for law enforcement agencies to control.

**International relations**

Combating these multiple streams of illicit drugs flowing into Australia has presented endless problems for policy makers and law enforcers. Ideally, the control of opiates demands cooperation beyond national boundaries. However, Australia has never been in a political position to attempt to eliminate, or even reduce, the size of the South East Asian opium crop. This approach would require Australia to adopt an interventionist strategy.

An interventionist approach would be characterised by striking at the source of the illicit drug production—the poppy fields, clandestine heroin laboratories, transport and transhipment arrangements, and money management and laundering networks of drug traffickers, rather than attempting to combat supply by police work once the drugs have entered the country.

Australia has been prevented from militarily challenging governments in these regions, not because it lacked political will, but because it has lacked the superpower ‘clout’ that, say, the United States possesses. Lacking the power of America, Australia can only request cooperation of its South East Asian neighbours even though, it could be argued, some opium growing nations’ drug policies are influenced (directly and indirectly) by global drug traffickers (Malbry, 1994; UN, 2004).
Even if Australia was in such a commanding political position internationally, the experience of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in South America indicates that large-scale counter-drug operations are not completely effective. Not because the strategy of eliminating drug laboratories and crops is somehow ineffective, but because strategies that are intended to promote favourable international relations sometimes take a higher priority than anti-drug strategies (Malbry, 1994).

Take for instance the 1991 case of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when it advised then President Bush that the Syrian Government was directly involved in the production of opium and hashish in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. The CIA estimated that these crops were worth approximately US$1 billion per annum, or around 20 per cent of Syria’s GNP. Rather than jeopardise Syria’s support for the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, the Bush Administration ‘turned a blind eye’ to this, thus over-riding US domestic drugs policies (Booth, 1996:348–349).

Similarly, in their assessment of Australia’s illegal drug problem Wardlaw, et al. (1991:133–134) found:

> There will clearly be times when an actual or potential clash could arise between [domestic] drug policy and foreign policy goals ... It will sometimes be important, therefore, for the Australian Government to view supply reduction efforts in terms of their impact on foreign policy concerns. In some situations, it will be the judgment of government that reduced performance in terms of drug-control objectives is a price that must be paid for the advancement of foreign policy objectives.

### Side effects of military intervention

If Australia was in a position to strike at the poppy fields using military force, such intervention would have complicating ‘side effects’ that would adversely impact on domestic policy as well as clash with foreign policy goals. First, there would be the cost of financing the scale of such an operation. In order to carry out a credible counter-drug operation, Australia would need to spend perhaps several hundred million dollars. Earmarking this amount of funds for, say, drug crop elimination programs in opium growing countries would no doubt prove problematic for the government that would have to find ways of raising the money.

Even if the Commonwealth Government was successful in finding a large amount of public money, it is debatable whether such funds would accomplish much even if it were channelled into an ‘aid package’. Australia would have little chance of convincing farmers to shift from growing opium to growing substitute crops unless there was a market for the produce and it would pay as much as it does for their poppy crops (e.g. clearly, coriander would not be a viable option…). Providing such a large amount of aid is likely to be met with a great deal of scepticism by Australian parliamentarians and taxpayers, especially if those countries have had difficulties in the past demonstrating their capability to account responsibly for aid money.

The second concern involves the military aspect of such an interventionist approach. To attack heroin at the source would likely require military weapons and equipment to be dispatched to the producer country in order to dismantle the production infrastructure and
distribution networks of drug traffickers. This is likely to mean attack helicopters, transport aircraft, assault vehicles, logistic support equipment, barracks and more.

The presence of significant numbers of Australian combat troops operating openly on foreign soil would no doubt be a sensitive issue at home as well as abroad. In addition, military personnel could be at greater risk—the presence of large numbers of troops (not to mention civilian nationals travelling in country) could present as soft targets for narco-terrorists (Library of Congress, 2002).

The third point to be made in terms of large-scale intervention is one of corruption. For example, drug traffickers have paid off corrupt officials in several drug production countries in exchange for secure smuggling routes and weapons. When this type of intervention has been used by the United States in South America, the practical benefits for the Americans were less than expected (Library of Congress, 2002).

**Covert operations**

Unconventional warfare techniques, such as small-scale covert military operations, may be an alternative to military forces operating openly, especially if aimed at specific targets that are based on high-grade intelligence. But these operations would be controversial too. This approach would entail, for instance (but stressing, this is a hypothetical example), Australia’s special forces backed by assets from its intelligence community to identify and then neutralise the most critical and vulnerable parts of a drug trafficker’s management, production, transportation and transhipment networks.

The CIA successfully conducted covert operations of this type against guerrilla groups operating in what was Military Region 3 during the Vietnam War (DeForest and Chanoff, 1990). Although the intent of the CIA’s use of this technique was different, the principles employed were the same.

Small-scale covert military operations, conducted in cooperation with source countries, such as ‘targeted interception’ could impact significantly on the flow feeding Australia’s heroin reservoir. Such secret operations may have a greater degree of success in deterring those engaged in the trafficking of illicit drugs than increasing law enforcement efforts domestically. Police action in Australia can only realistically target drug traffickers’ agents for arrest, many of whom are simply ‘mules’ or users engaged in trafficking to fund their own drug habit.

There are instances where Western governments have successfully used this type of policy option to curb international terrorism. Prominent cases include the use of the British SAS to target IRA terrorists in Ireland (Rivers, 1985) and US Special Forces to target terrorists in Beirut (Rivers, 1985). Israel is well known for its use of Mossad whose agents selectively targeted members of the Black September terrorist organisation throughout Europe in the 1970s (Katz, 1990), effectively neutralising that organisation. Recently, Israel called on these same assets to target the terrorists responsible for the November 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel and the attempted shooting-down of an Israeli commercial airliner in Kenya (Kerin, 2002).
Nevertheless, there are concerns with conducting this type of covert operation. These include the moral question of targeted interception and the practical consideration of having an operation compromised, leaving the government to deal with an international relations nightmare.

Offensive information warfare

Offensive information warfare, or cyber-war, ‘...is the use of all available electronic and computer tools to shut down the enemy’s electronics and communications...’ (Dunnigan, 1996:266). Unlike the other military operations discussed, there are few reasons why offensive information warfare tactics could not be adopted to target drug traffickers’ management and decision making systems (especially their informal money transfer systems, i.e. underground banking/money laundering) as well as using psyops to target opium growers and key suppliers/sponsors as a means of protecting Australia’s national security from this criminal threat.

Information warfare is an unquestionably remote form of confrontation—it is more acceptable, operationally, to destroy a drug trafficker’s information infrastructure, than to bomb their production facilities or target them personally for interception. Information attacks avoid human casualties, as there are no corpses when a logic bomb obliterates all of the business data contained in a drug trafficker’s computer system. If executed properly, information warfare would permit Australia to avoid deciding between competing international and domestic interests—it would allow the government to ‘have its cake and eat it too’, as the saying goes.

In a broad sense, information warfare is analogous to that of a naval blockade. Historically, countries imposed sanctions upon an adversary by instituting a blockade. A country could, in effect, isolate its enemy from the world by keeping all ships from reaching the targeted country’s ports. With computer technology, Australia could impose a blockade on drug traffickers by, for instance, unleashing a denial of service attack against their computer(s), or turning all their financial and operational data to ‘electronic confetti’ through the introduction of viruses or Trojans, the same way legitimate commercial networks are regularly attacked by random hackers. This approach pits Australia’s strengths against drug traffickers’ weaknesses in an unconventional manner—one in which there is no effective response.

The inquiry by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) into the now infamous September 11 attacks recommended a strategy to fight terrorism that is analogous to what is being suggested here for fighting drug traffickers. It stated that intelligence has enabled law enforcers to identify the financial facilitators whose efforts allowed al-Qaeda to operate. With these key players removed (i.e. arrested or killed) there was a decrease in the money available to finance future al-Qaeda operations and an increase in the cost of carrying out the operations it was able to organise, making them less effective. Most importantly, it rendered some planned operations totally impossible (US, 2004:382). If the same could be done to the cyber infrastructure that is essential to illicit drug operations, a similar result would surely be expected.

But to do this, a unit needs to be created to engage in 4GW. That is, a unit of information warriors who can conduct covert operations in cyberspace (Vest, 2001). This would require a
well-trained cadre of men and women who are capable of attacking information infrastructures remotely. These warriors would need to possess high-order intellectual skills and an in-depth understanding of computer architectures, programming languages, telecommunications, IT-security and data encryption (Lewis, n.d.). They would have to be aided by a small number of colleagues who are expert in financial intelligence—analysts who can locate and track illicit drug money as it makes its way through the maze of front companies and shell organisations that provide ‘cover’ for drug traffickers.

These personnel could either be soldiers trained as computer engineers or computer engineers trained as soldiers, or some combination thereof. But whatever the composition this unit takes, there is little doubt that the environment in which they will need to operate will have to be that of the military, not that of the police force or regulatory agency. This is because law enforcement and compliance work is primarily focused on collecting and safeguarding evidence for admission in a court of law. In contrast, the military’s function is to defeat an enemy. In an information war on drugs, it is the defeat of the enemy’s decision-support and money laundering systems that will be critical, not their seizure and preservation.

Initial consideration might lead one to assume that such an option would be complicated and some time away. But at present it is entirely possible for Australia to achieve, at the very least, a menacing capability. Using existing financial intelligence, military and IT experts, Australia could wage a raider-style campaign that could cause significant disruption to international illicit drug operations. Using a manoeuvrist approach, this strategy ‘…seeks to shatter the [drug traffickers'] cohesion through a series of actions orchestrated to a single purpose, creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the [drug trafficker] cannot cope’ (Australian Army, 2002: Chap 4).

Rand Corporation reported that: ‘Waging information war is relatively cheap. Unlike traditional weapon technologies, acquiring information weapons does not require vast financial resources… Computer expertise and access to major networks may be the only prerequisites’ (Rand, 1995). For instance, French resistance fighters during World War II used very modest resources to cut telegraph and telephone lines, thus helping prevent Nazi troops from being sent to reinforce coastal forces during the Allied invasion on D-Day—undermining the enemy’s centre of gravity (Stafford, 2000:197).

Attacks on drug traffickers’ computer networks could be crafted to inflict a costly impact on their future viability. Using sophisticated ‘worms’, for instance, their networks could be brought down, halting the transhipment of drugs and therefore jeopardising the organisation’s profitability. Ultimately, these attacks are intended to confront their ability to function freely. The fact that drug traffickers’ business systems are connected to the Internet makes them as vulnerable as anyone else (Meinel, 2003). Drug traffickers would be hard pressed to counter a concentrated, sustained attack by a small team of information warriors—and there would be no ‘smoking gun’.

These examples are only part of what information warfare is capable of delivering in relation to the war-on-drugs. Another tactic is that of psyops and disinformation. Briefly, drawing on an example from history, American agents were reported to have used disinformation when they inserted forged documents into British diplomatic pouches to try to convince the British
that George Washington’s army was larger than it actually was. Although this example might seem dated, it nevertheless demonstrates well the parallel of how a disinformation campaign could be waged against a drug trafficker with relative ease via, say, e-mail and the Internet. As Sun Tzu (1963:66) wrote: ‘All warfare is based on deception.’

Conclusion

Drug traffickers have transformed what was at one stage a cottage industry into a global business that now rivals the GNP of some less developed countries. The open borders that exist between some opium growing countries facilitate the movement of heroin to transhipment points on its way to Australia, and elsewhere in the world. Money laundering is accomplished easily through a maze of financial transactions and is facilitated by modern telecommunications and the Internet. All of these factors have defied traditional law enforcement countermeasures.

If there is a war-on-drugs, then the statistics contained in reports like the Australian Crime Commission’s Illicit Drug Data Report (2005) suggest that it is the drug traffickers who are winning. Even the forerunner to the Australian Crime Commission, the National Crime Authority, concluded that ‘…it is simply not a battle that can be won by law enforcement alone…’ (Crooke, 2001). Therefore, is it not imperative that we rethink supply-side strategies and realign our approach so that it plays an offensive role?

Rather than only chipping-away at the continuous stream of traffickers feeding the ‘reservoir’, why not embrace warlike tactics that attack the drug problem in front of the ‘Customs barrier’ at the source? Although strategies that use the formal legal system should be employed at every opportunity, the option of using intelligence-led cyber soldiers to wage an information war on drug traffickers’ financial infrastructure and their command and control arrangements, deserves further debate.

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NOTES

1. First generation warfare was characterised by the age of Napoleon; forces armed with guns operating in close-order formations to defeat cavalry and infantry who were armed with swords and bayonets. Second generation warfare was the age of firepower, managed in such a way that enabled an army to win through attrition. Third generation warfare saw the advent of decentralised attacks based on manoeuvrability and strategy. Fourth generation warfare is much more irregular. In the main, it comprises asymmetric operations ‘…in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatants and in which the emphasis is on bypassing an opposing military force…’ (Vest, 2001).

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Borneo 1945 – An Amphibious Success Story

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Sixty years ago Australian forces successfully led the Allied liberation of Borneo, the world’s third largest island, from Japanese occupation in the OBOE series of operations. These operations culminated in OBOE TWO, the amphibious assault on Balikpapan which was not only the last large scale Allied operation of World War II but remains Australia’s largest ever amphibious assault. As the culmination of the RAN’s participation in over 20 South West Pacific amphibious landings during World War II, the Balikpapan invasion demonstrated the high level of expertise in amphibious operations that had been achieved, as well as the degree to which joint and combined operations had developed during almost six years of war.

With rich oil resources and functional aerodromes, the strategic worth of Borneo was debated at the highest levels. Borneo’s position at the base of the South China Sea meant that it shared coastal waters with Indo-China, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Celebes and the Philippines. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed an invasion of Borneo in order to secure oil and rubber supplies, and to interdict Japanese communications with South East Asia. Borneo was also seen as a step towards an advance on Java.

Controversy surrounds the Borneo campaign. For example, the British Chiefs of Staff did not agree with the need for an advanced fleet base in Brunei Bay, and General Thomas A. Blamey, the Australian Commander in Chief, saw no justification for attacking Balikpapan. At the time it was argued that capture of the island from the occupying Japanese forces would provide a venue through which the Allies could control the South East Asia region. It has also been suggested that the capture of Borneo would meet postwar strategic objectives. A close reading of the literature suggests that the Australian Government desired to make a significant contribution to defeating Japan during 1945, in order to confirm its place at the table during later peace talks. Separately, there was pressure on the government to reinstate the prestige of the British empire by liberating British and Dutch colonies. Both these factors may have contributed to the decision to invade Borneo.

Initial plans called for six OBOE operations, however, as the Allied offensives progressed closer to Japan, OBOE THREE, FOUR and FIVE were cancelled. The remaining three amphibious landings were codenamed: OBOE ONE, the invasion of Tarakan island; OBOE SIX, the invasion
of north Borneo at Labuan and Brunei; and OBOE TWO, the invasion of Balikpapan. The sites were selected for the strategic assets and advantages their capture would offer the Allies. Tarakan had an airfield, docking facilities, protected all weather harbourage and relatively good roads. Even without the fleet base option, the liberation of Labuan and Brunei would secure the area’s oil and rubber resources. Balikpapan was selected for its oil reserves, two suitable airfields, and deep sheltered harbour.

In many ways the landings in Borneo were different from those in Europe and the rest of the Pacific. By early 1945 Japanese naval forces were confined to waters east and north of Singapore-Cam Ranh Bay and Japanese air power was greatly reduced, with less than 70 Japanese aircraft operating in the whole Netherlands East Indies. The Allies had effectively achieved sea and air control over much of the South West Pacific and therefore needed to plan only for opposition from smaller independent Japanese air and naval elements. In fact, no effective air or seaborne resistance was offered.

The amphibious assault on Tarakan (OBOE ONE) commenced, as planned, on 1 May 1945, and despite difficult coastal approaches, extensive minefields and strongly fortified defences, the landing was accomplished with marked success. A heavy concentration of naval and air bombardment prior to the landing, as well as effective naval gunfire support (NGS) to ground forces once ashore effectively neutralised most of the Japanese resistance: ‘had the Japanese elected to remain in these positions and fight, our casualties would have been extremely heavy’. Hard fighting by 9th Australian Division troops secured the area. Capture of Tarakan ensured that fighter control was achieved past Balikpapan, which would prevent Japanese shipping from entering the area. For the first time, all land and sea areas within the South West Pacific command came under Allied air superiority.

The landings at Labuan and Brunei (OBOE SIX) proceeded to plan on 10 June 1945. After preliminary naval bombardment, hydrographic and mine clearance operations, Australian troops met little Japanese opposition and moved rapidly to their first objectives. NGS helped reduce pockets of resistance on Labuan, while the 9th Australian Division secured much of Brunei and British Borneo. The Australian forces were able to release some Allied prisoners of war as well as provide humanitarian assistance to the Chinese, Malay and indigenous populations of north Borneo.

By July 1945, Balikpapan was defended by some 2000 regular Japanese troops and approximately 3000 locally conscripted residents, with a few Japanese air units capable of launching sporadic raids, but no effective naval support. The OBOE TWO plan required the landing of over 33,000 personnel, their supplies and heavy equipment in the assault, including over 21,000 men of the 7th Australian Division, 2000 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel, as well as 2000 men from United States and Netherlands East Indies units.

The naval forces allocated to OBOE TWO, under Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, USN, Commander Balikpapan Attack Force, included an Amphibious Task Group, a Cruiser Covering Group, and an Escort Carrier Group. The Amphibious Task Group consisted of over 120 ships, including the RAN Infantry Landing Ships (LSIs), Manoora (Flagship of the Transport Unit), Westralia and Kanimbla. Overall there were some 98 landing craft and miscellaneous vessels, with a screen of 10 destroyers, 5 destroyer escorts and the Australian frigate Gascoyne. Another frigate,
Warrego, operated in a specialised hydrographic unit within this Amphibious Task Group. The Cruiser Covering Group consisted of 10 cruisers and 14 destroyers organised into three separate commands, including HMA Ships Shropshire (heavy cruiser), Hobart, (light cruiser), Arunta (destroyer) and 2 USN destroyers under Commodore Harold B. Farncomb, RAN. The Escort Carrier Group included 3 carriers with approximately 90 aircraft in total, and a screen of 1 destroyer and 5 destroyer escorts.

Air support for OBOE TWO was supplied by the RAAF, US 13th and 5th Air Forces, and naval air units from the US 3rd and 7th Fleets. The RAAF, under Air Vice-Marshal William D. Bostock, acted as coordinating agency for all pre-invasion strikes and close support. The Balikpapan air operations began on 11 June 1945. Altogether, Bostock had 40 squadrons at his disposal for the period just before and during the landing, and of these, 25 were of heavy bombers, totalling 300 aircraft.6

The naval bombardment of Balikpapan commenced on 27 June 1945, with Shropshire and Hobart firing at Japanese targets along the coast. NGS from all three commands within the Cruiser Covering Group was made available throughout the OBOE TWO operations. Over 46,800 rounds of 4.7-inch to 8-inch munitions were fired by the naval forces in support of the Balikpapan operations, beating all records for ammunition delivered in support of a division size landing—‘and how those Aussies loved it!’7

Warrego and the hydrographic unit carried out surveys and placed marker buoys off the landing beaches and also surveyed the inner harbour. The mine clearance activities at Balikpapan were some of the most difficult of the war. Sweeping began on 15 June 1945, with 16 minesweepers and a covering force operating in shallow water and uncleared minefields, often under Japanese gunfire. The work took its toll; 3 minesweepers were sunk, 4 were damaged by mines and gunfire, 15 sets of magnetic gear were lost, 7 personnel were killed and 43 were wounded. In total, 50 mines were swept. Underwater demolition teams of US Army engineers cleared two gaps through the beach obstacles while under fire. The hydrographic, mine clearance and underwater demolition activities were most successful.8

On 1 July 1945, the first two amphibious waves hit the beaches in 91 amphibious vehicles and despite a choppy sea the ship to shore transfer had the troops landing 5 minutes early at 8.55 a.m. The Australian LSIs provided parts of the 3rd and subsequent waves. The last of the organised waves, the 17th, landed at 10.55 a.m. The beaches of Balikpapan were taken with little opposition, and by noon that day 10,500 troops, 700 vehicles and 1950 tons of stores had been landed.

Gascoyne escorted a convoy that arrived at Balikpapan on 5 July 1945 with supplies essential for the maintenance of land and air forces ashore. The Australian LSIs, having departed as soon as they had unloaded the assault troops, returned with reinforcements from Morotai on 7 July 1945. As the Australian 7th Division advanced inland they encountered strong pockets of Japanese resistance. A total of 229 Australians died and 634 were wounded in the Balikpapan operations.9

The RAN currently operates six Heavy Landing Craft (LCH). Although they were commissioned during 1973–74, the LCH still contribute to the Australian Defence Force’s amphibious capability.
and four of the six - Balikpapan, Brunei, Labuan, and Tarakan - commemorate the amphibious campaign in Borneo during 1945.

The amphibious landings in Borneo were professionally planned and executed operations that achieved their strategic objectives. They demonstrated Australia’s ability to successfully project power ashore in our region, through efficient use of joint and combined forces. Today we should look back at Borneo 1945 with pride, as it remains a classic example of how Australian strategic interests have been successfully pursued through maritime power projection.

The RAN Fleet Air Arm—Ashore in Vietnam

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On 30 April 1975, a North Vietnamese, Soviet supplied, T-54 tank smashed through the gates of the presidential palace in South Vietnam’s capital, Saigon. This act symbolically brought 25 years of civil war and the existence of the Republic of Vietnam to an end. Two years previously on 11 January 1973 the Governor-General of Australia had formally declared Australia’s 10 year participation in the war over, following the withdrawal of the bulk of our military forces.

The ubiquitous Bell UH1 Iroquois helicopter is still arguably the most instantly recognisable symbol of the Vietnam War. Images of the ‘helicopter war’ feature prominently in books, films and documentaries; indeed, a granite etched image of an Iroquois extracting troops forms the centrepiece of Australia’s national Vietnam Memorial located on Anzac Parade in Canberra. Not so widely known though is the role that was played by personnel of the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN’s) Fleet Air Arm (FAA), in a war that depended heavily on tactical air movement of combat troops, supplies and equipment in what were eventually called air-mobile operations.

On 14 July 1967, the Minister for Defence, Mr Allen Fairhall announced that eight RAN helicopter pilots and supporting staff would join a United States (US) Army helicopter unit in South Vietnam to provide support for allied forces, including the 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province. The new flight, designated the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV), was to be integrated with the US Army 135th Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) flying Iroquois helicopters in both the utility and gun-ship configurations. It was also announced that RAN FAA crews would supplement the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF’s) 9 Squadron based at Vung Tau.

The first contingent of pilots, observers, naval aircrewmen and support staff was assigned to 723 Squadron at Naval Air Station Nowra in July 1967, under the command of Lieutenant Commander N. Ralph, RAN. The flight consisted of eight pilots, four observers, four aircrewmen, twenty-four technical sailors and six support staff (drawn variously from cooks, stewards, writers, medical staff and storemen).

Following an eight-week period of training the first contingent arrived in Vietnam on 16 October 1967 and was quickly integrated with the 330 personnel of the 135th AHC. The RAN members took their place in the 135th according to rank and seniority with Ralph as second-in-command as well as officer-in-charge of the RANHFV. As a result of this unique relationship between the RAN and the US Army, the unit was officially designated ‘EMU’, for Experimental Military Unit. This was fitting, given that the EMU is a native Australian bird, yet amusing at the same time because of the emu’s inability to fly. The unit later adopted the unofficial motto ‘get the bloody job done’, which was to personify their attitude to air-mobile operations.

The 135th AHC was based at Vung Tau and comprised two troop lift platoons, each with eleven UH-1Ds, a gunship platoon with eight UH-1Cs, a maintenance platoon with a single UH-1D and a headquarters platoon. Six of the gunships were equipped with mini guns, rockets and machine guns. The remaining two were fitted with the XM-5 40mm grenade-launcher system, rockets and machine guns.
The role of 135th AHC was to provide tactical air movement of combat troops, supplies and equipment in air-mobile operations. This included augmentation of army medical services, search and rescue and the provision of a command and control aircraft capability. A typical day’s flying would involve one UH1-H command and control helicopter, four UH1-C gunships and ten troop lift aircraft (the latter being known as ‘slicks’).

The mission would normally be advised the previous day along with the details of the ground element (usually a battalion) that the EMU would be supporting. The air mission commander would attend a joint briefing and provide advice relating to air movement of troops, use of gunships and fuel requirements, and at the same time receive information from the ground force commander on when and where troops were to be inserted.

The mission would begin early the following day with the launch of the command and control aircraft at least half an hour before the rest of the flight. The aircraft would proceed to the location of the battalion commander (usually a field location) where last minute details would be checked and pick-up zones (PZ) and landing zones (LZ) identified. Once identified, an artillery preparation would be fired into the perimeters of the LZ for a 15-minute period before the arrival of the main force.

The command and control aircraft would then direct the insertion from above the scene of action. The gunships were usually the first directed into the area to place further ‘fire’ around the LZ, and once the area was declared clear, the slicks would be ordered into a landing point marked by the command and control helicopter with smoke.

As the slicks entered the LZ they too added their own suppression fire using M60 machine guns on final approach. On landing, the suppression fire ceased and the troops would quickly disembark before the slicks took off and returned to the PZ for their next load. It would normally take about five lifts to move an entire battalion with each of the ten slicks carrying six South Vietnamese, US or Australian soldiers. On completion of the insertion of troops into their objective, the slicks would then return to a reaction site where they awaited further instructions. It was not long before EMU became fully operational, flying its first mission of this type on 3 November 1967. By the end of November the company had flown 3182 hours in support of the US Army 9th Infantry Division and the 1st Australian Task Force based at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy province.

Several major operations followed in support of a combined allied sweep against the 5th Viet Cong Division and it was during one of these operations that EMU helicopters were first hit by enemy fire. The first aircraft to be shot down was a gunship piloted by Lieutenant A.A. Casadio, RAN, on 19 November 1967. After being forced down during an attack on Viet Cong positions in the Rung Sat Special Zone near Saigon, the enemy immediately attacked the helicopter’s crew. Despite their relative inexperience, control of the situation was maintained by setting up a defensive perimeter using the helicopter’s door-mounted M60 machine guns. The crew was later rescued by another EMU helicopter, but not before they had successfully driven off an unknown number of Viet Cong, killing two of them. This was a far cry from the carrier-borne flight operations for which the naval aviators had initially been trained.

In December 1967, the 135th AHC was relocated to Camp Blackhorse five miles south of Xuan Loc, in Long Khanh province. In February 1968, the North Vietnamese launched the Tet offensive.
and Camp Blackhorse came under enemy attack by mortar. Skirmishes on the boundaries became frequent and the enemy mining of the road from Long Binh to Baria, via Xuan Loc disrupted supply convoys causing shortages of aircraft spare parts.

In response to the Tet offensive, operations intensified with EMU aircraft frequently coming under enemy fire and being forced down. The RANHFV suffered its first casualty during a mission to lift out troops of the 18th Army of the Republic of Vietnam near Xuan Loc when Lieutenant Commander P.J. Vickers, RAN, was fatally wounded while piloting the lead aircraft. He was to be the first of five naval aviators killed in action during the flight’s four-year deployment to Vietnam.

At the same time, the eight RAN pilots attached to 9 Squadron RAAF were also providing troop-lift capacity for the 1st Australian Task Force, and re-supplying troops in the field with food, ammunition, clean clothing and stores.

An equally important role was aerial fire support, and to give 9 Squadron a greater capacity for direct support of Army ground operations, specially modified UH-1H helicopters were introduced early in 1969. Dubbed ‘Bushrangers’, these heavily armed aircraft operated as a light fire team of two, escorting slicks in combat assaults, providing suppression fire on enemy bunkers, and protecting medical evacuation aircraft. They also supported slicks that inserted and extracted Australian Special Air Service patrols in enemy occupied jungle areas. The RAN detachment to 9 Squadron played a significant part in enabling it to meet its army support role in Phuoc Tuy Province during 1968 and into 1969, until the last of its pilots returned home in May that year.

The RANHFV ceased operations on 8 June 1971. During its four-year deployment to Vietnam, over 200 RAN FAA personnel had rotated though the RANHFV in four contingents. Over this period they were continuously engaged in offensive operations, earning not only the pilots but also the maintenance and support staff of the flight, a reputation second to none.

The gallantry and distinguished service of RANHFV members was recognised by the award of three Member of the British Empire medals, eight Distinguished Service Crosses, five Distinguished Flying Crosses (DFCs), one British Empire Medal, twenty-four Mentions-in-Dispatches and numerous Vietnamese and US decorations. 723 Squadron, RANHFV’s parent unit, was awarded the battle honour ‘Vietnam 1967-71’ on 22 December 1972. The eight-man detachment to 9 Squadron RAAF was also recognised with the award of a DFC and three Mentions-in-Dispatches.

The flexibility demonstrated by FAA personnel in Vietnam, in adapting to offensive helicopter operations in the field in both a joint and coalition force environment, is unique in RAN history. This is best summarised by Captain Andy Craig, RAN (Rtd.), who flew with both the EMU and the RAN detachment to 9 Squadron RAAF during his time in Vietnam:

“The 135th seriously practiced the business of ‘getting the bloody job done’ - risks were certainly taken but... I don't think the 135th ever missed a task in my time with it. The flying was hard and challenging and, without question, the most exciting of my career”. 
The personnel of the FAA who flew with 9 Squadron and the 135th AHC in Vietnam remain a close knit group. In April 2002 the then Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral C.A. Barrie AC, RAN, unveiled a plaque in Bomaderry, NSW commemorating the service of the RANHFV and the 135th AHC. Reunion and remembrance ceremonies also took place in the US at Biloxi, Mississippi, on 25–26 May 2005 and at Fort Rucker, Alabama on 27 May 2005.\(^7\)

2. The only Australian combat troops remaining in Vietnam after the general withdrawal was a platoon guarding the Australian embassy in Saigon. This finally departed in June 1973.
5. The others were Lieutenant A.A. Casadio, RAN, Petty Officer O.C. Phillips, Leading Seaman N.E. Shipp, and Sub Lieutenant A.J. Huelin, RAN.
From the Land Warfare Studies Centre

As the Cold War ended, Australian defence and strategic planners questioned their assumptions about the threat environment and the concepts and tools available to fulfil a mission to protect Australian territory and interests. Was the Dibb Review construct of a ‘sea–air gap’ still applicable? Were the platforms acquired to prevent enemy lodgement in that gap going to remain viable tools and providers of strategic choice? Or, had the Australian Defence Force become hide-bound and limited in the range of options it could offer to the government? Most importantly, the overarching question became ‘how does the ADF structure for an uncertain future and still remain relevant?’.

Dr Michael Evans published a Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper (No. 103) in May 1999 that significantly challenged the greatest strategic assumption of the late 1980s and early 1990s—that stand-off weapons from air and sea platforms could defend Australia. The concept of conventional deterrence, as distinct from its nuclear sibling, is shown to be a Western idea of fighting wars you want (against ‘rational’ actors), not wars as they are (involving ‘irrational’ groups). Yet, asymmetrical threats often prove to be ‘undeterrable’, and, as such, the creation of a defence strategy based on deterrence provides diminishing utility in a complex threat spectrum. Precision weapons and networked forces based on a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ are less useful against enemies fighting in the political realm rather than the military one, and this strategy significantly ignores other, more flexible approaches to national power.

In Working Paper 104, Greg de Somer uses the history and evolution of the US Army-After-Next (AAN) paradigm to discover lessons for similar force-structuring assumptions and programs in the Australian Army. This paper debates the shape, role and nature of the Australian Army in the year 2025, and proposes some of the key processes to ensure that the Army the nation has available is the Army the nation needs. Interestingly, this paper was released in the months ahead of Australia’s deployment to East Timor, and, with hindsight, provides prescient warnings and suggestions about multi-national coalitions, interoperability issues, and short-warning but strategically-important threats and opportunities.

These and other hardcopy publications are available from the LWSC, ph: 02-6265 9624, e-mail: <lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au>, or can be downloaded from the Land Warfare Studies Centre website: <www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc>.

Conventional Deterrence in the Australian Strategic Context


Michael Evans

This paper analyses the relevance of deterrence theory based on conventional forces to Australian military strategy. It argues that a majority of Australian strategists did not favour conventional deterrence as an explicit strategic posture during the Cold War since it was seen
as an outcome, rather than a starting point, of successful defence planning. In the post–Cold War era, conventional deterrence has become a disputed subject amongst Western defence analysts. In a multipolar world prone to regional conflict, weapons proliferation, ethnic strife and political uncertainty, the credibility of deterrence using non-nuclear forces is highly problematical.

The paper outlines the parameters of the debate in the United States over implementing a concept of dynamic deterrence based on information-age weapons systems. Australian views on conventional deterrence, ranging from the concept of disproportionate response in the 1970s to the concept of basic deterrence in the 1990s, are sketched. The paper attempts to demonstrate how interest in conventional deterrence has revived in the 1990s mainly in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in the wake of the Coalition air campaign in the 1990–91 Gulf War. It is argued that an Australian conventional deterrence strategy based on employing standoff precision strike is both unrealistic and unlikely to meet the full range of national security needs. This is because the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) model of high-technology military operations represents an idealised Western approach to war which, while appearing well-tailored to the kind of operations liberal democracies would like to wage, is in fact too restrictive to deter or even control conflict in the future.

The present and foreseeable international security environment is unsuited for a single overarching strategy based on conventional deterrence. A spectrum of conflict has now emerged which is asymmetric in character and requires the application of a range of capabilities within the framework of a versatile approach to strategy. The paper recommends that Australia should seek to develop a joint maritime strategy based on agile forces for offshore manoeuvre and a willingness to participate in coalition military operations to reassure the present balance of power. Such a strategy should be determined by the following requirements: an emphasis on littoral operations in a maritime environment; the need for a clear recognition of asymmetric conflict; the ability to acquire affordable information technology; and, finally, by a realistic assessment of the domestic restraints that a liberal democracy such as Australia faces in employing armed force.

The Implications of the United States Army’s Army-After-Next Concepts for the Australian Army


Greg de Somer

This paper analyses the implications of the concepts derived from the US Army’s Army-After-Next (AAN) Project for the Australian Army. The paper is designed as an overview; it is a snapshot of ideas arising from the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and a speculative insight into the future strategic environment, rather than a detailed assessment or exhaustive examination of the AAN Project as a whole. Such an approach is necessarily selective, with issues identified and examined insofar as they impact on the debate central to the Australian Army’s force development process.
The AAN Project is now an institutionalised process within the US Army to focus on possible future warfare and emergent technologies that show potential, and which should therefore attract research and development investment to realise that capability. The AAN concept embodies a vision for the future of warfighting. Such warfare is likely to be characterised by rapid non-linear movement and the precise delivery of combat power by highly agile, technically advanced forces. The emphasis is on situational awareness, agility, mobility, firepower and sustainability. The speed at which the Australian Army adapts to these concepts depends on a recognition of what is emerging and a commitment to embrace change. The AAN Project is important, and the Australian Army can derive much from the conceptual nature of the process.

The policy dilemma central to the debate is whether resources should be shifted from some areas, and the forces associated with them, to others. This paper recommends that the Australian Army needs to be aware of Australia’s unique strategic policy and particular requirements when reviewing the concepts of the US Army’s force development project. A concept that would be relevant for the Australian Army is one that proposes an integrated, digitised force, invariably joint, postured for warfighting in a multinational alliance or coalition context, adaptable to other tasks and threats (both symmetric and asymmetric) to afford the maximum utility throughout the spectrum of conflict. At the same time the Australian Army must maintain an adequate capability as it adapts for the future.
Enablers—The Critical Factor

Reprinted from the Air Power Development Centre’s bulletin, Pathfinder, Issue 32, September 2005

Although the youngest of force projection capabilities, air power has carved a distinct niche for itself not only as a purely military capability but also as an asset that can be brought to bear in disparate situations in support of national policy. This rise to prominence, in a short span of a century, has been made possible because of two complementary factors. First, the continuous push by the commercial scientific community to enlarge the envelope of technology that provide air power with its operational capabilities and second, the willingness of the practitioners of air power to experiment with emerging technology in order to refine such capabilities. The combination of these two factors has created a cascading enhancement of air power capabilities, especially in the past few decades.

There is also a downside to this success story. As technology has continued to enhance air power capabilities and provide planners with increased options for its application, the cost factor has also surged, at times in a disproportionate way. This has resulted in a balanced force of high-end air power capabilities moving beyond the reach of even comparatively rich nations. Capabilities ranging from the benign use of airlift in humanitarian assistance to the forceful application of precision strike have become far too expensive to procure and maintain. The outcome has been the selective maintenance of particular capabilities by most of the air forces around the world. Maintaining the complete suite of capabilities in adequate measure is now prohibitively expensive and governments around the world are questioning the need for such expenditure.

While the core function of air power remains force projection in a military sense, in this scenario, capabilities that have been traditionally viewed as supporting the core function assume critical importance. These support capabilities are known variously as ‘force multipliers’ and ‘enablers’. Irrespective of the designation, what they achieve is a tangible improvement in capabilities while ensuring that the number of assets remains within the resource availability thereby achieving a great deal of cost-effectiveness. These enablers are more technology reliant than most air power applications. The major enablers are space-based assets, early warning devices, electronic warfare assets and air-to-air refuelling capabilities.

Space-based assets cover a large swath of capabilities. Currently the majority of surveillance and reconnaissance functions are done from space and this leads to targeting functions. Another area where space assets are almost omnipresent in their usage is communications. From being sparingly used even a decade ago, space communications have become the centrepiece of all military communication systems. It can be said without any doubt that military operations of any magnitude are now heavily reliant on space-based communications for their success. From an air power perspective, these communications in conjunction with navigational systems like the Global Positioning System (GPS) are vital to the success of any mission. Further, the accuracy of targeting and the precision of weapon strike are both direct functions of these enablers. The exactness of air power application, which has become its signature and the primary reason for its preference as a force of first choice and a tool of political deterrence, is achieved through the appropriate application of space-based assets.
Even when air power is not being employed in an offensive or coercive manner, there is a need to deploy adequate defensive capabilities. The improvements in Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) capabilities now provide a measure of assurance to air defence capabilities and greatly enhance offensive applications. Some form of AEW&C is now considered a baseline requisite for effective air control, even when such control is delineated in time and space.

The advent of such capabilities is based on the availability of advanced technology and therefore Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities have assumed increased importance. Effective EW can create a zone of complete silence that can be exploited to great advantage by an efficient adversary. The need to have sufficiently capable EW and also the capability to counter enemy action in the EW sphere is a necessity in the modern battlefield. Appropriate application of EW can make even a large force blind and ineffective. The importance of EW assets will only increase in the future with reliance on communications and other space-based assets becoming a prerequisite for effective air power application.

Historically range and reach have been a weak link in the employment of air power. The advent of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) has neutralised this perceived disadvantage. With AAR air power now has truly global reach. The outcome is the capability for a force to project air power anywhere and deliver the necessary force, whether it is the deployment of Special Forces or a direct strike on some centre of gravity. The rapidity with which air power can achieve such a strike has greatly increased the flexibility in its employment in support of national security requirements.

While the major enablers discussed above have become critical to the successful employment of air power, it must also be borne in mind that all of them by themselves are expensive capabilities to obtain, maintain and operate. Their cost-effectiveness is apparent in the enhancement of air power capabilities that they bring about and is a comparative assessment. The quantum of enablers needed and the types that an air force should aspire to acquire will be a direct function of the role that air force is expected to play in the pursuit of national security. The only hard fact is that without adequate enablers, no air force can be expected to deliver air power in a cost-effective manner for any given time.
Professional Research Notes

To enhance the *Journal's* aim of informing and promoting discussion on important issues of national and international defence and security matters, we devote this section to publicising current research on defence and related topics being undertaken around Australia. Each individual research note has four parts:

1. *ADFJ* Index Number comprising the relevant *ADFJ* Issue Number and the number assigned to each research note;
2. The title or brief description of the research;
3. Brief research notes; and
4. Contact details.

By the inclusion of researchers’ contact details, we hope to provide a forum for dialogue and debate. In this issue, we are highlighting some of the research currently under way at ADFA. We encourage all those who wish to publicise their research to forward details either to the Editor at: <publications@defence.adc.edu.au>, or to the Consulting Editor at: <markebery@defence.adc.edu.au>.

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Integrated Online Health Monitoring System for Effective Maintenance of Structures

Aircraft operating beyond their design life have become the ‘norm’ these days, making it imperative to develop efficient, reliable and cost effective tools for assessment of structural integrity and damage monitoring. Researchers from the School of Aerospace, Civil and Mechanical Engineering (ACME), School of Mechanical Engineering UNSW and the Materials Science and Technology Faculty have collaborated on a project titled ‘Integrated Online Health Monitoring System for Effective Maintenance of Structures’.

Traditional tools of non destructive evaluation such as eddy current, radiography, ultrasonic and magnetic particle testing are time consuming and costly. These tests are only applicable to periodic ground based testing, lacking the ability to detect damage when it occurs and to monitor its growth during flight. This project involves the assessment of two promising techniques for Online Structural Health monitoring: Acoustic Emission and Vibration Monitoring. Engineering at UNSW Kensington is studying the application of the AE system while researchers from ACME are examining the use of vibration monitoring with piezoelectric sensors to detect the inception and monitor the progression of damage in real time. After separate development and assessment, the two techniques will be brought together as a combined Online Health monitoring technique to cover a broader spectrum of defects and more effective damage assessment. UNSW@ADFA has a PhD student working on the project, who is currently engaged in developing finite models with simulated damage to generate numerical data for the assessment algorithm. Some experiments of vibration measurement with piezoelectric sensors have also been undertaken.

Tests are planned at UNSW Kensington Engineering for damage assessment using acoustic emission (AE). Due to the limited funding granted to the project, Engineering at Kensington was unable to procure the acoustic system originally planned, but some AE equipment available at
UNSW@ADFA is currently being updated and recommissioned for possible loan to Kensington Engineering under the Collaboration Initiative to conduct their Acoustic Emission tests.

The cooperative team comprises Dr Krishna Shankar, Prof Don Kelley, Mr Murat Tahtali, A/Prof Khosrow Zarrabi, Dr Sreenatha Anavatti, Dr Andrew Neely and A/Prof Alan Crosky.

The group through Dr Andrew Neely can be contacted via e-mail: <a.neely@adfa.edu.au>.

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A Study of the Military Command of Marshal Ferdinand Foch during the First World War

Dr Elizabeth Greenhalgh from UNSW@ADFA’s School of Humanities and Social Science was recently awarded a Travelling Fellowship for study abroad in 2005–2006 from the Australian Academy of the Humanities. Dr Greenhalgh will be travelling to the United States and Belgium to carry out work for her project.

Dr Elizabeth Greenhalgh is a UNSW Research Fellow working on a study of the military command of the French First World War general, Ferdinand Foch, who was also supreme allied commander in 1918. She has published several articles on Franco-British relations between 1914 and 1918 in such journals as the International History Review, Journal of Contemporary History, Journal of Military History, and War in History. Her book, Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War, was published by Cambridge University Press in November 2005. She has worked for many years on the international journal War & Society that is published by the School, most recently as joint editor.

Dr Elizabeth Greenhalgh can be contacted via e-mail: <e.greenhalgh@adfa.edu.au>.

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Defence and Security Risk Assessment using Agent Based Distillations

Today’s society continues to be preoccupied with the idea of risk. The recent events of September 11, the Bali bombing, SARS, the bush fires in Canberra, and the Tsunami are examples of human-made and natural disasters. These events had dramatic consequences on the social, economic, and political environment and numerous industries. This project offers an innovative methodological paradigm for assessing risk through the transfer of technologies drawn from defence simulations to the safety and security areas. The success of this project will mark a paradigm shift in the area of risk assessment and management.

Dr Michael Barlow can be contacted via e-mail: <m.barlow@adfa.edu.au>.

Dr Hussein Abbass can be contacted via e-mail: <h.abass@adfa.edu.au>.

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Understanding Low-Intensity Conflict

Since 1945, Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) has become a more dominant form of warfare. Conventional armies have a poor record of success in fighting LIC. This project uses the records
of the Australian Army’s operations in the Vietnam War to better understand its operational performance there and to unearth insights into the conduct of LIC. The project has the potential to reduce casualties, both military and civilian, and assist the Army in selecting new war-fighting technologies, designing training and developing doctrine for future LIC. The project will raise Australia’s profile in theorising about this increasingly common form of warfare.

Dr Hall is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, and served as an infantry platoon commander in Vietnam. He left the Army in 1991 and was the manager of the former Australian Defence Studies Centre at UNSW@ADFA until 2002. Also working on the project will be Dr Andrew Ross, a visiting fellow at UNSW@ADFA and a former Department of Defence operations analyst. Both have published on aspects of Australian military history.

Dr Bob Hall has a QE11 Fellowship and can be contacted via e-mail: <b.hall@adfa.edu.au>.

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The Myths of 1940

This study will investigate Britain in 1940, but many issues faced by that country then—the relationship between the political, military and intelligence leadership, public opinion and its influence on policy, political leadership and its influence on public opinion, war planning and fighting—remain as relevant to Australia today as they were to Britain during the Second World War. The role of the military in a democracy and the benefits of military experience to political leaders are issues still much discussed today.

Dr Robin Prior can be contacted via e-mail: <r.prior@adfa.edu.au>.
Book Reviews

GAME TO THE LAST:  
The 11th Australian Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli

James Hurst  
Oxford University Press, 2005  
ISBN 0 19 555331 4

Reviewed by John Donovan

When can their glory fade?  
O the wild charge they made!  
All the world wondered.  

Alfred, Lord Tennyson

The 11th Battalion was raised in August 1914, as part of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Division, First AIF. Two companies of the battalion landed with the first wave on Anzac Day, and the battalion as a unit was not sent from the peninsula for a rest until 17 November, after almost seven months in the confined Anzac beachhead. In early October, still more than six weeks before that moment of relief, there were only 69 men serving with the 11th who had landed with the battalion, and had never left the peninsula. Almost three and a half years after the landing at Anzac, the 11th Battalion was withdrawn from the trenches in France in September 1918, and did not return to action before the war ended.

James Hurst’s book follows the development of a thousand men from a collection of newly enlisted civilian soldiers into the enthusiastic but inexperienced unit that landed on the first Anzac Day, to the exhausted group of survivors who left Gallipoli in mid-November 1915. Many of those withdrawn in November were not originals, but from the 1000 or more reinforcements who had been sent to the battalion by that time. He covers the battalion’s contribution to the Gallipoli campaign in detail, and provides sufficient context to enable the reader to understand its place in the broader campaign. One chapter follows the battalion’s experiences after Gallipoli, and the fates of some of its members.

Following the reorganisation of the beachhead after it had stabilised, the 3rd Brigade was posted along Bolton’s Ridge, south of Lone Pine. Apart from the abortive raid on Gaba Tepe in early May, this remained their location. Hurst covers in great detail the operations along Bolton’s Ridge, including the heavy fighting to capture and develop what became known as Leane’s Trench. He also describes day-to-day life in the trenches at Anzac, with its ongoing trickle of casualties.

Along the way, we meet names that later became familiar, not just to the Australian population during the First World War, but in some cases to later generations. Many members of the 11th Battalion had been born in Britain, and enlisted to support their homeland (and, perhaps, to get a trip there). Not in the battalion, although he was part of the 3rd Brigade, was John
Simpson Kirkpatrick, one of the British-born, who is mentioned only in passing in this book, but to the current generation is probably the best-known Australian soldier of the World War I era. Another name familiar today is Bert Facey, member of the battalion and author of *A Fortunate Life*, who had two brothers killed at Anzac, one with the 11th Battalion, the other with the 10th Light Horse.

Others were 'characters' in their era, but are no longer remembered. Number 232, William Raymond 'Combo' Smith, veteran of the Boer War, was a permanent discipline problem (his fines during the war may have exceeded his pay), but was always there when the battalion was in the line. He claimed to have been the 'senior Private of the AIF' by the war's end. Another battalion member, Tom Shaw, was an early enlistee with regimental number 4, and also a veteran of the Boer War. He volunteered again for service, aged 68, when the Second World War began. His offer was declined, but he joined the Volunteer Defence Corps!

Some went on to distinguished military careers. Tom Louch enlisted in 1914, landed on Gallipoli as a corporal, and finished the war as a major. In 1939 he raised the 2/11th Battalion of the Second AIF, and commanded it until he was wounded in Greece in April 1941. Another member who features regularly in Hurst's narrative is Ray Leane, an original company commander. He was later to command the 48th Battalion, known in that era as the 'Joan of Arc Battalion' (said to be *made of all Leanes*, because of his propensity for gathering his relatives into the unit), and the 12th Brigade. Famous at the time, it is doubtful if his name would be recognised by many today.

Some battalion members died in particularly sad circumstances. Aubrey Darnell, an original officer and John Archibald, number 157 until commissioned on Gallipoli, were both killed by a random aerial bomb while leaving the trenches after the battalion's last day at the front in September 1918. Less than a month after returning home in 1919, Wally Graham, winner of the MC, died after falling from scaffolding in Kalgoorlie. This work, and other books sponsored by the Army History Unit, perform a valuable service in reminding today's generation of the achievements of their predecessors and perpetuating their memory.

Hurst quotes Kitchener's assessment, before the landing, that the Australians would be good enough if nothing more than a cruise in the Sea of Marmara was contemplated. Perhaps Kitchener was animated by concern about the discipline of the Australians. If so, Hurst shows that their discipline was more than adequate. Indeed, based on his descriptions of some of the engagements, it could be argued that the troops were too disciplined, being willing to attempt to implement orders that were little more than invitations to pointless suicide. It could also be argued that, later in the war, when they were more experienced, such orders would have been ignored, and replaced by substitutes more likely to produce a useful outcome.

There is, perhaps, an answer to the question posed in the extract from Tennyson's poem *The Charge of the Light Brigade*, quoted at the beginning of this review. That answer is in C.E.W. Bean's concluding words in Volume VI of his epic history of the First AIF:

> What these men did nothing can alter now. The good and the bad, the greatness and smallness of their story will stand. Whatever of glory it contains nothing can now lessen. It rises, as it will always rise, above the mists of ages, a monument to great-hearted men; and for their nation, a possession for ever.

Let us always treasure that possession.
I was eager to read this book and I was not disappointed, even when finding out that it was a work of faction, a fictional account of an otherwise historical story. While some five years too young to serve in the Vietnam War, as a Staff Cadet in Long Tan Company at Duntroon in 1975 we lived and breathed Counter Revolutionary Warfare. Bob Buick, a Platoon Sergeant from the battle of Long Tan, was one of our Field Instructors and he would prod our backs with a ‘God Stick’ if we would not grovel far enough into the dirt during simulated contact drills with insurgent enemy groups. The reality is that infantry combat takes place just six inches above the mud, and this account is testament to the officers and soldiers who held ground in that fateful rubber plantation.

While it is hard to make valid deductions from faction, this book should be mandatory reading for every young officer and soldier so that they understand the importance of the historically proven combined arms approach to warfare. The enemy split their heavy weapons from their infantry, significantly contributing to their failure to successfully deal with this encounter battle while en-route to the Task Force Base. While this tactical grouping failure is nothing new to any student of mortal combat, the subsequent infantry–artillery coordination and the infantry–armour cooperation displayed by the Australian Task Force was a telling blow to the numerically superior enemy.

Tanks, even light tanks or armoured cars as they are referred to by the enemy, save lives. Gunners, infantrymen and sappers are bedfellows in and after battle. My Troop Sergeant when I graduated had also been an Assault Pioneer during the battlefield clearance and his vivid account of engineer burials remains in my memory to this day.

This account begs the question as to whether the enemy would have been successful in overrunning the Task Force Base and killing 1000 Australian troops as they intended to do, if the encounter battle had not taken place or if D Company had been defeated in detail. Perhaps this hypothetical question is getting too far into faction for comfort. Unfortunately with the enemy seemingly having revised all accounts of their actions and having downgraded their Divisional Attack to a face-saving Area Ambush, it will take more faction than non-fiction to resolve the probability of this frightful prospect.

As an exponent of Guerrilla Warfare, I can relate to the enemy’s decision to send their heavy weapons and their infantry on separate lines of advance. I can also relate to their painstaking reconnaissance of the Task Force Base over several months. However what the enemy could not do is accurately assess the fighting spirit of the Australian infantryman, gunner and tanker. In retrospect, the Vietnamese planners should have studied Australian military history and
come up with a plan to defeat the Task Force in the softer underbelly of lounge-room Australia rather than in the rubber trees at Long Tan or among the low-lying hills of Nui Dat.

Dave Sabben is to be commended for maintaining the spirit of Long Tan almost 40 years after the event. One day, not too far into the future, Australian soldiers will train alongside their Vietnamese counterparts in the Vietnamese countryside. This story will be of immeasurable value in developing common bonds amongst our respective countries starting just six inches above the mud of the jungle floor.

**KIPPENBERGER:**
**An Inspired New Zealand Commander**

Glyn John Harper
ISBN 1 86950 557 3

Reviewed by P. K. Ebery

Military historian Glyn Harper’s 1997 study of Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger, now reissued in paperback, develops its subject at several levels. It is a brief history of an unusual man who inspired loyalty and affection among ordinary soldiers, it revisits the New Zealand Division’s early World War II battles to assess the competence of its senior commanders, and it is also a study of the art of leadership.

The New Zealand Division saw out the Greece, Crete, and North Africa campaigns and went on to fight in the Italian campaign right up until VE Day. From 1941 to 1943, Kippenberger commanded one of the three brigades that made up the New Zealand Division. Appointed General Officer Commanding the Division for the Battle of Cassino in Italy in 1944, he stepped on a land mine, and incurred war-ending wounds while observing his artillery firing.

The central thesis of Harper’s book is that Kippenberger succeeded as a commander because of his preparation before World War II, and because of his ability to learn from experience. He served briefly as a young soldier on the Somme in 1916 before being wounded and sent home. He displayed courage under fire, a quality inherent to his success in the next war, and remained always sensitive to the lot of the ordinary soldier. But the experience had a powerful effect on Kippenberger. Back in New Zealand, he deliberately devoted most of his spare time to studying military history, as preparation for another war with Germany that he felt sure would come. In order to gain practical experience in command, he became a keen territorial soldier, and by 1936 was the commanding officer of the Canterbury Regiment. This was at a time when the run down state of the New Zealand Army was a national scandal. In spite of all the discouragement, Kippenberger and other dedicated people persevered, fitting themselves for senior command from 1939 onwards.

Kippenberger made his share of errors in the disastrous early campaigns of 2nd NZEF, but by 1943 he had become a talented and confident tactician. What distinguishes him was his
willingness to reflect on his experience, draw lessons from it, and to apply them. Harper’s book ultimately presents the picture of a truly great commander—one who was courageous in adversity, had intelligence and fighting spirit, and was able to inspire loyalty from his men.

After the war, Kippenberger was a public figure, becoming editor–in–chief of the series of official war histories, and national president of the Returned Services Association. He created controversy by his unpopular but typical stand against omitting Maori from the 1949 All Black tour of South Africa. It was not to be supposed that he would turn his back on members of the Maori Battalion who had fought so outstandingly with the New Zealand Division, and he had courage enough to face the resulting bitter hostility from rugby supporters.

In 1949 Kippenberger published his highly readable book *Infantry Brigadier*, used by the Israeli Army as a staff college text, and regarded as a minor classic. Kippenberger died in Wellington in 1957.

*Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand Commander* is a balanced and well researched book. Harper writes clearly and concisely. He assesses his subject material as keenly and searchingly as Kippenberger did his battles. But for the general reader it is Kippenberger the man who arouses most interest, of whom the late Charles Upham VC wrote, ‘there was no better-loved man in the New Zealand Division.’

**MEDICINE UNDER SAIL**

Zachary B. Friedenberg  
The Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland, 2002  
ISBN 1 55750297 8

Reviewed by Major Michael Tyquin

*Medicine Under Sail* is a seafaring history that focuses on the effort to sustain health at sea in the period leading up to the age of steam.

The author begins by looking at the early roots of British medicine and the claims to superiority made by that nation’s physicians above those who later became known as surgeons. The early enmity between the Royal College of Physicians (as it came to be known in 1518) and those who practised or aspired to practice the less reputable trade of surgeon barbers did not help early mariners. While the 18th century British Navy harboured many quacks and ‘doctors’ who were very bad, a few were highly skilled surgeons. As a class they were looked down upon by society, ships’ commanders and the quarterdeck generally. Consequently no matter what his abilities and qualities were, the low esteem in which he was held meant that a ship’s surgeon had little, if any, influence in trying to introduce change in a way of life that rested on tradition and was shot through with superstition. In the British Navy surgeons did not receive a commission until 1843.
Most surgeons aboard merchantmen were just out of school with no funds or prior opportunities for practice and the majority of these appear to have served for one or two trips before leaving the sea life. The tenure of naval surgeons could also be brief but this attrition was not due to the surgeons but to the policy of navies to discharge most medical officers at the end of war—and then frantically seek to recruit them again with the outbreak of another conflict. During the Napoleonic Wars the Channel fleet had two hospital ships which transferred sick men to a shore hospital at Spithead. However some surgeons disapproved of these vessels, believing that ill sailors received better treatment on their own ship, where they were known and could be supported by their mates.

Such 'hospital ships’ as there were in the 17th and 18th centuries never outlasted a war or even sometimes a battle. These ships did not provide an additional level of care, rather they acted as holding places for the wounded—they were repositories of disabled manpower. Generally these floating incubators reflected the appalling statistics of their shore-based equivalents, where 20 to 30 per cent of all admissions might die from infection or contagion due to overcrowding.

Despite this there were some tentative advances. The author claims that from 1780 to 1812 the mortality from ship-borne disease (presumably for the Royal Navy) fell from 1 in 8 to 1 in 30. He attributes this to cleanliness, improved hygiene practices, separation of the sick from the healthy and improvement in diet—specifically by including anti-scorbutics. Definitive management of scurvy was not helped by ignorance of this disease, which was often confused with other opportunistic diseases such as Berri-Berri, Typhus and Dysentery.

Friedenberg makes the point very well that effective cures for scurvy were known at least a century before they became a commonplace in most Western navies. He discusses the usual medical luminaries, James Lind and others, together with their particular contributions to naval medicine. The tragedy was that often these discoveries were lost, forgotten, or ignored through poor communication, or simply because books or treatises could not be made available to a wider readership. Consequently many discoveries (such as water filtration and the distillation of seawater) had to be re-discovered, often at great cost. Ignorance was not infrequently compounded by professional jealousies and venality.

In the absence of a doctor aboard, ships’ captains took on the responsibility to care for sick patients, armed with a medicine chest and a book of instructions. They would have to act as physician, surgeon, pharmacist and obstetrician.

Friedenberg enlivens his narrative through many diary entries by ships’ captains, surgeons, passengers and others. But he focuses almost entirely on the British (and to a lesser extent) the post-revolution navies of the United States. There is little or no mention of the advances made in medicine by other seafaring countries such as the Dutch, the French or the Portuguese, nor is the famed naval medicine and fleet of the Order of Malta mentioned. The author refers to a number of intriguing technical devices, such as internal heating and ventilation of sailing ships, but diagrams do not accompany these. While an interesting read, Medicine Under Sail goes over old ground already well covered by naval and medical historians.
THE AMAZING SAS:
the inside story of Australia’s special forces

Ian McPhedran
HarperCollins Publishers, Sydney, 2005
ISBN 0 73227841 4

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Wing

In early 1991, the then Commanding Officer of the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Lewis, addressed the Regiment. He told the assembled group that the changing nature of world conflict, including the rising threat of international terrorism, would lead to SASR becoming the Australian Government’s ‘force of choice’. Subsequent events have largely demonstrated the prescience of this forecast and Lewis would later rise to the rank of Major General, becoming the first Commander of Special Operations Command. Over recent years, SASR has participated in the majority of the ADF’s recent operations, frequently in very prominent roles. The Regiment has demonstrated its world-class special forces capabilities and personnel, and it is one of the ADF’s most potent units.

It was perhaps inevitable that journalists would try to tell the story of SASR. Ian McPhedran’s book, The Amazing SAS: the inside story of Australia’s special forces, appeared in book stores in July 2005, following a trend set by a range of books about the British SAS and US Special Forces. The preface describes McPhedran’s desire to write about the Regiment, enabling the reader to learn more about ‘the mystery of these men’. McPhedran’s approach was to conduct dozens of interviews with a range of current and former SASR personnel and let them tell their own story through detailed quotations.

The book is organised into five broad sections. The first, ‘Making the Cut’ deals with the processes of special forces personnel selection and training. This is followed by ‘East Timor’, ‘At Home’, ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Iraq’, each dealing with periods of SASR activity over the period 1999 to 2003. The sections dealing with overseas operations blend accounts from senior officers, non-commissioned officers and troopers to demonstrate the effectiveness and versatility of the unit. McPhedran’s descriptions of the performance of the Regiment are generally very positive and he clearly appreciates the important capabilities that it offers as part of the ADF. But while the author praises the members of the Regiment for their personal humility and their desire to retain a low profile, both of which allow them to continue to do their sensitive work, his book does little to assist. Instead he has raised the profile of the unit and may have inadvertently led other journalists to attempt other exposés.

Of the five sections, ‘At Home’ is the least successful, because it fails to adequately deal with the constant and demanding training requirements of the Regiment, or with its recent peacetime national tasks in support of Australia’s interests. The important role played by SASR supporting the security of the Sydney Olympic Games receives only brief attention. The operations to apprehend the Motor Vessels South Tomi and Pong Su, which demonstrated both the capabilities of the ADF special forces and the Australian Government’s willingness to employ them, are barely mentioned. McPhedran prefers to concentrate on the more contentious issue of the apprehension of the MV Tampa.
McPhedran received official approval from the Department of Defence to conduct the interviews, and the book was subject to a security review prior to its publication. In accordance with departmental guidelines, McPhedran is careful not to reveal the identities of current SASR operational personnel. But he makes no bones about naming former members and attributing comments to them. His writing style is the greatest weakness of the book. Rather than providing a range of views about a given issue and then, with the benefit of some historical analysis, providing the reader with a full account of SASR activity, McPhedran instead tells the story by piecing together a series of quotations and personal anecdotes. This practice reveals something of McPhedran’s background as a journalist and demonstrates why the writing of military history is generally best left to serious military historians.

This book is thus in many ways a disappointment. While it provides some interesting personal reflections on SASR operations, it provides little new information for the serious reader. The book is best summed up as a collection of personal reminiscences of some recent ADF operations, presented in a readable tabloid style. The updated edition of David Horner’s history of SASR, *SAS Phantoms of War* (Allen & Unwin 2002), offers a far better view of the Regiment’s operations. Likewise, the unique way of life of SASR is better illustrated by Mick Malone’s *Pictorial History of the Australian Special Air Service 1957–1997* (Access Press 1997). Overall, *The Amazing SAS* is worthy of a casual skim during your next visit to a Defence library, but it is not recommended for those who wish to improve their professional knowledge of SASR.
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