


28 MAY 2020 Document 1

s47E(d)

 ★ ★ ★ ★		DECISION / NOTING BRIEF FOR CDF: IGADF AFGHANISTAN INQUIRY COMMUNICATION STRATEGY	
Group/Service:	ADFHQ s22	Reference:	s47E(d)
For information:	SEC, VCD	Due date:	28 May 20 Routine

Reference:

A. s22

Purpose

1. To seek your clearance of the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry Communication Strategy.

Recommendations

2. That you:
 - a. Note that the Issues Management Support Team – Special Forces has updated the Communications Plan at reference A to a Communication Strategy at enclosure 1.
 - b. Approve the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry Communication Strategy.


Key Issues

3. The Communication Strategy has been consulted widely within Defence. It has been provided to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force for concurrent clearance.




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s22	a. <u>Noted</u> Please discuss
	b. <u>Approved</u> Please discuss
	s22
Jocelyn King BRIG Head Issues Management Support Team – Special Forces Tel: s47E(d) Mob: s22 27 May 20	Angus J Campbell GEN CDF 29 May 20
Contact Officer: s47E(d)	Te s22
Clearance Officer: BRIG Jocelyn King	Te

s47E(d)



Enclosures:

1. IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry Communication Strategy
2. s47E(d)
3. 
4. 
5. 



Australian Government
Department of Defence

s47E(d)

IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry Communication Strategy


Document date: XX May 2020

Cleared by: Chief of the Defence Force

Prepared by: Afghanistan Inquiry Task Force




s47E(d)



Spokesperson

31. CDF will be the Defence spokesperson until he directs an alternative senior officer to assume this role.

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Clearances

Drafted	Name	Date
Strategic Issues Adviser to CDF	s47E(d)	28 February 2020
Media and Communication Adviser, Afghanistan Inquiry Task Force		21 May 2020
Clearance	Name	Date
Head Issues Management Support Team – Special Forces	BRIG Jocelyn King	21 May 2020
First Assistant Secretary Ministerial and Executive Communication and Coordination	Mr Peter Chesworth	22 May 2020
Vice Chief of the Defence Force	VADM David Johnston	25 May 2020
Chief of the Defence Force	GEN Angus J Campbell	21 May 2020

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
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**Afghanistan Inquiry Communication Strategy
Annex E**

AFGHANISTAN INQUIRY REPORT RELEASE – COMMUNICATION PLAN

(Correct as at **3 July 2020 1730**)

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COMMUNICATION APPROACH TO RECEIPT OF THE INQUIRY REPORT

Spokesperson

15. CDF will be the Defence spokesperson until he directs an alternate senior officer to assume this role.

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Media Conference

20. The principal activity CDF will undertake to notify the Australian public of the broad findings of the Inquiry is a media conference. In addition, he will release a number of documents which will be made publicly available on Defence's Afghanistan Inquiry website (under development as at 22 June 2020).


21. It is intended the media conference will be held in the Ngunnawal Theatre at Russell Offices, with a media alert to be issued several hours prior.

22. The media conference will commence immediately after a one-hour 'lock-up' to enable journalists to view select documents the CDF intends to release at the end of the media conference. This will enable greater transparency and support journalists in both preparation of their coverage and the posing of pertinent and informed questions. The CDF will make a prepared statement and then take questions.

23. The level of COVID-19 restrictions in place at the time of the media conference is unknown. The activity will be planned based on restrictions extant as at 2020 and refined in response to any changes to ACT restrictions. Defence Media will liaise with news organisations to determine media representatives and pool camera arrangements if required. As at June 2020, COVID-19 restrictions in the ACT relating to groups and gatherings in indoor spaces limits the number of people permitted in the Ngunnawal Theatre to one person every four square metres, with 24 people allowed in total.

24. Defence will feed the media conference to the Parliamentary Press Gallery and livestream to social media. It is also expected to be broadcast live on free-to-air television and Sky News Australia. It is likely the media conference will gain international media attention.

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Approval by SES Band 1/1-Star

Name: BRIG Jocelyn King
Position: Head Issues Management Support Team – Special Forces
Date: 24 June 2020

Name: BRIG Jane Spalding
Position: Director General Sensitive Issues Management – Army
Date: 24 June 2020

Name: Mr Cameron Heath
Position: Assistant Secretary Media and Communication
Date: 23 June 2020

Name: CDRE Michele Miller, AM, RAN
Position: Chief of Staff, Australian Defence Force Headquarters
Date: 25 June 2020

Approval by SES Band 2/2-Star

Name: Mr Peter Chesworth
Position: First Assistant Secretary Ministerial and Executive Coordination and Communication
Date: 24 June 2020

Approval by SES Band 3/3-Star

Name: VADM David Johnston, AO, RAN
Position: Vice Chief of the Defence Force
Date: 29 June 2020

Name: LTGEN Rick Burr, AO, DSC, MVO
Position: Chief of Army
Date: 29 June 2020

Approval by SEC-CDF

Name: Mr Greg Moriarty
Position: Secretary of the Department of Defence
Date: 3 July 2020

Name: GEN Angus J. Campbell, AO, DSC
Position: Chief of the Defence Force
Date: 3 July 2020

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**JOINT DIRECTIVE 14/2020 BY THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE AND
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE**

**AFGHANISTAN INQUIRY TASK FORCE TO MANAGE DEFENCE EQUITIES OF
THE IGADF AFGHANISTAN INQUIRY**

s47E(d)


PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this Directive is to establish the Afghanistan Inquiry Task Force (AITF) under the direction of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of the Department of Defence (SEC). The AITF will coordinate the Defence response to the Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force (IGADF) Afghanistan Inquiry report s47C

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Communication and Media

21. The AITF will lead strategic communications planning and media engagement throughout all phases. The CDF will be the primary Defence spokesperson unless he directs an alternate senior officer to assume this role.

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Greg Moriarty
Secretary

12 May 2020


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Angus J Campbell
General
Chief of the Defence Force

12 May 2020

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Department of Defence

Special Operations Command

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SOCAUST DIRECTIVE 10/20

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND PROTECTIVE SECURITY

References:

A. Defence Security Principles Framework, dated Jul 18

s33(a)(i)


BACKGROUND

s33(a)(i)

3. (U) This document provides direction to SOCOMD, for all of its members, to sustain its protective security posture by:
 - a. Confirming the SOCOMD protective security framework and implementation methodology necessary to achieve compliance with the references.
 - b. Allocating rules and responsibilities.

- c. Providing a coordination instruction for the management of protective security within SOCOMD.
- d. Providing detailed enclosures on SOCOMD-specific subjects to enhance understanding of their application in barracks and overseas.

s33(a)(i)



15. (O) Security is a function of command achieved through the establishment of effective protective security. Protective security incorporates information, personnel, physical security and information communications technology security. s47E(d) [REDACTED]

s47E(d) [REDACTED]

s47E(d) [REDACTED]

Protective security provides appropriate, risk-based security measures to be applied in response to the assessed threat and is achieved through the application of the following principles:

- a. (U) **Security-in-depth.** The implementation of multiple layers of tangible security measures and security procedures, including physical and technical activities and inspections.
- b. (U) **Need-to-know.** Ensuring classified and official information (including sensitive information) is only provided to those members who are appropriately security-cleared and have a genuine need-to-know the information, in order to conduct their tasks.
- c. (U) **Effective risk.** Security Risk Management (SRM) is used IAW ref A s33(a)(i) [REDACTED]
s33(a)(i) [REDACTED]

s33(a)(i) [REDACTED]

s47E(d)

SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT

s33(a)(i)

s47E(d)

requesting certification and/or accreditation. These are developed for individual requests, per building or room, and must be included in requests for all types of buildings whether a new build for initial certification or accreditation, or re-accreditation of an older building. They are to accompany the SRA; however, requirements for the SRMP change often and rapidly

s47E(d)

s33(a)(i)

s33(a)(i)



27. (O) **Espionage and Foreign Interference Legislation.** The *National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018* provides Australian Law Enforcement Agencies and Security Agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, necessary powers to investigate and pursue prosecution, with criminal charges and imprisonment now possible consequences for actions previously considered security incidents or breaches of administrative policy. The legislation also now includes an aggravated offence for providing false or misleading information during a security clearance process. This legislation has been designed to strengthen consequences of existing offences and introduce new foreign interference laws. SOCOMD members are to ensure they do not provide misleading or false information during security clearance processes, including revaluation of themselves, or as a referee for a colleague.

s33(a)(i)



CONCLUSION

s33(a)(i)

71. (O) This directive applies to all serving SOCOMD personnel, including APS and contracted staff, as well as force assigned elements within Australia, overseas and in training. At all times, SOCOMD members are responsible for the correct application of protective security and it will be reviewed annually to reflect policy change and ensure relevant guidance is provided to members. The annexes of this document specify direction for all SOCOMD members.

s22

AG Findlay, AM
MAJGEN
SOCAUST

s22

27 Oct 20

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SOCOMD SECURITY

DATED 27 OCT 20

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND MEDIA**References:**

- A. Defence *Media & Communication Policy* of 15 July 2019
- B. CDF/SECDEF Joint Directive 01/2020—*Support to Defence Ministers: Media & Communication* of 07 February 2020
- C. CA Directive 11/2015—*Approval to release personal stories and imagery* of 21 May 2018

SITUATION

1. (O) Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) is always the subject of interest to the media due to the nature of our work. This interest has been heightened over the past two/three years by the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry, and is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. s47E(d) and all SOCOMD personnel should be aware of how to handle such approaches.

2. (O) Unauthorised or inadvertent release of information to the media poses a significant risk to SOCOMD operational and personnel security.

INTENT

3. (O) This annex summarises the SOCOMD policy for engaging with the media. The Special Operations Commander Australia (SOCAUST) expects all personnel to comply with these provisions at all times.

MEDIA ENGAGEMENT

4. (O) SOCOMD's professionalism and reputation is dependent on high-quality, timely, accurate and relevant narratives. All information released into the public domain by SOCOMD will be overseen by SOCAUST – this information will represent an Army view, not an individual's view.

5. (O) IAW references A, B and C, all information produced for external public release, including editorial or advertising content for *Army News* or the other Service newspapers, external publications (including ex-service organisation and corps newsletters or magazines), social media posts, blogs, website material, imagery, books, presentations and speeches must be cleared by SOCAUST.

6. (O) The HQ SOCOMD PAO will seek further clearance from Army Headquarters, who will determine if further clearance from the Chief of the Defence Force, Department (Ministerial Executive Coordination & Communication) or the Minister for Defence is required. All operational material will also be cleared through the Commander Joint Operations (CJOPS).

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MEDIA CONTACT

7. (O) SOCOMD personnel are not authorised to participate in media interviews without prior approval from SOCAUST and Army Headquarters. The HQ SOCOMD PAO will coordinate all media engagements through the chain of command.
8. (O) If SOCOMD personnel are approached by the media for comment (about any subject), they must refer the journalist to either of the following:
- a. **Defence Media Operations:** telephone s47E(d) or s47E(d) [@defence.gov.au](mailto:s47E(d)@defence.gov.au);
 - b. **HQ SOCOMD PAO:** Major s47E(d) or s47E(d) [@defence.gov.au](mailto:s47E(d)@defence.gov.au)
 - c. **Interacting with the media:** be professional and treat the media like every other member of the Australian or international community. Listen to their question(s). Be professional when responding and speak slowly and clearly. Be concise and avoid the temptation to fill any silence with ongoing discussion. Do not speak “off the record” – there is no such thing. Always assume cameras or microphones are ‘on’.
- If asked: generally about SOCOMD or any of our capabilities, training etc.***
- “I’m sorry, I’m unable to talk to you about that. I’d suggest you direct your questions to Defence Media Operations in Canberra on s47E(d) or you can email your questions to s47E(d) [@defence.gov.au](mailto:s47E(d)@defence.gov.au).”
9. (O) Personnel are also to immediately report the contact to their chain of command.

IGADF AFGHANISTAN INQUIRY

10. (O) CDF is the only authorised Defence spokesperson about the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry.
11. (O) Over the past few years, SOCOMD personnel and their families have been contacted by the media to comment on the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry.
12. (O) Journalists have generally used social media (particularly LinkedIn, WhatsApp, Signal and Facebook) to make contact, however, they have also called personal mobile telephones, and, in the future, may confront personnel.
13. (O) If contacted via social media, take a screenshot of the message(s) before blocking the contact. Provide the screenshot to your chain of command.
14. (O) If contacted in person, respond by directing any questions to Defence Media Operations. Example responses:

If asked: generally about the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry

“I’m sorry, I’m not the best person to answer your questions about the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry. I’d suggest you direct your questions to Defence Media Operations in Canberra on s47E(d) or you can email your questions to s47E(d) [@defence.gov.au](mailto:s47E(d)@defence.gov.au).”

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

If asked: about your involvement in specific matters

“I’m sorry, I’m not the best person to answer your questions about the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry, please direct them to Defence Media Operations in Canberra on s47E(d)

“I understand how serious these matters are and why you are interested, but, as the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force is yet to complete the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry, it would be inappropriate for me to speculate on the outcome. Thank you.”

If confronted by media with cameras:

“I’m sorry, I’m not in a position to answer your questions, please direct them to Defence Media Operations in Canberra on s47E(d)

“Please do not photograph/film me. s47E(d) which means there are implications for my future employment in the Australian Defence Force and the security and safety of me and my family. I respectfully decline the opportunity to answer your questions. Thank you.”