Thank you for the welcome and it is wonderful, well for me, to be with a whole series of white uniforms for an occasion. To [VADM] Mark Hammond [AO RAN, Chief of Navy], thank you for the opportunity to come and address you all.

I acknowledge distinguished guests, fellow Chiefs, ladies and gentlemen, and just say what a great pleasure it is to be with you in Sydney, one of the homes of our fleet, for an occasion such as this.

I begin by acknowledging the Gadigal people, the Traditional Custodians of the land on which we meet, and pay my respects to their Elders past, present and emerging. I extend that respect to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people here today, and recognise the many who have contributed to the defence of Australia in times of peace and war.

When outlining his strategy for the Papuan Campaign, General Douglas Macarthur said: 

“New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past."

This sentiment is as relevant today as it was then, if not more so. The strategic environment in which we operate is evolving at an unprecedented pace, and in Australia we have a view that we no longer benefit from a 10-year warning time of conflict occurring in our region.

The world that we live in is defined by interconnectedness and rapid technological advancement, from which we reap a great deal of benefits. However, they also cause challenges for our collective security.

The rules-based order finds itself under increasing pressure from those who seek to challenge and change it. In addition to increased Sino-American competition, we are witnessing a resurgence of state-on-state conflict. The conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and Israel, India and Pakistan, and Cambodia and Thailand are not isolated incidents, but indicators of a broader global trend. In 2024 there were more countries in conflict than at any point since the end of the Second World War.

The rapid technological development, particularly of low-cost systems combined with artificial intelligence, and their increasing application in today’s conflicts are adding further complexity to it all.

This increase in state-on-state conflict is a deeply concerning trend. There is, however, an opportunity for Australia, like other countries, to learn from these conflicts in order to better prepare ourselves.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Ukraine, where emergent technologies have redefined the modern arms race and reshaped the front lines. The conflict has demonstrated the disruptive potential of repurposed commercial technologies in warfare, particularly when applied in asymmetric ways. These systems have offered low-cost, readily available and easy to operate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, combined with precision strike capabilities.

Ukraine’s Operation SPIDER WEB was an extraordinary demonstration of the outsized effect that modern drone technology can have, particularly when used in covert or asymmetric operations. With just 117 first-person drones, Ukraine was able to damage or destroy a third of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers, causing an estimated USD $7 billion in damage. Each of the drones was worth under USD $1,000.

The effectiveness and cost-efficiency of this attack is significant.

More exquisite, but still relatively cheap, drones have also seen widespread use. The LAN-196, known as Liutyi, is a one-way uncrewed aerial vehicle used to strike industrial facilities and critical infrastructure. The latest iteration employs an advanced machine vision system, integrating real-time visual data with satellite navigation to execute precise operations, while avoiding radar detection and electronic warfare countermeasures. With an estimated cost of USD $200,000 per unit, Ukraine’s advancements in UAV technology highlight how affordable and adaptable these systems can be.

While the Russia-Ukraine war is primarily a land war, autonomous and uncrewed surface vessels, such as the Sea Baby drones and the MAGURA, show us the multi-role versatility these platforms offer. They are capable of striking infrastructure and warships, and conducting ISR, search and rescue and mine countermeasure activities. The MAGURA has even demonstrated it is a credible threat to air assets, with Ukraine claiming the platform has performed the first recorded engagement and destruction of both a helicopter and a fast jet aircraft by an uncrewed surface vessel.

There are also valuable lessons we can learn from recent uses of long-range strike capabilities. The use of ballistic missiles and mass rocket barrages in the recent Iran-Israel conflict facilitated a borderless war without the invasion or participation of neighbouring nations. However, it also demonstrated just how quickly stockpiles of guided weapons and explosive ordnance are depleted. In just 12 days of fighting Iran launched over 550 missiles and 1,000 drones.

We see a similar situation in Ukraine with 155mm artillery shells, and importantly, the impact this has on global supply chains. Millions of 155mm rounds have been supplied to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in 2022, and open source reporting indicates a daily usage rate of between 3,000 – 6,000 rounds. These usage rates show the importance of not just maintaining adequate stockpiles, but also of establishing robust domestic manufacturing and collaborating together.

While advancements in long-range strike and autonomous capabilities have altered the physical conduct of battle, the rapid advancement of technology has similarly pushed warfare in less visible, but equally important, ways. Space and cyber are critical enablers of the physical domains, providing command and control, intelligence, positioning and navigation. As such, it comes as no surprise that cyber-attacks are regularly witnessed in and around modern conflict, crippling infrastructure and systems vital for military operations and our everyday lives.

Russia has made prolific use of phishing and malware for espionage targeting Ukrainian government agencies, industry and infrastructure, both for data and information. These attacks have been a persistent and serious concern for Ukraine, and reinforce the need for a strong and integrated space and cyber capability to defend against ever evolving cyber threats.

But Ukraine has also used the cyber domain to great effect at the tactical level on front lines. Russian mobile phones have been used to geolocate targets for precision strikes, such as the 2023 New Year’s Eve strike on Makiivka, which saw 89 Russian troops killed after their position was located and struck by HIMARS.

In the rapidly evolving drone arms race, Ukraine has begun to upload malware to their drones to generate cyber effects in the event that those drones are captured by Russia. These effects include damaging computers the drones are connected to and allowing Ukrainian forces to hijack drones re-purposed by Russia to reveal the location of the operator.

With the growing proliferation of advanced technologies, and as entry barriers continue to fall, non-state actors are increasingly gaining access to capabilities once reserved for nations, further complicating the modern threat landscape we all face. In the physical domains, groups such as the Houthis have demonstrated the ability to deploy advanced missile systems to target shipping in the Red Sea and strike near critical infrastructure in Israel. Despite the use of sophisticated air defence systems, these attacks continue to cause significant disruptions to supply chains and trade routes.

So how does this affect our region?

Australia – a nation girt by sea – has previously been able to rely on geographic distance for our security. However, as we have seen, advancements in technologies have made it so that our vast oceans now sometimes offer little more protection than narrow creeks.

The growing reach and lethality of long-range strike and autonomous and uncrewed systems means that a potential adversary no longer needs to be near our shores to pose a serious threat.

Our trade routes, infrastructure and military assets can all be targeted from afar. We also cannot forget that cyber and space domains, which underpin almost every aspect of our day-to-day lives, are not limited by geography. There are no borders in these domains, and no distance too great for an adversary or malicious actor to strike us.

Australia’s identity as a maritime nation is not just a matter of geography, it is our strategic reality. Our national security and economic strength are tied to the waters that surround us. Ninety-nine percent of our international exports by volume are by sea, ninety-nine percent of our internet traffic passes through sea cables. These are not just trade routes, they are lifelines. As such, the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region, and consequently the maritime domain, are of critical importance to Australia’s national security.

We can see this reflected in the Australian Defence Force’s transition from a balanced to a focused, integrated force. Thirty-eight per cent of the Integrated Investment Program, our future capabilities program, over the next decade is committed to maritime capabilities.

Central to this is the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS Pillar I, which represents the largest investment in military capability, industrial capacity and skilled workforce development in Australia’s history.

Defence is also investing in the surface fleet, increasing its lethality and size by acquiring new capabilities, such as the recently announced Mogami class frigates, and investing in long-range strike capabilities.

But I want to emphasise that Navy is not the sole contributor to the maritime domain. As an integrated force, the efforts and capabilities of all three Services, and space and cyber from our Joint Capabilities Group, are critical to the maritime domain.

Air Force’s P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft provide vital maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. Army is pivoting to a heavy focus on littoral warfare, and is acquiring littoral vessels and maritime long-range strike capabilities.

Collectively, these capabilities will provide a generational leap in Australia’s ability to project power and protect our national interests.

As clearly demonstrated in Ukraine, autonomous and uncrewed systems are vital to the modern battlefield. The development and acquisition of these systems is therefore also a priority for the Australian Defence Force.

The recently announced Ghost Shark fleet will provide Navy with an autonomous, long-range undersea warfare capability to conduct ISR, strike, and complement other capabilities like the Integrator uncrewed air system, which has completed its first launch and recovery. Army tested its Modular Robotic Vehicle fleet and first-person view drones in this year’s Exercise Talisman Sabre. And the Air Force has now received its first three MQ-4 Tritons, which will complement platforms like Ghost Bat, our autonomous, collaborative combat aircraft that recently completed a capability demonstration.

Collectively, these systems will disproportionately increase the combat and surveillance effect we are able to generate, and could offset the relatively small size of the Australian Defence Force.

Another major factor in Ukraine’s rapid development of technology has been their close partnership and cooperation with industry. The length of the period between battlefield technologies being replaced in Ukraine has been continuously shrinking, from roughly seven months in 2022 to barely four to six weeks in 2025.

Working with our industry partners to innovate, build resilience and capacity in priority areas such as domestic guided weapons, explosive ordnance, manufacturing and uncrewed systems is vital to our Defence Force, and is something that we are committed to progressing.

Allies and partners, and many of you are here, are also critical to Australia’s approach. We will continue to strengthen our relationships, and work with our Indo-Pacific and global partners to uphold a favourable balance of power and contribute to a stable, secure and prosperous region.

The Pukpuk Treaty with Papua New Guinea is only the most recent example of Australia’s long history of cooperation and partnership in the region. Through the Pacific Maritime Security Program, Australia is delivering $5.9 billion of sovereign maritime capability, sustainment, training, regional coordination, aerial surveillance and infrastructure to 16 partner nations over a 30-year period. We are working with partners in regional fora, such as the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting and Joint Heads of Pacific Security, to advance Pacific-led responses to Pacific security challenges.

Over the past 12 months, the ADF has conducted a significant number of maritime and joint activities alongside our partners, building both interoperability and people-to-people links. We participated in Exercise Keris Woomera, our largest activity with Indonesia, late last year and Exercise Alon, our largest activity with the Philippines and the United States, this year, and through the year have supported both French and United Kingdom carrier strike groups visiting this region. This year’s iteration of Exercise Talisman Sabre was the largest and most complex activity we have performed to date, with over 40,000 people from 19 nations, and for the first time featured an activity outside of Australia alongside our close partner Papua New Guinea.

Of course, everything I have just discussed, and as reflected in the Navy video just shown to us, is underpinned by the strength of our people. Our strength lies in their experience and expertise, and in our ability to operate as a high-performing team alongside our Services and our partners throughout the region and globally. As such, the recruitment, retention and growth of a highly-skilled Australian Defence Force, our Public Service counterparts and those that we work with in industry is critical, and a priority for Defence.

If I can conclude – in an era where distance no longer guarantees safety, and where technology is redefining the battlespace, our ability to project strength at sea will be central to Australia’s security and prosperity.

We are now approaching the end of the 2024 National Defence Strategy’s 2-year life cycle and the next iteration will be released next year. Australia has been closely watching and learning from events like those in Ukraine, and the next National Defence Strategy will be the beneficiary of the insights that we are gaining.

But we must not forget that National Defence is a whole-of-nation endeavour that requires Defence, our other government agencies, academia and industry to work hand-in-hand.

The challenges that we face, now and ahead, are complex.

My message to you, is that we are carefully watching, learning and assessing developments in technology and the changes to the conduct of warfare, all while working alongside our partners.

The investments that we are making today, and the training that we are performing, will ensure that the force-in-being is able to deter now, and the force that we are developing can continue to achieve deterrence into the future.

Thank you.