

UNCLASSIFIED

453SQN WLM FLT SI (OPS) 07-01
FLYING ORDER 04/19 AL4

FLYING ORDER 04/19

INTERIM UNAUTHORISED RPAS PROCEDURE AMENDMENT 4

Reference:

- A. [OC 44WG directive 02/2019 – Reporting of Unmanned Aerial System Safety Events](#)
- B. [Email dated 18 Mar 19 from OC 44WG – Reporting of Unmanned Aerial System Safety Events](#)
- C. [Manual of Air Traffic Services 5.1.2 – Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems](#)
- D. [44WG SI\(OPS\) 03-09 – Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Management](#)
- E. [453SQN WLM FLT SI\(OPS\) 03-06 – Local Civilian Operations](#)

INTRODUCTION

1. A trial of an unauthorised RPAS surveillance system is being undertaken at WLM. The first phase of the trial involves members of 26SQN (ABCP) or 1SECFOR (AFPOL) monitoring the airspace within 3NM of either runway threshold for RPAS, and reporting any detections to ATC.
2. No procedure exists in MATS or 44WG SI for responding to an unauthorised RPAS detection.

AIM

3. The aim of this instruction is to implement an interim procedure for responding to an RPAS detection, to preserve the operating efficiency of the airport while ensuring the safety of flight.

AUTHORITY

4. The authority for this instruction is FLTCDR 453SQN WLM FLT.
5. The reporting requirements of this Flying Order deviate from reference A. Authority for this deviation is OC 44WG – refer reference B.

SCOPE

6. This instruction applies to all personnel involved in the provision of ATS at Williamtown.

PROCEDURES

7. **RPAS surveillance.** RPAS surveillance terminals have been installed in the ABCP and ATC tower. Terminals are staffed during the normal operating hours of each facility.
8. **Surveyed area.** SECFOR surveillance personnel working in the ABCP have been briefed to monitor the airspace within 3NM of either runway threshold (ie, approximately a figure 8 centred on the ATC tower).
9. **Separation requirements.** The separation and segregation requirements between RPA and manned aircraft are described in references C and D. A visual representation of these requirements is published in annex B to reference E.
10. **Actions on detection.** Where an RPA is detected within the surveyed area, 1SECFOR will contact the tower. TWR will advise 1SECFOR if the RPA is authorised by ATC and no further action will be taken. If the RPA is not authorised, 1SECFOR will commence a law enforcement response.

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11. Deleted.

12. Deleted.

13. **ATC actions.** If an unauthorised RPA is detected, ATC are to respond IAW the following table:

RPAS POSITION	RPAS OPERATING HEIGHT	ATC RESPONSE
Over the approach or departure path for any aircraft (as defined in 44WG SI(OPS) 03-09)	At any level	Issue a safety alert and directed traffic information to affected aircraft
Within R596, when SAWR is active (not including FCTA)	At any level	Issue a safety alert and directed traffic information to RSO (if on duty) or operating aircraft directly
Anywhere else within controlled airspace	At/below 400FT	No action, unless the controller believes a safety hazard exists (eg: proximity to coastal corridor, low flying areas or other low-level flight paths)
	Above 400FT	Issue a safety alert and directed traffic information to affected aircraft

14. **Suggested RT for directed traffic information.** SAFETY ALERT, UNAUTHORISED UAV¹ DETECTED (POSITION) (LEVEL) [CLEARED TAKEOFF/LAND/APPROACH AT PILOT DISCRETION]

15. Deleted

16. **Pilot in command discretion.** The responsibility for the safety of an aircraft and its occupants ultimately rests with the pilot in command. Provided ATC are satisfied that the pilot is completely aware of the risk, ATC should not unreasonably withhold clearances where a pilot wishes to continue. The phrase "at pilot discretion" may be used with ATC instructions.

17. Deleted.

REPORTING

18. Any reporting of unauthorised RPA is to be prioritised behind the safe control of aircraft. If a controller is in doubt of requirements or requires guidance, contact OPSCDR for assistance.

19. Pertinent information that should be included in any RPAS reporting includes:

- location and maximum altitude of the RPA. Note the altitude listed in the Aeroscope software is the height of the RPA above the operator and will need to be converted to a height AGL or AMSL.
- Duration of RPAS flight
- drone ID and type

¹ The term "RPAS" is not widely understood outside the military

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- d. impact on manned aircraft (specify if none)
- e. actions carried out by ATC in response (specify if none)
- 20. The title of any unauthorised report should begin with 'UAV' for standardisation. Refer ref

21. **When to report.** No ATC reporting of an RPAS detection is required unless any of the following occur, in which case ATC shall raise an ASR, CCIR and DIR. Ref B is the authority to vary the requirements of Ref A:

- a. ATC are required to manoeuvre an aircraft, or withhold/modify a clearance, due to the presence of an unauthorised RPA
- b. ATC issue avoiding action or a pilot takes evasive action regarding an unauthorised RPA
- c. The RPA is detected by a means other than the Aeroscope system

22. Deleted

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CANCELLATION

26. This Flying Order is effective immediately and remains current until cancelled or incorporated into existing documentation.

Key Words:

RPAS	Drone	UAV	Segregation	
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File reference: BO2074360

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FLTCDR
453SQN WLM FLT

LIST OF EFFECTIVE 453SQN WLM FLT FLYING ORDERS AS AT DATE OF PUBLICATION OF THIS ORDER

04/19 AL4 – Interim unauthorised RPAS procedure
14/19 AL1 – WLMRSR separation limits
18/19 – Survey notification

ACG AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

References:

- A. [Defence Aviation Safety Regulation \(DASR\)](#)
- B. [Defence Aviation Safety Manual \(DASM\)](#)
- C. [AC SI\(OPS\) 01-41—Air Command Operational Airworthiness Management Plan \(OAMP\)](#)
- D. [AC SI\(OPS\) 06-04—Air Command Aviation Safety Management](#)
- F. [AC SI\(OPS\) 01-16—Aviation Risk Management](#)

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- I. [ACG SI\(OPS\) 06-05—Aviation Safety Risk Management](#)

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- K. [ACG SI\(PERS\) 05-01—ACG Work Health and Safety Management Plan](#)

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STANDING INSTRUCTION FEEDBACK

1. Users of this Standing Instruction (SI) are advised to provide feedback on the safety, currency, effectiveness and user satisfaction of this SI using [ACG SI\(OPS\) 06-04 – Feedback Email](#).

INTRODUCTION

2. The Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) ([Reference A](#)) require approved organisations, such as Military Air Operators (MAO), to establish and maintain an Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS)¹. In accordance with DASR SMS regulation, compliance with Defence's corporate ASMS solution, the *Defence Aviation Safety Manual* (DASM) ([Reference B](#)), satisfies the ASMS requirements for the issue of a MAO Certificate (MAOC). In addition, Air Command's (AC) AC SI(OPS) 01-41—*Air Command Operational Airworthiness Management Plan* (OAMP) ([Reference C](#)) requires that FEG CDRs ensure an SMS is established to be compliant and conformant with the DASM and AC SI(OPS) 06-04—*Air Command Aviation Safety Management* ([Reference D](#)).

3. Structured and effective aviation safety management practices are key to the prevention of aviation safety events and thus the preservation of human and materiel resources in Air Combat Group (ACG). An ASMS consists of written policies, plans, and procedures, coupled with organisational structures, accountabilities, attitudes, beliefs and practices which promote aviation safety and a generative aviation safety culture. The purpose of the ACG ASMS is to identify hazards and eliminate safety risk to people arising from aircraft operations, so far as is reasonably practicable (SFARP), or, where the risk cannot be eliminated, minimise the residual risk associated with the hazard SFARP.

4. The ACG ASMS encompasses the ASMS implemented at Wing (WG) and unit level, all ACG aviation activities, ACG personnel, and external service providers supporting ACG aviation.

5. The aviation safety objectives of the ACG ASMS are:

- a. zero Class A events,
- b. promulgation of up-to-date policy and orders, instructions, publications (OIP) for ACG aviation safety,
- c. full resourcing of the aviation safety management organisation,
- d. a 'just and fair' reporting culture that facilitates learning from errors and in which people are accountable for their aviation safety related behaviours,

1 DASR SMS – Aviation Safety Management Systems

- e. complete integration of risk management (RM) into all ACG flying and maintenance operations,
 - f. effective oversight of aviation safety within ACG,
 - g. personnel are trained in aviation safety relevant to their role, and
 - h. people are recognised for positive safety behaviour.
6. This instruction must be read in conjunction with:
- a. the DASM as the overarching Defence ASMS, and
 - b. AC SI(OPS) 06-04—*Air Command Aviation Safety Management*².
7. The ACG ASMS is complementary to the ACG Work Health and Safety (WHS) Management Plan (MP) ([Reference K](#)). The ACG WHSMP applies to all workers conducting business or undertakings on behalf of ACG, either in Australia or overseas, as per the Air Force Safety Manual; as well as visitors and volunteers. Workers include all Australian Defence Force (ADF) members, Australian Public Service (APS) personnel, contractors, work experience students, and volunteers.

AIM

8. The aim of this instruction is to implement an ASMS structure to meet the intent of the DASM and provide amplification to DASM and AC SI(OPS) 06-04 requirements by documenting specific requirements for aviation safety within ACG. This instruction aims to provide direction to subordinate commanders, executives, supervisors and personnel in the implementation of the ASMS to ensure that aviation safety is embedded in all aspects of their Defence aviation tasks and activities.

AUTHORITY

9. The authority for this instruction is Commander ACG [A00](#) Commander ([A00 CDR](#)).

SCOPE

10. The scope of the ACG ASMS is complementary to the Defence ASMS scope documented in the DASM. This instruction applies to all personnel involved in ACG aviation-related activities. The scope of the ACG ASMS includes flight operations and supporting functions such as continuing airworthiness, logistical support, mission planning and aviation support systems.

DEFINITIONS

11. The terms used in this instruction are defined in [Reference A](#) and [Reference B](#).
12. **Aviation safety.** Aviation safety is focused on the risk to people arising from aircraft operations and encompasses both the manner in which aircraft are flown, and the tasks, activities and management systems whose primary purpose is to enable safe flight.³

INSTRUCTION

13. The ACG ASMS operates IAW the DASM, with specific amplification in this SI and other related OIP.
14. All ACG commanders are accountable for complying with the DASR and requirements of the DASM, AC SI(OPS) 06-04 and any specific requirements of this instruction. CDR ACG's requirements for compliance with the DASR and implementation of DASM requirements are detailed below.

2 The Air Command ASMS is founded upon the DASM. The Air Command ASMS requires Accountable Managers to utilise the DASM and AC SI(OPS) 06-04 as the foundation of their organisation's complementary ASMS.

3 [Joint Directive 21/2021](#) on The Defence Aviation Safety Framework, para 7.

98. In accordance with the requirements contained in DASM Part 4, Chapter 2, Commanders at all levels must establish and promulgate a safety information communication strategy. OCs and COs must comply with the following ACG aviation safety communication strategy:

- a. **Commander's aviation safety policy and objectives.** Aviation Safety Policy statements are to be prominently displayed in the workplace and available on the Unit's DPN homepage.
- b. **Unit ASMS induction.** Policy regarding a just and fair culture and the open and honest reporting of errors, hazards and aviation safety events must be included in unit ASMS induction training.
- c. **Promulgation of Aviation Safety Officers.** Members responsible for aspects of the ASMS must be published on WG and/or Unit aviation safety websites.
- d. **Immediate Aviation Safety Notification.** For any aviation safety event classified, or potentially classified, as Class A or B, OCs or COs must immediately advise, via telephone, the DFSB Duty Officer and CDR ACG, or proxy.
- e. **Chain of command reporting for urgent aviation safety information.** Specific aviation-related events must be reported IAW applicable OIP, the DASM and the critical information requirements of the higher headquarters, including CAF and ACAUST. [Annex G](#) provides ACG guidance on the reporting requirements and timeframes for specific aviation-related events. The process for disseminating urgent aviation safety information must be exercised at least annually.¹²
- f. **DFSB and HQAC engagement.** All ASOs are encouraged to maintain regular communication with relevant DFSB and higher HQ aviation safety staff. In particular, relevant DFSB staff and the HQAC CASO and/or CMEASO must be advised of planned aviation safety activities such as safety stand-down days, AHRB and Wing ASC meetings.
- g. **Aviation Safety Information.** OCs and COs must ensure that the aviation safety information (e.g. audits, investigations, SPIs, planned actions) is readily available to personnel under their command. The information may be displayed on a Safety Notice Board, the WG or Unit website or other media. The notice board or website must be reviewed regularly to ensure information is current.
- h. **Dissemination of aviation safety information.** OCs and COs must ensure the implementation of a process that provides relevant aviation safety information to all personnel in a timely manner. Prior to dissemination of safety data and information, OCs, COs (or delegates) must consider the integrity of information, privacy of individuals/groups, and reputation of Defence.
- i. **Circulation of ASRs.** WASOs should assess the wider ramifications and educational value of their WG's ASRs and consider distribution to other ACG WGs or other FEGs, as appropriate.

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12 Reporting of urgent aviation safety information will generally be achieved whenever emergency response plans are exercised.

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ACG SI(OPS) 06-04

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REGISTER DATA	
Issue Authority	A9 Safety & Airworthiness / DS HQACG
Sponsor	A93 Group Aviation Safety / GASO HQACG
s47E(d)	Digitally signed by s47E(d) Date: 2023.06.20 12:47:02 +10'00' I certify the type, style, content, currency and accuracy of this SI on behalf of the Issue Authority.
Contact Officer/s	A93 Group Aviation Safety / GASO HQACG
OIP Manager	81WG SLO HQACG
s47E(d)	
Key Words	All Platforms (Lightning-II, Super Hornet, Growler, Hawk 127, Pilatus PC-21), Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS), Genuine Command Commitment, Generative Aviation Safety Culture, Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA), ACG Group Aviation Safety Officer (GASO), ACG Group Maintenance Aviation Safety Officer (GMASO), WG Aviation Safety Officer (WASO), Unit Aviation Safety Officer (UASO), Assistant Aviation Safety Officer (AASO), Unit Maintenance Aviation Safety Officer (MASO), Safety awards, Training and Education, Risk Management (RM), Aviation NTS Foundation, Hazard Reporting and Tracking, Aviation Safety Report (ASR), Sentinel, Investigation, Unit Emergency Plan, Audit, ASR CAMM2, Investigatory Quarantine, aircraft release, (For EFB)
Summary of Latest Amendment	
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ANNEX C – AVIATION SAFETY EVENT REPORTING AND TRACKING

GENERAL

1. The guidance in this annex is provided to supplement the policy, mandatory procedures and guidance in DASM Part 2, Chapter 1 to ensure standardisation of Sentinel aviation safety data entry across ACG in order to:
 - a. maintain high standards of aviation safety event investigation and reporting
 - b. prevent recurrence by improving or implementing risk controls that were identified as deficient or missing from aviation safety event investigations
 - c. provide a reliable and comparable data set to support aviation safety management and safety performance monitoring and measurement.
2. This annex is applicable to manned aircraft. ACG Units that employ Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) must include Aviation Safety Event Reporting and Tracking requirements specific to UAS in their Unit ASMS SI.
3. **Reportable occurrences.** Aircraft flight operations occurrences reported IAW DASM Part 2, Chapter 1, and this annex, meets the intent of DASR General Requirements (GR) Subpart B, GR.40 – *Occurrence Reporting*. Certain aviation safety events related to continuing airworthiness of ACG aircraft may require additional reporting to the Defence Aviation Safety Authority IAW with ACG SI (LOG) 02-02—ACG Reportable Occurrences, [Reference N](#).
4. **Sentinel access management.** Sentinel is the mandated ADF tool used to report all aviation safety events. Refer to DASM Part 2, Chapter 1 for information regarding system security classification. Sentinel profiles are associated with members' PMKeyS positions. All members in a designated aviation role in PMKeyS will have access to ASR within Sentinel. UASOs must coordinate with DFSB, by email to the ASR Service Desk, for the appointment of Local Administrators with privileges that enable them to reassign personnel to ASR functions (Investigator, Second Review, Approver). The functionality of reassigning roles provides administrators with the ability to assure the ASR process doesn't stagnate if a person nominated for an ASR function is absent or posted. Any number of unit members may be designated as Local Administrators but should be limited to personnel in aviation safety roles (e.g. WASO, WMASO, UASO, AASO, MASO, AMASO). WASOs must coordinate with each UASO to ensure the list of Local Administrators appointed within the WG is updated in the first quarter of each year.
5. **Sentinel Training.** Training in the use of Sentinel is provided during ASO-I, ASO-A and AIIIC courses. All personnel responsible for an ASR, or investigating an ASR, must be trained in either ASO-I or AIIIC or be under the supervision of a trained person.
6. For units with a contracted maintenance workforce the UASO is responsible for providing training to nominated personnel.
7. **ASR security classification.** Refer to DASM Part 2, Chapter 1 for information regarding system security classification. Where the handling of an ASR involves information classified higher than 'PROTECTED', the information must be stored on the Defence Secret Network (DSN) with DSN access instructions attached to the ASR. Classified lessons from an investigation may also be placed in the ADF Activities Analysis and Lessons Learnt Database (ADFAADS).
8. **Aviation Safety Report (ASR).** ASRs may be an Aviation Safety Event or Aviation Safety Issue as defined in the DASM, Part 2, Chapter 1.
9. The decision to submit an ASR is the responsibility of the CO. Submission of an ASR should be guided by the following principles:
 - a. If a Commander determines there is an aviation safety lesson to be drawn from a particular event, an ASR must be submitted and an investigation conducted.

- b. If there is no aviation safety lesson to be drawn from an event, Commanders should submit a DATA CAPTURE ONLY ASR to ensure safety data is captured in Sentinel to allow assessment of trends for analysis, hazard identification and presentation to the HTA.
10. **Dual Stream ASR.** An event that relates to aviation and which has caused or had the potential to impact personnel health or safety (including aircrew) is to be reported as both an Aviation and WHS event by activating a WHS stream for the ASR in Sentinel. The investigation team for a dual stream event is to include a USA because their role is to focus on human harm (WHS).
11. **ASR categorisation.** Aviation safety events are categorised as Flight Operations, Maintenance or Other Support Systems, as described in the DASM Part 2, Chapter 1. ASR Drafters are to select the most appropriate category based on the circumstances of the event.
12. **ASR event classification.** The classification of aviation safety events is to be completed as per DASM Part 2, Chapter 1. The DFSB guide, [Classification of Aviation Safety Events](#), should be used to ensure aviation safety events are appropriately classified. Where doubt exists as to the correct classification of an aviation safety event, advice should be sought from the WASO or WMASO. The classification of an ASR may be changed, based on early findings of an investigation. Where an Investigator considers that the classification should be changed, the Investigator must immediately contact the UASO and CO. If upgraded above Class C, immediate notification action must be initiated by the CO.
13. **Urgent aviation safety information.** For any aviation safety event classified, or potentially classified, as Class A or B, OCs or COs must advise, via telephone, the DFSB Duty Officer and CDR ACG (or proxy) and complete chain of command reporting.
14. **Chain of command reporting for urgent aviation safety information.** Chain of command reporting requires specific aviation-related events to be reported IAW applicable OIP, the DASM and the critical information requirements of the higher headquarters, including CAF, ACAUST (Cc A9 Aviation Safety), CDR ACG (Cc GASO) and Wing OCs (Cc WASOs). [Annex H](#) provides ACG guidance on the reporting requirements and timeframes for specific aviation-related events.
15. **Class A investigations.** IAW the DASM, all Defence Aviation Class A events are independently investigated by a DFSB Aviation Safety Investigation Team (ASIT) which reports directly to the Appointing Authority.
16. **Class B investigations.** Defence Aviation Class B events may be investigated by either DFSB or the FEG, as determined between ACAUST, CDR ACG and Director DFSB. Annex A to ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 provides instructions regarding the workflow for reporting and investigation of Class B aviation safety events. Responsibility for products depends on who is the Appointing Authority, per Table C-1.

Table C-1: Class B ASR product responsibility

Product (in order)	Appointing Authority		
	ACAUST	CDR ACG	WG OC
ASIT Appointment Minute ¹³ responsibility	HQAC A9 Aviation Safety	GASO	WASO
Aviation Safety Report	Signed by Investigator-in-ASIT and Officer-in-charge ASIT		
Option 1: Stand-alone aviation safety investigation report (ASIR) ¹⁴ + Executive Summary			
Option 2: ASR (Sentinel report + Executive Summary)	Executive summary signed by Investigator-in-charge ASIT and Officer-in-charge ASIT. Sentinel / SALUS report to be printed (PDF) and attached as an annex to the Executive summary. The Sentinel / SALUS report must		

Product (in order)	Appointing Authority		
	ACAUST	CDR ACG	WG OC
	not be released to the Aviation Review (sequence 2) phase until the investigation report has been accepted by the Appointing Authority		
ASR investigation Minute to Appointing Authority	OIC ASIT or Investigator (if no ASIT appointed)		
ASR Acceptance – Minute from Appointing Authority ¹⁵	HQAC A9 Aviation Safety	GASO ACAUST must be included as an Info addressee (through HQAC A9 Aviation Safety)	WASO ACAUST (through HQAC A9 Aviation Safety) and CDR ACG (through GASO) must be included as an Info addressee
Sentinel entries (for stand-alone reports)	If the investigator produces an ASIR all Actions and Recommendations must be entered into Sentinel, including details of causal factors to allow analysis. The ASIR report is to be referenced to the ASR. The WASO, WMASO or lead investigator is responsible for entering information into Sentinel.		
ASR Sign off	Unit Approving Authority		
Acceptance or rejection of recommendations – Minute to Appointing Authority	GASO (through CASO)	WASO (through GASO)	WASO
Implementation of recommendations and ASR closure – Minute to Appointing Authority	GASO (through CASO)	Minute not required. Implementation / rejection of recommendations to be recorded in Sentinel by WASO. HTA responsible for ASR closure through AHRB processes.	
Instructions to the HTA to Close the ASR – Minute from Appointing Authority	CASO	N/A – CDR ACG, as the AA, may direct closure as part of AHRB process	N/A – AA is the HTA in these circumstances. Closure as part of AHRB process

17. **Class C and D external investigations.** Some Class C and D investigations may be assessed as requiring investigation by an investigator external to the Unit. In this case it is the OC's responsibility to consult with DFSB before a recommendation is provided to CDR ACG (or proxy) regarding:

- a. delegation of appointing authority responsibilities to the OC, if appropriate
- b. who should conduct the investigation and whether an ASIT should be appointed, and if so, the suggested ASIT composition
- c. what level of external assistance/participation is anticipated (e.g. DFSB, DSTG or aircraft system SME)
- d. the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the investigation.

18. For all Class C and D external investigations the WASO is to draft the Aviation Safety Investigation Team (ASIT) appointment correspondence (Minute or email) for approval by the Appointing Authority.

19. **Class C and D internal investigations.** When a Class C or D ASR requires internal investigation Unit COs must assign a safety event investigator using the following guidance:

- a. **Aircrew.** For aircrew events, the investigator should be either an ASO(I) trained aircrew member (not involved in the event) or a SQN Supervisor (not involved in the event). Where this is not practicable and no supervisory factors are evident, the event Duty Supervisor may be assigned as the investigator. If supervisory factors become apparent or a conflict of interest develops, the investigation must be re-assigned to an independent ASO(I) trained investigator or AIIIC trained investigator (with ASO supervision).
 - b. **The CO as Event Aircrew.** Where the CO is involved in a safety event as the event aircrew, the OC should be the appointing authority for ASRs classified as Class C. The OC should also appoint a member to act as the investigator. In order to maintain appropriate oversight, the OC should complete the Approving Authority duties per the ASR Procedures section in this annex. Approving Authority duties may be delegated for events classified as Class D.
 - c. **Maintenance.** For maintenance events, an ASO(I) or AIIIC trained member of an appropriate rank and trade should be assigned as the investigator. Where this is not possible, another suitable member may be assigned as investigator under supervision.
 - d. **Independence.** Where a conflict of interest becomes apparent, the investigator must immediately inform the UASO or CO so that action can be taken to ensure the objectivity and independence of the investigation.
20. **Class A or B ASR and COMCARE reporting.** When the PIL assessment results in a classification of Class A or B, the CO must ensure that a Sentinel report is raised and Comcare is notified. Personnel should be cognisant of the [Air Force Guidance for Comcare Notification](#).
21. **Class A or B ASR and damaged aircraft reporting.** When the ADL assessment results in a classification of Class A or B the CO must ensure that an Aircraft Damage Report is raised in accordance with the [Air Force Continuing Airworthiness Manual](#), [ACG SI\(LOG\) 01-10—F/A-18F and EA-18G Technical Reporting](#), or F-35A Action Request (AR), as applicable.
22. **Aviation Safety Events Involving Civilian Aircraft.** Refer to DASM Pat 2, Chapter 1.
23. **Notification requirements for ASRs.** Aviation Reviewers must, following first review, disseminate ASRs in accordance with Aviation Review (Sequence 1) Guidance.

ASR PROCEDURES

24. Anyone in Defence aviation who is involved in, witnesses or is notified of an aviation safety event or issue may initiate an ASR. ASRs are to be processed according to the roles identified in the following paragraphs.
25. **Raising ASRs on aircraft under contractor control.** At times, it may not be entirely clear as to who retains care, custody or control of deeper maintenance aircraft. The responsibility for ASR reporting is:
- a. **Contractor only.** If the event occurs when the aircraft is under contractor control, the contractor is responsible for all aspects of the Sentinel report, which must be raised using the contractor's access to Sentinel.
 - b. **Flying operations.** If the event occurs during a post-contractor maintenance test flight, or intended post-contractor maintenance test flight, or at any other time when the aircraft is under the control of a Commonwealth test pilot, the aircraft captain's unit is responsible for raising and coordinating the completion of the ASR in Sentinel. Where required, the contractor is responsible for the conduct of the ASR technical investigation. After the contractor has completed the technical investigation, the contractor will forward the investigation report in electronic form to the operating unit MASO. The MASO is responsible for entering the information into the applicable Sentinel fields. After the MASO has completed entering the technical investigation data, the MASO will notify the unit SENG0 for review and acceptance.

ASR roles

30. **Drafter.** The Drafter may be any ACG member in a designated aviation role. The Drafter enters details of the ASR as a 'New Event' via Sentinel's *Defence KIOSK*. ACG's *ASR Drafter Guidance* provides step-by-step instructions, refer [Enclosure 1](#) for the guidance document.
31. Drafters must submit the ASR in Sentinel within 24 hours of the aviation safety event.
32. If access to the DPN or Sentinel is unavailable, manual reporting can be achieved using Web Form [AE774—Aviation Safety Report \(Offline\)](#). The information must be entered electronically when access to the DPN or Sentinel becomes available. For away base operations with no DPN connectivity, the completed Form AE774 must be sent to the SQN MCS or orderly room for entry into Sentinel. COs must ensure that a printed or electronic copy of Form AE774 is included in the FAK for each deployment.
33. **Aviation Reviewer (first review).** The first review should be conducted by the AASO, AMASO, MASO or UASO. ACG's *Aviation Review (Sequence 1) Guidance* provides step-by-step instructions, refer [Enclosure 1](#) for the guidance document.
34. The value of an ASR in preventing a recurrence is closely related to its timeliness. Only in exceptional circumstances should an ASR not be released within the 7 days SPI set in the DASM.
35. **Aviation Investigator.** The Aviation Investigator must be appointed by the Aviation Reviewer. See Investigation section for requirements when investigating aviation safety events. ACG's *ASR Investigator Guidance* provides step-by-step instructions, refer [Enclosure 1](#) for the guidance document.
36. While the most important aspect of an ASR investigation is the thoroughness of the investigation, timeliness cannot be ignored. If an investigation is likely to push sign-off beyond 30 days, the CO must consider giving the investigation greater priority or increasing the resources allocated to the investigation. If the investigation will not be completed to allow ASR sign-off within 30 days of being raised, the Investigator must advise the CO. The CO must then monitor the progress of the investigation.
37. **Aviation Reviewer (second review).** The second review must be conducted by the UASO, Duty Supervisor or SENG. ACG's *Aviation Reviewer (Sequence 2) Guidance* provides step-by-step instructions, refer [Enclosure 1](#) for the guidance document.
38. **Approving Authority.** The CO is the approving authority for ASRs. ACG's *ASR Approving Authority (CO) Guidance* provides step-by-step instructions, refer [Enclosure 1](#) for the guidance document. Some unit actions may require implementation prior to the ASR Approving Authority signing off the ASR. In these circumstances, the unit Actions may be initially assign outside of Sentinel.
39. DASM policy (P2C1) allows the CO to delegate the sign off of an ASR to responsible personnel with appropriate training. COs must record in the Unit ASMS the policy for delegation to sign off an ASR in Sentinel. In most cases, delegation would be the XO for aircrew initiated ASRs and the SENG for maintenance initiated ASRs. If the CO, XO and SENG are all absent, the UASO, AASO or MASO may release an ASR if they have been authorised to do so and the ASR requires releasing prior to the return of the CO, XO or SENG. COs may not delegate sign off for ASRs that include an investigation of a Class C ASR.
40. **Personnel assigned ASR Action or Recommendations.** ACG's *ASR Actions and Recommendations Guidance* provides step-by-step instructions, refer [Enclosure 1](#) for the guidance document.
41. **HTA.** At the AHRB, the HTA decides whether ASRs may be closed within Sentinel. DFSB's [HTA Close](#) guide provides step-by-step instructions.

ANNEX D – ACG AVIATION SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS / TARGETS

1. The Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) and Safety Performance Targets (SPT) for ACG are set to meet HQAC and FEG requirements.
2. **HQAC.** The only aviation safety-related SPI / SPT set by HQAC is:
 - a. **Unit ASR – Initial reporting timeframe.** AC SI(OPS) 06-04 requires 100% of ASRs to be progressed to the completion of First Review within seven calendar days of occurrence.
3. **FEG.** ACG's aviation safety-related SPI / SPT are set for each aviation safety objective (Table D-1) and against ASR completion (Table D-2).

Table D-1: SPI for ACG safety objectives

Safety objective	Zero Class A events
SPI O1	Number of Class A ASRs
SPT O1	0%
Safety objective	Promulgation of up-to-date aviation safety policy and orders, instructions, procedures (OIP) for ACG aviation
SPI O2	Number of ACG SI(OPS) 6-series within 3 year review currency
SPT O2	100%
Safety objective	Full resourcing of the aviation safety organisation
SPI O3	Number of ASO positions required by ACG SI(OPS) 06-04
SPT O3	No vacancy or position filled by unqualified personnel
SPI O4	Number of ASR investigators (with AIIC proficiency) by rank and group across OPS and Maintenance
SPT O4	At least one AIIC trained investigator per trade group at each SQN
Safety objective	A 'just and fair' reporting culture that facilitates learning from errors and in which people are accountable for their actions
SPI O5	Number of ASRs identifying violation as a Contributing Factor
SPT O5	0%
Safety objective	The full integration of risk management into all ACG flying and maintenance operations
SPI O6	Number of ASRs identifying risk management as a contributing factor (CF)
SPT O6	0%
Safety objective	Effective oversight of aviation safety within ACG
SPI O7	Number of Op Aw and CA audits conducted vs planned
SPT O7	100% of planned audits completed
Safety objective	Personnel are trained in aviation safety relevant to their role
SPI O8	Number of personnel trained IAW DASM Part 4 Chapter 1 Annex 1A
SPT O8	100%
Safety objective	People are recognised for positive safety behaviour
SPI O9	Number of people informally recognised for positive safety behaviours
SPT O9	No target set
SPI O10	Number of formal aviation safety awards
SPT O10	No target set

Table D-2: SPI for ACG ASR completion

ASR factor	ASR time to report
SPI R1	Time to report in Sentinel after the event
SPT R1	0% greater than 3 days ^{16,17}
ASR factor	Unit Class C and D ASR – Sign-off timeframe
SPI R2	Sign off time for Class C and D ASRs with a bypassed investigation
SPT R2	100% signed off within 30 days of occurrence
SPI R3	Sign off time for Class C and D ASRs with an investigation
SPT R3	0% signed off greater than 30 days of occurrence without Approving Authority approval
ASR factor	Command-led Class B ASR – Sign-off timeframe
SPI R4	Class B ASRs that have a command-led investigation should be signed off within 120 days, but not to the detriment of the investigation's quality or completeness.
SPT R4	0% signed off greater than 120 days of occurrence
ASR factor	ASR over-due actions
SPI R5	A realistic timeframe for completion of each Unit Action is required to be entered into Sentinel. ASR Actions should not exceed 30 days past the initial period set in the ASR
SPT R5	0% over-due actions exceeding 30 days past the initial period set in the ASR
ASR factor	ASR over-due recommendations
SPI R6	A realistic timeframe for completion of each ASR Recommendation is required to be entered into Sentinel. ASR Recommendations should not exceed 30 days past the initial period set in the ASR
SPT R6	0% over-due recommendations exceeding 30 days past the initial period set in the ASR

-
- 16 DASR General Regulation (GR) GR.40 – Occurrence Reporting states that the reporting period for all occurrences that have not required immediate notification is 72 hours. Within the overall limit of 72 hours for the submission of a report, the degree of urgency should be determined by the level of hazard judged to have resulted from the occurrence.
- 17 Some events will unavoidably exceed the three day time to report metric, an example being F-35A Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) errors may not be discovered >3 days after incident effect. In these circumstances the 'Occurred date' may be modified to the date the ASR was recognised for inclusion in reporting statistics.

ANNEX H – ACG AVIATION SAFETY IMMEDIATE REPORTING GUIDE

References:

- A. [Defence Instruction Administrative Policy, Annex C – AG4 – Incident reporting and management](#)
- B. [Incident Reporting and Management Policy \(IRMPOL\)](#)
- C. [AFSI ADMIN 11-01—Incident Management in Air Force](#)
- D. [Defence Aviation Safety Manual](#)
- E. [AC SI\(OPS\) 06-12—ACAUST Critical Information Requirements](#)
- F. [ACG SI\(ADMIN\) 09-01—Defence Incident Records and Reporting](#)

Purpose

1. The purpose of this guide is to describe ACG's reporting requirements for specific aviation-related events.

Background

2. Specific aviation-related events must be reported IAW applicable policy, manuals, instructions, and the critical information requirements of Commanders. The reporting mechanisms are telephone, email, the Immediate Safety Reporting (ISR) process and the Defence Incident Record (DIR).
3. The matrices below in Table G-1 to Table G-3 specifies the reporting requirements and timeframe for specific aviation-related events. All timeframes are from the time of becoming aware of the event.
4. Although this guide provides specific aviation-related events, readers must apply judgement in deciding when to report via a DIR since the guidance for when a DIR is required is generic. The Director of Strategic Issues Management-Air Force (DSIM-AF) DPN website on the Incident Reporting Process advises that a DIR is required for *“Any incident that is not routine and may have an impact on Defence capability, operations, personnel, security, safety, reputation, property, premises, environment, legal and ethical obligations, obligations to minors, and foreign relations”*.
5. Some aviation incidents may require careful management of critical and sensitive information in an expeditious and contained manner. For example, the details of operational and technical airworthiness matters may not be suitable for wide distribution.

Table G-1: ACG immediately reportable aviation event matrix

Aviation event outcome	Reports Required and timeframe		
	DFSB Source: Ref D	DSIM Source: Ref C	Chain of Command (CoC) Source: Ref E and F
Aircraft accident or loss (ref C) Class A or B aviation safety ²³ event (ref F) - Class A = PIL²⁴ of Fatal; ADL²⁵ of Destroyed - Class B = PIL of Serious; ADL of Substantial; PRL²⁶ of High or Very High	Phone report to DFSB DO within 1 hr	Phone report to, thru the CoC, to DSIM-AF within 1 hr followed by a DIR as soon as practicable, but within 24 hours	Phone report, thru the CoC, to ACAUST within 1 hr. Follow-up email to ACAUST and DACAUST. DFSB ISR through CoC to ACAUST within 24 hours
Serious flying incident, diversion or safety issue (ref C)		Phone report, thru the CoC, to DSIM-AF within 1 hr followed by a DIR as soon as practicable, but within 24 hours	
Significant (as determined by FEG CDR/COS FEG) aviation event / issue involving Air Command aircraft - flying or maintenance related (ref F)			Phone and email, thru CoC, to ACAUST and DACAUST. As soon as practicable in normal working hours, no later than the next working day
s47E(d)			

23 IAW Joint Directive 21/2021 – *The Defence Aviation Safety Framework*, aviation safety is the state in which risks to personnel arising from aircraft operations are eliminated or minimised so far as reasonable practicable through a continuous process of hazard identification and safety risk management. In the Defence context, aviation safety encompasses both the:

- manner in which aircraft are flown, and
- tasks, activities and management systems whose primary purpose is to enable safe flight.

24 Personnel Injury Level (PIL) – refer Defence Aviation Safety Manual for information.

25 Aircraft Damage Level (ADL) – refer Defence Aviation Safety Manual for information.

26 Perceived Risk Level (PRL) – refer Defence Aviation Safety Manual for information.

Aviation event outcome	Reports Required and timeframe		
	DFSB Source: Ref D	DSIM Source: Ref C	Chain of Command (CoC) Source: Ref E and F
Activation of Base Emergency Response resources (excluding Local Standby activation) (ref C)		Phone report, thru the CoC, to DSIM-AF within 1 hr followed by a DIR as soon as practicable, but within 24 hours	
Significant damage to aircraft, equipment or ground facilities impacting flying operations (ref C)		Phone report, thru the CoC, to DSIM-AF within 1 hr followed by a DIR as soon as practicable, but within 24 hours	
Significant (as determined by FEG CDR/COS FEG) damage to Air Command aircraft, equipment or facilities (ref F)			Phone and email, thru CoC, to ACAUST and DCAUST. As soon as practicable in normal working hours, no later than the next working day
Suspension of flying operations of a particular aircraft fleet if decided by the FEG CDR or a recommendation from external agencies (e.g. CASA, or foreign users of similar types) to suspend flying operations of an aircraft fleet (ref F)			Phone report, thru the CoC, to ACAUST within 1 hr. Follow-up email to ACAUST and DCAUST.
Significant noise complaints or inquiries from the public about Air Command operations (ref F)			Phone and email, thru CoC, to ACAUST and DCAUST. As soon as practicable in normal working hours, no later than the next working day
ACG aircraft diversion resulting in an inability to complete tasking or requiring rescue (ref G)			Phone through CoC, to CDRACG, as soon as practicable
Technical inspection requirements that may impact on operations or exercises (ref G)			Phone through CoC, to CDRACG, as soon as practicable

Table G-2: ISR to DFSB Duty Officer and Command Chain

ISR to DFSB Duty Officer and Command Chain												
Step	Description	Source										
1.	Telephone report to DFSB s47E(d) Aviation safety events classified Class A or Class B, or Class C or D that are upgraded to Class A or B, are to be reported immediately to the DFSB Duty Officer. Where there is any doubt as to whether an event may be classified as Class A or Class B, then it should be reported to the DFSB Duty Officer – the classification may be later downgraded if appropriate. <table><tr><th>Event Classification</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>Class A</td><td>PIL of Fatal ADL of Destroyed</td></tr><tr><td>Class B</td><td>PIL of Serious ADL of Substantial PRL of High or Very High</td></tr><tr><td>Class C</td><td>PIL of Minor ADL of Moderate PRL of Medium</td></tr><tr><td>Class D</td><td>PIL of No Injury ADL of No Damage/Minor Damage PRL of Low or Very Low</td></tr></table>	Event Classification	Description	Class A	PIL of Fatal ADL of Destroyed	Class B	PIL of Serious ADL of Substantial PRL of High or Very High	Class C	PIL of Minor ADL of Moderate PRL of Medium	Class D	PIL of No Injury ADL of No Damage/Minor Damage PRL of Low or Very Low	DASM P2 C1 para 1.24 and AC SI(OPS) 06-04 DASM P2 C1 Table 1-1
Event Classification	Description											
Class A	PIL of Fatal ADL of Destroyed											
Class B	PIL of Serious ADL of Substantial PRL of High or Very High											
Class C	PIL of Minor ADL of Moderate PRL of Medium											
Class D	PIL of No Injury ADL of No Damage/Minor Damage PRL of Low or Very Low											
	The DFSB DO is to be provided the following information as a minimum: • Your contact telephone numbers • Whether the FCR/CVR has been isolated • Occurrence type – Aviation and/or WHS (provide Sentinel ref #, if known) • ASR classification, if known • The unit(s) involved • Aircraft / Equipment involved (Types/Tail Numbers/Callsigns/Explosive ordnance) • Date and time of the safety event • The location of the safety event • Description of the safety event, including weather and flight details • Persons on board (if known) – Crew, PAX, VIP, other • Consequences – Persons injured, missing or deceased • Consequences – Aircraft / Equipment damage • Your rank, name, organisation, telephone and email • Any actions taken or intended	DFSB website										

ISR to DFSB Duty Officer and Command Chain		
Step	Description	Source
	Refer to the DFSB Notification Report on the DFSB website for all reporting items. Personnel providing a telephone report to DFSB should confirm with the DFSB DO that they intend to raise a DFSB Notification Report. NOTE Initial verbal or written ISR reporting does not require all suggested ISR details – a succinct summary of events is required.	AC SI(OPS) 06-04
2	Telephone report through the Chain of Command (CoC) <u>Within one hour</u> of being notified of the event the CO, or delegate, must telephone CDR ACG (via the CoC) to assure reporting requirements are met in accordance with Table 1 and relevant Manuals and Instructions. In CDR ACG's absence, the ACG COS is to be notified. The GASO should also be notified.	ACG SI(OPS) 06-04
3	Creating the Immediate Safety Report The DFSB Duty Officer is responsible for creating a written DFSB Notification Report to satisfy DFSB internal requirements. DFSB processes require that the DO e-mail the DFSB Notification Report to the call originator (generally within 1 hour of receiving the telephone report). On receipt of the e-mailed ISR by the call originator, the DFSB e-mail must be forwarded to their SQN executives, WASO and GASO, if not included as an email recipient by DFSB.	AC SI(OPS) 06-04
4	Distribution of the ISR On receipt of the written ISR from DFSB, the originating unit must pass the ISR through the CoC (including relevant ASOs as a Cc) as a follow up to telephone notifications. The originating unit may then use the ISR to pass, via the CoC, updated details to the Air Commander and Air Command staff as information comes available. There is no limit to the number of updates a unit may submit. However, Commanders are to ensure updates provide relevant, useful and new information in a concise and clear manner. Note: A DIR is required in parallel with an ISR. All updates must be consistent between the two reporting mechanisms.	AC SI(OPS) 06-04
5	Other reporting where PIL = Class A or B ASR When the PIL assessment results in a classification of Class A or B, the CO must ensure that a Sentinel report is raised and COMCARE is notified. Personnel should be cognisant of the Air Force Guidance for COMCARE Notification.	ACG SI(OPS) 06-04
6	Other reporting where ADL = Class A or B ASR When the ADL assessment results in a classification of Class A or B, the CO must ensure that an Aircraft Damage Report is raised in accordance with the	ACG SI(OPS)

ISR to DFSB Duty Officer and Command Chain		
Step	Description	Source
	Air Force Continuing Airworthiness Manual (AFCAMAN), Book III, Ch 6, or F-35A Action Request (AR), as applicable.	06-04
7	Other reporting considerations The originating unit of the report is responsible for actioning all other mandatory notification requirements such as ATSB, COMCARE and ARPANSA.	DASM P2 C1

Table G-3: DIR to DSIM-AF

DIR to DSIM-AF ²⁷		
Step	Description	Source
1	Telephone report to DSIM Initial notification is to be made via telephone report, through the CoC, to DSIM-AF on s47E(d) or s22 The telephone report is required within one hour of the incident occurring. Reference: DSIM incident reporting process .	AFSI ADMIN 11-01
2	Creating the DIR and administration Follow-on reporting via a Defence Incident Record (Webform AE530) is to occur in accordance with: - Defence Instruction Administrative Policy, Annex C – AG4 – Incident reporting and management - Incident Reporting and Management Manual - AFSI ADMIN 11-0 — Incident Management in Air Force. ACG specific DIR reporting requirements are detailed in ACG SI(ADMIN) 09-01 . Commanders are responsible for ensuring compliance with this instruction. Annex A to ACG SI(ADMIN) 09-01 provides an ‘Incident Notification Process Flowchart’.	AFSI ADMIN 11-01 ACG SI(ADMIN) 09-01

²⁷ The DIR process informs the Air Force Critical Incident Management Committee in order to coordinate and control the Air Force response to critical incidents.

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ACG REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES

References:

- A. [DASR – M.A. 202\(c\)](#)
- B. [DASR – 145.A.60](#)
- C. [DASR – AMC GR.40 – Occurrence Reporting \(AUS\)](#)
- D. [Defence Continuing Airworthiness Manual \(DCAMAN\)](#)
- E. [Defence Aviation Safety Manual \(DASM\)](#)
- F. [ACG SI\(OPS\) 06-04 – ACG Aviation Safety Management](#)

STANDING INSTRUCTION FEEDBACK

1. Users of this Standing Instruction (SI) are advised to provide feedback on the safety, currency, effectiveness and user satisfaction of content using: [ACG SI\(LOG\) 02-02 – Feedback Email](#)

INTRODUCTION

2. Occurrence Reporting is an essential element of the Continuing Airworthiness (CAw) management function. The key to successful Occurrence Reporting is the timely transmission of accurate information to affected agencies to ensure that they are informed of, and involved in the management of issues that affect the airworthiness of ACG operated aircraft.

AIM

3. This SI details the ACG process for Reportable Occurrences to meet the requirements of References A to D.

AUTHORITY

4. The Issue Authority (IA) for this SI is A02 Director Logistics Capability ACG as delegate for A00 CDR ACG. The Sponsor for this SI is A91 Continuing Airworthiness and Quality Management HQACG.

SCOPE

5. The SI is applicable to all ACG CAMO, CAM Service Providers, and Part 145 Maintenance Organisation (MO) personnel supporting ACG platforms.

INSTRUCTION

Reportable Occurrences

6. The appropriate notification of Reportable Occurrences are a regulatory requirement under DASR. A Reportable Occurrence is defined as: “an incident, malfunction, defect, technical defect or exceedance of limitations that endangers or could endanger the safe operation of aircraft and must be reported to the Authority,” as described at Reference [B](#) and [C](#). Reference [D](#) further specifies Reportable Occurrences relevant to particular organisations and affected aircraft systems. The ACG CAMO utilises corporate tools and reporting systems as the basis for all occurrence reporting.
7. The primary ACG occurrence reporting mechanism for Part 145 and Part M identified occurrences is via Aviation Safety Reports (ASRs) in Sentinel in accordance with Reference [E](#). For aviation safety events requiring an Occurrence Report, the ASR title is to be prefixed with the term ‘OR’ in the title. Where a pre-existing ASR is later determined as requiring an Occurrence Report, the term ‘OR’ is to be added to the title.
8. Where an Occurrence Report is not captured via an ASR, the [DASR Form 44 – Occurrence Report](#) is to be utilised. The DASR Form 44 – Occurrence Report can also be utilised when the event details cannot be adequately captured in an ASR.
9. Contracted service providers are to generate occurrence reports IAW this SI and their respective CAME Platform Handbook and MOE.

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10. All Reportable Occurrence records are to be retained by the originating unit within Objective, or an alternate approved record management system such as Sentinel.

Occurrence Report Register

11. An Occurrence Report register is to be maintained for each platform to provide a summary of all occurrence reports raised. The occurrence report details are to be populated for all reportable occurrences regardless of the reporting mechanism utilised, for example, via an ASR or Form 44. The Occurrence Report register for each platform can be found in objective at the following locations:

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12. The CAMO or CAM Service Provider shall determine actions required to control the risk and provide notification to the relevant stakeholders of any affected organisation.

Reporting time and distribution

13. References [E](#) and [F](#) requires the immediate notification of Class A and Class B aviation safety events. IAW Reference [A](#), Occurrence Reports shall be submitted to [DASA Occurrence Reporting](#) within 72 hours of the organisation identifying the reportable condition. All Form 44s raised should be sent to the relevant ACG Part 145 RM, CAM, MTCH/DoSA, ACG QM, DoCAM, A91/GASO, SQN CO, and Part 21 organisation (as applicable). Recipient organisations above may establish a relevant Sentinel Personal Interest Profile in order to monitor all associated platform ASRs for reportable occurrences.

Management of Reportable Occurrences

14. To ensure that any adverse trends in Unsafe Conditions and associated Reportable Occurrences are identified and actively managed, each DoCAM is responsible for ensuring that management reviews are conducted. These may be conducted IAW the relevant Platform Steward instruction. Notwithstanding this, Reportable Occurrences should be immediately triaged and managed to provide:

- a. correct management of the event to ensure appropriate troubleshooting and consideration of fleet wide events
- b. rapid identification of emerging deficiencies with technical equipment, systems or maintenance programs
- c. inputs to the reliability program which may then identify actionable trends.

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REGISTER DATA	
Issue Authority	A02 Director Logistics Capability
Sponsor	A91 Continuing Airworthiness and Quality Management
s47E(d)	Digitally signed by s47E(d) Date: 2026.04.22 09:26:29 +10'00' I certify the type, style, content, currency and accuracy of this SI on behalf of the Issue Authority.
Contact Officer	A911 SO2 ENG HQACG s47E(d)
Instruction Manager	QAO HQACG s47E(d)
s47E(d)	
Key Words	ACG, All platforms, Air, Force, Continuing, Airworthiness, Delegate, Defence, Safety, Authority, Occurrence, Reporting, Report, Reportable, Manual, Manager, Notification, AFCAMAN, ASR, CAMO, DASR, DASA, DASM, DLC, DoCAM, RM, SENGO, SPO, For AME
Summary of Latest Amendment	
Reference updates only. DASM, DCAMAN and DASR hyperlinks corrected	

78WG AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

References:

- A. [Defence Aviation Safety Manual \(DASM\)](#)
- B. [AC SI\(OPS\) 01-16 – Risk Management](#)
- C. [AC SI\(OPS\) 06-04 – Air Command Aviation Safety Management](#)
- D. [AC SI\(OPS\) 06-12 – ACAUST Critical Information Requirements](#)
- E. [AC SI\(OPS\) 06-14 – Management of Aviation Physiological Episodes and Events](#)
- F. [ACG SI\(OPS\) 06-04 – Aviation Safety Management](#)
- G. [ACG SI\(OPS\) 06-05 – Aviation Safety Risk Management](#)

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STANDING INSTRUCTION FEEDBACK

1. Users of this Standing Instruction (SI) are advised to provide feedback on the safety, currency, effectiveness and user satisfaction of this SI using [78WG SI\(OPS\) 06-04 – Feedback Email](#).

INTRODUCTION

2. Safety is an integral part of 78WG's organisational culture. 78WG promotes a 'just and fair culture' where personnel are responsible for their actions, but the context within which those actions were made is always taken into consideration.
3. This SI is governed by the DASM (reference [A](#)) and is complementary to AC SIs (references [B](#), [C](#) and [D](#)) and ACG SIs (references [F](#) and [G](#)).

AIM

4. The aim of this instruction is to detail how the twelve elements of the Defence ASMS are incorporated into the ASMS of 78WG, 4SQN, 76SQN and 79SQN.

AUTHORITY

5. The Issue Authority for this SI is Officer Commanding OC 78WG. The Sponsor for this SI is Executive Officer XO 78WG.

SCOPE

6. The 78WG ASMS encompasses all personnel and activities that may detect, contain or eliminate hazards in 78WG aviation operations. All 78WG units and personnel, regardless of employment or specialisation, may be involved with aviation to varying degrees and therefore have an integral role in the ASMS.

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PART 2 – SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

CH1 – HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

22. In February 2018 a policy update governing aviation safety event classification and reporting was introduced – Aviation Safety Reporting and Tracking (ASR&T).
23. **Classification.** Personnel Injury Level (PIL), Aircraft Damage Level (ADL) and Perceived Risk Level (PRL) as described in the policy update are to be used to classify an aviation safety event. If there is any uncertainty in categorising or classifying an ASR, clarification should be sought from either WASO 78WG or DFSB.
24. **Immediate Safety Reporting.** On occurrence of a Class A or B aviation safety event, or following classification upgrade of an event initially classified Class C or D, Immediate Safety Reporting is required IAW the DASM Part 2 Chapter 1 (reference [A](#)).
25. **Aviation Safety Reporting in Sentinel.** The Defence Corporate Safety Reporting Tool, Sentinel, is the primary means of reporting and recording aviation safety events of all classifications. All efforts are to be made to de-classify Aviation Safety Reports (ASR), with the intention of ensuring the widest dissemination possible.
26. **Reporting Timeframes.** SQN COs must ensure that the following ASR reporting timeframes are met IAW the DASM Part 2 Chapter 1 (reference [A](#)):
- a. **ASR.** For all occurrences, an ASR **must** be submitted within seven calendar days of the occurrence.
27. If an ASR is unable to be released IAW the above reporting timeframes the WASO 78WG must be informed.
28. DASM Part 2 Chapter 1 (reference [A](#)) provides additional guidance for ASRs including: the Air Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), Comcare, the Work Health and Safety (WHS) Branch, or the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA).
29. **Reporting Procedure.** Once a report is raised in Sentinel, the hazard narrative is to be distributed via the 'WLM 78WG ASRs' email list as soon as is reasonably practicable.
30. SQN UASOs are responsible for promulgating a SQN ASR flowchart to provide guidance on the ASR reporting process and the management of ASRs within their SQN.
31. **Preservation of Flight Data Recordings.** Following any flight for which an ASR is to be raised, the aircraft captain is responsible for ensuring that any involved MDLRS cartridges (Hawk) or Pilot Memory Modules (PC-21) are quarantined until the relevant files are saved to a secure location so that they remain available for any future investigation. For Hawk ASRs, pilots must advise the duty OPSO before inserting the MDLRS cartridge/s into the uploading dock. The OPSO will select the "ASR" option for the appropriate sortie/s which will ensure the files are copied to the permanent ASR folder on the Networked Operational Support System (NOSS).
32. **Mandatory Reporting for Oxygen-Related Events.** Due to ongoing concern with Physiological Episodes (PEs) and their inherent relationship with aircraft oxygen delivery systems, any malfunction or suspected malfunction of the aircraft oxygen system, regardless of the phase of flight in which it occurs, is to be raised as an ASR. Note: AC SI(OPS) 06-14 (reference [E](#)) details responsibilities for management of Physiological Episodes, including initial response and investigation requirements.
33. **General Guidance for ASR Submission.** The DASM provides the following direction:
- "Aviation safety event reporting is mandatory for any event where an aviation system (including the human element) fails to perform in the expected manner and adversely affects, or could have adversely affected *at the time*, the safety *or airworthiness* of an aviation system or third party."


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34. As a general rule, if an airborne malfunction is of such a nature that the sortie would have been aborted on safety grounds had the malfunction occurred prior to take-off, then an ASR should be submitted.

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CH3 – INVESTIGATION

43. For those occurrences classified as Class B, ACAUST will normally be the Appointing Authority. For Class B events, the FEGCDR (or delegate) is to consult with DFSB prior to providing a recommendation to ACAUST. This Class B investigation may be further delegated to OC 78WG to form an Aviation Safety Investigation Team (ASIT) consisting of 78WG staff and external agency support.

44. ASR appointing and investigation authorities are detailed in the DASM, Part 2 Chapter 3 (reference [A](#)).

45. If a 78WG ASR is to be investigated then the following must occur. SQN COs should assign either an ASO trained aircrew (not involved in the incident) or a SQN Supervisor (not duty) as the Investigating Officer (IO). Where this is not practicable and no supervisory factors are evident, the Duty Supervisor may be assigned as the IO. If supervisory factors become apparent and a conflict of interest develops, the IO is to inform the CO and hand control of the investigation to an independent IO.

46. 78WG ASRs must be investigated IAW the guidance provided in the DASM Part 2 Chapter 3 (reference [A](#)).

47. IAW the DASM (reference [A](#)), all Unit Recommendations must be assigned to WASO 78WG as the Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA) representative.

CH4 – MEDICAL ASPECTS TO AVIATION SAFETY INVESTIGATION

48. The DASM (reference [A](#)) has an extensive chapter on policy, procedures and guidance to Medical Officers (MOs) providing support to aviation safety event and issue investigations.

49. **Aviation Physiological Episodes.** Following a PE event, 78WG requires a coordinated and effective response and investigation to ensure the ongoing safety of aircrew and maintainers, preservation of evidence, data capture and the accurate identification and remediation of the root cause(s).

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AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REVIEW

74. The 78WG ASMS is regularly reviewed through: WASC meetings, UASC meetings, AHRBs, Audits and Surveys.

75. **ASR visibility.** To ensure a high professional standard is maintained it is important that we not only learn from our own mistakes but from the mistakes of others. Supervisors at all levels are encouraged to ensure that relevant ASRs from the unit and the wing are briefed to their personnel on a regular basis.

REGISTER DATA	
Issue Authority	OC 78WG
Sponsor	XO 78WG
s47E(d) Digitally signed by s47E(d) Date: 2026.05.01 12:29:32 +10'00' I certify the type, style, content, currency and accuracy of this SI on behalf of the Issue Authority.	
Contact Officer/s	STANDO HQ78WG s47E(d)
OIP Manager	PUBSO HQ78WG s47E(d)
s47E(d)	
Key Words	Risk, Flying, Safety
Summary of Latest Amendment	
s22 Amendments to references and hyperlinks throughout.	

82WG AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

References:

- A. [Joint Directive 21/2021—The Defence Aviation Safety Framework](#)
- B. [AC SI\(OPS\) 06-04—Air Command Aviation Safety Management](#)
- C. [Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual \(DASPMAN\)](#)
- D. [ACG SI\(OPS\) 06-04—ACG Aviation Safety Management](#)
- E. s47E(d)
- F. [ACG SI\(OPS\) 06-05—Aviation Safety Risk Management](#)
- G. s47E(d)
- H.
- I. s22
- J.
- K.

STANDING INSTRUCTION FEEDBACK

1. Users of this Standing Instruction (SI) are advised to provide feedback on the safety, currency, effectiveness and user satisfaction of this SI using [82WG SI\(OPS\) 06-04 – Feedback Email](#).

INTRODUCTION

2. **Defence Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS).** Joint Directive 21/2021 (Reference [A](#)), AC SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [B](#)) and the Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual (DASPMAN) (Reference [C](#)) provide policy and guidance on the application of aviation safety management within Defence. ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) provides the direction and guidance for all ACG personnel in the management of aviation safety and must be read in conjunction with this order.

AIM

3. This Instruction is to supplement ACG's direction and guidance in the management of aviation safety within 82WG.

AUTHORITY

4. This Instruction is issued under the authority of OC 82WG.

ASMS ELEMENTS

5. 82WG is required to demonstrate and provide evidence of compliance against each of the ASMS elements detailed in the DASPMAN (Reference [C](#)).

COMPONENT 1 – SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

Management commitment

6. In addition to the mechanisms listed in ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)), 82WG demonstrates a genuine management commitment to the ASMS through the following means:
 - a. OC 82WG, as Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA), is appointed as Chairperson of the Wing Aviation Safety Committee (WASC) and Aviation Hazard Review Board (AHRB).
 - b. OC 82WG awareness of all safety events through weekly OC's meetings and email distribution of hazard narratives as soon as reasonably practical (usually within 72 hours) of the incident.
 - c. OC 82WG review of all Hazard Reports released by 82WG units, achieved through regular AHRBs for each 82WG platform.
 - d. OC 82WG oversight of all surveys and audits conducted within 82WG.

Generative aviation safety culture

7. Creation of a generative safety culture is achieved through the mechanisms detailed in ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)).

Safety accountability and responsibilities

8. OC and CO aviation safety accountabilities and responsibilities are specified in the DASPMAN Volume 3 Chapter 14 (Reference [C](#)).

Appointment of key safety personnel

9. ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) details the aviation safety management structure and associated roles and responsibilities for 82WG. Appointments and deputies for each secondary duty role are to be promulgated via Routine Instruction and are detailed on the [82WG Safety Website](#) and unit Aviation Safety Websites.

10. **Duty statements.** The duties of ACG ASOs, including the WASO, WMASO, and subordinate unit ASOs, are listed in Annex B to ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)).

11. **Succession planning.** The WASO 82WG is responsible for succession planning of all aviation safety appointments within 82WG in consultation with XO 82WG and unit COs IAW requirements within ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)).

Coordination of emergency response planning

12. ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) details ACG's emergency response policy. The 82WG Accident and Incident Response plan is contained within 82WG SI(OPS) 06-01-01 (Reference [E](#)).

13. 82WG units must exercise the 82WG Accident and Incident Response Plan at the frequency specified in DASPMAN Vol 3 Chapter 14 (Reference [C](#)) with outcomes stored at [fBP8365144](#). Recommendations for amendments to the Plan are to be submitted to WASO 82WG for OC consideration.

14. An audit of responses to actual incidents/emergencies can be recorded as satisfying UEP exercise requirements.

SMS documentation

15. ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) details ACG's documented aviation safety policy. OC 82WG's endorsement of the ASMS is achieved through the promulgation of 82WG SI(OPS) Section 6 and related safety policy. Instructions issued as part of 82WG SI(OPS) Section 6 are to be reviewed at least every three years by WASO 82WG as required by the DASPMAN (Reference [C](#)).

COMPONENT 2 – SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

Hazard identification

16. An effective ASMS is highly dependent on reliable communication throughout the command chain and within units, from the highest to the lowest levels. The structure of the safety organisation will affect the lines of communication; however, all members of the organisation must understand how the system works, their place in it and how best to contribute ideas for improvement.

Aviation risk management

17. 82WG is committed to aviation risk management (RM) IAW ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) and ACG SI(OPS) 06-05 (Reference [F](#)). Specific 82WG guidance and instructions on the RM process are documented in 82WG SI(OPS) 06-05 (Reference [G](#)).

Hazard reporting and tracking

18. Aviation safety reporting is one of the largest contributors to the hazard identification process as it provides both qualitative and quantitative data from which to produce valid analysis and safety trends.

19. ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) details ACG's aviation safety event reporting and tracking policy. ASOs are to be familiar with the contents of Annex C to ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) which provides guidance for usage of Aviation Safety Reporting within ACG units.

20. **ASR.** If there is any doubt as to whether an ASR is required, guidance from the safety command chain is to be sought, firstly through the Duty Supervisor (DSUP)/Authorising Officer or UASO/MASO. DASPMAN (Reference [C](#)) guidance is that an event where 'an aviation system (including the human element) fails to perform in the expected manner and adversely affects, or could have adversely affected at the time, the safety or airworthiness of an aviation system or third party' must be reported.

21. **Mission aborts.** In accordance with the above guidance, cautions resulting in a mission abort due airworthiness should be reported as at least a Class D ASR. Conversely, a caution resolved airborne without loss of mission may not require an ASR if the supervisor deems it not to have adversely affected flying safety. Note that a loss of mission due malfunction of a non-airworthiness related system (e.g. FLIR failure during CAS) would not require an ASR.

22. **Bypassing investigation.** If there are no new factors identified or lessons to be learnt from an ASR, the investigation may be bypassed and the ASR used for data capture only. Before deciding to bypass the investigation, it is important to consider any recent trends with similar events that would warrant investigation. Events involving human factors are not suitable for bypass.

23. **Reporting processes and responsibilities.** Annex C to ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) details reporting processes and responsibilities, while the following details 82WG specific aspects:

a. **Report initiation.** The ASR originator will typically be the aircraft captain or the SENG/JENG/WOE/maintenance shift supervisor. After landing, if an ASR is required or suspected, aircraft captains are to inform the flight line supervisor and ensure all servicing or reconfigure activities are ceased and the aircraft quarantined for investigation. The after-flight documentation is then completed as follows:

- (1) Aircrew using their CAMM2 logon are to enter 'ASR ACTION' into the relevant U/S followed by pertinent information relating to the ASR U/S.
- (2) The ASOR check box is to be selected and the Sentinel generated ASR number, if known, entered into the 'ASOR Ref' field. The 'ASOR Ref' field is a mandatory field and if the ASR number is not immediately available, 'TBA' is to be annotated.
- (3) The aircraft must be placed in investigatory quarantine, using the "Quarantine Asset" function in CAMM2 to ensure that no maintenance or replenishment activities are conducted on the aircraft until cleared by the SENG or delegate.

b. **Report Classification.** Correct classification of the ASR is a critical step as each of the four classifications requires different actions. Definitions for aviation safety events are provided in the DASPMAN Vol 2 & Vol 3 Chap 14 (Reference [C](#)). Additionally, a Classification of Aviation Safety Events Fact Sheet is available of the [DFSB website](#) contains more detailed information and must be used to correctly classify the event.

- (1) **Physiological events** should be classified as a minimum of Class C.
- (2) **Bubble Infringements** final determination for reporting, investigation and classification requirements sits with DSUP/UASO on a case by case basis, but general guidance is as follows:
 - (a) **<1000ft:** Inform DSUP, likely no ASR required.

- (b) **<800ft:** Class D, data capture only.
- (c) **<500ft:** Class A, B or C with investigation recommended.

c. **Reporting Timelines.** DASPMAN Vol 2 & Vol 3 Chap 14 (Reference [C](#)) details the reporting timeframes required for ASR submission. Annex D to ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)) details Safety Performance Indicators and Targets for ASR timeframes.

- (1) **Raise.** IAW ACG SI(OPS) 06-04 (Reference [D](#)), ASRs must be raised in Sentinel within 72hrs of the event (or ASAP if found more than 72hrs after the event).
- (2) **First Review.** An ASR should be progressed to the completion of first Review within seven days of the safety event.
- (3) **Sign Off and Extension.** The ASR should be signed off by the Unit CO or delegate within 30 calendar days in order to ensure that timely actions and recommendations are assigned and that safety information is made available to the aviation community. The quality and completeness of the ASR should not be compromised to meet this timeline; however, extensions beyond 30 days must have WASO/WMASO approval in the first instance, if unavailable for any reason the Approving Authority (AA) can approve an extension in their absence. Extension requests are to be sent via an email to the [AMB 82WG WASO](#) mailbox.

d. **Documentation.** Once ASR action is initiated all perishable information and data is to be quarantined by the UASO. Applicable document impounding requirements for accidents and serious incidents are contained in Annex A3 to 82WG SI(OPS) 06-01-01 (Reference [E](#)). Refer to Annex D9 to 82WG SI(OPS) 06-01-01 for PEs. Refer to the DASPMAN Vol 2 & Vol 3 Chap 14 (Reference [C](#)) for further detail.

e. **Keywords.** The selection of the correct keyword is critical to ensure appropriate trend analysis can be performed. If there is any doubt on the correct keyword, contact the [WASO Inbox](#) for guidance.

- (1) **Physiological Episodes (PHYSEPs) / Events (PEs)** are to have primary keyword: *AO.38.06 Impairment and Incapacitation*. A secondary keyword for *TF.06.68 Oxygen* should only be added if the investigation has confirmed a technical issue.

f. **Message Writing Technique.** An ASR should report on facts, analyse their significance and draw conclusions in the form of unit actions and external recommendations. The drafter and Investigation Officer (IO) should write in the past tense, and should not include speculation but provide clear and concise factual statements. The IO should avoid excessive use of jargon unless previously explained and essential to the understanding of the event. Ultimately, an ASR should be checked for conciseness, coherence and completeness with emphasis on "what happened, how/why did it happen, and how to prevent recurrence."

g. **ASR Sign Off.** The Unit CO (or delegate for Class D ASRs) reviews and signs off an ASR as the Approving Authority. A CO delegate must be listed as the Approving Authority in the ASR in order to sign off the ASR.

h. **Unit Action Cancellation and Extensions after ASR Sign Off.** Any changes to unit actions after the ASR sign off stage may invalidate the unit review processes. Accordingly, to determine if the unit review process is valid or if it should be repeated:

- (1) The WASO inbox must be notified if a unit action is likely to be overdue by in excess of 30 days.
- (2) CO approval must be obtained and the WASO inbox must be notified if a unit action is likely to be cancelled.

i. **ASR Workflow.** The ASR follows a specific workflow built into the Aviation Safety reporting function of the Sentinel application. The stage of an ASR is clearly visible on the summary page. An ASR is only accessible after the first review stage. On occasions when the CO of a

SQN is a crew member in a safety event, OC 82WG should complete the CO comments field within Sentinel prior to sign off.

- j. **Specialist Input.** Depending on the nature of the aviation safety event, specialist agencies requested to assist with the investigation process could include:
- (1) Maintenance (SENGO, trades etc.)
 - (2) Air Traffic Control (civilian or military)
 - (3) Medical (Area Health, Aviation Medicine or other specialist)
 - (4) ARDU
 - (5) ACEASPO
 - (6) DFSB / CASO.
- k. **Closure of Unit Actions/Recommendations.** Actions and recommendations are to be left 'open' until such time as the required outcome is achieved. For actions and recommendations that require a Technical Publications Deficiency Report (TPDR) or other publication amendment to be raised, the action or recommendation should remain open until the TPDR has been actioned. In cases where the TPDR may not be actioned for an extended period of time, the action item can be 'Completed' if a Modification of Maintenance Instruction Standing Approval is created IAW Reference [H](#) with LMRC (Local Maintenance Requirement Card) added to the IETM/NAVAIR. The ASR must be referenced in the TPDR and the TPDR reference must be added as a comment in Sentinel. All unit actions and recommendations are reviewed by the HTA (or representative) after an ASR has been signed off.
- l. **Closed ASRs.** To close an ASR, all unit actions resulting from the investigation must have been appropriately addressed. Recommendations to external agencies should also be completed; however, the prerogative for a decision to close the ASR resides with the OC, in their role as HTA.
- m. **Sentinel unavailable.** In the event that Sentinel is unavailable, in the first instance, reporting should be achieved by contacting a squadron or wing member with access to the DPN and Sentinel. If not available, manual reporting can be achieved through Web Form [AE774—Aviation Safety Report \(Offline\)](#). When deployed to locations without access to the DPN, printed or electronic copies of Web Form [AE774](#) must be included in the Fly Away Kit (FAK).
- n. **Security Implications.** An ASR, like any other message, should be handled and dispatched according to an appropriate security classification. Although the incident itself may be deemed to be 'unclassified' (e.g. a technical malfunction), there may be other information contained in the ASR which could divulge the otherwise sensitive or classified nature of the task. Therefore, when drafting the ASR, aircraft captains and IOs are to maintain an awareness of the nature and security classification of the mission/task during which the aviation safety event took place. Points mentioned in an ASR which could be sensitive may include:
- (1) aircraft location/operating areas
 - (2) departure/arrival points
 - (3) intended tracks
 - (4) tasking and tactics
 - (5) flight following agencies
 - (6) activities with other allied forces.

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82WG SI(OPS) 06-04

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REVIEW

57. This SI must be reviewed at a period not exceeding three years IAW DASPMAN (Reference C).

REGISTER DATA	
Issue Authority	OC 82WG
Sponsor	WASO 82WG
s47E(d)	Digitally signed by s47E(d) Date: 2026.07.08 08:41:43 +10'00' I certify the type, style, content, currency and accuracy of this SI on behalf of the Issue Authority.
Contact Officer	s47E(d)
OIP Manager	s47E(d)
s47E(d)	
Key Words	Super Hornet, Growler, Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS), Aviation Risk Management (RM), Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual (DASPMAN), Non-Technical Skills (NTS), Safety, Wing Aviation Safety Officer (WASO), Unit Aviation Safety Officer (UASO), Assistant Aviation Safety Officer (AASO), Wing Maintenance Aviation Safety Officer (WMASO), Aviation Safety Report (ASR), Investigation, Quarantine, Sentinel, Unit Emergency Plan (UEP), ASRs on a Page, CME (Contracted Maintenance Event), Boeing Defence Australia (BDA), Line-oriented Flight Training (LOFT), Aviation Medicine (AvMed), Supplementary AvMed (SAvMed), For AME
Summary of Latest Amendment	
s22	

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L4303058 v37.0