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AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Army Headquarters

R1-4-B003, PO Box 7902, CANBERRA BC ACT 2610

R21541868

See distribution

DCA DIRECTIVE 01/15

SOCOMD GOVERNANCE REMEDIATION

References:

- A. Electronic Supply Chain Manual
- B. Defence Security Manual
- C. eDEOP 101 Explosive Regulations
- D. Army Health Instruction 08 *Supply, Carriage, Issue and Administration of Scheduled Medications by Army non-medical Officers* of 01 Jul 14

SITUATION

1. **Background.** A series of recent notifiable incidents at SASR have demonstrated shortcomings in governance, security, safety and administration within SOCOMD. SOCAUST is accountable to CA for ensuring that units under his command adhere to extant policy and satisfy governance requirements.
2. **Purpose.** This directive details SOCAUST's responsibilities for remediation of current governance deficiencies within SOCOMD. It also tasks commanders and staff within Army to support SOCAUST. Support from other groups within the ADO will be requested where required.

EXECUTION

3. **General Outline.** SOCAUST is to identify and rectify deficiencies in governance within SOCOMD. SOCAUST is to conduct a comprehensive review of SOCOMD systems, processes and culture at unit and Command level in order to identify and address organisational risk and preserve capability. DCA and COMD FORCOMD will support SOCAUST through staff support, and through external review and validation. External agencies will be requested to provide expertise and support to this process, coordinated by Army Headquarters.
4. **Phases.** SOCAUST is to address Command and unit level governance in four phases:
 - a. **Phase 1 – Identify.** Identify non-compliance with governance standards within SASR, other SOCOMD units, and SOHQ, focussing on safety, security, training, logistic, administrative and health functions;
 - b. **Phase 2 – Remediate.** Remediate all deficiencies identified in the governance review;
 - c. **Phase 3 – Rectify.** Implement and embed mandated procedures and controls within unit routine to re-establish directed compliance requirements, and address any cultural issues associated with current deficiencies;

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2

- d. **Phase 4 – Validate.** Commission external validation of SOCOMD compliance once management controls are embedded in unit practices.
- 5. **Endstate.** SOCOMD achieves and maintains compliance with Army and Defence governance standards.
- 6. **Restrictions.** Phase 1 and Phase 4 activities will include or be led by external-to-SOCOMD personnel upon direction by AHQ.

Tasks and responsibilities

7. **SOCAUST**

- a. **Immediate tasks.** SOCAUST is to assess and remediate the following as a priority:
 - (1) Explosive ordnance safety, security and accounting;
 - (2) CCI accounting security and control;
 - (3) Controlled stores accounting and control;
 - (4) Vehicle management and control;
 - (5) Health governance including the supply and management of pharmaceuticals;
 - (6) Safety management;
 - (7) Security management;
 - (8) Fuels management and control;
 - (9) General stores accounting and control;
 - (10) HAZCHEM management;
 - (11) APS and military administrative governance (including pay and allowances, leave and other pers admin governance requirements);
 - (12) Procurement processes; and
 - (13) Maintenance management.
- b. **Ongoing tasks:** SOCAUST is to address the following areas on an enduring basis:
 - (1) Management of SOCOMD establishment and personnel postings to address governance risk;
 - (2) Conduct of individual training that supports specialist SOCOMD logistic and governance proficiency requirements;
 - (3) Development of SOCOMD-specific policy requirements where mandated ADO governance controls do not support particular aspects of SOCOMD unit operations; and

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3

- (4) Education, training and professional development of SOCOMD members in governance and management responsibilities.

8. **COMD FORCOMD.** COMD FORCOMD is to provide subject matter expertise and other support to SOCAUST as requested. This may include specialist assessment teams, specialist and general assistance to remediation activities, and other advice.

9. **DCA.** DCA Division will lead AHQ provision of subject matter expertise, coordination and administration. DCA will task ACAA to provide governance support, and to conduct evaluation of remediation processes and outcomes. DCA will coordinate external support from other groups and agencies.

ADMINISTRATION

10. **Key Timings.**

- a. 27 Mar 15: SOCAUST initial scoping complete.
- b. 30 Apr 15: SOCAUST is to provide DCA a detailed plan of action.
- c. 30 Nov 15: Remedial activities complete.
- d. 30 Apr 16: All follow-on and auditing action complete.
- e. SOCAUST is to provide a formal monthly progress report to DCA from 30 Apr 15.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

11. DCA will maintain oversight of SOCOMD Governance Remediation on behalf of CA. AHQ and FORCOMD are to act in support of SOCOMD for the purposes of achieving this Directive.

CONCLUSION

12. Compliance and assurance are critical to Army capability. Implementation of this Directive will ensure that SOCOMD is best positioned to meet its ongoing governance responsibilities, thereby controlling enterprise risk and optimising capability delivery to Defence.

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R.M. Burr DSC, AM, MVO
Major General
Deputy Chief of Army

25 March 2015

Distribution:

COMD FORCOMD
SOCAUST

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4

Internal:

CA
DCA
HMSP-A
COFS AHQ
DGAO
DGCM-A
DGPERS-A
ADJTGEN-A

External:

CDF
SECRETARY
VCDF

Sponsor:

DGAO

Review Date: 27 Mar 16

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Supply Chain Governance Remedial Action Plan

Serial	Action	Risk Area Addressed	Responsibility	Due Dates	Status	Potential Mitigation strategy or outcome
1	Conduct re-baselining stock take of SASR to confirm scope of governance concerns and to enable transition to switching auto-consume off.	Identify scope of stock discrepancy	SOCOMD	27 Feb 15	SOCOMD have commenced the conduct of the baseline stocktake. Stocktake is being conducted independent of the unit by SOHQ staff.	Stocktake re-conducted to provide a baseline to re-establish control. Stocktake can also be used as a basis to compare against the early 2014 stocktake that was initiated when COMSARM auto consume was switched off.
2	Establish Contracted service for EO SD at SASR	Mitigate risk of theft and/or loss within EO facility by ensuring tighter control and no unaccompanied access.	AHQ/SOCOM D/JLC	01 Jul 15	SOHQ are engaging with JLC and Thales to execute the contract by May. It is understood that funding has been identified for next FY. Longer term aim is to include the facility at Holsworthy within the contract. Initial contract period will be six months to then be in a position to review the benefits and costs.	Facility will be under contractor control with depot level accounting processes that will reduce the risk of ammunition loss at the facility.
3	Review EO accounting policy and procedures	Identify and remediate any gaps in controls.	JLC		Minute written to VCDF	Assurance that any procedural gaps are addressed. Avoidance of a piecemeal approach to changing/introducing controls that may degrade the overall assurance of the policy and process.
4	Align LWP-G 7-3-1 Australian Defence Force Range Orders (Land) Chapter 6 with ESCM and DSM for ammunition accounting and control.	Ensure alignment of range procedures to security and supply chain requirements.	CATC	30 Mar 15	Draft minute for COMD CATC. Discussion with SAPS has occurred to provide a heads up of concerns and gaps.	Range procedures are aligned with the ESCM and accountability and control responsibilities reinforced.
5	Review the requirement for psychological testing for Ammunition Technicians	Minimise risk of personnel psychologically unsuited to the responsibility of handling and management of EO on a routine basis are identified.	DG PERS		Raised with Trade Mentor. Likely to be a discussion point after RAAOC Corps Committee meeting 25 Feb 15.	Confidence that personnel selected for the trade have the psychological profile that supports performance in trusted appointments.
6	Align Range supervisor training with the requirement to secure and control ammunition	Ensure that ammunition accounting and controls at range activities are taught to job standard.	CATC	30 Mar 15	Draft minute for COMD CATC	Range practice ammunition accountability and control responsibilities reinforced and taught to job standard.
7	Review SOCOMD procedures for supply, control carriage and issue of scheduled medications for compliance against Army health Instruction 08 dated 01 Jul 14	Ensure compliance to Army policy and minimise risk of scheduled medication loss or theft.	SOCOMD/JHC/ DG AHS	30 Mar 15	Draft Minute to SOHQ	SOCOMD control measures are aligned with Army requirements.
8	Confirm that no security/stock class one items are deficient	Minimise the risk that high risk munitions have been stolen or lost	SOCOMD/JLC		Awaiting outcome of baseline stocktake and subsequent reconciliation.	Will identify if high risk munitions have been lost.
9	Conduct a review of the management of security vetting by Army, in particular the assessment of vetted for key security/trust appointments.	Minimise risk of personnel who are unsuited to the responsibility of handling and managing EO.	AHQ		Discussed with Mick Gahan. This is likely to be problematic to execute due to resources. This may be mitigated by the re-introduction of psychological testing if viable. The SOCOMD option of annual police check may be an option for verification.	Risk of vetted personnel who are unsuitable for specific appointments is mitigated.
10	Review of security requirements for small unit magazines (non-depot, daylight hours manned facilities)	Minimise the risk of potential security loopholes between policies for large ammunition facilities (depots) and unmanned small quantity facilities. Manned unit magazines fall between these types of facilities.	DSA		Some discussions with DSA. DSA indicate that there is no need to change. This will require some face to face explanation with DSA as there is likely to be a lack of understanding of facility construction and type that is at the heart of the ambiguity in policy. Issue discussed with Mick Gahan and Paul Saunders. Happy for PATO to lead due to understanding of combination facilities operations and controls.	Risk of interpretation flexibility in DSM reduced. The requirement to risk manage pers access to manned workshop/laboratory/combination facilities is refined. Vehicle access, and personnel bag access to combination facilities is clarified and limited.
11	Review Ammunition Technician trade remediation activities to identify if actions are required to address apparent systemic shortages at key ranks. Army commenced an Ammunition technician trade remediation plan in 2007. Current asset/liability figures indicate that the trade is still experiencing shortages at key ranks. A review of the remediation plan and trade state may identify additional actions to improve availability and sustainability at key ranks.	Reduce the risk of an individual having unsupervised or unaccompanied access to EO.	DG PERS		Raised with Trade Mentor. Likely to be a discussion point after RAAOC Corps Committee meeting 25 Feb 15.	Risk of inadequate manning contributing to reduced control/management of ammunition is reduced.
12	Review policy on posting priorities for filling key governance/high governance risk positions within Army.	Confirm that appropriate policy and priority is applied to post personnel to priority and/or risk appointments.	DGPERS/SCM A			Risk of inadequate manning contributing to reduced control/management of ammunition is reduced.
13	Review of Army EO compliance & assurance	EO auditing within Army is	ACAA/JLC		Discussion with JLC and ACAA. Both are supportive of a review.	Risk of duplicated effort is mitigated. Audit activities is

	activities (including reporting) to ensure level and frequency adequately address risks.	currently conducted by an external agency (JLC) and does not necessarily address Army's need. At the T4 auditing level, Supply Chain governance and EO are separate.			Best option would be for adjustment/change to EO business process should be at Defence (ie. JLC lead) level. There may be a requirement for additional Army specific risks to be tested at Army level. EO BPT should be an additional tab on the BPT tool rather than a separate process.	focused on Defence and Army risk areas and synchronised to achieve best effect/coverage.
14	Confirm/review whether business process testing for management of scheduled medications occurs	Risk that units are not managing scheduled medications IAW the Army directive resulting in risk of loss or theft.			Draft minute for DG AHS. This is not tested by ACAA. It is understood that there is little or no audit capacity within JHC.	Risk of loss or theft of scheduled medications reduced.



SOCOMD Governance Remediation

Brief to DCA

23 Sep 15



Scope

- DCA Directive
- Accountability
- Resources
- Logistics
- Safety
- CEM
- Security
- Pers
- Training
- Health
- Chaplaincy



DCA Directive

- Leadership and accountability
- Symptoms vs cause
- ABC
- Assessment
 - Majority in Ph 2
 - Minority in Ph 3 (EO, maintenance, veh mngt)
 - Planning for Ph 4




Initiatives & Issues

- Initiatives
 - Pre-SUC training cse at SOHQ
 - SOCOMD Gov Board (end Oct)
 - SF Spt Staff cse back to FORCOMD
- Issues
 - Tent finalisation
 - Manning (SOHQ and specialist)
 - Base support arrangements



Legal – Admin and Discipline


		pre 2015	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
Mbrs	Overall	43	43	33	35	36	37	30	26	23	10
	Initiated	0	0	0	9	3	4	6	0	1	1
	Finalised	0	0	10	7	2	3	13	4	4	14





Legal – Admin and Discipline

Matters		pre	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
		2015									
	Overall	18	18	16	13	13	16	17	15	14	7
	Initiated	0	0	1	1	2	5	3	0	1	1
	Finalised	0	0	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	8






Legal – Admin and Discipline

Since Jan 15:

33 Matters dealt with involving **67** Members


26 Matters finalised involving **60** Members

7 Matters remain outstanding involving **7** Members –
only **2** within SOCOMD's authority








Finance - Accountability





Finance – Individual Accountability






SOJ4 Measures of Effectiveness against DCA Directive 1/15

Defence FOI 069/20/21
Document 3

SOCOMD Unit Maintenance Backlog




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SOLS – RTU from TS 15 created a maintenance burden.

SOCOMD – Average backlog lowered and largely mirrors the effectiveness of SASR.


SOCOMD TI and NTI Performance



TI - performance remains relatively unchanged only slight increase.

NTI - has significantly been remediated since the focus on governance. SASR has increased the most


Stocktaking % Error Rate 14/15 by Volume



Programmed Stocktakes: (Threshold is 5% for volume)

- STFC breaches:
 - One item brought on charge
 - Nine items written off
 - Three items brought on charge and five items written off
 - Four items brought on charge and four items written off

Stocktaking % Error Rate 14/15 by Assurance




Assurance Checks: (Threshold is 5% for assurance)

- Breach due to 5 items being written off



SOJ4 Measures of Effectiveness against DCA Directive 1/15


EO Corrective Action Request (CAR)



Units - trend indicates lack of SME (AT or ECN 401) support, poor operator returns and Q staff finalisation procedures of EO receipt and issues.

S33 - Insp scheduled Nov 15

Annual EO Stocktake




2 CDO - received 0% discrepancies

SASR - received 59.8% discrepancies

SOER - received 11% discrepancies

SOCOMD RPS



SASR - Transition of RPS to outsourcing through JLU (W)

SOLS - LAND 121 vehicle fleet RPS for all East Coast units.

SOCOMD - The reduction in RPS and transition to L121 has led to:

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Explanatory Notes

EO

- SASR EO discrepancies are from residual from the "Mattison" investigation.
- EO stock takes were cancelled in 2014 by OC SSS without SOCOMD knowledge.
- EO Management is improving albeit slowly and units without significant 401 manning are having greater governance issues.

Rations

- Swipe card systems within mess precincts (particularly SASR) have greatly reduced ration consumption against meal parade stats. This assists in eliminating fraud./

Fuel / Vehicle Management

- Fuel management through AD049 - vehicle authorisation forms is at 80% within SASR which greatly reduces the risk of fraud. (East coast fills through EIG multi user facilities so cannot track).
- Fuel audits through Fuel Ops Branch (JLC) have not flagged any discrepancies.

Physical Holdings

- Physical holdings are reducing in SASR and remaining steady in other units.
- RPS usage in SASR is decreasing and similar steps will be taken in 2 Cdo in 2016.
- Physical security (after theft) has been increased S33

Overall trend

- SOCOMD units are gradually trending upwards in all areas of mandatory governance and compliance with SASR leading.
- Overall governance culture has increased with the investigation process now utilised and DFDA action commenced if required.




Safety

- SOCOMD assurance activities on the practical application of safety in SOCOMD units:
 - SASR complete, including conduct of (external) IOI into ADRHIB capsize. Plus:
 - SASR Range Standing Orders rewritten
 - COMCARE liaison visit - nil concerns
 - observations remain ongoing per SOCOMD Safety Manager practice of routine visits
 - additional HAZCHEM management training being conducted 21-25 Sep
 - Remaining SOCOMD units underway:
 - EX TS15 observations made (nil SOCOMD issues); including:
 - Mt Bundy airfield seizure including heavy drop (2 Cdo Regt, SOER, US SOF & 176AD Sqn for rigging recovery);
 - HAF&GAF DA Hidden Valley Raceway (SASR, 2 Cdo Regt & US SOF); and
 - SOCCE (1 Cdo Regt & SOHQ) staff action.
 - PTS MFF course training at Corowa observed.
- ACAA governance assurance (audits):
 - SOLS complete - positive out brief - *'good safety culture'* (report not yet issued):
 - nil internal CARs (ie within unit control).
 - two external CARs against infrastructure - CPOL remediation & battery store
 - SOER complete - *out brief being conducted at time of drafting* (report not yet issued):
 - nil internal CARs (ie within unit control).
 - one external CAR against infrastructure - failure to provide compliant battery charging facility
 - SASR scheduled for late 2015
- DRSE assurance:
 - SASR complete - positive out brief (report not yet issued):
 - nil internal CARs (ie within unit control).
 - one CAR which relates to MILIS and requires AHQ resolution (not within unit control).
- Army Safety Day in SOCOMD preparation underway.
- SOCAUST WHS & HAZCHEM Management Directives currently in *DRAFT*



SOCOMD CEM Governance

SOCOMD CEM On Hand 2015




Procedures

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Outstanding

- 7 x items pending Provost Marshall authority for write off
- SOJ6 cell 'validation' of practices and procedures scheduled Oct – Nov 15





Security

- AHQ led review (50% implemented)
- Protocols
- Fence / Seaward Village / CB Re-dev



Pers

- SFDA and Para Allowance audit
 - 15 /1953 SFDA
 - 17/383 Para
 - 1 outstanding
- Leave Audit
- ARL (Fd Leave special)
- Manning and postings



SOCOMD TRAINING GOVERNANCE

Defence FOI 069/20/21
Document 3

SOCOMD has made a concerted effort in 2014 and 2015 to determine if there are any systemic or inefficient practices from a training governance perspective, with a view to providing greater assurance in this area. This has seen the introduction of a number of unique initiatives, and greater cooperation with FORCOMD, with training and training governance outcomes (including results from external audits) providing evidence of effectiveness / and continual improvement – this has occurred against a backdrop of continual manning pressures



Special Operations Command
Department of Defence

SOP 700 Series

Training SOPs

SOCOMD has developed comprehensive Sharepoint based Training SOPs completed in mid-2015. These ensure adherence to reliable, repeatable processes based on relevant policies for core SOJ7 branch tasks.

SOCOMD Initiated Governance Mechanisms

WHAT: Level 1 Training Evaluation Sharepoint Tool

WHEN: Fully functional 08 Oct 15

WHY: To efficiently collate student, AI and Supervisor feedback for SOCOMD run courses to inform course amendments.

HOW: Sharepoint administered questionnaires with automated data collation, compliant with relevant privacy laws. RMC-A has requested support adopting this system once complete.

WHAT: SO Training Systems Review

WHEN: Quarterly WEF Feb 15

WHY: To benchmark SOCOMD governance and individual training procedures with unit S7 staff.

HOW: Central forum communicating updates on policy and governance procedures, and resolving specific unit issues.



Miscellaneous Training Governance

LWP-G 7-3-1 ADF Range Regulations: 49 proposed amendments to Chapter 18 – SF Practices that ensure SF training reflects operational TTPs within acceptable risk thresholds & **MACWO Remediation:** IOI action items concluded in eight week period, and ahead of CA deadline (01 Jul 15). Comprised changes to doctrine, ab initio and continuation training, and TMPs (basic and supervisor). **Manning.** SOCOMD continue to experience difficulties in establishment and personnel postings to address Training governance risk, specifically in supporting Training and TD functional areas.

Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS)

Doctrine Rationalisation.

Consolidation and retirement of SOCOMD doctrine to remain “ready and relevant”. Future development of “DSN Wiki” to capture short-medium lessons learned repository, and preparing to adopt ‘Join Lessons Learned Information System’ (JLLIS) – SOCOMD to trial on behalf of Army in 2016.

SOCOMD 2015 External Governance Audit

WHAT: SFTC 2015 audit by RTO Cell, FORCOMD

WHEN: 16 Jun 15.

WHY: To assess SFTC compliance with Army Training Instructions and relevant policy in the conduct and governance of individual training.

HOW: External audit assessing 64 metrics across six core “Elements”.

RESULT: Full compliance across all 64 metrics with no corrective actions issued (the only TE across Army to achieve this in 2015). FORCOMD also requested assistance migrating several procedures for wider adoption.

WHAT: Corrective Action Register internally auditing SOCOMD individual training procedures

WHEN: Ongoing WEF 20 Oct 14

WHY: To identify recurring trends of procedural non-compliance across individual training for remediation.

HOW: Spreadsheet maintained by SFTC, with letters issued to unit COs and S7’s on a quarterly basis to identify trends and actions required.

RESULT: 20% improvement from 1st to 2nd quarter, with focus on four recurring processes that constitute 96% of non-compliances.

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SOCOMD INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

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Health Readiness

Medical Readiness (as at 21 Sep 15)

Deployable		Non-Deployable				
MEC 1	MEC 2	Overdue MEC Review	MEC 3	MEC 4	MEC 5	Incorrect MEC
1686	455	89	153	35	15	35
68.3%	18.4%	3.6%	6.2%	1.4%	0.6%	1.4%
86.8%		13.2%				

Dental Readiness (as at 21 Sep 15)

Deployable			Non-Deployable			
DC1	DC2	DC R*	Overdue	DC3	DC4	Incorrect DC
1,616	331	352	115	41	1	12
65.5%	13.4%	14.3%	4.7%	1.7%	0.0%	0.5%
93.2%			6.8%			

POPS Liability (as at 01 Sep 15)

POPS Not Due	POPS Due	POPS Overdue	Total
104	15	22	141



Health Governance

Defence FOI 069/20/21
Document 3

- Health Audits of all SOCOMD units completed over period Feb – Aug 15:
 - SASR
 - 1 CDO
 - 2 CDO
 - SOER
 - PTS
- Second round audits (six mths post) scheduled to commence Nov 15
- Overall Health Governance across SOCOMD complies with Defence health governance requirements, with only minor issues requiring remediation



Health and Wellbeing

Defence FOI 069/20/21
Document 3

- Release of revised SOCAUST Directive:
 - Force and Family Program: Supporting SOCOMD WII Members and their Families
- Development of the SOCOMD Psych Trauma Management Plan
- Development of SOCOMD Resilience Package
- Conduct of Mental Health First Aid Course
- Development of revised Third Location Decompression Program for designated operations



Chaplaincy – Support Areas

Army Chaplaincy Trends

SOCOMD

May-Aug 2015 :

Category		Issues		Events	Episodes	Event %	Episode %
1	Pastoral Ministry						
1.1	Family Relationship Support	1.1.1	Work / Home Tension	23	37	18%	19%
		1.1.2	Separation / MWD(U)	6	11		
		1.1.3	Family Health	42	70		
		1.1.4	Schooling	1	2		
		1.1.5	Family Relationship Dev	14	23		
		1.1.6	Relationship crisis	22	45		
1.2	Visits	1.2	Visits	21	47	4%	5%
1.3	Domestic Violence	1.3		5	9	1%	1%
1.4	Relationship Counselling	1.4.1	Prep - interdependent life	7	12	3%	3%
		1.4.2	Other	10	17		
1.5	Life Choices	1.5.1	Alcohol	20	35	10%	10%
		1.5.2	Drugs	4	8		
		1.5.3	Financial	2	2		
		1.5.4	Career	18	32		
		1.5.5	Ethics / Decision Making	14	25		
1.6	Work	1.6.1	Postings	11	17	16%	17%
		1.6.2	Medical / Rehab	31	60		
		1.6.3	Colleague tensions	24	48		
		1.6.4	Comd Generated Stress	21	37		
		1.6.5	Housing / Accommm	5	10		
1.7	Multiple Complex Issues	1.7		42	77	7%	8%
1.8	Other	1.8	Any other pastoral issues	36	60	6%	6%



2	Spiritual Ministry						
2.1	Loss & Grief	2.1.1	Death	28	37	6%	5%
		2.1.2	Death / VSI notifications	7	12		
2.2	Mental & Spiritual Wellbeing	2.2.1	Mental Health / Wellbeing	27	53	6%	6%
		2.2.2	Suicide Attempt / Suicide	7	12		
2.3	Moral Decision Making	2.3		9	20	2%	2%
2.4	Counsel & Advice	2.4		46	83	8%	8%
2.5	Training (list by number of lesson periods delivered)	2.5.1	Character Development	9	9	7%	5%
		2.5.2	CO hours	1	1		
		2.5.3	ASIST / CIMHS / Notification	3	3		
		2.5.4	Other	29	33		

3	Religious Ministry						
3.1	Religious Ministry & Sacraments	3.1.1	Preparing couples for marriage	9	22	7%	7%
		3.1.2	Other Religious Ministry (See note 5)	10	15		
		3.1.3	Chapel Services	4	4		
		3.1.4	Ceremonial Services	9	15		
3.2	Facilitation of Others	3.2	Facilitate other Traditions, Denominations	7	10	1%	1%

Totals				584	1013	100%	100%
--------	--	--	--	-----	------	------	------

4	Additional Information						
4.1	Deployment Related	4.1	How many of the above Events or Episodes were impacted by or related to operational deployment?	52	74	9%	7%
4.2	Call Outs	4.2	Events or Episodes initiated by a Call-Out	29	35	5%	3%



SOLS GOVERNANCE REMEDIATION

Defence FOI 069/20/21
Document 3

Supply Chain

Unacceptable

Average

Excellent



- Army Supply Chain Health Tracker (ASCHT) provides evidence of enhanced supply chain operations
- Business Process Monitoring Vol 1 – 698 / 743 'green'
- Demand Performance Vol 2 – satisfaction rate 89% (SOLS) vs 71% (FORCOMD)
- SCA data anomalies Vol 3 - some work still to do, in particular in RPS space
- Stocktaking Vol 4 – target completion 42%, actual completion 49%; issues identified WRT record keeping in 2014

Technical Integrity & Maint




- SOLS TIM-D is now compliant with version 5.1 of the TRAMM-L
- TRF auditing is now occurring (no evidence of auditing since Aug 13)
- SOPs established WRT Rapid Fabrication Cell
- Quality control issues largely rectified
- DUF Tech Cert and NTI process require further reinforcement across Sqn; lessons scheduled for Aug 15

Pers and Unit Admin



- March in/out templates now IAW DGPERS-A (DGPERS-A/OUT/2014/R19720602 of 27 Oct 14); reduced risk of data errors that may result in significant pay and allowance issues on transition to Defence One.
- DSN Registry system created IOT comply with a host of Records Management and Archive policy and legislation.
- Restructure of Obj Filing system IOT comply with a host of Records Management and Archive policy and legislation (including CA Dir 47/14 Information and Records Management).
- Audit schedule implemented IOT identify: High Leave Balance/Leave Lapsing, Categorisation, Classified Document Handling, Defence Sponsored Passports etc
- No Conditions of Service Travel/Payment register previously existed (non-unit funded expenditure and travel); register and document archive process implemented to comply with audit requirements.
- No tracking system for complex leave types (LSL, LWOP, PTLWOP, Mat Lve); system implemented to ensure recommencement of normal CoS.

Culture



- Zero requirement for DFDA action against any SOLS member in 2015, Infringements in 2015, return on Blood Alcohol testing in 2015, return on all Prohibited Substance testing in 2015
- Tangible focus on individuals being accountable for their actions
- Noticeable reduction in the number of SOLS members who are undergoing treatment in the psych space



SOLS GOVERNANCE REMEDIATION

Defence FOI 069/20/21
Document 3

Unacceptable

Average

Excellent

WHS



- Quarterly Meetings Being Conducted with progress being noted at each
- An effective CAR register established and maintained
- WHS training conducted throughout the year; greater awareness from soldiers in hazard identification and treatment
- Reasonable coverage of threats across the SQN are covered by SWP and JSA

Finance



- No intentional fraud or theft identified
- Further remediation required WRT Fraud Control
- Notable improvement WRT NPMA (Silver Sword Club)
- Procurement documentation is lacking by the DUF clerks and further training is required (UBM is aware and will be conducting trg)

Security



- Documentation has undergone significant remediation.
- Security Register has been reviewed and remediated to provided the required information
- Security SOs and SOPs have been update to incorporate current policy and directives
- Members security clearance and compartments briefs have been documented and now actively managed; increased awareness of PID and members responsibilities.
- Reaccreditation of infrastructure is currently occurring.
- A Key muster been conducted and the unit key register remediated to include all holding. A robust key management process has also been implemented.
- Armoury Access briefs have been raised to increases awareness of access responsibilities.
- Increased control of PEDs has been implemented within areas containing SECRET information.
- Classified Document holdings have been remediated and reduced to minimal holdings required.



AUSTRALIAN ARMY
(Office of the Chief of Army)

MINUTE

OCA/OUT/2016/R27873813

SOCAUST

For information:
DGLOG-A

REQUEST TO CLOSE DCA DIRECTIVE 01/15

References:

- A. DCA Directive 01/15 SOCOMD Governance Remediation of 25 Mar 16
- B. AM2641148 *SOHQ Response to DCA Directive 01/15* of 14 Sep 16
- C. AM2697434 *SOCOMD EO Account Adjustment* of 17 Aug 16

1. Ref A was my direction to you to address governance concerns arising from a series of notifiable incidents at SASR. Ref B was your request for closure of Ref A on the basis of remediation actions taken. Ref C was your request for SASR explosive ordnance (EO) stock adjustment following the EO stocktake identified in Ref B as an outstanding remediation action to Ref A.

2. I am satisfied that all governance issues identified in Ref A for remediation action have been addressed, with the exception of EO. A review of Ref C suggests ongoing risk with respect to EO accounting at SASR. Ref A will therefore remain open until I am satisfied that SASR can consistently account for EO in accordance with Army procedures. The accounting of EO expenditure for activities conducted outside Campbell Barracks remains of particular concern.

3. I anticipate that a successful SASR EO account stocktake in early 2017 would be sufficient to satisfy me that SASR was managing its EO account with due diligence. Please report again once this level of assurance has been achieved.

s22

RM Burr
MAJGEN
DCA

16 Nov 16

~~FOUO~~

Herron, William MR

From: s33 [REDACTED] LTCOL
Sent: Tuesday, 10 February 2015 2:42 PM
To: Monkivitch, Leo LTCOL
Cc: s33 [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Ministerial Advice ~~[SEC - PROTECTED, DLM - Sensitive]~~

~~PROTECTED Sensitive~~

Leo,

These comments have been released by A/SOCAUST.

Regards

s33 [REDACTED]

MINDEF Question: "Can I have an update on the outcome of the audit referred to in paragraph 5, when concluded please. Especially how this situation will be avoided in the future."

AHQ Comment: AHQ has commenced looking at identified key risk areas and has already written to VCDF. The specific audit being referred to is a combination of the ACAA audit and an additional desktop assessment of key policy documents (ESCM/DSM and LWP-G 7-3-1). Attached are the areas that AHQ has currently identified that may need to be looked at. What I would like is information on what SOCOMD has done in terms of looking at the incident, unit risk areas and any proposals to prevent reoccurrence at this stage. I expect that it is possible that not much has yet occurred and I do have some concerns that close to 60 days after the incident it may appear that Defence has not done much and, if this is the case, it is unlikely to reflect well. Any interim processes etc that have been put in place to address controls etc. at unit level should probably be detailed. I will probably articulate that the move to switch off auto consume is a proactive means by Defence to minimise such occurrences.

Short term

1. SASR has reduced the issue of ammunition to courses and pre-ordered ammunition only to give magazine staff time to implement the changes and assist with the COMSARM audit of the magazine.
2. SASR stored ammunition in 'training' boxes which made accountability difficult. The practice has now been ceased.
3. The OIC practice is now the person allowed to be issued or receipt ammunition and must sign the SQ80.
4. There is an SOHQ representative currently auditing COMSARM figures against actual stock in the SASR magazine.
5. Engagement with JLC (DGEO) to advise and assist for EO management at SASR.

Medium term

1. SASR conducting a full review of the magazine bay setup to mitigate against possible fraud / theft.

Long term

1. The engagement of a Thales contract to run the magazine.

MINDEF Question: "Update on how this occurred re failure of accounts, audits etc. Is there potential for this to be a wider problem in the ADF?"

AHQ comment: Again AHQ will use the detail above to answer much of this. The key here is any indications of key failings/causes would be appreciated. That should put us in a position to provide advice on the second component. My assessment of the requirements of the ESCM and DSM etc. are that it would be difficult under standard unit operations to have theft of this level without others being complicit s33 [REDACTED]
s33 [REDACTED] I am aware that due to stocktaking require s33 [REDACTED] ing ammunition identified would probably have been highlighted as a result of base line stock takes (I won't necessarily put this in but may to indicate that the system would probably have identified concerns anyway - arguably with an unacceptable lag).

1. As previously identified the key failing is the fragility of the system and the level of trust (without checks) placed in individuals. Lack of enforcement of policy and a lack of SOPs or orders to back up endorsed procedures. A lack of personnel also hampered some of the safe guards that are in place (such as the two person rule for working with ammunition). While the audits through the various agencies did not identify the issues, mainly due to deliberate effort by the individual to cover up the issues. The COMSARM audit (conducted remotely through JLC staff) did uncover anomalies which could have led to the discovery of this individual.

Regards

s33

From: s33 BRIG
Sent: Monday, 9 February 2015 16:53
To: s33 LTCOL
Subject: RE: Ministerial Advice [~~SEC PROTECTED, DLM Sensitive~~]

~~PROTECTED Sensitive~~

ack thanks

s33

s33

Brig
DSOCAUST

s33

@defence.gov.au

From: s33 LTCOL
Sent: Monday, 9 February 2015 14:35
To: s33 BRIG
Subject: FW: Ministerial Advice [~~SEC PROTECTED, DLM Sensitive~~]

~~PROTECTED Sensitive~~

Sir,

FYSA.

I have asked the RXO and A/OC SSS at SASR to provide a response back to myself tomorrow. I will draft some comments (without SASR advice) for you to consider, just in case SASR do not have an answer or do not answer back in time.

Regards

s33

From: Monkivitch, Leo LTCOL
Sent: Monday, 9 February 2015 14:26
To: s33 LTCOL
Cc: Longley, Nicole COL
Subject: Ministerial Advice [~~SEC PROTECTED, DLM Sensitive~~]

~~PROTECTED Sensitive~~

s33

I am planning to have the MINSUB cleared at DG level by COB tomorrow to allow a couple of days to get it through CA and SEC/CDF. At this stage I will probably have to get DSA and JLC clearance.

I would appreciate it if I could have SOCOMD input by 1400 tomorrow. If need be I will push a copy of the completed MINSUB back to ensure SOCOMD is happy with the way information is linked sequenced etc.

I need some comments specific to the two broad questions posed, namely:

1. On 14 Jan, you commented on MA15-000029 with *“Can I have an update on the outcome of the audit referred to in paragraph 5, when concluded please. Especially how this situation will be avoided in the future.”*

AHQ has commenced looking at identified key risk areas and has already written to VCDF. The specific audit being referred to is a combination of the ACAA audit and an additional desktop assessment of key policy documents (ESCM/DSM and LWP-G 7-3-1). Attached are the areas that AHQ has currently identified that may need to be looked at. What I would like is information on what SOCOMD has done in terms of looking at the incident, unit risk areas and any proposals to prevent reoccurrence at this stage. I expect that it is possible that not much has yet occurred and I do have some concerns that close to 60 days after the incident it may appear that Defence has not done much and, if this is the case, it is unlikely to reflect well. Any interim processes etc that have been put in place to address controls etc. at unit level should probably be detailed. I will probably articulate that the move to switch off auto consume is a proactive means by Defence to minimise such occurrences.

2. On XX Jan, The Assistant Minister for Defence also commented on MA15-000029 with *“Update on how this occurred re failure of accounts, audits etc. Is there potential for this to be a wider problem in the ADF?”*

Again AHQ will use the detail above to answer much of this. The key here is any indications of key failings/causes would be appreciated. That should put us in a position to provide advice on the second component. My assessment of the requirements of the ESCM and DSM etc. are that it would be difficult under standard unit operations to have theft of this level without others being complicit ^{s33}

^{s33} I am aware that due to stocktaking require ^{s33} probably have been highlighted as a result of base line stock takes (I won't necessarily put this in but may to indicate that the system would probably have identified concerns anyway - arguably with an unacceptable lag).

Any problems please call.

Leo

L.M. Monkivitch

LTCOL

Principal Ammunition Technical Officer

Army Headquarters

Ph: 02 6265 7167

^{s22}

Fx: 02 6265 6364

R1-4-A033

Director Logistics - Army

Director General Army Operations

Army Headquarters

Russell Offices

PO BOX 7902

CANBERRA BC, ACT

AUSTRALIA 2610

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Herron, William MR

From: Morris, Kirstie MISS on behalf of DSA Governance And Coord
Sent: Tuesday, 10 February 2015 3:18 PM
To: Monkivitch, Leo LTCOL
Cc: Crawford, Anna MRS; Keeley, Gloria MS; Burton, Lynda MRS
Subject: RE: MA15-000142.xml [~~SEC-PROTECTED, DLM-Sensitive~~]

~~PROTECTED Sensitive~~

Hi Leo,

Serial 10 in the Army "Supply Chain Governance Remedial Action Plan" asks DSA to "[Conduct a] Review of security requirements for small unit magazines (non-depot, daylight hours manned facilities"

s33



As the current policy provides this flexibility, the DSA does not consider there is a loophole in the policy and no requirement to review it.

Mr Michael Aichholzer is our Director of Security Policy and International Agreements and has advised that he is happy for you to contact him, should you wish to discuss the DSA response further. Michael's extension is 62539.

The DSA has no comments to add regarding the draft MINSUB.

Kind regards,

Kirstie Morris

Defence Security Authority / Tel: 02 6266 2169 | Email: DSA.GovernanceandCoord@defence.gov.au

From: Monkivitch, Leo LTCOL
Sent: Tuesday, 10 February 2015 08:41
To: DSA Governance And Coord; ADFIS HQ Operations; Miller, Warwick LTCOL; Surtees, Nick LTCOL; Lingard, Philip MR; Oliver, Denise LTCOL 2; Morris, Kirstie MISS
Cc: Stothart, Wade COL
Subject: MA15-000142.xml [~~SEC-PROTECTED, DLM-Sensitive~~]

~~PROTECTED Sensitive~~

Please find attached an updated draft of a MINSUB due Fri. I have provided details on the actions to date that AHQ has commenced to mitigate risk areas as a result of the incident last year. I would appreciate input from your areas on investigation and other activities that have been conducted by your respective organisations and a status update on those activities. For your information I have also included a task list of the focus areas that AHQ are looking at as a result of a DLOG-A assessment of the risks. You may note that these are not all in AHQ/Army's lane and Army will write to respective organisations requesting relevant reviews etc.

if you could provide me input today (ideally 1400, accept COB) it would be greatly appreciated. I expect that once cleared by my 1* it will probably be cleared by relevant 1* officers in your organisations via DPAWS in the next few days.

Regards,

Leo

L.M. Monkivitch

LTCOL

Principal Ammunition Technical Officer

Army Headquarters

Ph: 02 6265 7167

M: 

Fx: 02 6265 6364

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DGAO CORRESPONDENCE

TITLE:

**150129 – BRIEF – CA – FULL THEFT OF AMMUNITION AND CONTROLLED
STORES IN WA**

Object ID: R21024725
Registered date: 29-Jan-15
Sender Ref:

Registered in
Sharepoint OCA

Registered by:

Please indicate below on action required:

- ☒ Registered on SharePoint
- ☐ Update Version of Document / Correspondence
- ☐ Link with document – Objective ID:.....
- ☐ Dispatched – Hard Copy / Electronic Copy
- ☐ Return / do not return Brief
- ☐ Hard Copy to be Returned to Originator.....
- ☐ For Destruction – Requested by.....Date.....

**PLEASE NOTE, IF ACTION REQUIRED IS NOT MARKED THE CORRESPONDENCE WILL
BE DESTROYED**

Addressee

SEEN BY CA
CA 4/2
DCA
DGA
DI
PATO
2/2
LOG-A

~~PROTECTED~~

Code: A – Action I - Information C - Comments E – For Signature
G - Discuss D - Draft Reply O - Other X – Destroy

Appointment	Code	Comment By	Comments (include DATE)
DLOG-A		PATO	Ma'am, for your clearance please. [REDACTED] 29/1
DCA	1	DGAO	Sir, the initial review of the incident in WA has raised a number of systemic issues that are now being addressed. This will require work within Army and across JLC & DSA. [REDACTED] DGAO 30/1.
DCA [REDACTED]	E	DLOG-A	Sir, minor changes as requested by COPS. Now distinguished between immediate & longer term responses. Also minute to VCDF requesting CSLOG lead review. [REDACTED]

s22

2/2

we have spoken with AGSVA.
(Vetting Governance Director).

1. Spent convictions not always ~~included~~
included (dependent on state legislation
on whether they disclose).

s47F

4. Don't do assessment based ^{on} positions
that is up to agency (eg: Army).

Nicole Longley

R21024725

s22

s22

~~PROTECTED~~

For action by: 30 Jan 15

BRIEF FOR CA (THROUGH DCA AND DCA) ON THE THEFT OF AMMUNITION AND CONTROLLED STORES

1. **Purpose.** To provide you with an update on the governance concerns raised as a result of the arrest of an Army member in WA.
2. **Recommendations.** It is recommended that you:
 - a. **note** the theft of ammunition and other stores by an Army member in WA has highlighted a number of supply chain risks.
NOTED / PLEASE DISCUSS
 - b. **note** the concerns regarding the security and vetting process.
NOTED / PLEASE DISCUSS
 - c. **note** DLOG-A staff have commenced coordinating immediate actions to address the governance concerns identified as a result of the incident.
NOTED / PLEASE DISCUSS
 - d. **endorse** the conduct of further detailed root cause analysis into the incident.
ENDORSED / NOT ENDORSED / PLEASE DISCUSS
 - e. **sign** the attached minute to VCDF (Flag A).
SIGNED / NOT SIGNED / PLEASE DISCUSS
3. **Background.** On 18 Dec 14 a member of SASR was arrested by Western Australian Police (WAPOL) as a result of information received from a tipoff. During a subsequent search of his premise a large quantity of military equipment including ammunition, general stores pharmaceuticals and repair parts was seized. The quantity and nature of the stores has raised concerns over the controls in place to appropriately account for and secure equipment and stores.
4. **Supply Chain Governance and Control.** The incident has highlighted a number of potential gaps within the accountability and control framework for EO and controlled stores. These include:
 - a. Lack of independent assurance of ammunition use/accounting at range activity level – no additional signature/check of use and consumption.
 - b. Due to unforeseen circumstances an asset/liability gap existed at the unit for the Ammunition Technician (AT) trade that may have contributed to the incident. A gap currently exists across the whole AT trade. CCMA have identified the trade as a serious category and are currently managing it.

~~PROTECTED~~

~~PROTECTED~~

2

c.

s33

- d. Although business process testing is conducted by a number of agencies and Army, cross-pollination of results does not always occur.
- e. The training of all-corps soldiers for range supervision does not include basic accounting responsibilities which is a key function of range activity management (e.g. IOC Practice).
- f. There is no process to enable the chain of command to identify, mitigate, control and accept governance risk where compliance gaps for EO management are unavoidable as a result of manning or unit tempo.

5. **Class 5 - Ammunition.**

s33

s33

SOCOMD proposed that the operation of the SASR magazine be transferred to JLC. AHQ are in the process of identifying funding and then will negotiate the transfer of responsibility to JLC.

6. **Class 9 – Repair Parts.** A number of repair parts, including weapon parts, were also found at the member's premise. Reasonable governance process exist for weapon assemblies and controlled weapon parts, however, there are some risks in stocktaking methodologies for weapons that may result in gaps that can be exploited. To reduce this risk and to streamline accounting and stocktaking Army is currently trialling the tagging of weapons and controlled weapon parts. This trial is still in its early phases, but initial feedback is promising. There are a number of other risk areas relating to IT applications that have also been identified.

7. **Class 8 – Pharmaceuticals.** Class 8 stores, and in particular S4 and S8 scheduled drugs are tightly controlled and accounted for on a specialised IT system. Initial investigations have indicated that there does not appear to be any business process testing activities that validate the appropriate management of these stores. A business process testing methodology would provide assurance that units are managing these risks to an acceptable level.

8. **Security and vetting.** Initial inquiries have identified concerns regarding the management of security vetting of personnel. The member involved in the incident had recently undergone a vetting review as a result of concerns raised by the unit

s47F

s47F The review by DSA took 12 months to complete and resulted in revalidation of the member's security clearance

s47F

s47F

9. **Immediate actions.** A number of gaps in process or governance measures have already been identified and will be addressed in the immediate future. These include the revision of accounting forms, incorporation of basic range accounting requirements in range supervision

~~PROTECTED~~

~~PROTECTED~~

3

training and reinforcement of the requirement for accompanied access to armouries and ammunition facilities.

Please be more specific.

10. **Follow on actions.** In the medium to longer term the transfer of the SASR magazine to JLC control is planned and a holistic and detailed review of the accounting, security and governance process is warranted to identify the root cause of governance and control failures and ensure an enduring solution is developed. CJLOG is the lead for providing direction to Defence on all explosive ordnance accounting and should have the lead on this review. Army Improvements and DLOG-A staff are poised to assist.

Drafted by: LTCOL L. Monkivitch

PATO

Tel: 57167

2 Feb
Jan 15

Cleared by: COL N. Longley

DLOG-A

Tel: 56126

2 Feb
Jan 15

Consultation: AI, SOCOMD, ACAA, JLC

Flag:

A. Minute to CJLOG regarding governance concerns for ammunition and controlled stores.

~~PROTECTED~~



AUSTRALIAN ARMY
(Office of the Chief of Army)
MINUTE

OCA/OUT/2015/R21057483

VCDF

For information:

CN
CAF

**AMMUNITION AND CONTROLLED STORES GOVERNANCE CONCERNS AS A
RESULT OF THEFT IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA**

1. On 18 Dec 14 an Army member was arrested for alleged theft of ammunition, general stores, controlled stores and pharmaceuticals. Initial inquiries into the incident have highlighted possible weaknesses in the processes for management and accounting of explosive ordnance in particular.
2. It is requested that JLC lead a review of the governance and accounting requirements for explosive ordnance. I would anticipate that such a review would require support from the services and other enabling agencies and my staff are poised to assist.
3. My point of contact on this matter is DLOG-A, COL Nicole Longley, nicole.longley@defence.gov.au or on (02) 6265 6126.

s22



D.L. MORRISON
LTGEN
CA

R1-4-B003

4 Feb 15

~~PROTECTED~~