The operational (warfighting) performance of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein
Eastern Front 1942–1944

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A General’s General and Germany’s greatest military strategist of World War Two

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Introduction

1. It has been stated that ‘Hitler’s respect for [Field Marshal Erich von] Manstein bordered on fear’, and that he received universal respect from Germany’s generals and unswerving loyalty from his subordinates. Whilst others saw Manstein as ‘…not an easy man to serve … while he was charming to subordinates … he was intolerably arrogant with his equals and superiors …’. 2. Regardless of opinion however, Manstein’s operational leadership, coupled with the German Army’s tactical and operational doctrine, enabled his forces to accomplish extraordinary feats during the Second World War (WWII). German Army Regulation 300 Truppenführung was the practical distillation of that doctrine and represented the style of the German General Staff and its art of war. Furthermore, Truppenführung facilitated the operational leadership of officers like Manstein and made clear the expectations required of a commander and his soldiers.

3. Whilst the concept of leadership is not easy to define, for the purpose of this paper, leadership is about influence: the art of influencing and directing people [in context] to achieve willingly the team or organisational goal. The Australian Army further identifies leadership effectiveness as:

   a. building interpersonal relations, and
   b. achieving the task.

4. Manstein’s leadership exemplified German doctrine and utilised both Follower and Leader-based concepts to achieve leadership effectiveness. He led as the operational situation demanded; he delegated and participated, was supportive of his subordinates (to varying degrees) and provided guidance when necessary.

5. The aim of this paper is to critically examine the operational (warfighting) performance of Manstein in terms of leadership effectiveness. Analysis will be restricted to Manstein’s Eastern Front operations from 1942 to 1944 as this period proved the most challenging and controversial in Manstein’s career. The scope will cover Hersey and Blanchard’s (1982, 1996) Situational Leadership Theory (SLT) model; Manstein’s career prior to Stalingrad; three practical episodes from 1942 to 1944; and conclude with a critical analysis of Manstein’s leadership effectiveness using these three episodes and the SLT model.

Situational leadership theory model

6. Hersey and Blanchard’s SLT model was chosen to analyse Manstein’s leadership effectiveness, as defined by the Australian Army, as it has similarities to the Auftragstaktik and Befehlstaktik.
concepts espoused within *Truppenführung* and adopted by the Australian Army today. Furthermore, it is a model that originated from the Industrial Period, which includes WWII, and is indicative of the values and methods available to leaders of that period.

7. Hersey and Blanchard believe ‘there is no best leadership style or stimulus. Any leadership style can be effective or ineffective depending on the response that style gets in a particular situation’. According to Hersey and Blanchard’s model, ‘effective leaders adapt their leader behavior to meet the needs of their followers and the particular environment’. Hersey and Blanchard identify four leadership styles a leader might adopt in contextual situations:

   a. **(S1) Telling** (high task/low relationship behaviour). A leader provides detailed direction to subordinates and clearly defines roles and tasks. The style is deemed suitable for new personnel, menial or repetitive work and tasks requiring immediate resolution. Subordinates are viewed as being unable and unwilling to ‘do a good job’.

   b. **(S2) Selling** (high task/high relationship behaviour). A leader provides most of the direction however subordinates are encouraged to accept task ownership. This ‘coaching’ approach is suitable for leaders with subordinates who are willing and motivated but lack the required ‘maturity’ or ‘ability’.

   c. **(S3) Participating** (high relationship/low task behaviour). A leader shares the decision-making with subordinates and facilitates subordinate action and communication. This style requires high support and low direction from the leader and is useful when people are able but perhaps unwilling or insecure (they are of ‘moderate to high maturity’).

   d. **(S4) Delegating** (low relationship/low task behaviour). A leader identifies the task but the responsibility for determining how to complete the task is given to subordinates. This style requires a high degree of subordinate competence and maturity (people know what to do and are motivated to do it).

8. These four styles are divided between Leader Directed (Telling and Selling) and Follower Directed (Participating and Delegating) styles. These Leader and Follower Directed styles can be equated to the Australian Army’s concepts of Directed (Telling and Selling) and Directive (Participating and Delegating) Control, as originally formulated in *Truppenführung*.

9. It must be noted, however, that the SLT model has deficiencies. The primary criticism is researchers’ inability to substantiate the assumptions and propositions central to the model. This lack of empirical data also raises questions concerning SLT’s applicability to all societal demographics and whether it is only effective for individuals and not groups. Nevertheless, since 1969, SLT has been an accepted model due to its practicality and flexibility and it will be used to assess Manstein’s operational leadership effectiveness.

**Manstein pre-Stalingrad**

10. Manstein’s leadership style was heavily influenced by his early military education and the *Truppenführung* tenets. Manstein (1887–1973) began his military career in the Royal Prussian Cadet Corps at the age of 13. His cadet training combined military instruction with a balanced mix of physical, academic and religious education. This combination developed a sense of selfless devotion and ethical-moral fortitude that strengthened Manstein’s sense of honour.

11. On graduation in 1906 Manstein served as an officer cadet in the elite 3rd *Dritte Garderegiment zu Fuss*, was commissioned on 1 July 1907 and graduated from the prestigious *Kriegsakademie* in
1914. At the outbreak of the First World War he was serving as a First Lieutenant and Adjutant of the 2nd Guards Reserve Regiment.

12. In the First World War Manstein fought in Belgium, East Prussia and Poland. He was badly wounded in November 1914 and returned to duty in June 1915 as Adjutant to Headquarters 12th Army and subsequently as a General Staff Officer (GSO) with the 11th and 1st Armies on the Eastern and Western Fronts. He was posted as GSO I (Chief of Operations) for the 4th Cavalry Division following the Battle of Verdun and, in May 1918, was appointed GSO of the 213th Assault Infantry Division on the Western Front. At the close of WWI he had attained the rank of Captain, had received medals for his combat performance and had gained tactical, operational and strategic experience.

13. Manstein was promoted quickly during the interwar period and filled various command and staff appointments. It was as Head of the Operations Section of the General Staff that Manstein formally focused on the application of initiative, directive control and all-arms integration in warfighting. The importance of, and the ability to grasp and manage these requirements moulded and influenced Manstein’s later higher command and operational leadership style.

14. Manstein, as Chief of Staff (CoS) Army Group South, planned the successful German invasions of Poland (1939) and France (1940). However, after Poland, Manstein was removed as CoS and appointed to the less influential position of Commander XXXVIII Corps and played only a minor role in the conquest of France.

15. In late February 1941 Manstein was appointed commander of LVI Panzer Corps, part of Leeb’s Army Group North, for the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Manstein distinguished himself during the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa by successfully securing objectives, demonstrating his tactical flexibility and causing massive damage to Soviet forces during his 200km advance. His acknowledged abilities resulted in him being appointed Commander 11th Army after its commander was killed on 12 September 1942.

16. Manstein’s command of the 11th Army during the Crimean battle aptly demonstrated his grasp of tactical analysis, leadership and the use of combined arms as outlined in Truppenführung. Manstein’s success subsequently saw 11th Army thrust into critical areas to defuse crises before his attempt to break the siege of Paulus’s 6th Army in Stalingrad. His failure to relieve 6th Army, its ensuing destruction and the subsequent consequences for the Eastern Front left Manstein lamenting that the effort, with all its sacrifices, had been ‘in vain’. Hitler promoted Manstein to Field Marshal in July 1942.

MANSTEIN’S EASTERN FRONT OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP:
Stalingrad 1942, German Retreat 1942–43, Cherkassy Pocket 1944

Stalingrad 1942

17. Manstein’s Lost Victories portrays a man determined to relieve the surrounded 6th Army. Yet Manstein’s leadership, after taking command of Army Group Don on 20 November 1942, was reported as being arrogant and dismissive of his peers and subordinates’ recommendations. The ‘extremely self-assured’ Manstein discounted their opinions concerning the Luftwaffe’s inability to supply 6th Army and that the forces available were insufficient to mount a successful relief. In fact, Manstein’s evaluation and reporting to Hitler effectively ‘stabbed all the other commanders in the back’.

18. However, Manstein’s operational leadership during this period exhibited both Follower and Leader-directed action. His orders to a subordinate are indicative of the pressures faced:
You’ll answer with your head if you allow the Russians to break through toward Rostov in your sector. The Don-Chir line must hold. If it does not, then not only the Sixth Army in Stalingrad but also Army Group A … will be lost.\(^{41}\)

His personal leadership also remained inspiring to his subordinates. In the face of personal danger he remained calm, composed and presented a sense of control that bolstered his soldiers’ confidence.\(^{42}\)

19. Notwithstanding his lofty ideals, Manstein was unwilling to defy Hitler by countermanding Hitler’s order for 6th Army to ‘Stand Fast’—despite the extraordinary difficulties and Hitler’s unrealistic expectations. Stalingrad had become an ideological struggle between Hitler and Stalin and the difficulties and dangers raised by Manstein and Paulus were of little import to the Führer.\(^{43}\) Manstein blames Paulus and Hitler for the loss of Stalingrad and by doing so damages his own leadership credibility and highlights the folly of a ‘can do’ attitude in the face of contrary advice.\(^{44}\)

20. Manstein’s justification of 6th Army’s sacrifice in February 1943 raises questions about his ethical leadership and concern for his soldiers, especially since he had identified these traits as being most important in a leader.\(^{45}\) Here, Manstein displayed an uncharacteristic reluctance to adapt to changing circumstances, particularly in his refusal to adjust his plans despite his knowledge of 6th Army’s rapidly decreasing effectiveness and Army Group Don’s insufficient resources.\(^{46}\) On the other hand, and to Manstein’s tactical credit and operational leadership, his force came within 50km of the beleaguered 6th Army before exhausting itself.

**German Retreat 1942–43**

21. Manstein’s winter campaign of 1942–43 is reputedly one of the most brilliant of WWII. His defeat of the post-Stalingrad Russian winter offensive\(^{47}\) enabled the Germans to recapture Kharkov and set their Eastern Front defences. It was a classic example of the art of war at the operational level; specifically the application of directive control, initiative and mobile defence to wrest the advantage from a vastly superior enemy.\(^{48}\)

22. It also marked a change between Manstein’s operational deference to Hitler and the resurgence of his earlier commitment to the ideals encapsulated in Truppenführung. The German defeat at the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, the start of which was delayed by Hitler over Manstein’s objections, appeared to strengthen Manstein’s reluctance to conform to Hitler’s increasingly ineffective and costly operational demands.\(^{49}\)

23. Yet, contradictorily, Manstein would not tolerate similar subordinate non-compliance with his own directions. Mitcham believes Manstein’s personal ambition caused him to remove two subordinate generals for failing to meet Manstein’s tasks.\(^{50}\) Manstein knew he was being asked to achieve the impossible and, as he had faith in his own abilities, he expected his subordinates to achieve similar results on a smaller scale.

24. Mitcham contends that Manstein was overly concerned for his career and accordingly sought to shift responsibility for failure. Further evidence supporting this opinion can be seen in Manstein’s attempt to repair poor Nazi political perceptions\(^{51}\) of him through his issuing of an order denigrating Eastern Jews on 20 November 1941. Mitcham’s position that Manstein’s ambition for advancement was overwhelming and opportunistic certainly raises questions of hypocrisy and draws criticism of Manstein’s leadership style.\(^{52}\)

25. Manstein, despite these alleged personal flaws, continued to directly question Hitler’s strategy and command of the Eastern Front as the situation worsened into 1943–44.\(^{53}\) One can
postulate that Hitler’s incompetence only increased Manstein’s frustrations to the point where Manstein’s professional responsibility to his men and Germany reasserted its primacy over his personal ambitions. It is of great credit to Manstein’s leadership, and his soldiers’ belief in his tactical abilities, that despite the environmental and capability deficiencies, his troops continued to fight with great distinction and achievement.

**Cherkassy Pocket 1944**

26. Manstein’s use of mobile defence on the scale required on the Eastern Front proved devastatingly successful at times and the front remained relatively stable prior to December 1943. However, the 1943–44 Soviet winter offensive, and Manstein’s failure to convince Hitler to withdraw German forces, soon resulted in two German corps becoming isolated in the ‘Cherkassy Pocket’. As with Stalingrad, Hitler forbade the defenders to withdraw and ordered Manstein to launch a counter-attack. Manstein supported Hitler’s offensive despite his subordinate commanders reporting their forces inadequate for the task. It is debatable whether Manstein had a choice given the Germans’ overall weakness and the desperate need to recover the encircled forces.

27. On 14 February Manstein’s relief effort was halted within 10km of the encircled forces by heavy Soviet resistance. The situation was critical and on 15 February Manstein gave the direct order, in contravention of Hitler’s, for the Cherkassy Pocket to breakout towards his halted relief column. Manstein was no longer willing to accede to Hitler’s orders following the disasters caused by Hitler’s overruling of Manstein on Stalingrad, Kursk and Cherkassy.

28. The monumental effort that followed on 16–17 February left all German forces involved spent and Manstein’s relief force ineffectual. However, whilst German command and control failed and six divisions were destroyed, 30,000 of 59,000 trapped soldiers were recovered and another ‘Stalingrad’ had been averted.

29. Hitler eventually removed Manstein from command on 30 March 1944 following further confrontations between the two regarding Hitler’s conduct of the war on the Eastern Front. Manstein took no further part in WWII and was captured by the British and later tried in 1949 for war crimes. In a trial that drew condemnation from both Allied and German commentators, Manstein was sentenced to 18 years in prison. He was eventually released in May 1953 and was later employed as an advisor to the West German Army.

**Manstein’s leadership summarised and assessed**

30. As one of Hitler’s ‘Eastern Front Firemen’, Manstein regularly dealt with people and situations that were complex, critical and often in crises. Analysis of Manstein’s leadership style during these situations places him in the S3 and S4 quadrants of Hersey and Blanchard’s model but equally able to employ S1 and S2 behaviour should the situation demand.

31. The following practices enabled Manstein to contextualise his Leadership Behaviour:

   a. **Commanders should be visible to the troops.** This practice enabled Manstein to personally evaluate operating conditions and Follower Readiness (capability and morale) at the Front.

   b. **Maintain High Situational Awareness.** Manstein stated ‘...situations changed so rapidly, and favourable opportunities came and went so fast, that no tank-force
commander could afford to bind himself to a command post any great distance to the rear’.

Manstein’s high Situational Awareness enabled him to quickly assess Task Behaviour and adjust his Guidance relative to a situation.

c. **Teach by personal example.** Manstein developed situational leadership in his subordinates by leading from the front and using his initiative. Manstein recognised initiative as a force multiplier in mobile operations. He ‘… realized that his own strength [against numerically superior foes] lay in the superior training of his junior commanders and their capacity for independent action and leadership’.

Manstein expected his commanders, in the absence of higher guidance, to disobey orders if the situation demanded but remain ‘answerable with [their] head’ if their decisions resulted in failure.

d. **Apply the appropriate type of Control.** Manstein matched his Leader Behaviour to Follower Readiness and the situation by applying his Guidance through either Directive or Directed Control. Directive Control was his preference unless ‘operational intentions involved the assumption of responsibilities which it would have been unreasonable to expect the … headquarters in question to accept’.

32. Manstein’s effectiveness as an operational leader though was not only due to his own abilities but because he developed his subordinates’ leadership skills and capabilities. He readily discussed issues with subordinate commanders and refrained from directing them as to how to accomplish tasks within their own areas of responsibility.

33. Manstein’s effectiveness as a leader therefore depended on his ability to recognise when subordinates did not have the responsibility (Follower Readiness) required for a particular situation. In such cases, Manstein adopted S1 Leadership Behaviour and guided his subordinates with a firm hand to ensure his own overall operational goals were met. Through contextual Leadership Behaviour, Manstein developed subordinates who knew what was required, how to achieve what was expected and when to request higher guidance. These subordinates enabled Manstein to execute some of the most brilliant actions of WWII.

**Conclusion**

34. Manstein’s leadership style, warfighting effectiveness and application of the German art of war achieved extraordinary results. Manstein however presents as two different people; the first, a successful leader who exhibited charisma, decisiveness, trust in his subordinates (within limits), concern for troop welfare and a bold risk-taker with high principles. Indeed, Manstein’s lawyer at his 1949 trial attested to Manstein’s reputation when he stated ‘Nobody in this court imagines that Manstein is a bad man. He was beloved of his soldiers and his staff … Nobody questions that he possesses every conventional and domestic virtue’.

35. Alternatively, Manstein’s second persona was a complete contradiction: ambitious, intolerant of independent action (when it could compromise his position, standing and goals) and a leader who sought to shift blame and sacrifice subordinates to protect himself. Yet Manstein is remembered as an outstanding staff officer and a gifted and decisive field commander.

36. Manstein successfully incorporated the German Army’s doctrine into a leadership-style representative of Hersey and Blanchard’s SLT model. His leadership, as assessed against SLT...
and the Australian Army’s criteria, proved (with the one notable exception being his deference to Hitler) particularly effective on the Eastern Front during 1942–44. Manstein’s leadership, when given freedom of action, met and exceeded the requirements to build interpersonal relationships and achieve tasks.

37. Manstein’s acquiescence to Hitler’s ineffective Eastern Front strategies, however, proved his most significant failing and resulted in the wasteful deaths of German soldiers at Stalingrad, Kursk and Cherkassy during the period 1942–44. The influence of Manstein’s professional philosophy and military education was clearly evident in the emphasis Manstein placed on an officer’s loyalty to his Commander-in-Chief. Manstein realised too late that his practical realities were subservient to Hitler’s symbolic struggles.

38. Perhaps, therefore, Manstein’s greatest failing is not his loyalty to a Commander-in-Chief. Rather it is his recognition too late that his loyalty to an incompetent Hitler ultimately caused the death of hundreds of thousands of Germans who shared Manstein’s commitment to Germany and its art of war. Nevertheless, Manstein emerges as an extremely effective leader whose achievements deservedly identify him as a ‘General’s General and Germany’s greatest military strategist of WWII’.
Endnotes


6. *Truppenführung* has been translated as ‘Unit Command’.

7. *Truppenführung*’s influence is clearly evident today in modern Western military doctrines, including Australia’s, p. x.


9. Context as defined by internal and external variables such as the task, situation, time, team characteristics, expectations, ethics, culture and resources.


14. ibid., p. 103.


16. *Befehlstaktik*.

17. *Auftragstaktik*.


21. He regularly demonstrated his strong military ethics throughout his career (e.g. Manstein’s refusal to promulgate Hitler’s commissar order and his provisioning of Prisoners of War). ibid., p. 20.

22. Prussian Foot Guards Regiment.

23. Translated as ‘War Academy’. Manstein was subsequently accepted into the German General Staff.


27. The original General Staff invasion plan was codenamed ‘Yellow’. Manstein’s variant was known as *Sichelschnitt* (‘Sickle Cut’) and committed Germany’s armoured forces to drive a corridor from the Ardennes in southern Belgium to the Channel coast near Abbeville. This would isolate the Anglo–French defenders from their base in the heartland of France while a second armoured thrust through the Low Countries encircled them in a pincer movement. The centre of German armoured strength was aimed at exactly the point where the Maginot Line stopped, in territory

28. Manstein had created political tension and professional jealousy within the Wehrmacht’s senior officer corps with his perceived arrogance. He was removed as CoS when his commander was posted and could no longer protect Manstein from his detractors.

29. Mitcham, op. cit., p. 244.

30. 11th Army consisted of German (six infantry divisions, two mountain divisions, 1st SS Motorised Brigade Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler) and Rumanian (three mountain brigades, three cavalry brigades) forces.

31. Mitcham, op. cit., p. 244.

32. 24 September 1941 to 3 July 1942.

33. The 11th Army captured over 435 000 men, 768 tanks, 3107 guns, 141 aircraft, 155 anti-tank guns and 758 mortars not including those killed or destroyed. Mitcham, op. cit., pp. 244–245.

34. Manstein was tasked with securing the flank of the 18th Army following his attachment to Army Group North. Manstein isolated the Soviet penetration of the German front and destroyed seven Soviet infantry divisions, six infantry brigades and four armoured brigades of the elite 2nd Shock Army before destroying the remaining encircled forces. ibid., p. 246.

35. Manstein’s 11th Army was redesignated Army Group Don for the purpose of relieving the 6th Army and re–securing the southern front. Manstein faced ten Soviet combined arms armies, a tank army, four air armies, several independent cavalry, tank and mechanised corps and over 100 independent tank, artillery, anti–tank, combat engineer and other regiments. T.N. Dupuy and Paul Martell, 1982, Great Battles on the Eastern Front, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, p. 69.


37. Over 200 000 soldiers were trapped from one of the best and strongest of Germany’s Eastern Front armies.


39. Manstein himself stated that 6th Army required 700 tonnes a day if it was to fight effectively. However, the Luftwaffe only managed a daily average of 70 tonnes a day for the first three weeks. The equivalent of 20 grams of food/man/day. Ten per cent of what Manstein agreed as essential for daily operations.


41. Mellenthin, op. cit., p. 263.

42. Mitcham, op. cit., p. 248.


46. Manstein firmly believed the remaining 200 000 German soldiers (19 January 1943) in Stalingrad were diverting 90 major Russian formations from other critical areas despite evidence to the contrary. Wieder, op. cit., p. 142.


48. Manstein’s combat strength deteriorated quickly post-Stalingrad with the Soviets achieving a rough 6:1 force ratio advantage by 7 September 1943. ibid.

49. Hitler expected Manstein to hold a front exceeding 2000km with only 257 tanks and 220 assault guns.

50. General von Sponeck was removed after his division’s loss of Kerch against two Soviet armies and the failed Sevastopol attack in December 1941. Manstein removed General Kempf for the loss of Kharkov in August 1943.

51. Manstein had opposed Nazi policy concerning the service of Jewish soldiers in the German Army in early 1934. Manstein’s opposition resulted in him being removed from influential positions and only given opportunities requiring his military talents and local demands. Mitcham, op. cit., pp. 242–243; Manstein, op. cit., p. 14, pp. 127–128.


54. Manstein’s counterattack against the 5th Guards in October 1943 resulted in 350 tanks, 350 artillery pieces, 5000 prisoners and 10 000 Russian dead.

55. At meetings on 4 and 27 January 1944, Manstein personally demanded that Hitler permit a withdrawal. Mitcham, op. cit., pp. 251–252.


58. ibid., pp. 28–30.


63. ‘Field Marshal von Manstein’s type of leadership was typified by his preference to perform the duties of the army … commander from an advanced command post while the working staff set to work in peace in the rear areas’. Erich Abberger, *Activities of a Senior Engineer Officer of a Field Army During the Campaign in Russia*, 10 October 1953—a senior engineer for Manstein’s 11th Army.

64. Manstein, op. cit., p. 215; Paget, op. cit., p. 38.

65. Manstein, op. cit., p. 189; Effective German commanders ‘held the unshakeable belief that success could be fully exploited only if the commander was far forward receiving reports and issuing orders with minimum delay’. US Army War College, op. cit., p. 50.

66. Battelle Columbus Laboratories, op. cit., p. 94.


68. ibid., p. 383.

69. ibid.


71. Connelly, op. cit., p. 147.


73. Mellenthin, op. cit., p. 19.
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