

27/01/2020 15:12

s47Ec

CAPT - ARMY

AT: Approx. 271330 Jan 20.

AT: S35 35.02 E148 54.42.

WHAT: ARA MRH90 C/S ANGEL21 was exposed to a grass fire resulting in minor aircraft damage. Nil personnel injury; however, possible smoke exposure.

WHAT: Aircraft departed the area and returned to Canberra airport under a PANPAN. Crew and passengers are asymptomatic, but have been referred to medical facilities as a precautionary measure.

WHAT: Sentinel reporting is to be completed and ongoing medical support to members as required. Aircraft assessment to be carried out prior to aircraft and crew return to RAAF Richmond.

27/01/2020 14:07

s47Ec

CAPT - ARMY

AT: Time now.

AT: Canberra airport

WHAT: ARA MRH90 helicopter C/S ANGEL21 has landed following the declaration of a PANPAN.

WHAT: HQ MNRWTG notified. Issue currently unconfirmed.

WHAT: Fighting for information, details to follow

~~FOUO~~

INCIDENT REPORT

ACTION: AS REQ

INFO: HQJOC JOR WATCH COMMANDER

SUBJ: IIR OPERATION BUSHFIRE ASSIST CCIR OPBA/01-20 – MRH-90 external damage due to exposure to fire – MN RW TG – 27 JAN 2020

1. INCIDENT:

A. ADF UNITS INVOLVED: Multi National Rotary Wing Task Group (MNRWTG) OP BA 19/20, Air Mobile Response Team from 7 RAR. Aircraft home unit is 5 Aviation Regiment Townsville.

B. DTG OF INCIDENT: 27 1330L JAN 20.

C. LOCATION OF INCIDENT: Namadgi Forest LZ, Lat Long S35 35.02 E148 52.5

D. NATURE OF INCIDENT: An Australia Army MRH-90 Callsign ANGEL 21 was conducting a reconnaissance task in the Namadgi Forest region where the aircraft landed on a feature to assess the requirements for ongoing LZ clearance tasking. Upon landing the search light was switched off which was being utilised for traffic deconfliction. Within 3 -5 seconds of touch down a fire was ignited underneath the aircraft which was fanned by the rotor wash. The crew became aware of the grass fire to the rear of the aircraft from the Aircrewman noting a smoke smell. The crew lifted promptly and returned to the RAAF Fairbairn apron, Canberra Airport. On return the aircraft declared a PAN to Air Traffic Services reporting external damage to the airframe due to fire. The location of the fire was marked by the crew in order to pass to Emergency Services. The aircraft landed safely as intended and no personnel on board were injured.

2. ACTION BEING TAKEN BY UNIT INVOLVED: Crew members were asymptomatic, however those who self elected (2 Aircrewman) were escorted to a medical facility IOT be assessed for smoke and fumes inhalation. They were assessed as unaffected with no further action required. 7 RAR personnel conducting LZ clearance in the Namadgie Forrest as a part of the related task were extracted by TU RNZAF NH90 with no issue. An ARA MRH-90 C/S ANGEL 22 containing an onboard inspection team was deployed from RAAF Richmond to Fairbairn to assess the aircraft. The affected airframe has subsequently been quarantined in a hangar in location. DFSB was informed of the Aviation Safety Report which is assessed as a Class B type and all applicable personnel were informed of the event. The crew have been monitored for any health implications and were accommodated in Canberra overnight.

B. DETAILS OF EF PERS: s22 s47Ec s22 s47Ec s22 s47Ec s22 s47Ec. There were also two 7 RAR AMRT personnel on board.

1. DETAILS OF TCN/CF/ANSF INVOLVED. RNZAF NH90 were operating in the area and conducted the extraction of 7 RAR completing the LZ clearances without issue.

2. STATUS OF AUS PLATFORM OR EQUIP INVOLVED: MRH 90 A40-014 airframe is unserviceable and has been quarantined in a hangar at Fairbairn apron. The aircraft has had an initial visual inspection conducted by 5 Aviation MRH Maintenance Organisation personnel. The aircraft requires specialist assessment to confirm the repair requirements. The initial assessment of the damage is external fire damage to the aft sections of the fuselage, sponsons and the ramp. Composite damage and paint blistering has been identified. The two rear Emergency Flotation System have been significantly damaged by the fire. The extent of damage to wiring and internal structures is unknown.

3. FUTURE ACTION TO BE CONDUCTED: The affected aircraft will remain in quarantine in the Fairbairn hangar until an appropriate investigation has been completed as a part of the aviation safety requirements. The crew will be reunited with their TU Taipan via internal means of transportation on 28 Jan 20.

4. MEDIA INTEREST LEVEL: The grass fire that was reported IVO the aircraft has worsened and

is currently at 'Watch and Act' covering over 2000ha and designated the 'Orroral Fire'.

A. EMBEDDED MEDIA: Nil.

5. COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT/ COMMENTS: Currently the aircraft requires specialist inspection to confirm the time required to repair the damage. I expect we will have more information in the next 48 hours. Current requirements to support the ACT RFS is able to be met with remaining assets in the AO. The aviation safety investigation is commencing and will be completed with specialist staff from 5 Avn Regt and 16 Bde as required. We will pass SIR's as the situation develops.

6. POC: s47Ec s22 s47Ec s22

NOTE. INCIDENT REPORT TYPE AND SERIAL IDENTIFIERS ARE TO BE USED AS FOLLOWS:

IIR- FOR INITIAL INCIDENT REPORT

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SIR - FOR SUBSEQUENT
INCIDENT REPORT CIR-FOR
CLOSING INCIDENT REPORT
IIR/CIR - FOR INITIAL AND CLOSING INCIDENT REPORT.

INCREMENTING LETTER DESIGNATORS (A, B, C ETC.) ARE TO BE ADDED
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE IR NUMBER FOR ANY SIR/CIR AFTER THE IIR.

THE INCIDENT TYPE PART OF THE SUBJECT TO BE CHOSEN TO BEST (BRIEFLY)
DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT, AND SHOULD REMAIN THE SAME FOR ANY SIR/CIR.

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A40-014 AIRCRAFT INCIDENT IVO CANBERRA 27 JAN 20

PAN PAN PAN

ANGEL21

271356Local JAN 20 IVO CB

Time	From	To	Message
1356	A21	TU Taipan Command	Signal Message received from Angel 21 A21 pan pan. Enroute cb in contact with atc. External fire damage to. Landing cb in 2 No cas or anything
1357	TTC	A21	2A ack (on Signal)
1403	OPSO	CoS	Message passed to s47Ec CoS MNRWTG
1406	OC	OPSO	Aircraft on the ground at CB Pad A. Everyone is OK. Fire damage to rear left hand quadrant. EFS sponson mainly on left side but also some damage to the right. Paint blistering
1410	S5	OPSO	Grid given of the fire which was started by Angel 21 S35 35.02 E148 54.42 Elev 1256m
1415	OPSO	CoS	All above information passed. CoS will book accom for the DART Team and will alert the RFS to the Fire location and ACT AEC to direct any assets to recce the site.
1416	OPSO	Various	Quarantine actions carried out with respect to PEX, Ops Logs, CAMM2 etc
1417	S5	All Angel Troop	Blackout message sent to advise no external comms regarding work activities
1417	TST Comd		DART Team being stood up. Likely composition will be an Assessment team (names to follow)
1417	SSM		Accessing information from DASM on requirements post Incident such as Smoke and fumes, environmental reports etc
1450	CoS	OPSO	Request for how we are tracking. CoS will speak to duty AVMED in Adelaide for advice and booking crew in for Smoke and Fumes
1511	OC	OPSO	Update – crew in 34 SQN, will go around to Duntroon Med Facility for check up then meet back at 34 SQN.
1613	CoS	OPSO	Retask of ANGL22 to Firespot IVO Canberra until end of endurance. Message passed to ANGL22, TST, SSM, Ops

A40-014 AIRCRAFT INCIDENT IVO CANBERRA 27 JAN 20

1618	ANGL22		WU Richmond for Canberra with DART. Aircraft will overnight.
1635	OPSO	CoS	Attempted to call CoS to inform that ANGL22 had departed and a reminder that we will need accom for 19 and an Auth for Night Ops for ANGL22
1640	OPSO	34 SQN Hanger Mangaer	Hangerage secured for A40-014. Longer term hangerage will be sourced tomorrow.
1723	OPSO		ANGL22 WD Canberra
	s47Ec		DFSB have declared a Class b incident no further investigation by 5 Avn tonight.
1956	OPSO		Crew departing for accom. ASR to be written and submitted In the morning



Ministerial Brief for Noting

MS20-900105

FOR: Minister for Defence

Action Requested By: 5 February 2020

Reason for Urgency: N/A

Copies to: Secretary, Associate Secretary, VCDF, FASMECC, CJOPS

TIMELINE FOR REPORTING OF ADF MRH90 INVOLVEMENT IN ORRORAL FIRE INCIDENT (ACT)

Key Issues:

The purpose of this brief is to inform you of the reporting timelines relating to the ADF MRH90 helicopter involvement in the Orroral fire incident in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) of 27 January 2020. This brief specifically focuses on the operational reporting chains from the incident to OMINDEF. The incident occurred at approximately 1330h on 27 January 2020. A/Chief Of Staff Office of Minister for Defence was informed by phone of the incident at approximately 1855h and was provided with further detail in an email at 1935h. ADF involvement (then described as 'likely') in the Orroral fire was first acknowledged in an ACT Emergency Services Agency (ACT ESA) briefing at 1700h on 28 January 2020, with more detail provided at a subsequent media briefing at 1430h on 29 January 2020.

I (CDF) acknowledge the importance of timely, accurate and comprehensive reporting of operational incidents. This requirement has been reinforced through the command chain.

Media Considerations: The potential ADF involvement in the Orroral Fire has drawn significant media attention, and will likely continue to do so.

Noted by Minister:

Signature:

Linda Reynolds

...../...../2020

Minister comments

Cleared by: General Angus J Campbell, AO, DSC, ,
Chief of the Defence Force

s22

Contact: Major General RJH Noble, DSC, AM, CSC
Head Military Strategic Commitments

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Date cleared: 5 February 2020

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Sensitivity: Yes.

- Public and media interest in the ADF involvement in this incident is significant and is likely to continue given the impact of the fire on the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales.

Financial Impacts: No.

Regulatory Implications: No.

Consultation: Yes.

- BRIG Greg Novak, Previous Chief of Staff, Chief of the Defence Force
- LTCOL Jennifer Harris, Military Assistant, Chief of Joint Operations
- LTCOL Luke Dawson, Chief of Staff, Operation Bushfire Assist

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MS20-900105

Background:

At 1330h on 27 January 2020, an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Multi-Role Helicopter – 90 (MRH90) landed in a remote area of the Namadji National Park, ACT while conducting ACT Emergency Services Agency (ESA) requested operations to enable access for emergency services personnel. Immediately upon landing, the aircrew identified a fire at the rear of the aircraft. The aircraft took off within 10 15 seconds as a result of the significant fire ignition around the aircraft. It is assessed that the heat generated by the MRH90's landing light started a grassfire. The aircraft returned to Canberra Airport and conducted an emergency landing where it was met by emergency services. The aircrew were assessed for injury and an initial damage assessment was conducted on the aircraft. No injuries were sustained by the aircrew. Further assessment of the aircraft was directed.

A combined ADF and ACT Parks and Conservation Service (PCS) ground element was conducting Landing Zone clearance tasks approximately five kilometres from the incident site. These personnel were subsequently recovered from Orroral Valley to remove them from danger by a New Zealand NH-90 following the return of the MRH90 to Canberra Airport.

The incident was reported through operational channels, to both ADF and ACT ESA. At 1330h, 28 January 20, CJOPS engaged the ACT Chief Minister and ESA Commissioner ahead of an ACT ESA daily media briefing, but did not take part in the 1400h media conference under direction of OMINDEF. CJOPS was subsequently authorised to attend an ACT ESA-led media conference at 1700h at which the ACT Emergency Services Minister noted ADF involvement in the incident.

Further detailed information was provided to the media at an ACT ESA media brief by Major General Ellwood at 1430h on 29 January 2020.

Key Issues:

Reporting Timelines. The reporting processes for this event, from incident site through military chain of command to OMINDEF, initially focused on the safety of the aircrew and ground elements, and ACT ESA were informed of the location of the fire as soon as practicable. Although it appeared likely at the time that the MRH90 caused the fire, this information was not immediately released to the public pending further investigation and confirmation.

Severity of Incident. The aircraft immediately raised an emergency alert, a Possibility of Assistance Needed (PAN). This is the second highest level of alert for aircrew. The aircraft was able to make a safe landing at Canberra Airport, and immediately shut down. The aircrew were immediately referred for medical checks.

The aircraft suffered significant damage. An initial assessment was conducted on 28 January 2020. Detailed assessment and investigation is ongoing.

The ACT ESA were made aware of the fire almost immediately upon occurrence and responded in accordance with their protocols. The exact location of the fire was provided to ACT ESA immediately on arrival of the aircraft at Canberra Airport.

Focus of Reporting. The initial focus of action was on the safety of ADF and ACT PCS personnel remaining in Orroral Valley, the status of the fire, its impact for local communities and potential ADF involvement in the incident. Subsequent technical inspection of the MRH90 indicated damage to the airframe was significant. The details of damage were reported through technical channels but were absent from advice to OMINDEF. This

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MS20-900105

absence appears to be a result of aircrew and unit focus on the safety of personnel still in the active fire field and reputational impact to the ADF.

Media Engagement. Guidance on media release was coordinated through OMINDEF, MECC and ADF HQ. Approval for CJOPS attendance at the 1700h Media briefing, including release of information related to ADF involvement in the fire, was provided at approximately 1600h on 28 January 2020 by OMINDEF.

Incident and Reporting Timeline:

27 January 20:

- Approx 1330: Incident occurred. Aircraft departs the site. Ground element (including two ACT PCS personnel) remain in vicinity of the incident and monitor the fire movement.
- Approx 1340: Aircraft crew reports on incident via radio enroute to Canberra Airport and an emergency was declared to Air Traffic Control.
- Approx 1415: Aircraft landed and met by emergency vehicles and shuts down. Aircrew immediately pass incident location to ACT ESA.
- 1459: Comd JTF 1110 text to Commander Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 19-20 (OP BA) (Ellwood) advising of incident.
- 1518: Comd OP BA phone call to CJOPS advising of incident.
- 1558: Comd OP BA email to CJOPS advising of incident.
- 1601: Comd OP BA email to CJOPS further update.
- 1658: CJOPS email to Comd OP BA acknowledging advice of incident.
- 1706: ADF Liaison Officer (LO) asked by ACT ESA Commission to provide approved Talking Points (TPs).
- 1803: Comd OP BA phone call to CJOPS discussing incident and need to inform higher.
- 1802: CJOPS phone call to A/CDF advising of incident and likely ADF involvement in starting fire.
- 1804: CJOPS phone call to A/CDF advising email to follow.
- 1811: CJOPS email to A/CDF with details of incident.
- 1815: A/CDF acknowledged CJOPS email and directed O/MINDEF be informed (COS CDF).
- 1830: ADF LO advised there was no mention of cause of fire at 1715h ESA media conference.
- Approx 1855: COS CDF phone call to A/COS MINDEF to provide initial advice of incident.
- 1907: COS CDF text to A/COS MINDEF with further detail of incident.
- 1911: COS CDF email to CJOPS confirming A/COS MINDEF informed.
- 1935: COS CDF email to A/COS MINDEF providing detailed reporting of incident, including confirmation that: *"It is the opinion of the crew that residual heat from the landing light may have been an ignition source"* and that *"Air Element Commander ACT has informed the RFS, they're responding to the fire"*.
- Approx 2100: COS CDF and A/COS MINDEF discuss SOPs regarding use of MRH 90 landing lights.
- 2130: COS CDF email to CJOPS regarding interest from O/MINDEF in actions ADF were taking to *"amend SOPs for the use of landing lights and other potential ignition risks originating from our RWA"*.

28 January 20:

- AM: Phone call from Liaison Officer (LO) at ESA confirming that ESA Commissioner would appreciate a spokesperson be available at next ESA media conference at 1400.
- AM: Phone call from LO to ESA indicating media awareness of incident (and likely ADF involvement).
- 0830: CJOPS briefed PM on incident and that MRH90 likely contributed to ignition of Orroral Valley Fire
- 1310: CJOPS briefed ESA Commissioner, ACT Chief Minister and ACT Ministers on TPs.
- 1345: HMSC briefed COS MINDEF, requesting CJOPS participation in 1400h ESA media briefing. Request denied by COS MINDEF.
- 1600: OMINDEF approved CJOPS to speak at 1700 ESA media conference.

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- 1614: MSC Comms Advisor sends through updated TPs to CJOPS.
- Approx 1700: ESA media briefing – CJOPS references TPs applicable to potential cause of the fire.

29 January 20:

- 1057: MSC Comms Advisor email to HQJOC asking if CJOPS is available for 1400 media conference. Suggested Comd OP BA instead as he was in Canberra and could assume lead role.
- 1121: TPs sent to HQJOC to inform response to Canberra Times RFI.
- 1317: Email from Rotary Wing Task Group providing detail on sequence of events and crew actions.
- 1325: Phone call from Scott Bolitho (MECC) requesting COMD OP BA attendance at 1400 ESA media conference at request of OMINDEF.
- 1430 – ESA media briefing begins. Seven News, Seven Prime, Win TV, ABC, Riot Act and Canberra Times in attendance. Comd OP BA was asked about the incident, and praised the quick action of the crew to avoid being engulfed in flame. Comd OP BA provided additional detail as received from the Rotary Wing Task Group.

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~~UNCLASSIFIED: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**AUSTRALIAN ARMY**

1st Aviation Regiment

Minute**BQ10544546****16 AVN BDE****CONSOLIDATION REPORT – INCIDENT OCCURING 27 JAN 20 INVOLVING ANGEL21**

1. The purpose of this report is to review and consolidate the actions and reporting conducted by the Multi National Rotary Wing Task Group (MNRWTG) regarding an incident on 27 Jan 20, during Operation Bushfire Assist 2020.
2. An Australian Army MRH-90, call sign ANGEL21, operating under TU TAIPAN, was tasked by the Air Operations Manager of the ACT Emergency Service Agency (ESA) to conduct a reconnaissance task of the Namadgi Forrest region in ACT on 27 Jan 20 in order to identify potential Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs) for insertion and extraction of Remote Area Firefighting Teams. This task was part of an ongoing line of effort to which TU TAIPAN, 7 RAR and RNZAF elements were conducting ground reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance and aerial insertion of 7 RAR and RFS personnel via winching to clear HLZs within the Namadgi Forrest. The initial aircraft tasking was sent to the ACT MNRWTG Air Element Commander (AEC) liaison officer by ESA Air Operations 15 Jan 20 with support to the task commencing 22 Jan 20.
3. At 1330L ANGEL21 landed at a Namadgi Forest LZ (S35 35.02 E148 52.5) in order for aircrew and two 7 RAR personnel to disembark for a short break. The location had been identified as a potential HLZ by the ACT Incident Management Team in their ADF Task Request. Due to safety and visibility requirements, landing into the HLZ was conducted with the MRH-90 landing light on. It is assessed by TU TAIPAN that the heat from the aircraft's landing light caused the dry grass which the aircraft came in contact with to ignite. Approximately 3-5 seconds after landing, one of the aircrew reported the smell of smoke at the rear of the aircraft over the internal communications systems. ANGEL21 took off to return to RAAF Fairbairn. Due to the rotor wash and dry conditions the fire at the HLZ grew rapidly which was photographed by the crew during take-off. Fire from the HLZ rapidly spread within the Orroral Valley and was responded to by RFS and water bombing aircraft. An RFS Emergency Warning was issued and residents of the valley evacuated as fire continued to spread south east. During this period, RNZAF NH90's were on the ground on high readiness awaiting extracting the crews. They were launched in response to the fire for the extraction of 7 RAR and RFS ground reconnaissance teams. All members were extracted from the Orroral Valley and returned with no injuries.
4. Initial incident reporting was as follows:
 - a. At 1340L, enroute to RAAF Fairbairn, ANGEL21 declared a PAN PAN emergency call to Canberra Air Traffic Control due to external fire damage to the airframe.
 - b. At 1353L ANGEL21 declared a PAN PAN to Angel Troop chat via Signal messenger.
 - c. At 1400L TU TAIPAN informed HQ MNRWTG of ANGEL21 PAN PAN.

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- d. At 1407L an initial situation report notifying the Bushfire Assist Coordination Team (BACT) of a PAN PAN by ANGEL21 was sent via DACC Chat by HQ MNRWTG.
- e. At 1415L ANGEL21 returned to RAAF Fairbairn and provided the grid reference and details of the fires to the aero base firefighters in order to inform the RFS.
- f. At 1418L TU TAIPAN informed HQ MNRWTG of the fire damage to the aircraft and location of incident.
- g. At 1425L the AEC at ACT ESA was informed by HQ MNRWTG. This included additional details received from TU TAIPAN at 1418L regarding the requirement to launch RNZAF assets to extract 7RAR/RFS LZ clearance teams.
- h. At 1435L an initial situation report was sent to the BACT via email with a more detailed report sent at 1446L.
- i. At 1459L COMD JTF1110 advised the ADF National Support Coordinator with further strategic communication to CDF, MINDEF and internationally to RNZAF coordinated through CJOPS and DJFHQ from 28-30 Jan 20.

5. Following the incident, HQ MNRWTG sent an email to all AEC liaison officers and command positions to inform them of the incident and provide additional safety warnings on the use of landing lights. TU TAIPAN crews were verbally briefed that landing lights were to be turned off on final approach if an MRH required to land, if landing was not required, the aircraft was to remain in hover. TU TAIPAN Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were amended to reflect the new direction on landing lights with all members acknowledging that they had read the updated SOPs. The TU TAIPAN Risk Management Plan (RMP) was reviewed to include the rise of fire.

6. Once the incident was reported to DJFHQ at 1532L HQJOC Military and Public Affairs was directed to commence developing a holding statement and talking points. Public Affairs were informed by MNRWTG incident reporting and talking points were fact checked by HQ MNRWTG prior to submission to CJOPS. CJOPS approved release at 1719L which were subsequently provided via email to the MNRWTG Task Units and Liaison Officers. A further media release regarding the incident and bushfire was drafted and disseminated to the media by HQJOC Military Public Affairs and via media conference on the evening of 27 Jan 20. Prior to the release of talking points MNRWTG observed a communications blackout with no external communications regarding work activities permitted. The direction to commence a communications blackout sent via messenger to all members at 1417L. HQ MNRWTG maintained liaison with HQ JOC Military and Public Affairs in order to answer any further media requests for information throughout OP Bushfire Assist.

7. The four members of TU TAIPAN and two members of 7 RAR were on board ANGEL21 when the incident occurred. Details of 7 RAR personnel were included on the PY104 passenger manifest submitted by 7 RAR on 26 Jan 20. Following the return to RAAF Fairbairn COMD MNRWTG telephoned the crew in order to clarify details of the incident, confirm their wellbeing and ensure that medical treatment was being provided if required. The two 7 RAR personnel and two air crewmen were transported to RMC Duntroon Medical Centre for precautionary smoke inhalation screening. All personnel were assessed as unaffected with no further action required. In accordance with the IAM and SI (AVN) OPS policy HQ MNRWTG assessed that due to the very limited exposure to smoke encounter by crew, there was not require to consult an Aviation Medical Officer prior to the crew recommencing flying operations.

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8. The initial incident report (IIR) was completed on 28 Jan 20 and disseminated via DFMS to HQJOC. AIMS reporting (HQ16AVN BDE 01-20) was conducted via HQ 16 Aviation Brigade in accordance with single service reporting on 27 Jan 20. WHS Sentinel and Comcare reporting was completed on 28 Jan 20 in consultation with Comcare and 16 Aviation Brigade Safety Cell. The affected airframe (A40-014) was reclassified as unserviceable and quarantined in a hangar at RAAF Fairbairn. The Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) was informed of the Aviation Safety Report (DEFEV20010720) raised by the MNRWTG under 5 Aviation Regiment. The report was assessed as a Class B type and handed over to Aviation Branch for further investigation. DG Avn provided a waiver for crew grounding, quarantine and re-assessment in accordance with SI (AVN) OPS 6-202 on 28 Jan 20. On 3 Feb 20 DFSB provided a list items of immediate concerns for action. This included listing fire as a possible source of hazard in the TU Taipan RMP, documenting safety briefs to personnel and consistent training and information regarding use of landing lights. The subsequent incident investigation directed by Aviation Branch FORCOMD and assisted by DFSB remains ongoing.

9. On 1 Feb 20 the HQ MNRWTG Chief of Staff directed all members of the task group to capture correspondence, Ops Logs and any other material relating to the incident from 27 Jan to 30 Jan 20. The records archive is held within the 5 Aviation Regiment Objective Corporate structure. Records relating to the incident are restricted to those provided by MNRWTG and other force assigned personnel. There is no operational reporting from MNRWTG on the incident post 30 Jan 20 included in the Objective records. Access and controls for the Objective file is maintained by the Regiment's information manager. Documentation and correspondence gathered in the development of this report are also included.

10. In considering the actions and reporting conducted following the ANGEL21 incident the following recommendations are made:

- a. Incident reporting on 27-28 Jan 20 was conducted promptly and was effective in its ability to inform all relevant stakeholders and decision makers. However, a formal incident management procedure for joint domestic operations including CCIRs, reporting timeframes, reporting methods, responsibilities and the reporting chain for TU/TGs would enhance the control of information and distribution of reporting. In particular the ability to respond to information requests from other state and federal agencies as well as support military public affairs would be centrally coordinated.

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- b. All documentation and correspondence for the MNRWTG was held on personnel mailboxes, with exception of the HQ MNRWTG Watchkeeper group mailbox. The use of personnel mailboxes restricts access to the information and is ineffective for archiving into Objective. It is recommended that on future domestic operations, information management processes are established to formalise record keeping procedures. This would include developing a pre-established group mailboxes and positional mailboxes for TG/TU staff with a supporting Objective structure. This would allow for positions to be handed over with all previous reporting and correspondence accessible to oncoming personnel.

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A Brabazon
CAPT
S2
1st Aviation Regiment

06 Mar 20

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