

## 82WG FLYING ORDER 3-93

### 82WG RETURN TO FLYING FOLLOWING RUNWAY DEPARTURE INCIDENT

#### Reference:

- A. BP13923171 A44 F/A-18F and A46 EA-18G – *Cessation of Flight Operations of 08 Dec 2020*
- B. BP14058282 ACEA-X13-018-Loss of Ground Based Directional Control – *Risk Assessment and Control Schedule*
- C. BP14100625 *Brief for CDR ACG: Resumption of F/A-18F and EA-18G Flying Operations*

**Aircraft:** F/A-18F & EA-18G

#### Background

1. On Tuesday 08 Dec 20, F/A-18F A44-223 departed the Amberley runway during the take-off roll, leading to the aircrew initiating a successful ejection. The Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DfSB) have initiated an independent Class B Aviation Safety Investigation into the incident. As a result of the incident, pending investigation into the circumstances surrounding the occurrence, at Reference A, CDR ACG temporarily suspended flight authorisations for F/A-18F and EA-18G aircraft.
2. Following a risk assessment process (Ref B), CDR ACG has approved 82WGs return to flying (Ref C). This Flying Order outlines the operational controls implemented to support the decision to return to flying and will serve as initial guidance and direction until a detailed review of 82WG OIP is conducted in January 2021 to identify possible improvements.

#### Action

3. Prior to conducting Raise-Train-Sustain missions 82WG aircrew are to have conducted the following events:
  - a. Received a mass brief discussing Non-Technical Skills (NTS) and,
  - b. Conduct at least one ESIM which contains examples of both high speed and low speed aborts.
4. In addition to the aircrew requirements above the following controls are to be adhered to:
  - a. Where aircraft pre-take off lateral asymmetry exceeds 12 000 ft-lbs and crosswind is reported at ≥10 kts aircraft must line up on the runway centre line.
  - b. For runways less than 45m wide all line-ups with aircraft configurations exceeding 12 000 ft-lbs asymmetry are to be on the runway centreline.

#### Conclusion

5. In the context of an extremely disruptive 2020, this incident and an impending break from flying over the stand-down period, the focus of aircrew pre-mission preparation, briefing and debriefing during the return to flying should be directed to the sound execution of basic procedures and airmanship in accordance with current 82WG Orders, Publications and Procedures.

#### Cancellation

6. This Flying Order will be cancelled when all changes have been deemed no longer necessary or have been incorporated into enduring 82WG OIP.

**Sponsor:** SO2 ACI

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GCAPT  
OC 82WG

16 Dec 20

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**BRIEF FOR ACAUST: RESUMPTION OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS FOR A44 F/A-18F AND A46 EA-18G**

FEG/Directorate: ACG

Reference: BP14183530

Due Date: 18 Dec 20

**References:**

- A. Minute – CDR ACG – *A44 F/A-18F and A46 EA-18G Cessation of Flight Operations* 08 Dec 20 BP13923171
- B. AC SI OPS 1-41 Operational Airworthiness Management Plan
- C. Decision Brief – CDR ACG – *Resumption of F/A-18F and EA-18G Flight Operations* 17 Dec 20 BP14100625
- D. DASR ARO.055 Cessation of Flight Operations

**Recommendations**

That you:

- (a) **note** on 08 Dec 20 I directed a cessation of flight operations of the F/A-18F and EA-18G fleets IAW DASR ARO.055 (Ref A).
- (b) **note** IAW the Air Command OAMP (Ref B), resumption of flight operations following a fleet wide cessation requires ACAUST approval.
- (c) **note** whilst the DFSB investigation is likely to take several months, I now have sufficient information to be satisfied safe operation of the F/A-18F and EA-18G fleets is assured.
- (d) **note** as MAO-AM, I am satisfied to remove the DASR cessation of flight operations restriction imposed by me on 08 Dec 20 (Ref C and D).
- (e) **approve** the resumption of flight operations for the F/A-18F and EA-18G fleets IAW the Air Command OAMP (Ref B).

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AIRCDRE  
CDR ACG  
Tel: s47F

- (a) Noted / ~~Please Discuss~~
- (b) Noted / ~~Please Discuss~~
- (c) Noted / ~~Please Discuss~~
- (d) Noted / ~~Please Discuss~~
- (e) Approved / ~~Not Approved~~

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18 DEC 20

Branch/Section Head

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Action Officer

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## Background

1. On 08 Dec 20, a RAAF F/A-18F experienced a loss of directional control and departed the runway during the take-off roll at Amberley, leading to the aircrew initiating a successful ejection. I subsequently directed a temporary cessation of flight operations (Ref A) IAW DASR ARO55 (Ref D) because at the time, I could not be satisfied safe operations could be assured.

## Key Issues

2. DFSB have initiated an independent Class B Aviation Safety Investigation into the incident. Their conclusions and report are unlikely to be available for several months.

3. While information available at this stage does not conclusively eliminate technical fault(s) as a contributor to the accident, it does point to human factors as playing a major role. I am now also confident that any technical factor which may be identified as a contributor is almost certainly going to be limited to the incident aircraft, rather than a fleet wide concern.

4. At this point, 82WG and the Air Combat Electronic Attack (ACEA) Enterprise have conducted a Seven Step Risk Assessment and Control Schedule as outlined in Ref C that analyses the potential causes of the *loss of directional control* hazard.

5. The risk assessment captures a number of existing and additional reasonably practical controls, in both the technical and operational domains, to minimise the risk of recurrence and provide assurance of the continuing airworthiness of the A44 and A46 fleet. With the implementation of these technical and operational controls, the risk of *loss of directional control* on the ground is assessed as LOW (E1) and will remain SFARP while the investigation continues.

## Conclusion

6. As MAO-AM, I am satisfied to remove the cessation of flight operations and this decision brief seeks your approval for the resumption of flight operations of the A44 and A46 fleet IAW the Air Command OAMP.

## Consultation

7. The ACEA Enterprise has been closely assisting DFSB with the investigation. DFSB have also been engaged with the production of the Risk Assessment and Control Schedule, and have indicated support of the approach taken by the ACEA Enterprise. Additionally, ACEASPO has engaged with DASA (inclusive of ACPA) and have determined that DASA has no objections to the ACEA Enterprise's approach to the resumption of flight operations.

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