Paid 01 Nov 16 JSE

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defence

Credit Card Purchase Authorisation

AC 977
Revised 27 Jul 16

Printed on *(Date)*
1 Nov 2016

You MUST complete AE 108 - AusTender Reporting for purchases greater than or equal to $10,000 AUD *(including GST)*

For internal use only - not to be passed to supplier

Date 14 Oct 2016	Cardholder's name *(Optional)*	Form AD 975 submitted? *(Is the item an Asset?)* ☐ Yes ☑ No	Company code	TMS/ACMS/TRN reference number 30441311

Fund	Account code	Cost centre	Work breakdown structure number	Asset number	ESP	Internal order number	Description or reason	Quantity	Estimated cost ($) (AUD) (GST inclusive)	Total cost ($) (AUD) (GST inclusive)	Supplier
		100189					**Subscription to Twitonomy online analytics**	1	$240.00	$240.00	www.twitonomy.com

If the item is an Asset please complete form AD 975 - Asset Shell Request	**Total**	**$240.00**	Currency: **AUD**

Supplier address **www.twitonomy.com**		Phone	Fax
Contact name	Delivery address		Phone

AusTender reporting requirements *(See attached link for guidance:*
http://intranet.defence.gov.au/dmoweb/sites/DEPPP/comweb.asp?page=116804&Title=AusTender%20Publishing)

Was there any freight cost considered? ☐ Yes ☑ No

I certify that funds are available *(CASG use only)*

Signature	Printed name	Rank or level	Position title	Position number	Employee ID	Date

S47F

Date *01 Nov 16*

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From:
Sent: Tuesday, 1 November 2016 11:28 AM
To:
Subject: FW: Your access to Twitonomy Premium for @Fight_DAESH has been renewed! [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----
From: Twitonomy Premium [mailto:premium@twitonomy.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 1 November 2016 11:27
To: S47F ,   B
Subject: Your access to Twitonomy Premium for @Fight_DAESH has been renewed!

Hello,

We are pleased to inform you that your access to Twitonomy Premium has been renewed for the Twitter account @Fight_DAESH.
To enjoy all the premium features of Twitonomy, please sign out and sign back in to your account to update your session:
http://www.twitonomy.com/sign-in.php

Thanks for using Twitonomy Premium!

Best regards,

The Twitonomy Team
http://www.twitonomy.com
M: support@twitonomy.com
T: @TwitonomyApp

PS: If you need a receipt for your purchase, please note that you can get all your receipts in the "Account" section.

IMPORTANT: This email remains the property of the Department of Defence and is subject to the jurisdiction of section 70 of the Crimes Act 1914. If you have received this email in error, you are requested to contact the sender and delete the email.

Monday, 7 November 2016 08:18:17

Dept. of Defenc

CMS Expense Summary Report

Document ID : AU03856481

| **Card Holder** | S47F | **Account Type** | ANZ Visa International |
| **Account Holder** | S47F | | |

Expense Type   PURCHASES

Tran Date	Reference	Merchant	Merchant Cat.	Amount	Tax Code	Net	Tax	Gros
31-10-2016	VisaANZ0000022862087	TWITONOMY.COM	COMPUTER SOFTWARE STORES	(1@240.90) 240.90 **AUD**	P1	219.00	21.90	240.9
				240.90 AUD				
						219.00	**21.90**	**240.9**

Account Total   **219.00 21.90 240.9**

S47F

LEUT, RAN
Date.... 06 NOV 16

Noting Brief for DGMI

S33(a)(i) **Information Action Monthly Report**

Branch: J5

Reference: F1093154

For Information: CJOPS, DCJOPS, J3, J8, OC 2 Coy 1 Int Bn

Reference:

A. F1072289 *CJOPS TASKORD - OP OKRA - 071/15 TO CJOPS OPORD 07/14 - Commence* **S33(a)(i)** *Information Action ISO Op OKRA LOE4b: IO Effects To Degrade Daesh*

Purpose

1. The purpose of this brief is to update you on the **S33(a)(i)** Information Action for the reporting period 24 Aug – 24 Sep 15, as required in reference A.

Recommendations

2. It is recommended that DGMI:

a. **Note** the assessment for the **S33(a)(i)** Information Action reporting period.

    NOTED / PLEASE DISCUSS

b. **Note** the observations from the **S33(a)(i)** Information Action reporting period.

    NOTED / PLEASE DISCUSS

Comments:

S47F

LTCOL   CAPT, RAN
SO1 IO   A/J5

30/09/ 2015   30 /9 / 2015

Contact Officer: **S47F**
02 6128 5421

(3)   @Fight-DAESH product has been highlighted by the Global Communication Working Group's Coalition Spokesperson weekly as content to amplify

(4)   **S33(a)(i)**

c.   **MoE**. Based on the established 2014 baseline of eight English mis/disinformation products released by DAESH weekly, the following MOE has been recorded during the reporting period.

    (1)   A reduction of 62.5% in indentified Daesh disinformation products; now averaging three English mis/disinformation products released by DAESH weekly, (compared to eight in 2014)

        (a)   Note: Several factors impact on this assessment:

            (i)   Centralisation of propaganda under Wilayet systems in Iraq and Syria, thereby reducing the number of independent actors creating and distributing information.

            (ii)   Predominance of Daesh propaganda has shifted towards Statehood functions.

            (iii)   English-language Twitter dissemination by Daesh propagandists has reduced.

            (iv)   Increasing amount of mis/disinformation directed towards the Coalition from other areas (Yemen) or from other actors (JN).

5.   **Observations.** During the reporting period the following observations have been recorded.

a.   The decision to publicise and politicise @Fight_DAESH on launch has negatively impacted on the team's ability to 'learn by doing'.

Comment: The decision to promote the work of the account has led to a significant political polarisation among followers and an unreasonable level of scrutiny while the capability is still at MLOC.

b.   There remains a significant misunderstanding by senior leaders and commentators as to how **S33(a)(i)** seeks to generate effects on Twitter; **S33(a)(i)** does not require followers to be effective.

S33(a)(i)

c.   The ADF does not currently train or prepare personnel for social media information operations.

Background

3.   HQJOC commenced the **S33(a)(i)** Information Action on 24 AUG 15 following endorsement at the SETB and wide ranging interagency consultation. The **S33(a)(i)** Information Action seeks to *Degrade* Daesh propaganda dissemination by discrediting distributors of misinformation/disinformation and/or content of propaganda products.

Key points

4.   **Assessment.** The following MoP, MoI and MoE were recorded during the reporting period:

a.   **MoP.**

    (1)   14 products were developed for approval

    (2)   12 products were approved by the **S33(a)(i)** approval authority and released in 45 tweets

    (3)   Four of the products were developed by **S33(a)(i)** personnel; the remainder were developed within ▮▮▮▮

    (4)   Average rate of effort was one new product disseminated every second work day

    (5)   @Fight_DAESH attracted approximately 900 followers

    (6)   @Fight_DAESH has reached approximately 1.95 million *Twitter* users

    (7)   @Fight_DAESH generated 125,000 impressions, an average of 4000 impressions each day

    (8)   @Fight_DAESH generated 262 mentions in 108 global locations

    (9)   **S33(a)(i)** ▮▮▮▮

    (10)   **S33(a)(i)** ▮▮▮▮

    (11)   **S33(a)(i)** ▮▮▮▮

b.   **MoI.**

    (1)   Two targeted Daesh propagandists have blocked @Fight_DAESH from their news feeds

    (2)   One Daesh propagandist has been directed by a propaganda coordinator to delete a disinformation item exploited by @Fight_DAESH

Comment: While Army PSYOPS personnel are the most suitable, experiential learning is required before individuals become confident in the use of systems and targeting strategies employed to identify, confirm and exploit disinformation disseminated on social media.

d.   The ADF does not currently have access to IT systems optimised to support the ▮S33(a)(i)▮ activity.

Comment: ▮S33(a)(i)▮ continues to work with CIOG to enhance access and utility on the Defence Protected Network and to scope options for enhanced access under a tailored solution. This enhancement also seeks to support the use of multiple languages.

e.   Social media requires content to stay live, topical and effective.

Comment: The greatest limiting factor on ▮S33(a)(i)▮ at this time is identifying content for exploitation, within the scope of the Information Activity, in an environment that can generate in excess of six million social media posts per day.

Conclusion

6.   The ▮S33(a)(i)▮ Information Action has been operating for one month into a three month MLOC trial. During this initial reporting period the missteps that have occurred are all attributable to the team learning as they go. Assessments recorded to date are as expected and are considered encouraging, approaching the decision point in Nov 15 on achieving OLOC.

7.   Options to expand the scope of the ▮S33(a)(i)▮ Information Action are being developed separately.

Consultation

8.   ▮S47F▮ was consulted in the preparation of this brief.

Prepared by: ▮S47F▮

Cleared by: ▮▮▮▮▮

NOTING BRIEF FOR DGMI

S33(a)(i) **Information Action Monthly Report**

Branch: J5	**Reference:** AM2541066
For Information: CJOPS, DCJOPS, J3, J8, S33(a)(i)	

Purpose

1.   The purpose of this brief is to update you on the S33(a)(i) Information Action including Measures of Performance (MoP) for the reporting period 31 Mar 16 – 30 Apr 16.

Recommendations

2.   It is recommended that DGMI:

   a.   **Note** the assessment for S33(a)(i)   Information Action reporting period.

         NOTED / PLEASE DISCUSS

   b.   **Note** the observations from the S33(a)(i) Information Action reporting period.

         NOTED / PLEASE DISCUSS

Background

3.   HQJOC commenced the S33(a)(i) Information Action Aug 15 following endorsement at the SETB and wide ranging interagency consultation. The S33(a)(i) Information Action was expanded to include S33(a)(i) in Oct 15 and S33(a)(i) in Jan 16. These three Lines of Operation in combination seek to counter Daesh propaganda, by refuting false military claims, enhancing the global Coalition communication effort through re-tweeting attributed material, and highlight Daesh contraventions of fundamental Laws of Armed Conflict.

	Comments:
S47F CMDR, RAN SO1 IO / / 2016	S47F CAPT, RAN A/J5 / / 2016
Point of Contact: S47F	**Phone:** S47F

Key Points

4. Assessments. MoP:

   a. Twenty Tweets were released in this reporting period.

   b. **S33(a)(i)** ███████████████████████████████

   c. S33(a)(i)

      (1) One S33(a)(i) product submitted with a single potential Tweet reply.

      (2) This S33(a)(i) product was a direct reply to a Daesh supporter, refuting the supporter's claim of the size of Daesh territory. Therefore, only one tweet could be approved. The approved tweet was sent to the Daesh supporter and their account has since been suspended by Twitter.

   d. S33(a)(i) :

      (1) Five S33(a)(i) products submitted totalling 20 potential Tweets.

      (2) Sixteen Tweets approved.

   e. S33(a)(i) :

      (1) One S33(a)(i) product submitted totalling four potential Tweets.

      (2) Four Tweets approved.

   f. @Fight_DAESH:

      (1) Has 1,447 followers.

      (2) Since activation, @Fight_DAESH has sent 123 Tweets with a Potential Reach of over 3 Million Twitter users (Potential Reach is defined as the total number of followers of the people who have mentioned @Fight_DAESH).

      (3) The most retweeted product of @Fight_DAESH for Apr 16 was a S33(a)(i) Tweet that exposed how Daesh mistreat women by using them as sex slaves. This tweet was retweeted 14 times and liked 15 times.

   g. Staff:

      (1) S33(a)(i) ███

      (2) S33(a)(i) ███████████████████████████████████

      (3) S33(a)(i) is progressing the framework to allow Navy recruits awaiting Cryptologic Technician (CT) training to provide assistance in searching for Social Media material and development of Tweet products for @Fight_DAESH.

5. **Observations.** During the reporting period the following observations of Twitter have been recorded:

a. @Fight_DAESH has used a URL shortening service (Bit.ly) to provide links to external websites within Tweets. This service provides the ability to link to additional content and allows for an additional level of analytics above what is normally available within Twitter. With a normal tweet from @Fight_DAESH there is currently no available method to determine the number of users who read the tweet. A retweet does provide positive confirmation that a user has read our Tweet, however, the majority of users may simply read a Tweet without providing the retweet. S33(a)(i)

b. Image 1 is an extract from Bit.ly analytics for the Nadia Murad series of Tweets developed under S33(a)(i) . This extract does not contain the numerical click values due to limitations in exporting the image from the Bit.ly website, however, it does provide insight into the available data. The peaks seen on the 15 and 21 Apr coincide with the release of the Tweet from @Fight_DAESH. The decay after the initial release is illustrative of the immediate nature of Twitter and the short lifespan of a Tweet. Image 2 illustrates the geographic location of the users who clicked on the Bit.ly link.


Image 1. Bit.ly Analytics for Nadia Murad Tweets showing clicks

LOCATION

|	
United States	21
Germany	13
Australia	4
+5 more	6

44
TOTAL CLICKS

Image 2. Bit.ly Analytics for Nadia Murad Tweets showing location

    c.   Twitter continues to increase its effort to remove profiles supporting or producing Daesh material

    d.   It is increasingly difficult to find English language Twitter accounts supporting Daesh.

    e.   S33(a)(i) staff have noted an increase in anti ISIS sentiment in general

    f.   S33(a)(i) observation of @Fight_DAESH Tweets in Apr provides further evidence that the condemning of destruction to cultural sites or any mistreatment of women resonates with our audience.

Conclusion

6.   S33(a)(i)

Staff continue to refine production of material to meet guidance and are exploring new analytics methods to provide indicators of effectiveness.

Prepared by: S47F
Cleared by: