Providence Consulting Group Pty Ltd

First Principles Review of the ADF Service Police

for

The Department of Defence

Version 2.0

Document Management

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Executive Summary

Introduction

Providence Consulting Group was engaged by Chief of Staff Australian Defence Headquarters to identify from First Principles what the ADF requires of a Service Police capability and to develop options for the delivery of Service Policing capabilities from a whole of ADF perspective. While addressing all Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) it was tasked in particular to develop options that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Command and Management, Organisational Structures, and Personnel selection, management and training.

Key Judgments

Domestic policing (in garrison, shore establishment or air base) lays the foundation for operational policing. It develops the competencies and "the policing muscle memory" for the consistent delivery of policing effects by Service Police personnel. The domestic and investigative capabilities are part of the same continuum, yet they are currently separated into four organisations, with technical control exercised by five Provost Marshals (PMs), and remain uncoordinated across 46 locations. It is further complicated by the fact that the delivery of policing support including presence patrolling, incident/ emergency response, police intelligence, and liaison with other agencies provides an undoubted security/force protection benefit but conflates the security and policing requirements. These types of support require discrete policing skills; however, the diversion of Service Police to security support and other duties that do not require policing competencies is significantly diminishing their professional policing development.

Workforce constraints and emerging demands (e.g. security) have impacted on the evolution and delivery of Police support in the Joint and Single Service domains. Consequently, the needs of each should be considered as reforms are pursued. Of note, the requirement of Air Force Police (AFPOL) to support security tasking is unlikely to cease in the near-term, or until Air Force can reassess the allocation of assets directed to these tasks including Air Field Defence Guards. Continuing use of AFPOL in this role would be to the significant detriment to the delivery of policing support to Air Force. Similarly, the Review considers there is scope to rationalise the delivery of discipline, Human Resource (HR) and Whole of Ship Coordination effects to better enable the isolation of a dedicated Policing category within Navy. Army would also benefit from the rolling rotation of 1 MP Battalion personnel through its Domestic Policing Units to minimise the risk of policing skills fade.

In recognising the unique circumstances of each Service, it is clear they each face their own challenges:

a.   Army- the DPU and 1 MP Battalion and the need to balance operational policing with the development of core policing competencies

b.   Navy – A conflated Coxswain category that does policing and ship coordination duties that can currently only ever deliver a part time policing capability

c. Air Force – Platform and base security imperatives are substantially diverting police to security support tasks, again limiting professional development

At an enterprise level perspective, the ADF Service Police as a 'Whole-of-ADF' capability presents as lacking the coherence necessary to maximise the ability to generate robust effects from a relatively small and constrained force. This is resulting from:

a. Five separate Provost Marshal Offices and Four Police Heads of Defence Investigative Agencies that dilute the ability to generate aligned capability effects.

b. The failure to establish a common "one tribe many colours" policing identity under a common and well understood banner that perpetuates an "us and them" culture within the respective elements of the Service Police, and creates artificial jurisdictional boundaries in terms of the application of policing effects across the services.

c. At least eight points of capability development across the four policing elements resulting little uniformity of capability, poor protective equipment that doesn't meet duty of care responsibilities, poor communications, poor facility support and transport to deliver the policing effect across the regions.

d. A single IT system (DPSMS) managed separately by four police elements in 46 outposts which can report centrally but not share information laterally (in the same region). This common system is capturing four different data sets to report the ADF incident rate and does not effectively enable a common operating picture to support a Joint Incident Management System.

e. The limited capacity of individual outposts and the lack of a mature POLINT/CRIMINT reporting culture limits the ability to be an Intelligence Informed capability and define Service Police to be reactive rather than generating an approach suited for operations.

f. The DFDA has become overly legalised for a discipline system and the requirements for its implementation more complicated, increasing investigation effort and time to complete cases, reducing satisfaction levels and both damaging policing confidence and confidence in Police. Moreover, the DFDA is losing its "fitness for purpose" against the emerging crime environment making it more difficult for Service Police to adequately police the force.

g. Locally imposed jurisdictional limitations which un-necessarily constrain policing actions.

h. No common policing continuum with Navy and Air Force having no professional policing training beyond their basic entry course (both Officer and NCO).

i. Regional coordination is limited and is personality and consent based.

The primary reasons that are impacting on the delivery of the required ADF Service Police needs and outcomes can be summarised as:

a. Stove piped command and delivery of enabling support limits coordination, control and coherence of effort

b. Technical control of a limited specialist asset is insufficient to ensure the development and maintenance of professional standards. While TECHCON arrangements may have had a greater intent than this it is not being achieved in reality. The nature of the current C2, across the Services, historical mustering/category development, and

pressing environmental concerns (AF platform security) result in a consistent diversion of policing assets to other duties limiting the development and maintenance of policing competencies

c.   There are no structural arrangements to enable the coordination of regional and national efforts to enterprise effect

d.   The uncoordinated policing footprint limits capacity. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts and penny packeting inhibits optimising police support to all Services.

e.   The ADF has no Joint Doctrine to enable unified understanding of the Service Police Functions and Tasks. What doctrine that does exist at Single Service is out of date with recent developments across Five Eyes and NATO partners

f.   The PM-ADF's ability to direct actions is consent driven, and this consent /personality based approach is reflected down to the local level.

g.   Despite being recommended in numerous reviews Strategic Policing Plans or Operational Policing plans at the National or regional level do not exist

Notwithstanding these impediments to the effective and efficient delivery of Service Police effects opportunities exist to strengthen Service Police capability through an enterprise approach and the reinvestment of existing latent capacity to reinforce core policing effects across the ADF

Summary of Findings. A consolidated list of all key findings contained throughout the Review Paper is detailed in Enclosure 1 to this Executive Summary.

Key Proposals in Response to the Specified Statement of Work

The Statement of Work required the Review to identify from first principles what the ADF requires of a Service Police capability and to develop options to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of Service Policing capabilities from a whole of ADF perspective.

Articulating ADF Service Police Capability. In terms of articulating what the ADF requires of the Service Police Capability the Review proposes an ADF Service Police Blueprint that comprehensively captures expected Functions and Tasks of the ADF Service Police out to 2030. These Functions and Tasks align with emerging Five Eyes and NATO Partner Doctrine. The Blueprint further articulates an ADF Policing Model that frames the ADF Approach to policing the force and providing police support to the force. In order to preserve and support the force and the rule of law it proposes the ADF *adopt an intelligence-informed, responsive, mission-oriented, preventative Policing model.*

Improving Capability. In developing options to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of Service Policing capabilities from a whole of ADF perspective the Review proposes for consideration:

a.   **Courses of Action.** Four Courses of Action (COA) that adjust the Command and Control of the various elements of the ADF Service Police and the delivery of enabling support. The proposed COA are:

    i.   **COA 1 - Strengthen the Centre, Retain Current Command Structure**.   Retain existing C2 with Service PMs remaining separate to PM-ADF, but Strengthen the Centre by consolidating some or all enabling functions under JSPG to remove

duplication. Joint Investigation Office (JIO) remains with JSPG and all other Policing personnel remain with the Services.

ii. **COA 2 – Strengthen the Centre**, **Centralised Control and Enabling Functions, Service Based Domestic and Operational Policing.** All the Service PMs move to Under Command (UC) PM-ADF as do all the enabling functions. JIO remains with JSPG and all other police personnel remain with Services.

iii. **COA3 - Strengthen the Centre**, **Centralised Command and Domestic Policing and Investigation, Service based Operational Policing.** All the PMs move to UC PM-ADF as do the enabling functions. Garrison (including AFPOL (to be determined) and some, but not all, shore establishment NPC) and investigative Policing are consolidated under command JSPG. Ship NPC and 1 MP Bn remain UC respective Services.

iv. **COA 4 – New Start, optimised against Design Principles and current constraints removed.** This option was the "ideal" unconstrained model developed during the workshop with organisational design freedom and CIVPOL equivalent legislative powers. All current Military Policing capability across the Services are centralised under command of PM-ADF/JSPG. PM-ADF responsible for policing domestically and abroad (through FORGEN/OPGEN). Non-policing functions are retained in Single Services to be trained and delivered differently. Discipline functions are retained at unit level in all Services.

b. **Quick Wins.** A number of largely COA Agnostic 'Quick Wins' which address key undesirable effects impacting upon the delivery of the ADF Service Police Capability are proposed. The proposed 'Quick Wins' develop foundation documents and plans which can be produced in the near term but which provide a solid platform for the well-being and development of the capability into the future from a 'whole-of-ADF' and enterprise approach. These include the development of:

i. an ADF Service Police Strategic Plan 2030,

ii. a Joint Capability Needs Statement, and associated ADF Service Police Capability Development Plan, and Scoping Study for an ADF Service Police Capability Remediation Project,

iii. a Joint Service Police Doctrine Framework and an associated Service Police Doctrine Development Plan,

iv. an ADF Joint Service Police Training Continuum,

v. aligned ADF Service Police Selection Standards and Processes, and

vi. an ADF Service Police Information Management Alignment Project.

All COA developed were tested against their conformance to the adopted Service Police Review design principles and their ability to address the undesirable effects impacting upon the effective and efficient delivery of the ADF Service Police Capability. All COA address these to varying degrees of success however COA 2 and 3 are considered the most viable for further development and the ability to deliver meaningful reform.

The unconstrained approach, COA 4, provides substantial reform opportunities and while it proposes some legislative reform which could take some time to achieve it still delivers considerable benefits (even if legislative reform is not achieved) . It should be noted that it closely resembles the Canadian and NZDF Joint Policing Models. This COA merits further development but would require all Services to resolve how they utilise SP in non-core policing roles.

The Review considers that if COA 3 or COA 4 were selected for development, implementation of COA 2 is an important and inevitable transitional step. It would allow for a considered transitioned implementation whilst enabling positive reforms in the near term. It is assessed COA 2 implementation is achievable by Jan 19 and a COA 3 or 4 by Jan 20, pending scheduling through extant joint establishment review processes.

Recommendations

The following recommendations have been structured to address the totality of findings detailed above and to meet the requirements of the Statement of Work. It is recommended that:

a. There is a need to consider organisational and workforce reform across the Service Police environment.

b. That the proposed ADF Service Police Blueprint provides the common basis for understanding the spectrum of effects delivered by ADF Service Police, and the associated approach to policing, and should be used in the development of any future guidance in relation to the Service Police capability such as doctrine, policy, and directives.

c. That progression of COA 2 provides the option to establish a strong centre, unified enabling effects and control functions that would also support an interim phase to progress a COA 3 or 4.

d. COA 3 best addresses the capability design principles and identified undesirable effects, and their root causes, impacting the ADF SP environment and presents the best approach to more effectively meet ADFs future policing needs within existing workforce limitations.

e. That COA 2 should be progressed for implementation NLT Jan 19 and the detailed development of a COA 3 design be presented for COSC consideration in mid-2018.

f. That the standard NATO term "Military Police" be adopted in lieu of "Service Police" to describe the ADF's policing capability, regardless of Service when operating in the Joint Environment. For NPC operating solely in the maritime domain the term "Naval Police" should be adopted to replace "Service Police";

g. That the following 'Quick Wins' be developed:

    i.   an ADF Service Police Strategic Plan 2030,

    ii. a Joint Capability Needs Statement, and associated ADF Service Police Capability Development Plan, and Scoping Study for an ADF Service Police Capability Remediation Project,

    iii.   a Joint Service Police Doctrine Framework and an associated Service Police Doctrine Development Plan,

    iv.   an ADF Joint Service Police Training Continuum,

    v.   aligned ADF Service Police Selection Standards and Processes, and

    vi.   an ADF Service Police Information Management Alignment Project.

h.   That the ADF Service Police Review proceeds to a Phase 2 that will develop implementation of COA 2, detailed COA 3 design and 'Quick Win' Papers for further COSC consideration in mid-2018.

Conclusion

The ADF Service Police capability has been under-invested in terms of resources, intellectual effort, and Command interest for a protracted period. At present, and despite the investment being made, it is not optimised to, nor is it delivering, the level of capability expected. This Review aligns with a number of other efforts addressing the ADF's legal and disciplinary frameworks and this coincidence presents a time-limited opportunity to coherently address the totality of the identified issues. The proposed recommendations identify Courses of Action that require further development before detailed consideration, but nonetheless offer significant potential to enhance the delivery of Service Police Capability.

The Review proposals have focused on optimising the Service Police effects as an enterprise capability of the ADF whilst attempting to address the specific needs of each Service. The ADF Service Police Blueprint provides a means to unify understanding of and across the ADF Service Police Capability and the COA proposed all work to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery of policing effects. The adoption of the term 'Military Police' aligns the ADF with Five Eyes and NATO Partners and will work to improve interoperability with them, and create a more unified policing culture through a "one tribe many colours" approach under a common banner . The foundational documents and plans proposed through "Quick Wins" provide a solid platform to posture ADF Service Police for the next step towards a professionalised, capable "Whole of Defence" capability.

While a business as usual approach to the provision of Policing support to the ADF is possible it would likely continue to see a growing unfitness for purpose of the ADF Service Police against a well identified and growing law enforcement challenge that the current capability is not designed to address. Reform is necessary to best position the ADF Service Police to police the Force and provide police support to the Force into the future.

ADF Service Police Review

Summary of Key Findings

Key Findings	Recommendation that seek to Address Finding
1. The JSPG is a maturing organisation but the PM-ADF has little capacity to influence the maintenance of ADF wide Policing competencies through current TECHCON arrangements. There are significant training disparities between the three Services leaving Navy and Air Force Personnel less well prepared for the investigative roles they perform. The high levels of personnel that are J31 or below cause organisational risk and potentially expose Defence to breaches of Duty of Care.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
2. The NPC and NPCO categories represented a conflated capability that is optimised for Whole of Ship Coordination and related duties do the detriment of the Service Policing Skills. They are significantly undertrained in policing competencies in comparison to Army counterparts. They are an aging capability force that will lose a significant portion through age retirement in the near term. High levels of personnel who are J31, and excessive time in rank at the Chief Petty Officer level suggests significant trade management challenges and suggests Defence is exposed to breaches of Duty of Care. The Review considers there is scope to rationalise the delivery of discipline, HR and Whole of Ship Coordination effects to better enable the isolation of a dedicated Policing category within Navy.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
3. Army is well placed in terms of a robust police training continuum though continuation training in core policing skills is lacking in 1 MP Bn. PM –A is best structured to influence Policing outcomes by having command of Domestic Policing Units. With nearly 70% of all Initial Employment Trainees now being female, Army may wish to consider whether this represents an appropriate balance for the MP capability. Army runs at approximately 20% J31, suggesting Defence has some exposure to breaches of Duty of Care.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
4. The AFPOL mustering's ability to develop its core policing competencies is significantly impeded by its diversion to critical security tasks that do not require a core policing competency. The requirement of AFPOL to support security tasking is unlikely to cease in the near term or until Air Force can reassess the allocation of assets, including use of Air Field Defence Guards, to support this role, and this will continue to be at the significant detriment to the delivery of policing support to Air Force. Both AFPOL and SECPOLO (in policing roles) are significantly undertrained in policing competencies in comparison to Army counterparts. The balance between General Duties AFPOL and	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.

Key Findings	Recommendation that seek to Address Finding
Investigators (50/50) is unbalanced and unhealthy from a workforce management perspective. High levels of personnel are J31 or below and suggest Defence is exposed to breaches of Duty of Care.	
5. Against the current crime environment, the ADF Service Police are not sufficiently enabled to Police the force and civilian police do not have the capacity to address all support needs. This represents an "ungoverned space" that is arguably unaddressed organisational and reputational risk to the ADF.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
6. Proactive policing activities have a proportional and positive effect in the reduction of incident rates. A movement to a preventative policing approach provides the most means of addressing ADF incident rates in the absence of adjustments to legislative or Jurisdictional authorities.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
7. ADF Service Police are inadequately equipped to meet the range of threats that can be foreseen. As a minimum the Personal Protective Posture of all Police needs to be addressed including the scalable non-lethal response systems and personal protective ensemble. In their absence, ADF Duty of Care obligations are not being met.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
8. Current legislation is not keeping pace with the emerging challenges presented by advancements in technology. A more adaptive approach through broader jurisdictional boundaries with control frameworks nested within extant legislation may provide opportunities for ADF Service Police to better respond to the future criminal acts. The DFDA should be tested for its fitness for purpose.	B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
9. The failure to create a more unified policing model perpetuates an "us and them" culture and has led to the creation of artificial jurisdictional boundaries that limit Service Police delivery of common policing effects to ADF members of Services different to their own	B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
10. The Service Police Jurisdictional Model requires review to ensure	B - ADF Service Police Blue Print.

Key Findings	Recommendation that seek to Address Finding
the allowed Military Jurisdiction is sufficiently enables Service Police with appropriate powers to police the force and provide police support to the force into the future. This will require close coordination with the Summary Discipline Review and Defence Legal.	E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
11. The establishment of a coherent Joint Doctrine Hierarchy for Service Police may enable a formalised framework start point for the alignment and future development of strategic concepts, capability development and technical application of the Service Police effects in a 'whole-of-ADF' approach and within the Joint operational environment.	B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
12. Agreement is required on a Joint Capability Needs Statement for ADF Service Police that establishes the baseline to shape future strategic guidance, joint doctrine and capability development plans.	G - Develop "Quick Wins".
13. Agreement is required on the ADF Service Police Functions and Tasks to provide a common understanding of the application of policing effects in the garrison and Joint operational environments.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. G - Develop "Quick Wins".
14. Service Police elements expend a disproportionate weight of effort on governance and non-police functions at the expense of developing core policing skills and enabling the achievement of a professionalised "whole-of-ADF" police capability.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
15. Removal of non-police functions from Naval Police Coxswains on board ships cannot be achieved without significant detrimental impacts and unsustainable work distribution across extant ships' crew unless there is some rationalisation between Coxswain, MLP and SWO roles in the delivery of discipline, HR and Whole of Ship Coordination effects to better enable the isolation of a dedicated Policing category within Navy.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
16. ADF Service Police are not generating sufficient professional experience across core policing functions and task to ensure they are sufficiently prepared to support deployed Joint operational requirements, outside of their Single Service environments.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
17. Selection processes for both initial entry and investigative ADF Service Police are indiscernible form general entry requirements.	A - Org and Workforce Reform.

Key Findings	Recommendation that seek to Address Finding
The ADF should develop selection standards akin to those of the AFP that address communications skills, emotional intelligence, and psychological robustness consistent with the needs of policing duties.	G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
18. The development of core policing competencies is inconsistent across the Joint and Single Service environment. Training levels are inconsistent at almost all rank levels and the rate of policing activity is compromised by diversion to roles that do not require a core policing competency for their delivery. While ADF Service Police will likely always have a lower rate, complexity and diversity of cases than civilian counterparts, the consistent application of effort to police tasks, of all types, teamed with a robust training continuum, provides the most reliable means to develop an ADF Service Police capability that is fit for purpose.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
19.. In the interest of conformity and the promotion of common interoperability terminology that the ADF should consider the adoption of the standard NATO term "Military Police" to describe the ADF's policing capability, regardless of Service, when operating in the Joint Environment. For NPC operating solely in the Naval Environment the term "Naval Police" should be adopted to replace "Service Police". In terms of Uniform the form "MP" should be adopted on uniform patches and with Single Service Policing Insignia to be retained in the Joint Policing environment and the form "NP" adopted by Naval Police when operating solely in the Naval Environment. The adoption of a "one tribe" many colours approach under a common "military police" banner when operating in the joint environment would make a marked contribution to creating a more unified policing culture	F - Adopted NATO MP naming convention.
20. NATO Five Eyes moves to Joint Policing Capability are principally driven by size and the need to centrally command and decentrally execute the application of a scarce resource, which present considerations for future ADF Service Police options.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
21. The UK MP Guard Service provides a worthwhile model for the provision of a uniformed civilian armed response capability that could address current bases security needs but would require appropriate legal enablement.	E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
22. The ADF Service Police jurisdictional model requires review in order to ensure they have adequate powers to Police the Force proposals. This will require coordination with the Summary Discipline Review and Defence Legal more generally.	B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
23. The emerging crime spectrum requires the ADF to adopt alternate policing frameworks to address the growing policing vacuum. Efforts to institute a "whole-of-ADF" proactive policing approach	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print.

Key Findings	Recommendation that seek to Address Finding
may provide significant benefits, particularly in the absence of specific legislative amendments that enable ADF Service Police to deal with matters beyond or below the civilian police "threshold" of interest or capacity.	G - Develop "Quick Wins".
24. The emerging future crime spectrum and future operational context demands greater interoperability both within the ADF and with coalition partners and confirms the need to define a baseline for Joint Service Police competencies and training standards enabling the delivery of a common set of Service Police functions and tasks.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. G - Develop "Quick Wins".
25. A range of options exist to influence the design of selected courses of action across resources, skill sets, organisational design, processes, assurance of service/support, timelines and enabling requirements	A - Org and Workforce Reform. B - ADF Service Police Blue Print. D - COA 3 development. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
26. Enhanced Governance arrangements that support all proposed COA could be achieved through the inclusion of Service Deputy Chiefs as permanent members within the current JSP Governance Board Structure, chaired by the VCDF.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. G- Develop "Quick Wins". I- Proceed to Review Phase 2.
27. Command of a reformed Joint Service Police Group should reside with Joint Capability Group in the longer term. During the transitional phase, Joint Service Police Group should remain under command of VCDF.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. D - COA 3 development. I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
FIC Related Findings	
28. The ADF Service Police capability should be managed at an enterprise level to enable a systems approach that synchronises FIC and maximises efficiency opportunities from a 'whole-of-ADF' approach.	E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". IF - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
29. Tactical level relationships are the only mechanism enabling the management of police tasking in regional locations. Without a formalised framework that is not reliant on personal relationships, the ADF is unable to generate critical mass in locations to appropriately manage the scarce personnel resource to address current and future policing workflow demands.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. D - COA 3 development. I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
30. Service Policing duties are duplicated across the Services and not well coordinated in regional locations, which is resulting in less than optimal utilisation rates and contributing to the inability to generate a proactive policing model.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. D - COA 3 development. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins".

Key Findings	Recommendation that seek to Address Finding
	I – Proceed to Review Phase 2.
31. The C2 of ADF Service Police is overly complex and does not adequately support a coordinated technical control relationships or engagement with regional commanders or civilian police.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
32. There is duplication of enabling roles across Provost Marshal offices (including information management, intelligence, capability development, policy and governance). Opportunities to re-organise these elements may generate sufficient capacity to establish fully enabled and highly performing outputs to better support the entire Service Police capability.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
33. Opportunities to improve integration of information management and intelligence functions across the Provost Marshal offices may enable the Joint Incident Management System, move Service Police to an intelligence-led model and result in better utilisation of the scarce Service Police asset.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
34. The lack of unifying Joint Concepts and a Strategic Service Police Plan risk internal and external interoperability in the Combined / Joint operational environments.	G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
35. A common baseline Service Police entry standard does not exist, which impacts selection of "fit-and-proper" persons with required resilience and personal qualities to deliver a core-policing competencies and professional standards.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
36. Current Joint training opportunities for Service Police do not establish or maintain the relevant core policing skills throughout a member's policing career nor does it adequately set the base line competency for equitable pay grade advancement.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
37. Current training and employment category management governance frameworks are suitable with robust control mechanism delivered through COMDT DCSTC and DGTRADOC. Opportunities to generate a greater advisory role for PM-ADF within training governance may enable improved enterprise wide technical input.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
38. There is no existing joint SP workforce plan to adequately influence the development and conduct of career management, to improve the careers of all SP, enable ongoing professional development and to deliver better service policing effects throughout the ADF.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.

Key Findings	Recommendation that seek to Address Finding
39. There is no other established enterprise system to develop and maintain core policing competencies to an agreed standard; in particular, there is no contemporary, professional development framework for ADF Service Police beyond the ADF Investigator workforce.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
40. Opportunities exist to establish a 'whole-of-ADF' Service Police professional development framework aligned with the outcomes of the IGADF Own Initiative Inquiry into Service Police Code of Conduct and Professional Standards System.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
41. Opportunities exist to align the ADF Service Police workforce through common core policing entry standards, a common professionalisation framework supporting all Service Police not just investigators, a focus on generating ongoing common core policing competency and experience standards, and enhance the technical input of PM-ADF in workforce planning and significant career management selections.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
42. There is no evaluation of Service Police elements deployed in support of Major Joint Exercises, which is resulting in poor understanding of the capability and a lack of evidence to support modernisation efforts.	E – COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
43. There is no Service Police capability development champion to synchronise a coordinated approach to capability needs, which is impacting on the operational effectiveness and continued professionalisation of Service Police.	G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
44. Opportunities to establish a Joint Project within the Defence Integrated Investment Plan offer a suitable method to synchronise the modernisation of the ADF Service Police capability.	G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
45. The Joint Service Police Governance Board, chaired by VCDF, would offer a suitable means to appropriately address Service Police capability coordination if appropriate Service representation was enabled.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
46. There is limited coordination of ADF Service Police facility requirements through a central "champion" to progress facility business cases and develop a more efficient and effective facility footprint across the regions.	C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
47. A Principles based approach to co-locate ADF Service Police elements present will enable opportunities to achieve cost efficiencies, reduce facility footprints and enhance policing interoperability and operational outcomes.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
48. Opportunities to establish enhanced input to Basis of Provisioning/Issue considerations for Service Police common equipment and vehicles may generate resource efficiencies and	C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins".

Key Findings	Recommendation that seek to Address Finding
greater operational capability. This could be exercised through an appropriately resourced PM-ADF as a centralised function from a 'whole-of-ADF' perspective.	I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
49. Opportunities to further develop enabling support relationships with Defence and Other Government Intelligence Agencies will enable the generation of an intelligence-led, proactive ADF Service Police capability.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. E - COA 2 implementation COA 3 detailed design G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
50. Opportunities to develop a regional Service Police coordination function may enable better management of scare policing assets to deliver required enabling base security effects across competing SADFO and Base/Unit Commanders.	C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.
51. There are no formal relationships established with external to ADF policing agencies that enables a comprehensive professional development framework encompassing all ADF Service Police elements, not just the Investigative capability.	A - Org and Workforce Reform. C - COA 2 to establish interim phase. G - Develop "Quick Wins". I - Proceed to Review Phase 2.

Introduction

1.1. Background

Providence Consulting Group Pty Ltd ("Providence") was engaged by Australian Defence Headquarters to undertake a first principles review of the ADF Service Police Capability.

The ADF Service Police (SP) capability has been subject to numerous strategic level reviews and audits during the past decade. These efforts have often been catalysed by a specific (usually negative) event and have primarily focused on investigative capabilities in relation to serious and sensitive issues. Reviews of Single-Service SP capability have also been conducted which have focused on the individual Service group requirements. To date, a more holistic review that considers the broader application of Service Policing across the ADF in support of the military justice system has yet to occur.

Whilst this piecemeal approach to the SP review and development has resulted in some worthwhile reform, it has also resulted in inconsistent, uncoordinated and siloed delivery of SP effects. This is particularly evident in the duplicated functions provided by the four (not including PM JOC) separate Provost Marshal Offices (including SP intelligence, SP information and records management, SP capability development) and the delivery of SP general duties effects.

Given that SP management, investigations and general duties are intrinsically linked, these inefficiencies represent a critical shortcoming that could be rectified by considering SP effects from a 'whole of ADF' enterprise perspective and as a single capability.

1.2. Purpose

The purpose of the review was to independently examine the functionality of ADF Service Policing and make recommendations to improve effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of Service police effects across the ADF. This review was also to focus on enabling a SP capability that accords with the fundamental principles of SP endorsed by Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) which includes independence (SP operations should be undertaken with appropriate independence from the chain of command to ensure no undue command influence or interference occurs).

1.3. Scope of Review

The scope of this review, as detailed in the Statement of Work, follows.

"1. Identify from first principles what the ADF requires of a Service Police capability?

2. Develop options for the delivery of Service Policing capabilities as identified at task objective 1 (above) from a whole of ADF perspective. Without intending to constrain the review, this includes:

2a. **Command and Management**. Identify and develop options for more effective and efficient means for commanding and managing the delivery of Service Policing effects across the ADF.

2b. **Organisation**. Identify and develop force structure options enabling the more effective and efficient delivery of Service Policing effects across the ADF.

2c. **Personnel**. Identify and develop options for the effective and efficient management of SP trades, careers and training.

3. Based on the above task objectives, produce a fully consulted COSC agendum paper to enable ADF senior leadership to determine the way ahead for ADF Service Policing."

1.4.   Out of Scope Activity

During the conduct of this review a number of related reviews have also been underway. These have included, but not limited to:

a.   Summary Discipline Review

b.   IGADF Own Initiative Inquiry into the Service Police Code of Conduct and Professional Standards System

c.   Plan ACRUX (Navy Workforce)

d.   Security Workforce Management Review

e.   Naval Police Coxswain Officer Review

These reviews covered a wide range of areas with related interest to this review.   A challenge has been that the parallel nature of these reviews has seen the development of proposals which overlap in policy or organisational terms with the ADF Service Police.   The review team has engaged regularly with the personnel involved across this effort in order to understand the impacts of likely recommendations and to accommodate these as required. Subject to further directions, engagement across these bodies of work will continue to be required to ensure the alignment of effort and ideas over time.

1.5.   Assumptions

Key assumptions are reflected in the Design Principles for this review which reflect those adopted for the First Principles Review.   It was recognised that the resource environment remains constrained so the Review Team also assumed that any changes proposed must be "Optimised within Existing Resources" but where resource deficits might exist these should be identified and the proposed design should work to mitigate these capability gaps.

1.6.   Constraints

As noted above this Review was conducted in parallel to a range of reviews which have needed to be considered during its conduct and the preparation of this report.   While this has not constrained the findings of this Review they have, and continue to have, some influence on the how proposed Courses of Action may develop in the future and will need to be considered in any future efforts arising from this review.

1.7.   Approach to Review

A read-in, collate, consult, review, analyse and report approach was adopted for the conduct of the review and preparation of this report.

This report is informed by specific consultation and analysis conducted, and the following methods have been used to collect and develop data:

a.   **Stakeholder Engagement.**   Comprehensive engagement with stakeholders identified in the original Statement of Work was undertaken and the engagement list grew to

over 100 people as broader stakeholder interest and involvement was identified. The list of stakeholders engaged is at Annex A.

b. **Literature Review**. Analysis of the Department's records and documentation, detailed in Annex B including:

   i. Past Reviews related to the ADF Service Police

   ii. Doctrine, Guidance, Directives, Policy, manuals associated with ADF Service Police

   iii. Related Five Eyes and NATO Partner doctrine, policy and plans

   iv. Australian Civilian Police Strategic and Capability Plans

c. **Workshop**. A workshop involving 90 plus participants over four days was undertaken to assist with articulating current and future states issues and needs, the identification of undesirable effects and their root causes and the development of possible Courses of Action for organisational reforms. Participants included SP and non- SP personnel, a mix of Officer and Other Ranks, Workforce Planners from all Services, external agencies (ACMC, AFP, and PM–NZDF), and users (base commanders, unit commanders).

d. **Past "Your Say" Survey Analysis.** Analysis of past "Your Say" survey data as it relates to Service Police.

e. **Current SP Workforce Survey**. A comprehensive Workforce survey to all serving Service Police was conducted. This aimed to identify current weight of effort against policing functions and tasks across Services, and identification of issues across the Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC). The Survey had a greater than 30% rate across all Service Police.


Figure 1: Review Approach

1.8. Design Principles

The review established a set of Design Principles to guide analysis and the Course of Action development. These were based upon those adopted for the First Principles Review and were complemented by some additional considerations *(italics below)* relevant to the current Service Police and resource environment.

a.   Align with One Defence.

b.   Clear authorities and accountabilities that align with resources - servicing Joint and Service Needs.

c.   Outcome orientation - Delivering what is required with processes, systems and tools being the 'means not the end'.

d.   Simplicity - Eliminate duplication where possible.

e.   Focus on core business - Find the best mix of Permanent/Part Time/APS.

f.   Professionalism - Fit and Proper people through design.

g.   Timely, contestable advice - Access to excellence.

h.   *Transparency – Adopted Systems, Processes, and Code of Conduct should reflect those of a professional, accountable and transparent organisation.*

i.   *Structure for War, Modify for Peace – design to enable spectrum of operational policing functions.*

j.   *Optimise within Existing Resource Limits - Identify the shortfalls and design to mitigate the gaps.*

As Courses of Actions and other recommendations were developed they were checked for alignment against these design principles.

1.9 Project Governance

A Project Governance Board was established for the review. The Board was chaired by CofS ADFHQ and other members consisted of Service HQ CofS and Single Service Category/Mustering/Corps Leads (Director of Policing and Security N (DPSN)), Director of Security Air Force (DSec- AF), and Head of Corps RACMP).

The Governance Board was established to provide early advice on findings to the Services, to socialise thinking and to seek guidance on issues which may need to be addressed in future activities that will support development of the COSC Paper to be presented in Nov 17.

The Board first met in July 17 after the initial consultation period had concluded. It again met in August, in September (as part of the workshop back brief) and once more during the development of the COSC paper.

2. Current State of the ADF Service Police

2.1 Current ADF Service Police Command and Control (C2) and Workforce Characteristics

The respective Command and Control and workforce characteristics of the ADF Service Police are detailed below.

2.1.1 Joint Service Police Group (JSPG)

2.1.1.1. Policing in the Joint Environment.

The JSPG's principal policing effect is the delivery of investigative support for matters of a serious and/or sensitive nature. It provides a limited range of technical (Forensic, Disaster Victim identification (DVI)) capabilities, and has responsibility for the Technical Control (TECHCON) of ADF wide policing effects.

While ideally environmentally aligned investigative support can be provided by any member of the Joint Investigation Organisation (JIO) to any element of the ADF. JSPG through JIO typically provides the offshore operational investigative capability as required.

It is a mixed regular and reserve capability, leveraging off reservists with a comprehensive civilian police skill set (general duties and investigative).

2.1.1.2. Command and Control

The JSPG is commanded by the Provost Marshal – Australian Defence Force (PM-ADF), and it sits within Australian Defence Force Headquarters (ADFHQ) with PM-ADF being immediately responsible to the Chief of Staff ADFHQ. PM-ADF is the Principal Advisor on Policing Matters to the Chief of Defence Force.

The JSPG was established 16 May 2007 and has as its sole operational element the JIO, formerly known as the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS).

JSPG also provides a headquarters function and its structure is detailed in Annex F. Notably it contains the Service Police Intelligence Organisation (SPIO), Service Police Central Records Office (SPCRO), the Digital Forensic Unit, Forensic Services Branch, the Fraud and Debt Recoveries Unit, and Legal, Operations, Logistics and Coordination cells.

Notably, PM ADF does not have command of any other ADF policing element. The position has no command authority over other Service PM, who remain under Service command but it does retains a Technical Control (TECHCON) relationship with them. Whilst technically the Service PM are in direct support to PM ADF, they are not compelled to adhere to PM ADF's direction. This is evidenced in the selective provision of technical standards data and an inability to develop a common reporting methodology on DPSMS. In this sense TECHCON is achieved through consent rather than a direction based relationship and this has significantly inhibited the ability to achieve coherency and focus in the pursuit of professional standards, capability development, intelligence coordination and consistency in incident reporting.

2.1.1.3. Demographics[1]

As at 30 Jun 17 the head count for Service Police within JSPG was 126 (63 Army, 21 Navy, 32 Air Force) which sits at about 6% below establishment. On average 29 % are female, though the Army (23.8%), Air Force (31%) and Navy (42.9%) are all higher than the norm across the ADF.

2.1.1.4. MEC[2]

All JIO investigators undertaking policing roles are in effect, in an operational role in that a MEC 22 or better should apply. At present 28% of all males and 29% of females are MEC J31 or worse. Of note however, is that better than 40% of all Air Force personnel and 56% of Navy females are MEC J 31 or worse. While the JIO can arguably bear a higher proportion at this category it none the less reflects an unsatisfactory workforce status. This also places a significant burden on those who are deployable as they bear the continuing burden of having to be ready for sea deployment or to undertake land based response tasks if required.

2.1.1.5 Police Training Continuum.

Following selection into JIO there are a range of opportunities to undertake specialist courses, which are linked to pay increments for Army. Of note, Army personnel continue a training and promotion model which requires additional command, leadership, management and professional policing training at each rank increment. While Air Force and Navy undertake the command, leadership and management training (consistent with their Service needs) at each rank increment, there is no requirement for further professional policing development. In this sense, there is a disparity in trained skill set between the three Services with CO JIO observing this is reflected in the quality of work produced by the three Services. His observation was that Army presented as developing the consistently most competent investigators.

Key Finding. The JSPG is a maturing organisation but the PM-ADF has little capacity to influence the maintenance of ADF wide Policing competencies through current TECHCON arrangements. There are significant training disparities between the three Services leaving Navy and Air Force Personnel less well prepared for the investigative roles they perform. The high levels of personnel that are J31 or below cause organisational risk and potentially expose Defence to breaches of Duty of Care.

2.1.2 Navy

2.1.2.1. Policing within Navy

The NPC category arose from the amalgamation of the Naval Dockyard Police and Coxswain Categories, which occurred in 1991. This blended the shore based policing and security function with the Coxswain's discipline and on board regulating and support to ship (non-policing regulating functions – Human Resource Management, Travel/Movement Support, First Aid, Whole of Ship Coordination) duties. These latter duties now dominate on ship,

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[1] Demographics and MEC detail IAW DPG Workforce Data correct as at 30 June 2017
[2] Demographics and MEC detail IAW DPG Workforce Data correct as at 30 June 2017

with a relatively small amount of effort devoted to core policing functions and these are principally related to the delivery of discipline effects. Despite the competing demands of NPC at sea, good policing outcomes are achieved when they are so tasked. The limited training and resources and reduced focus on policing does limit continuing professional development.

It must also be recognised that Naval Shore Establishments effectively operate as ships in terms of structures and procedures. As such, shore based coxswains still perform the full spectrum of their policing and non-policing functions but with an increased emphasis on policing (about 60/40 in favour of policing duties).

The conflation of these duties at sea and on shore establishments reduces the professional policing experience rate of development in comparison to the other Services and also makes it difficult to isolate policing as a discrete function. Notably the 2015/16 Service Police Intelligence Office Operational Assessment observed that across the Navy fleet only 240 incidents were reported (155 discipline related), averaging at just over seven incidents per ship per year. Of interest, patrol boats averaged just over one incident report per year.

Since the creation of the NPC Category, Navy has also introduced Ship's Warrant Officer's and transferred some originally NPC duties across to the Maritime Logistics category. The Review considers there is scope to rationalise the delivery of discipline, HR and Whole of Ship Coordination effects to better enable the isolation of a dedicated Policing category within Navy.

Navy also has some special to Service considerations in relation to NPC.

a. **Ship to Shore Ratios.** NPC numbers are in part driven by ship to shore ratios and the need to keep NPC on Shore establishments poised for service on ships at short notice. The management of these numbers is perhaps complicated by a growing proportion of females in the category who must be posted to shore establishments if pregnant or otherwise ill/injured (as for males). As these personnel fall J31 or below, this also limits their ability to support base policing roles. This places additional burden on those NPC remaining on the shore establishment. More broadly the proportion of NPC that are lower than J31 remains high making them unfit for operational service at Sea or on shore establishments in general duties policing roles (which should be MEC 25 or better).

b. **Prosecutorial Role.** The NPC category is unique in providing both investigatory and prosecutorial roles in relation to DFDA. Within Army/Air Force this latter role is typically executed by any SNCO/Officer. Additionally, the 2015/16 Service Police Intelligent Office Operational Assessment identified over 64% of all NPC investigations are for minor disciplinary offences, which are typically addressed at the unit level by non-service police personnel by other Services. This perhaps further highlights the low tempo of policing, rather than discipline, focused activity, within Navy in comparison to other Services. It should be noted that NPC are regarded as doing the most thorough investigations at this level though the cost vs benefit is perhaps not justified noting that only 3% of minor discipline hearings in Army, which has the highest number of hearings, are overturned on review.

c. **Duties on Ship**. Unlike land based operations NPC on ship may not have the capacity to be reinforced with specialist policing capability at short notice. As highlighted above, the limited policing function of NPC on ships is primarily discipline related but

they must have the capacity to provide a first responder policing effect for minor investigations, serious or complex investigations, and mortuary affairs events. In this sense they still require comprehensive level of policing training and exposure to complex and diverse incidents to generate the appropriate level of experience to operate in isolated environments when embarked for protracted periods. This requires solid "REACT' drills, and perhaps heightened skills in terms of victim support, including for sexual assault.

2.1.2.2. Command and Control

The office of Provost Marshal – Navy (PM-N), sits under the command of the Director of Policing and Security Navy (DPSN). It consists of just nine personnel and provides technical control, quality assurance, limited specialist equipment and information management support over the Naval Police Coxswain (NPC) Capability. The office also provides information management (DPSMS) and Security support to DPSN. PM-N is the Chief of Navy's principal adviser on Service Police support and is Head Defence Investigative Agency - Navy.

The provision of Service Police support to Navy is through the embedding of NPC into shore bases and onto ships where they come directly under command of the Ship/Shore Base Commanding Officers. As such, the effect delivered by the NPC category is highly distributed. PM-N has no command authority over these personnel but does retain the technical control and assurance function over them and also provides advice and assistance to NPCs Fleet Units and Establishments on Policing, Investigation and Policy matters.

At present Navy provides 24 personnel for permanent serious and complex investigative duties to the JIO within JSPG. Once in the JIO, Navy Investigators can return to sea for investigative purpose but do not do so on a permanent basis as part of the Ships posted crew. This does not occur on a regular basis although the Navy's move to a deployed Task Group approach might make ship borne attachments a more regular supporting requirement for JIO personnel. On this basis the Investigator Category was split from the NPC category in 2013 (post the NPC category review) to enable a more professionalised investigative capability. Once streamed as an ADF investigator, NPC do not return to general duties NPC roles.

2.1.2.3. Demographics[3]

As at 30 Jun 17 the head count for Service Police within Navy was 12/193 which sits at about 6% below establishment. 29 % are female and evenly spread across the rank profile. There is a current bias towards SNCO within the NPC category. There is currently a 7 % shortfall at the Leading Seaman level and an 18% shortfall at Petty Officer level, compensated in small part by 66% oversupply of Warrant Officers. Of note, currently 47 Petty Officers are feeding into 61 Chief Petty Officer and above positions. In the oversupplied Warrant Officer Positions, it should be noted that 60% are MEC 3 or below. The associated knock-on effect is that Chief Petty Officers have had restricted promotion opportunities and are spending on average 70% longer time in rank before promotion than their other Service counterparts.

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[3] Demographics and MEC detail IAW DPG Workforce Data correct as at 30 June 2017

The NPC category is an aging force with approximately 30+% of NPC reaching retirement age within the next six years. Efforts are underway to adjust this profile but none the less Navy will lose a significant experience base in the near term.

2.1.2.4. MEC[2]

All NPC undertaking policing roles either at sea or on shore are, in effect, in an operational role in which a MEC 25 or better should apply. At present the NPC category is burdened by high proportions of MEC 3 or below (WO -60%, CPO 25.5%, PO- 31.9%, LS -18.5%) representing almost 25 % of the NPC category. As this 25% cannot serve at sea and must serve on Shore establishments, this represents almost 60% of Shore Establishment NPC are not fit for policing duties. While almost all of these personnel are currently undertaking policing roles Defence is arguably not meeting its duty of care obligations in exposing them to duties which they are temporarily unfit to perform. This also places a significant burden on those who are shore based and MEC25 or better as they bear the continuing burden of having to be ready for sea deployment or to undertake land based response tasks if required.

2.1.2.5. Police Training Continuum

NPC undertake the common entry training into the Service Police, along with their other Service counterparts. Beyond these entry courses there is no additional specialist policing training undertaken. Some will be required to undertake the ADFIC course prior to becoming an investigator within the JIO, but this is the extent of professional policing training and it does not extend to those in the ship borne or shore base policing environments. NPC do undertake a range of non- policing courses to support their other coxswain functions such as Whole of Ship Coordination, First Aid, and Helmsman.

NPC will undertake promotion courses which focus on Command, Leadership and Management however there are no further policing courses required for promotion to PO and above. PM-N is currently looking at addressing this shortfall though changes have not yet been instituted.

NPC Officer (NCPO) transferring from another officer workgroup are required to undertake the Service Police Officers Basic Course. However, NPC commissioning to LEUT are not required to do the Basic Course. Most NPCO fall into the latter category and unless they have completed the ADFIC they are unlikely to have completed any additional policing specific training since the rank of Leading Seaman when they completed their Initial Employment Training.

NPCO will undertake the Navy Officer promotion courses though these have no category specific training to prepare them for more senior policing specific roles. The only other required course is the Security Officer Qualification Course (2 days), the qualification needed to act as a Unit Security Officer. No current NPCO has attended Staff College.

Given the nature of policing within Navy there are also no specific to police command appointments available. As such it arguably is difficult to currently generate a career profile with an appropriate command/training/experience base that would position a NPCO to become PM-ADF and CDF's principal advisor on Service Police matters. To date no NPCO has been PM-ADF, though Navy has posted non NPCO into the position of PM-N.

> **Key Finding.** The NPC and NPCO categories represented a conflated capability that is optimised for Whole of Ship Coordination and related duties do the detriment of the Service Policing Skills. They are significantly undertrained in policing competencies in comparison to Army counterparts. They are an aging capability force that will lose a significant portion through age retirement in the near term. High levels of personnel who are J31, and excessive time in rank at the Chief Petty Officer level suggests significant trade management challenges and suggests Defence is exposed to breaches of Duty of Care. The Review considers there is scope to rationalise the delivery of discipline, HR and Whole of Ship Coordination effects to better enable the isolation of a dedicated Policing category within Navy.

2.1.3 Army

2.1.3.1 Policing within Army

The provision of Service Police support to Army is through two organisations, the Domestic Policing Unit (DPU). The DPU is administratively commanded by PM-A but it provides dedicated policing support to the allocated base and other dependencies. The 1st MP Battalion currently comes under command of 17 CSS Bde though it is anticipated this will transfer to 6 Bde in 2018.

The DPU provides Garrison Policing Support, and engagement with those Army Commander's interviewed highlighted the value in which they are held, albeit with the acknowledgement that they are under resourced for the dependency they support. Their policing rate of effort is constrained primarily by their numbers and their role in supporting security governance audits for Army, which consumes approximately 20% of their effort. Notwithstanding this the DPU generate a solid rate of policing effort on an annual basis.

1st MP Battalion provides the combat policing capability for Army and as such their focus is predominantly on training for operations rather than the delivery of what might be regarded as core law enforcement capabilities. As all MP are posted to the battalion as a first appointment it was identified that there is potential for core policing skills fade unless there is regular reinforcement of those skills learned during Initial Employment Training. While competency logs books go some way to ensuring skills retention a more structured approach is required.

2.1.3.2. Command and Control

The office of Provost Marshal – Army (PM-A), sits under the command of the Adjutant General -Army. The headquarters' element consist of just ten regular and reserve personnel and provides technical control, quality assurance, finance and information management support over the Military Police Capability.

PM-A is the Chief of Army's senior MP Officer and policing adviser. He is also Commanding Officer of the DPU, Head Defence Investigative Authority (Army), the Deputy Service Security Advisor – Army, retains Head of Corps (HOC) support functions as the DHOC, RACMP Capability Coordinator, Corps Doctrine & Policy Coordinator, and the Training Requirements Adviser – Army. In addition the PM-A is the National POC for NATO / ABCANZ in respect of MP (Shield) and the National POC for Forensics and Biometrics (WEF July 17).

PM-A has no command authority over 1st MP Battalion but does retain the technical control and assurance function over them.

2.1.3.3. Demographics[4]

As at 30 Jun 17 the head count for Service Police within Army 98/331 which sits at about 10% below establishment. 43 % are female though it should be noted it appears this number is likely to increase as Army pursues 25% females in Army by 2025. Approximately 67% of MP PTE now in training are female.

The size of Army vis-a-vis the other Services allows it to achieve a more balanced rank profile, consistent and appropriate times in rank, and with inflows/ outflows that appear appropriate to allow for reasonable promotion opportunities. There is currently a 70 % shortfall at the LCPL level and an 18% shortfall at SGT level, compensated in small part by 10% oversupply of PTEs and WOs. The RACMP Unit Establishment Review in 2014-2015 is noted to have introduced issues of retention at SNCO/WO ranks due to loss of promotion/posting opportunities, which exacerbated loss of experienced MP and the capability gap at SGT level.

2.1.3.4. MEC[5]

MP in DPU are employed in operational policing roles and a MEC J22 or better should apply. Those MP in 1 MP Bn require a MEC J22 for deployment but can sustain a proportion in training that are J31 or below. At present 20% of MP are J31 or below. While almost all of these personnel are currently undertaking policing roles, Defence is arguably not meeting its duty of care obligations in exposing them to duties which they are temporarily unfit to perform. This also places a significant burden on those who are J22 or better as they bear the continuing burden of having to be ready for response roles as required.

2.1.3.5. Police Training Continuum

All MP undertake the common entry training into the Service Police, along with their other Service counterparts. Beyond this the RACMP have instituted a robust police training continuum that in addition to command, leadership and management courses also provides policing skill enhancements as a prerequisite for promotion up to the rank of WO1/LTCOL in both general duties and investigative roles. This combined with a structure that provides for command opportunities at all levels up to and including LTCOL ensures Army is well placed to develop personnel with a profile of experience to be suitable as a future PM-ADF.

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[4] Demographics and MEC detail IAW DPG Workforce Data correct as at 30 June 2017
[5] Demographics and MEC detail IAW DPG Workforce Data correct as at 30 June 2017

> **Key Finding**. Army is well placed in terms of a robust police training continuum though continuation training in core policing skills is lacking in 1 MP Bn. PM –A is best structured to influence Policing outcomes by having command of Domestic Policing Units. With nearly 70% of all Initial Employment Trainees now being female, Army may wish to consider whether this represents an appropriate balance for the MP capability. Army runs at approximately 20% J31, suggesting Defence has some exposure to breaches of Duty of Care.

2.1.4 RAAF

2.1.4.1. Policing within Air Force

Unlike Army and Navy, the Air Force Policing environment is slightly different in that Air Force Bases are a platform from which combat operations are launched. This accrues the need for high levels of base and platform security and the need for those operating within that environment to have a sense of how air operations work. In a policing sense this means the Service Police must understand the security requirements of platforms, the special needs of emergency response, and the limitations that the primacy of air operations may have on policing actions. This security overlay and "airside or air operations" awareness is perhaps the key points of difference with their other Service counterparts undertaking Base Policing. This said the core policing skills, as identified in the Service Police Manual, are identical to those of the other Services.

The AFPOL mustering was created out of the restructuring of the Air Force Security Police (SECPOL,) which performed both security and policing functions, and the creation of Security Force Squadrons. The SECPOL mustering was broken into Air Force Security (AFSEC) and Air Force Police (AFPOL) mustering, with the policing numbers being significantly reduced. This very largely occurred as a recognition of the significant additional security burden associated with new Air Force Platforms (JSF, Super Hornet, Growler, P8 etc.) which require an enhance physical security presence over earlier air force platforms. This has been to the detriment to the Force governance effects delivered by the policing capability with incidents rates unlikely to have changed but now largely being unaddressed.

Notwithstanding the size of AFSEC mustering, the additional security burden noted above has required a disproportionately increased security support role for the AFPOL with a substantial amount (estimated at +50%) of time devoted to this role. Notably, the Air Field Defence Guard mustering has retained its high training rate and, despite its significant size and suitability for the task, has substantially avoided diversion to the AFSEC supplementation security support role. The requirement of AFPOL to support security tasking is unlikely to cease in the near term or until Air Force can reassess the allocation of assets to support this role, and this will continue to be at the significant detriment to the delivery of policing support to Air Force.

The conflation of duties reduces the professional policing experience rate of development in comparison to Army. Notably the 2015/16 Service Police Intelligence Office Operational Assessment observed that on average an AFPOL member reported less than 16 incidents and undertook just one investigation (as per DPSMS) per year, which is about less than half that of DPU member in Army.

2.1.4.2. Command and Control

The office of Provost Marshal – Air Force (PM-AF), sits under the command of the Director of Security Air Force. The PM-AF cell currently consists of just two personnel (one additional SQNLDR is currently seconded to the Security Improvement Program) and provides technical control, investigation governance and compliance, finance and information management and assurance support over the Police Capability as well as providing the AFPOL Mustering Capability Manager.   Recent re-tasking has also seen PM-AF undertaking a heightened security support role which now consumes 60% of the positions time. PM-AF is the Chief of Air Force's principal adviser on Service Police support and is Head Defence Investigative Agency –Air Force.

The provision of Service Police support to Air Force is principally through the AFPOL elements integrated into the three Security Force (SECFOR) squadrons of 95 Wing, Combat Support Group.   Each SECFOR Squadron has between two to five AFPOL detachments to support Air Force's Base police support needs. Furthermore, each SECFOR Squadron has the responsibility to generate a deployable Base Policing Detachment of up to six personal utilising a ready, readying, reset model. To date this detachment has not been deployed in the specific policing role but individual police have deployed albeit more often into security roles. Capability development support to the AFPOL detachments is provided through Security Force Squadrons by HQ 95 Wing.

Consistent with Air Force's centralised technical control decentralised command construct, PM-AF has no command authority over AFPOL elements, but retains TECHCON, through HQ95WG/SECFORSQN HQ, in relation to maintaining Service Policing and investigation standards, sponsorship and specialist reporting. While this works well for core Air Force competencies such as air worthiness, in practice for the policing competency as PM-AF retains minimal support staff for TECHCON purposes, actual TECHCON is ineffectual and the command model is demonstrably not working to sustain professional policing excellence.

2.1.4.3. Demographics[6]

As at 30 Jun 17 the head count for Service Police within AF (SECPOL in police related roles and AFPOL) 6/82 (includes those in JIO) which sits at about 2.4% below establishment. 30 % are female.

The rank profile appears balanced, consistent with appropriate time in rank, though inflows/ outflows are inconsistent and have potential to restrict promotion opportunities and perhaps hint to earlier gaps in recruiting. There is currently a 21% shortfall at the WO2 level and a 23% shortfall at SGT level, compensated in small part by 13% oversupply of CPLs. Of concern 44 AFPOL feed 44 Investigator positions within the JIO which appears unsustainable.

2.1.4.4. MEC[5]

All AFPOL are in operational policing roles and a MEC 22 or better should apply. At present 23% of AFPOL are J31 or below.   While almost these personnel are currently undertaking policing roles Defence is arguably not meeting its duty of care obligations in exposing them to duties which they are temporarily unfit to perform. This also places a significant burden

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[6] Demographics and MEC detail IAW DPG Workforce Data correct as at 30 June 2017

on those who are J22 or better as they bear the continuing burden of having to be ready for response roles as required.

2.1.4.5. Police Training Continuum

AFPOL and SECPOLO undertake the common entry training into the Service Police, along with their other Service counterparts. Beyond these entry courses there is no additional specialist policing training undertaken. Some will be required to undertake the ADFIC course prior to becoming an investigator within the JIO, or as a supervisor within the base policing environment though this is an ill-matched course for that requirement.

AFPOL will undertake promotion courses which focus on Command, Leadership and Management however there are no further policing courses required for promotion to SGT and above. Similarly, beyond the Joint Service Police Officer Basic Course, while SECPOLO may do security related courses they do not undertake additional policing specific courses to prepare them for more senior policing specific roles. As such it arguably is difficult to currently generate a career profile with an appropriate command/training/experience base that would position a SECPOLO to become PM-ADF and CDF's principal advisor on Service Police matters.

Key Finding. The AFPOL mustering's ability to develop its core policing competencies is significantly impeded by its diversion to critical security tasks that do not require a core policing competency. The requirement of AFPOL to support security tasking is unlikely to cease in the near term or until Air Force can reassess the allocation of assets, including use of Air Field Defence Guards, to support this role, and this will continue to be at the significant detriment to the delivery of policing support to Air Force. Both AFPOL and SECPOLO (in policing roles) are significantly undertrained in policing competencies in comparison to Army counterparts. The balance between General Duties AFPOL and Investigators (50/50) is unbalanced and unhealthy from a workforce management perspective. High levels of personnel are J31 or below and suggest Defence is exposed to breaches of Duty of Care.

2.2 Current ADF Service Policing/Criminal Environment

The 2015/16 Service Police Operational Assessment (SPOA) produced by the Service Police Intelligence Office perhaps provides the best articulation of the spectrum of incidents currently dealt with by the ADF Service Police. The Joint and Single Service investigative environments each reflect the nuance associated with each domain.

2.2.1 Top Offences by Domain

The top five offences in each domain are:

a.   **JIO.** Offences investigated by JIO reflect the serious and sensitive nature of JIO tasking i.e. Fraud 35%, Sexual Offences 14%, Sudden death 9%, Assault 8%, Drugs 7.6%

b.   **Navy**. Navy figures are skewed by NPC investigating all minor discipline incidents i.e. Discipline 64% Fraud 6.4%, Assault 6%, Security 5%, Theft 4%. If minor discipline actions are excluded the top five offences in Navy are, Fraud 17.6%, Assault 16.7%, Security 14%, Theft 11.8%, Driving Offences 5%

c.   **Army** (DPU only). Theft 49%, Assault 10.6%, damage 10.6%, Discipline (escalated from unit) 9.6%, Driving Offences 9.2%. The high rate of theft is likely related to the higher proportion of live-in soldiers and their high rate of absence from their lines whilst on exercise, combined with the need for an investigation to address loss of a Service issued item.

d.   **Air Force**. Discipline (escalated from unit) 18.7%, Theft 17.3%, Assault 14.7 %, Harassment 10.7%, Fraud 10.7%

2.2.2 Key Observations

In terms of the current offence environment the SPOA makes some key observations:

a.   If Service Police were to undertake proactive policing with respect to new policy, such as relationships with Outlaw motor cycle gangs, the SPOA predicts an increase in related offences.

b.   Proactive traffic enforcement has a direct and positive correlation in reducing traffic accident rates both domestically and in training.

c.   Theft is most effectively targeted at the local level through the implementation of proactive crime reductions strategies. Stakeholder engagement highlighted that the investigation of theft is hampered by the lack of surveillance technologies, particularly in live-in accommodation. It was noted by the Army DPU in Darwin that 28 /40 cases were theft related in 2016 and consumed over a person year of investigative effort for not one prosecution. This highlights the lack of a mature case management capability that considers the cost benefit analysis and arises from small police elements being separated from their command element.

d.   Fraud is the largest investigative liability for the ADF and is primarily related to Rental Allowance, Defence Travel Card misuse and the falsification (intentional and unintentional by failing to notify change in status). Most fraud is detected through anonymous reporting (40%) and less than 20% is through internal audits. The latter is in direct contrast to other Commonwealth Fraud where "detection methods for the incidents almost always involve internal auditing by entities". This suggests that the

rate of fraud is under-detected and a more proactive approach would detect more cases.

e. Assaults. There has been a steady decrease in reporting of assault since 2013 with approximately one third of assaults occurring off base and therefore requiring engagement with civilian police. 5% involve weapons such as glasses and knives and occasionally a rifle (butt stroke or pointing of a weapon). This latter point highlights the need for Service Police to be postured with appropriate PPE and non-lethal systems to address the threats that may confront them. Current PPE only provides a limited scalable non-lethal response i.e. a baton. Discussion with Defence Science and Technology Group has also further highlighted aspects of this challenge in that since 1977 the average Army male has grown approximately 9cm and 8kg and as such the aggravated challenge that Service Police may have to deal with is physically larger (if not stronger) than 40 years ago.

f. Sexual Offences. The SPOA highlights enhanced education/ awareness around sexual misconduct has enhanced the likelihood of reporting and appears to have also reduced the actual incident rate. Only 3% of sexual assault cases fall within ADF jurisdiction and 82% of cases have alcohol or drugs as a contributing factor. The treatment of these matters is complicated by complaint withdrawals, evidential limitations, jurisdictional difficulties and limited police powers. A victim based approach, where their desires take primacy, has some potential to ensure the perpetrators of unresolved crime can continue service without additional monitoring.

g. Drugs. The nature of drug use is changing with reducing patterns in cannabis use and with MDMA, amphetamines, methamphetamines and cocaine being the drugs of choice. Importantly the SPOA assesses that drug use within the ADF is largely under-detected and targeting by Service Police is severely restricted by limited powers of search, seizure and evidence procurement i.e. off base searches /communications evidence.

2.2.3 The Current Crime Focus Spectrum.

The Crime Focus Spectrum contained in Figure 2 below is designed to illustrate the application of the respective Service Police and Civilian Police focus of effort to the criminal environment, the interaction between these spheres and the issue of the Policing Vacuum Concept.

It highlights the interplay between Service Police and Civilian Police in addressing the spectrum of offences seen in the Defence environment. It characterises the challenges with addressing certain offences within Defence.

The Policing Vacuum represents an ungoverned space in the criminal environment which is of relevance to Defence (discipline, security, duty of care, reputation) but below external police interest, seriousness or resource justification thresholds and beyond the capacity of Service Police Jurisdiction, powers or powers to target or address.

It is an area subject to changing and often externally driven offence patterns and unless there are changes in Service Policing approaches it is an area likely to grow and represents in effect ungoverned risk to the ADF. It will be discussed further in the Future State analysis of the Policing/Criminal Environment.

CRIME FOCUS SPECTRUM

Criminal Environment

Policing Vacuum (the ungoverned space)

Drug Use Low level drug supply (<25g), low level harassment, low level indecent acts, OMCG, Cyber Crime

MPs have Interest but do not have powers to address

CIVPOL have powers to address but event is below threshold of interest

Service Crime Liability

Serious offences overseas DFDA S61, Internal Fraud

Civilian Police Remit

Serious Domestic Crime Sudden Death Rape Drug Manufacture Drug Trafficking

Jurisdiction Exchange

Theft, Serious Aslt*,Sexual Aslt*

Non-criminal discipline

Community Safety/Services

Non-shared intelligence and information

Liaison, Shared Intelligence and Information

Military Police

Civilian Police

Figure 2: Crime Focus Spectrum

It notes that there are a range of existing incidents which Service Police are inadequately enabled to address as a result of the limits to the legislative and jurisdictional powers they possess. This is causing issues now and its dimensions arguably represent unaddressed organisational and reputational risk to the ADF.

> **Key Finding.** Against the current crime environment, the ADF Service Police are not sufficiently enabled to Police the force and civilian police do not have the capacity to address all support needs. This represents an "ungoverned space" that is arguably unaddressed organisational and reputational risk to the ADF.

> **Key Finding.** Proactive policing activities have a proportional and positive effect in the reduction of incident rates. A movement to a preventative policing approach provides the most means of addressing ADF incident rates in the absence of adjustments to legislative or Jurisdictional authorities.

> **Key Finding.** ADF Service Police are inadequately equipped to meet the range of threats that can be foreseen. As a minimum the Personal Protective Posture of all Police needs to be addressed including the scalable non-lethal response systems and personal protective ensemble. In their absence, ADF Duty of Care obligations are not being met.

2.3 Current ADF Service Police Jurisdictional Framework

2.3.1 Understanding Jurisdiction.

In general terms, Legislative Authority is vested in the lawful right of designated persons or agencies to exercise governmental power or control. Jurisdiction is the right or power to administer justice, to exercise power and to apply laws.

Service Police are authorised through relevant legislation to take appropriate action against a Defence member. Military jurisdiction is considered to be **the extent of and limitation on the right** of an armed force **to exercise authority and control** over persons and offences e.g.: Military Police may detain a civilian suspect, though the Military justice system is unable to try them.

Legislative powers are intrinsically linked with the concept of Jurisdiction as mutually supporting frameworks. It has been noted that confusion exists across the ADF Service Police community and stakeholders regarding the application of the two frameworks, which is not enabling an effective approach to the coordination of policing effects across regions and between general duties and investigative police functions. Current legislative limitation and complexities are compounded by the existing application of jurisdictional boundaries related to policing within the ADF.

In the future, a well-designed and functioning Jurisdiction model could be seen as a way to establish the controls and assurance over a Service Police force that may otherwise be legislatively empowered to the same degree as their civilian counter parts. This is demonstrated in the UK (also Canada and the US) where their Military Police have the full powers and privileges of constables, identical to civilian police; though established jurisdiction limits their employment of the powers.

Jurisdiction is therefore a central concept underpinning Police operating models, however, in the ADF there is no single reference or authoritative instrument detailing the full extent of jurisdictional freedoms or limitations for Service Police. Jurisdictional limitations are often contained within various doctrine or policy products and in some instances are contra-indicative between Single Service interpretations. Local limitations, advised by base legal officers, particularly in relation to breath testing are also evident and contribute to a lack of consistency in duties.

When Police Jurisdiction is poorly defined and understood by the policing element, the application of policing powers is reduced and this is evident within the ADF Service Police.

2.3.2 The Current Legislative Situation

The DFDA is empowered under the Defence Act 1903 and Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act 1915; however, the Service Police have not been empowered under this act contributing to the growing 'un-governed space' detailed above.

Since 1980, the legislated authorities afforded to Service Police to access information have been eroded through the introduction of new legislation such as the Privacy Act 1988, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, and the Surveillance Devices Act 2007. Additionally, case law and evolving civilian police interpretation of these aforementioned legislative authorities have also reduced Service Police access to information and evidence, e.g. increasingly conservative interpretation of the Privacy Act,

leading to a lack of evidence available to the ADF for Administrative investigations vs DFDA investigations.

There is now also the increasing influence of aging legislation failing to keep up with technology advancement, particularly in response of cyber-crime and cyber-enabled-crime. Information previously stored and accessible as hard copy or locally stored electronic copy, is increasingly stored in the 'cloud' where physical infrastructure is more often than not, located outside Australia, and more likely in countries where Australian law has no influence or Jurisdiction. This is emphasised in Figure 3 below which highlights the significant legislative lag faced in empowering police (civil and military) to effectively police their respective communities.


Figure 3: Legislation Lag vs Technology Rate of Advance

Key Finding. Current legislation is not keeping pace with the emerging challenges presented by advancements in technology. A more adaptive approach through broader jurisdictional boundaries with control frameworks nested within extant legislation may provide opportunities for ADF Service Police to better respond to the future criminal acts. The DFDA should be tested for its fitness for purpose.

2.3.3 The Current Jurisdictional Model.

The current Investigative Jurisdiction model, defined in the SPMAN, is not sufficiently holistic and is specifically used to identify the Service Police elements that are to conduct investigations. The model is based on the application of higher level capabilities as the scale or seriousness of the incident or investigation increases. The single paragraph discussing jurisdiction in SPMAN provides some guidance on how to select an appropriate investigative element, however it also indicates where any contention exists higher guidance should be sought.

The current Service Police Jurisdictional Model is shown at Figure 4 below.

This investigative jurisdiction model is reported to be creating tension between elements of ADF Service Policing and units and is perhaps compounded by the command and cultural separation between domestic and investigative policing elements and between each of the

services and JSPG. Variances in procedural application and less than optimal coordination between these Service Police elements are resulting in delays and quality issues as investigations are progressed to conclusion. The model also fails to adequately define the jurisdictional boundary between unit discipline and Service Police, and similarly at the other end of the spectrum, where the Service Police jurisdiction wains and the CIVPOL jurisdiction take primacy.


Figure 4: ADF Police Investigation Jurisdiction Model

Broader jurisdictional problems exist due to a lack of a broad and holistic model. For instance, Single Services have established domestic policing Jurisdictional limitations, by instituting the notion of a Single Service nexus. This limitation has created a situation where artificial jurisdictional boundaries have been created limiting Service Police delivery of common policing effects to ADF members of Services different to their own. This is now reflected in the attitudes of Service personnel, where these is an increasing belief that Service Police from another Service have no authority over them. This perpetuates an "us and them" culture and works against the need identified in past reviews to establish a more unified policing culture.

Another Jurisdictional example is where Joint doctrine covering mortuary affairs has imposed a limitation on the personnel who have jurisdiction to those perform duties. By specifying JIO (formerly ADFIS) as the organisation who can perform the relevant duties, the ADF has limited the opportunity to use other appropriate Service Police resources to produce the required outcomes.

The establishment and maintenance of less than optimal jurisdictions for Service Police not only limit the current capability, but more importantly, will progressively contribute to poor delivery of the Service Policing effect into the future. This will be increasingly evident as the ungoverned space between Civilian Police and Service Police continues to expand in scale and/or complexity.

Considerations for a future jurisdictional model are outlined in Section 4.1.

Key Finding. The Service Police Jurisdictional Model requires review to ensure the allowed Military Jurisdiction is sufficiently enables Service Police with appropriate powers to police the force and provide police support to the force into the future. This will require close coordination with the Summary Discipline Review and Defence Legal.

Key Finding. The failure to create a more unified policing model perpetuates an "us and them" culture and has led to the creation of artificial jurisdictional boundaries that limit Service Police delivery of common policing effects to ADF members of Services different to their own.

2.4 Current ADF Service Police Needs, Functions and Tasks

2.4.1. The Fundamentals

A critical requirement to describe the performance characteristics of any capability is to clearly articulate organisational needs. These high level capability needs are informed by strategic guidance and translate into cascading capability concepts, doctrine, plans and organisational groupings. The current state environment of the ADF Service Police was analysed from a first principles approach utilising the following framework to determine the needs of Service Police from a "whole of ADF" perspective.


Figure 5: First Principles Approach to Capability Design

2.4.2. ADF Service Police – Understanding the Need

The ADF Service Police capability has no unifying Joint concept, no specific Joint doctrine nor Joint strategic plan. Fundamentally, the capability suffers from a lack of guidance at the strategic level, including no relevance within the Defence White Paper or Future Operating Concepts. While attempts have been made to develop a Joint Strategic Plan, these approaches have focussed solely on the investigative capability resident within the now Joint Service Police Group (JSPG)[7]. Consequently, neither Senior Leadership, key stakeholders nor the ADF Service Police community itself have a clear definition of ADF Service Police or a vision for the future development of a Joint approach to the capability.

In the absence of a definition of the Joint Capability Needs of Service Police, the Single Services have adopted individual approaches to defining the capability requirement of their respective Service Police elements. These approaches are not unified through a 'whole-of-ADF' framework and therefore the Single Service approaches have been developed, largely in doctrinal isolation, to address specific Service requirements with no perspective on how

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[7] Plan Sherlock: ADFIS Strategic Plan 2009 - 2020

their Service Police elements contribute to the Joint environment in either a domestic or overseas operational context.

Army has the most mature approach with an agreed capability needs statement, specific land warfare doctrine and numerous tactical level concepts of employment for Military Police in the land environment, though much of this requires update. While having no doctrine, Air Force has a range of specific directives and (draft) Concepts of Operation that focus on policing as a security enabler with no clear articulation of the unique requirements for policing. Similarly, Navy have no specific doctrine and available directives and concept of operations focus on other non-policing tasks performed by the Naval Police Coxswain. Currently, there does not exist an approach for the conduct of Joint policing in support of Joint operations. Extant frameworks provide guidance on the employment of police only within Service specific domains.

	Legislation	Government Directive	Strategic Concepts	CONEMP/ CONOPS	Application and Procedural Doctrine	Directives and Instructions
Joint	🟠	⚫	⚫	🔴	🟠	🟤
Navy	🟠	⚫	⚫	🔴	⚫	🟠
Airforce	🟠	⚫	⚫	🔴	⚫	🟠
Army	🟠	⚫	⚫	🟤	🟢	🟢

🟢 Readily and freely available body of knowledge or publication. Containing the full breadth of knowledge focused on Service Policing	🔴 Limited published knowledge, often difficult to locate and use effectively. Publications make limited mention or implication to Service Policing
🟠 Available knowledge, possibly contained as part of another related body of knowledge. Has direct linkages to Service Policing	⚫ Not available, published knowledge.

Figure 6: Current Legislation, Concept and Doctrine Status

The lack of Joint Philosophical, Procedural and Application level Doctrine continues to contribute to poor unification of the Service Police capability across the ADF. While Joint technical standards and tactical procedures are outlined in the extant ADF Service Police Manual (SPMAN), it continues to focus primarily on the application of investigative requirements within the directed jurisdictional model. Furthermore, in the absence of any strategic guidance the SPMAN, despite being authorised by CDF, is viewed by many Service Police elements as the pseudo document that provides a continuum of strategic guidance through to tactical level processes. While a sound procedural manual, it is not recognised within the hierarchy of concepts and doctrine as the authoritative document that informs the higher level capability definition and development that will ultimately enable any vision for a professionalised and unified ADF Service Police capability.

Key Finding. The establishment of a coherent Joint Doctrine Hierarchy for Service Police may enable a formalised framework start point for the alignment and future development of strategic concepts, capability development and technical application of the Service Police effects in a 'whole-of-ADF' approach and within the Joint operational environment.

2.4.3. ADF Service Police – Defining the Current State Need

Establishing a clear definition of what the ADF requires of its Service Police, in a Joint context, has not been established previously and has not been assisted by the disaggregation of information, and incomplete transmission of functions and tasks, across a range of Service related documentation. The lack of a clear Joint capability needs statement continues to inhibit the development of a "whole-of-ADF" approach to Service Police. The impact is a lack of a unified approach and understanding across the Services and Joint Service Police Group in their approach to policing and application of legislative authority in both a domestic and overseas operational context. Without a Joint understanding of the Joint and Service needs of the policing capability, synchronised capability development and professionalization of the force is likely to experience friction into the future. A detailed review of existing documentation, interviews and workshops with relevant stakeholders has confirmed the lack of clear understanding of the ADF Needs of the Service Police capability.

In conducting the review, the project team was able to draw upon multiple sources to consolidate a range of statements that articulated elements of what both Defence Senior Leadership, Formations and Unit Commanders and Service Police members themselves understood the current needs were of the respective Service Police elements. The project team was able to consolidate a range of features of a needs statement for ADF Service Police, which was then analysed and modified through the stakeholder workshop. The proposed framework to define Service Police needs and outcomes agreed by workshop stakeholders is outlined below:

Joint Element	Description
Capability Needs Require / Lead to	ADF Service Police **Need** to: • Support Command with strategic policing advice • Provide law enforcement, policing and enabling security effects supported by modern technology • Provide an intelligence-led, investigative and discipline capability • Be interoperable across the Services, Allies, Local and International Agencies • Be operationally ready in domestic, deployed and disconnected environments

Joint Element	Description
Require / Lead to Organisational Outcomes	If successful, the ADF Service Police capability will **achieve**: • An efficient, proactive, transparent and sustainable Joint policing capability underpinned by credible police tradecraft that is in tune with Single Service requirements • An ADF policing capability that: ○ Upholds the rule of law ○ Provides Command with the ability to make informed decisions around serious, sensitive and strategic personnel matters ○ Supports Command with advice on environmental threats and risks ○ Supports the reputation of, and discipline across, the ADF ○ Provides a well-equipped, resourced and professional policing effect for capable of adapting to domestic and deployed operations with appropriate authority ○ Achieves a safer security environment

Key Finding. Agreement is required on a Joint Capability Needs Statement for ADF Service Police that establishes the baseline to shape future strategic guidance, joint doctrine and capability development plans.

Further detailed elements of the needs statement are contained in Annex D.

2.4.4. Functions and Tasks

As detailed in Section 2.1 the Services employ their respective Service Police elements differently. While core functions do exist, the focus of effort on those functions vary across the Services to meet the required raise/train/sustain, force protection and operational priorities. In addition to core policing functions, Services employ their respective police elements across a range of non-Service Police roles. An example is the Navy Police Coxswain is expected to perform the roles of "whole ship-coordination", which does not require a police competency nor the employment of police specific skill sets.

The Joint publication, Service Police Manual (SPMAN), attempts to articulate the Common and Single Service Police roles and tasks. The specific issue with the current SPMAN is the confusion created by conflating Policing Functions, Tasks and Roles with roles and tasks which require no policing competency. The following SPMAN diagram (Figure 6) confuses Roles and Tasks across both the Joint and Single Service Domains:

Figure 7: SPMAN Vol1, Section 2: Common and Single-Service Police Roles and Tasks

While acknowledging that Service Police are employed differently across the Service and Joint environments, no consolidated articulation of the unique and specific functions of tasks required of Service Police exist. SPMAN outlines five Service Police Functions[8]: Law and Order, Support to Security Operations, Support to Emergency Management, Movement Support, and Detainee Management. However, the application of roles and tasks across functions are inconsistent in SPMAN and do not accurately reflect the employment of ADF Service Police across the Services. There are also inconsistencies with the doctrine, directives, CONOPS, and other guidance that does exist. The effect is a poor understanding across the ADF of the capabilities of each of the Service Police elements, friction in the management of tasking across jurisdictional boundaries and less than optimal consistency in the application of technical standards.

After reviewing the range of relevant reference material and literature across the ADF, the review team developed a comprehensive list of Service Police functions and tasks. The range of tasks were subject to critical review through Provost Marshal offices and a dedicated workshop, which developed a consolidated grouping of tasks across nine functional groups that reflect those functions spanning domestic and overseas operational requirements.

The following Figure 7 detailed the functional grouping and tasks. Other than Security Governance, what it is not highlighted are those functions performed by Service Police that do not require a core police competency.

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[8] SPMAN Vol 1, Part 1, Annex 2A, Table 2A-1: Common Service Police Roles and Tasks

Figure 8: ADF Service Police Functions and Task

Analysis of NZ, UK, Canadian, US and NATO Service Police strategic plans indicated alignment of the workshop agreed ADF Service Police Tasks with Five Eyes and NATO partners. Commonality between partner Nations is likely to improve ADF interoperability and credibility.

The specific weight of effort and prioritisation of Service Police elements vary across the specified functions and tasks. While the above functions and tasks reflect the 'whole of ADF' requirement, individual Services provide direction on the unique application of specific tasks to their Service domain requirements. For example, Navy do not maintain a military working dog support task as it is not required in the Maritime domain; however, Naval Police Coxswains may be expected to understand the application of the working dog capability to support police operations in a Joint environment. There is no common understanding how the range of Service Police functions and tasks could be applied and synchronised within the Joint operational environment

Key Finding. Agreement is required on the ADF Service Police Functions and Tasks to provide a common understanding of the application of policing effects in the garrison and Joint operational environments

In order to generate a full appreciation of the employment of ADF Service Police, it is important to understand the variety of "Service Specific Non-Policing" tasks performed by members. These tasks impinge on the ability of Services to generate a complete "policing capability". The extra-policing tasking is indicative of the unique AFS pressures on Services. It constrains sufficient manpower effort across current and emerging priorities necessary to relieve Service Police members to focus solely on policing specific effects, particularly within Navy and Air Force. Aside from the necessary Command/Control/Management/Governance responsibilities of Service Police Units/Elements; the key non-policing tasks include:

a.   HR Coordination Planning

b.   Corrective Training and Rehabilitation

c.   Ship Regulation

d.   Navigation (MWV/MCP)

e.   Whole-of-Ship Coordination

f.   Management of personnel movements

g.   Support to Head-of-Corp (Army)

h.   Support to Force Generation / Operational Generation

i.   Security Governance (Navy and Army)

j.   Support to Platform/Base Security (Air Force)

A workflow analysis was conducted across each Service police element to determine the weight of effort in the last 12 months against each task and understand the tension in developing a common application of Service Policing across the ADF. This analysis was based on anecdotal evidence through stakeholder interviews, specific weighted effort analysis in a stakeholder workshop and feedback through and ADF Service Police survey. The results of the collected data are located at Annex E.

It was estimated that approximately 40-50% of effort is estimated to be focussed on the core policing function of Law Enforcement. However, less than 30% of effort is expended on foundational skills developed through general duties and investigative policing. The implication for the ADF in a constrained environment is that it does not enable appropriate rate of effort to achieve the needs and outcomes desired of the Service Police (as a proactive, intelligence led capability), which is generated through general duties policing. It also introduces an indicator that the ADF continues to be challenged to generate professional police mastery where the depths of experience across core skills are not being developed.

Further challenges to the ADF Service Police capability is an estimated 30% of effort is expended on non-policing functions that require no specific policing competency or skill to execute. In Navy's context, it is reported that upwards of 60-70% of NPCs time on board ships is expended performing "whole-of-ship coordination" and other specific seamanship roles (less than 40% on Shore Establishments). Air Force Police are disproportionately utilised to supplement or perform security specific tasks while Army Domestic Police Unit staff have disproportionate tasking to performing physical security assessments of base facilities. Stakeholders and ADF Service Police members through workshop analysis have confirmed the review team's observation that the significant amount of time spent on non-policing functions are impacting their ability to deliver the expected needs and outcomes of the policing capability effects.

Key Finding. Service Police elements expend a disproportionate weight of effort on governance and non-police functions at the expense of developing core policing skills and enabling the achievement of a professionalised "whole-of-ADF" police capability

While opportunities can be explored to remove duplication across Services in the Command/Control/Management/Governance function and return latent capacity into core law enforcement functions/tasks, the same is not easily achieved in the other non-policing functions. Approaches to separate Service Police elements from non-policing tasks only

introduces further risk to the Services through redirection of those functions to other workforce elements that are also under similar pressures. The symbiotic nexus between policing and non-policing tasks is particularly challenging for Navy and Air Force:

a.   **Navy.** The Naval Police Coxswain performs a range of human resource, whole-of-ship coordination and regulation functions that are enabled through the delivery of an effective discipline system. Removal of these functions from the coxswain would introduce an untenable redistribution of tasks to other members of the ships company. The relationship for shore establishments is similar but to a much lesser degree given reduced requirement for these functions ashore. Since the creation of the NPC Category, Navy has also introduced Ship's Warrant Officer's and transferred some originally NPC duties across to the Maritime Logistics category. The Review considers there is scope to rationalise the delivery of discipline, HR and Whole of Ship Coordination effects to better enable the isolation of a dedicated Policing category within Navy.

b.   **Air Force.** The Air Force Police (AFPOL) currently provide a supporting enabler to the Air Force Base security effect that seeks to protect both personnel and critical aerial platforms and associated infrastructure. Removing AFPOL from SECFOR Squadrons, even if retained on the base, may introduce some manning pressures to replace security force personnel gaps to enable required levels of security effort, though the Review considers adequate resources exist within ADG to address this with minimal impact to ADG capability. AFPOL would still need to continue the provision of police intelligence and incident support to SECFOR elements to inform the overall base security environment.

> **Key Finding**. Removal of non-police functions from Naval Police Coxswains on board ships cannot be achieved without significant detrimental impacts and unsustainable work distribution across extant ships' crew unless there is some rationalisation between Coxswain, MLP and SWO roles in the delivery of discipline, HR and Whole of Ship Coordination effects to better enable the isolation of a dedicated Policing category within Navy.

The generation of skills and experience to effectively deliver the range of policing effects, within complex jurisdictions and authorisations, in a Joint operational environment are reliant on the regular performance of those skills within the domestic garrison and training environments. The current organisational and directed Service priorities do not afford the necessary exposure to the complexity, tempo and diversity of policing actions required to be performed in a deployed Joint operational environment. While a majority of Service Police indicate they are comfortable to deploy within their Service domains, over 50% of ADF Service Police members surveyed indicate they are not adequately prepared to perform policing tasks in a deployed Joint operational environment (outside of their Single Service operating domains).

> **Key Finding**. ADF Service Police are not generating sufficient professional experience across core policing functions and task to ensure they are sufficiently prepared to support deployed Joint operational requirements, outside of their Single Service environments.

2.5 Professional Baseline

2.5.1. Selection

Unlike civilian equivalents, the ADF has no specific to category selection criteria beyond meeting general entry requirements to the ADF.

a.   **Navy.** Navy selection is generally by transfer from another category and is preceded by a four week assessment period working within an NPC Office.

b.   **Army.** Army has no specific entry requirements for entry as a military police person beyond meeting general entry requirements. Army previously selected through transfer from other corps for entry at CPL level, providing a greater assurance of maturity and experience. Army now direct recruits into the rank of PTE and there is no minimum age limit.

c.   **Air Force.** Air Force has no specific entry requirements for entry as a military police person beyond meeting general entry requirements. Air Force also direct recruits into the rank of CPL with a minimum age of 18 as ab initio entrants.

d.   **JIO.** Current selection into JIO is initially through an expression of desire by currently serving Service Police, followed by a short term placement and an interview conducted other JIO staff. Selection does not include a psychometric assessment that addresses suitability for investigative and other duties such as Sexual Assault, fraud or e-crime investigator. Those entering the JIO are required to successfully undertake the ADFIC course, which can be completed at the rank of E5 (Corporal(E)); though arguably, as its purpose is to prepare people for supervisory roles in an investigatory framework it is not required until promotion to E6 (Sergeant(E)).

e.   **Civilian police Counterparts.** The key areas of difference between civil and military police recruitment/entry requirements are that civilian police require:

   i.   A suitability for police character assessment,

   ii.   Psychometric testing standards (intelligence, literacy and emotional intelligence testing) with specific to policing requirements,

   iii. A baseline eligibility for NV1 clearance,

   iv.   A panel interview conducted by serving police.

Of note, the IGADF Own Initiative Inquiry into the Service Police Code of Conduct and Professional Standards System has identified the need to sustain Service Police as "Fit and Proper" persons. Current entry standards would arguably fail this baseline requirement whereas adoption of a higher recruitment standard, akin to that adopted by the AFP and other civilian counterparts, would establish a robust baseline for entry. Additionally, the civilian criteria work to assure the emotional and psychological robustness for undertaking policing related duties.

> **Key Finding.** Selection processes for both initial entry and investigative ADF Service Police are indiscernible form general entry requirements. The ADF should develop selection standards akin to those of the AFP that address communications skills, emotional intelligence, and psychological robustness consistent with the needs of policing duties.

2.5.2. Policing Expertise

Policing expertise is developed through a combination of training and experience, with the latter being grown through tempo of operation, case complexity and diversity.

2.5.2.1 Training

While the Service Police Manual seeks to articulate the core policing competencies, the ADF does not have a common standard of core policing training continuum across the Services and across the respective rank levels. Air Force and Navy do not undertake any additional policing specific training beyond the rank of CPL/LS or FLGOFF/Sub-LEUT. Most NPCO have received no additional policing training beyond the rank of LS other than the ADF Investigators Course.

2.5.2.2 Policing Experience

The ADF undertakes a general recruitment regime which generally selects quality people with an overwhelming desire to do good. While they are of course a reflection of broader society, their "offence" rate is generally low in comparison to the community at large, particularly in relation to more serious crimes. Defence does of course have a discipline overlay that the civil community does not have but addressing these issues does little to grow policing experience. Similarly, jurisdictional limitations ensure that beyond identifying an offence is in the civilian domain, Service Police have very little opportunity to address complex crimes unless they occur on operations. In this sense, the current Service Policing development is constrained by the nature and frequency of offences within Defence.

Experience development is also a function of the tempo of police related activity, which is very closely linked to their parent Service. The rate of policing activity is difficult to measure from Service to Service as they have different incident reporting criteria and policies.

a. **Navy.** The mixed roles of NPC, spread across policing, Whole of Ship Coordination, Regulating, and first aid responsibilities ensure a relatively low rate of policing effort in comparison to other Services. This is particularly so on ship where the focus of effort (estimated at 60-80% of effort) is on those non-policing duties detailed above. Of note the 2015/16 Service Police Operational Assessment (SPOA) identified that just under 70% of all incidents dealt with by NPC are of a minor discipline nature that are dealt with by non-police personnel in the other Services. A key point of difference is that NPC both investigate and prosecute these cases making them highly competent in this respect. This discipline focus, whilst providing some continuing professional development, does reduce their capacity to address other policing functions and this is evident in the residual rate of policing effort. The Service Police Operational Assessment (previously noted) identified that there are on average just seven incident reports per ship with just 2.5 being related to non- discipline law enforcement events. Shore establishments undertake a higher rate of policing effort (approximately 60% of effort) but again there were only approximately 160 non- discipline law enforcement incidents reported across all navy Shore establishments in 2015/16 making for a low rate of activity to develop core policing skills.

b. **Air Force.** AFPOL provide an operational base policing capability where the core capabilities reflect a largely domestic policing function. Due to current operational requirements they provide a significant amount of security support, consuming an estimated 50% of their daily effort. This reduces the tempo of their policing effort and

works to limit the depth of their experience base. Air Force has about one third the incident rate of Army and one quarter the investigation rate, which appears to be a result of Air Force's high inclination towards addressing issues administratively. This again highlights the lower rate of experiential development for Air Force.

c.   **Army.** Army DPU's primary role is to undertake Garrison Policing support. This capacity is somewhat diminished as of a result of imposed security governance responsibilities, which were transferred to the Military Police with the demise of 3 Intelligence Company. This function does not require a policing competency but currently consumes 15-20% of the available Domestic Policing effort. Notwithstanding this, DPU undertake a consistent rate of policing effort. In contrast, MP posted to 1 MP Bn undertake a considerable amount of training but conduct very few "live" incident actions. While training develops their combat support policing skill it does mean they do undergo an element of technical policing skills fade whilst they are posted to the battalion, unless they are regularly exposed to technical policing roles. This is particularly evident in initial employment privates who are exposed to little law enforcement policing in this initial posting.

d.   **JIO.** In comparison to civilian equivalents, the personnel from the JIO have both a low rate of investigative effort and low relative complexity, despite their stated focus on major and serious. The SPOA identifies fraud is the most prolific crime investigated, followed by sexual offences, sudden death, assault and drug related crimes. This low level and narrow spectrum of events, being quite broadly distributed across the country arguably limits the development of a routine familiarity with these cases and contributes to longer case development times. It should also be noted that as JIO Investigators are recruited from the general duties areas within their Services, the experience base upon entry can vary quite dramatically.   This is reflected in overall performance with the current CO JIO (an Air Force member) identifying Army as providing the most consistently proficient investigators, followed by AF and then Navy, in terms of specialist capability.

Key Finding. The development of core policing competencies is inconsistent across the Joint and Single Service environment. Training levels are inconsistent at almost all rank levels and the rate of policing activity is compromised by diversion to roles that do not require a core policing competency for their delivery. While ADF Service Police will likely always have a lower rate, complexity and diversity of cases than civilian counterparts, the consistent application of effort to police tasks, of all types, teamed with a robust training continuum, provides the most reliable means to develop an ADF Service Police capability that is fit for purpose.

2.7 The Current ADF Service Police Model

A policing model can be described as a representation of a commonly accepted policing theory or practice. It is structured around specified policing assumptions and theoretical constructs, and is governed by accepted rules of inference in the particular field of policing. *As it describes and explains essential aspects of a policing concept, it is the essence of the accepted principles of organizing a police force and offers the best way of understanding a policing approach.*

In short, 'Policing Models' refer to alternative ways of 'Doing Policing' which might relate to:

a. The policing style of the whole police organisation - How it is oriented and what it views as priorities for the police organisation.

b. The policing approach adopted by units within a police organisation, how those units are to go about their specific function.

c. Policing techniques which at least some sections of the police organisation adopt in order to fulfil their function.

In the civilian police there are a variety of policing models and in practice police forces can typically employ a combination of models to deliver their full spectrum of capability. These can include predictive, Intelligence led, problem oriented, and community based approaches. Policing in the military environment has nuances that do not exist in their civilian counterparts, in particular the command support and mission oriented nature of policing in the Defence environment.

In its consultation with PM-ADF, the Service PMs, and other Service Police it was telling that little or no thought had been given to identifying the ADF Service Police approach to policing at either the Joint or Single Service Level.

While most would identify the ideal characteristics, both domestically and on operations, as being intelligence lead, proactive, mission oriented and preventative, almost all identified that at present the ADF Service Policing Model could best be described as reactive. When asked why this was the case the lack of capacity resulting from resourcing and diversion to other non-policing tasks, a lack of coordination of tasking, the absence of an intelligence culture all contributed to an inability to achieve the desired Policing Model.

As the establishment of a policing model is central to identifying how a police force structures and delivers its effects the Review believes an agreed policing model sets the foundation for how the Service Police will structure and approach delivery into the future. This will be discussed further in the Future State section of this report.

3.   The Need for Change

3.1 Implications of Other Reviews

This Review aligns with a number of other efforts addressing the ADF's Legal and Disciplinary frameworks and this coincidence presents a time limited opportunity to coherently address the totality of the identified issues. Reviews of particular note are outlined below.

3.1.1. Summary Discipline Review (SDR).

The SDR is being conducted slightly ahead of but generally in parallel with the ADF Service Police Review. Its focus of effort on the DFDA potentially has longer term implications for the delivery of policing effects but given the requirement for legislative change these are likely to occur in the longer term. Of note, the 2008 adjustments to the DFDA which led to the requirement for criminal levels of proof, even for basic discipline cases, substantially added to the investigative burden and time taken to develop cases for hearing. The associated delay in the ability to hear cases remains a substantive source of dissatisfaction amongst commanders. While the SDR may result in streamlining this model, it is unlikely to influence major structural changes arising from this review. Should this aspect be reformed it will positively influence the investigative load of all Service Police and arguably free up a great proportion of time to undertake proactive intelligence led, preventative policing tasks.

3.1.2. IGADF Own Initiative Inquiry into the Service Police Code of Conduct and Professional Standards System.

This Inquiry ran parallel to the ADF Service Police Review but has now been completed with the report now being finalised after a period of consultation. While the report's recommendations are yet to be agreed a key recommendation is that the IGADF should have an enhanced role in monitoring the performance of all Service Police personnel with a view to maintaining their status as a "fit and proper person". This recommendation has a number of implications which this review considers should be integrated into future reform;

a.   While IGADF will have prime oversight and responsibility for determining that breaches of professional standards or code of conduct have occurred the PM-ADF should oversee the treatment of such a breach through either disciplinary, administrative or retraining approaches.

b.   In order to be responsive to IGADF direction, the PM-ADF should establish the necessary structures and mechanisms within JSPG to monitor, manage and address professional standards and code of conduct across all Service Police.

3.2 Benchmarking with Five Eyes and NATO Allies

The Review conducted a benchmarking activity against ABCA and NATO Allies.

3.2.1. Doctrine

There is no Joint Service Police Doctrine. Where doctrine exists it is constrained to Single Service environments and lags the contemporary thinking evident in other Five Eyes and NATO doctrine. Army is the only Service with specific policing doctrine, which is in the process of alignment with ABCA and NATO doctrine. The differences largely reflect that other Five Eyes partners and NATO allies have rewritten their doctrine more recently than the ADF and have incorporated areas addressing the inclusion of Stability Operations Policing (Capacity Building, Sexual and Gender Based Violence, Protection of Civilians, and protection of Cultural Artefacts) and Technology enhancements (Biometrics/DNA). These aspects are addressed later in this report, but it is important for the purposes of Interoperability that the ADF address these capabilities from a Service Police perspective.

3.2.2. C2

The ADF's Five Eyes Partners provide some interesting C2 contrasts:

a. **NZ.** NZ has moved to a fully Joint Service Police Organisation with all Policing assets centralised to the PM NZDF who subsequently provides allocated policing support to the Joint and Single Service environment. While police remain environmentally aligned PM NZDF has the capability to cross level resources, as and when required. This has meant that they have had Air Force Police providing policing support aboard ships and on Army Bases, and similarly Navy Police have provided support to Air Force and Army, and Army Police to Air Force and Navy. Of note, the PM-NZDF was recruited from the NZ civilian Police and has overseen the transformation from Single Service to Joint Police in the past three years. While retaining Single Service emblems the NZDF has adopted the standard NATO term "Military Police" to describe all personnel (Navy, Army and Air Force) delivering Police effects and this is reflected on uniform Brassards (with retained service insignia). NZ Military Police are unarmed.

b. **Canada**. Canada has also adopted a Joint Policing Model with a single PM-CDF controlling all Army, Navy and Air Force Police. It is a deliberately land centric training model with all police undertaking the Army training continuum, supplemented by environmental top ups for those servicing in the Air Force or Naval environments. As for NZ, while there remains an environmental alignment for most support the PM-NZDF has the ability to reinforce support into one environment with personnel from the other Services as required. Unlike Australia, Canadian Military Police have equivalent jurisdictional powers to civilian police and are armed. Canada also adopts the standard NATO term "Military Police" to describe those delivering Police effects and this is reflected on uniform Brassards.

c. **UK**. The UK currently retains three Single Service Police Forces though it was identified by PM-ADF during the September NATO Military Police Conference that the UK is about to enter discussions about the potential for a Joint Policing Capability. The size of the UK Armed Forces and its Services has thus far largely enabled the retention of Single Service policing capabilities though the downsizing of all three Services is a prime driver of this Joint Policing consideration. The UK's troubled history in Northern Ireland has also driven other variations. UK Military Police are armed, though within

the UK jurisdiction model their powers are restricted to bases and training areas. UK bases are also protected by Military Police Armed Guards who are civilians (almost universally ex-military) but who retain some conditions of service (housing and medical). They have a rank system up to WO1 but have civilian scales of pay, presumably providing a more economical base security force. This very largely addresses the base security issue by providing a 24/7 Armed first response capability which buys time for the subsequent civilian police response capability. The UK retains Naval and Military police though in the international environment they use the standard NATO term "Military Police" to describe those delivering Police effects.

d.   **US.** As for the UK, the size of US Forces has enabled retention of Single Service police forces although all use the standard NATO term "Military Police" to describe those delivering Police effects and this is reflected on uniform Brassards. US Military Police are armed and have equivalent powers of search, detention and arrest to civilian police. The US also has a Defence Civilian Police Force who are armed and provide the base policing and first response security effect. These forces can be supplemented by co-located Military Police elements. PM-ADF engagement with his US equivalent during the NATO Military Police conference in September identified that the delineation between base and operational policing, and the focus on special to Service operational policing, has eroded their core policing skills and they are now re-emphasising the importance of their domestic policing role in generating operational policing capability.

e.   **NATO**. NATO member nations utilise Military Police in many different ways. National history, the presence of Gendarmerie style police forces such as the Italian Carabineer, Dutch Marechaussee, or the French National Gendarmerie in addition to Military Police, and the size of force being supported all play a very significant role in the shape of Police Force and how they are utilised. Common amongst all is the use of the standard NATO term "Military Police" to describe those delivering Police effects and this is reflected on uniform Brassards throughout NATO. Amongst the member nations there are a range on nations that reflect Single Service approach and other that have a Joint approach to Military Policing. The move to the latter is often size related as the smaller the asset the more centralised command and control is required to optimise usage against priorities.

3.2.3. Terminology

The ADF is unique in the use of the term "Service Police" to describe its policing capability, though this term does little to imply the effects that are delivered. As noted above Five Eyes and NATO Partners generally adopt the standard NATO term "Military Police" to identify their respective Policing capabilities of all three Services as it facilitates ready understanding of the capabilities delivered. The UK does retain the term Naval Police when Naval Police operate in the maritime domain, but uses the term MP when they are in the Joint environment.

The review recognises the importance of Single Service identity from a recruiting and culture perspective and noted the need to retain Single Service insignia i.e. Coxswain, RACMP, and AFPOL if the MP term be adopted. The review also recognises that, unlike like the land based policing activities of Army and Air Force personnel, Naval operations rarely present a joint policing environment. This said the adoption of the term Military Police to describe the collective policing capability in the Joint Land Environment, which captures the

permanent Air Force and Army status and Navy when they do operate on Land, and the term Naval Police when operating in the Naval environment still works to improve understanding of the effects delivered and interoperability in general. All personnel when operating in the Joint Environment would wear the MP Patch, albeit whilst retaining their single service insignia and titles. The adoption of a "one tribe many colours" approach under a common "military police" banner when operating in the joint environment would make a marked contribution to creating a more unified policing culture.

Key Finding. In the interest of conformity and the promotion of common interoperability terminology that the ADF should consider the adoption of the standard NATO term "Military Police" to describe the ADF's policing capability, regardless of Service, when operating in the Joint Environment. For NPC operating solely in the Naval Environment the term "Naval Police" should be adopted to replace "Service Police". In terms of Uniform the form "MP" should be adopted on uniform patches and with Single Service Policing Insignia to be retained in the Joint Policing environment and the form "NP" adopted by Naval Police when operating solely in the Naval Environment. The adoption of a "one tribe many colours" approach under a common "military police" banner when operating in the joint environment would make a marked contribution to creating a more unified policing culture

Key Finding. NATO Five Eyes moves to Joint Policing Capability are principally driven by size and the need to centrally command and decentrally execute the application of a scarce resource, which present considerations for future ADF Service Police options.

Key Finding. The UK MP Guard Service provides a worthwhile model for the provision of a uniformed civilian armed response capability that could address current bases security needs but would require appropriate legal enablement.

Recommendation: The ADF should adopt the standard NATO term "Military Police" in lieu of "Service Police" to describe the ADF's policing capability, regardless of Service when operating in the Joint Environment. For NPC operating solely in the maritime domain the term "Naval Police" should be adopted to replace "Service Police".

3.3 Issues arising from FIC Analysis

The review team conducted an analysis of the FIC related issues associated with the delivery of the ADF Service Police effects. A detailed focus was on the elements on Command and Management, Organisation and Personnel. It was noted that the span and depth of issues across the Fundamental Inputs to Capability were interrelated and treatment of specific issues in one area potentially generated second and third order impacts in another FIC element. Consequently, future design of the ADF Service Police capability must ensure an enterprise wide and systems level framework is adopted to ensure unintended consequences are not introduced into the Service Police environment and increase the existing complexity of the current system design.

A detailed outline of the FIC impacts is contained at Annex F and summarised below:

3.3.1. Organisation

- There are 46 separate domestic Service Police sites across the country.

- Lack of formal coordination between Service Police elements located in the same regional locations and in some instances on the same bases. Where coordination does exist, it is reliant on personal relationships rather than established coordination mechanisms.

- The ability to generate the required policing effect is affected by the number of Service Police members who are not employed in their posted policing role.

- The workflow pressures across the ADF Service Police environment appear unbalanced both across the Services and in Regional locations.

- Task level manning across the organisation, and across the three Services, is incorrect and inefficient.

- The manning pressures combined with the inability to surge police mass to deal with high workload case demands and priorities impinge on the ADF Service Police to move from a reactive to a proactive organisation.

- The lack of a balanced and coordinated workforce, at all levels of the organisation has duplicated administrative duties, and there is inefficient use of Service Police resources.

- There is a lack of unified Command, and organisational structures and communication lines are convoluted, which has contributed to inferior culture, poor morale and inertia in the Service Police organisation.

Key Finding. Tactical level relationships are the only mechanism enabling the management of police tasking in regional locations. Without a formalised framework that is not reliant on personal relationships, the ADF is unable to generate critical mass in locations to appropriately manage the scarce personnel resource to address current and future policing workflow demands.

Key Finding. Service Policing duties are duplicated across the Services and not well coordinated in regional locations, which is resulting in less than optimal utilisation rates and contributing to the inability to generate a proactive policing model

3.3.2. Command and Management

- The Command and Control (C2) structure across the ADF Service Police capability is complex and in part is reliant on personalities, and their consent, to deliver and coordinate the policing effects rather than formalised structures and procedures.

- The current arrangement, while working (to a level) is not optimal. Provost Marshals are required to navigate multiple layers of Command to manage the technical aspects of the workforce and have minimal capability to address police tasking.

- Defence Commanders have multiple points of entry to coordinate police effects, Civilian Police experience multiple levels of engagement from Service and JSPG policing elements from the same region to maintain situational awareness and intelligence of developing local criminal threats and obtain information on Defence members to assist in Defence investigations.

- HQ JSPG is focussed on the delivery of the investigative capability and has had constrained capacity to perform a capability coordinator function on behalf of all Joint Service Police elements.

- There is duplication of effort across capability development, doctrine, intelligence, training, governance and assurance, and information (DPSMS), incident, and technical standards management. The duplicated effort is limiting the ability to generate a fully capable outcome adequately supports the needs of all ADF Service Police elements.

- The information management system (DPSMS) is managed centrally in each of the Service Police Provost Marshal Offices and operated in each of the 46 outposts across the country. It exchanges information centrally but not laterally such that Service Police elements in the same region cannot cross reference local incidents.

- Different Service DPSMS reporting standards and poor information sharing protocols within DPSMS inhibits the ability to generate a complete policing common operating picture across the network.

- The collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence products is not focussed on being proactive and does not lead to a deterrent effect.

- There is no clear policing plan at the strategic, operational or tactical level within the domestic environment. There is no alignment to utilise available intelligence to better apply scare policing capabilities in a targeted manner to deal with current and emerging issues. Improving the synchronisation of policing effects will enable the ADF to move towards a more intelligence led Service Policing capability.

- With little appetite to amend current legislative powers and authorities, Service Police will continue to operate in a constrained environment into the future. They will need to generate greater interoperability with the Australian Federal Police and other Civilian Police agencies to deal with restrictions on Service Police powers in order to deal with emerging trends.

> **Key Finding.** The C2 of ADF Service Police is overly complex and does not adequately support a coordinated technical control relationships or engagement with regional commanders or civilian police.

Key Finding. There is duplication of enabling roles across Provost Marshal offices (including information management, intelligence, capability development, policy and governance). Opportunities to re-organise these elements may generate sufficient capacity to establish fully enabled and highly performing outputs to better support the entire Service Police capability.

Key Finding. Opportunities to improve integration of information management and intelligence functions across the Provost Marshal offices may enable the Joint Incident Management System, move Service Police to an intelligence-led model and result in better utilisation of the scarce Service Police asset.

Key Finding. The lack of unifying Joint Concepts and a Strategic Service Police Plan risk internal and external interoperability in the Combined / Joint operational environments.

3.3.3. Personnel

- The aging Naval Police Coxswain workforce presents risk to Navy through a significant loss of policing experience in the near term.

- A common baseline Service Police entry standard does not exist, which impacts selection of 'fit and proper' persons with required resilience and personal qualities to deliver core policing competencies and professional standards.

- The current training continuum across the three Services does not enable the maintenance of common baseline for core policing skills throughout a member's career.

- The disparity in training and experience levels across the Service Police does not enable a 'whole-of-ADF' approach to delivering a Joint policing effect in a Joint operational environment.

- Current differences in salaries and pay grade progression are largely attributable to the levels of experience and ongoing competency training delivered within the Service environments.

- The current framework does not establish a common baseline for core policing competencies, at all rank levels, as the enabler for a more equitable approach to Service Police remuneration.

- The current training and employment category management governance frameworks are suitable with robust control mechanisms delivered through COMDT DCSTC and DGTRADOC.

- Opportunities to generate a greater advisory role for PM-ADF within training governance may enable improved enterprise wide technical input.

- It would be undesirable to attempt to align the Service Police workforces under a Joint Career Management framework at this time. Single Service career management is a highly specialised process that meets the unique requirements of each Service

capability needs. It may be advantageous for PM-ADF to be more engaged in key Service Police career management decision to ensure appropriate technical advice is incorporated into career management cycles.

- There is no established enterprise wide system to develop and maintain core policing competencies to an agreed standard; in particular, there is no contemporary professional development framework for ADF Service Police outside of the ADF Investigator workforce.

> **Key Finding**. Opportunities exist to establish a 'whole-of-ADF' Service Police professional development framework aligned with the outcomes of the IGADF Own Initiative Inquiry into the Service Police Code of Conduct and Professional Standards System.

> **Key Finding**. There is no existing Joint Service Police workforce plan to adequately influence the development and conduct of career management, to improve the careers of all Service Police, enable ongoing professional development and to deliver better service policing effects throughout the ADF.

> **Key Finding**. Opportunities exist to align the ADF Service Police workforce through common core policing entry standards, a common professionalisation framework supporting all Service Police not just investigators, a focus on generating ongoing common core policing competency and experience standards, and enhance the technical input of PM-ADF in workforce planning and significant career management selections.

3.3.4. Collective Training

- There is very limited collective training across the Services and certainly no approach to Joint collective training.

- Currently, there is no intent to develop a Joint exercise concept for ADF Service Police. Current exercise design does not allow cross domain interaction between the various Service Police.

- During Major Exercises, Services will employ their Service Police elements and any training that is conducted remains within the Service maritime, land or air environment.

- Major Exercise Evaluation Plans do not include specific policing training objectives that are formally collected against, record observations and assess performance of the force, with lessons over time being codified and institutionalised.

- Assessing the ability to reinforce other Service Police elements, management of jurisdictional boundaries and integration with Civilian or Coalition Police Forces may be appropriate Joint training serials.

> **Key Finding**. There is no evaluation of Service Police elements deployed in support of Major Joint Exercises, which is resulting in poor understanding of the capability and a lack of evidence to support modernisation efforts.

3.3.5. Major Systems

- The current ADF approach to capability development for the Service Police is not suitably supporting the capability need, protecting the individual or supporting an approach towards a more professionalised force.

- A capability development manager focussed on major systems does not exist at the Joint level, which is hindering progress in Force Modernisation and integration of Service Police capability with Joint Projects.

- While HQ JSPG has established a Capability Management Cell it is not sufficiently resourced to undertake a capability coordinator role to champion Service Police capability requirements.

- Capability development is managed in a disaggregated manner within the Services and mostly treated as low priority minor projects.

- There is no standardised equipping of Service Police to support domestic policing in a garrison environment despite the core policing functions being common.

- It is assessed that part of the failure to implement a coordinated approach to capability development across the Services is a result of no Capstone Concepts or Strategic Plan for the Service Police from a 'whole-of-ADF' or Joint perspective.

- Service Police experience key deficiencies across garrison communications, information systems, Less-than-Lethal response options, modern biometric and forensics capability and inadequate Personal Protective Equipment.

- Service Police lack a comprehensive modernisation program within the Defence Integrated Investment Plan (IIP) where funding, acquisition and sustainment are appropriately managed to deliver an assured modernised Service Police capability, within the priorities of the IIP.

- PM-ADF does not have the suitable rank or authority to establish a functional Joint Capability Coordinator role.

> **Key Finding.** Opportunities to establish a Joint Project within the Defence Integrated Investment Plan offer a suitable method to synchronise the modernisation of the ADF Service Police capability.

> **Key Finding.** The Joint Service Police Governance Board, chaired by VCDF, would offer a suitable means to appropriately address Service Police capability coordination if appropriate Service representation was enabled.

3.3.6. Facilities and Training Areas

- There is no consolidated approach to Service Police facility requirements and in most cases facility development plans are being managed along individual Service lines in isolation to the other Services.

- Facilities across the three Services are not wholly fit for purpose. Key facility issues include: poorly located to enable "victim" anonymity; lack of communication equipment; poorly designed and equipped interview rooms; limited ability to enable intelligence and information sharing.

- Where Service Police elements are co-located in the same building there were noticeable improvements to interoperability and delivery of coordinated Service Police core policing tasks

- Co-location of Service Police elements are not feasible in all locations due to the long term facility build costs and distances between units and bases.

> **Key Finding.** There is limited coordination of ADF Service Police facility requirements through a central "champion" to progress facility business cases and develop a more efficient and effective facility footprint across the regions.

> **Key Finding.** A Principles based approach to co-locate ADF Service Police elements, where possible, will enable opportunities to achieve cost efficiencies, reduce facility footprints and enhance policing interoperability and operational outcomes.

3.3.7. Supply

- ADF Service Police elements do not experience any supply support issues that are unique when compared to the other ADF force elements.

- Issues affecting the ADF Service Police elements primarily result from unit level funding and sustainment budgets to assure the availability of in-service equipment and vehicles.

- The distribution of common equipment and vehicles across Service Police elements is unbalanced. The current Basis of Provisioning and Basis of Issue for like items to each Service do not have a standardised capability brick approach.

> **Key Finding.** Opportunities to establish enhanced input to Basis of Provisioning/Issue considerations for Service Police common equipment and vehicles may generate resource efficiencies and greater operational capability. This could be exercised through an appropriately resourced PM-ADF as a centralised function from a 'whole-of-ADF' perspective.

3.3.8. Support

- As the supported element, ADF Service Police do not experience any shared service support issues from enabling agencies that are unique when compared to the other ADF force elements.

- ADF Service Police intelligence function is enabled through engagement with Defence Security and Vetting Service (DS&VS) with reporting and information sharing on developing threats to ADF bases and specific individuals of interest.

- In the supporting role, ADF Service Police provide enabling support to Base/Unit Commanders and SADFOs as part of the overall base security effect.

- 37(2)(b) ██

- SPIO regularly receives intelligence product from AFP and to a lesser extent from state law enforcement.

- The current disaggregation of domestic garrison Service Police elements along Service lines creates poor lines of communication between both Service Police elements and relevant SADFOs.

> **Key Finding**. Opportunities to further develop enabling support relationships with Defence and Other Government Intelligence Agencies will enable the generation of an intelligence-led, proactive ADF Service Police capability.

> **Key Finding**. Opportunities to develop a regional Service Police coordination function may enable better management of scare policing assets to deliver required enabling base security effects across competing SADFO and Base/Unit Commanders.

3.3.9. Industry

- The lack of a formal relationship with industry has denied the opportunity to have an effective policing capability that has access to latest technologies and methodologies.

- Despite recent efforts, ADF policing is still not unified in terms of its formal / structured relationship with the external policing industry.

- There is no alignment to benchmarking standards, and lack of early industry engagement. ADF policing is denied the opportunity to have a better and unified grasp of its tradecraft.

> **Key Finding**. There are no formal relationships established with external to ADF policing agencies that enables a comprehensive professional development framework encompassing all ADF Service Police elements, not just the Investigative capability.

3.4 Current State Root Causes

A first step to developing any change program across an organisation is to clearly determine what the negative effects are that are impacting upon the organisation and the root causes of those effects. Establishing a clear baseline and a prioritised list of root causes ensures that future options resolve root causes and not merely treat symptoms and therefore ensure synchronised and sustainable change is implemented.

The table below outlines the stakeholder agreed list of key undesirable effects and root causes impacting the ADF Service Police capability:

Key Undesirable Effects	Primary Root Causes
• There is confusion about the functions, tasks and responsibilities of Service Police and interaction with Civilian Police domains across both domestic and overseas deployed environments.	• The Service Police organisation is stove piped and doesn't have a strong centre with enabling accountability, responsibilities, and reporting lines and governance.
• Service Police are not enabled to deliver the required levels of policing services expected by senior leadership.	• There is no ADF Service Police Strategic Plan with defined vision, mission, function, performance measures and goals and subordinate business plan.
• There is a strong level of tribalism across the Service Police organisation(s) with competing interests.	• There is no champion for Service Police career management, professional development and ongoing individual and collective training.
• The priority to fill Service Police positions is ill-defined or not understood.	• There is no ADF career model for Service Police, competency framework and training continuum to meet both Single Service and Joint requirements.
• Service Police generally have a poor brand and reputation across parts of the ADF.	
• There is little understanding of a common Service Police vision, mission, goals, services and performance measures.	• The Service Police individual joint and collective training models are suboptimal and not well integrated with the rest of ADF.
• There is a lot of duplication of functions and tasks at the Senior Service Police organisational levels which, increases waste, inefficiency and frustration.	• Legislation, Doctrine and Policy is out of date and not aligned to the needs of the current and future environment.
• The legislation doctrine and policy have not been updated to reflect policing requirements in the current and future environments.	• There is suboptimal branding, marketing and communications within the Service Police community, across the ADF and in the external environment.
• Inappropriate mental / physical attributes reduce ability to cope with employment conditions.	• The Service Police information management, knowledge management and information sharing is stove piped and not Joint.
• The Service Police Command and Control function, tasks and responsibilities are very stove piped and messy, leading to waste, risk and staff frustration.	• Service Police recruiting approach is not aligned to the current generation demographics.
• Service Police information/intel is not captured / disseminated coordinated effectively leading to ill-informed decision making.	• Service Police are not recognised as law enforcement agency or intelligence agency.
• Service Police is a fairly reactive org and uses sub optimal processes of intelligence led and evidence based info to plan its ops.	• There is no dedicated Service Police Capability Development, limited future planning for acquisition / sustainment and continuous improvement of Service Police capability.
• Not fit for purpose or accessible facilities or	• There are limits on AFS, which constrains manning and task allocation.

Key Undesirable Effects	Primary Root Causes
equipment results in wasted effort and or exposure to unacceptable risk. • Service Police have little involvement in the collective training space and Mission Rehearsal Exercises for operational deployments. • The Service Police organisational structure and lines of communication are convoluted and confusing. • Unfocused employment models and skills retention means Service Police can't complete tasks satisfactorily. • It is difficult to move Service Police capacity across the Service domains and this creates supply and demand issues, gaps and duplication. • Disparate conditions of service reduce retention and damage Joint cohesion. • Shared services model limits enabling support access, increasing Service Police breath of tasking / decreasing effectiveness.	

A detailed root cause analysis was performed to understand the related impacts on the undesirable effects if the root causes were able to be treated. This analysis is located at Annex G and indicates a prioritised list of root causes to be addressed. The key outcome from this analysis indicated the actions that would have the greatest immediate impact on the current state ADF Service Police environment were:

a. Implement an enterprise approach to enhance accountability, responsibilities and reporting lines and governance.

b. Develop an ADF Service Police strategic plan with defined mission, functions, performance measures and goals with relevant supporting FIC business plans.

c. Establish an appropriately star ranked officer as the formal champion of ADF Service Police to direct the enterprise wide development of the capability.

3.5 Summarising the Case for Change

Domestic policing (in garrison, shore base or air base) lays the foundation for operational policing. It develops the competencies and "the policing muscle memory" for the consistent delivery of policing effects. The domestic and investigative capabilities are part of the same continuum, yet they are currently separated into four organisations, with technical control exercised by five Provost Marshals (PMs), and remain uncoordinated across 46 locations (domestic garrison policing only, does not include Ship based NPC or 1 MP Bn). It is further complicated by the fact that the delivery of policing support including presence patrolling, incident/ emergency response, police intelligence, and liaison with other agencies provides an undoubted security/force protection benefit. These types of support require discrete policing skills; however, the diversion of Service Police to other duties that don't require these competencies is significantly diminishing their professional policing development.

3.5.1. Domain challenges

Workforce constraints and emerging demands (e.g. security) have impacted on the evolution and delivery of Police support in the Joint and Service domains and dictate the needs of each be considered as reforms are pursued. However, the requirement of AFPOL to support security tasking is unlikely to cease in the near term or until Air Force can reassess the allocation of assets, including use of Air Field Defence Guards, to support this role, and this will continue to be at the significant detriment to the delivery of policing support to Air Force. Similarly, the Review considers there is scope to rationalise the delivery of discipline, HR and Whole of Ship Coordination effects to better enable the isolation of a dedicated Policing category within Navy. Army would also benefit from the rolling rotation of 1 MP Bn personnel through its Domestic Policing Units to minimise the risk of policing skills fade.

This environment creates a range of tensions across the Services' ability to deliver a coherent and dedicated policing effect. While recognising the unique circumstances of each Service, they each face their own challenges:

a. Army- the DPU and 1 MP Battalion and the need to balance operational policing with the development of core policing competencies

b. Navy – A conflated Coxswain category that does policing and ship coordination duties that can currently only ever deliver a part time policing capability

c. Air Force – Platform and base security imperatives are substantially diverting police to security support tasks, again limiting professional development

3.5.2. Summary of Contributing Factors

In summary, at an enterprise level perspective, the ADF Service Police as a 'whole-of-ADF' capability is not sufficiently coherent to maximise the ability to generate robust effects from a small and constrained force. This is resulting from:

a. Five separate Provost Marshal Offices and Four Police Heads of Defence Investigative Agencies that dilute the ability to generate aligned capability effects.

b. The failure to establish a common "one tribe many colours" policing identity under a common and well understood banner that perpetuates an "us and them" culture within the respective elements of the Service Police, and creates artificial jurisdictional boundaries in terms of the application of policing effects across the services.

c. At least eight points of capability development across the four policing elements resulting in little uniformity of capability, poor protective equipment that doesn't meet duty of care responsibilities, poor communications, poor facility support and transport to deliver the policing effect across the regions.

d. A single IT system (DPSMS) managed separately by four police elements in 46 outposts which can report centrally but not share information laterally (in the same region). This common system is capturing four different data sets to report the ADF incident rate and does not effectively enable a common operating picture to support a Joint Incident Management System.

e. The limited capacity of individual outposts and the lack of a mature POLINT/CRIMINT reporting culture limits the ability to be an Intelligence Informed capability and defines Service Police to be reactive rather than generating an approach suited for operations.

f. The DFDA has become overly legalised for a discipline system, increasing investigation effort and time to complete cases, reducing satisfaction levels and both damaging policing confidence and confidence in Police.

g. Locally imposed jurisdictional limitations which un-necessarily constrain policing actions.

h. No common policing continuum with Navy and Air Force having no professional policing training beyond their basic entry course (both Officer and NCO).

i. Regional coordination is limited and is personality and consent based.

3.5.2. Summary of Contributing Reasons

The primary reasons that are impacting on the delivery of the required ADF Service Police needs and outcomes can be summarised as:

a. Stove piped command and delivery of enabling support limits coordination, control and coherence of effort.

b. Technical control of a limited specialist asset is insufficient to ensure the development and maintenance of professional standards. While TECHCON arrangements may have had a greater intent than this it is not being achieved in reality. The nature of the current C2, across the Services, historical mustering/category development, and pressing environmental concerns (Air Force platform security) result in a consistent diversion of policing assets to other duties limiting the development and maintenance of policing competencies.

c. There are no structural arrangements to enable the coordination of regional and national efforts to enterprise effect.

d. The uncoordinated policing footprint limits capacity. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts and penny packeting inhibits optimising police support to all Services.

e. The ADF has no Joint Doctrine to enable unified understanding of the Service Police Functions and Tasks. What doctrine that does exist at Single Service is out of date with recent developments across Five Eyes and NATO partners.

f. The PM-ADFs ability to direct actions is consent driven, and this consent /personality based approach is reflected down to the local level.

g. Despite being recommended in numerous reviews Strategic Policing Plans or Operational Policing plans at the National or regional level do not exist.

Opportunities exist to strengthen Service Police capability through an enterprise approach and the reinvestment of existing latent capacity to reinforce core policing effects across the ADF.

Recommendation: There is a need to consider organisational and workforce reform across the Service Police environment.

4. Future State

4.1 Moving to a Better (Future Fit for Purpose) Jurisdictional Model

In order to be fit for purpose in both policing the force and providing police support to the force the ADF Service Police require a suitable and modern jurisdiction model to adequately empower them to perform their duties, with only the minimum appropriate limitations in addition to those established in legislation.

A well designed and empowered Service Policing jurisdiction model would provide the opportunity to improve the existing Service policing effects across the ADF, whilst also underpinning the case for improved legislative powers. The jurisdiction model should allow better and more rapid application of policing effort at the lowest level possible, with the ultimate goal to be a reduction in timeframes in concluding policing matters, including investigations.

It is proposed to enhance the current investigative jurisdiction model to be more complete and allow better decisions to be made regarding the application of Service Police effect. To this end it is proposed:

a.   Service Police Jurisdiction be established as a Defence Instruction (General) and provide the primary reference for the establishment and recording of jurisdictional freedoms and limitations.

b.   The Jurisdiction model be based on an appropriate set of principles that seek to:

    i.   Maximise freedoms of action, rather than establish complex limitations that do not progress better policing outcomes.

    ii.   Triage and deliver an efficient and effective Service Police effect to all Services and locations.

    iii.   Establish strong connections and pathways into other law enforcement agencies[9] when required.

    iv.   Remove Single Service barriers to the delivery of Service Police effects by Service Police of any Service.

    v.   Maximise the use of existing legislative instruments.

    vi.   Reduce the Service Police involvement with unit level minor discipline matters.

    vii.   Promote proactive and community based Service policing.

c.   Establish specific considerations for determining appropriate jurisdiction in addition to scale[10] and capability[11]. Possible considerations, at a minimum, should include:

    i.   Scale (of the incident, wrongdoing or investigation).

    ii.   Geography (local resources and context).

    iii.   Capacity (availability of time and resources).

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[9] Other law enforcement agencies can include AFP, State Police, Crime commissions, and anti-corruption agencies

[10] Scale is the term used to describe the interplay between the size, importance and complexity of a matter

[11] Capability is one part of a broader 'subject matter expertise' consideration, and may be more appropriately set to limit individuals rather than complete organisations.

iv.   Subject Matter expertise (specialist skills, knowledge, experience).

d.   The Review recognises this task cannot be completed in isolation and identifies that any jurisdictional proposals will require coordination with the Summary Discipline Review and Defence Legal more generally.

A review of Service Police legislative powers and associated jurisdictional models must consider not only the domestic/garrison policing environment, but must also look to enable the ability to conduct contemporary policing across a range of environments. Specifically, limitations associated with collection of various forms of evidence, especially electronic data, in the domestic Australian setting do not necessarily apply during some overseas operations. In this respect, ADF Service Police are not appropriately enabled to develop their capabilities within the domestic setting to achieve required policing effects in a deployed overseas operational environment. The emerging crime spectrum may necessitate consideration of required legislative powers to address the policing vacuum, which may provide opportunities to consider the nexus between domestic policing effects and the ability to transition effectively to the deployed environment.

Key Finding. The ADF Service Police jurisdictional model requires review in order to ensure they have adequate powers to Police the Force proposals. This will require coordination with the Summary Discipline Review and Defence Legal more generally.

4.2 Defining the Future State

4.2.1 Defining Needs, Outcome and Issues

The ADF Service Police Workshop adopted a structured approach to defining the environment that would shape the Future State needs of ADF Service Police. Service and Joint needs were captured as were the spectrum of issues, across FIC, which are impacting on the delivery of Service Police capability effects. These were then affinitised to consolidate the principal themes into key problem statements. Against these bodies of work the elements identified were reviewed in terms of relative importance as an enabling need, deliverable outcome, and capability limiting issue.

The Workshop then worked to identify the full spectrum of functions and tasks they must do to meet expected Single Service and Joint needs and outcomes into the future. Importantly, the weight of effort each Service (and their elements) commits to these functions and tasks was also captured.

These bodies of work were then subject to further analysis to better understand the key undesirable effects that are impacting of the delivery of Police Capability and to identify their root causes.

4.2.2 Defining the Future Policing Environment out to 2030

4.2.2.1. Challenging the Future Needs.

A series of organisational "disruptor" briefs were presented at the ADF Service Police Review Workshop to challenge those present on the changing policing environment, the changing operational environment, and alternative approaches to delivering Service police effects. The following presented:

a. **PM-NZDF**. The PM-NZDF is three years into a five year appointment. He is a lateral recruit and was directly appointed as a Group Captain after a 30 plus year career in New Zealand Civilian Police. He was brought in specifically to transition existing Single Service police within the NZDF into a Joint Policing Group Service Joint and Single Service needs.

b. **AFP**. An AFP representative was brought into to highlight their emerging challenges with cyber-crime, organised crime, drugs, and social media.

c. **ACMC**. An Australian Civil Military Centre (ACMC) facilitator used the lens of PESTLE (Political, Economic, Social, Technology, Legislation and Environmental) to explore trends and drivers impacting on the ADF Service Police. These included impacts or organised crime, the protection of civilians, the protection of cultural artefacts, gender and sexual based violence, UN SCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security. As the Service Police have a high proportion of females it was identified that these present an important resource across stability operations, including in capacity building tasks. Another lens of FACT (Future Crimes, Accountability Increase, Cultural shift, and Technology use) was also used as a trigger for the stakeholders (Annex H).

d. **Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office (SeMPRO).** SeMPRO were invited to identify the changing natures of sexual offences in the broader community and what could realistically be expected to change within the Defence Community into the future.

e. **ADF Doctrine Liaison Officer to NATO.**   The workshop was briefed on emerging doctrinal changes within Five Eyes and NATO Partners. The brief highlighted the growing inclusion of stability policing in doctrine and the need to address technology inserts such as Biometric and DNA capture and analysis.

f. **Service Police Intelligence Organisation.** SPIO presented on its data tracking within Defence and environmental scanning of the civilian environment to offer projections on the likely offences ADF Service Police must be able to address in order to adequately "police the force and provide police support to the force".

4.2.2.2. Key Insights.

Some of the key insights include:

a. The potential reinsertion of the ADF into addressing domestic terrorism could accrue a heightened liaison role for Service Police with CIVPOL.

b. Stability Operations have a potential substantial policing overlay in terms of, but not restricted to, the "protection of civilians", "protection of cultural artefacts" and "sexual and gender based violence in conflict".

c. The move to digital admin and finance systems are likely to increase the potential for e-fraud and other cyber-crime.

d. The growth in the use of social media is likely to result in a growth in e-assault and e-sexual assault

e. The growth in the use of dating applications such as "tinder" or "grinder" is likely to be used as an argument for "consent" in sexual assault cases where parties have met through these means. This is already occurring.

f. The alignment of the increased attempts of criminal groups such as outlaw motorcycle gangs to associate with ADF personnel with the introduction of large naval platforms has potential to see illicit importation as a future issue for the ADF.

g. Sexual Assault has the potential to increase as current and future generations have much higher levels of access to pornography than existed in the past. This potential skewing of what is considered as normal sex is projected as a cause of future assault cases.

h. Within the broad Australian community drug crime is already considered at epidemic levels and is expected to grow with evident encroachment into the ADF as the recruiting base becomes more socialised to their use.

4.2.2.3. Emerging Crime Focus Spectrum.

In terms of these impacts on the Crime Focus Spectrum (discussed earlier), these likely influences on the ADF offence profile highlight an emerging environment that the ADF Service Police are not well positioned to address. It should be noted that while civilian police have some capability to address these issues they too will be subject to similar pressures across the civilian environment and their own capacity to assist will be further limited as their own resources come under increased stress. Furthermore, the current jurisdictional limitations, unless addressed, will continue to restrict the ADF Service Police ability to deal with these offences. In this sense the "Policing Vacuum" or "Ungoverned

Space' will likely grow, as will the potential for reputational and organisational risk to the ADF. This is highlighted diagrammatically in Figure 8 below.

Figure 9: Emerging Crime Spectrum

The ADF Service Police Review has identified a range of approaches to mitigate this growth in the "policing Vacuum". Two of these, increasing policing powers under the Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act 1915 and the use of the AFP to issue warrants under the DFDA require legislative change and are longer term solutions.

The complexity of dealing with discipline/criminal offences through administrative means is already heavily used by Air Force and is growing in use by Army. This is seen to provide a speedier remedy to providing a discipline outcome than using the DFDA. This is sub-optimal from a legal perspective as an offender may re-enter civil society without having an offence recorded against them. Additionally, the administrative approach limits the support available to victims and this may not be entirely acceptable as the ADF adopts a victim centric approach to crime.

Perhaps the quickest measure to address a growing policing vacuum is to move from a current reactive policing model to one that is preventative in nature, both in general duties policing and in the conduct of targeted investigations. While it is possible now it is significantly restricted by the stove-piped delivery of services and the inherent lack of

capacity and coordination this generates. There is solid evidence in Defence and in Civilian policing that proactive policing works to reduce offence rates and its adoption appears to be the best approach to Policing the force into the future and working to limit the "ungoverned space" in the absence of legislatively enabled improvements in the near term.

> **Key Finding**. The emerging crime spectrum requires the ADF to adopt alternate policing frameworks to address the growing policing vacuum. Efforts to institute a "whole-of-ADF" proactive policing approach may provide significant benefits, particularly in the absence of specific legislative amendments that enable ADF Service Police to deal with matters beyond or below the civilian police "threshold" of interest or capacity.

4.2.3 Redefining ADF Service Police Functions and Tasks in the 2030 Environment

4.2.3.1 Future Impacts.

In Section 2.4 of this paper, a stakeholder agreed framework for ADF Service Police functions and tasks are detailed. Grouping of tasks into consolidated functions reflected the current performance needs of the ADF Service Police. It was noted earlier in this report, that inconsistencies in the rate of effort of Service Police elements across the defined current state functions and tasks reflected the Single Service nuances and not the Joint Service Police competencies or other roles conducted by the police services. This had led to limited understanding of Service Police effects across the ADF, reduced interoperability with coalition partners and fails to reinforce the Service Police's own understanding of their core policing skills and required rates of effort. This prompted consideration of the future relevance of the current state functions and tasks.

In order to understand the enduring nature of the agreed ADF Service Police functions and tasks into the future policing environment of 2030, a comparative analysis was conducted through a specific workshop activity with Service Police and Non-Service Police stakeholders. The emerging crime spectrum, discussed in para 4.2.2 above, and potential growing police vacuum (as per figure 9 above) futures were reviewed against each of the current state Service Police functions and tasks. The NATO Military Police Future Capability Study[12] and relevant Five Eyes predictive analysis were utilised to inform alignment with the ADF's key coalition partners as the ADF looks to the future of ADF Service Policing. Analysis of the levels of importance and developing nature of potential future drivers determined an understanding of the impacts on the Service Police and specifically the relevance to a growing or otherwise demand on each of the current functions and tasks.

> **Key Finding**. The emerging future crime spectrum and future operational context demands greater interoperability both within the ADF and with coalition partners and confirms the need to define a baseline for Joint Service Police competencies and training standards enabling the delivery of a common set of Service Police functions and tasks

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[12] NATO Military Police Future Capability Study 2014, Annex B: NATO Military Police Capability Review

The outline of the deductions from the analysis of future drivers on the continued relevance of ADF Service Police functions and tasks are detailed Appendix 2 to Annex H. In summary, the analysis indicates that most Service Police functions and Tasks will see an increasing demand in importance as the capability progresses to the 2030 environment. Advances in technology are predicted to reduce the demand on traffic enforcement, security and movement/mobility and manoeuvre tasks through use of automation and advanced surveillance systems. However, the same driver and the need to become more interoperable with our coalition partners will increase the demand on police resources in crime prevention, incident response and site exploitation, complex investigations, and specialist capabilities including intelligence, forensics, biometrics, cyber and digital evidence. Similar trends are noted when comparing analysis of this review with that performed across NATO and Five Eyes partners.

A growing function that is evident across coalition partners and evident in the nature of current ADF operations is Stability Operations Policing. It is predicted there will become a growing demand on police across NATO, Five Eyes and United Nations operations to assist in the policing of fragile states or development of the rule of law capability where a vacuum exists post collapse of a state actor. While the ADF does not possess a "gendarmerie" style capability that is well suited to these roles, it is still envisaged that traditional Service Police (Military Police in the NATO/Five Eyes terminology) will play a critical component of a train/advise/assist role to develop a host nation's domestic policing capability until such time that Nation State can police itself. Sustaining this function within the ADF also aligns with an increasing need to generate greater integration with our coalition partners to ensure the ADF is interoperable in future state Combined, Joint and Interagency operational environments.

Developing an enhanced level of interoperability with coalition partners is multifaceted. NATO has identified achieving this in the future environment requires:

a. Terminology – standardise terminology to promote uniform understanding

b. Standards and Procedures – baseline communication and reporting procedures in conjunction with routine common training and exercises

c. Authorities and Jurisdictions – clear understanding of own Nation and establishment of a common set of authorities that empower police to work within 'basic rules' accepted by all contributing nations

d. Equipment – within National specifications, adoption of equipment and weapon (lethal and non-lethal) ensembles that are compatible operationally and supportable through multinational supply chains

e. Police Centre of Excellence – establishment of National centres of excellence capable of championing the intellectual and physical development of policing capabilities and ensure best practices and lessons are shared and adopted

4.2.3.1 A Refined Functional Framework

The conclusion of arising from the analysis of the 2030 policing environment indicates the proposed framework of Service Police functions and tasks are relevant now and will remain congruent with emerging domestic and international challenges. Importantly, adoption of these functions and tasks as the baseline for the development of the ADF Service Police Model is likely to enable enhanced interoperability with potential coalition partners.

During the workshop the functions and tasks were further refined to reflect the impacts of the emerging Service Police environment. The range of tasks were then affinitised to develop high level functions that better reflect the core nature of Service Police functions. The refined Functional framework is based on four ADF Service Police functions that cover the span of domestic and overseas operational requirements:

- Law Enforcement (General Duties Policing, Investigations, Intelligence, Specialist Capabilities, Stability Operations)

- Security and Force Protection (Force Protection, Security Governance)

- Movement, Mobility and Manoeuvre Support

- Internment and Detention

The proposed refined framework addressing workshop agreed ADF Service Police tasks aggregated across the four functions are detailed below. It was identified that the function of law enforcement is the primary core policing function of ADF Service Police, which is a foundational element to deliver the other three high level policing functions.

Figure 10: Refined ADF Service Police Functions and Task

The refined framework highlights that the application of core policing skills provides a substantive contribution to security outcomes. In this sense it reinforces the enduring nexus between policing and security in garrison, shore establishment, air base and on operations. While the format may require further review and minor adjustments (such as the potential removal of prohibited substance testing as it does not require a policing competency), the Project Team propose that given the level of analysis undertaken already by stakeholders, the above functions and tasks form a robust basis for the development of future Joint Doctrine, Concepts and Interoperability and alignment with NATO and Five Eyes partners. It is likely that Single Service rates of effort will continue to vary across these functions and task, however, from a Joint perspective it serves to ensure a common baseline for Joint Service Police competencies and training standards and ensure the effectiveness of ADF Service Police elements across the spectrum of Joint operations.

4.3 The ADF Service Policing Model

As noted in the earlier "Current State "section development of a ADF Service Policing Model provides the philosophical foundation for, and assists in identifying the organisational structures that support, the delivery of Service Police effects. The nature of modern conflict and societal expectations also means deployed forces, including police, will over time (as highlighted in Section 3.1) accrue additional responsibilities beyond those tasks currently identified. A Service Policing Model must look to have the flexibility to adapt to these changing demands.

The Review has looked deeply at the development of an ADF Service Policing Model and included it as a subject of the workshop held in September 2017. This process looked at core policing tasks and adjusted them to address the unique characteristics of policing in the Defence environment, which importantly included the command support function, the operational policing effects (air, land and sea), and the force preservation focus. In considering these elements the Review recommends that in order to position the Service Police to best achieve their police support function in addressing the future policing requirements discussed above that the ADF adopt the following policing model:

"To preserve and support the force and the rule of law, we will adopt an intelligence-informed, responsive, mission-oriented, preventative Policing model",

a.   Where Preserve the Force means:

    i.   Detect, Deter and Respond to Crime

    ii.   Protect Personnel and Reputation

    iii.   Both domestically and on operations

b.   And Responsive means:

    i.   Proactive to threats

    ii.   Reactive to events

4.4 The ADF Service Police Blueprint

Section 4.2.3 above proposes adjusted functions and tasks of the ADF Service Police. It incorporates all the projected policing tasks expected across the Joint and Single Service domains, in line with the Police tasking identified by the ADF's Five Eyes and NATO allies, out to 2030. The changes are modest and are evolutionary in nature, primarily reflecting the increasing role of police within Stability Operations and the inevitable impact of new technologies on the delivery of policing effects.

In an attempt to consolidate understanding and develop, where appropriate, a common approach to Service Policing, the review has developed a draft ADF Service Police Blueprint which encapsulates, on a single page, the consolidated Vision, Mission, Functions, Task, and Core enabling capabilities that should be expected of the ADF Service Police Capability. It is consistent with the proposed ADF Policing Model proposed above (Section 4.3) and is underpinned by Service Police Principles and Philosophies of Employment and Service Police Values (Annex I) which have been designed to universalise understanding of the characteristics of the Police function in the ADF.

Figure 11: ADF Service Police Blueprint

It should be noted that no police element is likely to undertake the full range of police functions and tasks detailed in the Blueprint but each should be able to identify those that they do engage in. Importantly, all Service Police should be able to identify how those functions and tasks may be applied across the Joint operational environment by Service Police acting in isolation or through a Joint interoperable approach to deliver a policing effect to deployed Commanders.

Recommendation: That the proposed ADF Service Police Blueprint provides the common basis for understanding the spectrum of effects delivered by ADF Service Police, and the associated approach to policing, and should be used in the development of any future guidance in relation to the Service Police Capability such as Doctrine, policy, plans and directives.

5. Options to Deliver the Future State

5.1 Course of Action Development

Having identified the range of undesirable effects and their root causes, developed a refined future state Functions and Tasks list, and articulated a Policing model for their achievement, the ADF Service Police Workshop undertook a Course of Action development activity.

5.1.1 Courses of Action Not Progressed

In the lead up to the activity a number of potential COA were considered by the Review Team but were not progressed. These were:

a. **"Back to the future".** This COA was proposed by PM-N and reverted investigative capability back to the Services, but this was seen as being unlikely to address the key issue of improving professional competency. It may have worked previously at a time when Service police elements were larger (substantially) than they are now and such a move would undo the positive work that has been achieved.

b. **CIVPOL Support**. Previous reviews had identified the potential for Civilian Police to provide the ADF's serious and sensitive investigative capability, including operationally. The review team engaged with the AFP who identified their considerable challenges dealing with increasing crime rates, in particular violent extremism, drugs and gangs against their static resource base. They indicated that they were unlikely to have the capacity to undertake the proposed support, and felt other options such as workforce sharing through a reserve workforce were likely to be too complex for them to adopt, so the option was not pursued further.

c. **Increased Funding**. Increased funding alone does not address the spectrum of issues facing ADF Service Police and does little to address key Command and Management issues at the core of the current challenge. While it will likely be important in aspects of COA development it was discounted as a discrete COA.

5.1.2 Courses of Action for Consideration

Stakeholders' engagement prior to the Workshop enabled the Review Team to develop a range of outline Courses of Action (COA). Workshop attendees were provided with these high-level draft 'options' to guide and trigger their development, assessment and critical thinking. These "options were consistent with being able to achieve the Guidance by the respective Service Chiefs and VCDF, and were all designed to "strengthen the centre" in varying levels. The 'starting point" draft options provided to the workshop were:

a. **COA 1 - Strengthen the Centre, Retain Current Command Structure**. Retain existing C2 with Service PMs remaining separate to PM-ADF, but Strengthen the Centre by consolidating some or all enabling functions under JSPG to remove duplication. Joint Investigation Office (JIO) remains with JSPG and all other Policing personnel remain with the Services.

b. **COA 2 – Strengthen the Centre**, **Centralised Control and Enabling Functions, Service Based Domestic and Operational Policing.** All the Service PMs move to Under Command (UC) PM-ADF as do all the enabling functions. JIO remains with JSPG and all other police personnel remain with Services.

c. **COA3 - Strengthen the Centre, Centralised Command and Domestic Policing and Investigation, Service based Operational Policing.** All the PMs move to UC PM-ADF as do the enabling functions. Garrison (including AFPOL (to be determined) and some, but not all, shore establishment Naval Police Coxswain (NPC) and investigative Policing are consolidated under command JSPG. Ship NPC and 1 MP Bn remain UC respective Services.

d. **COA 4 – New Start, optimised against Design Principles and current constraints removed.** This option was the "ideal" unconstrained model developed during the workshop with organisational design freedom and CIVPOL equivalent legislative powers. All current Military Policing capability across the Services are centralised under command of PM-ADF/JSPG. PM-ADF responsible for policing domestically and abroad (through FORGEN/OPGEN). Non-policing functions are retained in Single Services to be trained and delivered differently. Discipline functions are retained at unit level in all Services

Draft Options and Locations of Key Elements and Functions				
Option	**Location of PM-A, AF, N**	**Location of Garrison Police**	**Location of OP Police – AFPOL, MP BN, NPC on Ship, NPC on shore**	**Enabling Functions (CAPDEV, Int, Info Mngt, TechCon)**
1 – Strengthen the Centre, retain Current Command Structure	Remains under Service	Remains under Service	Remains under Service	Determine which to be centralised under JSPG
2 – Strengthen the Centre, Centralised Control and Enabling Functions, Service Based Domestic and Operational Policing	Into JSPG	Remains under Service	Remains under Service	Centralised under JSPG
3 – Strengthen the Centre, Centralised Command and Domestic Policing and Investigation, Service based Operational Policing	Into JSPG	Into JSPG	AFPOL (TBD) into JSPG, MP BN under Army, NPC on Ship under Navy, NPC on Shore split into Navy (TBD) and JSPG (TBD)	Centralised under JSPG
4 – New Start – Optimised against design principles with current constraints removed	Optimise to Design Principles	Optimise to Design Principles	Optimise to Design Principles	Optimise to Design Principles

From these "starting point" options the workshop attendees were tasked to develop these models, testing their development against Service Chief guidance, the review design principles as detailed in Section 1.9, and their ability to address the undesirable effects (across FIC) currently impacting on Service Police delivery of capability and the associated root causes (as detailed in Section 3.4). As they worked their designs they were tasked to critically assess them and identify what structures, processes or arrangements, would be required to optimise as far as possible the reduction in undesirable effects.

Against this guidance an outline of the COAs developed is presented below.

COA 1: Strengthen the Centre, Retain Current Command Structure

Feature Descriptions:

a.   No change to current-state C2 with Service PMs remaining separate to PM-ADF

b.   JSPG becomes a shared service provider for common policing support functions such as strategic planning, information management, capability development and intelligence reporting.

c.   PM-ADF assumes responsibility for provision of some service back to the Services, notably Information Management Support and Capability but does not gain a significant staff supplementation.

d.   Single Services retain policing elements less JIO, and retain all accountability and responsibility for delivery of the policing effect, and maintenance and development of police competencies.

COA 2: Strengthen the Centre, Centralised Control and Enabling Functions, Service Based Domestic and Operational Policing

Feature Descriptions:

a.   JSPG becomes the capability coordinator for all Service Police, retaining investigative specialties and JIO as subordinate elements.

b.   JSPG absorbs all PM Offices and staff in order to conduct strategic planning, capability, doctrine and policy development, information management and intelligence activities for the ADF policing effect/elements.

c.   PM-ADF assumes responsibility for provision of some service back to the Services, notably Information Management Support and Capability, but unlike Option1 gains a significant staff supplementation to achieve this effectively.

d.   All Security Governance activities remain a Single Service accountability/responsibility, though JSPG will provide Information Management support back to Service as required.

e.   Single Services retain policing elements less JIO, and retain all accountability and responsibility for delivery of the policing effect, and maintenance and development of police competencies. JSPG will provide Techcon oversight support back to the Services.

f.   Service PMs are retitled (TBA) but retain function as Service Police advisor to their Service Chief.

COA 3: Strengthen the Centre, Centralised Command and Domestic Policing and Investigation, Service based Operational Policing

Feature Descriptions:

a.   All domestic and investigative policing capabilities, resources and activities are consolidated under command PM-ADF. JSPG becomes the capability manager for Service Policing, conducting: strategic planning, capability development, information management, intelligence reporting, and career management planning /coordinating through Service CM agencies.

b. Force-generating policing elements remain under Single Service chains of command (1MP, NPC (Ships and establishment cadre, and possibly an adjusted AFPOL requirement)

c. Domestic and investigative police elements remain environmentally aligned but JSPG generates capacity for reinforcement or surge support where Services are unable to supply, including support to Navy for ship-to-shore ratios for NPC. JSPG establishes an enhanced regional command framework to better coordinate regional policing efforts and to centralised Policing advice to SADFO's and coordination with other agencies at an appropriate level.

d. All Security Governance activities remain a Single Service accountability/responsibility, though JSPG will provide Information Management support back to Service as required

e. PM-ADF assumes responsibility for maintenance and development of domestic and investigative policing competencies and for assuring delivery of policing and other agreed effects to Service Chief requirements. A Single Service Police Advisor/Authority to the ADF will be central, but Services will require establishing Service request catalogues and formal processes and reporting to Service Chiefs. Service Chiefs will lose organic domestic policing capability or garrison policing capability.

f. Single Services retain support policing elements and retain all accountability and responsibility for delivery of these policing effect, and maintenance and development of police competencies. JSPG will provide TECHCON oversight to assist Services in this respect.

COA 4 New Start, optimised against Design Principles and current constraints removed

Feature Descriptions:

a. All current personnel producing a policing effect within the ADF are referred to as Military Police (MP) in line with alliance partners and other international military police counterparts.

b. All current Military Policing capability across the Services are centralised under command of PM-ADF/JSPG

c. PM-ADF responsible for policing domestically and abroad (through FORGEN/OPGEN)

d. Non-policing functions are retained in Single Services to be trained and delivered differently

e. Discipline functions are retained at unit/ship level in all Services

f. Coxswain mariner duties separated from Policing (WOSC, Medical, and Navigation). They could retain discipline support function and heightened REACT support but police effect will be called forward as required.

g. Domestic and investigative police elements remain environmentally aligned but JSPG generates capacity for reinforcement or surge support where services are required.

h. AFPOL retain base support policing function but no longer diverted to Security Roles

i. The provision of   security governance support is delegated to unit level and is no longer conducted by Service Police.

5.2 Courses of Action Assessment

Following development of these COAs they were collectively assessed against the degree to which they addressed the Design Principles, the identified undesirable effects and their roots causes, and Service Chief and VCDF Guidance. They were also assessed in terms of the opportunities for reform each option presented, their ability to address risk, the comparative costs of change, the likely benefits and degree of cultural change realisation. This enabled a relative initial assessment for the options.

Assessment Criteria	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3	COA 4	Total Score
Design Principles	1	2	3	4	10
Strong Centre	1	2	4	3	10
Root Causes	1	1	4	4	10
Opportunities	1	1	4	4	10
Risk	2	4	3	1	10
Cost	4	3	2	1	10
Benefit	1	2	4	3	10
Culture	1	1	4	4	10
Total	12	16	28	24	

Notwithstanding these initial rankings it was clear that each option retained issues that require further consideration before COA or linked options could be selected. COAs 1 and 2 have a heavy requirement for the Services to address the policing rate of effort and the provision of support to PM-ADF to enable the position to exercise effective technical control over those policing assets not under command. COAs 3 and 4 require additional effort to demonstrate that the Services will continue to get a high level of environmentally aligned policing support, even if they do not own it.

While COA 1-4 could all be made to work, there is a sliding scale of each option's ability to improve command and control, the delivery of enabling support functions, the delivery of core policing effects, and importantly the professionalisation of the Force.

The model that retains the existing C2 structure (COA 1) does not align strongly to the Design Principles nor was it assessed as addressing many of the root causes. It would not nest responsibility for delivering the ADF Policing effect in a single PM-ADF, it would continue to perpetuate technical control challenges and would do little to provide more consistency within, and universalise professionalism of, the Force. This COA is not recommended for further development.

It is assessed COA 2 would improve C2 and delivery of key enabling support functions but would do little to create the framework to move to a more proactive policing model Regional coordination elements would be established but these would continue to be reliant upon Technical Control (TECHCON) arrangements to influence local policing effort. Without some additional command adjustment this would continue to be reliant upon local command consent to ensure a sustained focus on policing. This approach would limit efforts to provide a more structured approach to policing and working to grow professional expertise as the domestic and investigative capabilities will remain under four separate

commands across 46 locations. It provides a largely business as usual approach in terms of support to unit and base commanders, and SADFO.

COA 2 would be an essential transitional step should COA 3 or COA 4 be adopted. It would provide a functional JSPG HQ capability with additional capacity generated through unified enabling functions and removal of duplicated staff effort. In addition, a COA 2 offers the opportunity to establish stability through refined procedures and reporting functions that would reduce organisational change risk by proceeding directly to a COA 3 or 4 approach. On the basis of improved C2 and delivery of a stronger centre through unified enabling functions, and its status as a transitional step to other COA, the COA merits further development.

> **Recommendation:** Progression of COA 2 provides the option to establish a strong centre, unified enabling effects and control functions that would also support an interim phase to progress a COA 3 or 4.

COA 3 has been assessed as the COA that best addresses the design principles and the identified undesirable effects, and their root causes, impacting upon the effective and efficient delivery of the Service Police capability. It would vest authority for the domestic and investigative policing capability in a single entity, giving them the ability to optimise delivery of the core policing affects regionally, nationally and operationally. Operational policing would be vested within the Services, although the treatment of AFPOL would require further consideration. As PM-ADF would assume responsibility for domestic base (garrison) policing support, further detail would be required to develop assurance frameworks with Services for guaranteed availability of policing support consistent with Single Service needs. This COA is recommended as the 'Objective' ADF Service Police Capability. It merits further development to establish appropriate means to treat the domestic policing effort and meet existing Service needs.

> **Recommendation:** Further detailed development of COA 3 is appropriate noting it best addresses the capability design principles, and identified undesirable effects and their root causes impacting the ADF SP environment and presents the best approach to more effectively meet the ADF's future policing needs within existing workforce limitations,

The unconstrained approach, COA 4, provides substantial reform opportunities and while it proposes some legislative reform which could take some time to achieve it still delivers considerable benefits (even if legislative reform is not achieved). It should be noted that unknown to the Workshop element that developed this proposal it closely resembles the Canadian Joint Policing Model and similar to the NZDF Approach. This COA merits further development but would require all services to resolve how they utilize Service Police in non-core policing roles.

The Review also considers that if COA 3 or COA 4 were selected for development that implementation of COA 2 is an important and inevitable transitional step. It would allow for a considered transitioned implementation whilst enabling positive reforms in the near term. It is assessed COA2 implementation is achievable by Jan 19 and a COA 3 or 4 by Jan 20, pending scheduling through extant Joint Establishment Review processes.

> **Recommendation:** That COA 2 should be progressed for implementation NLT Jan 19 and the detailed development of a COA 3 design be presented for COSC consideration in mid-2018.

All options were also then reviewed for their best of breed inclusions which should be considered in any of the COA, or blended COA selected for further development. These included but were not restricted to:

a.   Centralise Enabling Functions,

b.   Consolidation of specialist skill support for centralised workforce management

c.   Establish a Capability Development Funding line in the Integrated Investment Plan through creation of a "JP20xx Remediation of the ADF Service Police Capability Rolling Program"

d.   Establish the PM-ADF/JSPG as the single point of coordination and management of engagement with Industry and other agencies

e.   The consolidation of C2 and increase in commonality of systems, training and, processes will improve professional credibility

f.   Establish an organic specialist advisory group to support command akin to CJHEALTH Professor of Military Surgery appointment. This could include advisers in forensics, technical forensics, victim and psychological support

g.   Evolve command of JSPG to Joint Capability Group over time

h.   Consider raising PM-ADF to a Star Ranked DGMP, consistent with like sized Five Eyes counterparts (Canada/UK)

i.   Establish dedicated MP dedicated Line of Effort and Support within CASG.

j.   Regional Coord (Options 1/2) or Command (COA 3/4) supports best utilisation of policing effort.

> **Key Finding.** A range of options exist to influence the design of selected courses of action across resources, skill sets, organisational design, processes, assurance of service/support, timelines and enabling requirements.

5.3 Higher C2 and Governance

In addition to COA development the workshop attendees were tasked to look at how current Governance arrangements could be strengthened. Consistent with the First Principles Design rules the approach taken was to improve what already existed, principally the Joint Service Police Governance Board. In addressing the needs of all COA, it was identified that the JSPG would be strengthened through the inclusion of Service Deputy Chiefs. This would provide a mechanism to ensure the mutual obligation and service delivery issues can be raised and addressed in a timely fashion, particularly if the PM-ADF assumes great responsibility for the delivery of policing services.

> **Key Finding**. Enhanced Governance arrangements that support all proposed COA could be achieved through the inclusion of Service Deputy Chiefs as permanent members within the current JSP Governance Board Structure, chaired by the VCDF.

The command of Joint Service Police Group in the longer term was also considered during the course of the Review and also during the Workshop. In any centralised model (COA 2, 3, 4) there was clear convergence of views that command of a reformed Joint Service Police Group should reside with Joint Capability Group in the longer term. During the transitional phase it was considered that Joint Service Police Group should remain under command of VCDF.

> **Key Finding**. Command of a reformed Joint Service Police Group should reside with Joint Capability Group in the longer term. During the transitional phase, Joint Service Police Group should remain under command of VCDF.

6. Delivering Reform

6.1 Identifying and Delivering Quick Wins

During the course of the review there were some fundamental undesirable effects affecting ADF Service Police identified. These were repeatedly substantiated at the workshop, and reflect issues that need to be addressed in some respect regardless of any specific COA that may be pursued, if ADF is to achieve an effective and efficient Service Police capability. Their root causes, and their proposed mitigation strategies and focus of effort, as identified by the review team and the stakeholders are:

a. **Deficit of Legislation and Policy**: Review, in collaboration with appropriate agencies, existing legislation and jurisdictional guidance to determine its fitness for purpose against the emerging policing environment to ensure ADF Service Police are sufficiently enabled to police the force and to provide police support to the force.

b. **No Strategic Plan**: Multiple earlier Reviews, and this Review, have highlighted the need for a Strategic Plan for ADF Service Police to guide development of the capability. It would be supported by the development of subordinate policing plans at the national, regional and local levels that direct policing activity consistent with adopting a more proactive preventative policing approach. It would include an implementation road map, governance and performance management framework, a cultural change plan, an enterprise risk model and an information/communications/PR plan.

c. **Limited Doctrinal Guidance.** The absence of a Service Police doctrine hierarchy and associated doctrine at all levels is a significant impediment to developing internal and external understanding of Service Police functions and tasks and their broader contribution to operations. Priority should be given to development of the Service Police doctrine hierarchy and subsequent doctrine commencing with Philosophical level doctrine on the "Employment of Joint Service Police".

d. **Service Police not recognised as Law Enforcement Agency**: Arguably the current legislative and Jurisdictional provisions do not enable Service Police to adequately police the force. Without adjustment, and given the foreseeable issues, the ADF Service Police will be unable to adequately police the force and a review of these provisions, including the DFDA is required. It was identified that enablement of Service Police under the Jervis Bay Territory Acceptance Act 1915, akin to the powers of the AFP would address many of the policing issues. Stakeholder engagement has highlighted that this has been resisted by the Attorney General's Department in the past due to the perceived lack of professionalism of Service Police as a force due to convoluted structures, inadequate processes, training and experience. The Review notes that the pursuit of improved policing powers is unlikely without reforms to C2, training, improved systems, and policing development that collectively work to professionalise the force.

e. **Stove-piped information management and intelligence**: Single Service information management elements should be consolidated with Service Police Central Records Office and the Service Police Intelligence Office to create an integrated Service Police Intelligence and Knowledge Management Cell. Efforts should be taken to standardise and align information management and the development of linked information management, intelligence and knowledge management capabilities.

f. **Service Police Structures are stove-piped**: A move to a centralised structure with decentralised task groups will achieve 'Joint' as much as possible while recognising Service requirements. PM-ADF currently retains TECHCON, but in order to better control the policing rate and focus of effort the position would benefit from having Direct Command over the Domestic and Investigative Policing capability. Support to base locations should be through direct support style arrangements. Service Police core skills should be universal, leaving Services to be able to shape and execute other functions to their own environmental (contextual) issues. Policing structures should be aligned with the rate of effort not solely along geographical lines.

g. **AFS Manning Constraints**: Current structures are not optimised for a balance between APS and AFS. When structures are considered in COA Development consideration should be given to the optimal use of APS (and contractors) to fill bespoke roles such as those where longevity/continuity/ speciality of experience is important, allowing Service Police to flow in/out IAW career development and Service needs without detriment to enterprise effects.

h. **Service Police Career management**: The ADF Service Police workforce is small and specialised. PM-ADF should be to be a domain workforce sponsor as a key stakeholder, and have a standing place on relevant Service workforce working groups.

i. **Training Continuum**: The Service Police training continuum is inconsistent across the Services for both officers and other ranks and does not allow for uniform professional policing development. A Joint Service Police Training Continuum that ensures common professional policing development of core policing competencies at all levels should be developed for consideration including the associated likely resource implications. JSPG should include a Professional Standards Monitoring Cell that sets and monitors the achievement of minimum standards and accreditation of all Service Police professionalism through a professional standards board

j. **Recruiting standard not aligned**: The Services do not have a common recruitment or selection standard, nor one designed to select personnel specifically suitable for Policing roles. In consultation with appropriate agencies an appropriate recruiting/selection pathway should be developed for consideration.

k. **Lack of a coordinated approach to Service Police Capability Development**: Service Police capability development is currently uncoordinated. JSPG should generate an appropriately staffed capability development cell that aligns capability development across the Services. The nature of current capability deficits across the Joint and Services domains highlight that a Remediation Project should be established and inserted into the Defence Integrated Investment Plan. A Joint Service Police Capability Need Statements and an outline Remediation Project Scoping Study should be developed to facilitate the creation of a JP 20XX Remediation of ADF Service Police Capability Rolling Program and its insertion into the Integrated Investment Plan. CASG should be engaged to determine how best to support the Service Police Capability.

l. **Poor Branding and Communication**: The Service Police brand has been diminished over time and needs to be reinforced to re-establish internal and Defence Wide understanding of their organisational roles, functions and tasks. JSPG need to have appropriate communications support to achieve this outcome as a concerted campaign.

m. **Project Implementation Governance.** Implementation of recommendations from previous reviews has been inconclusive as a result of a lack of effective implementation governance. The current Project Governance Board/Committee (*level) should transition to a Project Implementation Board/Committee, reporting directly to JSP Governance Board chaired by VCDF.

n. **Interoperability.** In order to improve interoperability and consistency with Five Eyes and NATO Partners that the term "Service Police" should transition to the term "Military Police" encompassing (Navy, Army, Air Force) to describe those personnel delivering policing effects.

A number of the Quick Win areas identified above would be addressed through progression of the COA and adoption of the ADF Service Police Blueprint. More broadly, the proposed 'Quick Wins' develop foundation documents and plans which can be developed in the near term (within six months) but which provide a solid and enduring platform for the well-being and development of the capability into the future from a 'whole-of-ADF' and enterprise approach. These include development of:

a. an ADF Service Police Strategic Plan 2030,

b. a Joint Capability Needs Statement, and associated ADF Service Police Capability Development Plan, and Scoping Study for an ADF Service Police Capability Remediation Project,

c. a Joint Service Police Doctrine Framework and an associated Service Police Doctrine Development Plan,

d. an ADF Joint Service Police Training Continuum,

e. aligned ADF Service Police Selection Standards and Processes, and

f. an ADF Service Police Information Management Alignment Project.

> **Recommendation:** That identified 'Quick Wins' be progressed including development of:
>
> a. an ADF Service Police Strategic Plan 2030,
>
> b. a Joint Capability Needs Statement, and associated ADF Service Police Capability Development Plan, and Scoping Study for an ADF Service Police Capability Remediation Project,
>
> c. a Joint Service Police Doctrine Framework and an associated Service Police Doctrine Development Plan
>
> d. an ADF Joint Service Police Training Continuum
>
> e. aligned ADF Service Police Selection Standards and Processes
>
> f. an ADF Service Police Information Management Alignment Project.

6.2 Pathway for Reform

A detailed timeline to enable a detailed reform program would be developed once a decision of the selected course (s) of action is made. Progression of the reform options would be best managed through a portfolio of programs and projects utilising a Project Implementation Committee framework reporting to the Three-Star JSP Governance Board to performance manage the agreed deliverables. Routine updates and key decision points would be made through COSC at selected milestones.

A potential outline for a pathway for reform is outlined in Figure 12 below.

The pathway is COA agnostic. The selection of specific COA will influence the detailed reform timeline. The outline pathway and broad indication of timeline to achieve Final Operating Capability (FOC) is based on the requirement to complete change requirements/activities, such as Unit Establishment Reviews within existing schedules, without any specific priority established for the reform program. A timeline to achieve Initial and Final Operating Capability states could be compressed if directed priorities were established for the completion of key reform activities.

COA 2 could be achieved quickly. It is assessed that a COA 2 state to establish centralised PM Offices would be a preliminary stage to achieving a COA 3 or COA 4 end-state. A move to COA 2 first would establish a Headquarter element to guide the transition to a selected Final Operating Capability end-state

Figure 11: ADF Service Police Blueprint

Phase 2:

A decision to proceed to Phase 2 could see three parallel lines of operation:

a. **Deliver Quick Wins**. This line of effort would seek to complete the range of agreed quick wins offering COA agnostic benefits to the ADF Service Police. It is assessed

those quick wins identified in the paper could be delivered by July 2018 for COSC endorsement. (ADF Service Police Strategic Plan 2030, Joint Capability Needs Statement and Capability Development Plan, Scoping Study for an ADF Service Police Capability Remediation Project, Service Police Doctrine Development Plan, ADF Joint Service Police Training Continuum Design, common selection standards and processes, Information Management Alignment Project business case)

b. **COA Detailed Development and Analysis**. The Project Management Office would seek to establish a multi-Service/Group planning team to conduct detailed development and resource analysis of selected options. In addition, Communications Plans would need to be agreed and commence as part of a long-term change management plan.

c. **Implementation Planning of Immediate Option**. A decision to proceed with specific organisation change would require comprehensive FIC design and implementation planning. Dependent on the directed change option, COSC would be engaged in July 2018 to endorse final design plan and agree to proceed with implementation.

Regardless of the recommendations that are agreed to transition to Phase 2, it is assessed that a re-frame of individual Provost Marshal offices will likely be required. Consideration of the need to adjust functions and tasks, address known issues raised in this paper within capacity and resources and determine how they may be required to posture for subsequent change management and the means to continue provision of agreed support service to DPSN and Director Security Air Force (mainly Information Management through DPSMS) will also need to be addressed.

The success of establishing the pre-conditions for change will be senior leadership agreement on the accountability and responsibility model and establishing a performance measurement framework. It would serve to not merely track milestones but ensure the portfolio of work remains synchronised in implementation as a systems approach to capability reform and that it is delivering outcomes.

Phase 3 / 4:

Dependent on the options selected for reform, it is likely a change program to move to a COA 2 type option could be implemented by January 2019 with Unit Establishment Reviews (UER) completed and posting orders struck July 2018, dependent on extant Joint and single Service organisational review schedule priorities. There are limited FIC implications with COA 2 and a rapid implementation could occur with minimal risk.

A decision to proceed to a COA 3 or COA 4 style option would require a longer term organisational change program. It is likely that a staged approach would need to be adopted to move to interim force structures that may potentially be achievable by January 2020 if staffing priority for the conduct of UER and other necessary activities was given. Given the potential FIC implications (organisation structures, C2, reporting, policy, workforce plans, facilities, supply/support contracts, etc.) it is likely that Final Operating Capability would be achievable mid-to-late 2021. This is largely driven by staff processes (UER, doctrine development and review, capability development initiation, potential facility disposition, workforce plans and training design implementation). Specific timelines for achievement of a Final Operating Capability will be dependent on the directed organisational reform option to be implemented and priorities established to navigate through required reform activities.

7. Summary and Consolidated Recommendations

7.1 Conclusion

The ADF Service Police capability has been under-invested in terms of resources, intellectual effort, and command interest for a protracted period. At present, and despite the investment made, it is not optimised to deliver the level of capability expected. This Review aligns with a number of other efforts addressing the ADF's Legal and Disciplinary frameworks and this coincidence presents a time-limited opportunity to coherently address the totality of the identified issues. The proposed recommendations identify Courses of Action that require further detailed development before implementation decisions can be made, but none the less offer significant potential to enhance the delivery of Service Police Capability.

The Review proposals have focused on optimising the Service Police effects as an enterprise capability of the ADF whilst attempting to address the specific needs of each Service. The ADF Service Police Blueprint provides a means to unify understanding of, and across, the ADF Service Police Capability and the COA proposed all work to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery of policing effects. The adoption of the term 'Military Police' aligns the ADF with Five Eyes and NATO Partners and will work to improve interoperability and to establish a more unified Policing culture by adopting a "one tribe many colours 'approach under a common banner. The foundational documents and plans proposed through "Quick Wins" provide a solid platform to posture ADF Service Police for the next step towards a professionalised, capable "Whole of Defence" capability.

While a 'business-as-usual' approach to the provision of Policing support to the ADF is possible it would likely continue to see a growing unfitness for purpose of the ADF Service Police against a well identified and growing law enforcement challenge that the current capability is not designed to address. Reform is necessary to best position the ADF Service Police to police the Force and provide police support to the Force into the future.

7.2 Summary of Recommendations

The following recommendations have been structured to address the totality of findings detailed above and to meet the requirements of the Statement of Work. It is recommended that:

a. There is a need to consider organisational and workforce reform across the Service Police environment.

b. That the proposed ADF Service Police Blueprint provides the common basis for understanding the spectrum of effects delivered by ADF Service Police, and the associated approach to policing, and should be used in the development of any future guidance in relation to the Service Police capability such as doctrine, policy, and directives.

c. That progression of COA 2 provides the option to establish a strong centre, unified enabling effects and control functions that would also support an interim phase to progress a COA 3 or 4.

d. COA 3 best addresses the capability design principles and identified undesirable effects, and their root causes, impacting the ADF SP environment and presents the best approach to more effectively meet ADFs future policing needs within existing workforce limitations.

e. That COA 2 should be progressed for implementation NLT Jan 19 and the detailed development of a COA 3 design be presented for COSC consideration in mid-2018.

f. That the standard NATO term "Military Police" be adopted in lieu of "Service Police" to describe the ADF's policing capability, regardless of Service when operating in the Joint Environment. For NPC operating solely in the Naval Environment the term "Naval Police" should be adopted to replace "Service Police";

g. That the following 'Quick Wins' be developed:

   i. an ADF Service Police Strategic Plan 2030,

   ii. a Joint Capability Needs Statement, and associated ADF Service Police Capability Development Plan, and Scoping Study for an ADF Service Police Capability Remediation Project,

   iii. a Joint Service Police Doctrine Framework and an associated Service Police Doctrine Development Plan,

   iv. an ADF Joint Service Police Training Continuum,

   v. aligned ADF Service Police Selection Standards and Processes, and

   vi. an ADF Service Police Information Management Alignment Project.

h. That the ADF Service Police Review proceeds to a Phase 2 that will develop implementation of COA 2, detailed COA 3 design and 'Quick Win' Papers for further COSC consideration in mid-2018.

Annex A
Stakeholder Engagement Plan

Primary Stakeholder List	Stakeholder Interest	FIC Focus
Chief of Navy – VADM T. Barrett	Strategic Guidance	• All
Chief of Army – LTGEN A. Campbell	Strategic Guidance	• All
Chief of Air Force – AIRMSHL L. Davies	Strategic Guidance	• All
Chief Joint Capabilities - AVM W. McDonald	Strategic Guidance	• All
Vice Chief of the Defence Force – VADM R. Griggs	Strategic Guidance	• All
Head Joint Enablers - MAJGEN Simone Wilkie	Strategic Guidance	• All
Deputy Chief of Joint Operations – MAJGEN G. Bilton	Strategic Guidance Operational Employment of Joint Service Police Effects	• Command & Management Organisation Personnel
Joint Chief of Staff HQ ADF – BRIG G. Whelan	Strategic Guidance Operational Employment of Joint Service Police Effects	• All
Chief of Staff Navy HQ – CDRE D. Greaves	Strategic Guidance Single Service Domestic Investigative and Policing Effects	• All
Chief Legal Advisor HNPAR - LCDR M. Donaldson	Single Service Domestic Investigative and Policing Effects	• Command & Management Personnel
Chief of Staff Army HQ – BRIG J. Spalding	Strategic Guidance Single Service Domestic Investigative and Policing Effects	• All
AHQ Legal Officer - LTCOL T Garrett	Single Service Domestic Investigative and Policing Effects	• Command & Management Personnel
Chief of Staff Air Force HQ – AIRCDRE K. Dunn	Strategic Guidance Single Service Domestic Investigative and Policing Effects	• All
Director Sensitive Issues Management Air Force - GPCAPT Karen Ashworth	Single Service Domestic Investigative and Policing Effects	• Command & Management Personnel
Air Force Legal - WGCDR M. Brick	Single Service Domestic Investigative and Policing Effects	• Command & Management Personnel
Provost Marshal ADF – COL N Surtees	Technical Authority Command and Control	• All

Primary Stakeholder List	Stakeholder Interest	FIC Focus
Provost Marshal Navy – CMDR R. Sadler	Technical Authority Command and Control	• All
Provost Marshal Army – LTCOL D McGarry	Technical Authority Command and Control	• All
Provost Marshal Air Force – WGCDR G. Mott	Technical Authority Command and Control	• All
Provost Marshal HQ Joint Operations Command - MAJ M. Luck	Command and Control	• All
Head Defence Legal – Mr Mark Cunliffe	Legislative Authorities	• Command & Management
IGADF – Mr J. Gaynor	Military Justice	• Command & Management
DIGADF – BRIG B. Worswick	Military Justice	• Command & Management
Assistant IGADF - GPCAPT P. Moss	Military Justice	• Command & Management
Military Justice Review Team - CDRE N. Perry	Military Justice	• Command & Management
Military Justice Review Team - COL G. Cameron	Military Justice	• Command & Management
Directorate Military Prosecutions – BRIG J. Woodwood	Military Justice	• Command & Management
Deputy Director Military Prosecutions - COL R. Cawte	Military Justice	• Command & Management
Directorate of Military Discipline Law – CAPT P. Bowers	Military Justice	• Command & Management
Defence Legal Service - AIRCDRE C. Hanna	Military Justice Legislative Authorities	• Command & Management
Registrar Military Justice - GPCAPT N. Harvey	Military Justice Legislative Authorities	• Command & Management
Judge Advocate General - MAJGEN I. Westwood	Military Justice Legislative Authorities	• Command & Management
Maritime Command Australia - RADM S. Mayer	Raise, Train, Sustain of Naval Coxswain Capability	• Command & Management Organisation
COMD FORCOMD - MAJGEN G. MacLachlan	Raise, Train, Sustain of Army Military Police Capability	• Command & Management Organisation
CO 1 MP BN – LTCOL N. Pierpoint	Raise, Train, Sustain of Army Military Police Capability	• All
CO Defence Force School of Policing / Defence Force Correctional Establishment – CMDR P. Hines	Training Trade / Career Management Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Command & Management Personnel Organisation

Primary Stakeholder List	Stakeholder Interest	FIC Focus
SADFO/CO 13 Squadron RAAF, RAAF Base Darwin - WGCDR S. Parsons	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• Command & Management
SADFO/DCOMD Northern Command, Larrakeyah Barracks, Darwin – CAPT B. Parker	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• Command & Management
SADFO/COMD 1 Brigade, Robertson Barracks, Darwin – BRIG B. James	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• Command & Management
SADFO/COMD 7 Brigade, Gallipoli Barracks, Darwin – BRIG A. Rawlins	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• Command & Management
SADFO/COMD 9 Brigade, Adelaide – BRIG M. Burgess	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• Command & Management
SADFO Edinburgh Precinct (incl. Woomera) - AIRCDRE V. Iervasi	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• Command & Management
SADFO/CO HMAS Stirling, Perth – CAPT B. Delamont	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• Command & Management
SADFO/CO RAAF Base Pearce - (A/CO) SQNLDR Stuart Lane	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• Command & Management
SADFO/CDR Combat Support Group, RAAF Base Amberley, Brisbane – AIRCDRE K Robertson	Customer Domestic Policing Effects	• All
Head of Corps, RACMP – BRIG C. Pearce	Capability Manager Employment Category Sponsor	• All
Director of Policing and Security Navy – CAPT A. Morthorpe	Capability Manager Employment Category Sponsor	• All
Director Security Air Force – GPCAPT W. Kelly	Capability Manager Employment Category Sponsor	• All
Deputy Provost Marshal - Navy - LCDR S. West Money	Capability Development Service Police Intelligence	• All
Deputy Provost Marshal – Army - MAJ G. Acheson-Thom	Capability Development Service Police Intelligence	• All
Joint Service Police Group – MAJ T. Wilson	Capability Development	• All
SO2 Doctrine, RACMP Head of Corps – MAJ M. Langdon	Capability Development	• Command & Management
OC Domestic Policing Unit - MAJ Nathan Myyrylainen	Capability Development Service Police Intelligence General Duties Policing Trade / Career Management	• All
Joint Service Police Group – Mr D. Barwick	Records Management	• Command & Management
Office of Provost Marshal – Navy – Mrs Sue Thornton	Records Management	• Command & Management

Primary Stakeholder List	Stakeholder Interest	FIC Focus
Office of Provost Marshal – Army – Mr Gordon Jenvey	Records Management	• Command & Management
Directorate of Policing and Security – Navy – Ms Jodie Archer	Records Management	• Command & Management
Directorate of Navy Policing and Security – CPO R. Henderson	Navy General Duties Policing	• All
Domestic Policing Unit Sergeant Major – WO1 G. Johnston	Army General Duties Policing	• All
Directorate of Security Air Force – Senior Mustering Advisor – WOFF A. Oestreich	Air Force General Duties Policing Trade / Career Management	• All
Director General Workforce Planning – Defence People Group - BRIG N. Fox	Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Command & Management Personnel Organisation
Director Workforce Modelling, Forecasting & Analysis – Defence People Group – GPCAPT J. Wheaton	Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Command & Management Personnel Organisation
Director General Navy People – CMDRE M. Miller	Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Personnel Organisation
Director Navy Workforce Management – CAPT J. Cowan	Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Personnel Organisation
Director Navy People Career Management Agency – CAPT D. Dezentje	Trade / Career Management	• Personnel Organisation
Director General Career Management Agency Army – BRIG W. Stothart	Trade / Career Management	• Personnel Organisation
Director General Personnel – Army – BRIG L. Wilton	Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Personnel Organisation
Director Workforce Management – Army – COL S. Kerr	Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Personnel Organisation
Director General Personnel – Air Force – AIRCDRE H. Ehlers	Trade / Career Management Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Personnel Organisation
Navy People Career Management Agency – LCDR N. Tuddenham	Trade / Career Management (Navy Officer Career Advisor)	• Personnel Organisation
Navy People Career Management Agency – CPO R. Young	Trade / Career Management (Navy Sailor Career Advisor)	• Personnel Organisation
Army Career Management Agency – MAJ D. Grey	Trade / Career Management (Army Officer Career Advisor)	• Personnel Organisation
Army Career Management Agency – WO1 T. Greenwood	Trade / Career Management (Army Soldier Career Advisor)	• Personnel Organisation
Directorate of Personnel – Air Force – SQNLDR W. Edward	Trade / Career Management (Air Force Officer Career Advisor)	• Personnel Organisation

Primary Stakeholder List	Stakeholder Interest	FIC Focus
Directorate of Personnel – Air Force – FSGT M. Forbes	Trade / Career Management (Air Force Airman/Woman Career Manager)	• Personnel Organisation
Directorate of Navy Workforce Management – WO C. Apperley	Trade / Career Management (Navy Police Category Sponsor and Workforce Manager)	• Personnel Organisation
Deputy Director Navy Warfare Management - CMDR T. Duggan	Workforce Capability Plans and Management	• Personnel Organisation
Commandant Defence Command Support Training Centre - COL K. Stewart	Trade / Career Management (Military Police Employment Category Manager)	• Command & Management Personnel Organisation Major Systems Support Facilities
Defence Command Support Training Centre - Military Police Employment Category Manager – MAJ D. Sweeney	Trade / Career Management (Military Police Employment Category Manager)	• Command & Management Personnel Organisation Major Systems Support Facilities
Joint Training Manager, Defence Command Support Training Centre – Ms J. Love	Training Trade / Career Management	• Command & Management Personnel Organisation
Defence Security Agency, First Assistant Secretary Security and Vetting Service	Domestic Investigative Policing Capability and Effects	• Command & Management
Senior Australian Federal Police Representative to the ADFIS Governance Board – POC TBC	Domestic Investigative Policing Capability and Effects	• Command & Management
Commanding Officer 95 Wing - GPCAPT D. Paddison	Domestic Investigative Policing Capability and Effects Owner RAAF SECPOL	• All
Officer Commanding 1 SECFOR Amberley - WGCDR A. Hoare	Domestic Investigative Policing Capability and Effects User RAAF SECPOL	• All
Officer Commanding 3 SECFOR Amberley - WGCDR C. Williams	Domestic Investigative Policing Capability and Effects User RAAF SECPOL	• All
OIC Domestic Police Unit Adelaide - SGT S. Bonney	Domestic Investigative Policing Capability and Effects	• All
YouSurvey -Director of People Intelligence & Research Workforce Planning - Mr Matthew Stanton	Workforce Capability Strategy	• Command & Management Personnel Organisation

Primary Stakeholder List	Stakeholder Interest	FIC Focus
ADFIS Facilities Development Officer - LTCOL G. Young	Future Facility Design	• Facilities
Army Plans - COL B. Kilpatrick	Military Police Strategic Needs, Capability and Effects	• All

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ADDP 2.4 Evaluation

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ADDP 3.11 Civil-Military Operations

ADDP 3.12 Special Operations

ADDP 3.13 Information Operations

ADDP 3.14 Targeting

ADDP 3.15 Airbase Operations

ADDP 3.16 Counter-Air

ADDP 3.17 Counter IED

ADDP 3.18 Operational Employment of Space

ADDP 3.2 Amphibious Operations

ADDP 3.20 The Military Contribution to Humanitarian Operations

ADDP 3.3 Joint Airspace Control

ADDP 3.4 CBRN Defence

ADDP 3.5 Electronic Warfare

ADDP 3.6 Joint Personnel Recovery

ADDP 3.7 Collection Operations

ADDP 3.8 Peace Operations

ADDP 3.9 Airbourne Operations

ADDP 4.0 Defence Logistics

ADDP 4.1 Logistic Support to Capability

ADDP 4.2 Logistic Support to Operations

ADDP 4.3 Supply

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ADFP 3.1.1 Joint Fire Support Procedures

ADFP 3.13.1 Information Operations Procedures

ADFP 3.14.1 Battle Damage Assessment

ADFP 3.14.2 Targeting Procedures

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Annex C
Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym	Description
ABCA(NZ)	American, Britain, Canadian, Australian, (New Zealand) Standardisation Program
ACMC	Australian Civil Military Centre
ADFIS	Australian Defence Force Investigative Service
AO	Area of Operations
BCC	Battlefield Circulation Control
BN	Battalion
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AFPOL	Air Force Police
AFSEC	Air Force Security
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
COA	Course of Action
COIN	Counter Insurgency
COY	Company
CPERS	Captured Personnel
CPP	Close Personal Protection
CS	Combat Support
CSG	Combat Support Group (RAAF)
CRIMINT	Criminal Intelligence
DACC	Defence Assistance to the Civil Community
DCSTC	Defence Combat Support Training Centre
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFACA	Defence Force Aid to Civil Authorities
DFCE	Defence Force Corrective Establishment
DFSP	Defence Force School of Policing
DGTRADOC	Director General training and Doctrine(Army)
DPSMS	Defence Policing and Security Management System
DPU	Domestic Policing Unit
DS&VS	Defence Security and Vetting Service
DVI	Disaster Victim Identification

Acronym	Description
EHC	Evacuee Handling centre
EvBO	Evidence Based Operations
FE	Force Element
FIC	Fundamental Inputs to Capability
FOC	Final Operational Capability
FORGEN	Force Generation
GD	General Duties
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief
HN	Host Nation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ID	Identify
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGADF	Inspector General Australian Defence Force
INT	Intelligence
IR	Incident report
JIATF	Joint Inter Agency Task Force
JIO	Joint Investigation Office
JTF	Joint Task Force
JSPG	Joint Service Police Group
JOC	Joint Operations Command
LE	Law Enforcement
LO	Liaison Officer
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOE	Line of Effort
LTL	Less Than Lethal
MCP	Minehunter Coastal Project
MEC	Medical Employment Classification
MMS	Mobility and Manoeuvre Support
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MOP	Measures of Performance
MP	Military Police
MPD	Military Police Dog
MSR	Main Supply Route

Acronym	Description
MWV	Minor Warfare Vessel
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPC	Naval Police Coxswain
NPCO	Naval Police Coxswain Officer
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
OGA	Other Government Agency
OPCOMD	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPGEN	Operational Generation
PERS	Personnel
PH	Phase
PM	Provost Marshal
PM-A	Provost Marshal - Army
PM-ADF	Provost Marshal - Australian Defence Force
PM-AF	Provost Marshal – Air Force
PM-JOC	Provost Marshal – Joint Operations Command
PM-JTF	Provost Marshal – Joint Task Force
PM-N	Provost Marshal - Navy
PM NZDF	Provost Marshal New Zealand Defence Force
POLINT	Police Intelligence
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
REACT	Review, Evaluate, Assist, Control, Take Notes
RETPERS	Returned Personnel
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RMP	Royal Military Police
ROL	Rule of Law
SADFO	Senior Australian Defence Force Officer
SDR	Summary Discipline Review
SECPOL	Security Police
SECPOLO	Security Police Officer
SeMPRO	Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office
SPIO	Service Police Intelligence Office

Acronym	Description
SOFA	State of Forces Agreement
SP	Service Police
SPMAN	Service Police Manual
SPT	Support
SI	Serious Incident
SYINT	Security Intelligence
TACOMD	Tactical Command
TACON	Tactical Control
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TECHCON	Technical Control
TSE	Technical Support Element
TST	Technical Support Team
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UK MP	United Kingdom Military Police
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VCP	Vehicle Check Point
VIP	Very Important Person
WOSC	Whole of Ship Coordination

ADF SERVICE POLICE NEEDS AND OUTCOMES

A consolidated list of high level needs and outcomes were developed by the Project Review Team as a result of stakeholder engagement interviews and literature analysis. The list was reviewed in detailed by a targeted workshop activity to develop an agreed consolidated list of current state needs and outcomes required of the ADF Service Police at a 'whole-of-ADF' perspective.

Joint Element	Description
Capability Needs (Requires / Leads to) Organisational Outcomes	ADF Service Police **Need** to: • Support Command with strategic policing advice. • Provide law enforcement, policing and enabling security effects supported by modern technology. • Provide an intelligence-led, investigative and discipline capability. • Be interoperable across the Services, Allies, Local and International Agencies. • Be operationally ready in domestic, deployed and disconnected environments.

	If successful, the ADF Service Police capability will **achieve**:
	
	• An efficient, proactive, transparent and sustainable Joint policing capability underpinned by credible police statecraft that is in tune with Single Service requirements.
	
	• An ADF policing capability that:
	
	   o Upholds the rule of law.
	
	   o Provides Command with the ability to make informed decisions around serious, sensitive and strategic personnel matters.
	
	   o Supports Command with advice on environmental threats and risks.
	
	   o Supports the reputation of, and discipline across, the ADF.
	
	   o Provides a well-equipped, resourced and professional policing effect for capable of adapting to domestic and deployed operations with appropriate authority.
	
	   o Achieves a safer security environment.

Within Service groups, workshop stakeholders developed a list of Service specific needs and outcomes that were relevant to their individual Service requirements. These Service domain items were utilised to inform the consolidated "whole-of-ADF" requirements.

Service Domain	Needs	Outcomes
JSPG	• Professional Standards. • Organic unified police capability. • Policing enabled by intelligence. • Policing supported by modern technology. • Able to support ADF operations. • Strategic advice and coordination of ADF policing.	• C2 –An efficient and sustainable Joint policing capability underpinned by credible police statecraft that is in tune with Single Service requirements. • Effects –A proactive capability which is transparent and supportive to ADF reputation management. • Ops – An ADF policing capability that is enabled to adapt to the operational environment with the appropriate authorities.
Navy	• Ops/Mission – Able to take an independent Ship/TF and operate in a disconnected environment. • C2 – Support command by providing policing effects and security effects. • C2 - Provide whole of ship coordination. • Policing – Detect and react to threats. • Manage outcomes of criminal acts (charge, prosecute, detain, punish). • Detain personnel (high risk). • Security – Support to command. • Deter threats. • Inform command of scale and risks of threats. • Enable force protection priorities.	• Policing – Effective investigators, crime scene managers, maintenance of the evidence chain of custody, community engagement, management of DFDA actions, detainment actions, policing missions (support to RAMSI etc.), General Duties (good order & discipline). • DPS/Mission – Efficient coordination of personnel capability in ship/TF, SAMDF, SME on execution of policing effects. • C2 – Timely advice to command on DISCPO policing matters, support Command to maintain good order & discipline, local threat awareness and advise Command on risks. • Security (effects) – Integrated security governance/standards in unit design and ops, integrated security effects into unit design and ops, CRIMINT, Police activities and events.

Service Domain	Needs	Outcomes
Army	• Intelligence lead, evidence-based law enforcement capability. • Organisational Law Enforcement, investigative, disciplining capability for domestic and operations in support of Command. • Professionally trained and operationally ready workforce. • Joint, interagency and international interoperable. • Ability to protect the force (security). • Uphold good order and military discipline. • Detect, deter, and deny threats.	• Effective policing operations enable the force to conform with rule of law and human rights. • Provide command with the ability to make informed decisions around serious, sensitive & strategic personnel matters, and maintenance of discipline across the force. • Through provision of ethical policing actions, preserve Army's reputation as a trusted and respected institution. • Provision of a professional policing force for domestic and deployed operations. • Adequately resourced and equipped to provide an effective policing function.
Air Force	• Organisationally focussed to provide policing and security capability to support command. • Provide policing effects. • Be interoperable with services and allies. • Organic policing capability. • Advice and support to enforce military discipline, provide Law Enforcement and operational advice. • Incident management.	• A safer base environment. • Contribute to security of Air Force platforms. • Achieve a timely and effective first response to critical incidents. • Achieve Joint policing effects (domestic and deployed). • Assist in achieving a disciplined workforce. • Achieve an effective minor investigative capability.

ADF SERVICE POLICE FUNCTIONS AND TASKS

Workshop Rate of Effort Analysis

The following table was developed during a targeted workshop analysis of rates of efforts across each Service Police environment. Specific rates of effort were developed for each individual Service Police capability brick (e.g. Provost Marshal Office, NPC on Ships, Domestic Policing Unit, AFPOL Detachment) and consolidated into an overall Joint/Service rate of effort to demonstrate total workflow across the workforce.

Service Police Task		JSPG	Navy	Army	Air Force	Average
Law Enforcement	General Duties Policing	8%	18%	11%	13%	13%
	Investigations	19%	12%	11%	14%	14%
	Intelligence	12%	4%	10%	7%	7%
	Specialist Capabilities	5%	2%	1%	3%	3%
	Stability Operations Policing	1%	1%	4%	3%	3%
	Total	45%	37%	37%	40%	40%
Security and Force Protection	Force Protection	2%	5%	7%	8%	8%
	Security Governance	4%	12%	0%	4%	4%
	Total	6%	17%	7%	12%	12%
Mobility, Movement and Manoeuvre Support		0%	1%	7%	3%	3%
Internment and Detention		9%	0%	5%	5%	5%
Command, Control, Management and Governance		27%	19%	24%	22%	22%
Service Non-Police Functions		13%	26%	20%	18%	18%
Total Weight of Effort		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Survey Rate of Effort Analysis

The following table was developed as a result of individual Service Police member responses to a survey. Responses indicated the percentage of time individuals spent in the last 12 months on policing and non-policing functions.

Survey results are aggregated as a whole to understand the weight of effort across the entire Service Police capability.

Function	Task	Sum	Task %	Function %
Law Enforcement	Law and Order - Minor Investigation	1192	11.2%	43.4%
	Law and Order - Major and/or Complex Investigation	896	8.4%	
	Law and Order - Law Enforcement [less investigations] (as defined in SPMAN Annex 2A)	793	7.5%	
	Law and Order - Provide support to command administrative and discipline functions (as defined in SPMAN Annex 2A)	1160	10.9%	
	Support to Emergency Management - Maintain control for safety and preserve incident scenes (as defined in SPMAN Annex 2A)	484	4.6%	
	Other – Military Dog Operations	80	0.8%	
Security	Support to Security Operations - Enhance the security of operations, personnel, information, vital assets and facilities (as defined in SPMAN Annex 2A)	716	6.8%	21.5%
	Other – Security Governance	372	3.5%	
	Other – Force Protection	325	3.1%	
	Other – Physical Security Assessments	417	3.9%	
	Other – Other Security (non-policing related)	447	4.2%	
Movements	Movement Support - Provide safety and control when required to movement of assets (as defined in SPMAN Annex 2A)	397	3.7%	3.7%
Detainee Management	Detainee Management – Garrison: Detention of ADF members (as defined in SPMAN Annex 2A)	146	1.4%	2.8%
	Detainee Management – Operations: Assist with the control of military and civil populations (as defined in SPMAN Annex 2A)	154	1.5%	
Other Non-Core Policing	Other – Whole-of-Ship Coordination	382	3.6%	28.5%
	Other – Seamanship & Navigation	193	1.8%	
	Other – Primary Health Care / Medical	110	1.0%	
	Other – Unit Administration	1530	14.4%	
	Other – Not Specified	811	7.6%	

As a comparative, the analysis from the workshop and the survey results indicate relatively the same magnitude of order related to rates/weight of effort against functions:

- Law Enforcement: 40 – 50%
- Security: 20 – 30%
- Movements: 0 – 5%
- Detainee Management: 0 – 5%
- Non-Policing Tasks: 20 – 30%

The Law Enforcement function is considered the primary core policing function that enables the delivery of the other functions. Within Law Enforcement, investigations and general duties policing are the critical tasks that grow the capability. The above data suggests approximately (rough order magnitude) 25 – 30% of all policing effort is focussed on the foundational tasks that grow and develop the baseline skills of the ADF Service Police force.

A consolidated perspective of 'whole of Service' weights of effort against Service Police functions are depicted in Figure 12 below:

Figure 12: Service Police Functions – Weight of Effort at Service Level

In addition to a whole of Service perspective, a comparative representation of key Service policing elements weight of effort across the policing functions is indicated in Figure 13 below:

Figure 13: Service Police Functions – Weight of Effort by Service Police element

The data indicates those Service Police elements directly engaged in Domestic/Garrison policing duties are gaining experience across the core-policing function of Law Enforcement. This is qualified by the review's observation that the JIOs are dedicated to complex investigative cases. Army DPU and AFPOL Detachments within SECFOR Squadrons have a large proportion of their effort focussed on security and security governance tasks. A

significant proportion of PM-A's weight of effort is focussed on RACMP Deputy Head of Corps functions. It is notable that the conflation of functions within Directorate Security and Policing – Air Force is resulting in little capacity for PM-AF to focus on the technical control and governing standards of the AFPOL across Air Force.

The two primary operational policing elements, specifically Army's 1 MP Bn and Navy's NPC on Ships, have very low (relative) weights of effort focussed on the core-policing function of Law Enforcement. As noted earlier in this report 67% of Navy law enforcement incidents relate to minor discipline events routinely handled by non-police personnel in the other services. Future design options may seek to consider opportunities to enable the development of core-policing skills across the Single Service and Joint environments that establish a common baseline standard and continued a professionalisation continuum to support police members regardless of posting environments.

CURRENT STATE: FUNDAMENTAL INPUTS TO CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

The Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) is a standardised list of nine inputs, designed to enable the effective generation of Defence capabilities. The list is used by Defence agencies at all levels and is designed to ensure that all agencies manage and report capability using a common set of management areas. FIC also assist in the appropriate allocation of financial resources across Defence, improve accountability and enhance the formulation of a response to a contingency when it arises. The detail of each FIC element is by no means prescriptive and permits reporting flexibility.

The scope of the review sought a consideration of the issues associated with the ADF Service Police within Command and Management, Organisation and Personnel. Throughout the review, it was noted that the span and depth of issues across the Fundamental Inputs to Capability were interrelated. The following section provides a detailed outline of the key issues that arose across the FIC elements. The issues consolidated by the review team were reviewed in detail during a four-day stakeholder workshop, which developed a problem statement for each FIC element and confirmed the range of undesirable effects.

A conclusion from the FIC analysis is the ADF Service Police capability has multiple impacts within Services that make the treatment of a 'whole-of-ADF' approach complex. Addressing one FIC issue is likely to result in second and third order effects across Service environments. Previous reviews into Service Police and the Military Justice System focussed on either specific problem areas or Single Service environments. A whole of system approach was not adopted and resulted in ongoing competing FIC issues across the Services. A lesson for future approaches to the ADF Service Police capability is treating issues in isolation is likely to generate a more complex environment.

Key Finding. The ADF Service Police capability should be managed at an enterprise level to enable a systems approach that synchronises FIC and maximises efficiency opportunities from a 'whole-of-ADF' approach.

1. ORGANISATION

The organisation element of FIC refers to the design of an appropriate underpinning structure across Defence to make individual capabilities function as designed and ensure the sustained and coordinated delivery of Defence outputs. It includes the relationship of critical organisations external to Defence including contractors, members of industry and other Government agencies that directly support Defence capabilities and whose actual contribution is more properly defined in the support input.

Problem: A lack of strategy, lack of unified Command and workforce imbalance lead to inefficiency and a lack of understanding of, and support to, Military Police capability.

Excluding HQ JSPG, Service Provost Marshal Offices, Naval Police Coxswains (NPC) posted to a Ship's crew and the 1st Military Police Battalion, Service Police in the domestic setting are group into Service specific policing elements in a wide dispersion across Australia. ADF Investigators, NPC ashore, Army Domestic Policing Units (DPU) and AFPOL Detachments are each located in separate office spaces within regional areas. In some cases, multiple Service Police elements are located on the same base and share the same building. In total, there are 46 separate domestic Service Police sites across the country, indicated Figure 14 below.

Figure 14: ADF Domestic Policing Footprint

The posted strength of Service Police across the various garrison "policing stations" totals 257. The dispersion of individuals is based on the size and complexity of the dependency they support, for example locations with Training Establishments generally have a larger per capita police/member ratio due to the high turnover and sensitive nature of trainee management. In addition, a number of Naval bases maintain higher shore based NPC numbers to maintain required Ship to Shore ratios to support fleet units that traditionally base out of those locations.

Of note, there is a lack of formal coordination between Service Police elements located in the same regional locations and in some instances on the same bases. Where coordination does exist, it is reliant on personal relationships rather than established coordination mechanisms. In general, Services tend to manage policing matters at their base locations with their own Service Police elements. Other than support from ADF Investigators at the regional Joint Investigative Offices (JIO), there is limited mutual cooperation and support between General Duties Police elements to deal with issues and manage surge requirements regionally. As an example, interviews with stakeholders in Darwin indicated numerous times where Army DPU or NPC Offices were unable to deal with the surge of General policing and minor investigations while other policing offices in Darwin had limited work rates of effort but a lack of a formal jurisdictional coordination framework did not allow surging of Service Police members for short periods of time to "smooth out" the required rate of effort across the regionally capability. The current Jurisdictional model complicates the management of workflow that has impeded the timely management of investigations between JIOs and General Duties Policing Elements.

The ability to generate the required policing effect is affected by the number of Service Police members who are not employed in their posted policing role. Across Air Force 6.82% of AFPOL members are not employed in policing roles rather are utilised to supplement security specific positions due to the growing pressures for Air Force in the security domain. While a seemingly low percentage, the spread is not even across regions. For example, the AFPOL Police Station at RAAF Base Edinburgh has an authorised establishment of five personnel with a posted strength of four. However, three of the posted assets are employed in base security officer or Squadron operations roles and the remaining AFPOL member in the police station is junior in experience. The ability to manage incidents at RAAF Base Edinburgh is only enabled through the personal approach of the Army DPU officer-in-charge to provide a more coordinated approach with the remaining AFPOL member. While an excellent example of how local level coordination can work, it is not supported by formal coordination mechanisms and may not survive future posting cycles or changing Army or Air Force operational priorities.

> **Key Finding.** Tactical level relationships are the only mechanism enabling the management of police tasking in regional locations. Without a formalised framework that is not reliant on personal relationships, the ADF is unable to generate critical mass in locations to appropriately manage the scarce personnel resource to address current and future policing workflow demands.

The workflow pressures across the ADF Service Police environment appear unbalanced both across the Services and in Regional locations. The review team conducted a broad analysis of workflow based solely on caseloads reported in the Service Police information management system DPSMS. The analysis considered the total number of Incident Reports (IR) and Investigations (INV) for each policing element. The following charts indicate the case load managed by domestic policing elements (Naval Shore Establishments, Army DPU, AFPOL Base Detachments and Joint Service Police Group) – higher fidelity charts are located at Appendix 1 to this annex.

Figure 15: ADF Service Police Case Load Distribution

Service Police Element	IR (4 yearly average)	INV (4 yearly average)	Total (4 yearly average)	Case Load per Person (4 yearly average)
Garrison Environment				
NPC Shore Establishments	626	372	998	17
Army DPUs & Regional HQ	4194	219	4413	72
AFPOL Base Dets	947	74	1021	26
JIO & Regional HQ	697	267	964	12
HQ DPU	15	2	16	2
PM-N	0	0	0	0
PM-A	0	0	0	0
PM-AF	3	0	3	3
HQ JSPG	66	4	71	3
Naval Fleet Units				
MW &Hydro Force	26	22	47	6
Patrol Boat Group	17	13	30	2
Surface Force	209	150	359	11
Submarine Force	1	1	3	1

The reported caseloads do not reflect the complexity or time duration required to manage individual IR or INV, nor the varied approaches by Services in reporting on DPSMS. However, the above charts and table provide a rough order magnitude indication of the unbalanced work rate in the Garrison environment.

It is acknowledged across the stakeholder groups that the various ADF Service Police elements are suffering from constrained manning. The manning pressures combined with the inability to surge police mass to deal with high workload case demands and priorities impinge on the ADF Service Police to move from a reactive to a proactive organisation. Opportunities that seek to consolidate duplicated functions and develop improved coordination mechanisms between Service and regionally located Service Police elements will enable reinvestment of latent capacity to effectively balanced workforce priorities and deliver timely policing effects.

Key Finding. Service Policing duties are duplicated across the Services and not well coordinated in regional locations, which is resulting in less than optimal utilisation rates and contributing to the inability to generate a proactive policing model

The above issues were considered in further detail during a four-day stakeholder workshop. Stakeholders identified a range of secondary issues and undesirable effects associated with the current ADF Service Police organisation design based along Service lines:

- There is a lack of unified Command, and organisational structures and communication lines are convoluted, which has contributed to inferior culture, poor morale and inertia in the Service Police organisation.
- There is no strategic centre to enable a cohesive view, rationale, engagement and focussed action for Service Police issues.
- Service Police issues are not able to be represented coherently at the strategic HQ and to external agencies, and this has led to a lack of understanding, and support for Service Police capability, internally and externally to Defence.
- Structures or units responsible for strategy, policy, concept, and doctrine development are non-existent. Similarly, there is no singular Service Police organisational unit responsible for capability development.
- The lack of a balanced and coordinated workforce, at all levels of the organisation has duplicated administrative duties, and there is inefficient use of Service Police resources.
- Task level manning across the organisation, and across the three Services, is incorrect and inefficient.
- There is little understanding of a common vision, mission, goals, services and performance measures in the organisation. There is a strong level of tribalism across the Service Police organisation with competing interests.
- There is a lot of duplication of functions and tasks at the senior Service Police levels, which increases waste, inefficiency and frustration.
- The C2 function, tasks and responsibilities are very stove piped and messy, leading to waste risk and staff frustration.
- The organisation is fairly reactive and uses sub-optimal processes of intelligence-led and evidence-based information to plan its operations. Service Police information intelligence is not captured / disseminated coordinated effectively leading to ill-informed decision making.
- Restrictive legislation, non-existing Doctrine, and un-harmonised Standards have a confusing effect about the functions tasks and responsibilities of Service Police versus Civilian Police in domestic environments and overseas deployments.

2. COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

The command and management element of FIC include coherent doctrine, command and control mechanisms, processes and procedures that enable the effective generation of Defence capabilities.

Problem Statement: Military Police C2 is unclear and inconsistent leading to ineffective collection and analysis of intelligence; and constrained and poor legislation has resulted in a disaggregated policing effect.

Command and Control

The ADF Service Police are governed through the offices of PM-ADF and the three Service Provost Marshals (PM-N, PM-A and PM-AF). A PM-JOC has been established to provide planning advice to CJOPS, Deployed JTF Commanders and technical support to deployed Service Police elements. Aside from PM-JOC the remaining four PM Offices are all co-located in the same office floor space to enable ease of communication between offices.

The Command and Control (C2) structure across the ADF Service Police capability is complex and in part is reliant on personalities to deliver and coordinate the policing effects rather than formalised structures and procedures. While stakeholders within Services have indicated that the current design is working, it was clear from a four-day stakeholder workshop that there is little understanding of a common vision, mission, goals, services and performance measures in the organisation.

The complexity of the C2 is displayed in the simplified lines of communication diagram below:

Figure 16: Current Command and Control Design

PM-ADF exercises technical control over all Service Police, which is delivered through respective Service PMs. While technical standards are established by PM-ADF, the application and quality assurance of Service Police remains the responsibility of the Service PMs. Service PMs exercise technical control only over Service Police members and units, other than PM-ADF who commands the ADF Investigative Service (ADFIS) and PM-A who commands the Domestic Policing Unit (DPU). All Service Police elements are disaggregated across the regions and on board Naval Vessels remain in support of local customer units. Naval Police Coxswains are directly under Command of the Ship's Captain.

The current arrangement, while working is not optimal. Provost Marshals are required to navigate multiple layers of Command to manage the technical aspects of the workforce. The coordination between Provost Marshal offices is less than optimal with multiple functions performed by each office. Furthermore, the technical control relationship is primarily achieved through consent rather than direction based relationship and this has significantly inhibited the ability to achieve coherency and focus in the pursuit of professional standards, capability development, and consistency in incident reporting.

A summary of the key elements of the existing Service Police C2 framework is provided in the following table:

JSPG	Navy	Army	Air Force
• Commanded by PM-ADF, and it sits within ADFHQ • PM-ADF is immediately responsible to the Chief of Staff ADFHQ. • PM-ADF is the Principal Advisor on Policing Matters to the Chief of Defence Force. • JSPG established in 2008 with operational element the Joint Investigation Organisation (JIO), (formerly known as the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS).) • JSPG contains the Service Police Intelligence Organisation (SPIO), Service Police Central Records Office, the Digital Forensic Unit, Forensic Services Branch, the Fraud and Debt Recoveries Unit,	• Provost Marshal – Navy (PM-N) sits under the command of the Director of Policing and Security Navy. • PM-N is the Chief of Navy's principal adviser on Service Police support and is Head Defence Investigative Agency - Navy. • PM-N Office consists of just nine personnel and provides technical control, quality assurance, finance and information management support over the Naval Police Coxswain (NPC) Capability. • PM-N office also provides information management (DPSMS) and Security support to DPOLSEC-N. • Service Police support to Navy is achieved through embedded NPC	• Provost Marshal – Army (PM-A), sits under the command of the Adjutant General - Army. • PM-A is the Chief of Army's principal adviser on Service Police support and is Head Defence Investigative Agency -Army. • PM-A office consists of 10 regular and reserve personnel and provides technical control, quality assurance, finance and information management support over the Military Police Capability. • PM-A has no command authority over 1st MP Battalion but does retain the technical control and assurance function over them. • PM-A retains no technical control over Army personnel	• . Provost Marshal – Air Force (PM-AF), sits under the command of the Director of Security Air Force. • PM-AF is the Chief of Air Force's principal adviser on Service Police support and is Head Defence Investigative Agency – Air Force. • The PM-AF Office consists of two personnel and provides technical control, investigation governance and compliance, finance and information management and assurance support over the Police Capability • PM-AF Office provides the AFPOL Mustering Capability Manager. • AFPOL elements are grouped into detachments and

JSPG	Navy	Army	Air Force
and Legal, Operations, Logistics and Coordination cells. • PM ADF has no command authority over other Service PM, who remain under Service command but retains a Technical Control (TECHCON) relationship with them.	at shore bases and Ships. • Service Police are under command of Ship/Shore Base Commanding Officers. Service Police effect is highly distributed. • PM-N has no command authority over these NPC but retains the technical control and assurance function • PM-N provides assistance to NPCs Fleet Units and Establishments on Policing, Investigation and Policy matters. • PM-N retains no technical control over Navy personnel streamed as ADF Investigators and posted to JSPG	streamed as ADF Investigators and posted to JSPG	distributed under command of Security Force Squadrons with 95 Wing of Air Force Combat Support Group. • PM-AF has no command authority but retains TECHCON, through HQ95WG/SECFORSQN HQ, over AFPOL elements in relation to maintaining Service policing and investigation standards, sponsorship and specialist reporting. • PM-AF retains no technical control over Navy personnel streamed as ADF Investigators and posted to JSPG

CDF has invested PM-ADF the authority to invoke a Tactical Control (TACON) arrangement over ADF Service Police in situations of extremis. While desktop exercises have been conducted to review this arrangement, it has been difficult to generate a scenario that requires the PM-ADF to assume TACON in an extreme event, which may actually trigger other domestic operational C2 frameworks through CJOPS. PM-ADF conducted a desktop exercise in May 2017 (Exercise In-Extremis) notionally situated in Adelaide, which highlighted:

- A situation requiring PM-ADF to exercise TACON in isolation would be of such short duration that attempting to establish formal lines of communication, orders and reporting structures would not be possible.

- The exercise did not invoke a TACON arrangement as all local tasking requirements were managed based on personal relationships of PM offices and local Service Police elements to provide required support.

- While communication internal to the Service Police elements was suitable, there was a lack of communication with local Commanders, SADFOs and Service Headquarters regarding the cross-Service tasking and re-direct of policing staff away from normal operating localities.

Interviews with local unit commanders and SADFOs across multiple regions expressed while generally satisfied with performance of local policing elements, some do experience frustration with requirement to engage multiple Service Police elements for base

coordination and security requirements. Currently, there is no regionally established control or coordination mechanism across Service Police elements. In addition, to Defence Commanders requiring multiple points of entry to coordinate effects, Civilian Police experience multiple levels of engagement from Service and JSPG policing elements from the same region to maintain situational awareness and intelligence of developing local criminal threats and obtain information on Defence members to assist in Defence investigations.

> **Key Finding**. The C2 of ADF Service Police is overly complex and does not adequately support a coordinated technical control relationships or engagement with regional commanders or civilian police.

Functionality of JSPG

The Joint Service Police Group was established in 2008 (then as ADFIS) to develop a professionalised ADF Investigative Service and also a central point to Jointly coordinate and/or provide a range of support and capability management on behalf of the ADF Service Police community. In a large part, this has proved successful in developing a functional investigative service that is performing to higher quality standards within the constraints of changing legislative and jurisdictional boundaries.

Figure 17: HQ JSPG Organisational Design

While HQ JSPG has undergone a number of Unit Establishment Reviews in recent history, these have tended to be increasing become focussed on the delivery of the investigative capability. In addition, pressures to offer up AFS savings has resulted in the reduction in manning and internal re-organisations. The resultant effect is an organisation that currently now has constrained capacity to perform a capability coordinator function on behalf of all Joint Service Police elements.

Duplicated Responsibilities

Despite a range of reviews that have attempted to rationalise and streamline processes across both the military justice and Service Police domains, they have not been well coordinated in the delivery of organisational structures. The result is a current state that has a range of similar roles, responsibilities and actions performed across the Service Police environment and in many cases, duplicated in respective Service Police Provost Marshal

Offices. The review team noted a strong level of tribalism across the Service Police organisation with competing interests that is inhibiting a more efficient and highly performing capability.

The following simplistic diagram illustrates that multiple areas are performing capability development, doctrine, intelligence, training, governance and assurance, information management (DPSMS), incident management and technical standards management.

Figure 18: Service Police Duplication of Responsibilities and Effort

The review team has noted through workflow analysis, stakeholder interviews and workshop activities that some of the roles performed in the Provost Marshal offices are replicated. While these roles deliver specific requirements to the relevant Provost Marshal, a fully functional role is constrained by manning and opportunities may exist to combine various areas to reduce duplication and enable capacity to generate a robust and highly functional capability outcome for the entire Service Police community. The roles of intelligence and information management are clear examples where capability enhancements could be achieved.

In other areas, improved coordination could be achieved through a number of means:

- Reallocation of staff between Provost Marshal offices may generate sufficient capacity to provide a coordinating function within JSPG for Governance and Quality Assurance, Capability Development, Technical Standards Management and Compliance, Concept and Doctrine Development and Incident Management.

- Adopting an enterprise approach across Service Police elements and key enabling agencies may enable greater alignment of workforce management outcomes, intelligence, planning and engagement with civilian law enforcement and related agencies.

> **Key Finding.** There is duplication of enabling roles across Provost Marshal offices (including information management, intelligence, capability development, policy and governance). Opportunities to re-organise these elements may generate sufficient capacity to establish fully enabled and highly performing outputs to better support the entire Service Police capability.

Information Management

The lack of clear command and management implies information sharing is sub-optimal. The collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence products is not focussed on being proactive and does not lead to a deterrent effect. Data sharing is constrained by Service barriers and Tri-Service reporting. There is no deployable CRIMINT database, and the reporting systems are stove-piped. There is no support for intelligence analysis, data fusion or for integration with the units. This has led to a very immature intelligence capability with virtually non-existent Information Operations. The collected and analysed intelligence is not effectively used, and further constrained by legislation. This has resulted in a disaggregated policing effect.

Information is reported by all Service Police elements on the information management system DPSMS. This system is scheduled for replaced as part of the Defence wide ECRMS project, which may improve usability and ease of access to information. However, ECRMS has no identified implementation schedule for the transition within the Service Police community.

DPSMS is managed centrally in each of the Service Police Provost Marshal Offices and operated in each of the 46 outposts across the country. Firewalls and access restrictions are built into the system which does not allow adequate visibility of records reported by one Service element by another Service element. Visibility can be managed across Provost Marshal Offices through the relevant Information Managers; however, information is not shared laterally between Service Police stations in the same locality. This inhibits the ability to generate a complete policing common operating picture across the network.

There is no formal mechanism to transfer information regarding a person of interest. For example, if an Army member of interest is posted from Townsville to Williamtown that member's DPSMS record is not transferred from DPU Townsville to 1 SECFOR AFPOL Detachment, nor is there a deliberate case handover for local Service Police elements to continue oversight of a member. Visibility of persons of interest is maintained centrally, however, the disaggregated nature of the Provost Marshal functions and specifically the information management systems is not allowing a proactive management and policing at the local level.

Services apply differing standards to reporting criteria within DPSMS. The criteria are determined by the Services and results in centralised reporting being difficult to make specific trend comparisons from raw data due to the varied thresholds for DPSMS reporting. The consequence is it does not adequately enable a Joint Incident Management System nor effectively support a common police operating picture or robust intelligence cycles.

Intelligence

Currently, the Service Police Intelligence Office (SPIO) consists of three members (03, E8 and E6). The information management system is a key enabler to the intelligence function performed by JSPG. The constraints noted above with DPSMS are not effectively enabling JSPG to deliver a robust intelligence capability.

The SPIO maintain strong relationships with other Defence Intelligence and Security Agencies in addition to other Government agencies, such as the AFP. These relationships have enabled a reasonable sharing of information at a central level. The office has proved ability to issue well-articulated intelligence assessments based on existing intelligence relationships and DPSMS reporting.

Throughout this review, it was reported to the review team that intelligence product is not filtering down to local level Service Police elements. When product is disseminated it is not in a form that is actionable or provided in a timely fashion. This is impacting the confidence in the ADF's police intelligence capability internal to the organisation. Consequently, Service Police elements are not actively submitting police intelligence situation/contact reports during the conduct of their routine duties. The result is a 'catch 22' cycle with the SPIO not receiving a complete intelligence picture in order to produce actionable intelligence product. In this sense a police intelligence culture is not evident.

It is likely that sufficient intelligence reporting is available both vertically and laterally within the organisation. What appears deficient is a clear policing plan established at either the Provost Marshal level or at the local level for tactical implementation. Robust policing plans would utilise available intelligence to better apply scare policing capabilities in a targeted manner to deal with current and emerging issues. Improving the synchronisation of policing effects will enable the ADF to move towards a more intelligence led Service Policing capability.

There is a symbiotic relationship between the SPIO and relevant information management roles performed between the Provost Marshal offices. If opportunities are explored to consolidate information management roles centrally within JSPG, capacity may be generated to establish a fully integrated information and intelligence cell capable of producing actionable information and intelligence product that enables the Joint Incident Management System and an intelligence led Service Police model.

Key Finding. Opportunities to improve integration of information management and intelligence functions across the Provost Marshal offices may enable the Joint Incident Management System, move Service Police to an intelligence-led model and result in better utilisation of the scarce Service Police asset.

Legislation

It has been noted that the legislative basis for Service Policing is outdated and poorly aligned to the modern requirements of the ADF and Service Policing, limiting the investigative and policing capability of the ADF. Historical reviews made recommendations to co-ordinate and regulate the ADF approach to legislative enhancement as an ongoing requirement for the development and maintenance of a modern and capable ADF, ensuring the freedoms and constrains applied to Service policing have been made. Despite these reforms, the legislative framework is not aligned to current needs, providing limited

legislative powers outside of the DFDA. The environment is further complicated by reduced powers as a result of amendments within other legislation such as the Privacy Act 1988, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the Surveillance Devices Act 2007.

There is little appetite to amend current legislative powers and authorities of Service Police. Therefore, Service Police will continue to operate in a constrained environment into the future and reliant on greater interoperability with the Australian Federal Police and other Civilian Police agencies to deal with restrictions on Service Police powers.

The Summary Discipline Review may offer opportunities to Service Police in the longer term, depending on the outcomes of that review. If this review is successful in streamlining the DFDA and/or Summary Discipline Process, it may positively impact the work-load of the ADF Service Police member resulting in more capacity to be reinvested in other core policing functions and tasks.

Policy and Doctrine

The ADF Service Police capability has no unifying Joint concept, no specific Joint doctrine nor Joint strategic plan. Service Police policy is generally being developed in an ad hoc manner and suffers from alignment with any capstone guidance. Consequently, the policing standards are not harmonised and there is confusion about the functions tasks and responsibilities of Service Police. It also contributes to expectation issues resulting from many ADF Service Police members seeing themselves trained to similar standards to their Civilian Police counterparts and held to the same legislative and professional standards, however, not invested with the same powers. Consequently, Senior Leadership, key stakeholders nor the ADF Service Police community itself have a clear definition of ADF Service Police or a vision for the future development of a Joint approach to the capability.

The review team conducted a detailed analysis of Joint doctrine, across all levels of philosophical, application and procedural publications. While there is limited comment on the functions of Service Police contained in Joint Logistic Doctrine it is more reflective of a Military Police approach for land based operations. There is no doctrine that articulates the unique Service Policing effect across the three Service Domains and how they contribute to the Joint Operational Environment.

The lack of a Joint framework to conceptually guide the ADF Service Police will result in no synchronisation or coherent capability development approach, no understanding of the employment of Service Police in support of the Joint Operating Concepts, negative impacts on expectations of the capability and less than optimal delivery of policing effects. Furthermore, the ADF risk interoperability issues with NATO and Five Eyes policing who are making significant progressive steps in defining the vision and mission of their policing capabilities through cogent strategic plans.

The Figure 14 below is indicative of the paucity of capstone guidance that is evident across other ADF capabilities:

	Legislation	Government Directive	Strategic Concepts	CONEMP/ CONOPS	Application and Procedural Doctrine	Directives and Instructions
Joint	🟠	⚫	⚫	🔴	🟠	🟤
Navy	🟠	⚫	⚫	🔴	⚫	🟠
Airforce	🟠	⚫	⚫	🔴	⚫	🟠
Army	🟠	⚫	⚫	🟤	🟢	🟢

🟢	Readily and freely available body of knowledge or publication. Containing the full breadth of knowledge focused on Service Policing	🔴	Limited published knowledge, often difficult to locate and use effectively. Publications make limited mention or implication to Service Policing
🟠	Available knowledge, possibly contained as part of another related body of knowledge. Has direct linkages to Service Policing	⚫	Not available, published knowledge.

Figure 19: Current Legislation, Concept and Doctrine Status

While Joint technical standards and tactical procedures are outlined in the extant ADF Service Police Manual (SPMAN), it continues to focus primarily on the application of on investigative requirements within the directed jurisdictional model. Furthermore, in the absence of any strategic guidance the SPMAN is viewed by many Service Police elements as the pseudo document that provides a continuum of strategic guidance through to tactical level processes. While a sound procedural manual it is not recognised within the hierarchy of concepts and doctrine as the authoritative document that informs the higher level capability definition and development that will ultimately enable any vision for a professionalised and unified ADF Service Police capability.

> **Key Finding.** The lack of unifying Joint Concepts and a Strategic Service Police Plan risk internal and external interoperability in the Combined / Joint operational environments.

3.   PERSONNEL

The personnel input refers to the competent workforce needed to meet all the organisational requirements that enable the effective generation of Defence capabilities. It incorporates recruitment, individual training and development, and retention of personnel with the skills and competencies required by the organisation. Personnel refers to all members of Defence, both military (permanent and Reserves) and civilian, including both Australian Public Service and contractors, and can include relevant members of industry and other Government agencies.

Problem Statement: Inconsistent recruiting, standards of entry, standards of qualification and individual training contribute to poor Military Police effectiveness and resilience.

Workforce Overview

The Services each employ their Service Police in different ways. Army maintain a dual mode system with FORGEN/OPGEN undertaken by 1 MP Bn, and daily garrison policing undertaken by the DPU. Air Force similarly generates these effects from within a single organisation, whilst continuing to divert substantial effort in support of security operations conducted by AFSEC. Navy are substantially different, in that, they employ their Service Police predominantly in the seafaring role, with responsibilities for whole-of-ship coordination, advanced medical and navigation duties. Policing effort by Service Police within Navy is very low whilst aboard ship. On Shore, Navy contribute more of their available time to policing duties; however, they still retain similar duties of staff rostering and coordination for their shore establishment.

The current state of the ADF Service Police workforce is indicated in the Figures 15 and 16 below for both Officer and Other Rank streams (data provided by Directorate of Strategic Workforce Plans and Analysis, DPG, correct as at 30 June 2017).

	O02 (LT (E))			O03 (CAPT (E))			O04 (MAJ (E))			O05 (LTCOL (E))			O06 (COL (E))		
	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force
Headcount - General Duties	1	18	6	6	34	14	4	32	14	1	13	6	0	1	1
Headcount - Investigator	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Headcount Total	0	18	6	6	34	14	4	32	14	1	13	6	0	1	1
Asset/Liability Gap	1	0	4	-1	9	-3	0	8	0	-2	7	3	0	0	1
Category (Trade) Mismatch, Non-Category & Pool Posting	3	2	0	0	18	8***	0	18	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
Rank Mismatch	1	0	0	0	1	5***	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Male / Female	0.0%	83.3%	16.7%	66.7%	82.4%	78.6%	100.0%	71.9%	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	100.0%	16.7%	83.3%	33.3%	17.6%	21.4%	0.0%	28.1%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MEC 2 and Above	100.0%	94.4%	100.0%	83.3%	97.1%	92.9%	100.0%	81.2%	78.6%	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%
MEC 3 and Below	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	16.7%	2.9%	7.1%	0.0%	18.8%	21.4%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Average Age	33	30.4	26.3	50.5	32.5	39.1	46.3	41.8	47.2	56	44.4	49.2	0	44.4	55
Average Time In Rank	2	3.1	1.8	6.7	5.9	4.1	1.8	8.3	6	1	5	4.2	0	0	3

Figure 20: Service Police Workforce Demographics - Officers

	E01(PTE(T) (E))			E02 (PTE (E)) & E03 (PTE(P) (E))			E04 (LCPL (E))			E05 (CPL (E))			E06 SGT (E)			E08 (WO2 (E))			E09 (WO1 (E))		
	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force	Navy	Army	Air Force
Headcount - General Duties	0	63	0	4	131	0	0	19	0	76	68	33	33	34	6	20	20	1	8	8	1
Headcount - Investigator	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	5	16	14	14	16	14	31	14	10	2	5	3
Headcount Total***	0	63	0	4	131	0	0	19	0	81	84	47	47	50	20	51	34	11	10	13	4
Asset/Liability Gap	0	0	0	4	13	0	0	-44	0	-6	0	7	-10	-12	-6	0	3	-3	4	2	0
Category (Trade) Mismatch, Non Category & Pool Posting	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	9	2****	0	9	0	0	13	0	3	5	0
Rank Mismatch	0	0	0	0	30	0	0	6	0	9	14	5****	6	1	0	9	1	0	3	2	0
Male / Female	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	75.0%	64.1%	0.0%	0.0%	84.2%	0.0%	69.1%	85.7%	61.7%	66.0%	88.0%	70.0%	70.6%	88.2%	90.9%	70.0%	84.6%	100.0%
	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	25.0%	35.9%	0.0%	0.0%	15.8%	0.0%	30.9%	14.3%	38.3%	34.0%	12.0%	30.0%	29.4%	11.8%	9.1%	30.0%	15.4%	0.0%
MEC 2 and Above	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	83.2%	0.0%	0.0%	89.5%	0.0%	81.5%	81.0%	75.7%	68.1%	70.0%	75.8%	74.5%	82.4%	78.8%	40.0%	84.6%	70.0%
MEC 3 and Below	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.8%	0.0%	0.0%	10.5%	0.0%	18.5%	19.0%	24.3%	31.9%	30.0%	24.2%	25.5%	17.6%	21.2%	60.0%	15.4%	30.0%
Average Age	0	0	0	33.5	25.6	0	0	29.4	0	35	34.1	34.9	40.9	40.2	40.5	47.6	45.2	46.9	49.7	48.4	52.7
Average Time In Rank	0	0	0	0	1.4	0	0	1.5	0	4.5	4.1	3.9	4.9	5	4.5	8.7	4.9	5.3	5.3	4.9	4.8

Figure 21: Service Police Workforce Demographics – Other Ranks

The structure of an Employment Category (EC) can be sustainable regardless of its size so long as the workforce behaviours (e.g. TiR, separation rates) and rank ratios support that structure. Accordingly, for each EC there is no minimum number of positions on the establishment that will tend an EC towards sustainability or unsustainability. However, it is generally accepted that the smaller the size of the EC, the greater is the influence of an individual's behaviour (e.g. separation) on the sustainability of the EC; and therefore, such behaviour may increase the likelihood.

The size of the ADF Service Police workforce is susceptible to disproportionate shocks from small changes resulting from individuals. This is particular relevant for Navy and Air Force where MEC status (Navy: 25%, Air Force: 20%) and requirements to maintain ship to shore ratios places significant burden on the rest of the workforce to generate an operational capability. It also introduces Work/Health/Safety risk to Defence where members at MEC 3 are employed within Service Police roles where those members are exposed to duties they are temporarily unfit to perform.

The Navy workforce presents as the one at most risk. Of note, currently 47 Petty Officer positions are feeding into 61 Chief Petty Officer and above positions. This is resulting in restricted promotion opportunities and with Navy SNCO spending on average 70% longer time in rank before promotion than their other Service counterparts. In addition, the NPC category is an aging force with approximately 30+% of NPC reaching retirement age within the next six years. Navy will lose a significant experience base in the near term.

Recruitment

Army and RAAF employ both ab initio as well as trade-transfer recruiting methodologies. RAN is trade-transfer only (no ab initio).

There is no common baseline entry standard for Service Police across the Services, which is resulting in quality differential in the Services, inconsistent member expectations, contributes to poor resilience requirements and overall broad employability across the ADF Service Police environment. Suitably vetted personnel are not involved in the recruitment actions and selection is not aligned to best practice standards. Airforce is the only Service to undertake an official selection board process to screen candidates prior to selection to progress into training and employment as a Service Police person.

> **Key Finding**. A common baseline Service Police entry standard does not exist, which impacts selection of "fit-and-proper" persons with required resilience and personal qualities to deliver a core-policing competencies and professional standards.

Stakeholders noted the resiliency of the workforce was an issue requiring attention. Whilst this may attributable to a broader generational issue, increasing entry age to provide Service Police with greater life and coping skills presents a freedom for the Service Police community to combat perceived workforce resilience issues.

Training and Pay

The career pathway for Service Police is graphically represented at Appendix 2. The graphic provides the comparison of career milestones, training and pay grade advancement across the Services.

Service Police Initial Employment Training (IET) is considered to be a Joint training package, delivering the same level of policing training to each candidate, regardless of their Service. The IET training currently incorporates the Service Police Investigators course, to ensure all Service Police are capable of undertaking basic investigations and conduct themselves effectively in a domestic policing situation. At the conclusion of the Joint IET, Army and Navy provide additional Single Service training for their Service Police. Officers are similar, in that, they complete a Joint Service Police Officer Basic Course, prior to commencing further Single Service training continuums.

There is no further alignment of Service Police training outside of the JIO (ADFIS) investigative specialisation and career stream for Service Police. Army has the most comprehensive Single Service and technical Service Police training and career model. Military Police (MP) personnel are provided a substantial level of command, leadership and management training in an 'all corps' setting, and additionally provided technical career advancement training to ensure Service Police receive training on their Service Police responsibilities at the next rank. Army also provide MP the opportunity to specialise in close personal protection and military working dog handling career paths. Neither Air Force nor Navy provide additional relevant police specific training throughout a Service Police person's career to ensure Service Police have the contemporary policing knowledge and skills required at each rank level.

Air Force adopts a "just-in-time" approach to avoid over-training, which provides the minimum level of training required to generate a competent workforce. This seeks to ensure the time delay between recruiting and becoming "trained asset" is minimised. However it does result in undertrained personnel beyond the rank of CPL.

The RAN demands a depth of training for its Naval Police Coxswains (NPC) not found in other Services, but this is largely explained by the additional tasks they are required to perform to support "the ship". These tasks lie outside the scope of Service policing, so there is limited work value in terms of generating a policing effect. Navy provide advanced seafaring training for their Other Ranks Service Police personnel, providing them with suitable career and pay progression options within Navy. Navy have no similar focus for the Officer category and have no current model to sustain the officer capability without substantial review and improvement.

Key Finding. Current Joint training opportunities for Service Police do not establish or maintain the relevant core policing skills throughout a member's policing career nor does it adequately set the base line competency for equitable pay grade advancement.

Commonality across IET is desirable to establish a baseline of skills, attitudes and competencies. This also establishes a baseline for remuneration purposes. Current differences in salaries (a recruiting / retention issue) are largely explained by continuation training. Army conducts ongoing continuation training as part of rank progression which provides a greater depth of training than is found in the other two Services. Navy and Air Force have no continuation training program

The differences in training (both initial depth and continuation) generate disparity in work value, which explains the Pay Group differences. To that end, it is recommended to maintain a baseline level of training for commonality, but tailor Service specific IET to prepare the workforces to generate Service Police effects. The generation of identical training regimes across the Services is not desirable and should be avoided; however, the use of competency log books does represent a freedom for PM ADF to monitor training outcomes across the Services post-IET.

COMDT DCTSC is the Training Authority for Service Police Training. While COMDT DCSTC reports through Director General Training and Doctrine Command (Army), this arrangement provides comprehensive training governance to provide oversight and control of the Service Police training system (in accordance with the Systems Approach to Defence Learning). Service interests are adequately managed and resourcing coordinated through extant the Service Police Training Advisory Group. These arrangements may be enhanced through a more formalised tightened role of the PM-ADF as a key advisor to these training and governance arrangements.

Key Finding. Current training and employment category management governance frameworks are suitable with robust control mechanism delivered through COMDT DCSTC and DGTRADOC. Opportunities to generate a greater advisory role for PM-ADF within training governance may enable improved enterprise wide technical input.

Career Management

ADF Service Police personnel management is administered differently across the Services, with postings designated to the Services. Postings and the career continuum are not considered in terms of a cradle-to-grave approach and are not aligned to retention strategies. Response to workforce demand and occupational analyses are not optimised.

Historical reviews have similarly noted the career management system and career pathways for Service Police are not co-ordinated or unified in their approach to the Service Police capability for the ADF. Those reviews recommended the development of a coordinated approach to the application of suitable career management functions to ensure the unified Service Policing effects are delivered as required and refreshed as appropriate. The expectation was this would support the maintenance of unified culture and Service policing effects within the ADF.

Currently the Joint Workforce Management framework is not considered to be mature enough to accommodate the potential option of establishing and managing a singular Joint Service Police workforce. New Zealand and Canadian Defence Forces have moved to a completely Joint Workforce and Career Management framework and offer insights to improve the ADF enterprise approach to workforce management as the ADF Joint workforce management framework matures.

Key Finding. There is no existing joint SP workforce plan to adequately influence the development and conduct of career management, to improve the careers of all SP, enable ongoing professional development and to deliver better service policing effects throughout the ADF.

It is noted that the Services employ their Service Police workforce quite differently and currently it would be undesirable to attempt to perfectly align the Service Police workforces recruiting, training and CMA functions. Single Service career management is a highly specialised process, which differs Service-to-Service and Other-Rank to Officer. Career management is largely delivering the intended outcomes for the Single Services, though potentially not addressing the enterprise core policing requirements due to a lack of a Joint Service Police workforce plan.

The investigative career pathway into the JIO (ADFIS) is largely a one-way career pathway. Currently none of the Services have established sound levels of in-flow and out-flow from the JIO. This stagnant workforce means development opportunities are reduced for Service Police broadly, cultural issues are intensified, and the Services are not gaining improved investigative skills within their Service Police workforces.

It may be advantageous to provide PM-ADF with a more active involvement in career management across all three CMAs. Potential input that may be advantageous in the selection of high profile Other Ranks or rotational 05 positions.

During the four day stakeholder workshop, the workforce group noted that any proposal that sought to "strengthen the centre" via the amalgamation of the five disparate Provost Marshall offices may offer opportunities to reduce senior ranking Officer and Other Rank establishments. This may have positive impacts to assist in improving structural sustainability across all Services. Further workforce analysis would be required to analyse the specific impacts from both a workforce sustainability and a Service capability output perspective.

Developing Common Professional Experience

Previous reviews noted that the Service Police quality and assurance framework was not providing the requisite level of reporting on the efficacy and efficiency of the Service Police capability. Those reviews recommended the establishment of a suitable framework of performance agreements between relevant elements of the ADF, in particular related elements of the Military Justice System; including capability agreements which allow for the management and measurement of the quality and efficacy of the policing effect within the ADF. Defence has since implemented a range of professional development opportunities, established the Joint Service Police Group to aligned technical standards and oversight of a quality and assurance framework, and developed common Initial Employment Training.

During the four-day stakeholder workshop, it was noted that Service Police training may require further detailed review to ensure it enables the unified and Joint capability required of a modern and progressive capability. While a foundation component, training is only one contributor to a robust professional development regime of a unified and Joint Service Policing culture (ethos).

Arising out of historical reviews and the establishment of the ADF Investigative Service, now the Joint Service Police Group (JSPG), a Joint professional development framework was established. However, this framework is almost entirely focussed on the development of ADF Investigators within the JSPG. Across the Services there are limited to no specific professional development opportunities afforded to members of the General Duties Police community. This is a weakness in the development of an advanced police capability from a 'whole-of-ADF' perspective.

A component of a member's professional development is derived from the depth and exposure to the complexity and diversity of policing activities throughout a member's career. Experience levels across the three Services vary greatly, which is attributed to the rates of effort members expend on non-core policing functions and tasks. An example of this experience differential is identifiable through consideration of the case load analysis presented earlier in this paper. The Figure 17 below is based on the average per person four-yearly case load (incident reports and investigations). From a rough order of magnitude perspective rate of effort, it is evident that the Army will generate a far greater experience level across its workforce than the other two Services comparable across rank progression (e.g. an Army CPL will experience 200 cases at rank progression, whereas it will take a Navy and Air Force member progression to PO/SGT (E) rank to generate the same weight of case load experience).

Figure22: Service Police Workforce Case Load Experience

> **Key Finding**. There is no other established enterprise system to develop and maintain core policing competencies to an agreed standard; in particular, there is no contemporary, professional development framework for ADF Service Police beyond the ADF Investigator workforce.

While the above data does not account variances in the types of cases recorded in DPSMS by respective Service police elements, nor for case complexity, from a sheer volume perspective it is apparent there is a significant experience differential in core policing across the ADF environment. While it may be difficult to redirect volume load across the Services, the issue confronting the development of a 'whole-of-ADF' Service Police capability is generating a common professional development standard. Opportunities that focus on ongoing competency and experience management through a log book system may enable better exposure of all ADF Service Police members to common core policing activities. The outcome would seek to improve interoperability of Service Police members in a Joint operational environment and may support common baselines for Pay Grade equalisation across the Services.

Opportunities exist to align a wider professionalisation framework with the outcomes of the IGADF Own Initiative Inquiry into Service Police Code of Conduct and Professional Standards System. Alignment of approaches may enable a suitable quality, compliance and governance mechanism to be established to assure a common 'whole-of-ADF' Service Police baseline to be established and maintained.

> **Key Finding**. Opportunities exist to establish a 'whole-of-ADF' Service Police professional development framework aligned with the outcomes of the IGADF Own Initiative Inquiry into Service Police Code of Conduct and Professional Standards System.

Opportunities

a. Implement an enterprise focussed, standardised, recruitment and selection process to enhance the basic standard of Service Police. Selection processes should ensure candidates have higher/better levels of:

    i. Emotional Intelligence

    ii. Civilian Education AND Experience (Age)

    iii. Emotional and Mental resilience

    iv. Self-motivation and the ability to act autonomously within limits

    v. Higher moral strength and standing

    vi. Higher communication skills

b. Enhance PM ADF engagement with relevant training authorities in order to:

    i. Set the enterprise competency baseline for all Service Police

    ii. Establish an enhanced Enterprise Service Police Training continuum to support the delivery of Service Policing effects into the future.

c.   Establish a professional competency development and assessment program, through a log book style system, to ensure improved professionalisation and skills are maintained by all Service Police.

d.   Establish an Enterprise Service Police Workforce Advisory Working Group in order to coordinate the approach to career management, training and pay. PM-ADF should establish standing meetings with the various heads of career management organisations to focus on the enterprise requirements, promotion board contributions and filling of key Joint appointments at the O4 and O5 levels.

e.   Explore the option to increase entry age for Service Police to combat perceived workforce resiliency issues.

f.   Maintain a common baseline for Service Police training which underpins a common baseline Service Police Pay Grade, with continuation training and broadening into niche capability roles offering greater work value and therefore higher PG placements.

g.   Introduce a competency log book to map skills across the Services

h.   Maintain extant separate Career Management Agency (CMA) functions, however tighten the linkages between PMADF, DCSTC and the CMAs, particularly for the growth and selection of high profile OR and rotational 05 positions.

Key Finding. Opportunities exist to align the ADF Service Police workforce through common core policing entry standards, a common professionalisation framework supporting all Service Police not just investigators, a focus on generating ongoing common core policing competency and experience standards, and enhance the technical input of PM-ADF in workforce planning and significant career management selections.

4. COLLECTIVE TRAINING

The collective training input refers to team training, which follows on from the prerequisite individual training outlined in the personnel FIC. Collective training enables the effective generation of Defence capabilities and it is validated against planning requirements and can include all facets of Defence, including corporate, combined, Joint, Single-Service permanent and Reserve members and civilians. It may also involve contractors and members of industry and other Government agencies.

Problem Statement: Broad Single Service needs and limited coordinated external engagement has resulted in no synchronised Joint Service Policing collective training and formal evaluation lines of effort to institutionalise training and operational lessons, which is impacting the ongoing development of a professional and coherent Joint policing capability

The current training focus across the Service Police domain is on individual training. There is very limited collective training across the Services and certainly no approach to Joint collective training. During Major Exercises, Services will generally deploy their Service Police elements, however, any training that is conducted remains within the Service maritime, land or air environment.

In summary, the current approach to collective training is outlined below:

a. **JSPG**. While ADF Investigators are deployed in support of Major Joint and Combined Exercises, they are employed in a 'white' role and not part of the training audience. In this context, ADF Investigators will utilise their skills only in the event of a serious incident occur during the exercise period.

b. **Navy**. Navy does not conduct exercises training objectives specifically for policing and investigations. However, internal and external audits conducted by IGADF have not highlighted any significant deficiencies within the maritime specific environment. When Navy undertakes fleet exercises the entire Ship's crew is exercised during whole-of-ship rotations that require all crew to perform their core and supplementary tasks on the ship. In this context the Naval Police Coxswain are adequately exercised in their 'whole-of-ship' coordination, regulation and other sea faring functions.

c. **Army**. On the whole the Military Police do not exercise their full suite of skills sets.

   i. Army will deploy the Military Police Battalion in support of Major Exercises that involve the land force. The Military Police capability elements are embedded within the training audience in support of the Combat Brigades, other Enabling Brigade and Divisional force elements. Military Police Battalion force elements will be utilised through deliberate training audience exercise scenarios that involved a combined force response (primarily Battlefield Circulation Control, CPERS, ICPC, Search, etc.). There are limited specific serials solely to observe the performance of the Military Police elements.

   ii. The Domestic Police Units are usually tasked to provide supplementary support to Major Exercises to fill out 'white' roles. They are not normally utilised as part of the training audience, which is reserved for the Military Police Battalion force elements.

d.   **Air Force**. During Major Exercises, Air Force deploy in support of the Air Base, as the weapon system, in order to operate the aerial platforms. In this context, the focus is on security and force protection of the Air Base and deployed aerial platforms. Where AFPOL elements are deployed, they are rarely utilised in a policing function, rather tend to supplement a security force requirement. In this context, there appears to be very little focus on exercising the AFPOL elements in a policing role.

During a four-day workshop, stakeholders noted that a focus on Single Service training needs results in a lack of commitment to external engagement / training with the consequence that there is no adherence to best practice training. There is no common training for the common policing functions, and the limited Joint collective training contributes to a lack of professional policing ability.

Even within a Single Service context, despite involvement of Service Police elements the exercise Evaluation Plans do not include specific policing training objectives that are formally collected against and reported on. Reviews of the Ex TALISMAN SABRE 17 and Ex HAMEL 17 evaluation plans and evaluation reports make no mention of the Service Police capability. Final observation reports from Senior Observer Trainers make almost no mention of the Service Police, other than minor commentary regarding Battlefield Circulation and Control performed by the Military Police cell embedded in the Combat Brigade Headquarters. There were no observations collected on Naval Police Coxswains, AFPOL or ADF Investigators.

The importance of the Evaluation Plan serves to formally record observations and assess performance of the force, with lessons over time being codified and institutionalised. These lessons inform the emerging needs and/or deficiencies of the capability in support of the Future Joint Operating Concept and the requirement for specific capability development lines of effort. No such approach exists for any ADF Service Police element resulting in a poor understanding of the state of the capability and a lack of evidence to support modernisation requirements.

> **Key Finding**. There is no evaluation of Service Police elements deployed in support of Major Joint Exercises, which is resulting in poor understanding of the capability and a lack of evidence to support modernisation efforts.

Currently there is no intent to develop a Joint exercise concept for ADF Service Police. Current exercise design does not allow cross domain interaction between the various Service Police.

Opportunities may be available to deliver a lower level of collective training outside of Major Exercise periods. Low cost and minimal resourced collective training activities such as desktop exercises, command post exercises, wargaming, etc. with ADF and Civilian Police agencies may offer avenues to assess a range of aspects of the Service Police capability. Assessing ability to reinforce other Service Police elements, management of Jurisdictional Boundaries and integration with Civilian or Coalition Police Forces may be appropriate training serials. Consistency and Service commitment to such activities would be vital to ensure they are appropriately designed, relevant and formally reported. Developing a profile over time will aid an evidence based argument for emerging modernisation requirements.

5. MAJOR SYSTEMS

The major systems input encompasses the major capital assets that enable the effective generation of Defence capabilities. Major systems assets, including interdependent systems, could be labelled as Class 7 supplies. However, they have been separated out because they are core components of capability; often comprising systems of principal items in their own right that regularly require more detailed management and reporting. They have significant whole-of-Government or Defence implications in the application of national power.

Problem Statement: The lack of a common policing IT system restricts application of intelligence-led effects; poor PPE definition risk safety of members; and the lack of a capability development manager has hindered the progression of a coherent and integrated Service Police force modernisation program.

Current State Overview

The operating environments of ADF Service Police vary across the Services. The equipping requirements of the Naval Police Coxswain on board a ship are significantly different to that of a Military Police Section providing Battlefield Circulation and Control in the Joint Land Combat environment. Service capability development approaches and equipping respective Service Police elements support the unique nature of the respective environmental deployed environments, albeit issues remain in some areas such as the provisioning of appropriate protected and networked vehicles for Army Military Police elements.

While the deployed environments across the Maritime, Land and Air domains may vary, the domestic environment is relatively the same albeit there are minor nuances associated with operating in vicinity of Aircraft or Naval vessels docked alongside. However, there is no standardised equipping of Service Police to support domestic policing in a garrison environment. Currently, there is no plan to modernise the Service Police capability to address the emerging police environment which is impacting the ability for Service Police elements to effectively coordinate policing effects and is introducing growing risk to personal safety.

While HQ JSPG has established a Capability Management Cell it is not sufficiently resourced to undertake a capability coordinator role to champion Service Police capability requirements. The cell has no ability to developed Concepts or Capability Needs Statements to articulate emerging minor or major equipment needs of the wider Service Police community. Furthermore, the cell is staffed with mostly junior staff who have no qualifications or experience in managing the capability development lifecycle. As a result, JSPG are currently unable to perform any capability coordination function and tend to focus on minor acquisition of supply items (such as High Visibility Vests) and developing technical standards (for core-policing tasks not employment or management of equipment items).

As result, capability development is managed in a disaggregated manner within the Services and mostly treated as minor projects with low funding priority. In broad, the treatment of capability development for each Service includes:

a. Within Navy, the responsibility for articulating the capability need is vested with PM-N. PM-N does not have strong integration with Head Navy Capability program

managers to coordinate robust capability requirements. The majority of equipment acquisition and sustainment is managed through Army as the Capability Manager.

b.   Within Army, the Military Police equipment and vehicles are managed across multiple program Directors within Head Land Systems Division. Articulation of capability needs are the responsibility of PM-A for the domestic policing environment and CO 1 MP BN for the Joint Land Combat operational environment. Army has a reasonable coordination mechanism through Head of Corps and numerous Military Police committees and working groups to consolidate the Military Police requirements and staff coordinated requirements to Army HQ.

c.   Within Air Force, PM-AF has little input to the AFPOL capability development approach. Articulation of the AFPOL capability need tends to be divested to AFPOL detachments within Security Force Squadrons, which are staffed through Combat Support Group and compete with wider Security Force requirements for approvals and funding. The majority of equipment acquisition and sustainment is managed through Army as the Capability Manager. Air Force appears to have the least strong capability development approach for Service Police.

In 2012, a Police Development Advisory Committee (PDAC), chaired by PM-ADF, was established in an attempt to generate closer capability coordination across the Services. However, PDAC members were generally represented by junior ranks who either did not have the authority to make decisions or the relevant knowledge/experience to provide informed comment/information to enable the working group's outcomes. Combined with the JSPG capability cell lack of capacity to provide a robust capability coordination role, the PDAC has failed to provide a suitable development framework for the Service Police capability.

It is assessed that part of the failure to implement a coordinated approach to capability development across the Services is a result of no Capstone Concepts or Strategic Plan for the Service Police from a 'whole-of-ADF' or Joint perspective. Furthermore, there is no capability development "champion" to progress an integrated approach to Service Police development.

> **Key Finding.** There is no Service Police capability development champion to synchronise a coordinated approach to capability needs, which is impacting on the operational effectiveness and continued professionalisation of Service Police.

Critical Deficiencies

Throughout the review team's engagement with stakeholders and workshop inputs, it has been observed that the technology and major systems in use by Service Police are not standardised, wholly fit for purpose nor efficiently managed. Recommendations were made to develop a unified and Joint approach to the Service Police Capability Development, ensuring their fitness for purpose in the modern and dynamic contexts of Service Policing and the current and emerging operational environments.

The range of items that were identified by stakeholders as deficient across the Service Police environment and suitable for treatment in a 'Joint' approach to capability development included:

a. **Communications**. Service Police in the garrison environment do not have a standardised communications system. Services employ a variety of communication methods for their respective garrison police elements, which range from a reliance on personal mobile phones, use of off the shelf basic hand held radios through to modernised digital delivered through the IIP. A key deficiency is the ability for Service Police elements to communicate on a closed network with other Service Police elements back to a central "base station" radio in order to coordinate policing tasks.

b. **Information Systems** (DPSMS).

   i. The limitations of the existing DPSMS information management system have been outlined in the Command and Management FIC. It does not enable information sharing laterally and inhibits the ability to generate a robust intelligence led policing capability.

   ii. There is no common, deployable policing CRIMINT database as a result Service Police situation awareness is constrained and this restricts the application of intelligence-led policing.

c. **Less than Lethal**. The Less Than Lethal (LTL) response options available to Service Police limit their ability to effective deal with an escalated response option in a manner that does not introduce undue safety risks to both the Service Police member and/or the person they are attempting to deal with. As an example, Service Police carry a baton that is capable of breaking a person's arms, legs and skull and cause permanent damage or death. However, they are currently not equipped with a Taser that could temporarily incapacitate a person while they are safely apprehended and result in no ongoing permanent injury.

d. **Biometrics**. Service Police a not sufficiently integrated with the developing biometric capability either within the ADF or with Civilian Police equivalents. The biometric capability has the potential to enable the ability of Service Police generate a more capable intelligence led and effective mechanism to analyse and manage relevant threats.

e. **Forensics**. The field of forensics is a highly specialised field. Currently JSPG provide a limited forensic capability to assist ADF Service Police to deal with a range of sensitive incidents. The current capability is not established nor equipped to deal with cyber-crime, which has been identified as a real current threat and is forecast to become more pervasive into the future.

f. **Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)**. Service Police in the domestic garrison environment are not adequately equipped with appropriate PPE. Current approaches to personal protection are both not well understood across Chains of Command and result in varied applications. These range from the use of high visibility vests through to AFPOL members patrolling air bases with TBAS and at one point weapons containing dummy rounds. These approaches are indicative of the threat to Service Police within the domestic garrison setting where the average Service member is taller and stronger than a decade ago and incidents of drug affected Service members is

growing. PPE that provides an ability to scale protection would be appropriate, with a minimum of a stab vest capability being a suitable baseline for members.

g. **Protected Mobility**. Services Police do not have access to protected mobility and extended range firepower to enable required combat survivability and maintain pace with the force in a contested Joint Land Combat environment.

h. **Military Dogs**. The Military Police dog systems are currently deficient in equipment and serviceability and lacks visibility as a discrete capability system, which impacts readiness and deployability.

Alternate Approach

It is assessed that the current ADF approach to capability development for the Service Police is not suitably supporting the capability need, protecting the individual or supporting an approach towards a more professionalised force. Considering alternate approaches that strengthen JSPG ability to develop a capability coordination role on behalf of the ADF Service Police domains would be an appropriate approach.

A more robust approach to deal with the current disaggregated approach would be appropriate. Suitable for consideration may include:

a. **JP 20XXX**. A Joint Project that provides an all-encompassing method to the development of the Service Police capability from an enterprise approach. Similar approaches have been adopted for other ADF capabilities, such as Intelligence. The establishment of a program portfolio that seeks to modernise Service Police over time through both integrating concept and doctrine development through to delivering modern, fit for purpose equipment and vehicles. The approach would enable establishment of the program within the Defence Integrated Investment Plan (IIP) where funding, acquisition and sustainment are appropriately managed to deliver an assured modernised Service Police capability within the priorities of the IIP.

Key Finding. Opportunities to establish a Joint Project within the Defence Integrated Investment Plan offer a suitable method to synchronise the modernisation of the ADF Service Police capability.

b. **JSPG Governance Board**. The establishment of a Capability Coordinator approach is assessed as a critical requirement to address the issues of the current approach to inadequately provide a coherent capability development approach to Service Police. While PM-ADF may perform the execution aspects of function, it requires an appropriately Star-ranked officer to champion the capability across relevant senior Defence committees. The utilisation of the JSP Governance Board chaired by VCDF may provide opportunities to establish such a function. The board would need to be strengthened with Star-Ranked representation from each Service Headquarter to enable appropriate authority to make decisions across the Services. Established as an enterprise approach, the VCDF through the JSPG Governance Board may enable a suitable capability coordinator framework.

Key Finding. The Joint Service Police Governance Board, chaired by VCDF, would offer a suitable means to appropriately address Service Police capability coordination if appropriate Service representation was enabled.

6.   FACILITIES AND TRAINING AREAS

The facilities and training areas input provides the infrastructure requirements that enable the effective generation of Defence capabilities. It includes all owned and leased Defence buildings, structures, property, plant and equipment, areas for training and other purposes, utilities and civil engineering works both at home bases and deployed locations.

Problem Statement: Service Police facilities across the three Services are not fit for purpose in terms of C2, intelligence and detention, inhibiting training capabilities and a deterrence effect.

The current ADF Service Police facility footprint is diverse, with 46 separate offices spread across the regions (excluding Ship Based NPC and the 1 MP Bn). In some locations, offices are co-located within the same building but this has resulted from a need to cohabitate due to a lack of other available facilities. Within these shared facilities there are no common purpose designs and respective Service police elements compete for space and access. The results are facilities that are accommodating the Service Police element but not completely fit for purpose.

The Defence Estate and Infrastructure Group were engaged as part of this review. It was confirmed that there is no consolidated approach to Service Police facility requirements and in most cases facility development plans are being managed along individual Service lines in isolation to the other Services. This has not been a fault of Defence Estate and Infrastructure Group but results from a lack of coordination across the Service elements.

> **Key Finding**. There is limited coordination of ADF Service Police facility requirements through a central "champion" to progress facility business cases and develop a more efficient and effective facility footprint across the regions.

A detailed status of each facility location has been provided to the review team. In summary the current facility state overview is as follows:

a.   JSPG. The Joint Investigative Offices are generally located near one of the domestic garrison policing offices on a base. Most facilities are aging, poorly designed to meet requirements and in some locations, are not suitable at all. There is currently no funding line approved to enable progression of submitted JSPG facilities business case (CSIR). Progression of JSPG facility requirements has stalled to a large degree as a result of a lack of Star-Ranked representation at Defence facility and works related senior committees to champion the JSPG requirement.

b.   Navy have recently progressed suitable upgrades to Service Police facilities. In 2017, two Naval Police Coxswain facilities were built at HMAS Cairns and HMAS Albatross with office relocation and work to commence at HMAS Kuttabul and HMAS Coonawarra late 2017. Facilities in other locations tend to be aging and not meeting current requirements.

c.   Army. The Army Domestic Policing Units are accommodated in a range of facilities. As base upgrades progress across the country the availability of facilities has generally

been improving. However, in many locations they continue to remain not fit for purpose as result of crowded office space, in adequate interview rooms and share office spaced with other lodger base units.

d.   Air Force. Like Army, AFPOL elements are accommodated in a range of facilities. In general, they enable performance of daily tasks, but are not adequate for core policing functions.

The key issues associated with existing facilities include:

a.   No appropriate located within a base location. In some locations the Service Police office is located on a main traffic thoroughfare or is highly visible, which anecdotal comments indicate it results in some victims not attending the Service Police office to report an incident for fear and stigma of being seen at the facility.

b.   Lack of appropriate communications equipment.

c.   Interview rooms are not fit for purpose for the range of interviews that are required to be performed, ranging from basic statements to complex and sensitive interviews.

d.   Poor design inhibits appropriate intelligence collection and assessment to be performed.

In some locations, Service Police elements are co-located in the same building with adjoining offices. Aside from facility and cost efficiencies, it was noted that this approach presented operational effectiveness outcomes. A good example is RAAF Edinburgh where the AFPOL Police Station incorporates the Army DPU and JSPG Joint Investigative Office (JIO). In this instance, Service Police share common interview rooms, detention cells and other suitability shared office space. It enables better duty of care when a member presents as result of an incident; e.g. after initially interviewed by the General Duties Service Police if they are found to have a more sensitive case the member can be smoothly transitioned to the ADF Investigator in the same facility. This has reduced the risk that the member returns to the unit waiting for an appointment with the JIO or decides not to proceed due to other issues. Consequently, the shared facility approach is seen to improve the management of ADF members.

It is noted that facility design and development is a long term and costly program. While co-location is desirable and produces better outcomes for the Service Police and ADF members, it is not feasible to immediately progress an approach to co-locate all Service Police elements. In some locations, this would not be suitable due to the distances between units and bases where dispersed Service Police offices remains appropriate to retain proximity to ADF members and enable timely responses to incidents. However, where opportunities to co-locate present, it is recommended these opportunities be progressed. Future opportunities to co-locate may arise during current base re-disposition planning across the

> **Key Finding.** A Principles based approach to co-locate ADF Service Police elements present will enable opportunities to achieve cost efficiencies, reduce facility footprints and enhance policing interoperability and operational outcomes.

7. SUPPLY

The supply input provides the essential consumables that enable the effective generation of Defence capabilities. Supplies are categorised in ten classes and include items from explosive ordnance to personal equipment. Sufficient supplies must be available to ensure that all activities associated with attaining and sustaining the agreed and funded level of activity, commensurate with required outputs, can be undertaken.

Problem Statement: The supply system is siloed through Service lines resulting in inequitable balance of vehicles, stores and equipment across Domestic Policing elements to effectively execute policing functions and tasks

The ADF Service Police elements do not experience any supply support issues that are unique when compared to the other ADF force elements. Issues affecting the ADF Service Police elements primarily result from unit level funding and sustainment budgets to assure the availability of in-service equipment and vehicles.

The distribution of common equipment and vehicles across Service Police elements is unbalanced. The current Basis of Provisioning and Basis of Issue for like items to each Service do not have a standardised capability brick approach. In some instances, this has resulted in an oversupply of items to some Service Police elements, while others are unable to access the same items. An example is the common issue police white fleet vehicles where JIOs hold sufficient vehicles for each member of an individual JIO while Navy, Army and Air Force domestic policing elements in the same location have one vehicle for the entire police element.

A more balanced approach to common issue Service Police equipment and vehicles would enable greater efficiencies across the Capability Manager sustainment budgets while improving the capability of Service Police elements. A centralised input from a 'whole-of-ADF' perspective to CASG and Capability Manager BOP/BOI considerations may be appropriate, which could be exercised through the PM-ADF if suitably resourced to do so.

Key Finding. Opportunities to establish enhanced input to Basis of Provisioning/Issue considerations for Service Police common equipment and vehicles may generate resource efficiencies and greater operational capability. This could be exercised through an appropriately resourced PM-ADF as a centralised function from a 'whole-of-ADF' perspective.

8. SUPPORT

The support input encompasses the total support base that enables the effective generation of Defence capabilities. Support can be provided by Enabling Groups and Services, Defence industry, contractors, other Government agencies such as Emergency Management Australia, and non-government organisations, both within Australia and overseas.

Problem Statement: Supporting relationships are not clearly defined contributing to friction between Commanders, SADFOs, Formations, Units and Domestic Policing elements and results in the delivery of policing being unbalanced across the regions.

Supported Element

As the supported element, ADF Service Police do not experience any shared service support issues from enabling agencies that are unique when compared to the other ADF force elements. It has been noted by stakeholders that due to the small size of the ADF Service Police, the shared Services model limitations and issues accessing enabling support creates disproportionate impacts on the Service Police and diverts scare police resources away from core policing functions and tasks.

Issues that arise because of base support requirements are managed through normal Service Chain of Command and Base Support Manager frameworks for resolution. This review did not assess the suitability of these contractual arrangements further.

The ADF Service Police intelligence function is enabled through engagement with Defence Security and Vetting Service (DS&VS) with reporting and information sharing on developing threats to ADF bases and specific individuals of interest. The ADF Service Police Intelligence Office within JSPG does not have a similar level of engagement with other Defence and Other Government Intelligence Agencies. Opportunities to develop this relationship further may provide enhanced enabling support to the Service Police intelligence function and assist in transitioning towards an intelligence-led police force.

Key Finding. Opportunities to further develop enabling support relationships with Defence and Other Government Intelligence Agencies will enable the generation of an intelligence-led, proactive ADF Service Police capability.

Supporting Element

In the supporting role, ADF Service Police provide enabling support to Base/Unit Commanders and SADFOs as part of the overall base security effect.

The current disaggregation of domestic garrison Service Police elements along Service lines creates poor lines of communication between both Service Police elements and relevant SADFOs. Some SADFOs are required to communicate with multiple Service Police elements within a locality to enable the base security requirements in the event of an incident. Currently there is no regional coordination of Service Police elements in support of regional SADFO and Base Commanders.

In May 2017, JSPG conducted Exercise 'In-Extremis' with a notional operational location in Adelaide. The exercise generated a scenario that required ADF Service Police from multiple locations to be deployed to a remote incident outside of the Adelaide region. In responding to the incident and massing ADF Service Police members to respond, it resulted in the unavailability of Service Police to respond to the SADFOs if required. A lesson identified was a lack of coordination at a regional level with SADFOs to manage priorities and maintain situational awareness. While primarily a Command and Control issue, as an enabling force element ADF Service Police require a greater control mechanism at the local level to manage SADFO and Base/Unit Commander requirements within the wider policing priorities. Generating enhanced mutual understanding will be important to future possible "in-extremis" incidents.

> **Key Finding**. Opportunities to develop a regional Service Police coordination function may enable better management of scare policing assets to deliver required enabling base security effects across competing SADFO and Base/Unit Commanders.

9.   INDUSTRY

A new addition to the FIC list (DWP16) is industry. The intent behind including industry as a FIC element is to ensure that Defence considers the industrial capabilities and capacity of Australian businesses – micro, small, medium and large – to deliver Defence capability, including operational capabilities and the full spectrum of support functions.

Problem Statement: The lack of a formal relationship with industry has denied the opportunity to have an effective policing capability that has access to latest technologies and methodologies.

Historical reviews noted that Service Police do not have the commensurate skills, knowledge and professional standing as their civilian counterparts; even though there is an expectation within the ADF that they do. Recommendations were been made to establish a realistic ADF expectation of the skills knowledge and standing required of Service Police professionals, such that they are empowered to achieve them and deliver a fit-for-purpose Service policing effect for the ADF. Part of this professionalisation included enhanced engagement with Civilian Police Law Enforcement Agencies.

On formation of the ADF Investigative Service (ADFIS), now JSPG, a Governance Board chaired by VCDF was established with a standing member being an ADF Commissioner. The AFP Commissioner provides guidance to both VCDF and PM-ADF on the continued development of the JSPG. Despite attendance on AFP conducted specialist courses, the focus of this engagement remains on developing the ADF Investigator with no deliberate approach to professionalising the General Duties Service Police member.

Despite recent efforts, ADF policing is still not unified in terms of its formal / structured relationship with the external policing industry. There is no alignment to benchmarking standards, and lack of early industry engagement. ADF policing is denied the opportunity to have a better and unified grasp of its tradecraft.

A comprehensive engagement with external to ADF law enforcement agencies that encompasses all ADF Service Police elements may have a range of benefits including:

a.   Benchmark standards of best practice across core policing functions and tasks.

b.   Generate targeted professional development opportunities and local cooperation, including: exposure to policing/security industry developments through forums and expos; secondments to ACIC, AFP, CIVPOL; bi-lateral police exchange programs with Five Eyes/NATO partners.

c.   Improve lateral transfer opportunities into the ADF Service Police to "buy-in" experience.

d.   Improved Jurisdictional coordination in the absence of legislation changes to increase ADF Service Police powers.

e.   Enhanced information sharing to enable improved investigation and management of ADF personnel of interest.

> **Key Finding.** There are no formal relationships established with external to ADF policing agencies that enables a comprehensive professional development framework encompassing all ADF Service Police elements, not just the Investigative capability.

Domestic Service Police Units
Case Load
4 Yearly Average

Domestic Service Police Units
Case Load
Per Person / Year (4 Yearly Average)

Domestic Service Police Units
Regional Case Load
4 Yearly Average

Domestic Service Police Units
Regional Case Load - Per Person
4 Yearly Average

Officer Career Progression Pathways

Each service has been provided with a number of rows to aid the separation of training and experience. Rows are titled to aid understanding of their purpose, with the majority of rows separating different aspects of training and the last row for each service containing information about specified experiential requirements.

The black area within Air Force is to aid in showing an alignment in Rank, whilst accommodating a difference in the years of service.

The Stars are representative of where PG advancement occurs, which in nearly all cases is the result of completing a specified level of training and relevant posting shortly thereafter. In most cases the pay is dated to the completion of the skill not the posting, however in nearly all cases the Career managers ensure the placement relevance is maintained.

⭐ = Pay Group

Army

Service		SCDT Yr0	LT Yr1	Yr2	Yr3	Yr4	Yr5	Yr6	CAPT Yr7	Yr8	Yr9	Yr10	Yr11	MAJ Yr12	Yr13	Yr14	Yr15	LTCOL Yr16	Yr17	Yr18	Yr19	Yr20	Yr21	COL Yr22
Army	General TRG	ADFA / FAC			ACCC					ACMC				AOC	ACSC									
Army	SP General TRG		SPOBC	SPOBC-ASS		SPOIC				SPOAC														
Army	SP Specialist TRG			Specialist (CPPO)	Tac Spt Team - OFFR Course																			
Army	SP Experience		MP General Duties Command Experience				Army General & TRG Experience					Sub Unit Command (1MP Bn, PTW, DPU)	OC DFCE				Dir ADFIS / PM-A	Unit Command 1MP Bn					

Joint SP

Service		Yr0	Yr1	Yr2	Yr3	Yr4	Yr5	Yr6	Yr7	Yr8	Yr9	Yr10	Yr11	Yr12	Yr13	Yr14	Yr15	Yr16	Yr17	Yr18	Yr19	Yr20	Yr21	Yr22
Joint SP	SP Specialist TRG	ADFA	SPOBC						ADFIC	JIO COMD CSE		Detention Spvr												
Joint SP	SP Experience						SO3 JSPG x4						SO2 CAP Manage / SO2 Investigation / ADFIS Regional COMD (A-					N6 / AF / A8 CO DFSP						PMADF

Air Force

Service		OCDT Yr0	LGOFF Yr1	Yr2	Yr3	Yr4	Yr5	Yr6	LTLT Yr7	Yr8	Yr9	Yr10	Yr11	SQNLDR Yr12	Yr13	Yr14	Yr15	WGCDR Yr16	Yr17	Yr18	Yr19	Yr20	Yr21	GPCAPT Yr22
Air Force	All Mustering General TRG	Dir Tgt - OTS			PMET - FLTLT / OR Tgt- OTS							PMET - SQNLDR			ACSC*								
Air Force	SP General TRG		SPOBC																					
Air Force	SP Specialist TRG																							
Air Force	SP Experience			Junior SECPOL Offr Experience		Junior SECPOL Offr Experience		SEC FL COMD Experience	SECPOL Posn / SECPOL Posn			SECFOR SQN XO / BSECO - Big Three / Police Dev Officer -	Deputy PM-AF / OIC SFS / Regional BSECO		SECFOR SQN CO / SFS CO / D COFS PMADF / COFS PMADF (AF-	PM-AF / Dir SP Spt				DIR SEC AF			

Navy

Service		MIDN Yr0	SBLT Yr1	Yr2	Yr3	Yr4	Yr5	Yr6	LEUT Yr7	Yr8	Yr9	Yr10	Yr11	LCDR Yr12	Yr13	Yr14	Yr15	CMDR Yr16	Yr17	Yr18	Yr19	Yr20	Yr21	CAPT Yr22
Navy	General TRG				Naval Officer Leadership Course 1&2				Intro to Joint Ops Course	LCDR Promotion Course				ACSC*										
Navy	SP General TRG		PQ Transfer (Category	SPOBC																				
Navy	SP Specialist TRG		Sec Offr Qual Course (USO)		ADFIC																			
Navy	SP Experience										SO2 PM-N	XO DFSP	PM-N											

Other Ranks Career Progression Pathways

Each service has been provided with a number of rows to aid the separation of training and experience. Rows are titled to aid understanding of their purpose, with the majority of rows separating different aspects of training and the last row for each service containing information about specified experiential requirements.

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☆ =Pay Group

ADF SERVICE POLICE CURRENT STATE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

During a four-day stakeholder workshop, a deliberate root cause analysis activity was conducted. A review of the current state ADF Service Police Need, Outcomes, Functions, Task and FIC related issues determined a range of undesirable effects impacting the delivery of policing effects in a 'whole-of-ADF' context. Those undesirable effects were consolidated into 19 key negative issues that require treatment. Utilising a range of root cause analysis methodologies, each of the 19 undesirable effects were analysis to determine their respective root causes. While a range of root causes were identified, they were able to be consolidated into an affinitised list of 12 primary root causes.

The application of the treatment of each root cause was considered in the context of each undesirable effect. The matrix below provides the assessment performed by the workshop stakeholders, which assessed the level of impact (High = 9, Medium = 3 and Low = 1) in addressing each undesirable effect if the root cause was resolved.

In keeping with the design principle of 'optimising within existing limits', the treatment of the root cause of inadequate manning was not assessed and discounted from further review.

The analysis resulted in a prioritised list of root causes to be treated. It should be noted that the root causes are agnostic of any decision on future models for the ADF Service Police capability. The ability to treat any of the identified root causes will have a positive effect on the current state of the ADF Service Police, if nothing else changes.

In summary, the top three actions that would have the greatest effect on the current state environment are:

1. Implement an enterprise approach to enhance accountability, responsibilities and reporting lines and governance.
2. Develop an ADF Service Police strategic plan with defined mission, functions, performance measures and goals with relevant supporting FIC business plans.
3. Establish an appropriately star ranked officer as the formal champion of ADF Service Police to direct the enterprise wide development of the capability.

Root Cause	There is confusion about the functions tasks and responsibilities of Svc Pol v CivPol in domestic v Overseas deployments	Service Police are enabled to deliver the expected levels of policing services expected of snr leadership	There is a strong level of tribalism across the SP Org with competing interests	The priority to fill SP positions is ill-defined or not understood	Service Police generally have a poor brand and reputation across parts of the ADF	There is little understanding of a common Service Police vision mission goals services and performance measures	There is a lot of duplication of functions and tasks at the snr SP levels which increases waste inefficiency and frustration	The legislation doctrine and policy have not been updated to reflect policing requirements in the current and future environments	Inappropriate mental / physical attributes reduce ability to cope with employment conditions	The SP C2 function tasks and responsibilities are very stove piped and messy leading to waste risk and staff frustration.	SP information/intel is not captured / disseminated coordinated effectively leading to ill-informed decision making	SP is a fairly reactive org and uses sub optimal processes of int led and evidence based info to plan its ops	Not fit for purpose or assessible facilities or equipment results in wasted effort and or exposure to unacceptable risk	SP have little involvement in the collective trg space and collective ops planning MREs	the SP org structure and comms lines are convoluted and confusing	Unfocused employment models and skills retention means SP can't complete tasks satisfactorily	it is difficult to move SP capacity across the svc and this creates supply and demand issues and gaps and duplication	Disparate conditions of svc reduce retention and damage joint cohesion	Shared Svcs model limits enabling spt access increasing SP breath of tasking / decreasing effectiveness	Total
The SP Org is stove piped and doesn't have a strong centre with enabling accountability responsibilities and reporting lines and governance	9	3	9	9	3	9	9	3	1	9	3	3	3	1	9	9	9	3	1	105
There is no SP ADF Strat Plan with defined vision mission function performance measures and goals and subordinate business plan	9	9	9	3	3	9	9	3	1	9	3	3	9	3	9	3	3	1	3	101
There is no champion for SP career management professional development and ongoing individual and collective trg	9	9	9	9	3	3	9	3	9	3	1	1	1	9	1	3	1	3	1	93
There is no ADF career model for SP competency framework and trg continuum to meet both single svc and joint requirements	9	9	9	9	3	9	3	9	3	1	1	1	1	9	1	3	1	3	1	93
The SP individual joint and collective training model are suboptimal and not well integrated with the rest of ADF	9	9	9	9	9	3	9	3	9	3	1	1	1	9	1	3	1	3	1	93
Legislation Doctrine and Policy is out of date and not aligned to the needs of the current and future environment	9	9	3	1	3	3	1	9	1	1	1	9	3	1	1	1	3	3	1	63
There is suboptimal branding marketing and communications within the SP community across the ADF and in the external environment	9	3	9	3	9	9	1	3	3	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	63
The SP information management and knowledge management and information sharing is stove piped and not joint	3	3	9	1	1	3	3	1	3	3	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	53
SP recruiting approach is not aligned to the current generation demographics	3	9	1	9	3	1	1	1	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	49
Service Police are not recognised as law enforcement agency or intelligence agency	9	9	1	1	9	3	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	47
There is no dedicated SP CAP DEV limited future planning for acq / sustainment and CI of SP capability	1	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	9	1	9	1	1	1	1	1	3	41
The limits on AFS constrains manning and task allocation	Not feasible for assessment within extant constrained environment																			0

FUTURE TRENDS AND IMPACTS ON FUNCTIONS

Introduction

The ADF Service Police Review team investigated the impact of future trends on Service Police functions during the Service Police workshop. An Australian Civil Military Centre (ACMC) facilitator used the lens of PESTLE (Political, Economic, Social, Technology, Legislation and Environmental) to explore trends and drivers impacting on the ADF Service Police environment. Another lens of FACT (Future Crimes, Accountability Increase, Cultural shift, and Technology use) was also used as a trigger for the stakeholders (Appendix 1) to examine future impacts on ADF Functions and Task. The analysis of future function and task impacts was compared with a similar analysis conducted by NATO in the development of their 'NATO Military Police Future Capability Study'. This comparative analysis is located at (Appendix 2).

ACMC – "The Future"

A summary of the key considerations developed by stakeholders during the ACMC analysis of future environmental impacts is summarised in the following paragraphs.

Political

There is likely to be an increasing Defence involvement in domestic affairs such as counter terrorism and aid to the community during crisis and natural disaster events. This will require a possible cultural and management change in the approach to ADF Service Policing. The role of ADF Service Police may be broadened with oversight and as a primary liaison partner with State, Government and other agencies.

There is likely to be an increasing role for ADF Service Police as an international citizen based on UNSCR 1325 (Women in peace and security), with Service Police playing a possible key role from a contribution point of view. This might lead to opportunities to build subject matter expertise in this context, and lead to enhanced contributions to recruitment and employment of women in the policing and security domain. The key roles might cover contribution to the protection of vulnerable groups (domestically and abroad) and prevention of harm.

In a variety of niche roles, ADF Service Police might be required to contribute to protection of civilians in operational environments, protection from war crimes, investigation of war crimes, preservation of human rights and inherent judicial inheritance. A well-trained ADF Service Police might also be supporting the application of force in highly scalable environments with a full range of options.

Economic

There will be increasing pressure and constraints complexities to deliver sound investigative outcomes. Digital collection mechanisms will need to be 'next-gen' in order to reduce the

personnel resource required to collect and manage investigation materials, evidence and data. Economic (financial) pressure on individuals and families may likely to increase the volume of work for police and investigators as the secondary impacts of financial stress play out into acts of crime to supplement low income ADF family groups.

Social

Current trends which see changes to traditional values and a youth boom will continue to rise, with impacts on workforce transitions.

There will be serious criminal elements targeting ex-ADF veterans for their skills and experience. Out Law Motorcycle Groups will look to fill the void of camaraderie and mateship as one of their recruitment techniques. This will compel better ADF exit plans for veterans, with possible roles for Service Police in maintaining community liaison with former ADF members.

Technology

Increasing technological crime is very likely, with the impact of training liability for Service Police in systems and methods for dealing with cyber-crime or cyber-enabled crime. There will be an increasing requirement to share and disseminate information across Service Police elements and partner agencies. Social Media is an ongoing weakness for the ADF and a primary method for 'grooming' ADF members as 'insider threats'.

The increase in high-technology will see an increasing use of drones and unmanned systems. This will lead to the requirement to match and defeat the threat capability as well. There will be the opportunity to develop tactical capability to support limited personnel resources, and for use in operational environment as a force multiplier.

Legal

The requirement for wide liaison and consultation with international and domestic agencies will grow, which will necessitate Service Police internal structures and competencies to support liaison and exchanges with other law enforcement agencies at all levels. There will be greater inter-agency coordination with the ADF, across other Government Departments and Five Eyes/NATO partners.

The environmental context will lead to further debate and changes to domestic and international law, legislation and jurisdictions. There could be possible singular Australian federal state or federal responsibility for policing, and increased security powers for police forces, requiring increased oversight

Innovative approaches might lead to changes in corrective options and e-criminalisation of some offences.

Future So-What's

The Service Police workshop stakeholders collated their thinking on the impacts of future trends and drivers into a set of five 'so-what' statements as below:

- High technology platforms such as the JSF come with a large security governance bill that will continue to place pressure across the Service Police to support, under current approaches. Security Governance is not solely in the police domain and other Force elements could support these outcomes to reduce pressure on the Service Police workforce.
- Instability (fragile states, insurgence and militant activity) in South-West Pacific will likely see increase in stability policing, particularly A&A and BPC. It may imply a greater role for Service Police in Stability Policing Operations.
- Investigation of cyber / ICT enabled crime requires Service Police to establish this capability and this necessitates a large training liability.
- Increase in battlespace management and navigation technology may see reduction in requirement for MMS and BCC provided by physical bodies.
- Increase in technology will allow Service Police to better integrate across the ADF, NATO, Five Eyes and government agencies for the sharing of law enforcement information and police and criminal intelligence.

Defining Policing

Based on the future trends and drivers, and their impacts on ADF Service Police, stakeholders at the workshop developed desired effects and characteristics of Service Police. As a start point to inform this development, the workshop stakeholders first agreed a definition of ADF Service Policing.

Definition

Service Police are:

- *specially trained, equipped and identified personnel appointed to support the Commander; and*
- *granted authority to perform Military Police Functions which deliver law enforcement, discipline, command and mission support effects.*

Desirable Effects

The generic desired policing effects are the Maintenance of Law and Order:

- Protection of persons and property
- Establish and maintain the Rule of Law
- Detect, Prevent and Respond to Crime
- Support the Judicial Process

The unique ADF Service Police effects, <u>*over and above*</u> the generic policing, deliver:

- Maintenance of good order and military discipline

- Delivering operationally focussed policing

- Force preservation

- Protect ADF reputation

- Provide support to Command

Desirable Characteristics - General

The generic policing characteristics are:

- Intelligence informed

- Community based

- Consent enabled

- Reactive / Proactive / Preventative

- Independent

- Discretionary / Prioritised

- Victim-based / Harm Minimisation

The unique ADF Service Police characteristics, _over and above_ the generic policing, characteristics are:

- Mission Oriented

- Survivable

- Threat Postured

Where **Preserve the Force** means:

- Detect, Deter and Respond to Crime

- Protect Personnel and Reputation

- Both domestically and on operations

And **Responsive** means:

- Proactive to threats

- Reactive to events

FUTURE TRENDS

- **F**uture Crimes

    – Social and Technology Networks, Sharing of Information

    – Technology, E-Fraud

    – Drugs

    – Protection of Civilians, Gender & Cultural artefacts

- **A**ccountability increase, Governance and Oversight of Police Departments

    – Sharing of Information, Privacy, Transparency, Public Records Access

    – Police Response to Minor Crimes – focus on analytics than minor thefts

    – Media oversight and 24/7 presence

    – Interoperability with partners, alliances, NGOs

- **C**ultural Shift, Leadership, Organizational Structure, Demographics

    – Next-Gen officers turned off by bureaucratic structure believing that it stifles innovation and growth

    – Social Media, Community Expectations and Future Crimes

    – Police Response to Minor Crimes – more focus on analytics than minor thefts

    – Community Oriented Policing

    – Social Media

    – Partnerships with the Community, the Private Sector, and Corporations/businesses

- **T**echnology Use

    – Social Media

    – Body Cameras, Facial Recognition

    – Predictive Policing, 'Hot Spots' Policing, Crime mapping

    – Big Data, Artificial Intelligence

    – GPS applications

    – Drones, Quad Copters, Automated Vehicles

    – Impact of new Capabilities & Platforms

ADF SERVICE POLICE FUNCTIONS AND TASKS

IMPACTS OF FUTURE DRIVES

The following table outlines the outcomes of an analysis of impacts of future trends and drivers on ADF Service Police Functions and Tasks. The table compares the ADF outcomes with relevant analysis from the NATO Study that analysed the impacts of the 2030 environment on Military Police capabilities in supporting NATO operations

*(NATO Military Police Future Capability Study, May 2014,
https://jadl.act.nato.int/NATO/data/NATO/lm_data/lm_69208/REPO/NATO_Future_MP_Capability_Study_FR.pdf)*

Function	Task / Activity	Trends / Drivers	ADF Impact of Future Trends	NATO Assessment
General Duties Policing	Conduct law enforcement	E-crime & sexual offences International Law	Same	Increase For Stability Ops
	Conduct crime prevention & reduction	Technology & information sharing	Increase	Increase
	Maintain order & discipline	Demographics & ADF requirements (SEMPRO)	Same	N/A
	Manage critical incidents & support emergency response	Human rights, Technology	Increase	Same
	Deliver a community based & victim centric Model	Community engagement	Increase	N/A
	Conduct traffic enforcement	Biometrics, preventative activities	Decrease	Same
	Conduct PSTP / RBT duties	Detection technologies, preventative activities	Increase	N/A
	Conduct police prosecution duties	Legislation	Decrease	N/A

Function	Task / Activity	Trends / Drivers	ADF Impact of Future Trends	NATO Assessment
		complexities		
Investigations	Provide investigative capability (complexity)	Legislation complexities	Increase	Increase Incl Cyber
	Investigate, analyse & report on criminal offences	Technology, Legislation	Increase	Increase Incl Cyber
	Evidence collection, handling & site exploitation (Technical Skills)	Technology, Accountability, Transparency	Increase	Increase Incl Cyber
	Support some incident & issue management	Accountability	Same	N/A
	Support investigations of LOAC breaches including war crimes	International law and interoperability	Same	Increase Training, Mentoring, Advise
Intelligence	Conduct inter-agency, allied & host nation liaison, coordination & information sharing	Interoperability & technology	Increase	Increase Data sharing critical for interoperability
	Collect, analyse & disseminate criminal intelligence	Predictive policing technologies	Increase	N/A
	Provide crime trends analysis to Command	Accountability & Predictive policing	Increase	Increase Reporting, Info Sharing
	Produce CRIMINT to inform police OPS	Predictive policing technologies	Increase	N/A
	Provide law & enforcement information	Legislation & Information sharing	Increase	Increase Reporting, Info Sharing
Specialist	Conduct disaster victim identification & support mortuary affairs & repatriation	Accountability, Transparency,	Increase	N/A

Function	Task / Activity	Trends / Drivers	ADF Impact of Future Trends	NATO Assessment
Capabilities	(Coronial)	International Law		
	Conduct biometric capture support	Technology	Increase	Increase
	Provide military working dogs support		Same	N/A
	Conduct crime scene exploitation	Forensics, partnerships with agencies	Increase	Increase Forensics
	Digital evidence collection & handling	Technology, IM	Increase	Increase
Stability Operations Policing	Support HADR Ops, civil governance, Infrastructure reconstruction & cultural property protection	Interoperability, International Legislation	Increase	Increase Training, Mentoring, Advise
	Support security sector reform activities	International Legislation	Increase	Increase Liaison for stability missions
	Support disarmament & demobilisation activities	International Legislation	Same	N/A
	Support, train & mentor Host-Nation Police (Civil & Military) & law enforcement agencies	Interoperability, International Legislation	Increase	Increase Training, Mentoring, Advise
	Provide support to safeguarding of civilians, sexual & gender-based violence operations	Human rights, Other agencies,	Increase	Increase Liaison for stability missions (incl. refugees)
	Establish & maintain rule of law (Phase 1 OPS)	Legislation	Increase	N/A

Function	Task / Activity	Trends / Drivers	ADF Impact of Future Trends	NATO Assessment
Force Protection	Support maritime & air force asset protection	Technologies, New capabilities	Increase	Same Escorts
	Provide area & physical security tasks	Industry, Technology	Same	Decrease (contracted security)
	Provide close personnel protection services	Industry, Technology	Same	Same Escorts
	Conduct event planning & public order management	Industry, Technology	Same	N/A
Security Governance	Support security governance	Industry	Decrease	N/A
	Conduct unit security duties	Technologies	Same	N/A
	Conduct security investigations	Agencies, Industry	Decrease	N/A
Movement, Mobility & Manoeuvre Support	Support mobility, manoeuvre operations, ship/shore & battlefield circulation	Technologies, New capabilities	Decrease	Same
	Control movement of stragglers, detainees/PW & displaced persons	Technology	Same	Decrease
Internment & Detention	Manage the Defence Force Corrective Establishment	Industry, Agencies, Technology	Decrease	N/A
	Provide custodial capabilities to own forces	Industry, Agencies, Technology	Same	N/A
	Conduct internment & detention of CPERS	Industry, Agencies, Technology, International Law	Same	N/A

Function	Task / Activity	Trends / Drivers	ADF Impact of Future Trends	NATO Assessment
	Support CPERS exploitation	Industry, Agencies, Technology, International Law	Increase	N/A
Command, Control, Management & Governance	Media Liaison & Information Operations	Technology, Accountability, Transparency, Legislation	Increase	Increase Training, Mentoring, Advise
	Policy Development		Increase	N/A
	Capability, Doctrine Development & force modernisation Management		Increase	N/A
	Information, Knowledge & Data Management	Technology, In Technology, Industry	Increase	Increase
	Standards & Technical Governance		increase	N/A
	Provide specialist police advice		Same	Increase Training, Mentoring, Advise
Service-Specific Non-Police	Conduct HR coordination planning	Not assessed		
	Corrective Training			
	Regulating	Impacts on the Non-Policing Function and Tasks will be determined by emerging Service capability drivers.		
	Navigation MWV/MCP			
	WOSC			
	Manage PERS Movt			
	Support HOC (Army)			
	Support FORGEN/OPGEN			
	Security Governance			

Proposed ADF Service Police Model

Vision

SP provide a modern professional, and trusted policing capability in support of the ADF across the spectrum of domestic and overseas operations.

The Service Police Blueprint

An intelligence-informed, responsive, mission-oriented, preventative Policing Model

Military Police are:

- specially trained, equipped and identified personnel appointed to support the Commander; and

- granted authority to perform Military Police Functions which deliver law enforcement, discipline, command and mission support effects.

Mission

To provide assured and professional Service Police, including Investigative services, to the ADF at home and on operations in order to protect its values, people, resources and reputation

Role

To Police the Force and provide Police Support to the Force through the provision of organic police to protect personnel, populations, and materiel, and to maintain order and enforce the law

Strategic Operating Environment

Service Police operate across and as part of the whole Force. Their contribution to Command Support and Law Enforcement is best achieved through adopting preventative and proactive actions founded in an intelligence-led and evidence-based approach. Professional experience gained domestically is the foundation for operational policing offshore.

Law Enforcement					Security and Force Protection		Movement, Mobility and Manoeuvre Support	Internment and Detention
General Duties Policing	**Investigations**	**Intelligence**	**Specialist Capabilities**	**Stability Operations Policing**	**Force Protection**	**Security Governance**		
•Conduct law enforcement •Conduct crime prevention & reduction •Maintain order & discipline •Manage critical incidents & support emergency response •Deliver a community based & victim centric Model •Conduct PSTP/ RBT duties •Conduct traffic enforcement •Conduct prosecution duties	•Provide investigative capability •Investigate, analyse & report on criminal offences •Evidence collection, handling & site exploitation •Support some incident & issue management •Support investigations of LOAC breaches including war crimes	•Conduct inter-agency, allied & host nation liaison coordination & information sharing •Collect, analyse & disseminate criminal intelligence •Provide crime trends analysis to Command •Produce CRIMINT to inform Police OPS •Provide law & enforcement information	•Conduct disaster victim identification & support mortuary affairs & repatriation •Digital evidence collection & handling •Conduct biometric capture support •Conduct crime scene exploitation •Provide military working dog support	-Support HADR Ops, civil governance, infrastructure reconstruction & cultural property protection •Support security sector reform activities •Support disarmament & demobilisation activities •Support, train & mentor Host-Nation Police (Civil & Military) & law enforcement agencies •Provide support to safeguarding of civilians, sexual & gender-based violence operations •Establish & maintain rule of law (Phase 1 OPS)	•Support Maritime & Air Force asset protection •Provide area and physical security tasks •Provide close personnel protection services •Conduct event planning & public order management	•Support security governance •Conduct unit security duties •Conduct security investigations	•Support mobility & manoeuvre operations, ship/shore & battlefield circulation •Control movement of stragglers, detainees/PW & displaced persons	•Manage the Defence Force Corrective Establishment •Provide custodial capabilities to own forces •Conduct internment & detention of CPERS •Support CPERS exploitation

Service Police Command, Control, Management and Governance

Media Liaison & Information Operations, Policy Development, Capability, Doctrine Development & Force Modernisation Management, Information, Knowledge & Data Management, Standards & Technical Governance

Underpinned by ADF SP Principles (POLICE), Philosophies (FORCE) and Values (PRIDE)

Professional, Respectful, Independent, Impartial, Diligent, Empathetic, Ethical

THE SERVICE POLICE MODEL

Principle	Description
P	**Prioritised.** Service Police capabilities are a limited specialist resource. As such, they must be commanded at the highest possible level to ensure Service Police assets are allocated to the highest priority operational tasks.
O	**Operationally Scaled.** At home or offshore any deployed Service Police capability must be scaled to meet the specific operational or Service requirement with regard to size, composition, specialist capabilities and graduated states of readiness.
L	**Legitimate.** Service Police will conduct, support and provide assurance to a number of tactical actions such as stop, search, arrest and detention activities, as well as policing and investigations. These must be conducted in accordance with legal mandates and the jurisdiction afforded to the operation.
I	**Independent.** All Service Police investigative and custody matters, and their respective activities, must be independent from the tactical and operational chain of command to ensure they are free from improper interference. **Informed.** Service Policing requires the active engagement across the communities it engages including commanders, units, security agencies, allied forces and host nation police forces when deployed. It uses the information and intelligence gained to proactively police the force and provide police support to the force
C	**Command and Control (C2).** Centralised command and decentralised execution will maximise the effectiveness of Service Police assets, allowing greater flexibility to meet the changing demands of the operation, and recognising the localised nature in delivering police effects.
E	**Early Engagement.** Service Police must engage and must be engaged early in any form of operational planning process. This allows Service Police related considerations that may affect the operation to be identified early and ensures that Service Police assets are employed in the most effective manner.

Philosophy	Description
F	**Fight Alongside.** The Service Police adopt a 'Soldier, Sailor, Airman/Woman First' mentality. Regular engagement and cooperation with our affiliated units promotes cohesion and ensures Service Police personnel hold the requisite physical and mental robustness to deploy alongside the ADFs operational and support elements - enabling Service Police to be employed to best effect.
O	**Operationally Focused.** Service Police exist to support the full spectrum of military operations both at home and overseas. All Service Police activity is therefore conducted in support of improving the Force's effectiveness on current and future operations.
R	**Relevant.** Service Police are the ADF's Policing and Custody specialists, whose skills and abilities are distinctly different from that of Civilian Police organisations. The role of Service Police is as relevant in Garrison as it is across the full spectrum of current and future operations on sea, land or in the air.
C	**Competent.** The experience gained from policing the Force on our bases is the enabler for Service Police competence and effectiveness on operations. Service Police are the only ADF organisation suitably experienced and with the necessary specialist skills and qualifications to assure the ADF's statutory responsibilities and legal obligations when deployed overseas.
E	**Ethical.** All policing is founded in understanding concepts of morality which drive ethical decision making. Service Police are perhaps unique in a combat force in being empowered to exercise discretion in the use of lethal force. In doing so they must exercise their ethical foundation, potentially in extreme circumstances, to determine the level of appropriate force necessary, whilst remaining accountable for their actions, for good as well as bad. This is the foundation of ethical policing. **Empathetic.** The nature of military Service is also uniquely different from that of civilian employment. As such, the ADF requires a Discipline System which understands the environment in which it lives and fights. Understanding the Force in its Single Service and Joint environments and through the context in which it operates makes Service Police uniquely placed to deal with matters of Service offending arising from military activity.

Value	Description
P	**Professional.** I work hard to deliver high quality results, to do my job to the best of my ability, and I take pride in my achievements and responsibility for my failures. I constantly seek to improve my work performance
R	**Respectful.** I am a servant of our force and hold myself to a higher standard in treating all those I meet with respect and courtesy.
I	**Independent.** I commit to the execution of the law and will not be swayed from my duty to ensure it is used appropriately in support of Defence and its people. **Impartial.** I will treat all parties equally and will not be swayed by bias or favour in the pursuit of the truth.
D	**Diligent.** I am diligent and thorough in the execution of my tasks. I commit to putting service before self and I am accountable for my actions.
E	**Ethical.** My badge is a symbol of trust, I enforce the law but I will hold myself to it and always work to do the right thing. **Empathetic.** I will work to build trust and confidence by listening to and working to understand those with whom I engage.