SECRET AUSTEO

Defence FOI 541/19/20

MS20-900165

Ministerial Brief for Noting

FOR: Minister for Defence INFO: Minister for Defence Industry

Action Requested By: N/A Reason for Urgency: N/A

Copies to: Secretary, CDF, Associate Secretary, VCDF, CDS, CN, CA, CAF, CJC, CJOPS, DEPSEC SP&I, DEPSEC E&IG, DEPSEC DPG, DEPSEC CASG

Defence Mobilisation Planning

Key Issue:

That you note Defence is preparing to conduct mobilisation planning for a range of contingencies including natural disasters, cyber warfare, pandemics and major conflict. VCDF will lead this planning effort with the support of DSTG in a staged approach focussing firstly on the national security community including Defence Industry as a critical element of capability employment, and enabling research institutions such as CSIRO and Defence think tanks. s47C(1)

Defence will commence

planning activities from 1 July 2020 with the intent to complete a Defence Mobilisation Plan in 2022.

Media Considerations: There is media interest in Defence responses to natural disasters, pandemics and national security threats. The mobilisation program has been discussed in *The Australian*, the *ASPI Strategist*, and *Australian Defence Magazine*. The *Australian Defence Magazine* has requested an interview with a Defence spokesperson.

Noted by Minister:	
Signature: Linda Reynolds	
/2020	
/ 2020	
Minister comments	
Cleared by: VADM D.J. Johnston, VCDF (02) 6265 2856	Contact: AIRCDRE R.L. Lennon, DG Force
	Exploration, Force Design Division, ADFHQ
	(02) 6265 7456
Date cleared:	

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Sensitivity: Yes

• The rationale for mobilisation planning may be perceived to be related to a specific military threat. Defence will mitigate this risk by emphasising that the planning process will strengthen Defence's contribution to government responses to a range of contingencies, not necessarily led by Defence. For this reason, Defence intends to undertake external engagement across the national security community in accordance with extant authorisations, \$47C(1)

s47C(1)

Regulatory Implications: No.

Consultation: Yes

- DEPSEC Strategic Policy and Intelligence
- Chief Defence Scientist
- DEPSEC CASG

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Background:

The last comprehensive Defence mobilisation plan was produced in s33(a)(ii)

While mobilisation planning such as reserve callouts is being conducted in isolation across Defence, s33(a)(ii)

Purpose:

Noting that the Department of Home Affairs produced a report on Australia's vulnerability to disaster risk in 2018, Defence will examine areas of national security that are vulnerable to adversary action and develop a Defence Mobilisation Plan that will guide investment in and enhance Defence's resilience to threats against Australia's national security. The Mobilisation Plan will leverage the outcomes of the Force Structure Plan 2019 and will consider elements of national power and sovereignty required for Defence to respond to significant attack on Australia or its national interests. The Plan will also consider Defence's contribution to disaster response and other major crisis where Defence is not the lead agency.

Scope of Mobilisation Planning:

Defence is undertaking a mobilisation planning program in several phases out to 2022 that will culminate in a Defence Mobilisation Plan. Phase One will ensure that the problem set is appropriate for Australia's current and emerging security outlook, and develop a methodology to analyse the mobilisation requirements of Defence and the national support base. Through a number of scenarios including major conflict, cyber attack and disaster response, Phase Two will examine specific lines of effort including \$47C(1)

Phase Three

will synthesise the findings to produce a Mobilisation Plan that will identify investment options to increase Defence and national resilience against strategic shock and identify the required actions for Government, Defence, the national support base and the broader community to improve national security resilience.

s47C(1)

External Engagement:

Over a two year period, the mobilisation program will require increasing external engagement to fully appreciate the impact of mobilisation on national resources including the community. The planning activities will focus initially on Defence and national security requirements in major conflict including Defence industry, which is a vital element of capability acquisition and sustainment.s47C(1)

Initial engagement

within Defence including industry partners and associated research organisations will be managed within extant arrangements.

To guide external engagement, Defence intends to s47C(1)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE CHIEFS OF SERVICE COMMITTEE

O2245383

COSC AGENDUM 131 OF 19 – MOBILISATION PLANNING UPDATE

Sponsoring COSC member: VCDF

SPONSOR'S EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

1. To update COSC on mobilisation planning in 2020.

Key judgments

s33(a)(ii)

3. Mobilisation planning will guide investment in and enhancement of Defence's resilience to threats against Australia's security. The Plan will consider the elements of national power and sovereignty required to respond to a significant attack on Australia or its national interests.

Recommendations

- 4. It is recommended that COSC:
- a. **note** that work has commenced on mobilisation planning under the direction of VCDF.
- b. **note** that an initial progress report will be submitted to COSC in Oct 20.

Resource implications

5. As of 13 Dec 19, FSP19 makes provision for the development of a mobilisation plan in out-turned. The plan will be delivered

by a planning staff established in Force Design Division. AVM Greg Evans (reserve) will provide military guidance and leadership to the planning effort. DST JOAD has identified resources to support methodology development and undertake analytical studies.

Consultation

6. No dissenting views. Refer to Annex A for coordinating staff comments.

Contact officer: AIRCDRE Richard Lennon.

Date authorised: 17 Jan 19

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AGENDUM PAPER

Background

7. Under the direction of VCDF, Force Design Division conducted a Defence mobilisation review in 2018-19. The report concluded that *the ADF* s33(a)(ii)

s33(a)(ii)

The

mobilisation planning effort will leverage force structure planning to provide this assessment and a clear rationale for actions that may strengthen Defence's ability to respond to crisis. Guided by DPG19, the plan includes \$33(a)(ii)

9. The need for mobilisation planning is also a key recommendation of FSP19. s33(a)(ii)

Arguments for Mobilisation Planning Strategy

- 10. Mobilisation planning will shape Defence's ability to respond to a major security threat in three layers; Defence, Whole of Government and as a national enterprise.
- 11. VCDF established a mobilisation planning team in Dec 19 to synchronise Defence activities contributing to mobilisation planning and to identify whole of government and national support requirements in a Mobilisation Plan. This team will develop and implement a mobilisation planning strategy over the next two and a half years.
- 12. The Mobilisation Plan will guide investment in and enhancement of Defence's resilience to threats against Australia's security. The plan will consider the elements of national power and sovereignty required to respond to a significant attack on Australia or its national interests.
- 13. s47C(1)

Recommendation 1: That COSC **note** that work has commenced on mobilisation planning under the direction of VCDF.

14. **Overview.** The mobilisation planning work is scheduled in four phases to be delivered over the next 28 months. An overview of the mobilisation planning process is enclosed.

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- 15. A quantitative and qualitative methodology is being developed in partnership with DST and is based on similar work completed by CSIRO.² Initial vulnerability analysis will leverage heavily the work already completed during FSP19 and complementary work by SP Division, MSP and Capability Managers. Planning will explore contingencies in which Defence is the lead agency in a mobilisation response as well as responses where Defence is in a support role (i.e. cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and services, or pandemics).
- 16. Mobilisation planning will be conducted in nine parallel lines of effort requiring (see Enclosure 1). A core element of the planning strategy will be to determine the interdependencies between the lines of effort and synchronise the work. Some activity is already underway.
- 17. s42
- 18. Additionally, in conjunction with Joint Logistics Group, the Australian Manufacturers of Explosive Ordnance group is examining Australian industry capacity to support sovereign explosive ordnance and munitions manufacturing. The mobilisation planning effort will also incorporate recent Defence supply chain modelling work conducted by DST.
- 19. s47C(1)
- 20. s47C(1)

Recommendation 2: That COSC **note** an initial progress report will be submitted to COSC in Oct 20

Timeline

21. Key activities to be completed before returning to COSC in Oct 20 include:

a. s47C(1)

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² Following a two year activity, CSIRO published the *Australian National Outlook 2019* that explores a range of nationally significant issues, risks and opportunities to identify how Australia's long-term prosperity can be secured.

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- e. s47C(1)
- f. COSC submission to provide initial insights report Oct 20

Risks and mitigation

- 22. Mobilisation planning is a large and complex body of work. The planning team is a small staffs47C(1) people and will be required to engage extensively with internal and external stakeholders. They will rely on key findings from the FSP, s42 and s33(a)(ii) . AVM Evans and the s47C(1) will mitigate the risk of scope creep through their leadership and guidance. Force Design Division will also mitigate this risk by contracting requisite third party expertise to provide appropriate skills at different stages of the planning effort.
- 23. s47C(1)

Conclusion

24. Mobilisation planning will guide investment in and enhancement of Defence's resilience to threats against Australia's security. It will consider the elements of national power and sovereignty required to respond to a significant attack on Australia or its national interests. Mobilisation planning is adjunct to the force structure plan that will synchronise a range of Defence activities and facilitate an understanding of Government and national resources required to support a major response to crisis.

Annex:

A. Coordinating Staff Comments

Enclosure

1. Overview of the mobilisation planning process

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RAN/HNC/DGNPSI (Cleared by: CDRE G. Christian/DGNPSI).

Annex A to COSC Agendum 131 of 19 Feb 20

COORDINATING STAFF COMMENT

4. **JCG** (Cleared by: AIRMSHL WG McDonald CJC)

Comment:

1.

• s47C(1)

UNCLASSIFIED SENSITIVE: COMMITTEE

Enclosure 1 to COSC Agendum 131 of 19 Feb 20

Overview of the Mobilisation Planning process

