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Letters to the Editor

The Kokoda Trail

Dear Editor,

I refer to Kerry Hodge's final paragraph in her letter printed in the July/August 98 edition.

The pre World War II name was the Port Moresby road (some road) or the Buna road, depending in which direction one was going. It was not called a track.

While we would all like to use the Australian and now fashionable TRACK, it remains TRAIL according to my advice from Papua New Guinea. The first Battle Honour on the Colours of the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment is KOKODA TRAIL, and TRAIL is used on the commemoration plaques at Kokoda. For these very good reasons the PNG Government continues to use TRAIL.

If Generals Rowell, Robertson and Berriman and the post World War II Battle Honours Committee had wanted to use TRACK they would have done so.

*Donald Ramsay Col (RL)
Australia-PNG Friendship Association*

Dear Editor,

I note the letter "Kakoda Trail" by Kerry Hodge (DFJ July/Aug 1998) wherein he pays tribute to the PNG manager for the well kept look of Bomana War Cemetery.

I last saw Bomana in 1969, and all those years ago it was an impressive memorial. The lush tropical greenery tastefully highlighting the more solemn symbols to our departed comrades.

It should be noted that our Australian War Graves Commission maintains many such cemeteries in many areas of the world, and all are looked after with as much care as is locally possible.

The gardens of Bomana cannot be compared with the quite arid nature of those in Beersheba, Damascus and Jerusalem, for instance. I visited these in the early 1970s during service with the United Nations, and we found very little green grass or gardens. Even in those

semi-desert areas, however, the cemeteries were carefully, even lovingly, cared for.

Lest we forget.

*George Hayes, RFD, ED
Retired Major*

Vanguard or Rearguard

Dear Editor,

Professor Hugh Smith wrote in his very interesting article which was entitled Australian Society: Vanguard or Rearguard? (*ADFJ* No.130 May/June 98) "The ADF has to make itself more like society and its careers more like civilian ones in order to encourage recruitment and retention". This statement although not new does highlight the frustration being felt throughout the ranks because it totally ignores the fact that most people see the ADF as being different from society and join to escape the insecurity and boredom of mainstream society. I would suggest that the ADF could fix a lot of its current problems by yelling loudly and proudly that we are different from society and that we should stop trying to "fit in".

If we accept that the ADF does have to become more like society, which one? Country or city, male or female, young or old, black or white, rich or poor? Your part in the Australian society has much more to do with your socio-economic and cultural heritage than it has to do with your employment. Why can't we be the Defence Society? There was a time in the not too distant past when the community looked to the ADF to set the standards for morality, training, recruitment and loyalty. What happened? Did we become just another job?

Whilst the notion of individual rights and equality for women is noble the reality is much harder, for example, a 21 year old woman in the Army is allowed more time to run a basic fitness test than her 45 year old male peer, but who is going to argue that women do not need this extra time? Until these simple institutionalised inequalities are addressed, rights and equality will remain a myth.

*M. Caldwell SSGT
Crash Rescue, Oakey*

Australasian Defense 2048 - An Alternative Future

By Lieutenant Colonel Ian Wing, Aust Int.

For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see;

Saw the vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be.

Alfred Lord Tennyson (1809-1892)¹

Preamble

Whether we like it or not our world is changing and military professionals must change with it or become obsolete. The study of the future seeks to optimise the predictability and efficiency of change by reducing the unexpected. This article uses a futuristic scenario and historical examples to illustrate the usefulness of one method of investigating the future - *alternative futures*.²

The consideration of the future is important. First, because the future is not preordained, the ideas and decisions of today will influence the world of tomorrow. The future can therefore be 'shaped' to reach desirable outcomes if inputs and their effects are understood. Australia's international security policy seeks to use this process as the former Chief of the Defence Force recently pointed out: 'We need strategies and policies which try to shape the environment from the outset.'³

Second, because the journey from the present day to the future will involve unavoidable changes, and the anticipation of such changes will enable opportunities to be maximised and threats minimised. The Minister for Defence recently stated that this century has seen three major changes in the international order.⁴ An analysis of world history indicates that further major changes are probable, if not inevitable - and that some changes may surprise us.

This article is an example of 'military futurism'.⁵ Futurism involves the examination of three essential questions:

What choices do I have? (the science of the possible).

What do I know? (the science of the probable).

What do I prefer? (the science of the preferable).⁶

These questions are intended to enable strategic planners to retain the initiative, anticipate circumstances and shape events in their favour. In so doing, futurist analysis will reduce the frequency of unexpected contingencies and the need for crisis management.

The body of this article is written as if published in the *Australasian Defense Force Journal* of September-October 2048.⁷ It is a futuristic scenario which is intended to stimulate consideration of the utility of alternative futures. Alternative futures are 'clusters of possibilities'⁸ involving 'alternative policy packages',⁹ and the consideration of each alternative future provides insights into strategies needed to shape a preferable future.¹⁰ The underlying philosophy of alternative futures is that individuals and nations are not set on a deterministic path to a single unitary future and the use of their powers of foresight and decision-making will empower them to select from a range of future trajectories.

The alternative future that eventually becomes the *future actuality* may or may not be completely foreseen. No-one has a crystal ball and sometimes everyone can be taken by surprise. But, because the future can be the result of choices that are made now, alternative futures provide an opportunity to identify which decisions are required to shape the most desirable future.

The philosophy behind 'Assumption-Based Planning' (ABP), which was developed by Rand to assist in mid and long range planning, is similar. ABP aims to create shaping and hedging actions to respond to vulnerabilities underlying key strategic assumptions. It uses the development of a fictitious world to explore the implications of failed assumptions.¹¹ In the Rand study, the choice of the fictitious world is made using the Delphi methodology which seeks to elicit group opinions without the undue influence of dominant members. It is a very useful methodology but is aimed at consensus which is frequently conservative in nature. This conservatism may lead planners to disregard circumstances which don't fit the mould.

In contrast, alternative futures offer a means to deliberately examine the unorthodox, but:

*Experts often resist this exercise. Since they know their country or region and have already presented all the plausible scenarios, why waste any effort on scenarios that are by definition highly unlikely?*²¹²

A prime example of the failure to anticipate and shape events was the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. Conventional wisdom in the 1980s was that the Soviet Union would survive and that *its collapse was an unlikely future, albeit possible*. We now know that the collapse of the Soviet Union became the actual future. The rigorous examination of alternative futures would have enabled national decision-makers to be better prepared for this course of events and to have created appropriate shaping strategies.

This article envisages a possible alternative future for Australia and the role played by its defence force. The scenario used by the article has been developed from an examination of the many driving forces which are operating within modern military forces, Australian society and contemporary international relations. These driving forces include the projection of trends for the merging of countries into supra-state agglomerations and the centralisation of executive power; republicanism and the changing federal system; the increasing influence of government bureaucracies and changes in the taxation system; economic interdependence and the de-massification of enterprises; the revolution in military affairs and advances in military technology; the power of information technology and information warfare; the broadening of the meaning of security and its effects on the roles of defence forces; the rationalisation of defence infrastructure and personnel; the effects of individualism and changing employment trends on military service; and the changing nature of national sovereignty and the rise of military companies.

The article begins with a description of a possible future Australasian political system. This is followed by a description of a future defence force which covers its history, organisation, operations and personnel. The value of the study of futurism by military professionals is then discussed. Next, historical examples are used as witnesses from the past to demonstrate the pace and scope of change, and the utility of the study of alternative futures. The article draws the reader's attention forward to 2048, then back to 1948 and finally returns them to the present.

Let us now use our imaginations, look forward fifty years to 2048, and take a glimpse at what might be.

2048 Scenario Text Begins.

A Look Forward to 2048

The nations of Australia and New Zealand were amalgamated in 2032 following the success of the Closer Political Relationships agreement of 2030 and the Australia and New Zealand Economic Union agreement of 2020.¹³ The new 'supra-state' entity was retitled 'Australasia' with the federal capital in Canberra. The Australasian Constitution was proclaimed after a series of direct participatory referendums which were conducted electronically throughout Australia and New Zealand. The new nation includes the states of North Island and South Island which joined the other seven states of Australasia (the Northern Territory had been renamed North Australia and was declared a state in 2010).¹⁴ The first President of Australasia, Margaret King, was born in Adelaide, South Australia, in 1988, and had risen to fame as a multi-media personality.

The current President of Australasia, Winston Lomu, was born in Wellington, North Island, in 1998. He is a self-made billionaire who was directly elected President for a six year term in 2044. He followed the established system of appointing a team of Departmental Secretaries to run the Australasian Public Service bureaucracy. The work of the Secretaries is subject to review from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet who are drawn from the majority party in the Federal Parliament. The nine state parliaments have survived the downsizings of the early twenty-first century but their powers are limited and real power is concentrated in Canberra. The inclusion of the state parliaments of North Island and South Island, and the addition of the representatives and senators from these two new states to the Australasian Parliament, were other important changes to the Australasian Federal system.

The pre-eminent role played by the President and the Departmental Secretaries has transformed the former Westminster-style system of government. The information age has concurrently transformed the efficiency of government operations and given the bureaucracy almost complete control over the lives of all Australasian people. For example the terms 'tax avoidance' and 'tax evasion' have been described as 'obsolete' in recent editions of the *Macquarie Dictionary* as it is now impossible for any financial

transactions to occur without the payment of the 20 *per cent* ‘Equitable Services Tax’ (EST).

History of the New ADF

The combined military capabilities of Australia and New Zealand were amalgamated under Australasian command at Russell Park and the new force was retitled the Australasian Defense Force (ADF). To assuage New Zealand sensitivities the new force is generally referred to as the ‘New ADF’ to differentiate it from the former Australian Defense Force.

The New ADF in its short history of only sixteen years has forged an impressive record. Formed on 1 January 2032, it continues to reflect the proud values of its ANZAC predecessors and provides the people of Australasia with an efficient and cost-effective military capability.

Organisation of the New ADF

The New ADF consists of the Australasian Navy (AN), Australasian Army (AA) and Australasian Aerospace Force (AAF). Each is commanded by a service chief with a staff nominally located in the Russell Park Defense Complex. The Complex recently replaced the old R1 and R2 buildings which dated from the twentieth century. The term ‘nominally’ reflects the capability for commanders to exercise command from almost any geographic location and to perform the tasks of a ‘virtual headquarters’ using broadband command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). The service chiefs do not exercise command over operations.

The Secretary for Defense works closely with the Chief of the Defense Force (CDF) to ensure unity of command at the national level. Oversight on administrative issues is provided by the Minister for Defense, an elected member of the Federal Parliament, although operational issues are the prerogative of the CDF. Headquarters Australasian Defense Force (HQADF) consists of the CDF and the Central Staff, and the three service chiefs, and their staffs.

Operations are commanded by one of two specified headquarters according to the nature of the operation. The specified headquarters are:

- Headquarters Socio-Political Command, which is responsible for all operations not anticipated to involve the use of force.
- Headquarters Battlespace Command, which is responsible for all operations which may involve the use of force.

The specified headquarters are nominally located in Canberra although virtual processes have overtaken the once important concept of geographic location.

The three levels of war which gained favour in the late twentieth century have been replaced by a single seamless continuum of command and control (C2). Two broad levels operate within the C2 continuum, these are known as the ‘national level’ and the ‘tactico-operational level’ (referred to as the ‘tac-op level’). These developments have been made possible by advances in C4I which have given the national level, made up of the Australasian Government, HQADF and the three specified commands, immediate oversight of the conduct of activities within the battlespace. Examples of advances in C4I are the operation of virtual planning and decision-making processes within all headquarters; the carriage of hand-held personal C4I units by all New ADF personnel; instant visual data from the battlespace to the national level provided by electronic links from the tac-op level; and the availability of constant real-time media coverage of any activities of public interest.

The New ADF has been concentrated into a small number of bases which rely on the civilian infrastructure for support. The principal bases are:

- AN. Fremantle, Darwin, Newcastle and Auckland.
- AA. Darwin, Townsville, Puckapunyal and Papakura.
- AAF. Tindal, Williamstown and Auckland.

Many former Department of Defense land holdings were sold off to raise funds for the replacement of ageing military equipment in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. This process enabled the New ADF to be substantially re-equipped although some capabilities were unable to be retained. Hard choices were made as a result of the interaction of the increased costs of high-technology equipment, declining defense fiscal resources and the need to equip the New ADF for new and emerging security threats.

Many dispersed former Army Reserve and Territorial facilities have also been sold off. This was made possible by the increased integration of Australasia’s part-time forces. The part-time element of the New ADF generally provides periods of

employment of two weeks or more, integrated or collocated with full-time New ADF training.

Operations

The global security environment is complicated and multi-dimensional. The United States has retained its status as the sole global superpower but it faces challenges from aspiring peer competitors and asymmetric threats. Australasia seeks to balance its relationships with the United Nations, the great powers (the United States and its American associations; the European Community; the Russian Federation; China and its Asian associations; and India), the small number of non-aligned countries, non-state actors (non-government organisations, multi-national corporations and military companies), and the many collapsed former states of Africa and the Pacific region.

The global power structure of the world is also 'trisected' between those states and organisations which have kept up with the information age, those which lag behind in the industrial age and those stranded in the agrarian age.¹⁵ Australasia has managed to keep pace with the information age category but only through many compromises to the forces of globalisation and at the cost of its freedom to act as a fully independent sovereign state.

The accepted concept of national security operates at four levels (individual, national, regional and international) and has been broadened to include five sectors (military, political, economic, societal and environmental).¹⁶ Domestic political requirements, public opinion, treaty obligations, international arrangements, the complicated security environment and the global trend towards the increasing use of defense forces in non-combatant tasks have combined to shape the roles of the New ADF.

The New ADF is prepared, trained and equipped to conduct ten types of operations:

- Support to the Civil Community. Examples of this support are the construction of infrastructure and housing in remote communities, and specialist support to major sporting and cultural events. The Australasian people have come to expect the New ADF to provide this support.
- Environmental Support. The New ADF conducts operations intended to reduce environmental problems including the provision of clean water; the distribution of food; and the control of pollution. These are seen as important methods of reducing tensions which may become catalysts

for conflict. Resources are becoming increasingly scarce and international disputes over them are a potential source of conflict. The world's population is now over ten billion and disparities between the very wealthy and very poor continue to increase.

- Search and Rescue (SAR). Australasia is respected for the high quality of its long distance search and rescue operations. AN and AF platforms are on call to respond to SAR situations.
- Disaster Relief. Floods and bushfires remain a serious problem in Australasia and the region; and global warming is exacerbating their effects. The AA provides firefighting and engineering resources to assist the civil community during natural disasters.
- Law Enforcement. Australasian maritime constabulary, fisheries protection, immigration control and barrier control operations are heavily dependent on support from the New ADF. Counter illicit drug operations are mounted in combination with the police forces and supported by New ADF surveillance platforms.
- Counter-Terrorism. Australasia's specialist bomb disposal and last resort close quarter battle capability to resolve siege-hostage situations are provided by the New ADF in close association with the police forces. Terrorism is the asymmetric weapon of choice among the disadvantaged interest motivated groups of the twenty-first century.
- International Engagement. The New ADF is an important part of Australasia's efforts to engage with the region. This involves military diplomacy; defense cooperation; international security conferences; international military exercises, training and exchanges; and reciprocal visits. Australasia's engagement with regional authoritarian regimes is facilitated by military-to-military linkages.
- Peace Operations. The New ADF is highly experienced in peace operations and has an impressive record of participation in United Nations and other international peace initiatives. The New ADF provides armed units, humanitarian response units and unarmed observers to peace operations around the world.
- Evacuation Operations. When regional nations are unable to maintain internal law and order the New ADF provides Australasia with the capability for the military evacuation of approved persons in hostile circumstances. Unstable regimes and violent intra-state conflicts in the

region have increased the frequency and importance of this type of operation.

- **Combatant Operations.** The world has avoided an outbreak of large scale warfare although occasional regional conflicts have occurred. Inter-state violence has declined in frequency although it cannot be ruled out. Intra-state violence, failed states, refugee flows, ethnic conflict and the internal security problems of some regional nations remain a greater concern for Australasia. The current *Defense Strategic Review* states that no nation is foreseen to have the motivation or intention to conduct military operations against Australasia although some regional nations possess the capability to do so. The New ADF is capable of deterring aggression and participating in collective security operations to compel other nations to conform with United Nations policies.

The development of this range of operations was a response to the fact that national security is affected by many types of threats - many of which do not involve military aggression.¹⁷ The New ADF, as the agency of government with principal responsibility for national security, has inevitably been drawn into a range of broadened concepts of security operations.

Personnel

The New ADF is made up of approximately 30,000 full-time personnel (9,000 AN, 12,000 AA and 9,000 AAF) and approximately 20,000 part-time personnel (of which 15,000 are AA). Some personnel pursue planned dual careers in the New ADF and various other official organisations such as the police forces, emergency services and Australasian Customs Service. This enables personnel to rotate their employment between New ADF units, which are often highly demanding, and other organisations, which can provide respite postings. Civilian public servants and contracted personnel have replaced uniformed personnel in many headquarters and support functions, enabling uniformed personnel to be concentrated at the tac-op level.

The New ADF provides equitable employment opportunities regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation or culture. All types of employment are open to women and approximately 25 per cent of the force is female.

Australasian citizenship is not a requirement for employment in the New ADF. Military consultants,

often with foreign backgrounds, but possessing expertise not available in Australasia, make up a small proportion of the New ADF. Once regarded as mercenaries these foreign military ‘experts’ work for fixed contracts and provide unlimited liability with the exception that they have an option not to serve in Australasian operations against their country of origin.

Most nations employ experts in a similar manner and they are almost entirely responsible for the defense of some nations in the Australasian region. These developments have required changes to some international conventions and domestic legislation,¹⁸ and two factors contributed to the need for this development. First, the widespread successes of military companies in providing security in third world nations and second, the reluctance of information-age nations to accept casualties from among their own nationals.¹⁹

Employment in the New ADF is no longer a popular career choice for young adults as it is viewed as inadequately remunerated. The problem of New ADF recruitment has been addressed with salary increases and performance bonuses although opportunities for self-actualisation are viewed as the dominant incentive for recruitment. Compulsory employment for young adults for up to two years has been considered but it was found that such a program was unable to provide the high technology skill sets required by military employment. For this reason, the employment of foreign experts provides a key part of the departmental outsourcing strategy. Australasian experts are preferred although they must compete openly with tenders submitted by experts of other nationalities.

The Way Ahead

The New ADF operates at a high tempo and its lean structure offers few opportunities for respite postings. The New ADF has been almost continuously involved in peace operations since its creation and the complicated geopolitical situation provides no prospect of a decrease in these commitments. Many New ADF personnel complain of ‘burn out’ from the many operational demands placed on them and personnel turnover is high. This turnover has been exacerbated by the tendency for skilled personnel to leave the New ADF and then return to offer their skills to it as experts.

The New ADF remains committed to providing security for Australasia, its people and interests. On its agenda are;

- The complete integration of all national law enforcement, security and military intelligence capabilities to improve intelligence support to the broadened national security agenda.
- The replacement of the AN fast ocean-going corvettes with large amphibious aircraft.
- The rationalisation of the structure of the AA to emphasise special forces, mobile infantry, civil affairs, engineering, medical and precision engagement capabilities.
- Further use of robotics to enable the downsizing of the New ADF's human resource requirements. For example, all AAF combat and intelligence collection aircraft are already 'uninhabited' and aircrew are only required for transport aircraft.
- Improvements in national defensive capabilities against weapons of mass destruction. All of the great powers, many non-aligned countries and some terrorist organisations possess these weapons.
- Participation in an international inhabited lunar base which will enable the New ADF to provide security for Australasian uranium mines on the moon. Environmentalists are protesting strongly against the mines and security is currently provided by a South African firm.

2048 Scenario Text Ends.

Futurism

The Australasian Defense Force described in this article includes ideas which some readers may find persuasive and some may find disturbing. It is all possible, but it remains to be seen if it is probable or likely. I have not envisaged the integration of the three armed services although it will remain a possibility, as will the creation of a separate maritime coastguard and perhaps, one day, a space force. I don't subscribe to all of the ideas portrayed in the scenario and that is as it should be: successful futurism will often force us out of our 'comfort zone'. As an intellectual exercise alternative futures must be plausible but provocative.

*Many currently useful ideas seemed bizarre or ridiculous when they were first considered. The seemingly improbable or hypothetical may, on analysis, be judged to have been unfashionable, novel, or unpleasant rather than unlikely or unrealistic.*²⁰

Futuristic forecasts fall into two broad categories: 'projections', which rely on the extrapolation of current trends, and 'predictions', which include the impact of new variables such as technological breakthroughs in a vision of the future. Both are susceptible to the problems of mental rigidity, technical determinism, overoptimism, over-pessimism, oversimplification, advocacy, isolationism, dogmatism and vested interests.²¹ The best futurism is well informed, objective and neither too conservative nor too radical.

I have previously pointed out that the future is not preordained and for this reason it is important to appreciate that all projections and predictions will themselves have an influence on the future. Self-fulfilling prophecies and self-defeating prophecies demonstrate the effects of predictions on the future.²² An understanding of this relationship works as both an inspiration for disciples of futurism and a cautionary reminder on the importance of getting things right. Futurism provides an opportunity for intellectual leverage on the decisions taken by policy-makers.

Futuristic thinking is not a new phenomenon and examples of futuristic books and articles feature in the professional literature of our allies. I hope that this article might stimulate contributions on the range of operations which might face the ADF 'force after next'.²³ Military professionals should all at least be aware of the themes of the recent work of influential futurists such as Toffler, Fukuyama, Huntington, Kaplan, Kennedy and van Creveld.²⁴ After all, 2048 is within the normal lifetime of roughly half of the personnel currently serving in today's ADF; and the defence force of 2048 may include their children or grandchildren. The CDF of 2048 is still a young child but he or she is out there somewhere. And much can change in fifty years... and the pace of change is always increasing.

A Look Back to 1948

Let us return from 2048 to the present day, and then look back a similar distance and remind ourselves of what once was.

First, a look at the big picture. Fifty years ago the term 'Australian Defence Force' was not used.²⁵ The vast majority of today's ADF personnel were yet to be born. Almost one million Australians had recently served in uniform during the Second World War and approximately 45,000 personnel made up the Australia's armed forces. Australians had recently

waged conventional warfare in Europe, North Africa and the Pacific; and were about to fight a collective security war in Korea. They would then experience twenty years of counter-insurgency operations in South-east Asia.

Second, a look at some details. In 1948, the Royal Australian Navy was commissioning its first aircraft carrier, the former HMS *Terrible* renamed HMAS *Sydney*, which was equipped with Sea Fury and Firefly aircraft. Australia's 65th, 66th and 67th Battalions were being progressively withdrawn from the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan and retitled as the three battalions of the Australian Regiment. Mustangs and Lincolns were the front-line fighters and bombers of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The Cold War was underway and RAAF aircraft were participating in the Berlin Airlift. The Australian Staff College had recently moved from the School of Infantry at Seymour to Fort Queenscliff, and the RAAF College was opened at Point Cook.²⁶ Overseas, the Malayan Emergency was just beginning; the war in Korea was two years away; Indonesia was yet to receive its independence from the Netherlands; and Vietnam was still part of French Indo-China.

The preceding paragraph shows that much has changed since 1948 and not all of the change was anticipated or welcome. The future is likely to be at least as different from the present as the present is different from the past. The pace of change indicates that it will actually be far more different, strange and unexpected. The many changes experienced in just fifty years of our history illustrate the relevance of the consideration of alternative futures which thoughtfully challenge the status quo and shed light on what might be.

Conclusion

Each of us should give some thought to alternative futures for the ADF. The many changes since 1948 demonstrate that we would be mistaken if we believed that the future will be just 'more of the same'. Nations rise and fall. Some of the influences of the information age the revolution in military affairs are already with us, others are yet to be felt, and some are possibly yet to be imagined.

This article has considered an alternative future for Australia using a mixture of concepts, some accepted and some controversial. Driving forces which are already in operation and projections of the effects of current trends were developed into the

scenario. It raised issues worthy of consideration, among which were:

- The concept of an amalgamated Australian and New Zealand defence force.
- The influence of developments in C4I on command arrangements.
- An overview of the future global security environment.
- A range of roles for the defence force which may result from the full acceptance of the broadened nature of security.
- The effects of trends in defence force and mercenary employment.

Further examination of this alternative future will reveal more issues, and each will reveal opportunities and threats. Once the process is exhausted another scenario can be developed from the examination of other trends and factors and this will raise other issues. Cross-impact analysis of each trend and factor will also reveal causal relationships and linkages between them.²⁷ The process can use specific projections and predictions or incorporate less-structured inputs derived from focus groups or discussion panels. The process should be rigorous and exhaustive to avoid outcomes which are merely unsystematic speculation.

The study of the future, when well-grounded in an understanding of history and of the present day, will assist the ADF in discovering the best course forward and avoiding dead-ends.²⁸ The future is not preordained but change can be understood and anticipated. The decision-maker who is sensitised to the range of possible futures will be better prepared to shape events.

Devices such as alternative futures can promote effective intelligence estimates, generate improved understanding of the impacts of emerging factors and promote new ideas. These new ideas are crucial to the successful development of the ADF in the twenty-first century. They will ensure that the ADF of 2048, in whatever form it takes, has the energy and vitality of the ADF of 1998.

NOTES

- 1 Tennyson, A., 'Locksley Hall' (15-16), *The Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson, Poet Laureate*, C. Kegan Paul and Co., London, 1880 (First Edition), pp.110-116
- 2 I am indebted to Hugh Smith, of the School of Politics, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, and Brett Pepler, of the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments, for their comments on an earlier version of this article.
- 3 Baker, J.S., General, 'Telstra Address to the National Press Club', 1 July 1998
- 4 McLachlan, I., Minister for Defence, 'Defence Challenges and Australia's Changing Security Outlook', text of address to the Joint Services Staff College, Weston Creek, ACT, 18 June 1998, p.1

- 5 'Futurism', also known as 'futurology', is a current intellectual discipline which should not be confused with the 'futurist' Italian artistic and literary movement of the early twentieth century.
- 6 Amara, R., 'Probing the Future', Fowles, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Futures Research*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1978, p.42
- 7 This article posits that the globalisation of communications will make American spelling conventions the rule in Australia and New Zealand by the early twenty-first century.
- 8 Derived from Fowles, *op cit*, 'Glossary', p.807.
- 9 Kahn, H. and Wiener, A.J., *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967, p.402
- 10 Purist students of the English language may take issue with the use of the term alternative to mean multiple, rather than 'one of two'. I have decided to follow the less strict American meaning of alternative which is 'one of two or more'.
- 11 Dewar, J.A., Builder, C.H., Hix, W.M. and Levin, M.H., *Assumption-based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times*, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993
- 12 Nye, J., 'Peering into the Future', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1994, p.89
- 13 The Closer Economic Relations agreement of 1983 and the Closer Defence Relations agreement of 1991 were precursors to this development.
- 14 In the weeks since this article was written the Australian Government has proposed that the Northern Territory receive statehood in 2001. Events are already moving faster than I had foreseen!
- 15 For an explanation of the 'trisected' theory power structure see Toffler, A. and H., 'Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age', *The Futurist*, Vol.32, No.5, June/July 1998, pp.26-38.
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- 17 Examples of the influence of this thinking can be seen in Canada's 1994 *White Paper on Defence*, <http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/94paper/white-paper-94.html> (accessed 29 June 1998), which includes a range of non-combatant and international security missions; *In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign Affairs and Trade Policy White Paper*, National Capital Printing, Canberra, 1997 which adopts a 'broad view of security'; and, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, the Report of the National Defense Panel, Washington, D.C., December 1997 which recommends that the United States adopt a broader approach to national security.
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25 The use of term 'Australian Defence Force' became widespread in the early 1980s and only rarely appeared in professional literature before then.

26 The 67th Battalion (3 AR/3 RAR) remained in Japan and did not return to Australia until after its active service in the Korean War in November 1954. The Australian Regiment was retitled the Royal Australian Regiment in 1949. The Australian Staff College was retitled the Command and Staff College in 1982. The School of Infantry was moved to Ingleburn in 1960 and Singleton in 1972. The RAAF College was retitled the RAAF Academy in 1961.

27 See Stover, J.G. and Gordon, T.J., 'Cross-Impact Analysis', Fowles, *op cit*, pp.301-328.

28 Examples of current alternative futures which concentrate on military issues are: Bakshi, G.D., 'Alternative Military Futures', *Strategic Analysis*, January 1996, pp.1399-1421; Metz, S., *Strategic Horizons: The Military Implications of Alternative Futures*, Strategic Studies Institute (US Army War College Army After Next Project), Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1997; and, Metz, S., 'Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures', *Parameters*, Autumn 1997, pp.15-26. *By Major R.G. Sharp, RAE*



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Defence exercises pay heed to environmental needs

International Peacetime Laws of the Environment and the Australian Defence Force

By Major R.G. Sharp, RAE

Today, there is an ever increasing rate of adoption of international laws relating to environmental issues, which take the form of either conventions, protocols, treaties or agreements, and Australia has a nation is a signatory to around sixty-five of such laws. In Australia, the mechanism for becoming bound under international law is related to Section 51 of the Constitution from which the executive arm of the Federal Government has the power to give domestic effect to a convention, protocol, treaty or agreement. Such conventions, protocols, agreements and treaties however, do not become law in Australia until implementing legislation is passed by the national parliament and this is usually only after extensive consultation with government and non-government organisations.

In the past, little has been said about the role international law of the environment in relation to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and this is not surprising since Australia's Defence policy tends to focus on military capabilities and regional relationships¹ and fails to mention the need to combat threats such as pollution and ensuring the military does not contribute to the degradation of the environment.

Nonetheless, Australia has at least started to debate the concept of environmental security and this is evident from recent forums² and the literature.³ In fact for the first time, Australia is beginning to consider the relevance of international law of the environment and its effect on peacetime military activities and is now asking itself:

*“How can the negative impacts on the environment of peacetime defence activities be minimised? Environmental impacts of peacetime defence activities are rarely considered at the international level, but as the environmental consciousness of political and bureaucratic elites has expanded it would seem reasonable to assume that there will be more to say on this subject in future years. There is, however, a substantial body of national environmental practice in relation to military activities at the domestic level”.*⁴

In peacetime, there are many environmental conventions, protocols, treaties and agreements which are binding on the ADF and its personnel and this is because:

- the ADF is an arm of the Federal Government and therefore subject to the legal regime under which international law of the environment is binding; and
- the ADF is also an agency of the Federal Government and therefore is subject to its environmental laws which implement particular environmental conventions, protocols, treaties and agreements since these laws bind the Crown in right of the Commonwealth unless they contain specific provisions which exempt the ADF.

With respect to criminal liability, there are a number of Commonwealth environmental laws which, although aimed at enforcing a particular environmental convention, protocol, treaty or agreement, specifically allow the Crown in right of the Commonwealth and therefore the ADF to be excluded from being prosecuted under that law. In addition, action can be brought about against the ADF under common law if there has been any act of negligence or nuisance with respect to damage to the environment. In peacetime, it is generally accepted that the ADF is required to exhibit a “duty of care” or otherwise will be may be liable to civil action against it.⁵ Furthermore, there is also a presumption that the offence provisions within a Commonwealth environmental law would not apply to the ADF.⁶

In order to fully understand the peacetime obligations of the ADF in relation to international law of the environment, certain conventions, protocols, treaties and agreements need to be examined both in isolation and in association with the relevant Commonwealth environmental law. Similarly, these peacetime obligations also need to be considered in the context of common law because some Australian courts have now decided to “import” international laws into common law and proceed to interpret and apply them regardless of the fact there is no related Commonwealth legislation.⁷

The Australian Defence Force's peacetime obligations

Cultural and natural heritage

Under the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the ADF is required to protect the world's cultural and natural heritage and according to the Convention:

"not to take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural heritage".⁸

This Convention applies to all ADF activities and obliges the ADF to take steps to preserve and conserve cultural and natural heritage covered by the Convention and which are known as World Heritage Areas. In Australia, this Convention is implemented under the *World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983* (Cth) which further binds the ADF by regulating its activities in World Heritage Areas. Under the Act, proclamations can be made in order to protect all or part of a World Heritage Area from damage or destruction and once a proclamation is made, the ADF is required to avoid certain acts as stated in the Act:

- “(i) carrying out excavation works or using explosives;
- (ii) erecting buildings or other substantial structures or any work preparatory to the erection of buildings or other substantial structure;
- (iii) damaging or destroying a building or other substantial structure;
- (iv) killing, cutting down or damaging any tree;
- (v) constructing or establishing any road or vehicular track; and
- (vi) doing any other act identified in the regulations to the Act”⁹

In addition to these provisions, there is also a requirement within the Act which allows the ADF to obtain consent to carry out an activity which is otherwise unlawful however this could constitute a breach of the Convention.

Wetlands

Under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, the ADF is required to conserve wetlands of international importance. Australia has a number of internationally listed wetlands listed under the Convention, one of which incidentally happens to be an ADF training area

known as Shoalwater Bay.¹⁰ The importance of this Area is reflected in its RAMSAR description which states that it is:

*“bounded by approximately 330 km of coastline including all islands. The area’s terrestrial and five major estuarine and marine environments represent the largest area in central east Queensland containing representative coastal, subcoastal, aquatic landscapes and ecosystems which are relatively undisturbed habitat areas for significant floral and faunal assemblages, including populations of rare and threatened species. The area represents a climatic overlap zone with an unusual mix of tropical, sub-tropical and temperature species”.*¹¹

In essence, Shoalwater Bay is a wetland of international importance because it satisfies a notable proportion of the RAMSAR criteria in that:

- it is a particularly good representative example of a natural wetland, characteristic of appropriate biogeographical region;
- it is a particularly good representative example of a wetland which plays a substantial hydrological, biological or ecological role in the natural functioning of a coastal system;
- it supports an appreciable assemblage of rare, vulnerable or endangered species or subspecies of plant or animal, or an appreciable number of individuals of any one or more of these species;
- it has a special value for maintaining the genetic and ecological diversity of a region of the quality and peculiarities of its flora and fauna;
- it has a special value as the habitat of plants and animals at a critical stage of their biological cycle;
- it has a special value for one or more endemic plant or animal species or communities;
- it supports 20 000 waterfowl;
- it supports substantial numbers of individuals from particular groups of waterfowl, indicative of wetland values, productivity or diversity; and
- it supports 1 *per cent* of the individuals of a population of one species or subspecies of waterfowl.¹²

At present, there are no Commonwealth Environmental Acts which protect RAMSAR wetlands such as those within the Shoalwater Bay Training Area although the *National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975* (Cth) provides for the creation of regulations,¹³ which if proclaimed could limit the ADF's capacity to use the training area.



Shoalwater Bay is a wetland of international importance

Trade in endangered species

Under the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora which is known as CITES, the ADF is required to protect certain endangered species against over-exploitation through international trade. Consequently, the ADF is not allowed to export or import into Australia any endangered species covered by the Convention.

In Australia, this Convention is implemented through the *Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1982* (Cth) and therefore, the ADF is bound by the provisions of the Act.¹⁴ For example, under the Act it is an offence to export or import without a permit, most species of Australian native fauna and flora as well as other non-native fauna and flora including material derived from such species.¹⁵ Unlike the Convention, this Act also regulates the movement fauna and flora both into and out of Australia.

Overall, the Convention and the Act have applicability to the ADF in two specific instances and that is:

- they control the accidental or deliberate collection of fauna or flora by ADF personnel who are participating in military training exercises outside Australia or in peacekeeping operations; and
- they control the collection of a particular fauna and related material which represent a traditional symbol or regimental mascot of a specific ADF unit such as a tiger or a bear.

Biological weapons

Under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, the ADF is required to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and to prevent biological warfare. In complying with the Convention, the ADF must:

- never produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbiological or other biological agents or toxins (otherwise than for peaceful purposes) or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes;¹⁶

- destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, weapons, equipment and means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes;¹⁷ and
- not transfer to any recipient, either directly or indirectly, and not in any way assist, encourage or induce any other government or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes.¹⁸

In Australia, this Convention is implemented through the *Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976* (Cth) which has provisions that bind the ADF.¹⁹ As with the Convention, this Act also prohibits the ADF to develop, produce, stockpile and acquire certain biological agents, toxins and biological weapons.²⁰

Marine Pollution

Under the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters which is also known as the *London Dumping Convention*, the ADF is required to obtain a permit before dumping substances at sea although under the terms of this Convention, ADF vessels and aircraft are entitled to sovereign immunity under international law²¹ and therefore exempt. This exemption is however difficult to apply given that all ADF vessels and aircraft are expected to act in a manner consistent with the aim of the Convention.

In Australia, this Convention is implemented under the *Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981* (Cth) which binds the ADF and is further strengthened by the *Defence Act 1903* (Cth) through a specific Defence Instruction²² which highlights the procedures the ADF are required to follow. In this Instruction, ADF officers responsible for the authorisation and arrangement of the disposal or surplus, obsolete and unserviceable stores are required to be familiar with both the Convention and the Act.

Ozone Layer

Under the *Vienna Convention* for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the ADF is required to protect the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from activities which modify or are

likely to modify the ozone layer.²³ In Australia, this Convention is implemented under the *Ozone Protection Act 1989* (Cth) which is binding on the ADF and this evident in the ADF's own Instruction.²⁴ Under this Instruction, the ADF is required to phase-out the use of scheduled substances in accordance with Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council guidelines.

Under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which entered into force in Australia on 1 January 1989, the ADF is also required to control the level of consumption of chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) and halons. Under the Protocol, which like the Convention is implemented under the *Ozone Protection Act 1989* (Cth), the ADF can only use scheduled substances for specific applications.

South Pacific

Under the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific, the ADF is required to protect and manage the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific Region through the control of pollution through both vessels and land based resources.

Under the Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping, the ADF is also prohibited from dumping within the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone or continental shelf of a signatory State without prior approval from that State.²⁵

Furthermore, under the Protocol concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region, the ADF is required to cooperate in taking measures to protect the South Pacific Region from the threats and effects of pollution incidents²⁶ by using the established reporting mechanism.²⁷

Migratory Birds

Under the Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Protection of Migratory Birds and their Environment, which is known as CAMBA, the ADF is prohibited to take any one of the 81 species of migratory birds listed under the

Agreement except in certain circumstances.²⁸ This Agreement, which has yet to be implemented in Australia, has been applied by the ADF, mainly in relation to its proposed site for East Coast Armaments Complex.²⁹

Under the Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction and the Environment, which is known as JAMBA, the ADF is also prohibited to take any one of the 66 species of migratory birds listed under the Agreement. This Agreement together with CAMBA is specifically adhered to by the ADF and this is evident in the environmental management plan for the recently constructed Ten Terminal Regiment and Army Maritime School facility in Townsville.³⁰ In the Plan, there is a specific objective which states that the new facility is designed:

*“To provide for the preservation of the adjacent bird habitat areas on the south bank of the Ross River by ensuring the development does not adversely impact the local environment pursuant to Australia’s obligations under the JAMBA and CAMBA international agreements”.*³¹

Hazardous Wastes

Under the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the ADF is required to control its transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. Under the Convention, the ADF is obliged to ensure that:

- personnel involved in the management of hazardous wastes take the steps necessary to prevent pollution;³²
- transboundary movement of hazardous waste is reduced to a minimum;³³ and
- only authorised ADF personnel are involved in the transportation or disposal of hazardous wastes.³⁴

In Australia, this Convention is implemented under the *Hazardous Substances (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989* (Cth) which like the Convention, also binds the ADF.³⁵ Under the Act, the ADF must not export or import any hazardous waste as defined in the Act except in accordance with a permit or relevant order.³⁶

Biological Diversity

Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the ADF is required to conserve and to sustainably use biological resources by:

- identifying activities which have or are likely to have significant adverse impact on biological diversity;³⁷
- protecting specific areas and rehabilitating degraded ecosystems;³⁸ and
- adopting measures to avoid or minimise adverse impacts on biological diversity.³⁹

In Australia, this Convention is implemented under numerous Commonwealth environmental laws and they include;

- the *Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974* (Cth) and its framework for assessment of impacts on biological diversity;
- the *Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975* (Cth) and its process of identifying places with biological diversity;
- the *Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975* (Cth) and its conservation of biologically diverse zones throughout the Great Barrier Reef;
- the *National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975* (Cth) and its mechanisms for the establishment and management of parks and other reserves and conservation zones containing biological diversity landscapes;
- the *Whale Protection Act 1980* (Cth) and its preservation, conservation and protection of whales and other cetacea thereby enhancing biological diversity in the territorial sea of Australia;
- the *Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1982* (Cth) and its regulation of the exporting and importing of animals and plants that collectively represent the nation’s biological diversity;
- the *World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983* (Cth) and its focus on protecting identified and internationally recognised biologically diverse areas;
- the *Fisheries Management Act 1991* (Cth) and its conservation of certain fish species and thereby enhancing the biological diversity in, and beyond, Australia’s fishing zone; and
- the *Endangered Species Protection Act 1992* (Cth) and its application in the protection of biological diversity on Commonwealth land.

With respect to the *Endangered Species Protection Act 1992* (Cth), this law has particular

application to the ADF in that it promotes compliance with the Convention through a Memorandum of Understanding that exists between the Department of Defence and the Australia Nature Conservation Agency (now Biodiversity Group, Environment Australia).

Climate Change

Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the ADF is required to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.⁴⁰ In complying with this Convention, the ADF must take measures as described in relevant national strategy⁴¹ to mitigate climate change. In Australia, this Convention is yet to be implemented under Commonwealth law however, the ADF has adopted an energy management policy⁴² which contains performance targets that will result in lower greenhouse gas emissions as well as reduced energy costs.

The Australian Defence Force and its role in the security of the environment in the Asia-Pacific region

Security of the environment is essentially about “sustainable development” and the ability to achieve economic growth, racial and social equity and population control. It is however, a complex and poorly understood concept and one which is directly related to poverty, injustice, land degradation and conflict. Accordingly, the World Commission on Environment and Development state that:

*“The first step in creating a more satisfactory basis for managing the interrelationships between security and sustainable development is to broaden our vision. Conflicts may arise not only because of political and military threats to national sovereignty; they may derive also from environmental degradation and the pre-emption of development options”.*⁴³

In 1993, the United Nations Environment Programme gave recognition to this link between security and the environment through a Governing Council by stating:

*“...that Governments should...establish a national environmental policy for the military sector”.*⁴⁴

In Australia, there has been some consideration given to the concept of regional environmental security and this is evident in the Australian Army’s environmental policy statement.⁴⁵ In this statement, the Army gives recognition to the importance of the air, water and soil and the need to adopt a greater stewardship role in protecting both Australia’s and the World’s environment through action involving compliance with domestic and international laws.

“Army gives recognition to the importance of the air, water and soil and the need to adopt a greater stewardship role in protecting the environment”.

Until recently, the interest in international environmental law in Australia has generally revolved around foreign policy and trade considerations but now it is becoming a necessity to the extent that we are beginning to see an active engagement by government in the development and enforcement of international law of the environment in order to maintain security, prosperity and the well-being of the nation.⁴⁶ In the South Pacific, international law of the environment is of particular interest and when combined with the concept of security, this often leads to only one outcome and that is the prevention of environmental degradation. In fact, it has been stated that:

*“The World may end in a whimper rather than a bang: with a total resource depletion, not with a general nuclear war. Ecological damage to the earth’s life-support systems is a less spectacular but more basic threat to peace and survival. Pessimists conclude that, given the persistence of competitive national sovereignties as the organising principle of the international system, the challenge of scarcity is more likely to precipitate conflict than compel collaboration”.*⁴⁷

In Asia and across the Pacific, there is considerable evidence which indicates that international law of the environment is developing rapidly and that this development is being driven by the need to address regional and sub-regional environmental issues such as land degradation, deforestation, availability and quality of fresh water and the degradation of marine and coastal ecosystems. According to recent research,⁴⁸ there as been numerous environmental declarations, agreements, resolutions, accords and conventions developed for the different regions within Asia-Pacific. Although only a few of these declarations, agreements, resolutions, accords and conventions are applicable to the ADF, it is likely that this applicability will change in the future given the



Governments should establish a national environmental policy for the military sector

present diplomatic and political dialogue which suggests that there exists a greater role for Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, it is inevitable that Australia will become a party to many of these declarations, agreements, resolutions, accords and conventions.

If this happens, this in turn will place considerable environmental compliance obligations on the ADF, especially when it participates in cooperative military activities such as joint exercises in and around the Asia-Pacific region. A point which has already been made in that joint military exercises have become not just more frequent and regular, they have begun to enhance and promote greater a understanding and level of trust between ASEAN nations and Australia.⁴⁹

Conclusion

Given that international laws of the environment are applicable to the ADF, it is clear that there exists a significant obligation on the ADF to take account of its activities both in Australia and region and ensure that it acts in a manner which protects the environment. In preparing for the future, the ADF needs now to become more aware of an emerging global understanding and desire by the world's

military to meet their environmental obligations⁵⁰ and therefore:

- restore greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000;
- conserve and sustainably use biological diversity;
- sustainably develop;
- integrate economic, social and environmental considerations into the decision-making process;
- conform to standards regarding the treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes;
- eliminate deliberate discharges of oil, chemicals, sewage, and garbage from ships at sea or in ports and minimise the potential for accidental discharges of oil and chemicals;
- phase-out the use of Chloroflourocarbons and Halons;
- ensure that hazardous wastes are disposed of in an environmental sound and efficient manner, and as close to the generating source as possible; and
- ban all transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.

NOTES

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How Sharp A Sword? Defining Legitimacy in Offensive Capabilities¹

By Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Smith, RAE

“.. ‘tis expressly against the law of arms: ‘tis as arrant a piece of knavery, mark you now, as can be offered; in your conscience, now, is it not?”

Shakespeare: King Henry V²

Introduction

Since the 1970s, the development of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has demonstrated a strong trend toward increased regulation of the means and methods of waging war.³ This trend is evident in a growing number of international conventions which restrict or prohibit the use of military capabilities, such as certain classes of weapons.⁴ The foreign policy objectives of many nations would imply in-principle support for such regulation,⁵ but those nations also maintain defence forces and thus implicitly reserve the right to apply military force if necessary. For such countries, support for the regulation of warfare must be balanced against the need to preserve essential defence capabilities.

Ultimately, subscription to the treaties which constitute IHL is decided by politicians. The policy process informing their decisions varies from country to country, but in democracies it generally involves a pluralist debate with input from a number of government and non-government actors, including defence forces. Recent events have shown that defence forces are not necessarily pre-eminent in these debates:⁶ other actors in the policy process, including non-state actors, participate very effectively and often oppose conventional military positions. Unless their participation is equally effective, there is a risk that the important input of military professionals will be marginalised in future debates.

One basis on which capabilities have been attacked is their legal, moral or ethical legitimacy. To play their proper role in debates over regulating the conduct of warfare, military professionals must not only espouse a sound position, but in articulating that position they must demonstrate a thorough understanding of all the considerations involved,

including the question of legitimacy. Such considerations are currently addressed on an *ad hoc* basis: while the strict legal dimension of the problem is relatively well defined, there is no articulated rationale for determining a nation’s position on the legitimacy of any means or method of warfare.

Recent trends indicate that proposals to regulate the conduct of warfare will be raised with increasing frequency, and will be pursued with growing political sophistication. Such proposals are likely to be based heavily on legal and ethical or moral arguments, compellingly supported by horrific images of suffering caused by the abuse of military force. While a professional military perspective will not necessarily oppose these proposals, it should serve to balance non-military perspectives if necessary. To do this, military professionals must maintain their credibility as expert advisers by ensuring that their advice is both technically and ethically sound. The military profession therefore needs to explore the ethical dimensions of warfare, and develop a rationale which can be used to test the legitimacy and desirability of any means of conducting it.

This article aims to explore the issues affecting the legitimacy of using weapons or specific military practices, and to develop a framework for assessing the legitimacy of any capability. This task will be approached by:

- identifying the ethical and legal issues affecting the military use of weapons or practices;
- analysing the impact of these issues, and
- developing a methodology for assessing the legitimacy of using a particular weapon or practice.

This consideration will draw heavily on the debate preceding the recently concluded “Ottawa” Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines (APLs), as the most recent example of a convention restricting the use of a military capability.

Background

Customary rules to limit the conduct of warfare have existed for thousands of years⁷. Codification of

these rules began in the mid-nineteenth century, with the development of multinational conventions. These conventions now constitute part of the body of international law known as IHL, of which the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is a major element.⁸ Through the development of IHL, certain legal principles have achieved customary acceptance. These principles form the basis for determining the legality of means and methods of warring.⁹

IHL conventions seek to limit the application of force in conflicts to that which is necessary for the attainment of “legitimate” military objectives. Several of these conventions prohibit or severely limit the use of certain capabilities deemed to have little or no legitimate military application.¹⁰ Often, these conventions are developed “reactively”: that is, they are formulated in response to the employment of a new capability whose use was not formerly subject to restrictions. Subscription to conventions is not universal, but is increasing, and there is broad and active participation in the various international fora in which they are formulated and reviewed.

While many nations strongly support IHL, they also maintain defence forces, and therefore reserve the option of applying military force in pursuit of their objectives. For this option to be effective, military forces must possess worthwhile capabilities. A convention limiting the military capabilities available to a nation thus also limits its options for the employment of military force should the need arise. In agreeing to limit its military capabilities, a country must therefore ensure that it does not compromise its capacity to defend itself.

In several recent conflicts, military capabilities have been employed to inflict what are customarily accepted as humanitarian “atrocities”.¹¹ Most of these conflicts have been intra-national, involving poorly-trained “irregular” forces which have not abided by IHL principles. Within the same time, there have been relatively few conflicts waged between sophisticated, well-trained national forces employing conventional military capabilities in strict accordance with IHL. This has generated the impression that some conventional weapons and military practices hitherto regarded as legitimate can have no proper application, which in turn has led to demands for their prohibition.¹² The proponents of these demands¹³ are pursuing them with increasing political skill.¹⁴ This has led to mounting pressure on governments to agree to the restrictions sought.

Military technology is developing constantly, and new capabilities are being fielded at a rapid rate. It may be difficult to assess the humanitarian implications of a prospective capability, to determine

its legitimacy or to devise any necessary restrictions on its use.^{15, 16} The lack of a concise rationale for determining legitimacy complicates this task.

In deciding whether to support a proposal to limit its war-fighting options, a nation must address two questions:

- whether the weapon or practice concerned is “legitimate” in terms of the customary principles of legitimacy; and
- whether it can afford to forego recourse to the associated military capability.

In addressing these questions, Western governments usually seek advice from their defence forces.¹⁷ This imposes an ethical responsibility on the military for the provision of advice based on rigorous analysis of the proposal and the associated issues.

The Ethical Problem

Most defence forces have an implied ethos, under which they accept responsibility for maintaining their nation’s capacity to apply lethal force in pursuit of its interests.¹⁸ Professionalism is a key part of that ethos, and a professional military force accepts the regulation of its conduct by the observance of a code of ethics which is both formal (in the form of domestic and international law), and informal (in the form of customary standards of conduct).¹⁹ As its agency for national defence, a nation grants its military a certain moral authority for the application of force, which is not granted to other elements of society.²⁰

It is axiomatic that, in performing their mission of national defence, military personnel could be exposed to grave physical danger and personal suffering. An ethical duty of care applies to the military, as an employer, to minimise that danger and suffering. Because a defence force is fundamentally responsible for the defence of its nation’s people, the impact of unrestricted warfare on the population must also be considered, and minimised. Effective IHL conventions are one means of protecting both military personnel and the civilian population, and should therefore be supported wherever appropriate.

In most democracies, a decision to employ military force will be made by Government which will bear the responsibility for the ethical and moral rectitude of that decision.²¹ Once that decision is made, however, judgements as to the specific capabilities employed in the application of force will probably be devolved to the defence force. Ethical conventions demand that the military be able to

justify its use of those capabilities.²² This in turn demands that the defence force rigorously examine the capabilities at its disposal, to ensure that these are both ethically and morally appropriate and adequate for the country's needs. Trends, such as changing technology, may alter the factors affecting these ethical assessments. Capabilities should therefore be periodically reviewed, to ensure that they remain appropriate. Similarly, the acceptability of new capabilities must be rigorously assessed before they are adopted, to ensure that they accord with IHL principles.

The military's ethical problem in advising government on the acceptability of IHL proposals has several dimensions. As indicated above, these include determining:

- the legitimacy of a particular capability;
- the ethical constraints on the use of that capability; and
- the national requirement for recourse to that capability.

Legitimacy

The legitimacy of a particular military capability could be determined in purely legal terms, by testing it against the established customary legal principles of:

- discrimination;
- proportionality; and
- minimisation of superfluous suffering (Annex B).

The application of this test might seem, on the face of it, to be a simple and objective process. Realistically, however, certain "human factors" could influence its objectivity. Ethically, these should be recognised and their influence allowed for. These complicating factors could include:

- "paradigm slavery";
- unrealistic faith in the influence of professional norms; and
- the inappropriate use of historical precedent.

Paradigm Slavery. The employment of capabilities which have an established place in a military force's doctrine and practices can become paradigmatic. Service people may be culturally predisposed to accepting these paradigms as unassailable "articles of faith", and therefore unwilling to question their legitimacy:

*I will be so bold as to tell you that I know the disciplines of war; and there is an end.*²³

The influence of such paradigms is strong, and could compromise the objectivity of assessments. Paradigm slavery is a cultural bent, which can probably only be overcome either by inculcating a

type of "academic" rigour in the analytical practices of military officers, or by seeking external input to the analytical process.

The Influence of Professional Norms. Most Western nations have well-established conventional professional defence forces, whose members are trained in and practice the application of IHL. The culture of these forces therefore assumes the inviolability of IHL principles. This may create an unrealistic expectation that other military forces will embrace a similar culture. Recent abuses of IHL principles provide ample evidence that this is not the case.²⁴ A realistic assessment of the legitimacy of any capability must comprehend the scope for it to be abused. Conceivably, a particular capability might be so predisposed to abuse that uniformly lawful use is not a realistic expectation. In such a case, its legitimacy would be seriously questionable. The professional culture of a military force might lead its analysts to ignore this possibility.

Misuse of Historical Precedent. As has been mentioned, proposals to restrict the use of military capabilities tend to arise "reactively". They are often inspired by historical events involving the unlawful use of those capabilities. Given the diverse levels and natures of armed conflict, it is possible that conclusions drawn about the legitimacy of a capability in one type of conflict might be inappropriately generalised, and applied to other (or all) types. For example, a capability observed to have disastrous humanitarian consequences and questionable military efficacy when used in a scenario of, say, low-intensity insurgent warfare might be deemed illegitimate on the strength of those observations. The same capability could, however, have significant military utility and few humanitarian consequences if targeted against conventional forces in high-intensity "manoeuvre" warfare. The abuse of a capability in one case, therefore, does not prove it incapable of legitimate use under other circumstances. These considerations are of particular significance at a time when the pattern of warfare world-wide tends to be dominated by low- to medium-intensity conflicts, waged by either irregular or poorly-trained regular forces.²⁵

The Impact of Outlawing Capabilities

The development, acquisition and maintenance of a military capability usually involves high costs and long lead-times. These are not usually undertaken unless the prospective capability promises some advantage. It might therefore be assumed that each

capability serves some useful purpose, which contributes to the overall effectiveness of the force employing it. It follows that, if a force foregoes a useful capability, its overall effectiveness will be diminished unless a suitable alternative is employed. A decision to forego recourse to the use of a capability should therefore involve an assessment of:

- the importance of the capability; and
- the suitability of alternatives.

Importance of a Capability. The importance of a capability to a military force's performance of its mission will be determined by the impact of not having it. In assessing that importance, however, there are certain potential pitfalls which must be avoided. These include:

Paradigm Slavery. Paradigm slavery in relation to the legitimacy of a capability has been discussed. Paradigm slavery may also influence assessments of a capability's importance, by biasing estimates of its effectiveness. This is particularly relevant in the case of capabilities on whose effectiveness there is little current, reliable data. For example, in the recent debate over APLs some countries initially opposed a total ban, maintaining that APLs can be legitimately and effectively used in the conduct of defensive manoeuvre warfare. Yet there is little relevant historical experience of this use of mines²⁶. Arguments as to the effectiveness of mines in this role could thus be based on doctrinal paradigms, rather than rigorous analysis.

Accuracy of Modelling Techniques. In the absence of reliable data, modelling could be used to assess the importance of a capability. In doing so, there is a danger that flaws in the modelling technique used could distort the results obtained. This is particularly so in the case of capabilities which derive part of their effect from factors which are not readily quantifiable. For example, the effectiveness of an artillery barrage may be the sum of the physical destruction caused directly by exploding munitions, and the psychological impact of the experience on targeted personnel. Physical destruction is relatively easy to model, using well-established statistical data. Psychological effects are less easy to quantify, and it could be tempting to ignore these or to adopt an inappropriate and unreliable modelling technique for them. An assessment of effectiveness which does not accurately incorporate all aspects of a capability could be extremely misleading.

Current Versus Potential Importance. Government policy may limit its defence force's structure to that

which would be necessary to deal with a specific enemy threat in a specific set of strategic circumstances²⁷. Sensible policy, however, would recognise that those circumstances are dynamic, and could alter with changes in the strategic climate. IHL conventions, on the other hand, are not dynamic: banned capabilities remain banned, irrespective of changes in the strategic circumstances of states parties. It is inconceivable that subscription to a convention might be subject to a caveat of. While Current Strategic Circumstances Obtain.²⁸ Foregoing a capability based on an assessment of limited current utility could thus be dangerous, as it might deny the use of that capability at some future time when it would be of great potential utility. As a principle, therefore, the importance of a military capability must be assessed in all potential scenarios, rather than merely those with current relevance.

Viability of Alternative Capabilities. The importance of a capability may be diminished if a viable alternative capability exists. An assessment of the viability of an alternative capability must consider:

- the extent to which it fills the need met by the existing capability;
- its physical and financial practicality; and
- its own legitimacy (i.e., the extent to which it lessens the objectionable impact of the existing capability, or introduces new problems).

Meeting the Need. An alternative capability may be less effective than the existing one. For example, denying manoeuvre on a piece of terrain by fencing it off may be less effective than by mining it. The adoption of less effective alternatives may degrade the overall capability of the force. The impact of this degradation must be determined in assessing the suitability of alternatives.

Practicality. The cost or physical difficulty of employing an alternative capability may render it practically unavailable to a force. A decision to forego use of an existing capability in favour of an alternative may therefore, for practical purposes, constitute a decision to forego the alternative as well, with a consequent degradation in force effectiveness.

Legitimacy. An alternative capability could potentially have IHL implications rendering it equally objectionable to the one it replaces. For example, neutralisation of an area target could be achieved by the use of either cluster munitions, or unguided unitary munitions. The unexploded ordnance (UXO) hazard associated with cluster munitions has generated humanitarian objections to their use. The use of unguided unitary munitions as an alternative

could, however, have collateral damage implications of far greater humanitarian significance than cluster munitions UXOs. The relative legitimacy of alternatives must therefore be addressed before they are adopted.

Conceivably, the lack of suitable alternatives may force the retention of capabilities with some objectionable characteristics. Advancing technology may, however, offer much more acceptable solutions to the same capability requirements. For example, the emerging field of non-lethal weapons promises possibilities for offensive capabilities with are far more inherently humane than some current ones. The emergence of a suitable alternative may invalidate arguments for retaining capabilities of questionable legitimacy. Professional defence forces are usually fully alert to opportunities to update and improve their offensive capabilities, and frequently sponsor the necessary research and development themselves. The focus of this development is normally on enhanced lethality, however. This focus should be broadened to include seeking ways to improving the humanitarian characteristics of offensive capabilities where necessary.

The Political Dimension

Certain political factors will impinge on a nation's decision to support IHL proposals. These could include:

- “political correctness”;
- international security implications; and
- foreign relations implications.

Political Correctness. Defence issues do not ride high in some countries' national consciousness. In general, however, people are sympathetic to proposals to limit the damage and suffering caused by war. The proponents of IHL initiatives are showing increasing skill in obtaining both public and governmental support for their proposals. A position advocating the retention of a capability whose legitimacy is contentious could therefore be unpopular, while the converse position could attract considerable political kudos. Agreeing to forego such a capability may be politically attractive.²⁹ Considerable pressure might be brought to bear on a government to forego a capability assessed to have limited current or potential utility, even if that capability is deemed to be 'technically' legitimate. In so doing, there is a danger of creating an adverse precedent.

Adverse Precedent. Agreeing to ban a capability whose legitimacy and utility are defensible could create a precedent which might severely restrict a

nation's position in respect of other, more important capabilities. This can be overcome by determining the nation's position through the rigorous application of endorsed principles, irrespective of the perceived value of the capability in question.

International Implications. Regulation of warmaking is achieved not merely by subscription to conventions, but by the way those conventions achieve customary acceptance in international practice. Conventions which are widely supported by the international community impose expectations of compliance on all nations, including non-signatories. Non-compliance might therefore risk hostile international action, such as the imposition of sanctions. By adding their support to IHL conventions, nations can thus contribute to their effectiveness in controlling the actions of 'renegade' states. Support for conventions which are of limited practical significance to a nation might therefore be desirable as an exercise of 'good international citizenship'.

Foreign Relations Implications. An IHL proposal could, conceivably, relate to a capability of defensible legitimacy, which has little or no potential utility to a nation but great value to another country. Agreeing, out of political expediency, to a ban on that capability could lead to damaging diplomatic conflict with the other country. An ethical difficulty also arises should a capability be banned on the basis that a suitable, but much more expensive, alternative is available: this alternative may be obtainable by wealthy nations but unaffordable to less affluent ones. Customary acceptance of such a ban could lead to poorer countries being deprived of a needed capability. As with the potential problems of decisions based on 'political correctness', the difficulties of the foreign relations implications of IHL proposals can be overcome by determining national positions through the rigid application of endorsed principles.

An Ethical Methodology

Governments will continue to need professional military advice in determining the national position on proposals to limit the use of military capabilities. In formulating this advice, the military is bound by certain ethical principles. Proposals for restrictions on warfare will continue to be advanced, and might even arise more frequently in the future. In order to meet its responsibilities for advising government, the military needs a methodology for assessing the legitimacy and

value of capabilities which addresses the ethical principles involved.

The preceding section has covered some of the ethical considerations which will affect any assessment of a capability. Taking these into account, the following methodology has been devised:

- Develop a thorough technical and operational understanding of the capability;
- Analyse use of the capability. and assess its potential for abuse;
- Determine the capability's legality in terms of:
 - discrimination,
 - proportionality, and
 - infliction of superfluous suffering.

Determine the impact of the nation not having recourse to the capability.

Once this methodology has been applied, it should be possible to formulate a suggested national position on the proposal.

Technical and Operational Understanding

The legitimacy and value of a military capability can only be assessed if it is thoroughly understood. A sound understanding must include a knowledge of the associated equipment; how it works, how the capability is employed and how it achieves its effect; and what its costs, advantages and limitations are. As an expert, professional organisation, the defence force should ideally command a comprehensive knowledge of all military capabilities relevant to modern warfare. In reality, not all of the capabilities which might be the subject of proposed limitations will be represented in a defence force's prevailing structure. Current, relevant knowledge of those capabilities may therefore not be immediately available. This should not, however, exclude a nation from meaningful participation in debate over that capability. It may be necessary to commence an assessment of the capability with a study of it. Sources of information for such a study could include historical accounts of its use and data on its effectiveness, reports by other nations which have employed it, and data derived from analytical techniques such as modelling. Failure to demonstrate a thorough understanding of the capability could damage both the military's credibility in the domestic political debate, and the nation's prospects of negotiating a satisfactory outcome in international fora.

Analyse the Use of the Capability

IHL proposals restricting the employment of military capabilities often follow "atrocities" caused by their

unlawful use. Any military capability can be used unlawfully with dire humanitarian consequences. It does not follow, however, that the potential for such abuse renders a capability incapable of proper use. Conversely, the potential for lawful use does not render a capability incapable of abuse. For example, a highly accurate sniper rifle in the hands of a competent, responsible soldier might be deemed eminently capable of discriminate use, and hence of inflicting only proportionate damage and of avoiding superfluous injury: it might thus be considered a humane and legitimate weapon. Firing the same weapon blindly into a crowd of non-combatants, however, would violate all principles of LOAC. It is therefore ultimately the use of a weapon, rather than its nature, which is lawful or unlawful.

Lawful use of some capabilities could be highly problematic. The practical difficulty of using some weapons lawfully could mitigate against their legitimacy. For example, prescribed practice in the use of landmines was to mark and record in detail areas where they were laid. In reality, however, this seldom occurred, and in any event such marking and recording is a practical impossibility in the case of remotely delivered, scatterable mines. The long-term effects of such mines have had the disastrous humanitarian consequences which ultimately led to their banning. Military forces have an ethical duty to rigorously and realistically assess the potential for abuse of a capability.

Determine Legality

Principles of Legality. The three principles against which the legality of a military capability must be tested are discussed in detail at Annex B. The extent to which a capability can be used in compliance with these principles must be rigorously assessed. The validity of this assessment will be dependent on the assessor's understanding of the capability, its characteristics and use. For example, an assessment of the proportionality of using APLs might be limited to consideration of their effects on combatants only. These effects could be deemed to be consistent with those of other high-explosive weapons, and in proportion to the value of their military objective. Such a limited consideration might conclude that the mines satisfied the principle of proportionality. As was argued during the APL debate, however, most mines are effective indefinitely, and often continue to inflict injuries on non-combatants long after their military purpose has been served. Such long-term effects would be disproportionate to the value of the

original military objective. A failure to understand or admit this key characteristic of the capability might lead to an inadequate assessment of its legality.

Social Impact. A full assessment of a capability's legitimacy must be informed by a realistic understanding of its impact on target populations. For example, weapons which use laser beams capable of blinding targeted personnel might be considered legitimate, or at least preferable to certain alternatives, in that their effects are non-lethal and therefore in accordance with the principle of minimising superfluous suffering. A complete evaluation of the weapon's impact should, however, consider the social outcome of blinding for the victim. In affluent Western societies, support programs are available for blind people which could make the effects of blindness tolerable. In poorer societies of the developing world, however, the social cost of supporting an increased proportion of blind people, and the degradation in quality of life imposed on those people, might be sufficient to render the use of blinding weapons excessively injurious or disproportionate to the value of the military objective, and therefore unlawful. Failure to consider these impacts could distort assessments of the capability's legitimacy. Considerations such as this are of increasing importance now that conflicts are largely fought in the developing world. Public debate is likely to give considerable weight to factors such as social impacts, and the credibility of military assessments of a capability's legitimacy will be harmed if these impacts are not adequately acknowledged.

Impact of Unavailability

Subscription to a convention banning the use of a capability will render that capability lawfully unavailable under any circumstance. In advising government whether or not to so subscribe, the military must determine the operational impact of not having recourse to that capability. This assessment must comprehend the use of alternative capabilities. If it is assessed that the loss of a capability (otherwise considered legitimate) would unacceptably degrade the defence force's capacity to perform its mission, government should be advised against agreeing to forego that capability.

Formulate Suggested Position

Once the legitimacy (legality) and importance of a capability have been determined, these findings should be communicated to government in the form of a suggested national position. The scope of that

position should include a consideration of all relevant issues, and should clearly convey all arguments.

Other Principles

The above methodology must be employed in strict accordance with certain general principles. These are:

- argument on the basis of principle, not political expediency;
- intellectual rigour; and
- pessimism.

Principle Versus Expediency. As discussed above, it may be politically attractive for a nation to concede to proposals for limitations on certain capabilities where this can be done without immediate impact on that nation. This could, however, create adverse precedents, deny future use of ethically defensible capabilities, and embarrass allied countries. To avoid these undesirable outcomes, it is essential that the national position be based on firm principle, and not on political expediency.

Rigour. IHL issues are often emotive, and are always vigorously debated. Any national position is likely to attract some criticism, and in order for it to be credible, it must be based on sound reasoning and rigorous analysis. The pitfalls of paradigm slavery, invalid historical examples or faulty modelling must be avoided. To do so, positions must be developed within a culture of "academic" rigour and scrupulous honesty. The emotive nature of IHL issues will complicate the application of rigour in any case, but rigour can best be preserved by:

- employing appropriate expertise in the conduct of analysis; and
- seeking qualified, external input and comment.

Pessimism. Some of the more radical proposals for disarmament, demilitarisation and "peace building" imply a certain optimism concerning human nature, and the possibility of eliminating or controlling war. Studies of the military professional ethic have noted that the military perspective is consistently pessimistic about these concepts.³⁰ The military profession has an ethical responsibility to maintain this pessimism, in order to balance an unreasoned optimism which could undermine national security. Such pessimism is unlikely to ever be popular in peacetime, and its maintenance requires a certain intellectual and moral discipline. A practical application of this pessimism is the assessment of the utility of capabilities in worst case, rather than best case or prevailing scenarios. Pessimism must, however, be balanced. An intransigent adherence to

unrealistic pessimism could also be unethical, and lead to the retention of unnecessary and illegitimate capabilities after their useful purpose has been served. Scrupulous observation of the principle of rigour should help to maintain this balance.

Conclusion

Military forces will have a continuing requirement to advise their governments on the acceptability of proposals to limit the methods and means of warfare which are available to their nations. This advice is likely to be provided as a contribution to a pluralist debate in which the military is only one participant, with no particular authority or pre-eminence.

As a profession, the military is bound by ethical responsibilities which extend to the capabilities which it employs. Currently, there is no articulated methodology for determining the legitimacy and desirability of any capability, but such a methodology is needed to ensure that consistent, high-quality advice is provided to government. As the formulation of this advice itself involves ethical considerations,

any methodology developed must also comprehend those considerations.

The pattern of armed conflict world-wide is dominated by low- to medium-intensity conflicts, most of them occurring in developing nations. At the same time, modern technology is developing, at an accelerating rate, both lethal weapon systems of significantly increased destructiveness, and effective non-lethal weapons. All of this suggests an atmosphere of change in the profession of arms, in which some paradigms should be critically re-evaluated. Amid this change, opportunities may exist to circumscribe the use of military capabilities, in order to ameliorate their adverse humanitarian effects without depriving nations of their defensive value. As responsible practitioners of the military profession, defence forces should vigorously explore these opportunities. Failure to do so could leave them ill-prepared to participate effectively in debate on proposals to limit their capabilities.

This article has identified and discussed some of the considerations involved in assessing the legitimacy and value of military capabilities, and has proposed a methodology for formulating advice on those issues. That methodology relies on a rigorous and disciplined observance of the military's professional responsibilities.

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Henri Dunant at one of the Castiglione churches in which there were 500 wounded soldiers.

ANNEX. A– Current Conventions Limiting the Use of Weapons Systems

Serial	Title	Date	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles, under 400 Grams Weight (St. Petersburg Convention) ¹	1868	Signed by Great Britain, applies to Australia
2	Declaration Prohibiting the Use of Asphyxiating Gases (Hague II) ¹	1899	Acceded to by Great Britain in 1907, applies to Australia
3	Declaration Prohibiting the Use of Expanding Bullets (Hague III) ¹	1899	Acceded to by Great Britain in 1907, applies to Australia
4	International Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague VIII) ¹	1907	Signed by Great Britain, applies to Australia
5	Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare ¹	1925	Entry into force for Australia 1930
6	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) ¹	1968	Entry into force for Australia 1973
7	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) ¹	1972	Entry into force for Australia 1977
8	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be considered to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (Inhumane Weapons Convention - IWC) ¹	1980	Three subordinate Protocols: a. Protocol One: Fragments Transparent to X-Rays b. Protocol Two: Landmines c. Protocol Three: Incendiary Weapons
9	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	1993	Signed by Australia 1993. Entry into force 1996.
10	“Ottawa Treaty” Banning APLs	1997	

Note:

Of the ten conventions detailed here, five were formulated in the 100 years from 1868 to 1967, but the remaining five were formulated in the 25 years 1968-1993. This would indicate a quickening in the pace at which such conventions are raised.

ANNEX. B

General

International customary law has identified three principles which must be satisfied in order for a means or methods of war-making to be deemed legitimate:

- discrimination;
- proportionality; and
- minimisation of unnecessary suffering.³²

Discrimination

The principle of discrimination, or “non-combatant immunity”³³, requires that ‘belligerents distinguish between civilian objects on the one hand and military objectives on the other’³⁴. Under this principle, practices involving the indiscriminate application of force are unlawful. By implication, means of war-making (i.e. weapons systems) which are incapable of being employed discriminately are unlawful. This principle has been cited as a justification for the banning of chemical weapons, and was also used to justify the banning of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). Significantly, the Ottawa Treaty’s ban on all *victim-actuated* APLs sets a new criterion for discrimination, in that discrimination must be able to be applied by a human being in “real time”.

Proportionality

The principle of proportionality obliges a belligerent to consider the possible impact on civilians of military action against a military objective, and to minimise that impact. If the effects of military action are estimated to be disproportionate “in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”, the proposed military action is unlawful.³⁵ Practices or means which are likely, in any event, to have disproportionate effects on non-combatant populations could be deemed fundamentally unlawful under this principle. Proportionality has been used as an argument for banning “weapons of mass destruction”, because of their massive effects, and APLs and cluster munitions, because of their long-term effects on civilian populations.³⁶

Minimisation of Unnecessary Suffering

This principle applies to both combatants and civilians. It requires that the human suffering involved in any military action be only that which is necessary to achieve the legitimate military objective of that action. Suffering in excess of this is deemed to be superfluous, and is unlawful. In the case of civilians, there is a clear overlap of this principle with that of proportionality. This principle has been the basis of bans on “expanding bullets”³⁷, and is also claimed as a justification for bans on a range of modern weapons, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, landmines and cluster munitions³⁸. Included in this principle is the concept of *military necessity*, under which offensive action and its effects must be justified as essential to achieve a legitimate military objective. Action or effects in excess of this are not militarily necessary. Thus, action resulting in collateral damage to a non-military target might be justifiable if that damage were an unavoidable consequence of the action, no alternative were available and the military benefit of the action were proportionate to the damage inflicted.

NOTES

1. The capabilities with which this article is concerned are the offensive “means and methods” of waging war: specifically, weapon systems and the ways in which they are used. Although these form only part of the spectrum of concepts conventionally referred to as “capabilities”, for ease of reference “capability” will be used in this article as a generic term for offensive “means and methods”.
2. Shakespeare, *King Henry V*. Act IV, Scene VII.
3. The terms “means and methods”, “practices” and “weapons” are used frequently and almost interchangeably in the literature associated with this subject.
4. A list of current conventions is at Annex A.
5. For example, Australia’s policy of “contributing to the cause of good international citizenship”, articulated first by Gareth Evans under the Hawke Labor Government in 1989 and maintained in principle by the subsequent Liberal Government. See Evans, G. *Australia’s Regional Security*. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1989, p.1.
6. In the recent international debate over anti-personnel landmines (APLs), for example, several Western governments decided against the advice of their defence forces to support a global ban on these weapons.
7. Kewley, G. *Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts*, VCTA Publishing, Melbourne, p.2.
8. Modern IHL has its origins in the work of Henry Dunant, the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Kewley, 1984, p.2). Dunant’s description of a devastating battle in the 1860s (Dunant, H. *A Memory of Solferino*) led to the *Geneva Conventions* of 1864, which were the first example of a formal multilateral agreement to limit the means and methods of warfare.
9. See Annex B.

10. For example, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the use, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.
11. For example, Iraq's use of chemical weapons to annihilate the civilian population of the village of Halabja, in Kurdistan, in 1988, or the widespread and indiscriminate use of APLs world-wide.
12. For example, a treaty banning the production, transfer, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines was concluded in December 1997, even though these were previously regarded as a legitimate capability.
13. The term "Peace Movement" is commonly used to refer to groups and individuals advocating the abolition or severe limitation of warfare. The Peace Movement is somewhat loose and informal, but includes non-government organisations (NGOs - such as aid organisations), academic bodies (such as the Peace Research Centre within the Australian National University) and special-interest groups.
14. For example, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines waged a "tactical" lobbying campaign, over a prolonged period, which systematically countered the sources of political opposition to the ban and which saw a number of countries reverse their policy positions to support a ban.
15. For example, weapons using laser beams to dazzle or permanently blind target personnel are currently being fielded, but as yet no specific conventions on their use have been developed.
16. Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the *Geneva Conventions* places an onus on nations to determine the legality of new weapons or practices. *Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, ICRC, Geneva, 1977, p.28.
17. For example, in preparing for the 1995 Review Conference of the IWC, the Australian positions on various issues were developed by the Department of Defence (Army and HQ ADF) in cooperation with DFAT.
18. For example, the Australian Army articulates this in *Army's Ethos and Values*. DPUBS, Canberra, 1994 (pass).
19. Hartle, A.E. *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, University Press of Kansas, USA, 1989, Chap. 3 (passim).
20. *Ibid*, p. 32
21. The issue of the moral "justness" of a war is the subject of the legal principle of "*jus ad bellum*". In most democracies, the application of this principle is the responsibility of Government.
22. The legitimacy of the means and methods used in war is the subject of the principle of "*jus in bello*". In most democracies, Government will take the advice of the military on the application of this principle in policy. In many situations arising in war, practical application will be in the hands of the local military commander.
23. Shakespeare, *King Henry V*, Act III, Scene III.
24. For example, the use of landmines since the entry into force of the IWC has, almost universally, not complied with the Landmines Protocol. Some of the non-compliant nations have been signatories to the IWC (e.g. the former Soviet Union). The abuses of APLs have been so significant as to inspire a treaty prohibiting them outright.
25. Of 26 conflicts reported in the period 1978-1991, 21 were fought by an irregular force on at least one side. 18 were internal conflicts. Brogan, P. *World Conflicts: Why and Where they are Happening*. Bloomsbury, London, 1992, pp. 624-5.
26. It could be argued that the last significant use of APLs in defensive manoeuvre was during the Korean War, or, more credibly, WWII. Most use since WWII has been in insurgent warfare, in ways which are conventionally considered illegitimate.
27. For example, Australian defence policy only requires that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) be able to deal with the enemy military capabilities which could be brought to bear against Australia at short notice ("Short Warning Conflict"[SWC]) DA94, *op cit* p. 24
28. This option was specifically proscribed in the negotiations for the recent treaty banning APLs.
29. For example, the Australian Government was accused of "feel good" politics over its decision to support a ban on APLs. Sheridan, Greg "In defence of the much maligned minefield", *The Australian*, 30 September 1997, p. 15.
30. Hartle, *op cit*, pp. 34-5
31. *Australian Treaty List 1989*. No. 38, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989.
32. Authorities differ in their identification and expression of IHL principles affecting military capabilities. The principles enumerated here are those identified by Paul Davies and are, in the author's opinion, the most convenient and readily understood distillation of the key IHL concepts (Davies, P. *The War of the Mines*. Pluto Press, London, 1994, p. 132). Other writers define the same concepts differently: for example, Australian Defence Force doctrine includes the principle of "military necessity" (Australian Defence Force Publication 37, paras 203 and 206). For the purposes of this article, this concept is comprehended by the principle of "minimisation of unnecessary suffering".
33. Becker, L.C. and Becker, C.B.(eds) *Encyclopaedia of Ethics*, St. James Press, London, 1992, Vol. II, p.808.
34. Davies, *op cit* pp. 131-2.
35. *Ibid*, p. 132.
36. *Ibid*, p. 137.
37. As codified in the Hague Convention of 1899.
38. Davies, *op cit*, p. 138.

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The Australian-Indonesian Security Agreement: Where Did it Come From – Where is it Going?

By Group Captain Brenton Crowhurst, RAAF

Question: *What is it?*

It is small. It fits on one page. In effect it is only three paragraphs in length. Its formulation was surrounded in secrecy and it has major ramifications for two countries.

Answer: *It is the Australian – Indonesian Security Agreement.*

On 14 December 1995 Mr Keating, the Prime Minister of Australia, surprises the world by announcing that Australia and Indonesia were about to sign a historic security agreement. No one knew of its existence. Mr Keating only informed the US the day before its disclosure and President Soeharto of Indonesia discussed it with no one. Four days later, on 18 December 1995, Senator Evans representing Australia and Mr Ali Alatas representing Indonesia signed the *Australia – Indonesia Security Agreement*. Moreover, both countries ratified the agreement within a year. However, if it is so small and lacking in detail, is it worth anything and does it have any relevance?

To be able to determine the answer to this question it is necessary firstly to establish the history of Indonesian- Australian relations. This article will outline the highs and lows in their relationship and ascertain the importance each country has placed upon the relationship with the other. Once the stability and closeness of the relationship has been established, an analysis of the Agreement itself will be undertaken. The article will describe the evolution of the Agreement, the events that led to its development, the people involved in its drafting and also analyse the wording of the Agreement. Finally, will ascertain the implications of the Agreement to both Australia and Indonesia as well as to their allies and regional partners.

History of the Australian-Indonesian Relationship

The relationship between Indonesia and Australia could be best described as resembling a roller coaster.

Immediately after the Second World War it was Australia that supported Indonesia's call for independence from the Netherlands. Prime Minister Chifley was consistent in his support for the Indonesian republicans, despite strong criticism from the Opposition for failing to support a "white" ally in the region.¹ When the issue was referred to the United Nations, a Good Offices Committee was established. Both the Dutch and the Indonesians were invited to nominate one country. Indonesia chose Australia and the Australian representatives ably promoted the Indonesian cause. After Indonesia gained independence in 1948 they remained grateful for Australia's support for many years. This led to a stable bilateral relationship.

Sukarno became the first President of Indonesia and he committed the country to a free and active foreign policy. Free in the sense that he focused on securing an international position which was separate from the cold war competition between the US and the Soviet Union. Active in the sense that Indonesia concentrated on its own course in international affairs focusing on opposition to colonialism, participation in the Non-Aligned Movement and later ASEAN.

During the late 50s, Australia supported the Dutch claim to the colony of West New Guinea. However, in November and December 1961 President Sukarno made a series of belligerent statements in which he declared that he was prepared to liberate West Irian, by force if necessary. Consequently, in January 1962, Australia's position towards West Irian changed dramatically when the then Minister for External Affairs Sir Garfield Barwick argued that "the Dutch" position was untenable and that Australia's principle interest was to secure Indonesia's friendship.² Accordingly, in 1963 Australia supported the peaceful transfer of control of West New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia, with the provision that an act of self determination would be conducted prior to 1969.

During the same period, Australia was embroiled in an argument with Indonesia, over Australia's support for the formation of the state of Malaysia. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio coined the phrase *Konfrontasi* when he announced, on 20 January 1963, a policy of Confrontation against Malaysia. At this time President Sukarno was playing

a delicate balancing act by trying to keep control of both the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) and the anti-communist military while using Soviet funds to rapidly expand the armed forces and simultaneously trying to maintain public support for his opposition to the formation of Malaysia.

Throughout this period Australia's relations with Indonesia remained at an uneasy calm. This assertion is as established by an incident which took place on 15 September 1963, where mobs in Jakarta, upon hearing of the creation of Malaysia, burned the British Embassy but left the Australian Embassy untouched. However, as incidents of cross-border raids into Borneo by Indonesian forces increased, Australia further demonstrated support for Malaysia by committing, in January 1965, a battalion of combat troops to the region as well as combat aircraft based at Butterworth. Seventeen Australian soldiers died during this war.

In 1965, the Sukarno regime was overthrown and replaced by the Soeharto New Order government. Indonesia's foreign policy was then focused on peace, economic reconstruction and the formation of ASEAN. However, in 1971 Australia signed the *Five Power Defence Agreement* with the UK, NZ, Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia had been excluded from the discussions and again this caused Indonesia's distrust of Australia's intentions within the region.

November 1975 saw Indonesian troops occupy the former Portuguese colony of East Timor with it being declared a province of Indonesia in 1976. During the reporting of these events five Australian journalists disappeared and were reported killed by Indonesian forces. Tensions between the two countries rose but not to the level of confrontation. With the fullness of time, even though the fate of the journalists was never satisfactorily explained, relations returned to normal. In 1978 Australia recognised *de jure* Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. Again Australia demonstrates that friendly relations with its northern neighbour, with the underlying aim of improving Australia's national security, is more important to Australia than the fate of a small island state and its people.

For the next ten years relationship between the two countries remained relatively stable. Unfortunately, in 1986, another incident occurred which saw all Australian journalists expelled from Indonesia. *The Sydney Morning Herald* published a series of articles that alleged corruption in the Soeharto family. Considerable diplomatic manoeuvring was employed and great pains were

taken to explain to the Indonesian government Australia's concept of a free press.

Over the next decade, many agreements were reached between the two countries, such as:

- a. in 1989 the declaration of the Zone of Cooperation in the Timor Gap;
- b. an Extradition treaty in 1992;
- c. an agreement on cooperation in fisheries in 1992;
- d. an agreement on the promotion and protection of investments in 1992;
- e. an agreement on the protection and enforcement of copyright in 1992; and
- f. in 1994 an agreement on cooperation in scientific research and technological.

Although this was a period of improving relationships, an incident occurred in 1991 that threatened to destroy all the positive developments.

The Indonesian military, stationed in East Timor, opened fire on a crowd in Dili attending the funeral of a rebel. Between 100 and 200 East Timorese people were killed and the incident became known world wide as the Dili massacre. The US suspended all Indonesian military aid and training conducted under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) scheme. Australia lodged a formal protest and campaigned for an Indonesian Government Inquiry into the incident. However, again, pragmatic views on the importance of our relationship with Indonesia transcended the national outrage on the violation of human rights.

In retrospect, it would be impossible to assert that the Australian – Indonesian relationship has always been smooth, although it could be argued that Australia has always considered the maintenance of a friendly relationship with our northern neighbour to be of paramount importance.

Evolution of the Security Agreement

It was the vision and strength of personality of the former Prime Minister, Paul Keating which brought the *Australia – Indonesia Security Agreement* to fruition. During his first campaign for the Prime Ministership he identified that a healthy relationship with Indonesia was of paramount importance to the security and prosperity of Australia. However, it was not until he was being briefed for his first official visit as Prime Minister to Indonesia in 1992, that Mr Keating became fully aware of the history of the relationship between the two countries. He learned that it was his political heroes, Curtin and Chifley, who had supported the formation of this nation.

Consequently, Keating was often heard to remark “We have to do something about Indonesia”.³

During this visit Keating began to develop a strong relationship with President Soeharto. Mr Keating publicly acknowledged (what many had said in private) the strategic benefit the Soeharto regime had delivered to Australia. “I think he thought he was owed a recognition, and he was chuffed that he had it,” Mr Keating remarked to a confidante.⁴ Over the next two years he worked closely with Soeharto on APEC issues. Firstly, Keating is credited with convincing President Soeharto to attend the first APEC meeting. Secondly, while Soeharto was preparing to host the second APEC summit, Keating helped to develop support for the *Bogor Declaration*.⁵

Following these successes Keating thought, “It was time to make it completely clear that their two countries trusted each other, had no territorial designs on each other, and shared the same strategic interests”. He continued on to say, “A formal declaration of these fundamentals was the most powerful way to make the point.” Finally Keating followed these assertions with “If we don’t do it, then its likely it will never be done.”⁶ The Prime Minister was to receive all the encouragement he needed in the form of a non-committal response from President Soeharto.

To represent Australia in the delicate negotiations Keating selected three men. Firstly he chose the former Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Gration, a man trusted and respected in Indonesia. Second, his foreign affairs adviser Mr Allan Gyngell and the third was the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Mr Allan Taylor. President Soeharto selected the formidable Secretary of State, Dr Moerdiono who, like Soeharto and Gration, was a former general. Dr Moerdiono specialised in handling Indonesia’s most important negotiations.

In Australia there were only a few people aware of the existence of either the negotiating team or their aim. These were Gareth Evans, Robert Ray, General John Baker and a few senior public officials. They were sworn to secrecy as Keating knew that the negotiations would inevitably fail if opened to public debate and intense scrutiny.

Initial negotiations in 1994 proceeded slowly with Australia producing a “non-paper” and delivering it to Dr Moerdiono in September. It was not until twelve months later that Keating and Soeharto next met at which time Soeharto raised the topic of the security agreement and it was he who gave it the green light to proceed to the next step, that of producing a draft text. Over the next two months bureaucrats in both countries drafted an initial text but it was Gration and

Moerdiono who produced the final draft. In November, at the APEC conference in Osaka, Soeharto and Keating met and made final minor changes to the draft. Consequently, on 18 December 1995, only four days after announcing the existence of the agreement, the foreign ministers of both countries signed the document. Australia ratified the agreement through the Executive Council, a practice the Howard Government changed immediately upon gaining power in 1996. Indonesia ratified the agreement just prior to John Howard’s first visit to Jakarta in the capacity of Prime Minister.

The Agreement

The Agreement is in effect only three paragraphs in length. I consider this document to be extremely brief for one which has implications of such magnitude for the region. However, ...does it need to be more verbose?

The first paragraph of the Agreement states: “The Parties undertake to consult at ministerial level on a regular basis about matters affecting their common security and to develop such cooperation as would benefit their own security and the region.” Since the signing of the agreement, meetings between the respective foreign ministers have occurred at least annually. From these meetings flow a series of other government meetings, such as, the Australia – Indonesia Defence Cooperation Committee meetings. Moreover, below this level there has been sub-committee meetings and working groups formed. Discussions over a wide range of subjects now take place at many levels on a regular basis. Furthermore, a better understanding of each others opinions and concerns ensues.

These meetings provide a forum for further discussions on agreements that already exist, such as the *Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Agreement*. Since the inception of the *Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Agreement*, reporting of surveillance activities conducted in the zone by either country, has been sketchy and frequently delivered late. Moreover, surveillance activities have been uncoordinated. After December 1995, a working group was formed to rectify these problems. With the new environment, where trust between the group’s members is growing, agreements that would have previously taken years to develop, are now being devised and formalised at one meeting.⁷ This bodes well for future negotiations on defence cooperation.

It is timely at this juncture to discuss the third paragraph of the Agreement, as its intent is to further expand upon the contents of the first paragraph. This paragraph states, "The Parties agree to promote – in accordance with the policies and priorities of each – mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field in areas to be identified by the two Parties." Obviously, it is a statement which is intended to promote cooperation over a wide range of subjects, including political and economic areas, and not just security. Furthermore, it is a public announcement that both Australia and Indonesia have confidence in the future of their relationship.

It needs to be noted that Indonesia is second only to PNG as a recipient of Australian foreign aid. However, Indonesia's economy is rapidly expanding and with the help of a friendly developed country it will only be a short time before its description will defy that of "developing country". In his article in the *Australian Financial Review* of 15 December 1995, Mr Robertson correctly identified that "... with Indonesia's rapid modernisation, Australian – Indonesian relations now have a depth and breadth across economic, commercial and cultural dimensions which will continue to grow. Indonesia is already looking to Australia as a source of high technology solutions to many of its development problems."⁸ Certainly Australia wants to be the friendly neighbour that assists in Indonesia's development. This decision by Australia, appears to be based upon the hypothesis that friends, who trade together and who have integrated and interdependent economies, are unlikely to risk economic ruin by going to war against each other.

The second paragraph of the Agreement is the pivotal statement on security. By stating the Parties undertake to consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each Party. "It appears to be all encompassing. But what was intended by the statement The Parties undertake to consult each other in the case of adverse challenges..." and what does it really mean?

It is not a NATO type agreement where an attack against one of the parties is considered to be an attack on them all. As with the ANZUS treaty and the Joint Declaration of principles Australia signed with Papua New Guinea in 1987, there is no automatic guarantee of a military response should either be attacked. It only states that each will consult. This has been the trend of all agreement/alliances signed within the region over the last two and a half decades and I do

not consider it out of the ordinary. No country today would risk its security on an all binding agreement to go to another's aid. What would happen in the instance whereby one country considers its treaty partner to be in the wrong? Should it be committed to a war just because of a treaty even though it considers the actions of its ally to be wrong? Except for the members of NATO, it is doubtful that any country would, in the future, put themselves in the position where their response is dictated by a treaty.

At the same time, one must question the intent of the statement "adverse challenges". In the initial draft the wording proposed by Australia was "external threats." However, Indonesia did not want the agreement to be seen as a military pact, so the agreement was amended to "read adverse external challenges" with the word "external" finally being removed at the request of Soeharto at the last meeting prior to the signing of the agreement between himself and Mr Keating in Japan.

Many people, including the then Leader of the Australia Opposition, Mr Howard, queried the choice of words. Political commentators questioned whether this meant that Australia could be drawn into some Indonesia domestic or internal problem. Mr Keating immediately clarified this point during his press conference of 14 December 1995 when he stated that "...the agreement only related to external security challenges, not those of a domestic nature."⁹ Similarly, Minister Ali Alatas confirmed the interpretation in a press conference on 19 December 1995.¹⁰ Therefore, even though President Soeharto attempted to muddy the meaning of this phrase, both governments were immediately required to further define it; thus, negating Indonesia's intentions of avoiding the agreement appearing to be a defence pact. In fact, by the time the agreement was signed all countries in the region saw the agreement for what it was, that is, a pact involving both economic and security elements.

Implications to Indonesia

Many political commentators were surprised when the agreement was announced. Most were aware that relations between Australia and Indonesia were on the improve and that there seemed to be a special bond between Mr Keating and President Soeharto. However, no-one expected the announcement on 14 December 1995, that an agreement had been reached and that it would be signed in four days time. Furthermore, the surprise

was compounded by the fact that the agreement was negotiated during the political storm over the appointment of the former Indonesian Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Herman Mantiri, as Ambassador to Australia.

Why should there have been such surprise that two regional neighbours had developed a security agreement? Firstly, since Independence, as previously stated, Indonesia has adopted and maintained a “free and active” foreign policy. Furthermore, Indonesia has never before entered into a security agreement with anyone.¹¹ ASEAN, which is economic union of South East Asian countries, has been the limit to which Indonesia would tolerate foreign policy input by other countries. In fact, as the Australian – Indonesian Security Agreement was being proposed and drafted, Indonesia adopted a high profile stance in the Non Aligned Movement and had become chairman of the movement for the period from 1992 to 1995.

Secondly, the agreement was negotiated in total secrecy. Indonesia felt that there was no obligation to follow the “ASEAN consensus”, that any members decision which may affect the economic, political and security situation of the SE Asian region should be subject to prior consultation¹², before announcing the Agreement’s existence. Foreign Minister Alatas stated that “We do not need to consult them (ASEAN) before we have a bilateral something with Australia¹³ ...” But then his following statement showed that Indonesia was still smarting from not being consulted at the formation of the *Five Powers Defence Agreement* (FPDA) when he said “By the same token we didn’t feel consulted when FPDA was made.”¹⁴ Indonesia is signalling to the region that it has matured as a regional power and if required it will unilaterally determine its own fundamental security policies.

Even though the regional powers were surprised by the announcement, most have reacted positively. Initially commentators thought that ASEAN countries might react adversely given current disputes between Indonesia and some of its neighbours – notably Malaysia and Vietnam. But most have announced that they support it with Singapore coming out strongly in favour of the Agreement. In fact Dr Matahir stated, “an agreement between neighbours for peace is always good.”¹⁵

So what does Indonesia gain with respect to security from this agreement? Firstly, the Agreement removes the threat to Indonesia’s southern border, as posed by Australia during Confrontation. The agreement announces to the world that Indonesia is neither a threat to Australia now, nor will it be and in

the future. This allows Indonesia to concentrate on its regions it considers to be threatened.

Indonesia has always perceived the threats to its security to be aimed at its northern borders. According to Indonesia military and political leaders, China is considered to be the only country with the potential to threaten Indonesia. China’s aggressive stance over sovereignty of the Spratley Islands has awakened fears within the region of Beijing’s expansionist intentions. China’s claims border on Indonesia’s potentially rich oil fields surrounding the Natuna Islands.

But would Australia come to Indonesia’s aid if it is threatened by China? At this stage it could be argued that this is unlikely. However, the real answer would depend upon Australia’s foreign policy and the state of its relations with China at the time. What Indonesia is gaining from the agreement is training and exposure to modern weapons and tactics. Since the Dili massacre of 1991 the US has slowly withdrawn military aid to Indonesia. Furthermore, following the 1993 announcement of the disproportionate sentences for those involved in the massacre, the US suspended all International Military and Training (IMET) for the Indonesia Military. In the previous 40 years more than 15,000 Indonesian Officers had trained in the US and according to a 1989 estimate, between 17 and 25 *per cent* of Indonesian Army generals had received training in US Army schools.¹⁶ Since 1993, Australia has become the largest supplier of military training to Indonesia. Over two hundred Indonesians currently receive training in Australian military institutions per year compared to only three as little as six years ago.¹⁷

As stated above, Indonesia believes that China is its main security threat, so it desires the US to remain engaged in the region. However, the fallout from the Dili massacre means that relations between the US and Indonesia are strained at all levels. Fortunately, Australia has good relations and security agreements with both nations. Therefore, Australia is being used by both countries as the conduit for retaining and maintaining, some if only limited, communication between them.¹⁸ The US relies upon Australia’s advice on Indonesian matters. Similarly, Indonesia uses Australia to inform the US that they are not the human right abusers the world press portrays.

Most critics of the Agreement assert that Australia has made a pact with human right abusers and that training obtained in Australia is used against the defenceless in Indonesia.¹⁹ Unfortunately, the element which these critics choose to ignore is the type of training the Indonesian military receive. In every foreign course conducted in Australia, the students

are subjected to lectures on the *Law of Armed Conflict*, *Rules of Engagement*, the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* and the meanings of the different Geneva Conventions. Concurrently, the officers are exposed to a more relaxed military and civilian society. Furthermore, they receive training on current military equipment and tactics. Such training leads to a more rounded type of military officer who, firstly, would be able to operate with Australian forces if required, and who has been exposed to a different manner of living and code of behaviour. Australian policy makers believe that the positive influence on behaviour through education is far superior to criticism.

Finally, the Agreement further erodes Australia's ability to criticise Indonesia's human rights record. Even though Mr Keating said that the Agreement would not prevent Australia from making it clear where it stood on human rights in Indonesia²⁰ he also stated in an interview on the ABC's *7:30 Report*, that "We are not going to hock the entire Indonesian relationship on Timor...." and "A prime ministers duty, his first duty, is the security of his country".²¹ It is obvious that such contradicting statements informs Indonesian officials that Australia no longer has leverage on contentious issues, such as Irian Jaya and human rights.

Implications to Australia

In Australia, the Agreement was received with relative calm. Proponents of civil rights and freedom of expression, derided the Agreement. The Western Australia Greens Senator Dee Margetts said that the treaty was a slap in the face for East Timor.²² The Opposition, on the other hand, broadly supported the adoption of this Agreement. Mr Howard stated that "Indonesia is Australia's closest northern neighbour and the Coalition supports the continued development of the relationship in a way that reflects its importance to both countries."²³ However, the Coalition did query the use of the phrase "external challenges".

What drew most public criticism was the secrecy in which the Agreement was negotiated. A spokesman for Mr Keating, however, rejected any suggestion that it was a manoeuvre designed to avoid controversy. "When you are negotiating with foreign governments, you do it privately, not in the media".²⁴ However, it appears that Mr Keating had serious doubts of reaching a satisfactory conclusion to the Agreement if it had been opened to public debate. He considered, correctly I believe, that the debate would

have been hijacked by the vocal "minority" and "human rights" interest groups. Also, in an effort to preclude Parliamentary debate, he evoked the executive privilege to make treaties and ratified the Agreement with a vote by the Executive Council.²⁵ So in effect the treaty was presented to the Australian people as a *fait accompli*. For both these decisions he was branded a dictator.²⁶

Over the last twenty years, whenever Australia's security was discussed or whenever opinion polls were taken, the average Australian indicated that they thought that our main threat to Australia's security came from Indonesia. Some military leaders held the same opinion even though they knew that the Indonesian military lacked both the ability and the resources necessary to mount a successful attack against Australia. The Agreement finally demonstrates that Indonesia has no ambitions towards Australia other than peaceful trade, economic and diplomatic relations. Mr Keating was emphatic when he said that "Australia was no threat to Indonesia and Indonesia was no threat to Australia."²⁷ Moreover, Mr Keating further debunked the idea that Indonesia had ever been a threat by stating that the consequences (cost) of having a hostile or just unfriendly Indonesia on our northern border would have been incalculable.²⁸

In announcing the Agreement, Mr Keating demonstrated its importance by stating "...no nation is more important to us than Indonesia." This statement in effect places Indonesia along side the US as our most valuable ally. Unfortunately, not everyone was applauding the benefits of a security agreement. On the day that its existence was announced, the Indonesian State Secretary, Mr Moerdiono stressed that the security agreement should be seen in the overall context of Indonesia's economic development. However, a leading Indonesian strategic analyst, Dr Jusuf Wanandi, said Indonesia believed it critical to formalise the existing close relationship so it would not be dependent on personalities.²⁹ Even though Indonesia tried to down play the security aspect of the agreement, most commentators saw the Agreement for what it was, that is, an agreement between two countries who have substantial common interests in trade, investment and regional security. Neither country saw the agreement as a defence pact against a common foe, but rather as two countries with shared strategic interests and perceptions on security.

The Agreement also put in place the last stone of a security wall involving Australia and her neighbours. Since 1971 Australia had the FPDA with Malaysia, Singapore, Great Britain and New Zealand.

Furthermore, Australia had reached security agreement with PNG in 1989. Consequently, the Security agreement with Indonesia means that Australia now has security agreements with all her important neighbouring countries.

Conclusion

Over the last 50 years relations between Australia and Indonesia could only be described as bumpy road. Initially Australia championed the fight for independence and formation of the Republic of Indonesia. However, Indonesia was determined not to be drawn into the cold war competition and Sukarno avidly followed a “free and active” foreign policy. Even though Australia opposed Indonesia during confrontation and initially disagreed with the annexation of Irian Jaya, neither country resorted to a direct conflict. Following the succession to power of President Soeharto and his “New Order” relations gradually improved despite the speed bumps of East Timor and the Dili massacre.

The foresight of Mr Keating and the authoritarian power of President Soeharto brought the Indonesian – Australian Security Agreement to reality. Nevertheless it is more than just a Defence Pact, it is an agreement that also promotes political tolerance, economic cooperation, investment and trade between the two countries. All of this was encapsulated in three paragraphs.

Not everyone has applauded the Agreement. Proponents of Human Rights believe that Australia has forsaken the people of East Timor. Furthermore, they state that Australia is training Human Rights abusers so that when they return to their country they can inflict more pain on the peasants. Australian politicians recognise that they have lost leverage on Human Rights issues with Indonesia but consider the security of Australia is worth the loss. With respect to the issue of training the Indonesian military, Australia believes it is better to try to influence behaviour through education rather than criticism.

The future of the Indonesian-Australian relationship appears rosy. By ratifying this agreement, Indonesia has told the world that Australia is its most important ally. Similarly, Mr Keating’s words echo this sentiment “... no nation is more important to us than Indonesia”. Both countries have emphatically stated that they are allies and that they are not potential threats to each other. They will not always agree but the Agreement promotes understanding and tolerance between two countries who were once

envisaged as potential enemies but now can be seen to be committed allies.

NOTES

1. Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments*. (Sydney, Australia: Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd, 1992) page 16.
2. *Ibid*, page 230
3. Peter Hartcher, “How the Enemy Became an Ally”. *Australian Financial Review*, 4 July 1996, page 1.
4. *Ibid*.
5. The *Bogor Declaration* is an ambitious promise to embrace free trade and investment across the region and a landmark in the evolution of the world trading system.
6. Peter Hartcher, “The Indonesia Deal – An Act of Faith”. *Australian Financial Review*, 5 July 1996, page 26.
7. The author attended one such meeting in February 1997.
8. Robertson, Alan. “Indonesia Security Pact is Good for Both Countries”. *Australian Financial Review*, 15 December 1995, page 24.
9. Alan DuPont, “The Australia – Indonesia Security Agreement”. *Australian Quarterly*, Winter 1996, page 52.
10. *Ibid*, page 52.
11. *Ibid*, page 52.
12. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, “The New Security Agreement between Indonesia and Australia”. *Pacific Research*, November 1995 / February 1996, page 16.
13. *Weekend Australian* 16-17 December 1995.
14. *Op cit*.
15. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 December 1995, page 1.
16. David Jenkins, “A Neighbourly Relationship”. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 May 1995, page 17.
17. Greg Earl, “Looming Poll Spurred Signing – Australia-Indonesia – A New Era”. *Australian Financial Review*, 15 December 1995, page 16.
18. Author heard a senior PACCOM officer asserted this in March 1996.
19. Inferred by both Clive Hamilton in his article “The Indonesian Treaty – Ignoring Human Rights”. *Australian Financial Review* 21 December 1995, page 17 and by Senator D. Margetts in a speech to the Australian Senate on 21 May 1996.
20. David Lague, “Howard Happy but Activists are Dismayed – Australia and Indonesia Join Forces”. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 December 1995, page 6.
21. Australian Broadcasting Corporation – 7:30 Report of 14 December 1995.
22. Geoffrey Baker, “Historic Pact with Indonesia”. *Australian Financial Review*, 15 December 1995, page 1.
23. David Shires, “Pact is Sensible – Howard – Australia-Indonesia a New Era”. *Australian Financial Review*, 15 December 1995, page 17.
24. David Lague, “Treaty Negotiations Surrounded by Secrecy”. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 December 1995, page 6.
25. Australia ratified the treaty simply by processing it through the Executive Council – a provocation to the then opposition, now the Government, which has since changed the treaty process to ensure parliamentary scrutiny.
26. Padraic P. McGuinness, “Indonesian Treaty Good in Intention but not in Execution”. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 December 1995, page 12.
27. Tony Wright, “Australia, Indonesia Join Forces”. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 December 1995, page 1.
28. Harold Crouch, “New Treaty is More About Symbolism than Reality”. *Pacific Research*, November 1995 / February 1996, page 18.
29. Greg Earl, page 16.

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Group Captain Brent Crowhurst joined the RAAF in January 1971 and attended the RAAF Academy for the first four years of his career. Upon graduation he undertook pilot training and was posted off course to fighters. He initially trained on the Mirage III and completed his first operational tour at Butterworth Malaysia with No. 3 Squadron. He was then trained as a Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) and spent the next 15 months instructing at No. 2 Flying Training School located at RAAF Pearce. Following this posting he spent 6 years at RAAF Williamtown instructing on both the Mirage III and Macchi MB-326H.

Promoted to Squadron Leader in 1986. Group Captain Crowhurst was selected to attend the RAF Advanced Staff Course at RAF Bracknell, UK. Upon his return to Australia he was posted to Williamtown where he converted to the F/A-18 Hornet. He remained at No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit as the Training Flight Commander for twelve months and the Executive Officer for a further eighteen months.

Promoted to Wing Commander in January 1991, Group Captain Crowhurst was posted to 81WG for two years as the Senior Operations Officer. Following this he assumed command of No. 3 Squadron which flew the F/A-18. He remained the Commanding Officer for two and a half years before again leaving Australia to attend the US Air War College (AWC), a twelve month course conducted at Maxwell, AFB, Montgomery, Alabama.

After graduating from AWC, Group Captain Crowhurst was posted to Headquarters Australian Defence Force, Strategic Operations and Plans Division as SO1 Air Operations. Crowhurst assumed his current position of Director of the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, with a promotion to Group Captain, on 1 July 97.

Group Captain Crowhurst is married to Lorraine and has four children ranging in ages from 15 to 21.

A Framework for a Unified Decision Making Process

By Captain T. Basan, RAINF

Introduction

Decision making is one of the most critical capabilities of mankind. The inability to make timely and relevant decisions, that has led to the downfall of many a human enterprise. War has been no exception. The Australian Defence Force believes command and control are critical components of warfighting and have been identified as force multipliers.¹ It is believed that having an edge in command, control and communications will improve our ability to win, by ensuring shorter decision timings and increasing the precision of our action. A key component of command and control is the process that aids decision making.

People are the energising element in any organised group.

Good people can get results even without proper planning and organisation; backed by sound plans and organisation, good people become outstanding.

Louis A. Allen²

As Louis A. Allen highlights, good people can overcome the deficiencies of a system; however, when provided with good processes, procedures and systems even the average can be successful. Within Army, the Appreciation Process has been, until recently³, the primary aid to decision making at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. The Appreciation Process is a logical form of reasoning that, in its generic form, can be used for operational, non-operational and non-military problems.⁴ The essence of an appreciation is clear thought and logical reasoning.⁵ This logical focus and emphasis on reasoning minimises the ability for intuition to play an integrated part in decision making, even though, there is evidence that intuition is a useful mode of decision making.

The Appreciation Process is now considered to be “not particularly suited to the rapid planning and decision making required in modern conflict.”⁶ This is

reinforced by the use of other methods of decision making within Army’s administrative arena, and the introduction of alternate military decision making processes with the other America, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) Armies.⁷ These observations highlight a growing concern that the current process is not sufficiently flexible for the emerging era.

Two Approaches to Decision Making

*All knowledge is sterile,
which does not lead to action*

Mercier⁸

Thinking about decisions and the process to make decisions, should be an important part of military research, experimentation and training. However, this does not seem to be the case, given the lack of significant reference to the process in journals, training, or service manuals and the lack of a basic framework to understand the elements of the process within the military. This is a significant deficiency for an organisation in which decisions can mean the life or death of personnel, communities, nations and states.

There appears to be two distinct types of decision making systems used by humans to achieve action in an enterprise. Both have the ability to be used in isolation or in combination with the other in order to suit the circumstance of the problem, opportunity or task. The first approach owes its origins to the method of learning used by the brain.⁹ The other, to the evolution of conceptual thought via deconstruction of past events and the participants actions. They are referred to here as “action first” and “thinking first” decisions.

Action First Decisions

Research indicates that our brain is a self-patterning system.¹⁰ From birth our brains begin a process of discovery, learning and development that takes a helpless infant to a fully productive adult. It does so, initially, by initiating random nervous

stimuli. The stimuli travel along the nervous system and make the body act in a particular way. These actions form part of an action/reaction cycle where the actions are accepted or rejected, based on their usefulness. The useful stimuli are then reinforced by repetition, practice and rehearsal until an appropriate degree of accuracy and precision has been achieved. This constant practice not only allows the brain to ensure a desired level of accuracy, but also allows the brain to identify appropriate triggers for complex actions.¹¹

“Action first” decision making is the type of decision making that is based on action in response to some form of trigger. This technique uses the same process as a new born and is rooted in the concept of fight or flight - action/reaction. The process operates on the basis that you do something and wait to see what eventuates. The basic process is “action - observe - think”. This process draws on our innate ability to observe, develop and store standard responses to situations.¹²

Within Army, a well known and understood example of an “action first” decision is the weapon malfunction Immediate Action Drill. Once proficiency has been achieved in the drill, the actions of “cock - lock - look” are performed subconsciously. Immediate action is triggered by the weapon failing to fire and corrective action is initiated by a visual trigger. Another example is the Basic Drill of “run - down - crawl - observe - aim - fire”. Whilst drills are common for an individual, they are also used by teams.

Battle drills are “action first” decisions that have been developed for small combat teams. Battle drills are taught to enable them to react quickly with some semblance of order without lengthy discussion or direction. No appreciation of the situation is required, only the ability to recognise a trigger, then select and initiate an appropriate response. Our infantry have a number of combat tested battle drills. One battle drill that combat soldiers are familiar with is that used when contact is made with the enemy in close country. A section is on patrol when a shot rings out (trigger), all the soldiers yell “CONTACT——” (trigger/action) and rapidly deploy into pre-planned positions (action). It is only once the soldiers are in position that the commander intervenes, by first asking for information (observe) so that he can formulate his plan of action (think). It can be seen from this example, that a group can also go through the process of “action - observe - think”. It is also clear, that immediately prior to acting on the incoming fire, no effort was expended in considering all the factors in the situation.

For the “Action first” approach to be successful the situation must fulfil four criteria: be so familiar or closely replicate an experience that has had an observed successful solution, there is confidence that your experience can cope with the situation, that you can read the situation and it is easy to identify those triggers that are relevant to the situation. “Action first” relies on two fundamentals - speed and simplicity. This leads to three characteristics: the ability to crawl and then run through sequential actions; when tired, exhausted or pressed for time, the subconscious comes to the fore; and thought can be focused at a higher, thinking level of a problem. This approach has been selected by some armies, such as the old Soviet Union, where extensive reliance was placed on the use drills. However, the price that must be paid to be proficient in this approach is extensive scenario development;and exhaustive practise, and the underpinning belief that your situation awareness will accurately trigger the best response.

Thinking First Decisions

The brain also has the ability to consider factors that affect a situation. “Thinking first” decision making is action that is generated by thinking about the issue at hand rather than responding to a trigger. This type of decision making forms the basis of the Appreciation Process and operates on the basis that a careful appraisal, either consciously or unconsciously, has been carried out before a solution is designed. Also, through exhaustive effort , deconstruction of previous events and their results is undertaken not to develop precise responses but to identify principles, guidelines and rules to support future thinking. When coupled with exhaustive analysis of the situation, rather than a search for triggers we have the possibility of a scientific solution. The basic process is “think - initiate - action”.¹³

Deductive and inductive reasoning are two common methods of reasoning, which form the basis of European logic.¹⁴ Logic has proven to be highly effective for the scientist, researcher and long lead time planner; since hypothesis and deductions flow from the consideration given to all the factors and variables that affect the situation. This model is the basis of many decision making processes, such as the Appreciation Process, Tactical Decision Making Process and the new Australian Military Appreciation Process.

As the *Manual of Land Warfare* states: “an appreciation of a situation is a logical process of

reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to the course of action to be taken in order to accomplish his mission.”¹⁵ The *Joint Service Publication 102* identifies five steps: review the situation, select the aim, consider the factors, consider the courses of action and select the best course of action when using the appreciation process.¹⁶ An important point to understand when considering the definition, is that there are 362 880 possible permutations from a total of just nine pieces of information. However, to avoid the mammoth computations in considering all the factors, the process is generally cut short to consider only selected factors such as ground, enemy, own forces, weather, time and space; still a mammoth task. And from personal experience, one often wonders how effectively the selected factors are being considered by decision makers.

With the current focus on Manoeuvre Warfare theory and thought, the perceived inability of the Appreciation Process to adequately deal with rapid planning has become the focus of some effort at Command and Staff College (C&SC). C&SC has produced a modified variant of the US Army’s – *Tactical Decision Making Process* called the *Military Decision Making Process*¹⁷, recently renamed the *Military Appreciation Process* (MAP).¹⁸ In the MAP, decisions follow a similar form to the Appreciation Process; however, the focus is strictly on combat. The central pillar of the MAP is the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), which provides highly developed graphic tools for the analysis of the situation.¹⁹ However, there is the danger that the ability of the Appreciation Process to be used outside the combat environment, without modification, may be thrown out in the search for a model that overcomes its combat deficiencies.

A New Framework for Decision Making

There is another way of viewing decision making, a way that offers the opportunity of combining the strengths of both the “action first” and “thinking first” approaches to decision making, in order to provide a holistic decision making framework. It is proposed that this be done by turning the current view on its head and focusing on the result required, and not on the decision process itself.

Combining “Action and Thinking First”

Decision making is the search for and the selection of a means of action to achieve a desired effect. It is not an end in itself. The search for a perfect solution to a situation can be a daunting, difficult and or impossible task. Since a solution is dependent on variables, factors and options that may not be known or cannot be identified, it is better to decide and act in a timely fashion rather than wait for a perfect solution to blossom.²⁰ The need for timely action overcomes the inclination to inactivity and missed opportunities inherent in the search for the best solution. A solution is generated by the interaction of a decision and action itself.

Solution = Decision + Action

The solution that is generated must aim to do one of three things: either solve the problem, task or opportunity (PTO) with an optimum answer; resolve the PTO with a good enough response; or dissolve the PTO by changing the conditions so as to eliminate the problem. The ability to achieve one of the three solution options is generally time dependent.²¹

With an emphasis on outcomes, it is possible to encourage and promote the seizure and retention of the initiative. Once the initiative has been seized, exploitation of any possibilities or opportunities can also occur. Since these results or actions are in the future, there is a need to focus on what can be, rather than on what is. This requires an understanding of action/reaction.

Action/Reaction System

The Action/Reaction System, as illustrated in Figure 1, is an adaption of an idea put forward by Dr Hewitt-Glesson, an Australian cognitive scientist.²² The Action/Reaction System combines the two approaches to action generation and provides the core on which this process is based. Within this system, there are four components that lead to action. The four components are developed by combining the basic processes inherent in “action first” and “thinking first” decisions. This results in an Action - Observe - Think - Initiate (AOTI) Cycle which can be started by using one of two entry points.

Once we initiate action or observe, we enter the Action/Reaction System. It is by either doing something immediately, or spending time thinking about the situation, that we will ensure an appropriate response is generated to the situation. Since AOTI is a closed loop, it is possible to identify the position of a




Figure 1. Action/Reaction System and AOTI Cycle.

participant within the cycle. Another feature of the cycle is the ability to move from one point on the cycle to another at a speed of choice, so that the speed of motion meets our needs and resolves the situation in our favour. The speed of movement through the cycle is increased by repetition, practice and rehearsal in the same way a well trained team or athletes perfect their tactics, techniques and procedures.

A Unified Decision Making Process

Basic Decision Making Process

The model in Figure 2 illustrates the components of a basic decision process underpinned by the two approaches to decision making, the Action/Reaction System and the AOTI Cycle. The “Basic Decision Process” (BDP) provides the framework from which the UDMP can emerge.

Information, from all the observations made of the situation, acts as the input for the BDP. The BDP can be either an “action” or a “thinking first” decision process which produces an action output. In the “action” mode there are modules that case assessment, search for triggers, store solutions and store results, whilst in “thinking first” mode the modules conduct case assessment, solution development, solution assessment and store results. At this point both are designed to have the same form so as to be in position to be merged together.

Synthesis

Figure 3 now divides the BDP into three distinct components: an assessment process, a decision path and an initiation process. Both the “action first” and “thinking first” approaches take this simplified form. The simplified form maintains the unique structures and requirements of each approach.

Overview of the UDMP

As illustrated in Figure 4, the UDMP allows both the “action and thinking first” patterns to be integrated into a universal system. The UDMP takes the unique decision paths of the “action first” and “thinking first” processes and not only merges them into a unified process, but also retains their form and strengths without dilution in the new decision making process.

In the UDMP, observations of the situation are assessed and used to identify the best of three decision paths to produce a decision for an issue, task, reaction, opportunity or problem at hand. The ability to select the best path does not restrict the concurrent use of the other paths to produce alternate options. However, once the selected decision path has generated a course of action, a deliberate process of initiation is required to commence that action. This action and the resulting effect on the situation is observed and fed back into the cycle as new information to allow further action or reaction.

The UDMP allows sensors to gather data and information by observing the environment,




Figure 2. Basic Decision Process




Figure 3. BDP at component level

participants, and any changes to either; as well as searching information databases. The gathered information will be either in a raw or processed form. However, the form of the information is not as critical as the timeliness of its availability. All the available information is assessed at the Assessment Gate before proceeding down a decision path.

Early assessment of the situation is vital to timely decision making. The Assessment Gate aims to classify, interpret and understand the incoming information in sufficient depth to ensure usability in at least one of the decision paths. Where information is deficient, the Assessment Gate will provide the necessary assumptions for path selection and then action. The assumptions are re-stated as an information requirement, which is used by the information gathering sensors as a focusing tool. Should there be an overload of information, the Assessment Gate filters the information to identify the amount of information needed by the decision path and the response required.

“Template”, “Design” and “Intuition” are the three decision paths within this process. The three

decision paths deliver specialised decision support that, given the circumstances, can generate courses of action that lead to decisive action. For common or pre-planned situations the “Template” path offers an ideal solution. Should the situation be novel or sufficient time be available for more thought, then the “Design” path can be used to generate a course of action. A third option is the “Intuition” path. “Intuition” allows greater freedom of thought than the other paths and is the realm of ideas generation. In general, “Intuition” is the foundation on which both “Design” and “Template” are based.

Once a path is selected, the processes or tools within the path are employed to generate action options. The action selected will be one of several options in a continuum of solutions, which range from excellent to poor. However, an even smaller number will fit into a band of acceptability when measured against risk, organisational constraints or commander’s preference. Those courses that offer potential are tested against predicted success criteria to determine the course which offers the most flexibility and gain for the least cost. The selected




Figure 4. Unified Decision Making Process

course of action is then developed into a plan. Once approved, the plan is then initiated by specific direction.

With the start of action, all the information gathering sensors are re-focused on specific parts of the area of engagement, interest and influence. The sensors observe our own actions, those of our opponent and the environment. These observations are then fed back into the decision making process to provide action support. Action support is accomplished by an evaluation which confirms the plan's appropriateness and identifies any need for remedial action in a process of continuous improvement.

The Components of a Unified Decision Making Process

Observation

Information is the basis of any decision.²³ For a commander, incoming data and information provide the knowledge necessary for an understanding of the situation. The information required by the decision maker is derived from two sources: databases and data acquired by observation/information gathering assets called sensors.²⁴ This is illustrated in Figure 5. Within the military context, sensor based information will be obtained from superior, subordinate, supporting and flanking units, as well as allied organisations. Whilst data based information is derived from the personal constructs, experiences and professional study of the decision maker and organisational libraries.

Sensors, such as reconnaissance and surveillance assets, take snap shots of the situation. The snap shots are limited in both time and battlespace and aim to detect, classify and identify objects in order to

develop a coherent picture of the situation and cue attack systems. The frame of view produced by a snap shot provides a one dimensional view of the situation. Since there may be conflict between the sensors, a commander should ideally confirm the information with another source. For example, an area under surveillance could have both a sentry and unattended ground sensors coverage to minimise enemy penetration. A common danger of single snap shots is that the view point is affected by the position and bias of the observer. This can lead to the most common decision error - flawed framing rather than flawed logic.²⁵ There is also a potential of single-source information being manipulated to achieve deception objectives, for any of the participants.

Where a lack of information occurs, assumptions derived from databases are used to fill the gaps. However, it is essential that assumptions are validated. The process of validating assumptions is through the development of an information requirement and the search conducted by the available sensors on a priority basis.

Assessment GATE

Assessment of a situation is critical to a unified decision making process and provides the linkage between the three decision paths. The Assessment Gate is a filtering device which provides situation awareness and identifies a decision path. The assessment of information enables an understanding of the overall situation, which is vital in framing the boundaries of a decision.

Situations can be divided into problems, tasks and opportunities, and are analysed to identify the key indicators for an appropriate solution. The solution must close the gap between the visioned endstate and the current situation. This is illustrated by the following short equations:




Figure 5. Observation




Figure 6. Assessment Gate

PTO = Envisaged End State – Current State

Care needs to be exercised to ensure that the correct problem, task or opportunity is identified; correct assumptions are made; and the all important cause is attacked, rather than the symptoms.²⁶ This is not just selection of the aim, but a deeper understanding of the real cause of concern, the essential or core issue that must be addressed.

Understanding allows the recognition of the key patterns formed by an idea, problem, environment or block of knowledge. Understanding occurs with the cross fertilisation of experience, the interpretation of the current situation and the incoming information. Within the military context, knowledge, observations and measurements of the environment; information on the participants; and available instructions must pass through an assessment process before a decision path is selected.²⁷

To reach a full understanding, information must be assessed, evaluated, classified and formatted so that it is optimised for use in the decision paths. Within each profession, some factors will be considered critical to success and used to create models. The models aid understanding by their ability to predict the future over any time frame. The more sophisticated the models, the better the overall understanding and thus the predictive ability of an organisation.²⁸

The Assessment Gate, as illustrated in Figure 6, uses five sub-processes to assess, classify, evaluate and format information. The five processes are called Trigger Search, Experience Search, Pattern Search, Time Calculation and Information Sufficiency Check. The five processes can be run concurrently or sequentially.

Trigger Search. Trigger Search is a process designed to identify trigger systems that can initiate action. A trigger system is a mechanism which rapidly initiates a stored sequence of action or begins a thought process. A trigger system unconsciously initiates action, as often the hardest thing to do is to get started! The sequence of action or thought initiated by a trigger is a standardised response that has a proven probability of success within a given situation.²⁹ “Triggers” help to avoid the need to analyse and carry out complex computations which are difficult, time consuming and potentially irrelevant. Within a situation, the trigger to act will be based on either a task or a threat, since both demand rapid and decisive action. “Triggers” are of two types: act now or await my command. An example of the former is a section on patrol in close country which comes under fire in an ambush; immediate action is called for and consists of the section automatically performing a Counter Ambush Drill. An example of the later, is the Obstacle Crossing Drill; this is where the soldiers take up positions, but the scouts do not cross the obstacle until ordered. With time and experience, a large database of triggers and responses is created for later use. This database provides memory for an organisation. When a trigger is

identified, "Template" is the optimum decision path; however, "Design" or "Intuition" can be used if time permits.

Experience Search. The Experience Search process searches the database to identify any similarity between the present situation and past experiences or knowledge. Experience is critical to all organisations and even more so when the price of misjudgment is high. One of the fundamental and essential benefits of experience is the ability to provide assumptions when information is limited or conflicting. This ability to fill in the blanks is critical to situation awareness.³⁰ A comprehensive experience base consists of a database full of relevant facts and figures, the ability to learn and the ability to develop standard responses to situations.³¹ The database includes the observations and measurements obtained from case studies, historical analysis, training, experimentation, operational experience and other experience which can be utilised in the learning process. The development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and drills is based on a search for patterns of action that have a high probability of success and, therefore, draws heavily on the organisations database. To ensure that lessons learnt are disseminated; deliberate repetition, rehearsal and practice are essential.³²

Pattern Search. Pattern Search searches for and identify any recurring pattern of action in the current situation. Once a pattern is identified the pattern can be analysed to detect weakness or vulnerability. Once a vulnerable point is located there is the possibility of manipulating the situation to expose that vulnerability to attack. A Pattern Search is fundamental to the anticipation of what an opponent is going to do next. A quick example illustrates this point. Whilst undergoing combat training at the Land Command Battle School - Tully, platoons are often confronted with a harassing opponent. The nature of our deployment drills and standing operating procedures make it possible for the opposing force to impose delay by engaging the lead elements, which naturally use a Contact Drill. During the time required to employ the drill, the platoon commander to gain information, and the following elements to close up for possible manoeuvre; the opposing force will withdraw. There is then a further time lag as the platoon probes forward to confirm the opposing force has withdrawn. This can go on for quite some time. Once a pattern is identified an "action on" can be developed to deal with the opposition's anticipated action. Pattern Search helps to get inside your opponent's decision cycle faster than he can get in yours.

Time Calculation. Time Calculations are considered "the most important factor in operations"³³ and, therefore, must be done early in solving a problem. Time calculations completed before using a decision path allows for the efficient use of a scarce resource. The early focus on time management allows participants to implement concurrent activity to ensure efficient time utilisation. The time checking process, selected in this unified process, breaks time into four key components: staff, preparation, execution and re-constitution time. Time planning commences by designating a start and end time. Then reverse time planning is used. The available time is allocated for the staffing process required to plan, coordinate and initiate the action; any preparation needs; the probable time required to execute the mission; and finally, the need to re-constitute before the next mission. The output of the Time Calculation is a timeline that designates the time critical milestones such as start point, key tasks, coordination requirement, reconnaissance, orders, backbriefs, rehearsals and end point.³⁴ The other essential product of a time calculation is the identification of the amount of time available for a decision. This will have a direct bearing on the decision path selected.

Information Sufficiency Check. The Information Sufficiency Check allows verification of the possession of sufficient information to begin action. This is done by reviewing the information received from the sensors and checking the database for relevant information. The information undergoes an evaluation to determine the minimum necessary information to make a decision within each decision path. Should information be missing, the shortfall can be addressed by assumptions so that decision making can start. Another important function of this check is the determination of when enough essential information has been gathered and any further data will simply overload the decision maker. The key to the Information Sufficiency Check is the determination of a critical information requirement. The assumptions and critical information requirements are passed to the information gatherers who develop an information gathering plan. The information gathering plan prioritise, allocates and cues assets to confirm or search for the essential data. Additional, relevant data and information are continuously fed into the decision making process.

Once the five sub-processes have been completed, an overall assessment of the situation provides the framework within which action can occur. This framework provides five outputs: an understanding of the situation, an optimum decision path, a timeline, key assumptions and success criteria. This

information is used by the decision path to produce a plan of action.

Decision Paths

Within the military, threatening situations tend to dictate a limited range of options that need to be initiated.³⁵ These options are, more often than not, time critical and need to be generated and supported, once action has been initiated. The key component of the UDMP is the decision paths. Whilst each path has been used in other decision processes, it is the new unified structure illustrated in Figure 4 that provides a decision making synergy.

The three decision paths that are used in the UDMP were selected on their ability to respond to specific problems, tasks or opportunities by either resolving, solving or dissolving the task at hand.³⁶ "Template" allows standard solutions to be applied to time critical situations, thus resolving the problem. "Design" permits the lengthy process of analysis and the creation of a solution that best fits the conditions and standard required by the situation, which solves the problem. "Intuition" involves the intuitive capability of our minds; it requires experience, study and an inquisitive mind to create unlikely, yet successful combinations to dissolve the issue at hand.

Even though each path will lead to a solution, each is different and ideal for specific conditions. It is, therefore, imperative that the correct path be selected.

Template. "Template" is the term applied to standard responses that are designed to deal with a specific task or problem under set conditions for a predicted result. "Templates" provide a decision path to resolve a problem, task or opportunity with a good enough solution, rather than an optimum one. Rather than spend valuable execution time on analysis only those options within very clear boundaries are considered. A simple example is the "two up" assault formations adopted by the Australian Army, this is taught to the novice and is expected to be used by combat leaders throughout their career - it is Army's standard assault formation. The advantage of "Templates" is that time is maximised in execution, not in planning for action. The quick selection of method and a focus on the execution of a mission permits a rapid operational tempo. As Sophocles, 495-406 BC, said: "one must learn by doing things, for though you think you know, you have no certainty until you try".³⁷ This philosophy underpins the nature of "Template".

"Template" is illustrated in Figure 7 and is made up of three components: Level of Relevance/Abstraction, Options and Plans.

The Level of Relevance/Abstraction identifies the level at which the problem must be dealt with. This component contains models of various environments, situations and appropriate actions for success. The models provide a clearly defined framework within which action can occur. It does so by providing guidance in selecting a solution within the range of options, by working from a theoretical and general level to a practical and specific level. This offers the ability to predict action and then model a response that is effective within time constraints. A system without the ability to differentiate the relevant level of abstraction becomes either inundated with information or denied vital information. Additionally, the Level of Relevance/Abstraction allows commanders to understand the minimum priority information requirements of superior or subordinate echelons. This avoids micro-management or the opposite occurring.³⁸

The standard responses that form the bedrock of "Template" are held in the component called "Options". Given a situation that has a time constraint, it is common for decision makers to trawl their minds for various options that are available. In a structured decision making process it is essential that this ability is captured. "Options" provides the decision maker with an answer to the question: "Given the current situation, what are my options?" "Options" is divided into Triggers, Organisational and Instinctive Solutions. Triggers initiate the stored solutions, however, the solution may need to be adapted to suit the current situation. "Options" takes the ability of the mind to develop, store and use previously successful solutions.

Organisational Solutions are the "Options" that form the doctrinal way an organisation carries out its role - for Army, the way we think and fight. In this decision path there are three levels which can be used individually or in combination - they are tactics, techniques and procedures. Tactics provide the ideal action or response for dealing with a mission or situation by military forces. Tactics are developed to provide the common optimum organisational solution to a problem. They are developed by optimising capabilities and functions whilst minimising vulnerability in accomplishing a task.³⁹ Techniques are detailed sequential actions to accomplish a task or produce a product. This approach will work most of the time in most cases, but they are not set into doctrine as the only way to do a task. Once mastered, techniques ensure the highest quality in the most




Figure 7. Template path

economical way. Several techniques can be applied to a given situation and produce the same result. Therefore, it is important that those tasked with execution are permitted the authority and freedom to select an appropriate technique, as they see fit.⁴⁰ A procedure is a set of instructions covering those features of an action which lends itself to standardised or detailed courses that describe how to perform a certain task in an effective and efficient way. Procedures must be followed in detail to ensure that a common approach is taken and action can quickly occur. Procedures are generally written as standard operating procedures and are well known but not instinctive. In a particular case, they are applicable unless prescribed otherwise.⁴¹

Instinctive Solutions are the Drills and “Actions On” used by either an individual or team. Drills are established norms of behaviour under various conditions so that, when initiated, action is executed with the minimum of direction and in the spirit intended. Drills must be adapted to real situations where performance can be generated in a rigid pattern

so that automatic or instinctive responses occur. Instinctive responses relieve the need for detailed memory. Once learnt, it is driven by processes that are scarcely conscious and allow freedom to deal with more pressing thought requiring situations. “Actions on” are developed patterns of action which deal with specific situations identified in a particular environment and are rarely promulgated to a more general audience. “Actions on” provide a level of instinctive response close to that of drills.⁴²

Once an option has been identified, a plan of action is called for. This facility is provided by the component called “Plan”. The appropriate plan is extracted from the database and prepared for “Initiation” as the “Current Plan”. As this plan is implemented it must be monitored to ensure that it remains appropriate. Since information has begun to flow from the observation of the situation - the process moves through the AOTI Cycle. Any decisions that need to be made are then processed by the UDMP. Whilst action conforms to the plan, “Template” performs as an action support process. It

does so by monitoring the plan's effectiveness, alerting and focusing on any divergence from the plan. Should the plan no longer be feasible or an opportunity arises, a new decision must be made.

Alternate courses of action become "Contingency Plans" and are those options available but not selected by the commander. These will include those techniques that have not been selected, but are available to solve, resolve or dissolve the PTO. Should one be selected for implementation, it is considered and utilised in the same fashion as the "Current Plan". Thus flexibility to adjust the plan is built into the process.

A common concern for those using the "Template" path is the likelihood that an opponent will predict the selected course of action. Whilst a valid concern, the inherent speed of this process ensures getting inside the opponent's decision cycle. Even though the opposition is aware of his impending fate, he is unable to do anything to neutralise that fate.⁴³ "Template" uses the training base to quickly assess the situation, decide on a course of action, and execute. This allows forces to be better prepared and, therefore, be able to strike fast, hard and unexpectedly. Repetition, rehearsal and practice lead to precision and accuracy, which makes this process easy to use, effective and time efficient.

Figure 8 is an example of a theoretical organisational solution template. Whilst not definitive, it illustrates an option that could be developed further.⁴⁴

Design. Is the second decision path to be discussed. "Design" aims to bring into being a new solution, specifically created for the situation at hand and, as such, is an optimum solution to the PTO present. For instance when building a home, the options are either an off the shelf plan or an architect designed house - specific to your needs. "Template" deals with the first and "Design" the second option.

The process of "Design" is a deliberate methodical process of vision, analysis, and creativity. The resulting action, which can be a modification of an older course of action or the creation of a new response, is based on calculation and computation to achieve a practical end.

This tool is more powerful than the current Appreciation Process, because we comprehend that designing is the movement from an idea, aim or mission to an optimum solution. Without "Design" we can only deal with standard problems or tasks in a standard or *ad hoc* way. "Design" is best used when time is available for a detailed study of the situation. Design offers an increased flexibility in decision

making whilst retaining the strengths of the Appreciation Process.

Design is made up of three components: Vision, Analysis and Creativity. The three components are used sequentially in the same fashion as the Appreciation Process.⁴⁵ However, the generic methodology provides flexibility by allowing various tools to be used that best suit the situation. Figure 9 illustrates the components of "Design".

Problems, tasks or opportunities can easily be confused with symptoms. This leads to a quick fix or an excuse for no action. To overcome this problem, "Vision" aims to identify and define the problem, the end state and the obstacles to be overcome. Then "Analysis" is used to classify, collect and analyse the information to frame the situation and develop an understanding of the situation. Finally, "Creativity" is used to prepare plans of action.

"Vision" is the mental imaging used to identify and define the problem and, most importantly, the desired end state that overcomes the particular obstacle. "Vision" provides the boundaries or framework within which the problem will be addressed. A clear idea of the endstate allows all parties involved to focus on the result required and not attempt to treat, solve or create solutions to the wrong problems or symptoms.⁴⁶ It avoids going off on a tangent. A key aspect of vision is the impact of a commander's personality and character on a situation. In particular, the endstate is shaped and controlled by a commander's will power, more so than by his intellect.⁴⁷ Therefore, a commander needs to be involved early in the formulation of the endstate. He does this by stating his overall intent and a concept of action. It is essential that the vision be promulgated clearly, accurately and concisely.

"Analysis" is the classification, collection and analysis of information. This dissection of a situation into its components allows the identification of both known and unknown information. The value of analysis is in an understanding of why it is so and how this can be used to formulate a plan - not as an end in itself. Analysis is concerned with observation and measurement. This process allows you to identify the resources available, to group them and to measure the quantity and quality of those resources. A concern in any analysis is that holistic interactions within complex systems may be lost when it is broken down into its sub-components. Therefore, it is important that effort is directed at considering all the factors. "Analysis" provides a foundation or database on which creativity can be built.⁴⁸

The three components of "Analysis" can make use of the many tools that are available. Classification

ATTACK

PURPOSE	To disrupt, disperse or destroy an enemy force		
KEY PRINCIPLES	TYPES	STAGES	GROUPS
Concentration of Force Security Co-operation Offensive Action Surprise	Quick Deliberate Silent Noisy	Preparatory Assault Exploitation Reorganisation	Assault Fire Support Reserve Security
CONSIDERATIONS	gain information objective firm bases reserves	timings phases fire plan flanks	administration enemy reserves rates of advance
METHODS	Infiltration Penetration	Envelopment Direct fire attack	Indirect fire attack




Figure 8. Organisational Solution Template for an Attack




Figure 9. Design Path

allows information to be presented in a format that permits manipulation during analysis. During collection both quantitative and qualitative methodology, as well as, direct and indirect sources can be tapped to provide the basis on which analysis can occur. Collection can make use of the tools of Total Quality Management, comparative data contained in various manuals and *aides memoir*, systems study, sampling or testing, evaluation or trials, to name a few. Analysis of the classified and collected information is done by using various tools, such as, pay-off matrix, decision trees, comparisons, algorithms, cause and effect diagrams, histograms, graphs and others. The result of an analysis is a list of specific characteristics that identify a successful solution.

The purpose of creativity is to change from old ideas or methods to newer, better solutions by identifying possibilities and then selecting one that suits the current need. "Creativity" is concerned with using the understanding and insight gained during "Analysis". Understanding is derived from the patterns of interaction of the information identified in the "Vision" and "Analysis" phases. Understanding and insight are also able to look at the current view and change that view, as more information proves that the previous idea is no longer valid or inappropriate.⁴⁹ This leads to the importance of

identifying specific success criteria during "Analysis". From the information gathered a number of courses of action or ideas are developed and then tested against the success criteria, so that an optimal solution can be produced.⁵⁰

The essential product of "Design" is action achieved through a documented, methodical and reproducible process. However, once solutions are accepted as generally applicable, there is no need to use the "Design" path in similar circumstances. The solution is then stored as a "Template".

Intuition. Is the third decision path in the UDMP. To many brought up in the European culture of logic most judgements, decisions or determinations appear to be rational and logical. They appear logical because the person who makes them can explain the basis of his decision to himself and to others. Unfortunately, other judgements appear as hunches, guesses or gut feelings since their origins are obscure. As Neisser observed, "Intuition is quick, and often compelling; reason is plodding and pale".⁵¹

In this decision making process, "Intuition" is acknowledged and tailored to utilise the inherent subconscious ability of the brain. The solution generated by intuition will generally dissolve the conditions and makes previous considerations obsolete.⁵² This ability to disregard well held beliefs in the way things are done is the significant element of

the “Intuition” path. Thus, “Intuition” is the germination of genius and is the start point from which both “Design” and “Templates” are derived.

The ability to sense the situation and refine judgements under pressure has been termed by Clausewitz as “the inward eye” and has been observed across the centuries⁵³. This faculty offers not only the ability to determine the possible but also the impossible. “Intuition” is valued because of its perceptiveness, speed of decision, holistic view and originality; whilst its drawbacks are its apparent unreliability, difficulty in justification and inability to be reproduced. However, “there is a time for scientific method and a time for intuition - the one brings with it more certainty, the other offers more possibilities; the two are the only basis for creative thinking”⁵⁴.

Research by Professor H.A. Simon concluded that those utilising intuition will quickly impose meaning on complex patterns of information, have superior attention and memory, be able to rapidly interpret information, and have rapid mental processing.⁵⁵ Whilst a relative few individuals will have inherent talent and an inclination to this methodology, it is possible for the majority to use intuition effectively. This can be achieved by understanding the principles, learning and then applying the relevant tools.⁵⁶

The model in Figure 10 illustrates a generic model that combines the four key aspects of intuition. The four components in the intuitive creative process are Saturation, Deliberation, Incubation and Illumination. For the tool to be effective it is imperative that there be saturation or immersion in the problem. This allows the individual to fully understand the nature of the task and the surrounding information. Saturation is aided by a mental database that is based on experience, familiarity and study. The second component, Deliberation, amounts to the digestion of all the information and consideration of various patterns of thought. The database of information is trawled by an aim, mission or purpose which searches for possible solutions that are mentally analysed, challenged, rearranged and tested. The feasibility of the various options is based on an individual’s experience and is critical to this tool. This is followed by a period of Incubation, during which the conscious brain is switched off, this allows the subconscious to search for a solution. The possible solutions are brought into the conscious mind in an illuminating flash and are then checked for appropriateness. This model is considered to be an accurate description of what occurs and is enhanced by practice and the development of self confidence.⁵⁷

There are a number of methods that can be used to speed up and tap this region of the mind. One method is brainstorming. The value of brainstorming is that it cuts across our search for absolutes and offers an opportunity to generate solutions without obvious restraint. This process is best used by a group to formulate ideas that can then be evaluated and transformed into action. The key principles of brainstorming are that judgement is suspended, so that all ideas are accepted as valid, until a review can be undertaken and that, initially, the quantity of ideas is more important than quality.

The brainstorming process ensures all ideas are recorded sequentially, regardless of feasibility or usefulness, since they may form the catalyst for a further idea. Once the idea generation phase has been exhausted, a process of judgement can occur. Judgement is designed to group the ideas into three categories: workable, worth considering, and unlikely to work. After grouping, the ideas can be joined, modified or improved. Finally, the options are compared in terms that best meet the success criteria.⁵⁸

Cognitive Mapping is a tool that is also available. Cognitive mapping was pioneered in the UK and is based on Kelly’s theory of personal constructs. Constructs amount to the basis on which an individual strives to make sense of his situation and bring mental order, so as to predict and control the future. Cognitive mapping is a model that graphically




Figure 10. *Intuition Path*

shows the interconnection of ideas and the supporting arguments. The map is a series of ideas linked by arrows. Of importance is the need to capture the meaning or essence of the idea. An effective approach to derive the essential meaning is to place the opposite phrase next to the stated phrase. These paired phrases are termed constructs or concepts. The concepts are then linked in a causal manner. This tool has been turned into software for organisational use.⁵⁹

Initiation

“Initiation” is poorly done. As Napoleon observed, “nothing is more difficult and more precious than to decide”.⁶⁰ There are numerous ways to begin but our fear of failure creates an inertia that prevents action occurring. Whilst “Initiation” can be difficult to do, once started, there is a momentum and feedback that pulls one forward.⁶¹ As the saying goes: “Seize the moment, seize the day”.

“Initiation” is illustrated in Figure 11 and is divided into “Selection” and “Implementation”. During “Selection”, courses are compared and tested against the success criteria identified during “Assessment Gate”. The two parts of “Selection” are firstly, a comparison of the courses open - to confirm acceptability, suitability, feasibility and risk; and secondly, the testing of a course of action by simulation.

To effectively deal with the aversion to failure, the concept of risk management has been created.

Risk management is a tool that identifies the hazards, considers the exposure, severity and probability of the hazard’s impact and then developing courses of action to either end or minimise the impact of the risk.

$$\text{Risk} = \text{Hazards} \times \text{Consequences} \times \text{Exposure Probability}$$

Risk management cannot eliminate risk; however, it allows a course to be selected from the continuum of risk ranging from averse to risk seeking. The ideal risk level will suit the comfort zone of those deciding. Decisions have a level of acceptability and commitment, thus risk management aids the execution of the decision.⁶²

The testing or simulation process aims to reveal any unforeseen possibilities that can be seized or identify any vulnerability that needs to be prepared for. The process can use a number of tools such as running the course of action in accelerated time, action-reaction-counteraction, controlled experiment or freeplay scenarios. Simulation allows the consequences that influence or impact on your action to be identified, measured and controlled. Finally, certainty or the probability of success can be identified.⁶³

Once a course of action has been accepted, it then needs to be implemented. This is done by first developing instructions and issuing the appropriate execution order. An important point is that the plan is the start of change, since no military plan survives the first shot or clash.⁶⁴




Figure 11. *Initiation Process*

Action/Reaction

Action is everything! As Euripides, 425 BC, observed, “the God of War hates those who hesitate”⁶⁵. Action involves the co-ordinated and synchronised deployment of a force’s capability to achieve the result required. In some circumstances it may also be directed inaction. Once action has been initiated, a commander must carefully observe the changing situation to ensure the action unfolds in a manner that will achieve the desired endstate. This aspect of decision making is action support and is provided by cycling through observation and assessment to determine the appropriateness of the plan. Any action is continuously assessed in relation to time, triggers and experiences, so as to determine whether to maintain the current plan. Should a change in plan be required, Contingency Plans or “Intuition” can be used to deal with the situation. Action support allows for continuous improvement through “Template” and the ability to take advantage of any opportunity.⁶⁶

Conclusion

This framework for a Unified Decision Making Process is a model which synthesises the natural ability of both an individual and an organisation to decide by using three distinct decision paths - “Template”, “Design” and “Intuition”. The decision paths allow for the development of standard responses; the design of a solution from first principles; or an intuitive answer to deal with an issue, problem, task or opportunity. The three decision paths can be used separately or concurrently to produce a decision. When used with a deliberate process of assessment and initiation, decisions lead to timely, effective and efficient action.

Since people are the most important element in any organised group. Good people can get results even without proper processes, structures or resources. Only a limited number of processes or approaches to decision making nurture the human ability to be creative, motivated and committed. Our western culture is based on the search for absolutes; unfortunately in practice, it is difficult to be absolutely sure of anything. This is especially so in military operations, where friction and uncertainty are so great.⁶⁷ Commanders will need to initiate actions with information of varying degrees of accuracy.

They will be operating, if not in the dark, at least in some form of half light. It is at this point, when the least is confirmed that the greatest pressure is brought to bear.⁶⁸ However, when people are supported with the best processes, structures and resources they can achieve outstanding results. To help commanders and staff, it is imperative that a useful framework for a decision making process is developed, taught and used.

In this article I have attempted to bring order and organisation to the decision making process. By embracing a Unified Decision Making Process, decisions can be made in a timely fashion, be coherent with our doctrinal concepts, and logical in light of the situation.

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
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See the whites of their eyes.


(And the pimple on their nose).

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



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

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First AIF Enlistment Patterns and Reasons For Their Variation

By Colonel K.H. Jobson, AM

From a population of less than five million, an army of almost 417 000 men was raised between 1914 and 1918; over 330 000 served overseas.¹ The approximate percentage of Australian males between the ages of 18 and 44 that enlisted was 38.7 per cent, New South Wales had the highest proportion at 39.8 per cent and Western Australia the lowest at 37.5 per cent.² The proportion of the eligible male population that voluntarily enlisted was very high as were the casualty rates, both non-battle and battle casualties. Of course, many of the surviving casualties were wounded or injured several times. Men who suffered wounds that were not disabling were returned as reinforcements to their units after recovery. During the war, 60 000 casualties who were evacuated from units were returned fit for duty by the Medical Services.³

A primary feature of enlistment pattern was the difference in enlistments between the years 1914-16

and the significantly lower figures for 1917-18. Figure 1 gives a comparison of enlistments by years.

This chart displays AIF enlistments for WWI.⁴ 1914⁵ covers just less than five months and 1918 covers only eleven months. Bean believed that enlistment for 1914 was affected by “war fever” and constituted “the first fine rush to enlistment”.⁶ The only full years were 1915-17 and as can be seen enlistments showed a marked almost uniform decline over these three years.

Enlistments never exceeded 5 000 per month during 1917-18. Whether this was due to war weariness⁷ and a lack of available manpower given the very high figures for 1914-16 is difficult to determine categorically, but a combination of both is probable. Figures 2 and 3⁸ show monthly enlistments for 1915 and 1916. Since conscription was not adopted in Australia during the war the figures only reflect volunteers. The political fervour generated by the conscription issue was the most probable cause of the high rate of enlistment for 1916. The highest enlistment month, July 1915, is closely associated in



France, 13 October 1918, a 114th Howitzer Battery Gun of Australian Field Artillery, drawn by mules, on its way to the forward areas to support the advance.

Figure 1. Annual Enlistments 1914 - 1918

time with the losses at Gallipoli, the sinking of the *Lusitania*⁹ and the government call for volunteers to reinforce losses, for these not to be regarded as the major causal factors for such high figures. The first 22 casualties from Gallipoli were announced on 2 May, by 25 June 10 000 had been listed.¹⁰ Only nine casualties were suffered in the German New Guinea campaign in 1914. Many men were motivated by revenge, wanting to fill the gaps and the sure knowledge that a real fight was occurring. Gammage believed that many men were persuaded to join simply by being asked, previously they had not thought that they were needed.¹¹ “Snowball” recruiting marches to enlist also manifested themselves in New South Wales during late 1915.¹² Early 1916 resulted in high figures that dropped to August. In August, Prime Minister Hughes announced the coming conscription referendum. Enlistments rose markedly during September and October. Anecdotal evidence indicated that many men sought to avoid the inevitable and in some cases fearing embarrassment, enlisted.¹³

British-born enlistees made up eighteen *per cent* of enlistments, this was a marginal over representation. These men were affected by the call to defend the Empire, but were also attracted by the prospect of a free trip home. The high rate of pay was an initial attraction for most young enlistees.¹⁴

The AIF was the only purely volunteer army that fought in WWI. Physical standards for enlistment were not altered during the war, even though there was great pressure in the last year to do so.¹⁵ In this statement General Monash has overlooked the reduction in minimum height to 5’ 2” from 5’ 6” in July 1915. This height limit remains today in the Australian Army. The British Army lowered their minimum height requirements to below five feet and formed the 35th “Bantam Division”.¹⁶

Casualties were not the only reason for increased enlistments. In early 1916 it was decided to double the AIF divisions to five. The Third division was raised in early 1916, the Fourth in February and the Fifth in March 1916 in Egypt.¹⁷ Despite losses Australia maintained these divisions for the remainder of the war.



Men of the Original Light Horse of the AIF before departure from Australia in 1914.



Recruiting Poster




Figure 2. Monthly Enlistments AIF 1915




Figure 3. Monthly Enlistments AIF 1916




Figure 4. Monthly Enlistments AIF 1917




Figure 5. Monthly Enlistments AIF 1918

Campaign	Period	Killed	Wounded	Total Cas
Gallipoli	9/14-12/14	8587	19367	27954
Northern France	4/15-12/15	1624	4409	6033
1st Somme	3/16-7/16	7487	23277	30764
1st Hindenburg line	11/16-5/17	8295	23280	31575
Nth France	11/16-6/17	944	4153	5097
Messines	6/17-6/17	2298	6701	8999
3rd Ypres	7/17-10/17	10107	30612	40719
Messines Front	11/17-3/18	1512	4670	6182
Lys	4/18-8/18	1672	5311	6983
Dernacourt, V Bret& Hamel	13/18-8/18	6088	17856	23944
3rd Somme	8/18-10/18	8782	23938	32720
Mid East	4/16-10/18	1626	3200	4826

Figure 6. Casualty Figures

Figures 4 and 5¹⁸ show enlistments for 1917 and 1918. They are on the same scale and clearly show that 5 000 enlistees monthly was not attained. The average monthly enlistment for 1917 was 3 149 and 1918 showed a drop to 2 625. Every month, except for December 1916, in the three previous years was above 5 000. During 1917-18 a Federal Director of recruiting was appointed to lead a new recruiting campaign. Even though thorough organisation and funding were provided for the campaign, it fell well short of expectations. Bush towns were seen to be war weary. "Everyone knew this and people were not encouraged to join in recruiting drives".¹⁹

Casualty figures for the war are shown in Figure 6 drawn from data presented in Smith's work.²⁰

Wounded to dead ratios were approximately 2:1 for Gallipoli and 3:1 for the remainder of campaigns. While a link is clear between casualties in 1915 and enlistments that is not the case for the remainder of the war with the possible exception of 1st Somme. Major losses such as 1st Hindenburg Line and 3rd Ypres did not result in an increase in enlistments. These losses better explain a war weariness and lack

of volunteer manpower, particularly since many permanently disabled wounded had returned to Australia for convalescence. They were in the public and private eye and would have presented a shocking example of the consequences of war. The dead were not buried in Australia, rather they were buried in war cemeteries near battlefields. While their deaths clearly led to much suffering at home they also remained invisible since conventional family burial and proper mourning did not occur.

The early patterns of enlistment reflected enthusiasm and pride of empire. Individual motivations are difficult to measure although evidence from the time and from the hindsight of survivors confirms the early war euphoria brought about by adventure, pay, and a desire by the eighteen *per cent* who were British born recruits to gain a free trip home. The response to early casualties from Gallipoli, the *Lusitania* sinking that was seen as a cowardly act by the German Navy and the government call for volunteers were the primary reasons for the high figures for July 1915. The casualties for 1917 and 1918 were unable to be

replaced by enlistment and improved medical procedures. The failure of the conscription referenda initially provided a boost to enlistments, but was a negative aspect for 1917 and 1918. What is clear, however, is the significant *per capita* commitment in human resources and finance made by Australia when compared to the other allies.

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3. Butler, A. *Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, Vol II*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1940, p. 447.
4. Scott, *op cit*, pp. 871-2
5. Gammage, B. *The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War*, Penguin, 1975 p. 6. 52 561 from 820 000 eligible by age had enlisted.
6. White, R. *Motives for joining up: Self-sacrifice, self-interest and social class, 1914-18*, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, no. 9, October 1986, p. 4.
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Colonel Keith Jobson graduated from OCS in June 1971 and was posted to 3TB. He served with 6 RAR from 1973-74 as Assault Pioneer Platoon commander and as a Staff Officer at HQ 1MD in 1975-76. In 1977 he was posted as Adjutant 49 RQR. He was selected as an exchange officer with the Guards Division in Germany and England from 1978-79 as a Mechanised Company 21C, Company Commander and Battalion Operations Officer. Upon his return to Australia he was posted as Adjutant and Tactics Instructor Infantry Centre from 1980-82. He was posted back to 6RAR as a Parachute Company Commander and Operations Officer from 1983-85 and attended the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College in 1986. He filled the Staff Officer Grade Two Personnel appointment in the Infantry Directorate from 1987-88 and was promoted to the Grade One appointment in the Directorate in December 1988. He assumed command of NORFORCE in January 1990. He was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia in the 1992 Queens Birthday Honours for outstanding service as commanding officer of NORFORCE. In July 1992 he was posted as an instructor at the Command and Staff College at Queenscliff. In 1994 he was seconded to United Nations Headquarters in New York as the head of the Duty Room in the newly formed Situation Centre of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He was promoted to Colonel upon his return to Australia in January 1996 as the Director of Joint Exercise Plans. His appointment as Director Military Personnel Operations within the Defence Personnel Executive based in Canberra was assumed in December 1997. He is currently the Director General of Public Affairs.

Colonel Jobson holds an Arts Degree, majoring in History, a Graduate Diploma in Management Studies and a Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety Management.

Book Reviews

DIGGERS' SONGS by Warren Fahey 234 pages, in hard multicoloured cover with numerous illustrations and photos, priced at \$35.00 including postage from Australian Military History Publications, 13 Veronica Place Loftus NSW 2232.

Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant H.S. Brennan RFD, JP, (Ret)

This would have been one of the toughest reviews which I have done as I am not by nature a musical type of person possibly because as a youngster having a very musical father, my mother and myself were subjected to dear old Dad singing for most of the day and as we lived at the time when amusement for families was largely a locally organised project on farms so it was a case of grin and bear it. Having said that, back to the book.

The author has not only gathered over 300 individual songs and ditties but each has some form of identification written with it and the author has some 15 pages in the front of the book as an introduction both to clarify his method of allotting the tunes to the various stages of when Australia was at war and to describe his own devotion to publicise songs and ditties before they become lost history.

The book is divided into four main Chapters, plus the above mentioned Introduction, a Postscript, a Bibliography and Discography, an Index of all Titles and Opening Lines, an Index of Contributors and Writers plus several blank pages at the back of the book for the owner to transcribe any of his own songs or ditties.

Chapter 1 deals with the popular tunes which were published in or during the era from the Maroi War during the 1860s, the Sudan War and the Boxer Rebellion, all of which the Australian Government sent varying numbers of troops as a token gesture to England. Songs of this period were virtually patriotic towards Mother England and it was not until the 1914 - 1918 Great War the ditties based on drawing room ballads began to make their appearance.

Chapter 2 details the rising of such amendments to favourite tunes and points the way to a relaxation of style in the songs selected in the book, also the mass refusal to accept conscription as advocated by the late Billy Hughes supported by England is shown in the various songs and articles depicting this era.

Chapter 3 carries the reader through the period of World War II and as a reader of the material supplied

in the book points the way to a further relaxation of the morals of ditties and reduces to some degree our acceptance of blind faith in England and the English commander of the various arms of the Services, more accent is placed on making fun of or ridiculing senior officers than was evident in the Colonial days. The acceptance of ladies into the Services in non-combatant roles is brought out by inclusion of ballads pertaining to ladies in the various branches of the Services.

Chapter 4 which takes us through from the end of 1939-45 War to the Gulf war gives the reader once again the feeling of relaxing the thoughts of those in the Services be the Navy, Army or Air Force, and showing that since 1939 popular songs as such have a much light hearted content than back in the late 1800s and early 1900s. A very well put together album of Service oriented songs and ditties and well worth buying even for the written research which it contains.

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER Samuel P. Huntington, Simon and Schuster, 367pp

Reviewed by Major P.G. Petersen

The end of the Cold War has led to less certainty about the likelihood and nature of future conflicts that may affect Australia. Samuel P. Huntington's book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, is an attempt to map the emerging patterns of conflict around the world and for this reason it is of significant interest to Australian foreign policy and strategic planners.

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order develops Huntington's 1993 thesis "The Clash of Civilizations?" which was published in *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 72, No.3) and with which many readers will be familiar. The original thesis was published when there were relatively few models available to help make sense of the post Cold War world, and it has influenced much of the discussion about international relations since then. American and Australian politicians regularly use the thesis as a point of reference, both in support of and as a contradiction to their policies.

The message in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is unchanged from Huntington's 1993 thesis and it is repeated throughout the book; "the fault lines of civilization are becoming

the central lines of conflict in Global politics.” Unfortunately, Huntington doesn’t develop his 1993 thesis any further on this book. Although he supports his arguments with more detail, Huntington does not exploit all 367 pages of the book to the best possible effect and he leaves many of the critics of his 1993 thesis unanswered.

The first part of Huntington’s hypothesis argues that cultural distinctions are more important than economic, political or ideological issues and he makes the persuasive, *albeit* pessimistic point that these distinctions make intercivilisational friction inevitable. Huntington takes this opportunity to address the criticism that his 1993 thesis was too simplistic by arguing that no paradigm can completely describe the real world and still be a useful analytical tool. He suggests that, as a tool for analysis, “The Clash of Civilization” is an appropriate compromise between simplistic paradigms such as Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” and very complex, realist theories such as “the world in chaos”.

Huntington takes time in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* to define what constitutes a civilization and explore the evolution of the eight civilisations he identifies in the world today; Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Latin American, Orthodox Russian, African and Western. With minor amendments – the Sinic civilization is distinguished from Confucian cultures – these eight civilisations are the same as the ones described in the 1993 thesis.

One of the central and more convincing arguments in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is the suggestion that the modernisation of non Western civilisations is not the same as globalization. Huntington suggests that the spread of Western fashion and icons into non Western civilisations is unimportant compared to the very limited penetration of genuine Western values (such as liberal democracy) into these cultures.

Huntington goes further, to argue that globalisation is a euphemism for Westernisation and he suggests the Western universalism is often perceived by non Western imperialism. This leads Huntington to argue that attempts to spread “Western values” into other civilisations are not just futile, but are also immoral and risk antagonising other civilisations. This is a theme which other writers have explored more thoroughly than Huntington, who ignores the apparent confluence of conservative ideology in Western and Asian societies.

In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Huntington describes the decline of Western influences and the ascendancy of Islamic and Sinic civilisations.

Huntington argues that there is a direct relationship between a culture’s economic wealth and its sense of “moral superiority” and that, for this reason, the rapidly growing countries of Asia have become less deferential to the West. The point is particularly relevant to Australia as it tries to reconcile its liberal democratic values with what Huntington’s describes as “emerging Asian universalism”

The economic ascendancy of Asia is a phenomenon which Huntington refers to throughout his book and he uses examples from Asia to support much of his thesis. In particular, Huntington predicts that as China’s economy grows, other elements of the Sinic civilization will coalesce around it, till it eventually dominates the region. Huntington sees this effect snowballing as Vietnam, Korea and even non Sinic states such as Japan, defect from the West and “bandwagon” with China. Elsewhere in the book, Huntington suggests that this does not eliminate the potential for clashes between civilisations in Asia and he casts doubts on the capacity of organisations such as ASEAN to prevent such conflict.

In his 1993 thesis, Huntington suggested that Western hegemony was threatened by the potential alliance of the economically powerful Confucian civilization and the increasingly militant Islamic civilization. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remake of World Order* steps back from that prediction, noting that the cultural differences between these two civilisations may be too great to allow a robust alliance to form. Nevertheless, Huntington suggests that the West represents a “common enemy” to Islam and China and he draws some predictable conclusions about the effect this may have on the global balance of power and the cultural dominance of the West.

Huntington’s examination of Western civilization is briefer and less convincing than his discussion of other civilisations. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remake of World Order* contains a cliched and unsubstantiated argument that the West is in “moral decline” and that rejection of traditional Western values will lead to the end of Western civilization. Huntington defends assimilation and makes an attack on multiculturalism which will provide an irresistible target for criticism from a wide forum. Nonetheless, these views are also likely to resonate with some readers. Huntington does not believe it is possible for the West to dominate the world as it has done for the last several hundred years, however he does believe that Western values are worth protecting as other civilisations challenge Western hegemony. For this reason, Huntington emphasises the need for rapprochement with other civilisations if conflict is to be avoided.

Huntington is not reluctant to offer advice and he includes a manifesto for the West which is designed to reduce the risk of global intercivilisational war. The manifesto for the West avoiding intervention in the affairs of other civilisations and fortifying Western interests through the maintenance of technological and military superiority and the closer integration of Western states. *The Clash of the Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* concludes with a scenario of how global war might develop if the West ignores this manifesto.

A book such as *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* which purports to describe the causes of future global conflict, is relevant to all people involved in defence policy and strategic planning. Notwithstanding, Huntington only applied his paradigm to large scale issues and he ignores smaller conflicts which might be relevant to Australia. It remains to be seen if the paradigm of the “clash of civilisations” can be successfully applied to regional situations such as the clash between Javanese and Timorese in Indonesia or to the conflict between cultures in Bougainville.

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is a contentious book but it is not an informative book. Its value lies in Huntington's implied summons to challenge his hypothesis rather than in his research or analysis. It is disappointing that Huntington does not use this book to significantly further develop his 1993 thesis, however his book is still topical and may reignite, if not necessarily advance the debate about the “clash of civilisations”.

200 SHOTS: Damien Parer, George Silk and the Australians at War in New Guinea, by Neil McDonald & Peter Brune, Allen & Unwin, 1998

Reviewed by Lisa Keen Department of Defence

This book is a profoundly moving account of a side of history which doesn't always sit easily with bureaucrats, military hierarchies, nor indeed a public craving reassurance. It is also a rather brutal reminder of the suppression and censorship of the courageous work of two photographers who were caught up in the daily realities of the war in New Guinea.

This is also an ambitious book. The philosophy of the work is to give an historical analysis of the war photography of Damien Parer and George Silk, combined with oral histories from participants and available documentary evidence. The book seeks to use the images as legitimate historic sources rather than as illustrations for a pre-determined point of debate. The authors have a mixed success in this endeavour.

Limitations are not only the photographic material available, but also the duration/conditions of the photographers' deployments throughout the prolonged campaigns inevitably leads the authors towards either reliance on other theories; or in some areas, a significant knowledge of the campaigns, commanders and units with which to either balance the assertions or fill the gaps.

Having said that *200 Shots* is an important work which unabashedly tackles issues which are as sharply relevant today as 55 years ago: The often indistinct line between the military's need to preserve operational security and the bureaucratic desire to be the arbiters of a publicly palatable history. Reality versus political expediency: history versus Hollywood.

Even the deployed personnel had a different expectation: Captain Bill McLaren, a doctor who treated soldiers after the battle of Isurava, recollected a conversation with Damien Parer, Who was working in the area:

“This is not what people want to see. It's sordid, there's nothing good about it.”

“This is what they're bloody well going to see!” Parer replied. “The complacency down there; they've got to be shaken out of it!”

Parer and Silk were employed by the Australian Department of information, whose job it was to receive the stills and film material from the front, and produce newsreels (film) and newspaper photos and copy to feed and information-starved public.

Both were resistant to the traditional practice of “setting up” the action shots – way behind the lines – to get close-up and compelling images. George Silk and Damien Parer increasingly felt the need to live with the soldiers and to record the victories and disasters; the tedious days of toil in unimaginable conditions followed by the violent confusion of battle.

They went past their brief for propaganda shots featuring grimaced/cosy meetings between Blamey and McArthur. They crossed that line that every official war correspondent faces (and few take the next step), and felt the opposing forces of a moral obligation to record reality versus a stifling realisation that nobody at home (save the Intellos) really wanted to know. They plunged on.

Parer's harrowing images of Kokoda and Silk's confronting visual records of the fight for the Gona-Buna beach-head are awesome. It is perhaps a shame that the reproduction of the photographic material is not always up to standard in the book – but this may be attributable to the author's stated aim of analysing the source material.

Amateur and professional photographers alike will enjoy the observations of difficulties posed by 1940s

“slow” film stock, untold humidity and deep canopy jungle light conditions, as well as the choice of cameras to give the maximum portability and reliability.

Researchers and history buffs will be shocked by the evident lack of will by successive Governments to allocate sufficient funds to preserve the original caption details and dope sheets – often robbing us of names, places, time, descriptions, observations which are irreplaceable.

Just about any reader will be appalled by the often arbitrary decisions made by managers of the old Department of Information: It is clear that both professional photographers understood that much of their work would be held up before release, due to operational imperatives – but neither bargained for the bureaucratic disdain and grave insults which later came their way.

This book shows us that Parer and Silk had an eye for pathos and an innate respect for the magnitude of the events in which they shared. It invites us to empathise with Silk and Parer’s belief that somewhere, someday, someone needed to see the images for which they gave their total devotion to craft and dedication to country.

LAVARACK: RIVAL GENERAL by Brett Lodge, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, RRP \$29.95 Pb

Reviewed by Major P.M. McDermott RFD (AALC)

This book is an excellent assessment of the military career of Lieutenant General Sir John Lavarack who was Commandant of the Royal Military College at Duntroon (1933-34) and Chief of the General Staff (1935 to 1939) as well as a wartime General.

Before World War II Imperial defence policy, including the Hankey Report, was dominated by the Singapore strategy of the dispatch of a fleet to Singapore in the event of a possible invasion of Australia. However, in 1930 Lavarack had warned:

the dispatch of the British battle fleet to the Far East for the protection of Imperial (including Australian) interests cannot be counted upon with sufficient certainty, and the risks of the non-completion, capture, or neutralisation of Singapore, results in a total risk that no isolated white community such as Australia would be justified in taking (p.14).

As CGS Lavarack attempted to ensure that Australia was prepared for the coming conflict, but he was not always successful. His proposal for compulsory training was rejected as was his proposal that more resources be allocated to the field rather than fixed coastal defences. His opposition to the Singapore strategy was expressed in forceful terms and, perhaps, without regard to the sensibilities of those who adhered

to the orthodox position of naval supremacy including Blamey and Shedden (later the Permanent Head of the Defence Department).

After the outbreak of War, Lavarack accepted a drop in rank to Major-General to raise the 7th Division and take it abroad on active service. At the time Blamey had sought legal advice from Mr Justice Dixon on his proposal to drop the rank of Lavarack so that he was equivalent in rank to the other Divisional Commanders.

Lavarack had the distinction of being the first Allied Commander to halt the advance of Rommel in North Africa. This occurred at Tobruk in April 1941 soon after Lavarack had been appointed GOC Cyrenaica by Wavell and so placed in command of British and Dominion troops. His plan for the defence of Tobruk was so effective that the German attack was beaten back with heavy losses. He based the defence upon using the outer perimeter of Tobruk rather than the internal, weaker, perimeter as suggested by Blamey and Wavell.

Despite being the first to defeat Rommel, Blamey arranged that he be replaced as GOC Cyrenaica in Tobruk after less than one week. Lavarack was also in command of the Syria campaign where the Vichy French put up a ferocious defence. This book contains a useful analysis of the work of Lavarack at Tobruk and Syria which earned Lavarack a knighthood.

The author regards Lavarack as “Australia’s forgotten general”, essentially because of Blamey who regarded Lavarack as a distrusted rival who deserved as much obscurity that could be heaped upon him. The author makes it clear that Blamey ensured that the work of Lavarack was not given publicity. Blamey had censored articles which dealt with the role of Lavarack at Tobruk (see, eg, p.255), and had even requested the Minister for the Army (Sir Percy Spender) to give “minimum publicity” to the Syria campaign (p.153).

From 1942 until 1944 Lavarack was GOC, First Army which was headquartered at Toowoomba. At this time he was responsible for the defence of north-eastern Australia. However, the threat of a Japanese attack soon diminished. Blamey ensured that Lavarack would never command in battle again by having First Army HQ in Australia even though there was clear potential for having it involved in New Guinea. In 1944 Blamey had arranged for Lavarack to be posted to the military mission Washington which ended his military career. He retired from the Army in 1946 and became the Governor of Queensland.

To some extent the career of Lavarack may have been hindered by his fiery personality and the antipathy that some at that time had for the regular general to expose the myth of citizen soldier superiority on the

field. However, it is clear that Lavarack was deliberately sidelined from the theatre of war. In this he was not alone for Blamey had similarly ended the careers of other Generals.

This book is a balanced account of the career of a distinguished soldier. It places on the public record the brilliant contribution of Lavarack. The author must be congratulated on his extensive research.

‘VICTOR TWO’ INSIDE IRAQ—THE CRUCIAL SAS MISSION by Peter “Yorky” Crossland

Reviewed by Corporal P.G.Downes

It is ironic that as I write a review on the book, Victor Two, the world is again preparing to meet Iraq in the deadly game of war in an effort to suppress the weapons of mass destruction created by Saddam Hussein and his regime. Again Coalition Forces have called upon the unique skills of the Special Air Services to assist them in their unfortunate but necessary task. The word “Special” which is central to the title of the SAS is exactly what these soldiers are. More often than not, their work is covert and secrecy surrounds their missions and their identity.

They have been compared to a surgeon cutting out a cancer, “It’s not a pleasant job, but someone has to do it”. For those who think that being in the SAS is a glamour job, they are wrong. The general public knows little of what they do and even less of who they are. They do dare and if they win, it is normally at a high cost to themselves or their family life as was so tragically evidenced in Townsville in 1996.

Victor Two is a story about such men. It traces the life of the author, Peter “Yorky” Crossland during his service with the British SAS which encompassed tours in such places as Northern Ireland, South America and Iraq. The majority of the book, however, deals with the activities of himself and his unit during their service behind enemy lines in Iraq during the Gulf War. Victor Two was the codename for the centre of Iraqi scud operations and the SAS mission was to penetrate deep behind enemy lines, locate this communications centre, destroy it and withdraw using one of their skills in which they are well trained, escape and evasion. This book is not glossed with the typical “Hollywood shoot ‘em up knock ‘em down” stuff.

Yes this book does contain moments of action, moments of fear and uncertainty and moments of human pain and suffering but is relayed to the reader in a way that talks about the operations of the SAS doing what they are trained to do. To go in, do the job and get out as quickly and quietly as possible. They achieved their endstate but not without loss of life. Yes in this one, heroes did die and one was captured, but this is

real life, real war not a Hollywood movie. Perhaps, “hero” is not a term they would relate to.

When reading this book, one should have no doubt about what danger these men were facing and it is not a game they played but a very real situation they faced and any soldier would face, placed in the same situation. It was written by a soldier who in the face of personal adversity, carried out his mission along with others and continued to soldier on for some time after returning home to a broken marriage and a dying son.

Peter “Yorky” Crossland was a soldier and although a member of the elite SAS, shows through his book that he is not a superman but a man who suffers the same hurts and defeats that life sometimes hands out. Despite this, when the time came, he carried out his duties as a soldier, professionally. He did his unit, his country and his family proud.

In conclusion, I found the book to be excellent reading and as a soldier was appreciative of the author’s honesty and his “tell it like it was” attitude throughout the book. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in Special Operations Warfare or Covert Operations during the 1990-91 Gulf War.

AUSTRALIAN PARTISAN A TRUE STORY OF LOVE AND CONFLICT by Lynette Oates with Ian Sproule. Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 1997. 129 pages \$20.00 (including postage and handling from the publishers). Paperback.

Reviewed by Major Peter Murphy

The need to tell one’s story coupled with the recent widespread availability of home publishing software had led to a plethora of books and diaries recounting individual experiences. Some, such as A.B. Facey’s *A Fortunate Life*, have been inspirational, but many have failed to rise above the ordinary. So it was with some hesitation that I approached a reading of Private Ian Sproule’s World War II experiences as a Prisoner of War and Partisan. These concerns were not assuaged by the book’s poor production values, including a cover reminiscent of a war comic, hand drawn maps and grainy photographs. Yet the book tells a story that is engaging and contains a few twists worthy of a film script.


Ian Sproule enlisted in the AIF as soon as he was old enough and joined his battalion during the siege of Tobruk. He was later to serve in Syria and then at El Alamein. It was at El Alamein that he was captured and subsequently interned in an Italian prisoner of war camp. The capitulation of the Italians of 1943 enabled many POWs to escape from camps before the Germans were able to re-establish control, and this

provides the beginning of the most interesting portion of the book.

Sproule and a mate narrowly avoid re-capture on several occasions before joining up with communist partisans in northern Italy. The group is amateurish and fairly ineffective, although the Australians in the group have a number of successes destroying a munitions train and ambushing a German convoy. Most of the groups activities centre around obtaining food or arms and ammunition. In the last action that Sproule fights, Private Les Parker is fatally wounded by a mortar round and Sproule believes "he had flung himself on top of me to protect me". There is no doubt that Parker was a very brave man, however, it seems most improbable that Parker would have had the time to save Sproule from the blast. It is interesting that he attributes his survival to the act of a mate rather than luck, which is the more likely explanation. Perhaps this stems from the strong bonds that were formed during those dangerous times.

During his year with the partisans Sproule meets and falls in love with an Italian girl. This deepens the narrative and brings the every day aspects of life as a partisan into sharp relief. Sproule abruptly terminates the relationship when he and a number of Australians make an epic nine day crossing of the Alps to freedom in Allied held France. Despite his promises, he does not return for the woman at the end of the war. However, the memories of this relationship make the last section of the book compelling reading. To say more would be to spoil the denouement of the story.

I am surprised that the book is recognised as being authored by "Lynette Oates with Ian Sproule" as it has been written in the first person and is after all Sproule's story. Nonetheless it is a remarkable story of an episode of Australian military history that is not well known. *Australian Partisan* is both an interesting and entertaining story that falls into the "inspirational" category of books recounting the lives of ordinary men.



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