



**Australian Government**  
**Defence**

**DPM: Visit to**

s22

**Washington DC, United States**

**29 January – 5 February 2023**  
**Travel Brief for DPM**

## Dress

	Civilian Dress
	Business Attire
	Smart Casual
	Travel Attire
	PT Clothes
s22	

Day/Date	Event	Dress
Friday 3 February 2023	Transit	Travel Attire
	Meeting with Secretary Austin	Business Attire

Local time	Activity	Location	Dress	Comments	AEST
Friday 3 February 2023				Washington - Honolulu	
s22					
1300	Meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin	Pentagon		Accompanied by: Ms Tarnawsky, s47E(d) s47E(d) – to capture Opening Remarks	0500+1



**Australian Government**  

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**Defence**

**DPM: Visit to  
Washington DC, United States**

**2-3 February 2023**

Local time	Activity	Location	Dress	Comments	AEST
Friday 3 February 2023					Washington s22
s22					
1300-1400	Meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin	Pentagon		Accompanied by: HOM, Ms Tarnawsky, s47E(d) Waiting in reception area: s47E(d) , AFP	0500+1

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**Local  
Time**

**CBR Time  
(+1 day)**

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**1300-1400 Meeting with US SECDEF Austin**

0500-0600

Venue: s33(a)(iii)

DPM, HOM, Ms Tarnawsky, s47E(d)

Reception area: s47E(d)

AFP

# Media and Strategic Communication Summary

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence

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**Destination:** s22, United States

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**From:** 30/12/2022    **To:** 4/02/2023

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**Key media opportunities include:**

- Media products
  - Talking Points
  - Joint Media Release announcing visit

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## Key Media Opportunities

Local	AEST	Activity	Communication Products	Responsible
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Date: Friday, 3 February 2023

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1300	0500+1	Meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin	Imagery Social Media	DPM Media Liaison s22 Post
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## **Meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III**

### **Opening Remarks**

It's a pleasure to see Secretary Austin again. Thank you for welcoming us to the United States, and I look forward to a productive exchange today.

For more than seventy years, Australia's Alliance with the United States has been central to our national security.

It is more than a strategic partnership; it is a network of people united by a set of shared convictions and experience.

We are bound by our common vision of a secure, prosperous and resilient Indo-Pacific.

And a commitment to work with others to preserve an inclusive regional order founded on rules agreed by all.

Our region, the Indo-Pacific, is being reshaped and our strategic environment is becoming more challenging.

Dialogue and our diplomatic partnerships are central to shaping the trajectory of the region and our engagement with regional countries reflects this.

We will always be better off in a world where rules are clear, mutually negotiated and consistently followed.

But we also have to contend with the implications of a changing region.

Among the biggest changes is the level of military build-up we are seeing.

The AUKUS partnership will enable Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to deter threats to our national security and support the stability of the region.

We have been working over the last 18 months to identify the Optimal Pathway for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, and will make an announcement soon.

The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines will be a defining moment for Australia.

Nuclear-powered submarines will place the greatest question of doubt in an adversary's mind allowing Australia to defend itself, and contribute to security of the Indo-Pacific for the decades ahead.

Under AUKUS we are also pursuing a number of advanced capabilities to harness technological developments and help maintain our capability edge.

Secretary Austin – thank you again for hosting us today. I look forward to both our Alliance and the AUKUS partnership continuing to strengthen through 2023.

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## **United States**

### **United States Alliance**


- There is no more important defence partner to Australia than the United States.
- For decades, Australia and the United States have proven highly capable of adapting the way we work together to meet pressing challenges; the Alliance is not static.
  - We must evolve again in response to the deteriorating security landscape.
- A conflict in our region would be disastrous for everyone.
  - Australia and the United States will continue to work bilaterally, and with our partners across the globe, to deter aggression, counter coercion, and make space for sovereign decision-making.
- Australia will do its share. We are making significant investments in being a capable and effective ally.
  - The Defence Strategic Review will examine how we can more effectively integrate and interoperate with key partners, including the United States.
- Our Alliance strengthens, rather than detracts from, Australia's sovereignty, affording us access to capability, technology, and intelligence we could not acquire on our own.

### **AUKUS**


- The Indo-Pacific is increasingly contested and the peace and prosperity we have enjoyed in recent decades is under pressure.
- The AUKUS partnership is essential for Australia's security.
- It builds on our longstanding alliance with the United States and our historic ties with the United Kingdom.
- AUKUS allows us to pool resources across the three partners in the areas that matter most to our shared strategic interests.
- Through AUKUS we will deliver superior high end capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines.
- The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines will be a defining moment for Australia.
- These submarines will place the greatest question of doubt in an adversary's mind, allowing us to keep Australia and Australians secure for the decades ahead.
- The work to identify the pathway to an Australian nuclear-powered submarine capability is a truly trilateral effort and an announcement will be made soon.
- Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States continue to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop an effective and robust safeguards and verification approach for our program, consistent with our nuclear non-proliferation obligations and commitments.
- The IAEA has expressed its confidence, on several occasions, in the level of transparency and engagement by AUKUS partners.
- Australia does not seek and will not acquire nuclear weapons.

- Australia will not undertake enrichment or reprocessing in support of the nuclear powered submarine program.
- It is proposed that Australia receive reactor power units from the UK or US which are complete and welded-closed. These reactor units will not require refuelling for their entire lifetime.
- The power units are designed so that the removal of any nuclear material would be extremely difficult and render the power unit, and the submarine, inoperable.
- AUKUS will not only deliver nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, but also guide accelerated development of advanced defence capabilities where they have the most impact.
- Our pursuit of Advanced Capabilities under AUKUS aims to bolster our interoperability and joint capabilities to maintain and extend our capability edge by: aligning national priorities, amplifying our collective strength, and accelerating the development and acquisition of these capabilities for mutual strategic benefit.
- The six key areas chosen-undersea warfare, electronic warfare, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, advanced cyber, quantum technologies and artificial intelligence – are those that will make a significant contribution to Australia's future defence capability.
- To enable this work, AUKUS partners are also working to leverage our innovation and information sharing capabilities to ensure rapid, tangible, collaboration.
- We have made strong progress in these areas and I am committed to maintaining this momentum.
- The Advanced Capabilities pursued through AUKUS may end up being just as important, if not more, than nuclear-powered submarines.

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### **Defence Strategic Review (DSR)**

- The very different strategic environment we are facing will demand more of our defence force.
- The accelerating rate of change caused by growing regional military capabilities has decreased our strategic response time.
- Australia needs to be better able to deter conflict and increase the cost for aggressors.
- The DSR is a comprehensive review of how Defence is positioned to deal with current and future strategic circumstances.
  - It will position Australia's defence for the next decade and beyond.
- We need to ensure that we can adapt to the world as it has become, not how we want it to be.
- It will review and prioritise Defence's capabilities, structure, posture, and preparedness.
- As I've said before, Australia must invest in capabilities that enable us to hold potential adversaries' forces at-risk at greater distance, and increase the cost of aggression against Australia and its interests.
  - Impactful power projection is critical.
- The final report and recommendations will soon be presented to the Australian Government.
  - After appropriate consideration, there will be a public announcement.
  - It would be inappropriate to pre-empt the report's recommendations or outcomes at this time.

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## **International relations**

### **Iran**


- Deeply concerned by ongoing protests in Iran following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini.
- We strongly condemn the ongoing heavy-handed repression of protests by the Iranian authorities and are deeply disturbed by Iran's recent execution of protesters, including that of British-Iranian dual citizen Alireza Akbari [on 14 January 2023]
  - My thoughts are with Alireza Akbari's family and friends.
- The Australian Government will continue to work both domestically, and with international partners to hold Iran to account. We are advocating strongly in support of the human rights of the Iranian people, and are taking decisive action in response to Iran's egregious human rights violations, including by imposing sanctions on targeted persons and entities.

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Contact officer: s47E(d)  
Contact officer phone: s22