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**BRIEF FOR CDF: DEFENCE ABUSE RESPONSE TASKFORCE REPORT –  
ASSESSMENT OF THE 'ADFA 24' CASES**

Group: DPG

Reference: AB15824970

For information: HDL

Due Date: 08 Nov 13

**Recommendations**

That you:

- (a) Note the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce's *'Assessment of the 'ADFA 24' cases* (the ADFA 24 Report), of 16 Oct 13 (copy held by SO(L) CDF) contains recommendations for action by Defence, in addition to systemic observations about the instance of abuse at ADFA;
- (b) Agree that the Report, on its own, is insufficient to justify specific action against individuals and that further work, including the specialist analysis of case materials and the clarification of key issues with the Taskforce is required;
- (c) Sign the attached letter (attachment A) to the Chair of the Taskforce acknowledging receipt of the ADFA 24 Report, requesting the return of Defence records (such as the ADFIS materials and Grey Review documentation) and seeking clarification from the Taskforce of key issues related to the implementation of the Taskforce's recommendations;
- (d) Note that, in order to ensure coherent, consistent and timely action on the recommendations in the Report affecting alleged victims and perpetrators from the three Services, a centralised model of initial review and course of action determination by a 1-star officer appointed by you is proposed; and
- (e) Agree to seek the concurrence of the Service Chiefs with this centralised initial review model, leaving the ultimate decisions with respect to outcomes affecting individuals with single-Service delegates (in line with extant delegations).

**Background**

1. This brief provides you with an initial analysis of the ADFA 24 Report, together with a list of key points requiring clarification with the Taskforce and a recommended model for the consideration and implementation of the Taskforce's recommendations.
2. My view of the ADFA 24 Report, having consulted with Defence Legal and your SO(L), is that the Report lacks clarity in certain areas and provides insufficient detail for immediate action by Defence on the recommendations made by the Taskforce.

**Key Issues**

3. **ADFA 24 Report overview**

- (a) The Taskforce's assessment concerns only those cases of sexual assault previously reviewed as part of the DLA Piper Review and, before that, the Grey Review of 1998. It does not cover other ADFA-related complaints received by the Taskforce.
- (b) The Report identifies nineteen (19) cases where alleged victims of sexual assault are identifiable. Case summaries are offered in respect of each one. The Taskforce recommends action by Defence in respect of thirteen (13) of those 19 cases (refer to Attachment B to the Report). The 13 cases subject to Taskforce recommendations involve seventeen (17) individuals identified by the Taskforce as 'still serving' (in some capacity, including as Reservists). These individuals include those suspected of

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alleged sexual assaults, and a smaller number of individuals who were allegedly responsible for the mismanagement of sexual assault cases at ADFA.

- (c) The recommendations made by the Taskforce for Defence to consider include:
- (1) taking administrative or management action against a 'manager';
  - (2) further investigation and/or disciplinary, administrative or management action against a 'suspect';
  - (3) undertaking further review of documentation, including additional material that may be available to Defence, to consider whether further investigation and/or disciplinary, administrative or management action is warranted; and
  - (4) investigating why administrative or disciplinary action was not taken in certain cases, for instance following a decision by civilian police or prosecutors not to proceed with a particular matter.
4. Each one of the Taskforce's recommendations requires further review and analysis of the supporting evidence, together with an appreciation of the alleged victim's wishes and any prior action taken by civilian agencies and/or Defence. The passage of time and the complexity of many of the cases mean that specialist advice will be required.
5. The systemic observations made by the Taskforce (at page 7 and 8 of the Report) do not raise anything new. Many of the issues and comments have been overtaken by recent events and cultural change initiatives at ADFA.
6. **Points of clarification.** Before Defence acts on the Taskforce's recommendations, a number of matters require clarification. These are set out below and explained in Annex A:
- (a) Defence requires the return of original evidence, records and materials provided to the Taskforce, and the provision of any additional relevant materials held and releasable by the Taskforce, in order to properly inform its decision making process.
  - (b) Defence requires advice from the Taskforce as to whether any of the 13 cases of sexual assault remain subject to review by the Taskforce Crime Group, the Administrative Action Officer (AAO), or whether any of the cases are under police investigation. Duplication of effort and unintended interference must be avoided.
  - (c) Defence requires clarification of each complainant's wishes prior to initiating criminal, disciplinary, or administrative action. Defence is no different from the Taskforce in this respect. Further consultation will be critical to avoiding further harm.
  - (d) In many of the recommendations made by the Taskforce, the term 'management action' is used. The intended meaning of this term requires clarification.
  - (e) Although identified as 'serving', many of the individuals identified by the Taskforce appear to be Reserve members; either Standby Reserve (inactive) or Active Reserve. The current status of individuals must be confirmed in order to determine risk to others, triage response action, and clarify the scope of Defence's options in each case.
7. The draft letter at Attachment A acknowledges the receipt of the ADFA 24 Report and includes an annexed list of questions designed to clarify the points above at para 6(a) – (d). Item 6(e) above can be actioned internally by the ORU.
8. **Proposed model for Defence implementation.** Further work is required by a dedicated team to thoroughly analyse the source materials and case history of each matter and to determine the available, and appropriate, follow-on actions by Defence. This will depend on



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factors such as victim consent, the status of alleged perpetrators and Defence's jurisdiction, and the results of any prior inquiry or investigation. A threshold issue will be whether 'no further action' may or should be taken, notwithstanding the recommendation from the Taskforce. A further consideration will be determining what, if any, options are available to properly authorised delegates and decision makers in relation to affected serving personnel in accordance with the Defence (Personnel) Regulations and the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* (DFDA). The following models are highlighted for consideration:

- (a) **Centralised approach: a single 1-star reviewing officer.** The ADFA 24 cases concern alleged perpetrators and responsible commanders/managers from each Service. Rather than dissecting the cases (and materials) along Service lines, a centralised initial review and assessment process is recommended. In order to avoid process duplication and achieve timely, consistent and coherent threshold course of action decisions on this group of related, historic allegations of sexual abuse at ADFA, I recommend you appoint either myself as DGCR, or a separate 1-star officer (possibly from the Reserve) to work within the ORU, to undertake this task. This model is expanded upon at Annex B to this Brief.
- (b) **De-centralised single Service approach.** An alternative to the above approach would be to simply refer each matter to the relevant Service Chief for their review and action. Risks of this approach include divergent timing of action and inconsistent outcomes. Further, as almost every one of the 13 cases referred by the Taskforce for action involves members of more than one Service, a single-Service approach is problematic.

9. Noting the potential sensitivity to a centralised approach, the recommended model should be discussed with the Service Chiefs in order to secure their support.

**Consultation: SO(L) CDF and Defence Legal**

 <b>H. EHLERS</b> DG CRR Tel: (02) 6265 1513 M: <span style="background-color: black; color: black;">s47F</span>	(a) <del>Noted / Please Discuss</del> (b) <del>Agreed / Not Agreed</del> (c) <del>Signed / Not Signed</del> (d) <del>Noted / Please Discuss</del> (e) <del>Agreed / Not Agreed</del>
	 <b>D.J. HURLEY, AC, DSC</b> GEN CDF
09 Nov 13 Action Officer    WGCDR C. Deveney	4 Nov 13 W: (02) 6265 2462    Mob: <span style="background-color: black; color: black;">s47F</span>

**Annexes:**

- A. Issues for clarification in relation to ADFA 24 Report
- B. Centralised initial review and assessment model – ADFA 24 Report implementation

**Attachment**

- 1. Draft Letter from CDF to the Chair of the Taskforce – *ADFA 24 Report*

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**ANNEX A TO  
CDF BRIEF – ADFA 24 REPORT  
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**ISSUES FOR CLARIFICATION IN RELATION TO ADFA 24 REPORT**

As highlighted at paragraph 6 of the Brief to CDF concerning the Taskforce's ADFA 24 Report, a number of key issues require further clarification with the Taskforce prior to any Defence action on the recommendations made in the Report. These issues are explained in further detail below.

**Return of ADFA records, source materials and evidence**

1. The ADFA 24 Report was not accompanied by the original source documents and material analysed by the Taskforce. Return of these records and evidence provided to the Taskforce by Defence, and in some cases by the complainants, is a necessary precursor step to any internal assessment and decision on the recommendations made by the Taskforce. Decision makers are obliged to refer to all reasonably available relevant material. The expeditious delivery of these materials in accordance with the intent expressed on page 2 of the Report, together with relevant Taskforce case analysis as to 'plausibility' and the catalogued records should be sought to enable Defence's action on the Report.

**De-conflicting ADFA 24 cases with ADFIS, Taskforce Crime Group and ACT Police**

2. The Taskforce has made recommendations with respect to 13 cases of alleged sexual assault at ADFA in the mid 1990's. In its Report, the Taskforce records that in October 2012, ADFIS recommended that the ADFA 24 allegations be referred to ACT Police (page 2). No further detail is offered in relation to whether such action was formally taken. The Taskforce also notes that a number of the ADFA 24 cases were referred to ACT Police and the ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) during the mid-1990's (page 4). Further, the Report refers to the fact that the Taskforce has consulted with ACT Police criminal investigations regarding information it holds on the ADFA 24 matters. However, it is not apparent from the Report whether, for instance, any of the cases subject to recommendations in the Report are also either already subject to ACT Police investigation or are currently under consideration by the Taskforce Crime Group for further referral to a law enforcement body. This is relevant noting that in its Third Interim Report to the Attorney-General and Minister for Defence, of September 2013, reference is made to one matter as having been referred to ACT Police and the Crime Group having a further forty-one (41) active matters under assessment (page 14).

3. I recommend that the Taskforce be asked to clarify whether any of the 13 cases subject to recommendations for Defence action in the Report have been, or are being considered for referral to the ACT Police (or another police force), and if so which cases are affected.

**De-conflicting ADFA 24 cases with Taskforce AAO action**

4. In addition to the above, it is equally important to determine whether the 13 cases identified in the ADFA 24 Report are subject to concurrent assessment by the Taskforce Administrative Action Officer (AAO). The AAO may determine whether certain cases should be referred to Defence for disciplinary or administrative action. This potential overlap is relevant given that at page 14 of the Taskforce's Third Interim Report reference is made to the AAO having seventy-three (73) cases under consideration. Further, the ADFA 24 Report mentions that the Taskforce is focussing on finalising individual complaints relating to abuse at ADFA, including the ADFA 24 cases, in accordance with the wishes of complainants. This indicates that this process remains unfinished (pages 3 and 10). Duplication of process should be avoided and clarification should be sought from the Taskforce in this regard.

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5. The ADFA 24 Report refers to the Taskforce having been contacted by six (6) individual complainants it considers to be part of the ADFA 24 cases (page 3). The Report mentions that of them, three (3) complainants are still serving (in some capacity). The relevant cases apparently concern three (3) alleged abusers who are also still serving (in some capacity). However, it is not clear which, if any, of the cases captured in Attachment B to the Report and subject to specific recommendations made by the Taskforce are related to these 6 complainants or 3 abusers. Additionally, the wishes or intent of each of the 6 complainants regarding their preparedness to support further Defence inquiry or investigative action are not made clear in the Report.

6. The Report narrative indicates that work remains ongoing to resolve or provide outcomes to these complainants in relation to their matters. Additionally, the Report suggests that one or more of the complainants have provided information to the Taskforce in addition to that provided by Defence. Although, the Report goes on to confirm that such information is not incorporated into the Report or its accompanying case summaries. The lack of clarity regarding the wishes of complainants, and the absence of relevant additional evidence or complaint testimony, is likely to undermine the completeness of Defence's assessment of case materials. This will potentially result in well-intentioned, but harmful or unnecessary unsolicited contact with complainants and victims. In the interests of 'doing no further harm', this is to be avoided.

7. In addition to the considerations above, Defence will need to determine a position in relation to the appropriateness or otherwise of contacting identified victims who have not raised their matter directly with the Taskforce. The ADFA 24 Report suggests that ADFIS may consider initiating unsolicited contact with alleged victims identified in the Report; while at the same time the Report records the policy of ACT Police not to do so, and states that based on specialist advice given to it from services working with victims of sexual assault the Taskforce has decided not to do so. I recommend that the Taskforce be asked to clarify this issue.

**Clarification of 'management action'**

8. In many of the recommendations made by the Taskforce, the term 'management action' is used in addition to the well understood ADF concepts of disciplinary and administrative action. It is not clear from the ADFA 24 Report what is meant by this element of the recommended action. At page 15 of the Taskforce's Third Interim Report the Taskforce recorded that it was taking steps to identify other ways of dealing with complaints via referral to Defence which could be taken not involving the complainant. There is a risk that 'management action' implies career management decisions made without the provision of natural justice or procedural fairness to impacted ADF members. What is meant by the term 'management action' should be clarified with the Taskforce.

**Clarification of status of service**

9. Although identified as 'serving', many of the individuals identified as such by the Taskforce are in fact Reserve members; either Standby Reserve (inactive) or Active Reserve. The current status of affected personnel must be confirmed in order to determine risk, triage response action, and clarify the scope of Defence action available in each case.

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**ANNEX B TO  
CDF BRIEF – ADFA 24 REPORT  
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### **CENTRALISED INITIAL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT MODEL**

Paragraph 8 of the covering brief discusses two possible options for the implementation of the recommendations made in the ADFA 24 Report. A centralised approach to the initial review and course of action development and determination is the preferred and recommended model. This annex explains in further detail the intended scope and operation of this model in order to inform further discussions with Service Chiefs and specialist areas (ADFIS and Defence Legal).

#### **Challenges presented by historic and mixed-Service cases of sexual assault**

1. The ADFA 24 cases and related recommendations made by the Taskforce in Attachment B to its Report concern alleged perpetrators or responsible commanders/managers from all three Services. Some of the identified individuals are considered by the Taskforce as being 'still-serving'. Although, many of the individuals appear to be Reserve officers rather than permanent officers. This mix of Services and service-status presents challenges when understood in the context of the Defence (Personnel) Regulations and the operation of the delegations provided along Service lines in relation to the initiation and imposition of adverse administrative action such as censure, reduction in rank or termination of service.
2. The underlying alleged abuse occurred in a tri-Service training institution throughout the mid-1990's. In the intervening time, a number of the cases have been subject to both internal review (Grey Review and DLA Piper) and external investigation (such as by the ACT Police and subsequent assessment by the ACT Director of Public Prosecutions) or other scrutiny (for example by the Defence Force Ombudsman, Department of Veterans' Affairs, and through various Ministerial Representations). Others, as noted in the Report were either not reported, or reported by the victim but subject to express wishes and constraints of confidentiality and decisions not to support or participate in any follow-on inquiry or investigation.

#### **Centralised model: appointment of a 1-star delegate to implement the ADFA 24 Report**

3. Rather than dissecting the thirteen (13) ADFA 24 cases along Service lines according to that of the potential respondents, a centralised initial review and assessment process is recommended. In order to achieve timely, consistent and coherent decisions on this group of mixed-Service, related and historic allegations of sexual abuse at ADFA, I recommend that you consider appointing a single 1-star officer to action the recommendations contained in the Taskforce's ADFA 24 Report. This proposal is further strengthened by the efficiency of minimising the need for duplicate review processes in each Service HQ or Personnel Branch and the desirability of avoiding any need to split apart the volumes of ADFA records provided to the Taskforce. As discussed below, I propose that the 1-star officer be supported directly by the Organisational Response Unit (ORU) and through extant liaison arrangements with ADFIS, Defence Legal and the Services.

#### **Initial review and assessment task**

4. The role of the 1-star officer would be as much about consistency in any determinations that 'no further action' is required in relation to certain cases across the Services, as it would be about determining what options might exist for Defence to take action against alleged perpetrators or responsible commanders/managers and who the appropriate initiating and imposing authorities might be. A centralised approach would enable such decisions to be taken according to uniform guiding principles and advice. Priority and accountability would be ensured through a direct reporting mechanism to CDF.

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5. Rather than being a final decision maker, I propose that the 1-star officer could be authorised to refer cases to ADFIS, the Service police or the Director of Military Prosecutions for specialist investigation and advice where criminal or disciplinary action is relevant. The officer could also determine whether to recommend that an appropriate single-Service delegate initiate adverse administrative action. Further, the 1-star officer would be responsible for providing advice to you in response to questions posed by the Taskforce where file reviews are suggested or comment is sought as to why certain decisions were taken at the time of the alleged abuse. In each instance, the officer would review case materials, prepare findings in relation to the Taskforce recommendations, and provide decision briefs to the appropriate authority (such as the Service Directors General – Personnel or other nominated decision-maker). Any determination that 'not further action' be taken on a case subject to a Taskforce recommendations would be referred to you for endorsement. This centralised model would achieve a single point of threshold case analysis, assessment, and determination of follow-on steps for Defence action.

6. Incidental to the authorities described above, the officer would be able to inform themselves by reviewing the relevant evidence and records provided by the Taskforce and any additional materials available within Defence. The officer could also gather additional relevant information through interviews or further research. Where considered necessary, this might include initiating further inquiries or recommending such action to you or the appropriate Service Chief.

**Single-Service decision authority**

7. As flagged above, most of the relevant administrative decision making authority under the Defence (Personnel) Regulations reside within the Services. Therefore, following the centralised review process described above, single-Service delegates – such as the respective Directors General – Personnel would retain the ultimate decision making authority regarding the imposition of adverse administrative action (including, for example, censures or termination decisions).

**Appointment, staffing and support**

8. Two options are proposed with respect to the appointment of a 1-star officer to undertake the centralised review and assessment function:

- a. I, as DGCR, could be given this task as an adjunct to my responsibility for the work of the ORU in support of the Taskforce.
- b. A separate 1-star officer, potentially drawn from the Reserve, could be appointed to undertake the task as a sole and dedicated function. In that case, I would recommend that the officer be responsible through me, and would be administratively and functionally supported by the ORU. The Services could be asked to nominate available suitable Reserve officers for this role.

9. Whichever of the options presented above is chosen, given the nature of the task and the volume of records requiring review, the 1-star officer would require dedicated, short-term, supplementation staffing (akin to that required to undertake a significant inquiry) in order to undertake necessary file reviews and analysis. Access to support from Defence Legal officers with practical experience in ADF administrative and disciplinary processes and recent high profile cases would also be required and is supported by DGADFLS.

10. **Consultation with the Services.** While initial action is undertaken to further analyse the ADFA 24 Report, and while Defence awaits the provision of the evidence and records as well as further clarification from the Taskforce of those matters identified in Annex A, I recommend that the centralised model proposed above is discussed with the Service Chiefs in order to generate their support.

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FOI 421/13/14  
Item 2

**MINISTERIAL ADVICE**

Routine / Priority

Date Due:

**For Action: Minister for Defence**

For Info: Assistant Minister

Copies to: Secretary, FASMECC, CN, CAF, CA, VCDF, HDL, DGCRR, PM-ADF

**Defence Abuse Response Taskforce – referrals to Defence for possible disciplinary, administrative or management action**

**Purpose:**

To advise you on action underway in Defence to assess allegations of abuse referred to us by the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce.

**Key Points:**

1. **'ADFA 24' matters.** The Terms of Reference for the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce ('the Taskforce') included a requirement to assess 24 cases of sexual abuse at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) in the 1990s which were identified as part of the DLA Piper Review. These are the so-called 'ADFA 24' matters. Defence provided material relevant to allegations of military and civil offences at ADFA to the Taskforce on 21 December 2012 and 17 January 2013.
2. On 16 October 2013, the Chair of the Taskforce provided advice to me on 19 of the 'ADFA 24' cases. The Taskforce advice did not include any detailed investigation or case analysis of each matter. Rather, the Taskforce provided only a summary of the Defence material and any additional information provided by the complainant. The advice contained a list of recommendations for Defence action in relation to 13 of these 19 cases which included that Defence consider:
  - a. taking administrative or management action against staff involved in allegedly mismanaging a complaint;
  - b. further investigation and/or disciplinary, administrative or management action against the alleged perpetrator;
  - c. undertaking further review of documentation, including additional material that may be available to Defence, to consider whether further investigation and/or disciplinary, administrative or management action is warranted; and
  - d. investigating why administrative or disciplinary action was not taken in certain cases, for instance following a decision by civilian police or prosecutors not to proceed with a particular matter.
3. The Taskforce did not make any recommendations in relation to the remaining 6 cases. Defence must now undertake significant further detailed case analysis to determine what, if any, further action can be taken in relation to the 13 cases.

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4. **Other referrals.** Separately, on 13 November 2013, with the consent of the complainants, the Chair also referred three cases of alleged abuse to me for Defence's consideration. One of these complaints is the same as one of the ADFA 24 matters and is the only one, to date, of the ADFA 24 matters where the complainant has expressed a wish for Defence to take action in relation to the matter and to be contacted by Defence if required.
5. **Defence action.** The summary of information provided by the Taskforce is insufficient to support Defence initiating specific action against individuals. The Taskforce and Defence apply different evidentiary tests to determine whether a matter should be assessed and action pursued. For the Taskforce, the test is whether, on all the information before it, the allegation of abuse is plausible. Plausibility means having the appearance of reasonableness. The Taskforce may make a decision that a matter is plausible and should be referred to Defence for consideration of further administrative or disciplinary action, and /or relevant civilian police for criminal investigation. However, Defence requires material sufficient to satisfy a 'balance of probabilities' standard to support any administrative action against individuals, and on the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt to support action under the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982*. Therefore, Defence must undertake further work, including obtaining full case materials (rather than summaries) from the Taskforce, and clarifying key issues such as whether the remaining 'ADFA 24' complainants agree for Defence to be informed that they have contacted the Taskforce and for copies of any material that they have provided to the Taskforce to be provided to Defence. Without this consent, Defence is constrained in making a comprehensive assessment of a case and in initiating any action. I am also cognisant of my obligation not to do any further harm to complainants and am extremely reluctant for Defence representatives to approach a complainant for information or take any action that may affect a complainant unless the Taskforce had first engaged with them and obtained appropriate consent.
6. On 4 November 2013, I sought further information from the Taskforce regarding the ADFA 24 cases. Additional supporting materials concerning those cases was provided to Defence by 21 November 2013. The supporting material for the separate referrals was provided to Defence on 11 December 2013.
7. On the basis of referrals from the Taskforce to date, Defence is currently considering a total of 15 cases for further action. These cases involve:
  - a. 21 complainants [REDACTED] s47E, six of whom are serving members;
  - b. 15 alleged perpetrators [REDACTED] s47E who are serving members: nine of whom are in the permanent force, two in the Active Reserves and four in the Standby Reserves; and
  - c. include two cases of alleged sexual assault.
8. The highest rank of any of the alleged perpetrators in the ADFA 24 cases is currently O4 (Major equivalent) and the highest rank of any of the alleged perpetrators in the other referred matters is O6 (Colonel equivalent). On the basis of the available material, including the historic nature of the allegations and consideration of current posting locations, it is assessed that none of the alleged perpetrators who are currently serving present an immediate threat to Defence personnel.
9. A more detailed assessment of the cases, including referral of the two cases of alleged sexual assault to the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS) for investigation in accordance with law enforcement protocols, is presently underway in order to provide considered advice to me and the relevant Service Chief as to what further action, if any, may be

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appropriate. Assessment is being undertaken within the Organisational Response Unit where a Referrals Review Team has been established from staff temporarily assigned from the Services.

10. Considering the age of these matters, the volume of material to be reviewed and the need to be sensitive to complainants' wellbeing, I do not anticipate being able to close out the ADFA 24 cases and other referrals until at least mid-2014. It is possible that the Taskforce will refer additional cases of abuse to me for consideration; however I do not have a sense of how many cases this may include or when this may occur.

**Recommendations:**

That you:

- i. **Note** that the Taskforce has referred a total of 21 matters to Defence and made recommendations to Defence to consider possible management, administrative or disciplinary action in relation to 15 of those matters.  
Noted / Please Discuss
- ii. **Note** that some alleged perpetrators are presently serving with Defence, but I have formed the view that there is no immediate threat to Defence personnel.  
Noted / Please Discuss
- iii. **Note** that two matters have been referred to ADFIS for consideration in accordance with law enforcement protocols.  
Noted / Please Discuss
- iv. **Note** that the ORU has commenced a detailed assessment of these cases to determine what, if any, further action can be taken in relation to the complaints.  
Noted / Please Discuss

<p>Approved By</p> <p><b>D.J. Hurley, AC, DSC</b> General Chief of Defence Force</p> <p>18 December 2013</p>	
<p><b>Contact Officer:</b></p> <p>AIRCDRE Henrik Ehlers</p>	<p><b>Phone:</b></p> <p>(02) 6265 1513</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">David Johnston / /</p>	

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**Resources:**

11. The Referrals Review Team will be constituted by staff temporarily assigned from the Services who hold specialist skills in resource management and administrative processes.

**Consultation**

12. N/A.

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