Ethics under fire: challenges for the Australian Army

Tom Frame and Albert Palazzo (eds.)
NewSouth Publishing: Sydney, 2017, 320 pages
$39.99

Reviewed by Alexander J. Edgar, University of Adelaide

The ADF, and particularly the Australian Army, is the only statutory body granted legal authority to use lethal force to defend the national interest—and it is equipped with formidable weaponry to complete the task. It is with this authority in mind that this book poses the critical questions that face the modern Australian Army about how it conducts itself in the fulfilment of its duty.

The authors are from non-government organisations, the military and academia, therefore offering a broad range of perspectives from which to analyse the ethical questions facing the Australian Army. Although broken into seven ‘parts’, the book realistically covers three broad themes: military ethics and expectations in a modern democratic society; the changing face of modern warfare; and how to train our soldiers to deal with ethical dilemmas in the contemporary context.

The first theme is certainly the broadest and most fundamental, exploring how the ethics of Australian society and the military interact and influence each other. The authors highlight the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and Abu Ghraib torture in Iraq as instances where the ethics of the military were compromised, thus diminishing the political will of the people for war.

Charles Dunlap Jnr highlights that upholding proper ethical behaviour can ‘substantially affect warfighting capability’ because combatants erode their own legitimacy in a war by causing ‘unnecessary deaths or damage’. It is clear through this theme in the book that the authors draw an obvious link between the ability of the Australian Army to function as a warfighting force and its willingness to uphold a set of ethics.

This link leads to a discussion about the ethical frameworks by which decisions can be made in a military situation. Drawing the link between the need for ethical analysis and how ethics affects warfighting capability, leads to the next consideration—given the changing face of warfare and the shift in how governments use the Australian Army, are the Army’s ethics sufficiently evolving to keep up with the rapid pace of change?

Warfare is changing and how governments use the Australian Army is changing as well, providing a platform for the authors within this theme to discuss how ethical dilemmas facing the Australian Army can be addressed. Cyberwarfare, peacekeeping and the imposition of Western ethics were the three concepts with the most interesting and well-developed discussions.

Adam Henschke’s chapter on cyberwarfare discusses how the indiscriminate nature of some cyber weaponry can hold it in breach of international laws in jus ad bello. Adam Brandt Ford examines how social media is being weaponised and expanding the boundaries of war. Both ideas challenge traditional concepts of war. Lee Hayward poses the most pertinent questions in this area, namely can the Army or Australia make any real difference in areas where social change can take generations, specifically posing questions about changing attitudes toward women in Zambia.

The final theme for consideration is the need to train ethical soldiers and leaders throughout a soldier’s career. Commentary throughout the book highlights that Australia is a world leader in ethical training for its Army, albeit there is room for improvement. The book provides ample policy ideas to address this problem.
Dr Deane-Peter Baker offers a nuanced approach that requires academia and the military to use modern research findings to provide situations of direct relevance to students of military ethics, which is a relatively simple policy shift. Baker’s most poignant observation is the use of historical failures in ethical dilemmas, such as My Lai, contending that it is too easy for students simply to dismiss these situations saying, ‘I would never do that’. He also offers the idea that ethicists need to receive real military experience.

Raising the example of embedded journalists, ethicists could similarly join military operations in a civilian capacity. Jamie Cullens recommends that the Army should have a senior officer at the Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel rank in charge of overseeing ethics training for the Army, a policy recently enacted by the British. The merit of the policy proposals in this book are beyond the scope of this review, however, they are worthy of further consideration.

Ethics under fire offers a thorough analysis of new ethical challenges facing today’s Australian Army. The book offers a thematically appropriate approach to ethics and ethical decision-making frameworks, poses contemporary questions about evolving technology, and offers policy proposals to the Army. It should be widely read throughout the Army for its relevance to contemporary warfighting.

Reviewed by Gregory J. Ivey

This book provides a short, readable yet sophisticated analysis of the role played by the Australian Army in Papua New Guinea (PNG) over the 24 years prior to that country’s independence. With rare access to archives and servicemen in both countries, as well as a comprehensive body of secondary sources, Moss presents an original and well-argued perspective on integrating PNG soldiers into the history of the Australian Army, which:

Reconceptualises this institution [the Australian Army] as one that grappled, successfully ... with the employment of a considerable number of culturally diverse foreigners.

Essentially, the text is an empathetic history of the Australian Army in PNG from 1951 to 1975. Of necessity, Moss provides the background of the Second World War roles of the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR) and the issues arising from its success. The author then discusses the re-establishment, management and development of the PNG Defence Force, including its colonial nature and problems through the 1950s; its upgraded defence role and nation-building initiatives during the 1960s; and the Australian Army’s focus on transition towards PNG’s self-determination in the early 1970s. The themed chapters are written chronologically, apart from an out-of-sequence account of the lives of Australian servicemen and their families in PNG during that period.

This production is militarily-useful, with a list of senior military appointments, maps, photographs and a substantial index, which includes the names of those servicemen mentioned in the text. While the map of Port Moresby is very useful, the map of PNG might justifiably have been extended to include the neighbouring Indonesian province of Irian Jaya, which featured so prominently in PNG’s defence posture throughout this period. The extensive notes and bibliography point to the PhD thesis on which this book is based. While technically costly, the publishers might have considered adding some colour photos, which are readily available and would have considerably enhanced the publication.

Moss has not delineated separately the elements of doctrine, training, command, logistics and force structure. Rather he has integrated these

**Guarding the Periphery: the Australian Army in Papua New Guinea, 1951-75**

Tristan Moss
Cambridge University Press: Port Melbourne, 2017, 266 pages
ISBN: 978-1-1071-9596-7
$59.95
Australia's petroleum supply and its implications for the ADF

into the chronological chapter structure. Likewise, and more prominently, Moss addresses the issues of race and civil-military relations. The Australian Army is the disclosed focus—not the RAN or the RAAF—perhaps reflecting the author's sources and funding support. Even then, not all Army Corps are covered as there are only passing references to the groundwork of the Engineers or the mapping work of the Survey teams, both of which undertook substantial ‘aid to the civil community’ programs in PNG during this period.

Military readers may well feel that their particular area of interest deserved more attention in the text. Nevertheless, Moss has provided end-notes which indicate the sources for further information. Probably for the sake of consistency and focus, the author has covered the Army’s PNG-manned units and those standard Army units that included PNG servicemen.

Moss describes a number of events during this ‘watershed period’, notably the process of decolonisation, the creation of PNG Command, the raising of 2 PIR but not 3 PIR, and the arrival of National Service education instructors at the key bases. The book perhaps should have included mention of the ‘Act of Free Choice’ of 1969 in adjoining Irian Jaya, which occasioned extensive PIR patrols in the western districts of PNG in anticipation of cross-border refugee flows. The combined effect of those activities, as well as the earlier operational patrolling during the period of ‘confrontation’ between Indonesia and Malaysia, was long-lasting according to Moss.

The text retains its original intent as a subtle yet persuasive argument about the unique character, strategic role and forward-looking progress of the Army in PNG before 1975. While chiefly an outside/objective view of the Army, this book is infused, particularly in Chapter 6 (The ‘black handers’), with an internal view of the Army with which former Australian servicemen and some PNG servicemen would likely identify.

For example, within the prevailing pre-independence employment and education conditions, the indigenous servicemen ‘saw themselves as an elite within PNG’, being both highly trained and much better educated than the wider PNG population. Indeed, there is an echo of the Second World War, when senior indigenous soldiers had to assert their hard-earned status to insensitive Australian officers at Lae in 1945. The internal view captured in this chapter, however, does not seem to fully reflect the social progress made within the PIR. The quoted assessment of the PIR commanding officer in the mid-1950s about the Australian-PNG social distance could hardly have been sustained after the mid-1960s.

Moss has written a landmark study of this foreign chapter of the Australian Army after the Second World War. It will also be interesting reading for today’s PNG Defence Force since, as the author observes, ‘PNG has been omitted from the [Australian] Army’s history and the Army from PNG’s history’. This book provides, as all good history does, a framework suggesting several possible lines of further research: for example, a formal history of the original establishment and management of the force of PNG soldiers from 1940 to 1947; or a conceptual analysis of the funding, command, re-structures and (costly) deployments of the PNG Defence Force after 1975.

Overall, this modestly-sized book is a well-researched, constructive account of the Australian Army’s role in PNG before independence. There are examples here of the Army’s capacity to successfully train and educate foreign servicemen, to play a model role in mentoring indigenous servicemen towards leadership positions, and to leave a legacy overseas which provides the foundation for future military relationships. Since PNG’s independence, the ADF is one of the few government agencies to have maintained a strategic and respectful, rather than colonial, relationship with their counterparts in PNG—and such ADF-PNG Defence Force programs continue today.

Australia’s connections with PNG are many, including geography, ethnography, history, economy, hospitality and military. Australia’s 2017 Foreign Affairs White Paper endorses its
‘enduring partnership’ and ‘close defence cooperation’ with PNG, so this book is both a timely and relevant addition to the Australian Army’s History Series.

Cyberspace in peace and war

Martin Libicki
Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2016, 496 pages
US$55

Reviewed by Jim Truscott, OAM

This book is most informative about the potential transformation of warfare across the continuum of peace-time friction and kinetic conflict, going well beyond the realm of everyday computer users into a highly-classified and speculative space. It is divided into five major sections, addressing foundations, policies, operations, strategies and norms.

The author draws on considerable material from previously-published RAND reports, some of which he authored. It is a highly-technical read and, by necessity, introduces much new terminology, requiring readers to adapt to language including advanced persistent threats, the ‘zero-day vulnerability’ in commercial software, and nuclear notions of ‘mutually assured destruction’. Much of it, however, is very US-centric, and although the issues are obviously global, it would be interesting to hear Australian perspectives.

The author introduces a myriad of topics and many current cyber-warfare examples under the themes of disruption, corruption and disruption. I found it intriguing to read that while some organisations know they under cyber-attack, there are also those who don’t know they are being attacked, highlighting the obvious need to be able to identify the threat—and ideally the attacker—before remedial actions or counter-measures can be considered.

It is fascinating that cyber war is described as the most serious near-term threat to the US. The fact that US Cyber Command is under US Strategic Command, which also has responsibility for strategic deterrence and global strike, begs the reader to ask why Australia does not have such a Cyber Command. Is the Australian Signals Directorate enough? It reminded me of my early experience with cyber warfare in 1996, when I was serving in the SAS, when the ‘adversary’ attempted to introduce a virus into the Battlefield Command Support System being fielded by the 1st Brigade in Exercise Phoenix in the Northern Territory.

The author explains that one of the many challenges in developing and executing capability is being able to actually ‘weaponise’ cyber warfare. I found this an interesting discussion, especially as no-one really makes public their cyber-warfare capability, with the partial exception of what was released by Edward Snowden about the supposed capabilities of the US National Security Agency. Unfortunately, much of the discussion in this section was very technical, and seemingly more suited to academics and researchers than cyber-warfare practitioners.

The author highlights debate over the ‘Las Vegas rules’ that treat cyberspace as a separate venue of conflict and not subject to the usual laws of armed conflict. It highlights the obvious need for consideration of cross-domain (land, sea, air and space) strategy and its potential escalation into kinetic warfare, regardless of the rules that may apply.

The conclusion about whether the world would be less violent if wars were fought in cyberspace rather than by conventional warfare is thought provoking. This book is a must-read for those in Australia’s military high command and other government departments with a responsibility for national security. One thing is certain, the hackers, especially those that are government-sponsored, will already have it on their e-book shelves.
Palestine diaries: the Light Horsemen’s own story, battle by battle

Jonathan King
Scribe: Melbourne, 2017, 448 pages
ISBN: 978-1-9253-2266-8
$39.99

Reviewed by Jim Truscott, OAM

When you read the personal stories in this battle-by-battle account, it seems quite extraordinary that only one Victoria Cross was awarded to a member of the Light Horse throughout their multiple legendary actions from Gallipoli in 1915, Sinai in 1916, Palestine in 1917-18, and then Jordan and Syria in 1918. Even more notable is the refusal by General Allenby, who commanded the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), to send the Australian Mounted Division to the Western Front.

The desert campaign, which went from the defence of the Suez Canal to an all-out offensive against the Ottoman Empire, is described as a long ride over two and a half years in stifling dust and extreme cold. Remarkably, the EEF captured 40,000 Turkish and German prisoners, with less than 100 Light Horsemen captured. There were five Light Horse Brigades by the end of the war, organised as cavalry, with four-man/horse sections rather than infantry, but with the ability to dismount and fight as infantry.

Romani was the first and close-run battle, in which Lieutenant General Chauvel pushed his men to breaking point, and the first land victory for the Allies in World War 1. Chauvel’s ruthless strategy at Romani is described as an ‘equine steam roller’, which routed the Turks from Romani to El Arish. The horses went 56 hours without water, while the men spent 44 hours in the saddle with only one water bottle for 35 hours. In 24 hours, they rode 80 kilometres and then fought mounted and dismounted 40 kilometres from water. There was classic insubordination to boot by a Brigadier, who ignored Chauvel’s order to withdraw, which turned the tide and for which Chauvel later expressed his gratitude.

The subsequent battle for Rafa was almost given up for lack of water and, again, a NZ Brigade disobeyed orders to withdraw and charged. By comparison, after the decisive victories at Romani, El Arish, Magdhaba and Rafa, the first battle of Gaza was one of the worse-led battles of the desert campaign, plagued by poor communications and Generals too far from the action. The second attack on Gaza was a suicidal advance by infantry, which the British War Cabinet likened to a second Gallipoli, after which the EEF spent five months facing off the Turks in constant reconnaissance.

The battle for Beersheba, which was part of the third battle of Gaza, was a stunning victory and turning point in the battle for Palestine. The Light Horse traversed desert sand in a night march over 40 kilometres and the horses went 48 hours without water. An infantry attack from the west and south enabled the Light Horse to advance from the east, supported by British artillery. It was an incredible assault by 1000 men over seven kilometres, commencing at the trot, then canter, then a charge over the last two and a half kilometres in which 31 men and 44 horses were killed, just as the wells were about to be poisoned and blown up. Interestingly, Chauvel reckoned that it was continual movement and not speed that won the day.

10 Light Horse was the first of the EEF to enter Jerusalem in December 1917 and the first Christians in six centuries. They encountered difficult terrain north of the Dead Sea around Jericho and were thrice defeated after crossing the Jordan River at Es Salt and Amman. Then, by the time a troop from 10 Light Horse took a short cut to be the first of the EEF to ride into Damascus, much to the chagrin of Lawrence of Arabia, Chauvel commanded four Divisions and the largest cavalry force in history. Some of the Light Horse were even issued swords late
in the campaign. The EFF encountered a lot of diseases towards the end, leading up to the final battle at Aleppo.

My only minor criticism is that I would have liked to have read more about the roles of the Australian Service Corps in sustaining the force. However, the focus of this book is on the diaries, letters and photos of brave young Australian men, whose service and sacrifice shaped several nations. This easy-to-read book is a welcome addition to any Australian library.