ADDP 5.0

PLANS SERIES
ADDP 5.0
JOINT PLANNING

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General
Chief of the Defence Force

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PREFACE

1. Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDPs) and Australian Defence Force Publications (ADFPs) are authorised joint doctrine for the guidance of Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations. ADDPs are pitched at the philosophical and high-application level and ADFPs at the application and procedural level. Policy is prescriptive as represented by Defence Instructions, and has legal standing. Doctrine is not policy and does not have legal standing; however, it provides authoritative and proven guidance, which can be adapted to suit each unique situation.

2. The content of this publication has been derived from general principles and doctrine contained in other relevant ADDPs, Defence Instructions and allied publications and agreements. Every opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine its contents, applicability and currency. If deficiencies or errors are found, amendment action should to be taken. The Joint Doctrine Centre invites assistance, from whatever source, to improve this publication.

3. **Aim.** The aim of ADDP 5.0—*Joint Planning* is to provide guidance for the planning of ADF campaigns and operations in joint, multinational and multiagency environments.

4. **Level.** This publication is for use by commanders and staffs at the strategic and operational levels. It is also designed to be suitable for use by members of other agencies who interact with the ADF during planning for multiagency activities, to assist them to develop a knowledge of ADF planning processes.

5. **Scope.** This publication provides philosophical level doctrine on joint planning. It describes the nature and scope of joint planning at the strategic and operational levels.

6. ADDP 5.0, edition 2, contains a number of changes from edition 1 with regard to the publication’s structure and focus. The significant changes and inclusions are:

   a. A greatly expanded discussion of operational art, operational design and arrangement of operations, which aligns with recent major conceptual developments in key areas such as centre of gravity analysis, has been included (Chapter 2).

   b. Discussion of Defence and ADF planning processes, including inputs and outputs at the strategic and operational levels, has been expanded and included in a stand-alone chapter (Chapter 3).

   c. Discussion of the principal organisations that contribute to strategic and operational level planning has been consolidated into a single chapter and updated (Chapter 4).

   d. The content of this publication aligns with that of the latest editions of key related ADDP and ADFP, which are listed in the next paragraph.
7. ADDP 5.0 needs to be viewed within the total context of warfighting. To this end, additional recommended reading is:

a. ADDP-D—*Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*

b. ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control*

c. ADDP 00.9—*Multiagency Coordination: Defence’s Contribution to Australian Government Responses*

d. ADFP 2.0.1—*Intelligence Procedures*

e. ADDP 3.0—*Campaigns and Operations*

f. ADFP 5.0.1—*Joint Military Appreciation Process*

g. Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 1—*Australian Maritime Doctrine*

h. Land Warfare Doctrine 1—*Fundamentals of Land Warfare*

i. Australian Air Publication 1000-D—*The Air Power Manual*. 
AMENDMENTS

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Executive summary

- This chapter defines planning and briefly outlines its conduct within, and importance to, the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
- Several overarching concepts provide the context in which joint planning occurs. These concepts include the ‘levels of conflict’, ‘campaigns’ and ‘operations’, and the ‘campaign cycle’.
- Effective planning is a prerequisite for the successful conduct of campaigns and operations.
- There are two types of campaign and operation planning: deliberate and immediate.
- ADF joint planning occurs within a whole-of-government context and should, as far as practicable, synchronise with the needs and requirements of other government departments.

In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.

General of the Army (Retired) Dwight D. Eisenhower
34th President of the United States (1953–61) 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Planning is of the utmost importance to the successful conduct of campaigns and operations. It is what enables the conversion of national strategic objectives into a series of attainable military objectives. In turn, it enables each of these military objectives to be met due to the thorough preparedness that the act of planning engenders.

1.2 This publication is the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) primary planning doctrine publication. It describes broadly the methods and processes that the ADF uses to plan campaigns and operations within a joint, multinational and multiagency environment. The publication is structured as follows:

a. Chapter 1—‘Introduction’ establishes the conceptual context in which planning occurs, prior to defining the term ‘planning’ and discussing its importance to the ADF. This chapter then establishes the types of campaign and operation planning that the ADF undertakes, and summarises the ADF approach to planning.

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b. Chapter 2—‘Foundations of Planning’ discusses the ‘operational art’, ‘operational design’ and ‘arrangement of operations’ in detail. Together, these provide the intellectual framework underpinning joint planning in the ADF, and knowledge of their application is therefore a vital pre-requisite for successful planning.

c. Chapter 3—‘The Australian Defence Force Planning Framework’ provides an overview of the planning processes employed by the ADF. It summarises strategic and operational planning considerations, as well as detailing the inputs to, and outputs of, strategic and operational planning.

d. Chapter 4—‘Principal Organisations and Responsibilities’ describes the organisations within Defence and the ADF that contribute to the conduct of planning on a routine basis. ADF joint planning occurs within a whole-of-government and multinational context and organisations that contribute to multiagency and multinational planning are also described.

1.3 This publication provides overarching, philosophical level doctrine that describes the nature and scope of joint planning at the strategic and operational levels of conflict. Readers are encouraged to read this publication in conjunction with Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process, which provides application level guidance for operational and tactical level commanders and staff.

CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

1.4 This section provides a summary of the key overarching concepts that together establish the context in which joint planning occurs. While these concepts are vital to the discussion that follows, readers should bear in mind that they are only briefly summarised at this juncture. For a greater elaboration of each concept, see Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0—Campaigns and Operations.

Levels of conflict

1.5 The ADF recognises three levels of conflict: the strategic level (which can be sub-divided into national strategic and military strategic); the operational level; and the tactical level. These levels, which are graphically depicted in Figure 1.1, provide a useful framework for planning campaigns and operations and for ensuring that military activity aligns with strategic and policy goals.

1.6 Strategic level. The strategic level is concerned with the art and science of employing national power in a synchronised fashion to achieve the national end state and national objectives. The strategic level of conflict includes:

a. National strategic. The national strategic level is the broad political dimension of national activities, both domestically and internationally, and is the exclusive province of government. Mobilisation of national military and

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2 Throughout this chapter the terms ‘end state’ and ‘objectives’ are applied as they would be during the conduct of joint planning. For definitions of, and an elaboration about, these terms see chapter 2—‘Foundations of Planning’.
non-military resources occurs at this level. National strategic planners provide the overall direction for military strategic planners.

b. **Military strategic.** The military strategic level is where military strategic planning occurs to achieve the military component of the national strategic end state and objectives. The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) is responsible for setting the military strategic end state and for determining military strategic objectives, desired effects, critical coordination activities and the broad approach to be taken.

1.7 **Operational level.** At the operational level campaigns and operations are planned, synchronised and conducted to achieve strategic objectives. At this level, campaign and operational end states and objectives, and the sequence of tactical actions required to achieve them, are identified. The operational level provides direction and resources to force elements (FE) undertaking military action, thus acting as the interface between the strategic and tactical levels.

1.8 **Tactical level.** At the tactical level military tasks are planned and conducted to achieve operational objectives. Tactical military action integrates and applies kinetic and non-kinetic force to bring about desired effects. One or more joint task forces (JTFs), each comprising an appropriate mix of capabilities to enable them to meet operational objectives, normally conduct joint operations at the tactical level. Most JTF FE and the commanders of those FE conduct activities at the tactical level.

1.9 **Overlapping levels.** In practice the levels of conflict overlap and the distinctions between them may not always be clear. This has substantial implications for planning because tactical actions may have disproportionate desired or undesired operational or strategic level consequences. Conversely, tactical FE may be tasked directly by the military strategic level to achieve strategic effects. This potential for overlap, and its implications, needs to be considered during the conduct of joint planning.
Figure 1.1: The levels of conflict

Campaigns and operations

Definitions

**Campaign.** A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic end state or objective within a given time and geographical area.

**Operation.** A series of tactical actions with a common unifying purpose, planned and conducted to achieve a strategic or campaign end state or objective within a given time and geographical area.

1.10 To achieve the military strategic (and ultimately national strategic) end state and objectives, the ADF conducts campaigns and operations. A single conflict may involve the prosecution of a single campaign or several campaigns. If there is more than one campaign, these may occur sequentially or simultaneously. A campaign may include a number of phases, with each phase involving a single operation, or a series or array of operations.

1.11 The building blocks of campaigns are operations, and the building blocks of operations are actions at the tactical level. The essence of a campaign is the orchestration of operations and tactical actions to achieve the military strategic end
state. If tactical actions do not contribute to obtaining the desired end state, then, ultimately, they are wasted effort.

1.12 Not all operations need be part of a campaign. A campaign is not required if the intended end state is attainable through a single operation. Although the focus of operations is at a lower level than campaigns, the planning methodology is the same.

1.13 Campaigns and operations are joint, involving FE from two or more Services operating together under one commander. They may also be multinational, involving forces from two or more nations operating together under one commander. Campaigns and operations are also likely to occur in a multiagency context, with success requiring cooperation between the ADF, other government departments (OGD), inter-government organisations, and non-governmental organisations. Operations that have multinational and multiagency aspects require the development of a comprehensive approach that orchestrates, coordinates and de-conflicts military and non-military activities.

1.14 At the national strategic level, the Australian Government, through a whole-of-government approach, seeks to use a broad range of national assets to achieve national strategic objectives. Defence’s military strategic end state is subordinate to the national strategic end state and objectives, and may be only one step towards achieving them. Planning for campaigns and operations should, as far as practicable, synchronise with the needs and requirements of OGD.

1.15 For a more detailed discussion of multinational and multiagency planning considerations see chapter 4—‘Principal Organisations and Responsibilities’.

**Planning and the campaign cycle**

1.16 Campaigning is conducted in accordance with the campaign cycle, which consists of two parts: campaign design; and campaign management. Each part of the cycle consists of steps which intersect and overlap, and which may be sequential, simultaneous or cyclical, depending on the context in which a campaign is conducted and the manner in which it progresses.

1.17 Although simple in concept, the campaign cycle is dynamic in function. It is the basis for the integration of numerous processes and activities, potentially consisting of hundreds of tasks executed throughout a headquarters, subordinate formations, and FE. The campaign cycle is graphically depicted in Figure 1.2.

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3 For further information about command arrangements during multinational operations see ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control*.

4 For further information about multiagency coordination see ADDP 00.9—*Multiagency Coordination: Defence Contribution to Australian Government Responses*.
1.18 **The campaign cycle and operations.** Operations may be undertaken as part of a campaign, or as an independent activity. When undertaken as part of a campaign, a series of operations can occur either sequentially or concurrently. Based on national or military strategic objectives, campaign planning firstly determines the campaign objectives. It then determines the number and type of operations required to achieve these objectives. The planning of each operation identifies the tactical actions required to achieve the campaign objectives pertaining to that operation.

1.19 When an operation is conducted as an independent activity, it is nevertheless conducted in accordance with the campaign cycle. In this instance, operational planning focuses more directly on the interface between the national and military strategic end state and objectives, and tactical action.

1.20 **Campaign design.** Campaign design comprises the first two steps of the campaign cycle: gaining situational understanding; and planning. The focus throughout campaign design is the military strategic end state and its associated objectives. In broad terms campaign design determines and develops:

a. a campaign end state

b. campaign objectives
c. a campaign plan

d. assessment criteria.

1.21 This publication focuses on the campaign design part of the campaign cycle. While discussion is mainly concerned with planning, gaining situational understanding is also discussed because successfully completing this step is vital to enabling the planner to plan effectively.

1.22 Campaign management. Campaign management comprises the remaining four steps of the campaign cycle: preparation; execution; assessment; and adaptation. These steps are not substantially addressed in this publication because they relate to the conduct of campaigns rather than to the planning of them.\(^5\)

1.23 Deconflicting terminology: ‘campaign design’ vs. ‘operational design’. The terms ‘campaign design’ and ‘operational design’ are not synonymous. Throughout this publication the term ‘campaign design’ is used in reference to the campaign cycle and its constituent parts. The term ‘operational design’ is used to refer to a schematic that articulates the contemporary application of operational art.\(^6\) Readers should take care not to confuse these terms.

JOINT PLANNING

1.24 Planning is an activity of the mind guided by a process. Planning involves clearly identifying the end state and objectives to be achieved, identifying and selecting a preferred course of action (COA), describing how the COA is to be prosecuted and identifying the resources that will be required. Effective planning is a prerequisite for the successful conduct of campaigns and operations.

1.25 Effective planning breaks the campaign or operation into manageable pieces assignable as tasks. It is generally analytic and reductionist, in the sense that it provides a means for addressing complex problems in a manageable way. The most effective plans are comprehensive, clear, concise and direct.

1.26 Planning involves projecting thoughts forward in time and space to influence events before they occur. Rather than responding to events as they unfold, good planners anticipate these events. Planners contemplate and evaluate potential decisions and actions in advance; they visualise consequences of possible COA and determine whether they will contribute to achieving the desired end state. Good planning strives to reduce the effects of complexity during execution.

1.27 A plan is not a fixed succession of steps to be slavishly followed but, rather, is a solid foundation for adaptation to changing circumstances. Good plans seek to achieve objectives efficiently and economically, and retain a clear focus on the demands they are placing on those that will execute them.

\(^5\) For further details about these aspects of the campaign cycle see ADDP 3.0—Campaigns and Operations.

\(^6\) For further details about operational art and operational design see chapter 2—‘Foundations of Planning’.
Types of planning

1.28 Planning is conducted across Defence and meets diverse organisational objectives, including workforce and departmental structure development, and determination of Fundamental Inputs to Capability. This publication does not address the nature or methodology of planning that occurs in these areas. Rather, its focus is limited to campaign and operation planning and the methodology that enables this to occur. Where strategic and tactical level organisations are addressed, discussion is limited to the role these organisations play in relation to campaign and operation planning.

1.29 Campaign and operation planning falls into two broad categories: deliberate and immediate.

a. **Deliberate planning.** Deliberate planning is ‘planning for the possible’ and is concerned with identifying potential military responses to possible scenarios within a given timeframe. It is therefore largely assumption-based. Deliberate planning is intended to ensure that considered guidance for the employment of the ADF is available as a starting point for immediate planning. Deliberate planning is informed by Defence planning guidance, analysis of possible future strategic environments and quarterly strategic reviews. It may be initiated in response to a CDF Planning Directive or as a result of departmental processes, or may be self-initiated by a commander as a result of their own situational understanding of the operational environment and possible future requirements.

b. **Immediate planning.** Immediate planning is ‘planning for the likely or certain’. Because it is usually conducted in response to actual events it is more detailed and specific than deliberate planning. Immediate planning includes planning in a crisis situation (crisis planning), planning for future and current operations and planning for the termination of current operations. Immediate planning rests on close monitoring of an emerging situation. It is normally initiated in response to a CDF Planning Directive but may also be initiated by military strategic or operational level commanders. For crisis situations, the analysis of COA is truncated and the focus is on developing a timely response.

The Australian Defence Force approach to planning

1.30 ADF joint planning occurs within a whole-of-government context. Where the ADF is designated the lead planning agency, it will accommodate planning staff from other organisations within acceptable operations security limitations. Where the ADF is not the lead planning agency, it will provide appropriate personnel and information to facilitate Defence’s role within the planning team, noting that there is generally concurrent planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and that processes overlap.

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7 For further information about the nature of deliberate and immediate planning at the strategic and operational levels see chapter 3—‘The Australian Defence Force Planning Framework’.
1.31 In summary, the broad process for the planning of a new campaign or operation, or for changing the authorised scope of a current campaign or operation, is:

a. Campaign and operation planning begins when Government provides strategic guidance to CDF, or endorses a proposed military response to a likely or emergent crisis or threat. The Strategic Command Group supports CDF in developing a CDF Planning Directive.

b. The CDF Planning Directive is then issued to the operational level commander. Usually this commander will be the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).

c. Planners within the operational level headquarters staff use the joint military appreciation process (JMAP) to develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) based on the guidance provided by the CDF Planning Directive. The completed CONOPS is forwarded to CDF for approval.

d. The operational level staff then develops a campaign or operation plan and a proposed JTF composition based on the CONOPS.

e. Once Government approves the campaign or operation plan and the JTF composition, CDF and/or the operational commander (usually CJOPS) issue their orders.

1.32 For a more detailed description of ADF planning processes, including both strategic level planning and the JMAP, see chapter 3—‘The Australian Defence Force Planning Framework’.
CHAPTER 2

FOUNDATIONS OF PLANNING

Executive summary

- This chapter establishes the intellectual framework that underpins joint planning in the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
- This framework consists primarily of three components: operational art; operational design; and arrangement of operations.
- Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations.
- The key elements of operational art are divisible into two broad categories: operational design; and arrangement of operations.
- Operational design articulates the contemporary application of operational art. It synthesises classical notions of operational art with selected aspects of complex adaptive systems approaches.
- Arrangement of operations adds additional details to the broad outputs of operational design. It ensures activities are appropriately ordered to efficiently progress towards achieving the desired end state.
- There are some common planning errors that should be avoided, including planning in too much detail, inflexibly planning for certainty and over-adherence to process.

INTRODUCTION

2.1 The purpose of joint planning is to derive a military strategic end state and supporting military strategic objectives from national strategic objectives, and then to determine what operational objectives are required to attain the military strategic end state. Joint planning involves identifying what is to be achieved, identifying and selecting a preferred course of action (COA) and identifying the resources that will be required to implement it. To do this, planners must project their thoughts forward in time and space to attempt to influence events before they occur. In essence, therefore, planning is a cognitive process.

2.2 Like all cognitive processes, planning is guided by an underlying intellectual framework. Planners may either explicitly or implicitly understand this framework. However, the advantage of developing an explicit understanding is that it affords an opportunity to ensure that the process itself is comprehensive and that planning does not omit vital aspects.

2.3 This chapter establishes the intellectual framework that underpins joint planning in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This framework consists primarily of three components: operational art; operational design; and arrangement of operations. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first three sections each discuss one of these components and detail the constituent elements of that component. A fourth section highlights some common problems encountered during planning and establishes ways that they can be avoided.

**OPERATIONAL ART**

_In industrial conditions, the dual dimensions of tactics and strategy had to be intellectually connected by an ‘intermediate member’—or operational level of war. Only at the operational level could combat actions be forged into an ensemble and so provide the creative tactical material for extensive operations united by strategy._

Dr Michael Evans, 2004

2.4 Operational art is the mechanism used to link available resources (means) and tactical actions (ways) to the attainment of national and military strategic end states and objectives (ends), while taking into account possible costs (risk). A sound understanding of operational art is essential to the successful conduct of joint planning.

**Definition**

**Operational art.** The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions. It requires a commander to:

(a) identify the military conditions or end state that constitute the strategic objective
(b) decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state
(c) order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives
(d) apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

2.5 The key elements of operational art constitute a collection of ideas about how best to link discrete tactical actions to achieve overarching strategic objectives.

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These elements are divisible into two broad categories: operational design; and arrangement of operations. These categories and their constituent elements are introduced below.

2.6 The discussion below has been kept intentionally generic and theoretical. The precise application of operational art and related ideas may vary depending upon the specific planning process utilised, for example during conduct of the joint military appreciation process (JMAP). Commanders and planning staff should be aware of this potential for variation and, where necessary, take it into consideration during the conduct of planning.

**OPERATIONAL DESIGN**

2.7 Operational design is a schematic that articulates the contemporary application of operational art. It constitutes a synthesis between classical notions of operational art, developed during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries when conflict was dominated by large industrialised forces, and selected aspects of the complex adaptive systems approaches that have been developed during the early twenty-first century. In application, operational design promotes flexibility while maintaining simplicity and practicality. The symbiotic relationship between operational design and more traditional means of applying operational art through planning is perhaps best summarised by US Marine Corps General James N. Mattis.

\[
\text{Design does not replace planning, but planning is incomplete without design. The balance between the two varies from operation to operation as well as within each operation. Operational design must help the commander provide enough structure to an ill-structured problem so that planning can lead to effective action toward strategic objectives. Executed correctly, the two processes always are complementary, overlapping, synergistic, and continuous.} \\
\text{General James N. Mattis, 2009} \quad 4
\]

2.8 The elements of operational design that are elaborated below are:

- framing
- end state and operational objectives
- centre of gravity (COG)
- decisive points (DP)
- effects

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3 The JMAP is discussed in more detail in chapter 3—‘The Australian Defence Force Planning Framework’.

f. lines of operation (LOO).

**Framing**

2.9 Framing is a tool that may be used by commanders and their staff to develop a deeper situational understanding. It may be used when the commander assesses that they are confronting an interactively complex, ill-structured problem. When undertaken, framing usually occurs at the commencement of operational design.

2.10 **Complexity.** There are two types of complexity: structural and interactive. Structural complexity exists in a system made up of many parts, but where these parts interact in a predictable (usually linear) way. Interactive complexity exists in a system that is made up of many parts, but wherein those parts are able to interact with each other and with the system itself in many possible ways, which may change significantly over time. The second order, third order, etc., effects of this variety of interaction are very difficult to accurately predict, and are pervasive to the extent that they may even change the structure of the system itself. An interactively complex system is often also referred to as a complex adaptive system.

2.11 Although military operations have always been structurally complex, today it is widely understood that contemporary military operations are also interactively complex. As a result, operational problems are often ill-structured and the effects of any action cannot necessarily be taken for granted. Solving these problems requires first developing a detailed situational understanding, which includes developing an awareness not only of the components of the system, but also of their interactions with one another and of the functioning of the system as an integrated whole. Framing is a mechanism for reaching such a situational understanding.

2.12 **Types of frame.** There are two types of frame:

a. the environment frame

b. the problem frame.

2.13 **Environment frame.** The environment frame contextualises the operational environment (OE) by examining all the elements, conditions and circumstances that may influence the employment of capabilities and decisions of the commander during campaigns and operations. It questions what is going on in the environment and what the environment should look like at the desired strategic end state. Specifically, the environment frame considers:

a. How the OE developed from a historical and cultural perspective, how it currently exists (current conditions), possible future conditions, and how these relate to the desired strategic end state.

b. Own capabilities and current operational commitment.

c. Identifying one’s own assumptions about the nature of the OE, to enable rapid adaptation to change within it.

d. Which actors exist within the OE, along with their identity, history, culture, current state and future goals, and the development of relationships between actors.
e. The strategic intent of the threat, including its objectives, limitations, specific direction and time constraints.

f. Causes of conflict within the OE and between actors (which may be historical, economic, ethnic, or other).

g. Physical conditions within the OE (which may include major terrain features, major infrastructure and weather).

2.14 Problem frame. The problem frame aims to ensure that when facing an interactively complex, ill-structured problem, the 'right' problem has been accurately identified. The problem frame is a refinement of the environment frame that defines the areas for action that will transform existing conditions toward a desired end state. Problem framing involves isolating and understanding the root causes of the entirety of a problem. The core of the problem frame is the identification of the differences between the OE as it is now and the desired OE. The result is a narrative of what the problem is, which generally takes the form of a declarative statement.

Example of a problem narrative

`The lack of a government capable of exercising sovereign control in country X allows criminal and terrorist organisations to flourish, which in turn threatens regional stability.'`

2.15 The problem frame considers:

a. strategic level direction

b. status of current operations

c. the commander’s initial guidance, including time constraints and planning considerations, force preparation and capability requirements, and guidance from previous planning

d. intelligence updates.

2.16 Information requirements. Developing the environment and problem frames involves the review of various documents, directives and other inputs and is therefore likely to lead to the identification of gaps in knowledge about the situation. Identifying the information required to fill these gaps assists in accurately creating the environment and problem frames.
End state and operational objectives

Definitions

**End state.** The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of a campaign or operation, which indicates that the strategic objective(s) has been achieved.

**Operational objective.** An objective that needs to be achieved during a campaign or operation to enable the end state to be reached. Note: Correct assessment of operational objectives is crucial to success at the operational level.

2.17 **End state.** The end state is a desired future condition represented by a number of specific criteria that the commander wants to be in place for a campaign or operation to conclude or to proceed to a new phase. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates integration and synchronisation and helps manage risk. The end state is seldom fixed and is likely to evolve throughout the campaign or operation as opportunities or complications arise.

**Example of an end state**

‘Country X insurgency operations have ceased, AUS nationals in country Y are secure and ADF assets have been redeployed to AUS.’

(Note that the description is of a condition, not of the actions required to achieve it.)

2.18 **Operational objectives.** Campaign and operational objectives are determined by the relevant commander and represent tangible things to be achieved in order to arrive at the end state. (In other words, the sum total of the achievement of all operational objectives should equate to reaching the operational end state). Objectives are expressed in terms of one or more DP that need to be achieved.

Centre of gravity

**Definition**

**Centre of gravity.** A dynamic and powerful physical or moral agent of action or influence with certain qualities and capabilities that derive their benefit from a given location or terrain.

2.19 **Military actions never take place in a vacuum.** Instead, they are always conducted in an OE characterised in part by the presence of other actors. These actors may include, for example, one or more adversary forces, allied military forces, inter-government and non-governmental organisations, other government departments, and civilians.

2.20 **Although all actors have a COG, the primary focus of this section is on one particular actor: the adversary.** Defeating the adversary has traditionally been the focus of military action, and it has therefore been necessary for military planners to be able to develop a means to do this. COG analysis provides this means. The importance of the COG was perhaps best summarised by the term’s originator, the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz.
What the theorist has to say here is this: one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.

Major General Carl von Clausewitz, 1832  

2.21 In a more recent analysis, Dr Joseph L. Strange and Colonel Richard Iron offered a refined understanding of COG based on a comprehensive re-interpretation of Clausewitz and the various translations of his work. Their re-interpretation addressed many of the issues created by earlier understandings of the nature of COG and of COG analysis, and forms the basis of the definition of COG given above and the framework for COG analysis given below in paragraph 2.31.

2.22 Based on Strange and Iron’s re-interpretation, an adversary’s COG may also be construed as that thing or those things (noun), which the adversary possesses, that can stop the friendly force from achieving its desired end state; or the thing that the adversary requires to achieve its desired end state. The friendly COG can be construed in the same way (that thing or those things that allow the friendly force to achieve its desired end state, or to stop the adversary from achieving its own). According to this construing, the COG is important in relation to the achievement of the desired end state by either force. In other words, the adversary’s COG must be dealt with because of its potential to prevent the friendly force from achieving its desired end state. Defeating, destroying, neutralising or otherwise influencing the adversary’s COG in a desired way is therefore likely to constitute an operational objective that must be met before the operational end state can be reached.

2.23 COG may be either physical, such as an adversary’s military capability, or moral, such as the will to fight. They are also contextual and relative, and their existence depends upon each party’s view of the threats and the requirements to develop or maintain power and strength relative to their need to be effective in accomplishing their objectives. Therefore, commanders and planning staff must consider not only the adversary COG, but they also must identify and protect that of their own forces.

2.24 COG are likely to be different at each of the levels of conflict. At the strategic level, a COG is more likely to be moral: although it could be a military force, or a set of critical capabilities or functions, it is more likely to be an alliance, political or military leaders, or national will. At the operational and tactical levels, COG is more likely to be physical: it is often associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—such as a powerful element of the armed forces—but could also include other capabilities. In any planning activity, planners should focus on the COG of their own commander’s proximate adversary, however for the shaping, neutralisation, defeat or

5 Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Howard and Paret, pp. 595-6.

destruction of an adversary’s operational COG to undermine their strategic COG, the relationship between the two must also be determined and understood.

2.25 Before solidifying COG into the plan, planners should analyse and test the validity of the COG. The shaping, neutralisation, defeat or destruction of a valid COG should cause an adversary to change its COA or prevent an adversary from achieving its end state. If analysis and/or wargaming show that this does not occur, then perhaps planners have misidentified the COG, and they must revise their COG analysis.

2.26 The COG construct is also useful as an analytical tool to help commanders and their staff to analyse friendly and adversary sources of strength, weaknesses and vulnerability. This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost. Planners must continually analyse and refine their understanding of COG due to actions taken by friendly forces and the adversary’s reactions to those actions.

2.27 Characteristics that may be associated with a COG are shown in Figure 2.1. These characteristics highlight the need to achieve a mixture of flexibility and analytical rigour to successfully determine and analyse the adversary’s COG.

![Figure 2.1: Characteristics of centres of gravity](image)
2.28 In some situations there may be more than one adversary. Each of these has a unique COG related to their own objectives. The need to deal with multiple COG does not invalidate the COG analysis—it merely presents complications to the arrangement and sequencing of the actions that need to be taken to defeat each adversary’s COG. Specifically, the development of DP, LOO and phasing (these are discussed below) will need to take the multiple adversaries COG into account.

2.29 The adversary is not the only force that has a COG. Although the adversary COG has been the primary focus of this section, all actors within the OE will have a COG. Depending on the mission and desired end state, it may be important to consider the COG of other actors and the impact of these COG on one’s own operations. For example, if an actor comes under threat of adversary action, an analysis of its COG may provide the friendly commander with options for the best way to provide support to that actor. The conduct of COG analysis of other actors will need to take into account that actor’s objectives and end state relative to own and adversary objectives and end state, and may lead to the identification of additional DP, LOO and/or phases (discussed below).

2.30 One’s own forces also have a COG and this needs to be explicitly determined so that measures can be taken to protect it against threats. COG analysis therefore should be conducted for friendly forces. In some circumstances, for example humanitarian action following a natural disaster, there may be no adversary COG. In these cases, friendly force COG may be affected by physical conditions within the OE, or by actors which are not adversarial but which may nevertheless pose a threat to achieving the desired friendly force end state.\(^7\) Determining a friendly force COG is still relevant in these situations, but the associated critical vulnerabilities (discussed below) will be targetable—and will need to be protected—in a different way than they would when facing an adversary.

2.31 **Centre of gravity analysis.** Analysis of friendly, adversary and other relevant actor’s COG is a key step in operational design. Once COG have been identified, the commander and planning staff determine how to undermine adversary COG while protecting friendly COG and influencing other actor COG in the desired manner. Understanding the relationship between COG not only permits but also compels greater precision in thought and expression in operational design. Planners should analyse COG within a framework of three critical factors—capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities—to aid in this understanding.

a. **Critical capabilities.** Critical capabilities (CC) are the primary abilities that allow a COG to function in the context of a given scenario, situation or circumstance. In essence, they are what the centre of gravity does; its affect on something (verb). The centre of gravity is the source of power to effect its CC, which are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). When determining what constitutes a CC, the key word is usually a verb: a CC enables the COG to have an effect because it can

\(^7\) For this reason Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) refers to the broader concept of ‘threat COG’, rather than to ‘adversary COG’. For further details about the JIPOE see Chapter 3—‘The Australian Defence Force Planning Framework’.
destroy something, or seize an objective, or prevent friendly forces from achieving their desired end state.

b. **Critical requirements.** Critical requirements (CR) are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a CC to become or remain fully operational. Those things that are essential for the centre of gravity to achieve its critical capabilities. It must be noted here that the key term is ‘critical’. A system may consist of many things, but few are likely to be critical.

c. **Critical vulnerabilities.** Critical vulnerabilities (CV) are the CR, or aspects or components thereof, that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a way that will contribute to a COG failing to achieve its critical capabilities. Although rarely the neutralisation, defeat or destruction of a single CV will neutralise, defeat or destroy a COG, it is much more common that the targeting of multiple CV is necessary for the COG to be affected. In these instances, the cumulative effect of targeting multiple CV is what neutralises, defeat or destroys the COG. This cumulative effect can be achieved through the development DP that target an adversary CV, through the identification of desired effects, through the ordering of DP into LOO and through sequencing (these are discussed below).

2.32 Planners will understandably want to focus their efforts against the CV that will do the most decisive damage to an adversary’s COG. However, in selecting those CV planners must also compare their criticality with their accessibility, vulnerability, redundancy, ability to recuperate, and impact on the civilian populace, and then balance those factors against friendly capabilities to affect those vulnerabilities. Planners should also ensure that while they are seeking to neutralise, defeat or destroy adversary CV, they also take appropriate measures to protect friendly force CV from adversaries attempting to do the same.

2.33 The relationship between critical factors can be diagrammatically represented by a COG construct. A generic example of a COG construct is shown in Figure 2.2. In this example the relationships identified between each of the critical factors means that targeting CV 5, 6 and 7 will have the best chance of affecting the COG.
2.34 Analysis of adversary critical factors must be based on the best available knowledge of how adversaries organise, fight, think and make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. Commanders and their planning staff must develop an understanding of their adversaries’ capabilities and vulnerabilities as well as factors that might influence an adversary to abandon its objectives. They must also envision how friendly forces and actions appear from the adversaries’ viewpoints. Otherwise, they may fall into the trap of ascribing to an adversary attitudes, values, and reactions that mirror their own.

**Decisive points**

**Definition**

**Decisive point.** A geographic place, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. Note: This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.

2.35 A DP is an operational milestone that is considered to be a necessary step towards reaching the end state, achieving an operational objective, defeating an adversary’s COG or protecting the friendly force’s COG. DP set conditions that affect the adversary, friendly forces or the OE to the significant advantage of friendly forces.
Importantly, reaching a DP may require the completion of several tasks, actions or activities that will require the allocation of resources to achieve.

2.36 The characteristics of a DP include the following:

a. it is the articulation of a purpose, outcome, task or effect
b. it is measurable in terms of time, space and magnitude
c. it is expressed in the past tense.

Example of a decisive point

‘The adversary employment of close air support is denied by D – 2.’

2.37 DP can be physical in nature, such as neutralising, disrupting, destroying, capturing or gaining control of a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, a cache, an air base, a command post, critical boundaries, airspace, or communications facilities. In some cases, specific key events also may be decisive points, such as attainment of air or maritime superiority, triggering commitment of the adversary’s reserve, opening a supply route during humanitarian operations, or gaining the trust of a key leader. In still other cases, DP may have a larger systemic impact and, when acted on, can substantially affect the adversary’s information, financial, economic, or social systems.

2.38 Although COG are not usually DP, DP are often the key to attacking or protecting a COG. The most important DP can be determined by an analysis of critical factors. Understanding the relationship between a COG’s CC, CR and CV can illuminate direct and indirect approaches to neutralising, disrupting or destroying the adversary’s COG. It is likely that influencing CV in particular will constitute DP.

2.39 Although campaigns or operations may have numerous DP, only a few will have operational or even strategic significance. Identifying DP is a critical part of operational design. Normally there are far more DP than can be attacked, seized, retained, controlled or protected with the forces and capabilities available. Accordingly, planners should study and analyse potential DP and determine which offer the best opportunity to reach the desired end state, achieve an operational objective, defeat an adversary’s COG or protect the friendly force’s COG. Once a broad range of DP have been identified, the commander then designates the most important as the focus for further planning and allocates sufficient resources to produce the desired effects against them.

Effects

2.40 The Macquarie Dictionary defines an effect as ‘that which is produced by some agency or cause’. In the military context, an effect may be the physical,
physiological, psychological or functional impact on the adversary or on another key actor within the OE, as a result or consequence of own military or non-military actions.

2.41 Although more applicable at the higher levels of conflict, particularly campaign planning, potential effects at all levels must be considered as tactical level actions can have significant operational and strategic level effects. A chain of effects consists of the direct effects initially resulting from an action, and a subsequent series of effects that result from, or are triggered by, the effect of the initial action or a set of actions. These subsequent effects are often referred to as second order, third order, etc, depending on the extent of their removal from the initial, intended effect. Second and subsequent order effects can arise from the cumulative result of many other effects, both direct and indirect.

2.42 Effects are useful in campaign and operation planning but must be used with great care. Firstly, cause and effect chains are complex and difficult to comprehend, let alone predict. It is not possible to identify all possible effects that may result from an action. Some intended effects may never occur. Some may be generated by a particular action and may be able to be identified. Others may occur but may not be able to be identified or measured. Some unintended effects may also occur. These may or may not be able to be identified. While an intended first order effect may result from a particular action, and may be identified, that action may result in significant but unintended and unidentified second and third order effects.

2.43 This is part of the innate uncertainty of warfare and makes plans that rely on long chains of related effects particularly problematic. Short effects chains are more reliable and chains of a single link are the most reliable of all. Intended effects should be:

a. measurable
b. distinguishable
c. linked to one or more objectives.

2.44 Measurable results of a particular action may not appear for some time. This time lag not only complicates assessment enormously but it could slow the tempo of operations. A major difficulty lies in assessing effects and then deciding and implementing adjustments at a pace that supports the campaign or operation. The human dimension makes consideration of effects extremely difficult. However, commanders and staff should aim to envisage all potential effects of their actions, particularly unintended, adverse effects. When intended or unintended beneficial effects occur action must be taken to quickly exploit them. Similarly, action must be taken to quickly mitigate adverse effects.

2.45 In operational design, intended effects may be linked to the development of DP and in such cases they may be expressed as tasks to be given to subordinate force elements (FE). This achieves the goal of creating measurable and distinguishable effects that are linked to one or more objectives, although the possibility of adverse second and subsequent order effects must still be considered and mitigated against where possible.
### Example of effects in support of a campaign objective

**Campaign objective:** The sovereignty of country X is maintained.

**Supporting effects:**

1. Support is gained from the international community for the coalition protection of X’s sovereignty.
2. Defence of X is facilitated by its leadership’s rapid acceptance and reception of deployed coalition forces.
3. Denial of low level Y cross-border incursions into X’s territory is achieved.
4. Deterrence of Y’s aggression against X is achieved.

#### Lines of operation

2.46 Specific planning processes may employ effects verbs or unique military effects definitions that assist in the conduct of detailed effects planning. For more details of the effects definitions used within the ADF see ADDP 3.0—Campaigns and Operations.

2.47 In a campaign or operation, a LOO is a thematic line linking several DP in time and space on a path to the end state or to an operational objective. The LOO is a cognitive tool that helps in the conduct of operational design, its aim being to graphically represent the campaign or operation and by so doing, to assist commanders and planners to visualise its conduct.

2.48 A campaign or operation may have one or more LOO. A single LOO has the advantage of concentrating forces and simplifying planning. Multiple LOO, on the other hand, increase flexibility and create more opportunities for success. The decision to operate on multiple LOO will largely depend on the availability of resources.

2.49 At the strategic and operational levels, LOO may be used to functionally group activities such as combat, population protection, population support and/or reconstruction. When this occurs, LOO are likely to be mutually reinforcing and planners need to take into consideration the possibility that actions within one LOO may have either a positive or a negative impact upon actions or desired effects within other LOO.

2.50 A generic example of an operation with multiple LOO is shown in Figure 2.3. In this example each LOO is comprised of several DP (which are represented by the numbered triangles) and proceeds towards achieving an operational objective. Because defeating the adversary’s COG may be a prerequisite for achieving the end state, this may constitute an operational objective in its own right (this is represented by the inclusion of the COG as the third objective). Achieving all operational objectives will achieve the operational end state, which itself contributes to achieving either a military strategic objective (if the operation is part of a broader campaign) or the military strategic end state (if the operation is conducted independently).
Figure 2.3: Example of an operation with multiple lines of operation

2.51 To develop LOO, planners visualise how the operation should progress, consider each of the DP, and determine the optimal sequence in which they should occur. DP are grouped and organised along logical, complementary lines, based on conditions such as functionality, force availability, geographical location or type of effects required. When developing LOO, it is important that the activities, events and effects outside of the military sphere be considered, including the Australian Government’s application of other elements of national power.

ARRANGEMENT OF OPERATIONS

2.52 Arrangement of operations adds additional details to the broad outputs of operational design. These additional details are important because they allow commanders and planners to ensure that activities are appropriately ordered to be able to efficiently progress towards achieving the end state. Thinking about the arrangement of operations helps commanders and planners to determine the tempo of activities in time, space and purpose.

2.53 The specific elements of the arrangement of operations that are elaborated below are:

a. risk
b. culminating point
c. operational reach
d. sequencing
e. phasing
f. main effort (ME)
g. branches and sequels
h. assessment.
Risk

2.54 Risk management is a necessary component of campaign and operation planning, and is achieved by the systematic application of procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating and monitoring risk. Rather than being restrictive, thorough managing of risk, rather than simply avoiding it, is at the core of good planning. Planning processes, such as the JMAP, are tools that allow for the identification and management of risk to occur during planning.

2.55 Potential risks should be identified during campaign and operation planning and highlighted to the commander. The commander will determine the degree of risk they are willing to accept. The level of risk a subordinate commander is permitted to accept is known as their risk tolerance threshold.

2.56 Types of risk include risks to the success of the campaign or operation (what may cause the operation to fail?) and risks to the joint force (what losses are acceptable during the course of the operation?). Risks to the joint force should not be considered as a percentage based on force numbers, but rather should be considered in terms of capabilities. For example, if it is essential to the success of the operation that capability X can produce effect Y during phase 2, then risking the loss of capability X during phase 1 would be an unacceptable level of risk.

Culminating point

**Definition**

Culminating point. The point in time and location where a force will no longer be stronger than the adversary and risks losing the initiative.

Notes:

1. This may be due to reduced combat power, attrition, logistics, dwindling national will or other factors.
2. To be successful, the operation should aim to achieve its objectives before reaching its culminating point.

2.57 A culminating point may become evident during analysis of any COA and occurs when the current situation can be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. Reaching a culminating point constitutes a risk to the success of the campaign or operation. During offensive operations, a culminating point may be reached due to a number of factors including extended lines of communication, logistic exhaustion, stiffening adversary resistance, the erosion of combat power or strategic and political shifts. To be successful, a campaign or operation should aim to achieve its objectives before it reaches its culminating point.

Operational reach

**Definition**

Operational reach. The distance and duration across which a force element can successfully employ its military capabilities.
2.58 Operational reach is fundamentally linked to a FE’s culminating point and is therefore a form of risk to the success of the campaign or operation that needs to be considered during planning. Although operational reach may be constrained by the OE, it may be extended by the forward positioning of capabilities and resources. When developing LOO, planners should ensure that the FE allocated to a LOO have the operational reach to achieve their objectives and transition to the next phase of the campaign or operation.

Sequencing

2.59 Planning aims to reach the end state or to achieve an objective. It does this through the ordering of DP to form LOO. This ordering of DP into LOO, and the subsequent ordering of LOO into a logical progression in time, space and purpose is referred to as sequencing. There are several aspects of sequencing which need to be taken into consideration during planning. These include:

a. **Synchronisation.** Synchronisation allows for the execution of multiple related and mutually supporting actions, possibly across several domains and in different locations, timed to maximise their combined intended effects on the adversary.  

b. **Simultaneity and depth.** Simultaneity aims to paralyse the adversary command and control system by presenting it with so many simultaneous attacks or threats that it is unable to identify or implement a coherent response. Simultaneity is most impactful when it combines actions across all the domains and when it reaches into the adversary’s operational and strategic depth. Fully developed simultaneity denies an adversary force strategic direction, situational understanding, command and control, and support and manoeuvre. It is not an end in itself but, rather, lays a force open to the piecemeal destruction of its COG.

c. **Tempo.** Tempo is the rate of activity relative to the adversary, and comprises speed of adapting to changing circumstances, speed of decision, speed of execution, and speed of transition from one operation or action to the next. The belligerent that is able to consistently maintain higher tempo than its adversary tends to seize and retain the initiative and develop the campaign or operation on its own terms.

d. **Operational pauses.** Operational pauses are sometimes unavoidable. As a campaign or operation progresses, logistics demands, the desire to wait for more favourable circumstances within the OE, the need to reconstitute forces or a shift in the main effort may impose a need for an operational pause in order to avoid reaching the culminating point. However, operational pauses risk surrendering the initiative to the adversary—as friendly forces recover and reset so does the adversary—and so are only justifiable when there are no alternatives. As far as possible planning should seek to provide for the sustainment of superior tempo until the conclusion of an operation. This might impose a requirement for phasing.

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For further information about domains see ADDP 3.0—*Campaigns and Operations*. 

Edition 2
Phasing

Definition

Phase. A specific part of a campaign or operation that is different from those that precede or follow.

2.60 Once the DP and LOO have been developed, and sequencing has been determined, the commander may choose to divide the campaign or operation into phases. A phase is a discrete and identifiable activity across all LOO, usually having time or space dimensions that allow for the reorganisation and redirection of forces between each phase. Within each phase a commander identifies a specific ME for that phase.

Main effort

Definition

Main effort. A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area and time, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. It is linked to reaching the desired end state or to achieving an objective.

2.61 Each phase of a campaign or operation should have a designated ME. The ME may be a DP or the main LOO during that particular phase. It is what the commander thinks is going to be decisive and it provides the focus for the activity that is considered to be crucial to success in the campaign or operation, or in that phase of it. For this reason the main effort is linked to reaching the desired end state or to achieving an objective: what is identified as most likely to allow this to occur is designated as the ME. Supporting effort(s) should also be identified. Intelligence and logistics are examples of commonly identified supporting efforts.

Branches and sequels

2.62 The sequence of events leading to the desired end state is not rigid. A commander needs the flexibility to change the order in which activities occur, to rebalance across LOO and to shift the main effort. During planning this flexibility is aided by the identification and preparation of branches (variations from the base plan) and sequels (further development of the base plan).

Definitions

Branch. An option for a particular phase within a line of operation, designed to anticipate decisive points and provide the commander with the flexibility to maintain the initiative. Note: A branch is a deviation from, and then return to, the same line of operation.

Sequel. A significant shift in focus and identifies a different line of operation in a campaign or operation plan, which may or may not develop into a different course of action.

2.63 Commander's decision point. A commander's decision point (CDP) is a point along a LOO at which the commander must make a decision whether to continue to progress along the original LOO, or to deviate onto a branch or a sequel.
A CDP identifies the options available to the commander and the conditions that need to be set for each option. A CDP is represented diagrammatically on a LOO through the use of a numbered star.

2.64 **Branches.** A branch is a deviation from, then return to, the same LOO. The addition of a branch creates flexibility within a plan by anticipating situations that could require its alteration. Such situations may result from adversary action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or a change to conditions within the OE. The relationship between a LOO and a branch is graphically represented in Figure 2.4.

![Figure 2.4: A line of operation showing the position of a branch](image)

2.65 **Sequels.** A sequel is a move off of an initial LOO and onto a separate LOO, which may or may not achieve the same operational objective as the original LOO. Sequels anticipate and plan for subsequent operations based on a range of possible campaign or operational outcomes, such as the failure to successfully achieve a DP. The relationship between a LOO and a sequel is graphically represented in Figure 2.5. (In this case the sequel leads to achieving a different operational objective to that of the original LOO. This will not always be the case and sometimes a sequel will lead to achieving the initial operational objective, albeit without returning to the original LOO).

![Figure 2.5: A line of operation showing the position of a sequel](image)

### Assessment

2.66 Adaptation is the means by which the initiative is retained over potentially extended periods and against innovative adversaries in an ever-changing OE. Successful campaigning therefore requires that progress be measured in order to identify the need for change. ‘Campaign assessment’ is the term used to describe the
processes of monitoring and evaluating the progress of a campaign or operation towards achieving its objectives and end state.

2.67 Assessment is a continuing process that starts during planning and finishes after termination. Assessment measures include measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE). MOP and MOE are used in combination. MOP are used to determine whether tasks are being performed as intended, while MOE focus on whether the outcomes being sought are actually being achieved. MOE in particular rely on accurate situational understanding of the problem frame; of the logic used to arrive at the resultant underlying assumptions, approach, and campaign or operation concept; and ultimately, on the articulation of the plan itself.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE**

**PRACTICE OF OPERATIONAL ART: THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1914**

On 06 August 1914 the British Government requested that Australia send a military force to capture German territory in New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, and destroy German wireless stations in the Pacific. Australia quickly responded to the request, organising an Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (ANMEF) comprising of 1 000 soldiers and 500 naval reservists, under the command of Colonel William Holmes, DSO, MID.

The force commenced recruiting on 11 August and subsequently sailed from Sydney on 19 August. It stopped at Palm Island, off of the Australian coast near Townsville, on 24 August, so that it could conduct training and rehearse amphibious landings. Concurrently, HMAS *Australia* and *Melbourne*, and the French cruiser *Montcalm*, escorted a New Zealand force to German Samoa, where that force seized a German wireless station near Apia. These ships then sailed to Palm Island, where they commenced escorting the ANMEF.

On 02 September the force sailed to Port Moresby (then part of the Australian-controlled Territory of Papua), where it rendezvoused with a 500-strong contingent from Queensland as well as with several other naval ships, including HAMS *Sydney*. Colonel Holmes assessed that the Queensland contingent, which comprised of hastily mobilised reservists, was inadequately trained and equipped for the operation. He therefore decided to leave the Queensland contingent in Port Moresby.

The remainder of the ANMEF sailed from Port Moresby on 07 September. HMAS *Melbourne* was detached and steamed to Nauru, where she was tasked to destroy a German wireless station. Nauru surrendered without a fight when she arrived on 09 September, and it was subsequently found that the wireless station had already been disabled by its own staff.

The main force sailed to Rabaul, on the island of New Britain, arriving on 11 September and finding no German forces in the town. It conducted unopposed amphibious landings nearby at Herbertshöhe and Kabakaul, and then, leaving small forces to secure the landing sites, commenced advancing inland at 0700 h.

A small force of German soldiers and native policemen was encountered a few kilometres inland near Bita Paka. Several skirmishes were fought throughout the day with casualties taken on both sides. Increasingly outnumbered due to the landing of
Australian reinforcements, much of the German force surrendered at nightfall and the ANMEF had captured its objective, a wireless station at Bita Paka, by 1900 h.

Remaining German forces consolidated 19 kilometres to the west at Toma, which was besieged by the ANMEF from 14–17 September. During the siege, the ANMEF conducted a firepower demonstration against a nearby hill, which helped persuade the Germans to enter into negotiations. These were completed on 17 September and the last remaining German forces had surrendered by 21 September. German resistance subsequently collapsed throughout the territory and New Guinea came under Australian control for the remainder of the war.

Although they were quickly eclipsed in scale by Gallipoli and the Western Front, ANMEF operations in the Pacific present an excellent example of the Australian practise of operational art. This is the case not because of scale but because of function: the linking of strategic aims with tactical actions, as well as the synchronisation of joint operations in depth, both evidence the practice of operational art during the planning and conduct of ANMEF operations.
As a result of ANMEF operations, German wireless stations were destroyed across the Pacific. This had the strategic effect of denying communications to the German East Asia Squadron, which quickly sailed for South America, leaving the allies essentially unopposed in the Pacific and precipitating the surrender of German territories across the region.

**COMMON PLANNING ERRORS**

2.68 This section summarises some of the errors commonly encountered during the conduct of planning. Planners need to develop an understanding of these errors and their causes, so that they are able to avoid repeating them.

2.69 **Over-adherence to process.** Planning processes such as the JMAP can be strong tools for developing responses to well defined military problems. However, the doctrinal process may not be as directly applicable to some other activities in which the core problem is not a military one. Planners need to be prepared to adapt military planning processes such as the JMAP to fit the problem under consideration, rather than vice versa.
2.70  **Planning for certainty.** While planners anticipate, they should not predict. When a group of planners engages in a detailed planning process to determine possible adversary and friendly courses of action there is always the risk of it sliding into groupthink. Groupthink occurs when group members strive to achieve unanimity at the cost of realistically appraising alternative courses of action. It involves a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgment and is usually the result of intense in-group pressure to conform. Groupthink can lead to truncated or superficial attention being paid to the degree of uncertainty that typically prevails in real-world situations. One result of failing to accept uncertainty is the production of plans that are not sufficiently robust and that fail to provide a sound platform for adaptation to a changing situation.

2.71  **Planning group diversity.** A lack of diversity in a planning group risks leading to the omission of important perspectives or knowledge. Sometimes there is an imperative to restrict the diversity of the planning group. For example, to meet operations security requirements compartmented planning may be required, which may severely constrain the ability to consult a range of subject matter experts to ensure a high degree of certainty and accuracy. In these cases it may be necessary to constitute a ‘red team’ within, but independent of, the planning team to provide some diversity.

2.72  **Seeking too much detail.** Planning brings with it the temptation to over-engineer solutions to problems and to digress into unnecessary detail. Planners must always bear in mind the need to keep plans as simple as possible. This ensures that they minimise the chance for misunderstanding between themselves and those implementing the plan, while concurrently maximising their chances of completing a relevant plan in a timely manner.

2.73  **The presumption of detachment.** Once a planning staff engages with a problem they tend to develop an affinity with it. A planner’s ability to understand the problem, and to posture rational solutions to it, is at least partially hampered by irrational (and often unrealised) factors associated with their commitment. For example, once forces have fought over a piece of terrain it assumes an importance that may be completely unrelated to its military significance. Planners need to ensure that they take measures to remain as objective as possible when seeking solutions to problems.
CHAPTER 3
THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PLANNING FRAMEWORK

Executive summary
- This chapter provides an overview of the planning processes employed within the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
- Planning is conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict.
- The requirements of planning at each level vary and different approaches to planning are therefore required to ensure appropriate planning is successfully conducted at each level.
- Government provides national strategic guidance to Defence in a variety of ways, including through strategic policy documents such as the National Security Strategy and Defence White Papers.
- Based on this guidance, Defence conducts military strategic planning and produces several outputs, principally Chief of Defence Force Planning Directives.
- The ADF uses the joint military appreciation process to conduct campaign and operation planning.
- The joint military appreciation process includes: scoping and framing; mission analysis; course of action development; course of action analysis; and decision and concept of operations development. It is supported by the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment.

INTRODUCTION

3.1 Joint planning is conducted throughout the Australian Defence Force (ADF) at all levels of conflict. At the national strategic level Government provides strategic guidance to Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). Based on this guidance CDF and the Strategic Command Group (SCG) conduct military strategic level planning and derive their own guidance, which is given to operational level commanders.

3.2 Campaign and operation planning is based on strategic guidance. Orders developed as a result of campaign and operation planning are subsequently issued to tactical level commanders. Tactical level commanders each conduct their own planning based on their orders, the environment and the situation unfolding around them. Based on this planning they conduct tactical activities that work towards achieving operational and, ultimately, strategic level goals.

3.3 This chapter details the mechanisms used to enable the conduct of joint planning at each of the levels of conflict, as well as examining the relationships between planning at each level. The chapter is divided into three sections: strategic planning; campaign and operation planning; and tactical planning.
3.4 Planning to conduct campaigns and operations begins at the national strategic level with the provision by Government of strategic guidance to CDF. Military strategic level planning is undertaken based on this guidance, with the intent of providing direction from CDF to operational level commanders (the principal ADF operational level commander is the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS)).

3.5 In broad terms, strategic level planning seeks to:

a. Establish clear linkages between a campaign (or an operation conducted independently of a campaign) and the Government’s strategic priorities and direction.

b. Ensure policy making and planning are informed by a deliberate national strategy.

c. Provide a shared, coherent basis for operational level decision making by defining the linkages between strategic intent and campaign and operation planning.

Initiating strategic planning

3.6 Strategic level planning may be initiated in one of two ways. First, Government may direct CDF to undertake strategic planning for particular activities or contingencies. In this case, CDF receives national strategic guidance through one or more mechanisms, including the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) and the Quarterly Strategic Review (QSR) (these are elaborated below). Second, CDF may initiate military strategic level planning to ensure that the ADF is best prepared to provide Government with advice and options when it is called upon to do so.

Strategic planning considerations

3.7 Successful strategic planning requires the consideration of a wide range of factors. Key factors that should be considered by strategic planners include:

a. national strategic objectives and end state

b. capabilities and resources

c. campaign and operation partners

d. limitations

e. legal issues

f. risk

g. termination conditions

h. transition and exit strategy

i. intelligence

j. communications

k. operations security (OPSEC).

3.8 **National strategic objectives and end state.** Awareness of the national strategic objectives and end state allow commanders and their planning staffs to focus their efforts on achieving known, tangible national strategic goals. It also assists planners to identify national strategic level priorities and to determine what forces Government is prepared to commit to achieving them.

3.9 **Capabilities and resources.** Planners need to consider the civilian and military capabilities and resources that Government is prepared to commit to a campaign or operation, and ensure that they conduct planning within the scope of allocated capabilities and resources.

3.10 **Campaign and operation partners.** Every campaign or operation has partnerships at various levels. At the strategic level the primary partnership considerations are whether a campaign or operation will be an Australian or multinational (MN) operation (MNO), and whether it will be conducted exclusively by Defence or in partnership with other government departments (OGD). The type of partnership arrangement and the proposed partners guide negotiations on roles and responsibilities, and establishment of common objectives and end states.\(^2\) This includes consideration of whether:

a. **Australia will be the lead nation.** As the lead nation (LN), Australia is responsible for the majority of strategic and operational level planning and commanding the campaign or operation including negotiating troop contributions. LN responsibilities include providing the overarching command and control mechanisms and those elements of logistic support that are common across the MN force.

b. **Australia will be a supporting nation.** The complexity of the planning considerations as a supporting nation may be reduced as planners are not responsible for coordinating the command, control and integration of all contributing nations. This allows planning staff more time to plan Australia’s

\(^2\) For further information about multiagency and multinational planning see chapter 4—‘Principal Organisations and Responsibilities’.
contribution and its integration with the LN and its systems. However, balancing Australia’s national interests with the LN strategic objectives may need careful consideration.³

c. **Defence will be the lead agency.** When Government designates Defence the lead agency, Defence takes reasonable measures to accommodate the requirements of OGD that are also contributing to the conduct of a campaign or operation.

d. **Defence will be a supporting agency.** When Government determines that Defence is a supporting agency, Defence provides appropriate support to the designated lead agency.⁴

### 3.11 Limitations

The conduct of campaigns and operations is invariably subject to limitations. These limitations can circumscribe the political and/or strategic aims of an operation, the intensity of combat operations, the geographic extent of military action, the duration of hostilities, support of national objectives by the host and home populations, and the kinds of military operations and activities conducted. Limitations consist of constraints and restrictions.

a. **Constraints.** Constraints are actions imposed by a superior commander or another authority, which must be undertaken. Constraints may be derived from specified or implied tasks. An example is the tasking of a subordinate commander to maintain a reserve for employment that may be employed by the superior commander on order.

b. **Restrictions.** Restrictions are prohibitions on activities that a superior commander or another authority might impose. Restrictions may be legal (imposed by international and domestic laws); moral and ethical (these limitations are now very largely absorbed into international norms and values); or political (which include, in the case of multinational operations, what is considered acceptable by all contributing countries).

### 3.12 Legal issues

One type of restriction is the requirement to comply with international and domestic laws during the conduct of campaigns and operations. At the strategic level any possible legal issues arising from potential military actions will need to be identified during strategic planning. This includes determining the rules of engagement that apply to ADF personnel prosecuting a particular campaign or operation.

### 3.13 Risk

All military activities involve varying degrees of risk. The majority of tangible risks are mitigated through the application of risk management measures including standard operating procedures and coordination measures. Strategic

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³ For further information about the conduct of MNO see Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.3—Multinational Operations.

⁴ For further information about the multiagency coordination see ADDP 00.9—Multiagency Coordination: Defence Contribution to Australian Government Responses.
planning will need to determine the degree of acceptable risk in terms of adverse outcomes.

3.14 **Termination conditions.** Strategic planning will need to consider the conditions under which a campaign or operation should be terminated. The campaign or operation may be terminated when the national strategic end state is achieved or for some other strategic reason.

3.15 **Transition and exit strategy.** Once the military strategic end state has been reached, or if some other termination condition has been met, the campaign or operation may cease or may transition to a new stage, which may be led by another agency. Strategic planning will need to consider the requirements of this transition.

3.16 **Intelligence.** Intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing require considerable effort. In multiagency or MNO, sharing and/or withholding intelligence may facilitate or restrain informed decision making during strategic planning.

3.17 **Communications.** Communications includes those between ADF force elements as well as those between Defence and OGD, between Defence and other actors such as inter-government and non-governmental organisations, and between Australia and MN partners. In the early stages, these communication links are required for planning and integration. During the campaign or operation, they provide the means for all participants to coordinate their efforts.

3.18 **Operations security.** OPSEC is a significant concern for strategic level planning staff. At this level, personnel from a range of OGDs, other agencies and MN military partners may be consulted during planning. Much of the intelligence used as a basis for situational understanding and planning is sensitive. Defence planners will need to take the clearance level of personnel from other agencies into account when making arrangements to include them in planning.

**National strategic guidance**

3.19 National strategic guidance is given to Defence through a variety of means. These include publically available policy statements and classified communications. Based on this overarching guidance, a hierarchical range of documents is produced to provide further detail. The key national strategic guidance documents are briefly described below.\(^5\)

a. **National Security Strategy.** Australia’s first National Security Strategy, released in 2013, provides an overarching framework for Australian national security efforts and sets strategic priorities for the next five years. It explains Australia’s national security vision and objectives, examines Australia’s strategic outlook, and sets national security priorities.

\(^5\) Further information about each of these documents, except for the National Security Strategy, can be found in: Australian Government Department of Defence, The Strategy Framework 2010, Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2010. At the time of writing of this doctrine publication, the National Security Strategy can be accessed through the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet internet site.
b. **National Security Committee of Cabinet decisions.** The National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) issues directions to Defence and OGD as the result of deliberations and consideration of Cabinet Submissions.

c. **Defence White Papers.** Defence White Papers are Australia’s principal policy documents regarding Defence. They present the Government’s long-term national strategic direction as well as future capability requirements and constitute the paramount national strategic guidance document for use within Defence. Defence White Papers are unclassified to ensure transparency and accountability for Defence policy and plans.

d. **Other policy statements.** From time-to-time the Government produces other policy statements that provide direction to Defence. An example is the Counter-Terrorism White Paper.

e. **Defence Planning Guidance.** The DPG is the Government’s primary classified Defence planning document and Defence’s lead classified strategy document. It provides specific classified policy guidance that is reflected in the declaratory policy contained within the Defence White Papers; identifies the objectives and broad priorities that guide relationships with OGD and MN partners; and includes a strategic risk assessment and analysis of the future strategic environment, including identifying contingencies to which Defence may need to respond during the next 20 years. The NSC reviews the DPG annually and recommends any necessary adjustments. This ensures that the DPG provides up-to-date guidance between the release of Defence White Papers.

f. **Quarterly Strategic Review.** The QSR advises CDF and the SCG of potential changes in Australia’s strategic environment and of strategic level issues that may arise within the next three to 24 months. The QSR examines issues that may require a change to force posture or readiness in response to an emerging or changing situation. The QSR is developed through a consultative process between several Defence Groups and Services and is approved by CDF.

g. **Strategy papers.** Strategy papers are written about specific issues and provide policy options, policy direction, or a discussion of pertinent issues that may be referred to internally within Defence or written to inform a whole-of-government approach. Some strategy papers are developed with MN partners and address issues of mutual interest. Strategy papers are classified and draw on guidance given within the DPG, the QSR and other strategic guidance documents.

h. **Australian Capability Context Scenarios.** The Australian Capability Context Scenarios are a classified collection of scenarios that are linked to higher priority contingencies in the DPG and reflect possible circumstances under which the future joint force may be employed. They form the basis of Force Structure Reviews that inform Defence White Paper development, as well as enabling the conduct of scenario-based strategic planning.

i. **Military strategic level doctrine.** Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-Doctrine (ADDP-D)—*Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine* is the ADF’s
capstone joint doctrine publication. It outlines the Australian approach to warfare and provides broad military strategic level guidance that assists in the conduct of planning at the military strategic level.

Military strategic level planning outputs

3.20 Military strategic level planning results in several outputs. These may include:

a. CDF Planning Directives
b. Ministerial and Cabinet submissions
c. CDF orders, which include warning orders (WNGO), alert orders (ALERTO), execute orders (EXECUTO) and cease orders (CEASEO).

3.21 Chief of Defence Force Planning Directive. The principal output of deliberate planning at the military strategic level is the CDF Planning Directive. CDF Planning Directives are developed in response to national strategic guidance. Each CDF Planning Directive contains specific guidance for use during the conduct of campaign and operation planning. For operational level commanders such as CJOPS, the receipt of a CDF Planning Directive is the trigger to commence planning for a specific campaign or operation.

3.22 A CDF Planning Directive is produced by a coordinated process involving:

a. Military Strategic Commitments
b. Strategy Executive (specifically, Strategic Policy Division and International Policy Division)
c. Defence Intelligence Organisation
d. Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)
e. Service Headquarters
f. other Defence Groups and OGD as necessary.\(^6\)

3.23 CDF Planning Directives are produced in two parts, as shown in Figure 3.1.

a. Part A focuses on the strategic context, including national and military strategic interests, priorities and objectives. This part also articulates the strategic risk and the relevant engagement aspects applicable to the planning requirement. Development of Part A is led by Strategic Policy Division, with contributions being made by the other organisations identified in paragraph 3.22 where applicable.

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\(^6\) For further information about each of these organisations see chapter 4—‘Principal Organisations and Responsibilities’.
b. Part B provides CDF intent and planning direction. It may include a mission statement and will outline tasks, additional planning factors, limitations and the planning timeline. Development of Part B is led by Military Strategic Commitments, with contributions being made by the other organisations identified in paragraph 3.22 where applicable.

3.24 Development of Parts A and B is normally sequential, but if time constraints do not permit this then the two parts can be developed concurrently. The developed CDF Planning Directive, comprising both Parts A and B, is cleared by Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), Deputy Secretary Strategy and CJOPS and is then submitted to CDF for endorsement, which is done in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Defence.

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CDF Planning Directive
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
Background

PART A - STRATEGIC CONTEXT
National Strategic Level
   National Strategic Interests
   National Strategic Priorities
   Relationships and Engagement
   Strategic Risk

Defence Strategic Level
   Defence Strategic Interest
   Defence Strategic Objectives
   Defence Strategic End state

PART B - PLANNING DIRECTION
CDF Intent
   Purpose, Method and End state

   Proposed Mission
   Although likely to be proposed by CJOPS during back brief to Strategic Command Group

   Tasks
   Additional Planning Factors
   Limitations
   Planning Timeline
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Figure 3.1: Chief of the Defence Force Planning Directive format

3.25 **Ministerial and Cabinet submissions.** The SCG provides advice to CDF on the preferred option(s) to be referred to the Minister for Defence via a Ministerial Submission or to the NSC via a Cabinet Submission. The NSC formally approves military options. Alternatively, the NSC may endorse an option(s) for further development.

3.26 **Chief of Defence Force orders.** CDF orders are prepared by Military Strategic Commitments and released by the Head of Military Strategic Commitments on CDF’s behalf. They are issued to the operational commander (usually CJOPS) to facilitate operational level planning and force preparation, advise of changes in strategic guidance and of circumstances that will impact upon an ongoing campaign or operation, and to cease a campaign or operation. There are four types of CDF orders.
a. **Warning order.** The purpose of a CDF WNGO is to inform planning at the operational level. A CDF WNGO draws upon guidance contained in a number of national strategic guidance documents, as well as the CDF Planning Directive and any directions provided by the Strategic Command Group. An example of the format of a CDF WNGO is in Annex 3A.

b. **Alert order.** The purpose of a CDF ALERTO is to direct Service Chiefs to force assign force elements to the operational level commander for a campaign or operation. The CDF ALERTO draws upon a number of strategic guidance and planning documents including the CDF Planning Directive and the CDF WNGO. If a WNGO has not previously been issued, the ALERTO may initiate campaign and operation planning. An example of the format of a CDF ALERTO is in Annex 3B.

c. **Execute order.** The CDF EXECUTO authorises the commencement of a campaign or operation. An example of the format of a CDF EXECUTO is in Annex 3C.

d. **Cease order.** CDF will issue a CEASEO to order the termination of an operation. Receipt of a CDF CEASEO may constitute the trigger for an operational commander to commence termination or transition planning, if this has not been previously initiated. An example of the format of a CDF CEASEO is in Annex 3D.

**Deliberate and immediate planning at the strategic level**

3.27 The distinctions between deliberate and immediate planning are not fixed but, generally, deliberate planning focuses on longer-term possibilities while immediate planning focuses on near-term probabilities or on responding to events that are presently occurring. Although there is no fixed timeframe for either type of planning, at the strategic level the focus and scale of planning often results in the need for greater timeframes to ensure that plans can be adequately implemented. For example, a situation requiring a very large scale response or a degree of national mobilisation may represent a crisis even though several months are available for preparation.

3.28 The relationship between deliberate and immediate planning at the strategic level is shown in Figure 3.2. It should be noted that the timeframe shown is indicative only.
3.29 **Deliberate planning.** The development of the aforementioned national strategic guidance documents is the product of deliberate planning conducted at the national strategic level. The DPG in particular informs capability development and reviews of the DPG may lead to the production of CDF Planning Directives. As a result of reviews of the DPG, or in the wake of a revision of the QSR, strategy papers may be written to canvass policy options for specific circumstances. Together, these three documents provide the trigger for deliberate planning at the military strategic level.

3.30 **Immediate planning.** Immediate planning at the strategic level is designed to rapidly develop military options to respond to a likely or certain event that will happen soon or is happening now. As far as possible, immediate planning at the strategic level should follow the same process as deliberate planning at the strategic level, however this process will need to be adapted to fit within the time available.

3.31 Immediate planning is often initiated following a significant unforeseen event or the onset of a crisis. In most cases the SCG will convene to consider the situation. An interdepartmental emergency task force (IDETF) may be formed by government to begin formulating a whole-of-government response to a crisis. In such situations, Defence may either be appointed as lead agency or as a supporting agency.

### HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

**AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC PLANNING DURING WORLD WAR II**

Prior to World War II Australian military and political leaders had not, with limited exceptions, been involved in strategic decision making. The lack of clearly defined high level command machinery did not seem to be a problem when Australian forces were operating under British commanders prior to and early in the War. In mid-1941, however, when the Government began to consider the defence of Australia, critical problems arose. As war with Japan approached the Government began to prepare strategic decision making machinery.

The War Cabinet, a sub-committee of Cabinet, emerged from the peace-time Council of Defence as the lead agency for Australian war participation. Although the War
Cabinet did not include permanent Service representatives, it was advised by the Defence Committee and each Service’s Chief of Staff advised it on operational issues and provided appreciations on request. The Defence Committee included the Chiefs of Staff, an officer of the secretariat of the Department of Defence, and intermittently the Controller General of Munitions, Controller of Civil Aviation, and Chairman of the Principle Supply Officers Committee.

**Australia’s first War Cabinet meeting, held on 27 September 1939 and chaired by Prime Minister the Right Honourable Robert Menzies, KC**

An Advisory War Council was established in October 1940, incorporating members from all Parliamentary parties in an effort to instil political stability within Government strategic decision making. The Advisory War Council became the focal point of Australian strategic decision making until the arrival of US Army General Douglas MacArthur. The absence of the Department of External Affairs from the War Cabinet in the period 1940–41 stands in stark contrast to the level of influence the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade exerts during strategic decision making today.

The then-Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Robert Menzies, KC, led the early strategic decision making machinery. He often relied heavily on advice given by the Secretary of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden, OBE, especially when the Chiefs of Staff were divided over an issue. The military had a vital but indirect role in emanating strategic ideas, but in most cases their advice was heavily filtered through Shedden’s secretariat and they were insulated from meaningful joint command. Communications, proclamations, plans and Cabinet Submissions were prepared and held in readiness by Shedden.

The absence of an organisation to provide for high level joint operational command of the forces was a fundamental weakness. The Chiefs of Staff exercised no joint and little Service command function. This lack of strategic level joint command was to prove a major difficulty as the War with Japan developed in littoral terrain, demanding the speedy development of coordinated air, sea and land operations. The lack of coherent deliberate military strategic planning guidance formulated from an Australian perspective caused the Advisory War Council to repeatedly defer
decisions until strategic advice and estimates were available from Britain.

The conflicting demands of home defence and Imperial defence contributed to what was a less than cohesive deliberate planning process. One result was the under-planning for homeland defence based on the false assumption of Singapore’s impregnability. As the Japanese threat began to materialise in 1941 Australia was locked into an Imperial rather than an independent strategy, which would have better addressed Australian national security interests. The optimism that had driven strategic policy through the first year of the war became less and less tenable in the face of Japanese activity.

The February 1941 War Cabinet meetings marked a significant turning point in Australian strategic decision making. Prime Minister Menzies convinced the Advisory War Council to appreciate the differences between Australian and British strategic outlooks, objectives and priorities. This was quickly followed by the realisation that neither the United States nor Britain would be able to help Australia should the Japanese push south. However, Australia’s strategic infrastructure had rapidly and dynamically matured to meet the new challenges. Through the tumultuous 1940–41 period Australia began to create its first authentic, autonomous strategic decision making machinery.

Australia’s inaugural strategic decision making machinery was forged during a war of national survival. Unlike during the First World War, Australia demanded influence over the strategic use of its forces during World War II. This strategic influence was played out in both the Imperial context and in a global alliance context, and focused Australia’s efforts on still-emerging, but distinctly Australian, national interests. In doing so the Government laid the foundations of modern Australian strategic policy formulation and planning.

CAMPAIGN AND OPERATION PLANNING

3.32 This section describes campaign and operation planning at the operational level. It is at this level that commanders use operational design and arrangement of operations to develop creative ways to employ tactical means to achieve an operational end state or a military strategic end state or objective. The section first discusses the initiation of operational planning and secondly addresses inputs into operational level planning. It then lists operational level planning considerations before providing a brief overview of the operational level planning process. Finally, it summarises the key outputs of operational level planning.

3.33 In the ADF, the operational level of conflict is the primary responsibility of CJOPS. Depending on the nature and scale of an operation, and within the constraints of any amplifying directive released by CDF, CJOPS may directly command ADF campaigns and independent operations on behalf of CDF. Other ADF operational level commanders include Commander Border Protection Command and Commander Deployable Joint Force Headquarters. These commanders exercise

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For further information about operational design and arrangement of operations see chapter 2—‘Foundations of Planning’.
limited command authorities and command forces in a narrower variety of situations than CJOPS.\(^8\)

**Initiating campaign and operation planning**

3.34 Planning for campaigns and operations may be initiated in two ways. First, the operational level commander may receive a CDF Planning Directive or CDF orders, which will trigger the conduct of operational planning. Second, the operational level commander may initiate campaign or operation planning on their own initiative. For example, CJOPS may initiate deliberate planning to develop military response options to an anticipated event or situation.

**Inputs into campaign and operation planning**

3.35 Campaign and operation planning is informed by the military strategic level planning outputs that are described in the previous section. These outputs include CDF Planning Directives and various types of CDF orders.

3.36 There is not necessarily a linear flow between military strategic level planning outputs and the conduct of campaign and operation planning. Especially in cases where immediate planning is required in response to an unfolding situation, strategic and operational level planning may be undertaken concurrently. In these cases operational level planning will need to be adjusted to take into account military strategic guidance as the relevant military strategic level planning outputs are received by the operational level commander and their planning staff.

**Campaign and operation planning considerations**

3.37 Successful campaign and operation planning requires the consideration of a wide range of factors. Planning considerations specific to campaign and operation planning include:

a. national strategic and political considerations
b. limitations
c. Service Chief’s advice
d. force availability and rotation
e. readiness
f. logistics support arrangements, including contractors and finances
g. liaison with other nations and agencies
h. force design and generation.

\(^8\) For further information about the roles of these commanders and their organisations see chapter 4—‘Principal Organisations and Responsibilities’.
3.38 **National strategic and political considerations.** National strategic interests should determine the nature and level of ADF involvement in any Australian response. Additionally, any significant change in public support to an operation may influence the political limitations imposed. For example, should popular support for ADF participation in a MNO decline, political limitations may reduce the level and/or type of commitment.

3.39 **Limitations.** The conduct of campaigns and operations is invariably subject to limitations. Limitations, which are detailed in paragraph 3.11, include constraints (which are actions imposed by a superior commander or another authority, which must be undertaken) and restrictions (which are prohibitions on activities that a superior commander or another authority might impose).

3.40 **Legal considerations.** All ADF campaigns and operations must be legitimate and must be planned and conducted in accordance with Australian and international law, including treaties and customary international law. Rules of engagement are issued by the Government and provide operational and tactical level guidance about the legal restrictions placed upon a force. These legal considerations are a form of restriction (see paragraph 3.11b).

3.41 **Service Chief’s advice.** The Service Chiefs provide advice to operational level commanders and to their Services about the anticipated nature and degree of Service contributions to a joint force. This guidance is refined through the planning process to identify what capabilities are suitable and can be provided, how they could be most effectively employed, and when they will be ready for deployment.

3.42 **Force availability and rotation.** The forces available for a campaign or operation should be identified in the initial phases of campaign and operation planning. Depending on the anticipated task and duration of the campaign or operation, it may be necessary to develop force rotation cycles to achieve campaign and operation objectives and to balance new and existing commitments.

3.43 **Readiness.** Any shortfall in the level of readiness of the forces to be utilised should be identified. For example, if pre-deployment training is necessary for a specific campaign or operation, the cost in resources and time should be factored into the plan.

3.44 **Logistic support arrangements, including contractors and finances.** The available logistic support and financial/funding arrangements, including any shortfalls and the possible use of contractors, are all examined in the early stages of campaign and operation planning. Often, establishing robust logistic support will take longer than the preparation of tactical forces and early logistical preparation may remove a potential brake on the campaign or operation’s development.

3.45 **Liaison with other nations or agencies.** MN and whole-of-government approaches demand that relationships are established with potential partners. The exchange of liaison officers for operational planning purposes serves to strengthen the relationships between partners but needs to be subject to the demands of OPSEC.

3.46 **Force design and generation.** Throughout the campaign design part of the campaign cycle, commanders and staff consider the force elements (FE) and
capabilities required and identify which FE and capabilities are available. Toward the end of the campaign design part of the cycle, campaign and operation plans are modified and a force designed to accommodate differences between the optimum force required to conduct and sustain the campaign or operation effectively and the forces actually available, including personnel, equipment and facilities.

3.47 The following considerations are influential in force design:

a. **Single-Service responsibilities.** The Service Chiefs have a statutory role in exercising full command of their services and will have responsibilities for issues such as technical control that extend throughout a campaign or operation. Their input is central to the processes of force design.9

b. **Roles and tasks.** Any campaign or operation plan is likely to require the performance of a large number of tasks. FE are identified that have the requisite characteristics for the tasks that are required of them. In some cases FE will be employed outside their primary role either because they are ready and available or because no FE exists on the order of battle that can fulfil the specific requirements.

c. **Established versus ad hoc structures.** Combining various FE that complement each other into ad hoc groupings can markedly improve force effectiveness. At the operational level decisions are made that balance ad hoc groupings against the risks raised by relative unfamiliarity and the reduced short-term flexibility this engenders.

d. **Force provider versus force employer.** Inherent in joint activities and particularly pronounced at the operational level, the force provider is not usually the force employer. This is inevitable in the formation of joint task forces (JTF) but creates pressures for comprehensive mission rehearsals and work-up training.

e. **Force options and risk.** In the process of force design there is often a tendency to base the force on the details of the original campaign or operation plan. This may lead to an austere force with little redundancy or flexibility. The risk presented by such a force is that it may not be sufficiently flexible to adapt as required during the conduct of a campaign or operation. Appropriately balanced forces are normally better able to deal with the expected dynamism of conflict.

f. **Force availability.** Different FE are held at differing levels of preparedness based on the needs identified in the QSR, the Operational Preparedness Directive and by deliberate strategic planning. In the event that an unforeseen need arises the decision may need to be taken to either incorporate FE that are not fully prepared or that are not a close fit to the

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9 For further details about full command, technical control and other states of command see ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control.*
tasks to be performed. Each of these approaches engenders a degree of risk that will need to be recognised, articulated and mitigated by planners.

g. **Sustainability and rotation.** Campaigns and operations may require the sustainment of effort over months or even years. Sustainability will need to be carefully considered during campaign and operation planning. Critical equipment may be damaged or suffer low reliability due to operating conditions or rate of effort, key personnel may become casualties or require rotation, and FE can be replaced by trickle feeding individuals or by rotating as formed units. Sustaining the effort required for the time needed is a fundamental aspect of force design.

3.48 CJOPS is the ADF’s designated force design authority. In this capacity CJOPS makes recommendations to CDF about the composition of JTF to be deployed on campaigns and operations.

**Joint military appreciation process**

3.49 ADF campaign and operation planning is conducted using the joint military appreciation process (JMAP). The JMAP employs the operational art systematically through the application of operational design and arrangement of operations, to ensure the production of creative, robust and appropriate plans supported by the allocation of sufficient resources.

3.50 The JMAP and the supporting Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) are diagrammatically represented in Figure 3.3.

![Joint Military Appreciation Process and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment](image)

**Figure 3.3: Joint military appreciation process**

3.51 It should be noted that the elements of operational design and arrangement of operations, which are detailed in chapter 2—‘Foundations of Planning’, are each applied within a particular part of the JMAP or the JIPOE, although the exact part varies for each element. For example, framing occurs during the scoping and framing step of the JMAP, while friendly centre of gravity (COG) analysis occurs in the mission analysis step and threat COG analysis occurs as part of the JIPOE. This
delineation ensures that planning occurs in accordance with a well defined and structured process.\textsuperscript{10}

3.52 **Deconflicting terminology: ‘joint military appreciation process’ vs. ‘joint operation planning process’**. The ‘joint operation planning process’ is the name applied within USA joint doctrine to describe the USA military’s equivalent to the ADF’s JMAP. Members of the ADF should be aware of this discrepancy in nomenclature, especially when serving in multinational environments.

3.53 **Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment**. JIPOE provides integral support to the JMAP. The purpose of JIPOE is to develop and maintain the situational understanding of the commander and planning staff. The JIPOE effort is continuous, product oriented and future focused. Intelligence agencies provide essential inputs to the JIPOE outputs.

3.54 JIPOE requires the conduct of a thorough analysis of the operational environment, including its geospatial, infrastructure, weather, terrain, social, political, legal and cultural elements, and their influences and effects on potential friendly and threat courses of action (COA). JIPOE also requires a detailed analysis of a full range of possible threat COA, which should always include the threat’s most likely and most dangerous COA, and the conduct of a detailed threat COG analysis.\textsuperscript{11}

3.55 Full details of the JIPOE and its constituent components are contained in Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 2.0.1—*Intelligence Procedures*.

3.56 **Joint military appreciation process**. The JMAP employs elements of operational design and arrangement of operations to enable the conduct of detailed campaign and operation planning. JMAP has five steps.

a. **Step 1: Scoping and framing**. Scoping and framing contributes to the development of situational understanding. Scoping and framing may include:

   (1) examining the requirements identified (implicitly and explicitly) within the commander’s initial guidance

   (2) identifying initial force preparation and capability requirements

   (3) seeking guidance from previous deliberate or immediate planning activities

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\textsuperscript{10} Precise details about which elements of operational design and arrangement of operations are conducted in which part of the JMAP and JIPOE are given in the documents that correspond to these processes. These documents are: ADFP 2.0.1—*Intelligence Procedures* (for JIPOE); and ADFP 5.0.1—*Joint Military Appreciation Process* (for JMAP).

\textsuperscript{11} For further information about COG and COG analysis see chapter 2—‘Foundations of Planning’.
(4) conducting framing to ensure the correct problem has been identified and will be subsequently addressed during the conduct of planning.\footnote{12}

b. Outputs of scoping and framing include the environment and problem frames, a listing of information requirements in priority order, confirmation of the commander’s initial planning guidance, identification of the desired end state, and the initial identification of types of FE that may be required to conduct the impending campaign or operation.

c. **Step 2: mission analysis.** Mission analysis (MA) ensures that the superior commander’s intent is clearly understood and focuses planning within the boundaries of that intent. MA assists to identify the mission and associated tasks that are essential to successfully satisfying the superior commander’s intent and achieving the desired end state. MA results in the creation of a clearly articulated mission statement and clearly understood commander’s guidance, the identification of objectives, decisive points (DP) and corresponding effects, and the sequencing of DP to form lines of operation.

d. The main inputs to MA are the superior commander’s planning guidance, for example a CDF Planning Directive or WNGO, or a directive issued by the operational level commander. Scoping and framing, and JIPOE, are also key inputs into MA, and staff from all headquarters branches and specialist functional areas should also provide additional input. These inputs enable planning staff to identify the factors of friendly force time and space, emphasise specialist support issues, and assist in identifying the friendly COG and conducting a COG analysis (which is another output of MA).

e. **Step 3: course of action development.** The aim of COA development is to create a number of appreciably different COA. These COA should be achievable and allowable, meet the superior commander’s intent and the campaign or operation objectives, and sufficiently detailed to be analysed in the next step of the JMAP, COA analysis.

f. COA development combines the military knowledge, experience and imagination of planning staff and the application of operational art to develop a number of different friendly COA. Critical at this step in the JMAP is the review of the products of MA and JIPOE. Equally important in COA development is the visualisation of the intended plan by understanding the broad concept of scheme of manoeuvre.

g. **Step 4: course of action analysis.** COA analysis is the process of analysing friendly COA against adversary COA using a selected war gaming method. (A war game is a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation. Human cognition and operational art are also used in war gaming to validate and verify each friendly COA against each adversary COA, in a real or assumed situation).

\footnote{12}{For further information about framing see chapter 2—‘Foundations of Planning’.
h. The output of COA analysis is a number of improved and viable COA. Improvements are identified and recorded during the conduct of the war game and the COA that were developed during COA development are subsequently modified to incorporate these improvements.

i. **Step 5: Decision and concept of operations development.** In this final step of the JMAP, the operational level commander (usually CJOPS) compares the strengths and weaknesses of each friendly COA and decides which COA is to be developed into a concept of operations (CONOPS). Once developed, the CONOPS is passed to the military strategic level commander (CDF) for approval.

3.57 Full details of the JMAP and its constituent steps are contained in ADFP 5.0.1—*Joint Military Appreciation Process*.

3.58 **Plan development and execution.** Once approved, the CONOPS forms the basis of a campaign or operation plan (OPLAN). The OPLAN and supporting plans are finalised and promulgated through a campaign or operation order (OPORD) or a campaign or operation instruction (OPINST). Further details about OPORD and OPINST are in Annex 3E.

3.59 Execution of a plan involves issuing orders, monitoring and assessing the plan through to completion and continually synchronising and coordinating activities until a CEASEO is executed. Upon the execution of the OPLAN, the operations staff within a headquarters manages the day-to-day execution and monitoring of the plan. Planning staff may assist with the monitoring function and may also plan additional branches and sequels as required. Careful synchronisation and coordination between execution of the OPLAN and supporting plans is crucial to the success of the campaign or operation.

**Deliberate and immediate campaign and operation planning**

3.60 Similarly to planning at the strategic level, both deliberate and immediate campaign and operation planning should follow the same planning process. However, this process will need to be adapted to fit within the limited time available during the conduct of immediate planning.

3.61 This notwithstanding, the conduct of deliberate campaign and operation planning may involve the production of unique outputs, such as an Australian Operational Concept (AOC), which provide guidance of a broad, flexible and longer-term nature. Due to the shorter timeframe, this type of output is not required for immediate planning.

**Campaign and operation planning outputs**

3.62 Campaign and operation planning results in several outputs. These may include:

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13 For further information about branches and sequels see chapter 2—‘Foundations of Planning’. 

Edition 2
a. an AOC
b. a concept
c. a CONOPS
d. a concept plan (CONPLAN)
e. an OPLAN
f. a campaign plan
g. an OPORD or OPINST.

3.63 **Australian Operational Concept.** Deliberate planning may result in the production of an AOC. AOC define the scope of a campaign or operation, specify the authorities involved, and provide an overview of execution. AOC also provide supporting information to planners in order to develop a broad understanding of what is or could be involved in the conduct of a specific mission. In a HQJOC context Joint Operations Command Operational Preparedness Requirements provide information about indicative forces and readiness levels for each AOC.

3.64 Three types of AOC may be developed during deliberate planning: a concept; a CONOPS; and/or a CONPLAN (it should be noted that immediate planning may also produce a CONOPS). An AOC may subsequently be refined during immediate planning to produce an OPLAN.

3.65 **Concept.** Concepts outline a potential military response within a one to two year time frame. They provide the guidance and commander’s intent, scoping, objectives, mission and end state. Concepts may provide the draft purpose, mission and commander’s intent for a subsequent CONOPS.

3.66 **Concept of operations.** A CONOPS outlines a potential military response within a six to 12 month time frame. They include a draft purpose, mission and commander’s intent and are normally based on specific threats and/or scenarios and provide a response option(s) and general time and space considerations.

3.67 **Concept plan.** A CONPLAN is developed based on general or specific events to provide detailed information for a potential military response within a three to six month time frame. A CONPLAN may include ROE and other detailed information.

3.68 **Operation plan.** Similarly to a CONPLAN, an OPLAN is developed based on general or specific events to provide detailed information for a potential military response within a three to six month time frame. An OPLAN is likely to be even more refined than a CONPLAN and includes considerable detail that is in the format of, or can be converted quickly into, an OPORD or OPINST, supporting orders, and targeting and other directives. An example of an OPLAN is in Annex 3F.

3.69 **Campaign plan.** A campaign plan is a plan for a series of related operations aimed at accomplishing a series of military strategic objectives or a single military strategic end state. An example of a campaign plan is in Annex 3G.
3.70 **Campaign or operation order and campaign or operation instruction.** Once a CONOPS has been approved by CDF it will be used as the basis of a campaign or operation order or instruction (an OPORD or an OPINST). A related CONPLAN, OPLAN or campaign plan may also be used to form the basis the OPORD or OPINST. Once developed an OPORD or OPINST is approved by Government, CDF and the operational level commander. On receipt of a CDF EXECUTO, the OPORD or OPINST is given to the relevant operational and/or tactical level commander(s) for execution. Further details about orders and instructions are in Annex 3E.

### TACTICAL PLANNING

3.71 Although the focus of a JTF is on the execution rather than the planning of a campaign or operation, a JTF headquarters nevertheless conducts operational and tactical level planning. The level at which a JTF headquarters conducts planning depends upon the nature of the campaign or operation that it is executing. While the balance of JTF planning is usually focused on the sequencing of tactical actions, at the beginning of a campaign or operation the JTF headquarters is more likely to participate in wide-ranging campaign or operation planning.

3.72 The circumstances in which a JTF headquarters may conduct planning at the operational level are addressed in further detail in chapter 4—‘Principal Organisations and Responsibilities’.

3.73 JTF headquarters, component commanders and FE all conduct both immediate and deliberate tactical level planning. Even at the lowest tactical level the commanders of small FE use tactical planning processes to ensure that tactical decisions can be made quickly and soundly. The tactical considerations and principles employed during these processes, and the manner in which they need to be applied, often vary between domains and Services. By definition these processes do not employ the operational art and therefore they are not discussed further within this publication.

### Annexes:

- **3A.** Example of a Chief of the Defence Force Warning Order
- **3B.** Example of a Chief of the Defence Force Alert Order
- **3C.** Example of a Chief of the Defence Force Execute Order
- **3D.** Example of a Chief of the Defence Force Cease Order
- **3E.** Operation Orders and Instructions
- **3F.** Campaign Plan Format
- **3G.** Operation Plan Format
EXAMPLE OF THE FORMAT OF A CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE WARNING ORDER

1. An example of the format of a Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) warning order is shown below. This example is for guidance only and should be adapted to suit the particular operation.

PRECEDENCE
DTG
FM: CDF AUSTRALIA
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION AND RELEASIBILITY
SUBJ: CDF WARNING ORDER - OP ...
A. CDF PLANNING DIRECTIVE .../... DATED ...
B. (OTHER REFERENCES AS NEEDED)

1. SITUATION
1.A. OP ... IS THE CODENAME FOR [DESCRIBE PURPOSE OF ADF INVOLVEMENT WHICH CAN BE DRAWN FROM CDF INTENT IN THE CDF PLANNING DIRECTIVE]
1.B. BACKGROUND TO THE SITUATION
1.C. NSC DECISIONS AND GUIDANCE

2. MISSION. THE ADF IS TO BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY ....IN ORDER TO ...
2.A. FORCE ELEMENTS:[LIST MULTIPLE FORCE ELEMENTS IF REQUIRED.]:
2.A.(1)...

3. NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.
3.A. NATIONAL AIM.
3.B. NATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.

4. ADF CONSIDERATIONS.
4.A. CDF INTENT.
4.B. MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.
4.C. MILITARY STRATEGIC END STATE

5. PLANNING GUIDANCE.

Edition 2
6. TASKS. TASKS FOR CJOPS, SERVICE CHIEFS AND OTHERS AS REQUIRED. FOR EXAMPLE:
6.A. CJOPS IS TO:
6.B. TRIGGERS
6.C. SHAPING AND INFLUENCING
6.D. CONOPS
6.E. RESTRICTIONS
6.F. CONSULTATION

7. COMMAND AND CONTROL. CJOPS IS TO COMMAND OP …

8. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. SUB-PARAS AS REQUIRED. FOR EXAMPLE
8.A. MOVEMENT.
8.B. SUSTAINMENT.
8.C. HEALTH.
8.D NOS/COS.
8.E. FINANCE. INTERNAL ORDER NO … IS TO BE USED TO CAPTURE OP … COSTS.

9. POC [INSERT APPOINTMENT AND NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER]

10. ACTION ADDRESSEE TO ACK TO POC GIVEN AT PARA 9.
EXAMPLE OF THE FORMAT OF A CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE
ALERT ORDER

1. An example of the format of a Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) alert order is shown below. This example is for guidance only and should be adapted to suit the particular operation. Guidance from a previously issued CDF warning order should not be restated: ‘NO CHANGE’ indicates information contained in a previously issued CDF warning order remains current.

PRECEDENCE
DTG
FM: CDF AUSTRALIA
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION AND RELEASIBILITY
SUBJ: CDF ALERTO .../... - OP ...
A. CDF WNGO PLAN ... DATED ....
B. CDF PLANNING DIRECTIVE .../... PLAN ... DATED ....
C. DIO MILITARY THREAT ASSESSMENT ... DATED ....
D. MINSUB FIRST ASSISTANT SECRETARY INTERNATIONAL POLICY (FASIP)....DATED...

1. SITUATION.
1.A. THIS IS AN ALERT ORDER.
1.B. OP ... IS THE CODENAME FOR THE [...] 
1.C. REF A AND B PROVIDED WARNING AND PLANNING DIRECTION FOR OP .... REF D AUTH CJOPS TO COMMENCE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH SERVICE CHIEFS, THE FORCE PREPARATION OF THE ANTICIPATED FE
REQUIRED FOR OP ....
1.C. GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA (GOAS) HAS AGREED TO ...
1.D. THREAT. THE LATEST MILITARY THREAT ASSESSMENT (MTA) IS
DETAILED AT REF C.
THE OPERATIONAL THREAT FOR ADF PERSONNEL IS ASSESSED AS ...

2. MISSION. THE ADF IS TO ...[OR, STATE ‘NO CHANGE’ IF WNGO PREVIOUSLY ISSUED]
3. EXECUTION.

3.A. NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. [INSERT SECTIONS AS REQUIRED OR STATE 'NO CHANGE'.]

3.A.1. NATIONAL AIM.

3.A.2. NATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.

3.A.3. NATIONAL POLICY. NATIONAL POLICY IS AS FOLLOWS:


3.B. ADF CONSIDERATIONS. [INSERT SECTIONS AS REQUIRED OR STATE ‘NO CHANGE’.]

3.B.1. CDF INTENT. THE ADF IS TO...

3.B.2. MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. THE MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES ARE:

3.B.3. MILITARY END STATE. THE MILITARY END STATE FOR OP ... IS:

3.C. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2).

3.C.1. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. THE C2 ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

3.C.1.A. ...

3.D. TASKS.

3.D.1. CJOPS IS TO:

3.D.1.A. ON RECEIPT OF OP ... EXECUTE ORDER, COMD AND CONTROL OP ... IAW REF .. AND ... AND SUBSEQUENT AMPLIFICATION ORDERS;

3.D.1.B. SUBMIT A RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REQUEST (ROEREQ) TO CDF;

3.D.2. SERVICE CHIEFS ARE TO FORCE ASSIGN UNDER TCOMD OF CJOPS THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL/ FORCE ELEMENTS:

3.D.2.A. ...

3.G. PLANNING GUIDANCE.

3.G.1. OPERATIONS SECURITY.

3.G.1.A. THE CODENAME QUOTE OP ... UNQUOTE AND ITS MEANING ARE UNCLASSIFIED. PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL DETAILS ASSOCIATED WITH OP ... ARE TO BE CLASSIFIED IAW ITS CONTENT.

3.G.2. AREA OF OPERATIONS.

3.G.3. FORCE SIZE.

3.G.4. LEGAL. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ADF OPERATIONS IS ...


3.G.5. INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO).

3.G.5.A. STRATEGIC SHAPING AND INFLUENCING PLANNING.

3.G.6. PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

3.H. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
3.H.1. EXPECTED DEPLOYMENT DURATION.

3.H.1.A. THE ADF CONTRIBUTION TO OP ... WILL COMMENCE FROM ... AND OPS ARE EXPECTED TO CEASE ON ....

3.H.1.B. THE DURATION OF EACH ROTATION FOR OP ... IS TO BE ....

3.H.2. NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.

4.A. OPERATIONAL VIABILITY PERIOD (OVP).

4.B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

4.C. FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD).

4.D. EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT POLICY.

4.E. FORCE PREPARATION.

4.F. HEALTH.

4.G. AGE OF DEPLOYING PERSONNEL.

4.H. MAIL POLICY.

4.I. FINANCE. ALL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OP ... WILL BE CAPTURED USING THE ROMAN IO:....

4.J. NATURE OF SERVICE.

4.K. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

5. COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE.

6. POC. [APPOINTMENT, RANK, NAME AND SPEAKEASY NUMBER AND ALT POC DETAILS]

7. ACTION ADDRESSEES TO ACK TO POC GIVEN AT PARA 6.
EXAMPLE OF THE FORMAT OF A CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE EXECUTE ORDER

1. An example of the format of a Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) execute order (EXECUTO) is shown below. This example is for guidance only and should be adapted to suit the particular operation.

2. Updates to the EXECUTO are issued as amplifications (AMP) in the format 'Op … - CDF EXECUTE ORDER …/… AMP … (Subject)'. Guidance from a previously issued CDF warning order or CDF alert order should not be restated: ‘NO CHANGE’ indicates that information from a previous order remains current.

PRECEDENCE

DTG
FM: CDF AUSTRALIA
TO:
NFO:
CLASSIFICATION AND RELEASIBILITY
SUBJ: CDF EXECUTO …/… - OP …
A. CDF AUSTRALIA ALERT ORDER …/… OP … .

1. SITUATION.
1.A. THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER.
1.B. OP … IS CODENAME FOR ADF CONTRIBUTION TO …
1.C. [BACKGROUND TO THE OPERATION]

2. MISSION.

3. EXECUTION.
3.A. NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. NO CHANGE.
3.B. ADF CONSIDERATIONS. NO CHANGE.
3.C. TIMINGS.
3.C.1. OP … WILL COMMENCE ON …. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, OP … IS EXPECTED TO LAST FOR …., BUT THE DURATION OF INDIVIDUAL FE DEPLOYMENTS MAY BE FOR SHORTER PERIODS AND WILL BE REGULARLY REVIEWED BY GOAS.
3.D. TASKS.
3.D.1. [DESIGNATED COMMANDER] IS TO EXECUTE OP … FROM …, AS COMMANDER OF….
3.D.2. [OTHER TASKS AS REQUIRED]

3.C.1. OPERATIONAL SECURITY. NO CHANGE.

3.C.2. AREA OF OPERATIONS. NO CHANGE.

3.C.3. FORCE COMPOSITION. THE APPROVED FORCE COMPOSITION FOR OP …, IS AS FOLLOWS:

3.C.3.A. SINGLE SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS.

3.C.3.A.1. MARITIME COMPONENT - …

3.C.3.A.2. LAND COMPONENT - …

3.C.3.A.3. AIR COMPONENT - …

3.C.4. NATIONAL POLICY (NATPOL) GUIDANCE.

3.C.5. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

3.C.6. IO. NO CHANGE.

3.C.7. MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.

4.A. NATURE OF SERVICE/CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

5.A. CJOPS IS TO EXERCISE THEATRE COMMAND OF ASSIGNED FORCES FOR OP ….

5.B. VIDE REF A, A JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) IS TO BE FORMED TO INCORPORATE ALL FORCES DEPLOYED TO …. THE COMMANDER OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF-…) SHALL REPORT DIRECTLY TO CJOPS;

5.B.1. EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL, THROUGH DEPLOYED COMPONENT COMMANDERS, OF ALL ADF FORCE ELEMENTS DEPLOYED TO …; AND

5.B.2. EXERCISE NATIONAL COMMAND OF ALL ADF FORCE ELEMENTS AND ADF PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO….

5.C. CDF WILL RETAIN A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE RELATIONSHIP WITH COMDJTF-… ON ISSUES OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.

5.D. SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND OPERATIONAL REPORTING WILL BE FUSED THROUGH COMDJTF-…, WHO WILL BE THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF OPERATIONAL REPORTING FROM … TO AUSTRALIA.

6. POC [INSERT APPOINTMENT AND NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER]

7. ACTION ADDRESSEE TO ACK TO POC GIVEN AT PARA 6.
EXAMPLE OF THE FORMAT OF A CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE CEASE ORDER

1. An example of the format of a Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) cease order is shown below. This example is for guidance only and should be adapted to suit the particular operation.

PRECEDENCE
DTG
FM: CDF AUSTRALIA
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION AND RELEASIBILITY
SUBJ: CDF CEASE ORDER 0…/0… - OP …
A. CDF AUSTRALIA … OF …(CDF EXECUTO 0…/0… - OP …).
B. CDF AUSTRALIA … OF [DTG] (CDF EXECUTO 0…/0… – OP …).
C. CDF DIRECTIVE …/… OF … (JOINT DIRECTIVE FROM CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE TO CJOPS).
D. JOC …/…/… JOC OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION …/… OP ….

1. SITUATION.
1.A. THIS IS A CEASE ORDER. OP …IS THE CODENAME FOR THE ADF OPERATION TO….
1.B. OP … OBJECTIVES.
1.B.1. NATIONAL STRATEGIC END STATES. VIDE REF …, THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC END STATE FOR OP … HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.
1.B.2. MILITARY STRATEGIC END STATE. VIDE REF …, THE MILITARY STRATEGIC END STATE FOR OP … HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.
1.B.3. MISSION. THE MISSION OF OP … IN REF … HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.

2. MISSION. JOC IS TO CEASE OP XXX.

3. EXECUTION.
3.A. CDF INTENT:
3.B. TASKS. JOC IS TO:
3.B.1. TAKE NECESSARY OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TO FORMALLY CLOSE OP …;
3.B.2. SUBMIT A POR TO CDF NLT …
4. ADMIN AND LOG.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

6. POC. [POSITION, RANK, NAME AND TEL.NAME]

7. ACTION ADDRESSEES TO ACK TO POC GIVEN AT PARA 6.
OPERATION ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS

1. Orders and instructions are the means by which the intentions of a commander, and the directions for fulfilling them, are conveyed to subordinates. Orders and instructions must be:
   a. accurate
   b. clear and unambiguous
   c. as brief as is consistent with clarity
   d. capable of execution
   e. timely.

2. The following criteria are used to identify an order (and discriminate it from an operational instruction):
   a. An order requires definite action to be taken to achieve a certain intention—the mission and the method of fulfilling it must be clearly stated so that the recipient is in no doubt about what action is to be taken.
   b. Orders are normally issued when the commander has some form of immediate control over the situation, when compliance with the method laid down is necessary for coordination and is unlikely to prejudice the initiative or local knowledge of a subordinate.

3. **Operation order.** An operation order (OPORD) is the means by which a commander clearly, accurately and concisely directs and coordinates the actions of their forces in preparation for and in the conduct of operations. OPORD are divided into the following sections:
   a. situation
   b. mission
   c. execution
   d. administration and logistics
   e. command and signals.

4. **Support order.** A support order (SPTORD) covers the operational requirements for personnel, health, logistics, finance and movements. Like an OPORD, a SPTORD should be clear, accurate and concise. The contents of a SPTORD include but are not limited to:
   a. situation—enemy, friendly, assumptions, resource availability and planning factors
   b. mission
c. execution—concept of logistic support, environmental issues and tasks

d. personnel

e. administration and logistics—supply and distribution, levels of supply, water supply, rations and provisions, salvage, local acquisition of supplies and services, petroleum, oils and lubricants and mortuary affairs

f. legal aspects

g. medical—preventative medical and health services

h. mobility and transportation

i. civil engineering support

j. security assistance

k. administration

l. command and signal.

5. **Operation instruction.** The following criteria are used to identify an operation instruction (OPINST):

a. An OPINST indicates the commander’s intention and possibly the overall plan, but leaves the detailed course of action to the subordinate commander.

b. OPINST are normally issued instead of an order:

(1) to a commander with an independent mission

(2) where the speed of movement or lack of information makes specific orders impossible or undesirable

(3) when a commander wishes to communicate the aim, or future intentions, beyond that which can be defined in a specific and detailed order

(4) to deal with unforeseen emergencies such as civil emergencies or terrorist attacks

or

(5) to plan for contingencies.
CAMPAIGN PLAN FORMAT

1. The standard format for a campaign plan is as follows:

a. **Situation.** The situation is a brief description of the conditions that resulted in the requirement for the campaign. The situation may include:

   (1) The strategic situation across the theatre and the events that brought about the situation.

   (2) The activities of other nations as they apply to, or impact upon, the campaign.

   (3) The whole-of-government appreciation of the situation, including relationships with allies and the actions being undertaken by other government departments and agencies.

   (4) Strategic guidance:

      (a) Chief of the Defence Force’s intent

      (b) strategic objectives

      (c) military/strategic end state (including conflict termination considerations)

      (d) strategic limitations (constraints and restrictions).

   (5) Brief description of the threat situation, the adversary centre of gravity (COG), critical capabilities, critical requirements, critical vulnerabilities, and possible adversary courses of action.

   (6) Identify own COG and critical factors. State the forces available for operations and any force preparation issues.

b. **Assumptions.** Campaign plans are a combination of deliberate and immediate planning, much of which may initially be based on assumptions. All significant assumptions combat and logistic should be listed. Planners must allocate effort to replacing assumptions with facts to reduce risks.

c. **Mission.** The campaign mission must be a concise statement focused on achieving the strategic objective and defeating the threat COG.

d. **Chief of Joint Operations’ intent.** Chief of Joint Operations’ (CJOPS’) intent includes the campaign purpose and end state. The intent provides CJOPS’ vision for the campaign and should be a clear, concise and relatively short statement. The intent should describe the military conditions that subordinate commanders must meet to achieve the campaign’s desired end state.

e. **Campaign outline.** The campaign outline describes the objectives, tasks and supporting plans required for the success of the campaign. The campaign outline consists of the following:
(1) **General description.** A simple, concise explanation of the campaign by phases. Each phase may be named.

(2) **Phases.** Each phase is described in detail. This is to include any operation which needs to be conducted during each stage. Synchronisation of operations and supporting activities is to be included. Any branches or sequels identified are also to be listed for each phase. For each branch or sequel, a commander’s decision point must be provided to allow activation of the branch or sequel. Any targeting and information operations requirements for that phase should be included in the description. The phases are described by:

(a) purpose

(b) method
   (i) main and supporting efforts
   (ii) reserve designated

(c) end state

(d) key operational considerations.

(3) **Deception measures.** Dependant on the security classification, the deception measures of other coalition partners may be included to ensure they are not unnecessarily compromised.

(4) **Force assignment.** Brief description of forces required for the campaign is provided for each phase. Detailed assignment of forces is to be attached as an annex to the plan.

(5) **Tasks.** Tasks are to be allocated to subordinate headquarters including allocation of responsibility for further operational planning. A detailed task matrix is attached as an annex to the plan.

(6) **Coordination instructions.** Instructions to coordinate future planning, campaign level briefing and back-briefing, and initial force preparation and movement may be included.

(7) **Boundaries.** The campaign area of operations and joint task force (JTF) areas of operations are to be described and included as an annex.

(8) **Timings.** Broad timings to allow integration and synchronisation of operations are provided.

(9) **Legal.** The legal regime applicable to the campaign, status of forces agreements and memoranda of understanding and guidance on rules of engagement.
f. **Administration.** The administrative concept, based on phases, should allocate administrative responsibilities, support priorities, and identify special requirements.

g. **Logistics.** The logistics support concept, based on phases, should allocate logistics responsibilities and specify logistic and materiel support priorities.

h. **Command and control.** The command and control relationships, including multinational and joint command arrangements, are described. The command chain and liaison requirements are presented in a command and control diagram. The communication information system plan is briefly described, with the detail included as an annex.

i. **Key operational considerations.** This section lists the issues that are critical to the success of the campaign.
OPERATION PLAN FORMAT

1. Once the concept of operations has been endorsed at the strategic level, an operation plan (OPLAN) and supporting plans are produced.

Operation plans

2. The contents of the OPLAN vary depending upon the nature of the operation, and as a general rule, should provide adequate guidance to enable staff to develop the operation order (OPORD) or operation instruction (OPINST). An OPLAN should specify:
   a. mission, intent, objectives and end state
   b. limitations (constraints and restrictions)
   c. force allocation and grouping
   d. command and control arrangements
   e. information operations
   f. communication and information systems
   g. operations security (OPSEC)
   h. deception plan (if applicable)
   i. offensive support priorities
   j. intelligence aspects
   k. electronic warfare
   l. rules of engagement and law of armed conflict aspects
   m. administration and logistics
   n. movement priorities
   o. civil affairs and civil aid
   p. public affairs aspects
   q. financial arrangements
   r. legal aspects
   s. code words
   t. reporting.
3. Requirements for the production of supporting plans and the regular review of the plan should also be addressed.

Supporting plans

4. Supporting plans are developed by staff branches in consultation with the Services and other agencies as appropriate and with those commanders supporting the operation. Their timely development is dependent on the concurrent involvement of all planning staffs during development of the OPLAN. Establishing liaison between planning staffs from the highest to the lowest levels are essential.

5. The commander or the principal staff officers may determine aspects to be included in the OPLAN, and those aspects to be relegated to supporting plans. There are no firm rules concerning this division, as long as the main plan is coherent and the supporting plans are closely integrated in both timeliness and content. In many circumstances supporting plans are used to reduce to essentials the scope and detail of the OPLAN. More complex and specialised aspects likely to be of interest to specific staff branches and elements can be covered in the supporting plans.

6. The subjects covered by supporting plans are flexible and could include, but are not limited to:
   a. intelligence
   b. information operations
   c. administration
   d. movement
   e. communication and information systems
   f. electronic warfare
   g. deception
   h. force protection
   i. surveillance
   j. reinforcement
   k. OPSEC
   l. public affairs
   m. legal support
   n. offensive support.

7. Throughout all stages of development, supporting plans must be reviewed and checked against the OPLAN. When finalised, supporting plans are endorsed by the Chief of Staff. In the Headquarters Joint Operations Command context, completed supporting plans are reviewed by the Commander’s Planning Group.
before being passed to Australian Defence Headquarters for endorsement by the Strategic Command Group and approval by the Chief of the Defence Force. After examination and modification, if required, the plan may be issued as a directive, OPORD or OPINST as appropriate.

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1 For further details of this process see chapter 4—‘Principal Organisations and Responsibilities’.
CHAPTER 4

PRINCIPAL ORGANISATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Executive summary

- This chapter outlines the principal organisations involved in campaign and operation planning conducted by the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
- At the national strategic level, Government develops national strategy through several organisations, including the Cabinet and the National Security Committee of Cabinet.
- At the military strategic level, Chief of the Defence Force is supported by several key individuals and organisations within Defence and the ADF that contribute to the conduct of military strategic planning.
- The operational level of conflict is primarily the responsibility of Chief of Joint Operations, who may directly command ADF campaigns and independent operations on behalf of Chief of the Defence Force.
- Headquarters Joint Operations Command, which is commanded by Chief of Joint Operations, is the primary organisation tasked with conducting campaign and operation planning.
- Other Government departments and multinational partners are often involved in, or consulted during, the planning process. The nature of this involvement or consultation varies from case to case.

INTRODUCTION

4.1 This chapter outlines the principal organisations involved in campaign and operation planning conducted by the Australian Defence Force (ADF). A simplified representation of the relationships between these organisations and of their relative position within the planning process is shown in Figure 4.1. In this diagram, the planning process starts the top left (at the strategic level) and concludes with the delivery of an operational order (OPORD) and its annexes to the commander of a joint task force (at the tactical level).

Bruce D. Porter, PhD, 1994

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Figure 4.1: Australian Defence Force campaign and operation planning responsibilities

4.2 This chapter describes each of the organisations shown in this diagram, as well as detailing their responsibilities related to campaign and operation planning. At the national strategic level, strategy is developed and implemented using a whole-of-government approach. To enable an understanding of this approach, this chapter also provides a brief explanation of the role of other government departments (OGD) that may be involved or consulted during planning.

4.3 The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first three describe the organisations that contribute to campaign and operation planning at national strategic, military strategic and operational levels respectively. The fourth section provides a brief outline of OGD and multinational (MN) partners that may also be involved in the planning process, and the manner in which they may be involved.

THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL

4.4 At the national strategic level Government develops national strategy, which has both military and other elements, and then provides national strategic guidance to Defence and OGD. The organisations that provide this guidance, which are discussed below, include:

a. the Australian Government
b. Cabinet
c. the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC)
d. the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS).

**The Australian Government**

4.5 All Defence activities are governed by the cardinal principle of control of the ADF by the civil authority. Defence and the ADF are accountable to the Australian Government, and the Government in turn, through the Parliament, is accountable to the people of Australia. To ensure this control and accountability, as well as to ensure coordination between Government departments and agencies, the Government formulates national strategy through the employment of national security governance.

4.6 **National security governance.** National security governance refers to arrangements to lead, manage and hold to account the national security community. A whole-of-government approach requires that national security is understood as more than simply a military endeavour. To advance a whole-of-government approach the National Security Adviser (NSA) in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet holds a central position within the national security community for coordination, policy development and provision of advice on national security to the Prime Minister.

4.7 The national security community includes traditional national security departments, such as the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, but extends broadly across Government to provide the coordination and unity of effort that is essential to the whole-of-government approach. The role played by OGD is discussed in further detail in the fourth section of this chapter.

4.8 **National strategic guidance.** The Government is responsible for formulating national strategy and for determining the role of Defence and the ADF in implementing this strategy. National strategic guidance is given to Defence through a variety of mechanisms, including (but not limited to) the National Security Strategy, Defence White Papers, NSC decisions, the Defence Planning Guidance and the Quarterly Strategic Review. For further information about national strategic guidance see chapter 3—’The Australian Defence Force Planning Framework’.

**Cabinet**

4.9 Cabinet is the key decision making forum for Government. It sets the broad direction for Government policy. To provide appropriate focus on specific issues, Cabinet delegates much of its work to committees. The key committee concerned with establishing Australia’s national strategy is the NSC.

**The National Security Committee of Cabinet**

4.10 The NSC directs national strategy and provides coherence to overall national, alliance and coalition policy, including military and non-military aspects. Within these general responsibilities, the NSC has specific responsibilities with respect to campaign and operations planning. They include:

a. determining the national strategic objectives to be achieved, and monitoring of progress towards their achievement
b. determining the circumstances in which military activity should cease (the end state)

c. stipulating and monitoring restrictions imposed on operations

d. making available required resources including, if required, direction to the national industrial base.

4.11 Membership of the NSC usually comprises the Prime Minister (Chairman), the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence (MINDEF), the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Treasurer and the Attorney-General.

The Secretaries Committee on National Security

4.12 Prior to being considered by the NSC, all submissions and memoranda are first considered by the SCNS. Membership of the SCNS consists of the Secretaries of several Australian Government Departments that each have an interest in Australian national security, as well as the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). The role of SCNS is to ensure that whole-of-government implications are taken into account, that facts are agreed, and to resolve (as far as possible) differences in policy at the Secretaries' level in advance of consideration by the NSC. Consideration by SCNS is a consultation requirement prior to any issue being taken forward to the NSC. SCNS, however, is not intended as a substitute for working-level consultation between departments and agencies.

THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL

4.13 At the military strategic level CDF and various other individuals and organisations within Defence develop plans to provide military options to achieve the national strategic objectives set by Government. These individuals and organisations, which are discussed below, include:

a. CDF

b. Secretary of the Department of Defence (SECDEF)

c. Strategic Command Group (SCG)

d. Military Strategic Commitments Division (MSC)

e. Strategy Executive

f. other individuals and organisations that provide specialist advice to military strategic planning.

Chief of the Defence Force

4.14 CDF is the principal military adviser to MINDEF and advises on the military implications of strategic developments, strategy and planning, and issues strategic directives and future intentions. CDF advises MINDEF of strategic developments that may require a military response, the progress of operations, future military plans and the resource requirements to achieve national strategic objectives. Consistent with Government guidance, CDF approves the requirement for joint, multiagency and/or
MN planning at the military strategic level. After consultation with the SCG, CDF provides appropriate guidance to military strategic planners.

**Secretary of the Department of Defence**

4.15 SECDEF is the principal civilian adviser to MINDEF and advises on policy, departmental issues and on the stewardship of Defence resources. In the military strategic realm, SECDEF advises on capability development for the current and future human and financial resources required to meet Defence’s capability outputs.

**Strategic Command Group**

4.16 The SCG advises CDF on strategic issues and related operational matters, including emerging threats, policy matters, public affairs and force availability. It assists CDF in the formulation of military strategic guidance to Government and to operational level commanders within the ADF.

4.17 Attendance at the SCG is limited to the appropriate senior Defence officials. The permanent members are CDF (Chairman); SECDEF; Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF); the Service Chiefs; Deputy Secretary Strategy; Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security; and Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).

**Military Strategic Commitments Division**

4.18 MSC is part of the VCDF Group. It contributes to planning at the military strategic level through two components of its organisation:

a. **Current Commitments.** MSC Current Commitments coordinates joint military strategic inputs generated by Defence for the purposes of engaging Government, other agencies, allies and coalition partners.

b. **Future Commitments.** MSC Future Commitments undertakes concept formulation and strategic coordination to enable future military commitments and strategic targeting.

**Strategy Executive**

4.19 The Strategy Executive develops military strategy and strategic policy to provide a framework for the development of future Defence capability, and to support military deployments, operations and exercises. The Strategy Executive has two divisions:

a. **Strategic Policy Division.** Strategic Policy Division develops policy, military strategy and strategic planning guidance and advice for Government, senior Defence leaders and other government agencies on the strategic implications of Defence and national security matters. The Division leads the development of key Defence planning and policy documents including the Defence White Paper and Defence Planning Guidance.

b. **International Policy Division.** International Policy Division provides policy advice about the implications of international developments for Australia’s security interests, and manages Defence’s international relationships.
The provision of specialist advice to military strategic level planning

4.20 In addition to the above individuals and organisations within Defence that conduct military strategic level planning, several others provide planning advice and guidance with respect to specific issues, areas or specialisations. These individuals include:

a. **Service Chiefs.** The Service Chiefs are the principal advisors to CDF on aspects of Defence policy, military strategy and the employment of forces as they relate to their Service. The Service Chiefs are represented at various planning groups, including the SCG. The Service Chiefs also provide specialist single Service advice to CJOPS to assist in joint campaign and operation planning.

b. **Commander Joint Logistics.** Commander Joint Logistics is the strategic logistics adviser to CDF for all joint logistics aspects of campaign and operation planning.

c. **Commander Joint Health.** Commander Joint Health is the strategic joint health adviser to CDF for all joint health aspects of planning and operations.

d. **Deputy Secretary Strategy.** Deputy Secretary Strategy is head of the Strategy Executive and is responsible for the delivery of strategic policy advice to CDF and SECDEF.

e. **Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security.** Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security advises and coordinates intelligence support to planning and advises CDF on security matters.

f. **Head Information and Communications Technology Operations.** Head Information and Communications Technology Operations is responsible for the governance and management of the Defence information environment, which encompasses intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, information warfare, electronic warfare, command and headquarters information and management systems. Head Information and Communications Technology Operations is the strategic J6 to CDF and is the principal military adviser on information and communications technology delivery and support to military operations.

g. **Director General Strategic Communication.** Director General Strategic Communication is responsible for providing strategic communication planning guidance to CDF.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

4.21 This section details the roles of individuals and organisations within the ADF that conduct campaign and operation planning. These individuals and organisations include:

a. **CJOPS**

b. **Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)**
c. Border Protection Command (BPC)
d. Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ)
e. joint task force (JTF) headquarters.

Chief of Joint Operations

4.22 In the ADF the operational level of conflict is primarily the responsibility of CJOPS. Depending on the nature and scale of an operation, and within the constraints of any amplifying directive released by CDF, CJOPS may directly command ADF campaigns and independent operations on behalf of CDF. CJOPS also commands HQJOC, which is the ADF’s primary organisation tasked with campaign and operation planning. Other ADF operational level commanders exercise more limited command authorities than CJOPS and command forces in a much narrower variety of situations than CJOPS.2

4.23 To assist CDF in the discharge of command functions related to joint planning, CJOPS has specific responsibility for:

a. planning campaigns and operations, as directed by CDF
b. conducting contingency planning as required, but routinely and in accordance with Defence planning guidance and military strategic guidance, strategic and operational level intelligence estimates and the Quarterly Strategic Review
c. assisting, developing and maintaining country-specific planning
d. providing contingency planning assistance teams and support and response teams as required
e. providing accurate and timely advice on operation concepts and plans, the employment of forces, and military capabilities
f. meeting organisational performance agreements and directed level of capability requirements for joint operations command and for any standing JTF.

Headquarters Joint Operations Command

4.24 Commanded by CJOPS, HQJOC is responsible for planning, commanding and managing ADF campaigns and operations. It is the ADF’s primary operational level planning organisation. HQJOC comprises the following groups:

a. Executive Branch (J0)
b. Personnel and Logistics Branch (J1/4)

2 For further information about command authorities see Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.1—Command and Control.
c. Intelligence Branch (J2)
d. Operations Branch (J3)
e. Plans Branch (J5)
f. Communication and Information Systems Branch (J6)
g. Australian Defence Simulation Training Centre (J7)
h. Engagement and Assessment Branch (J8)
i. the following organisations, which are permanently force assigned to CJOPS for planning and operations:

(1) BPC
(2) 1st Joint Movements Group
(3) Maritime Operations
(4) Submarine Operations
(5) Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Headquarters 1st Division when in its secondary role)
(6) Headquarters Special Operations Command
(7) Air and Space Operations Centre.

4.25 Given its role as the ADF’s primary organisation responsible for campaign and operation planning, it is unsurprising that HQJOC’s internal planning process is very well developed, with several internal organisations taking part in the planning process. These organisations are briefly described below. Further details about the HQJOC planning process are in Annex 4A.

4.26 **Commander’s Planning Group.** The Commander’s Planning Group (CPG) is chaired by CJOPS and is the senior operational level planning group within HQJOC. It provides guidance to subordinate planning groups and reviews and endorses campaign and operation planning products. The standing members of the CPG are:

a. CJOPS (chair)
b. Chief of Staff (COS) HQJOC
c. HQJOC branch heads (J1/4, J2, J3, J5, J6, J7, J8)
d. Director General Maritime
e. Commander 1st Division
f. Director General Air
g. Special Operations Commander Australia

h. specialist advisors, such as legal, finance, health, strategic communications and other organisations as required.

4.27 **Joint Planning Group.** The role of the Joint Planning Group (JPG) is to plan campaigns and operations. It also provides direction to supporting and specialist planning groups. The JPG is normally chaired by J5 or J3 branch staff and is attended by representatives from other branches of HQJOC, single Services and other Defence groups and external agencies as required. The members of the JPG and its relationship with the CPG are illustrated in Figure 4.2.

![Figure 4.2: Headquarters Joint Operations Command Joint Planning Group organisation](image)

4.28 The JPG is responsible for producing operational correspondence and other documentation, including:

a. CJOPS planning directives

b. joint military appreciation process (JMAP) outputs including mission analysis briefs, course of action (COA) development briefs, COA analysis briefs and decision briefs

c. campaign plans

d. concept plans (CONPLAN)
4. Supporting planning groups. The CPG and the JPG may be supported by the following planning groups:

a. **Joint Intelligence Planning Group.** The Joint Intelligence Planning Group develops planning guidance for intelligence support to the planning process.


c. **Integrated Effects Planning Group.** The Integrated Effects Planning Group coordinates, synchronises and targets the effects generated by specialist capabilities, both kinetic and non-kinetic, and integrates them into operational plans. The Integrated Effects Planning Group also produces targeting plans.

d. **Joint Legal Planning Group.** The Joint Legal Planning Group provides support to the CPG, the JPG and the Operational Target Working Group. The Joint Legal Planning Group also produces legal support plans.

e. **Joint Health Planning Group.** The Joint Health Planning Group supports the activities of the JPG by coordinating health support input to the OPLAN and by preparing any separate health support orders or instructions.


g. **Joint Communications Planning Group.** The Joint Communications Planning Group plans, coordinates and advises on communications requirements.

h. **Specialist planning groups.** Other specialist planning groups may be formed as required to deal with aspects of planning that are not adequately addressed by the standing planning groups.

4.30 Temporal planning zones. To ensure efficient allocation of staff effort and the continuity of planning, responsibility for planning is distributed across several staff...
branches. COS, J3 and J5 will normally discuss planning requirements and allocate responsibility to the most appropriate functional area. In broad terms, planning responsibility is divided along temporal lines as follows.\(^5\)

### a. J3 (Operations)

The J3 branch is responsible for execution and management of current operations. The J3 branch is further divided into the following functions:

1. **J33 (Joint Control Centre)**. The J33 is responsible for current operations and manages current activities.

2. **J35 (Future Operations)**. The J35 provides a planning function within the J3 branch for near term planning. The J35 is also the link between current operations and future plans. J35 staff participate in the JPG and transition plans through to execution. This may involve refining OPLAN into executable OPORD.

### b. J5 (Plans)

The J5 is responsible for longer-term planning, although the division of responsibility between the J3 and J5 does not always fit neatly into the temporal zones. The J5 branch forms the core of the JPG and is responsible for drawing together the appropriate staff and specialist planners to provide CJOPS with advice and options for all future operations. The J5 branch is further divided into the following functions:

1. **J53 (Operations Plans)**. The J53 is responsible for planning all operations that are likely or certain to occur (immediate planning). The J53 produces CONPLAN and OPLAN for likely operations and OPORD for operations that are certain to be executed. J53 also reviews OPORD that are currently being executed. The J53 works closely with the J35 to ensure continuity in the transition of plans to the J3 branch for execution.

2. **J55 (Military Options)**. The J55 is responsible for developing military options based on possible future contingencies. The J55 contributes to strategic decision-making by drawing upon deliberate planning products to develop military options that may be developed into CONPLAN or OPLAN by the J53.

3. **J50 (Campaign Plans)**. The J50 is responsible for the production of campaign plans and campaign assessments.

### 4.31 Figure 4.3 illustrates the interaction of the planning responsibilities between the J3 and J5 branches of HQJOC. The timings shown are not fixed and should be considered a guide only. Other factors, such as available effort and the nature of the product, also influence which staff branch is engaged.

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\(^5\) For further details about the common joint staff system see Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process.
4.32 **Planning battle rhythm.** Planning activities are synchronised with the operational battle rhythm to ensure that plans are informed by the appropriate situational understanding products and that subordinate planning groups have adequate time to formulate their input to joint plans. The planning battle rhythm also incorporates opportunities for planning staff to back-brief CJOPS about planning outcomes and, in turn, to receive CJOPS' guidance.

4.33 Where plans require endorsement by strategic level organisations such as the SCG or NSC, the planning battle rhythm incorporates the opportunity for CJOPS to brief these organisations and receive their endorsement or further guidance. Figure 4.4 illustrates the planning relationship and battle rhythm between the CPG, JPG, supporting planning groups and tactical organisations.
4.34 **Single Service contributions to planning.** Navy, Army and Air Force contribute to HQJOC planning through provision of force generation, technical and tactical advice. The Services also issue orders and instructions to their subordinate elements for the generation and mounting of forces for force assignment to CJOPS.

**Border Protection Command**

4.35 BPC is a multiagency organisation consisting of ADF, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Australian Fisheries Management Authority and Australian Quarantine Inspection Service personnel. BPC is the Australian Government’s lead organisation with respect to offshore security and undertakes planning, preparedness, prevention, response and recovery-related maritime security activities, including responses to terrorism threats or incidents originating from Australia’s maritime domain.

4.36 BPC is responsible for the operational level planning of designated ADF operations, joint exercises and other activities in support of the provision of military offshore patrol, prevention, interdiction and response capabilities pertaining to the protection of offshore facilities and shipping.

**Deployable Joint Force Headquarters**

4.37 In its primary role Headquarters 1st Division is responsible for the conduct of mission specific training, assessment and certification of Army force elements prior to their assignment to CJOPS for the conduct of joint operations. However, Headquarters 1st Division also has a secondary role to be prepared to stand up as a DJFHQ for a large land-based operation. When stood up, DJFHQ comes under the
operational control of CJOPS and may be involved in the conduct of operational level planning.

**Joint task forces**

4.38 Although each situation is different, campaign or operation planning may be conducted by a JTF Headquarters for a variety of reasons. These may include:

a. parallel planning for an operation in which an operational level headquarters (usually HQJOC) has the lead planning responsibility

or

b. independently planning operations because an operational level headquarters (usually HQJOC) is fully tasked.

4.39 Where a JTF undertakes campaign or operation planning it needs to take into consideration the unique circumstances that result from its subordinate position to the operational level headquarters (usually HQJOC). These considerations include:

a. **Role of the joint task force.** The role of the JTF influences campaign and operation planning in a number of ways. Firstly, as the JTF is likely to be conducting the operation, its perceived role in planning and execution may differ subtly from the superior commander's intent. Secondly, JTF planners (tactical level staff) have a tendency to delve further into the tactical level and 'fight the battles' rather than develop an operational level plan. Consequently their considerations tend to be more focused on the tactical rather than the operational level.

b. **Force assignment.** JTF Headquarters have reduced visibility of the scope of ADF capabilities, readiness and concurrent and future taskings than do operational level headquarters. They also do not have the authority to force assign FE or to activate the mission. These responsibilities rest with HQJOC. While this information may be readily available, a JTF would not normally have the authority to plan through these thresholds without consulting HQJOC for authorisation. Therefore, even when a JTF plans a campaign or operation, HQJOC remains responsible for force design and allocation.

c. **Options for joint task force organisation.** A JTF may be constructed using either the component or direct command method. Both methods have benefits and drawbacks. The preferred method may provide the optimal outcome for a campaign or operation, but that must be balanced with the raise, train and sustain requirements and potential requirements for other campaigns and/or operations. A JTF undertaking operational level planning would not generally have adequate situational understanding to be able to determine the best long-term choice. 

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6 For further information about the methods of command see ADDP 00.1—*Command and Control*. 
d. **Synchronisation of joint operations.** Synchronisation of joint operations necessarily occurs at all the levels of command. Although a JTF may have very well developed capacities for tactical and even operational level synchronisation it will rely heavily on the command and control framework established at the operational and the strategic levels. This is also true of MN operations (MNO).

e. **Relationship with Chief of Joint Operations.** CJOPS’ responsibility includes planning for campaigns and operations. Where a JTF headquarters is conducting campaign or operation planning, CJOPS remains responsible for this planning and for subsequent activation. Therefore, JTF Headquarters must establish and maintain a close relationship with CJOPS and consult frequently with HQJOC staff throughout the planning process.

f. **Command and control arrangements.** The command and control arrangements between HQJOC and a JTF Headquarters are relatively straightforward. The command and control arrangements between the JTF Headquarters, OGD, intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations and other nations are less well-defined when a JTF is undertaking campaign or operation level planning. Establishing these arrangements and exchanging liaison officers requires HQJOC consultation and facilitation in the early stages of planning.  

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g. **Transition to other agencies.** Ideally, once the military strategic end state has been achieved the campaign or operation is terminated and the joint force redeploys. In practice there is usually a period of transition where the military steps back and other agencies assume control. Although the military strategic and operational level planning staff may conduct the high level planning between nations and agencies, the majority of the planning and execution for this transition is conducted by the JTF Headquarters. In some cases the transition will be from an Australian military force to another Government department. In other cases it may require the establishment of a new host nation government and associated security forces. The complexity of this transition places considerable strain on the JTF Headquarters resources, which may require supplementation to achieve the transition. Additional resources allocated to assist the transition may result in a more orderly transition.

h. **Redeployment, remediation, recovery and repatriation, and reconstitution.** Redeployment, remediation, recovery and repatriation, and reconstitution are operational level tasks. It is a lengthy process and requires closely coordinated planning between HQJOC, JTF Headquarters and OGD. In essence redeployment is the reverse of reception, staging, on-forwarding and integration and requires similar planning consideration. Remediation, recovery and repatriation, and reconstitution requires coordinated effort from many organisations within Defence. HQJOC and the Service Headquarters

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7 For further details about command arrangements during MNO and multiagency operations see ADDP 00.1—Command and Control.
plan and coordinate activities such as strategic movement. However, the JTF Headquarters, possibly with supplementation, must plan and coordinate the tactical aspects of in-theatre movements, preparation and cleaning, order of march, handover of responsibilities to other agencies, relinquishment of facilities, equipment recovery and movement and waste disposal, among many other things.

4.40 JTF also conduct planning at the tactical level. For further information about JTF tactical level planning see chapter 3—‘The Australian Defence Force Planning Process’.

MULTIAGENCY AND MULTINATIONAL PLANNING

4.41 Defence does not operate in a vacuum. On the contrary, almost all military campaigns and operations are conducted within an operational environment characterised by the presence of numerous actors. For campaign and operation planning, two groups of actors are particularly important as both may be involved in, or consulted during, the planning process. These groups of actors are OGD, which are involved in multiagency planning alongside Defence, and Australia’s MN partners, which are involved in the conduct of MN planning along with the ADF.

Multiagency planning

4.42 Australian national strategy is developed by Government and has military and non-military aspects. Defence and ADF military strategic and operational level planning contributes to implementing the military aspect of national strategy. By necessity, this planning occurs within a whole-of-government context, which involves ongoing coordination and cooperation between Defence and OGD. This coordination and cooperation is primarily achieved through two types of interdepartmental organisation:

a. **Interdepartmental committees.** Interdepartmental committees (IDC) are permanent or long-standing organisations that include representatives from several Government departments united by the need for ongoing cooperation regarding a specific issue or a range of related issues.

b. **Interdepartmental emergency task forces.** For crisis management an interdepartmental emergency task force (IDETF) is formed to gather interdepartmental views on options for responses. The designated lead department for a particular crisis uses the IDETF to gain a comprehensive perspective on the issues at hand.

4.43 **Key departments and agencies.** The whole-of-government approach is inclusive of a broad range of departments and agencies, all of which participate in various IDC and IDETF. The departments and agencies most frequently involved in national security planning include:

a. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C)

b. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)

c. Attorney-General’s Department (AGD)
d. Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC)
e. Australian Federal Police (AFP)
f. Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS)
g. Office of National Assessments (ONA)
h. Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)
i. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)
j. Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS)
k. other departments and agencies, whenever their input is required.

4.44 Figure 4.5 illustrates the interaction of Australian Government departments and agencies in supporting the formulation of national strategy.

![Diagram of national security coordination]

**Figure 4.5: National security coordination**

4.45 **Interdepartmental committees relevant to ADF joint planning.** Several IDC are relevant to ADF joint planning at the strategic and operational levels. These IDC include:

a. **The National Intelligence Coordination Committee.** The National Intelligence Coordination Committee is the most senior mechanism for the strategic coordination of national intelligence. The NSA (from PM&C) is the

---

chair, and membership includes leaders from across the Australian intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. The Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security, and the Directors of the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation, Defence Intelligence Organisation and the Defence Signals Directorate represent Defence.

b. **Strategic Policy Coordination Group.** Strategic Policy Coordination Group coordinates key policy issues affecting Australia’s international strategic concerns. The Deputy NSA (from PM&C) is the chair. VCDF and Deputy Secretary Strategy represent Defence. Representatives from DFAT and ONA are also principal members.

c. **Border Protection Task Force.** The Border Protection Task Force is a regular meeting of officials that support BPC. The Border Protection Task Force develops policy advice and provides expert input from across government to better coordinate and streamline arrangements to manage and respond to irregular maritime arrivals. The NSA (from PM&C) is the chair, with the Chief Executive Officer of ACBPS as the deputy chair. Deputy Secretaries (or equivalent) attend from Defence, DFAT, AGD, DIAC, AusAID, AFP, ONA, ASIO, ASIS and others as required.

d. **Homeland and Border Security Policy Coordination Group.** The Homeland and Border Security Policy Coordination Group acts on national security issues of a domestic nature. Defence is not a permanent member but is invited to attend when the committee is addressing matters that may have Defence considerations. The Deputy NSA (from PM&C) is the chair and the permanent members are from departments and agencies with core responsibility for domestic security, including PM&C, AGD, DIAC, the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, AFP, ASIO, Australian Crime Commission and ACBPS.

4.46 For further information about multiagency coordination see Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 00.9—*Multiagency Coordination: Defence’s Contribution to Australian Government Responses*.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE**

**MULTIAGENCY COOPERATION DURING PLANNING: REGIONAL ASSISTANCE MISSION TO SOLOMON ISLANDS, 2003**

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), the ADF component of which was Operation ANODE, commenced on 24 July 2003. The mission came about following the breakdown of law and order in Solomon Islands, which had been caused by a mixture of national bankruptcy and police corruption. Corrupt police, in particular, had formed links to criminal gangs that extorted money from the government, and police weapons had also been stolen by these gangs.

From the outset, RAMSI was planned and conducted using a whole-of-government approach. Initially led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, deployed forces included 1 500 ADF personnel, 155 members of the Australian Federal Police and 90 Australian Protective Services personnel. The deployment was also multinational, with various South Pacific coalition partners also contributing forces.
ADF and AFP personnel deployed to Solomon Islands as part of RAMSI destroy weapons handed in during a gun amnesty, 21 August 2003

To facilitate the effective flow of information during planning for RAMSI a number of measures were taken. At the strategic level, an interdepartmental emergency task force was established by DFAT to coordinate advice to government and the whole-of-government effort. To facilitate planning cooperation at the operational level, the ADF appointed a military adviser at the O6 level to assist the Special Coordinator in his role as the leader of RAMSI and adviser to the Solomon Islands Government. The ADF was also represented at daily AFP briefings in Canberra.

Resource planning was premised on a number of considerations, including the non-warlike nature of the operation, a scaling back of ADF elements as the security situation improved, and ADF provision of logistic support gradually being replaced by civilian contractors.

Multinational planning

4.47 Depending on the strategic and political circumstances, other nations may be invited to contribute to ADF joint planning. MN planning, which integrates planning staff, may occur where two or more nations are collaborating. When Australia is the Lead Nation, other nations involved in planning typically embed a liaison officer(s) with the ADF headquarters organisation responsible for planning. When Australia is a contributing nation, the ADF typically embeds a liaison officer(s) within the relevant lead nation planning organisation.

4.48 In the majority of cases Australian military operations will be MN. At the strategic and operational levels, planning for these operations requires substantial cooperation. Normally, the lead nation orchestrates planning. The other nations’
involvement is commensurable with their level of involvement in the conduct of the operation and with the size of their troop contribution.

4.49 Allied organisations that Australia is most likely to cooperate with during the conduct strategic and operational level planning include:

a. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
b. United States Combatant Commands
c. Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand
d. Permanent Joint Headquarters United Kingdom
e. Five Power Defence Arrangement (which includes Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaysia).

4.50 For further information about the conduct of MNO see ADDP 00.3—*Multinational Operations*.

Annex:
4A. Headquarters Joint Operations Command Planning Process
## HEADQUARTERS JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND PLANNING PROCESS

Table 4A.1: Headquarters Joint Operations Command planning process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) INITIATION</th>
<th>(2) MISSION ANALYSIS</th>
<th>(3) COA DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>(4) CONOPS DEV</th>
<th>(5) EXECUTION</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trigger</td>
<td>Planning guidance</td>
<td>Draft Mission</td>
<td>COPS Planning</td>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COPS Planning</td>
<td>Update</td>
<td>Directives</td>
<td>Instructions</td>
<td>CP0</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>CFJP</td>
<td>ENDFORCE</td>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Alert</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>ENSD</td>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>CPG</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>ENDS</td>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Alert</td>
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<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>ENDS</td>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Alert</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>ENDS</td>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Support</td>
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<td>Support</td>
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<td>ENDS</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
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<td>Support</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>ENDS</td>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Alert</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning Stage</td>
<td>Trigger</td>
<td>Planning process begins from a higher level or other means of initiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission Analysis</td>
<td>CoA Dev/Analysis</td>
<td>COA analysis, possible COA development, and endorsement COA draft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>JOC monitors operation and support of JOC plans and J3 monitors operation and support of CJP plans</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- JP 1-0: Operational Concepts
- JP 3-02: Doctrine
- JP 3-02-1: Joint Force Operations
- JP 3-02A: Joint Operations
- JM 6-0: Employment of Marine Corps Forces
- OPNAVINST 5700.1B: Joint Force publication series
- UNCLASSIFIED Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
- UNCLASSIFIED CoA
- UNCLASSIFIED Mission
- UNCLASSIFIED Plan
- UNCLASSIFIED Program Management
- UNCLASSIFIED Program to OIC
- UNCLASSIFIED Requirements
- UNCLASSIFIED Software
- UNCLASSIFIED System Engineering
- UNCLASSIFIED Training
- UNCLASSIFIED Warfare

**Legend:**
- CPG: Conceptual Planning Group
- CG: Conceptual Group
- JOC: Joint Operations Center
- COA: Course of Action
- WP: War Planner
- JP: Joint Publication
- JSI: Joint Staff Instruction
- OPNAV: Office of the Secretary of the Navy
- MARADMIN: Marine Administrative
- OIC: Officer in Charge
- UNCLASSIFIED: Unpublished or classified information

**Edition 2**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Stage</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Initiation</td>
<td>CJOPS Guidance</td>
<td>J5 (Chair), Component Commissions, COS</td>
<td>J5 is responsible for ensuring all agencies are involved in the planning and coordination of the COA. J5 is the leader of the scheme of maneuver and planning group in HJDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trigger</td>
<td>J5 (Chair), Component Commissions, COS</td>
<td>J5 (Chair) convenes the meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Mission Analysis</td>
<td>JFG</td>
<td>J6 (Chair), Component Commissions, COS, J5 and J2</td>
<td>J6 (Secretary) as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>CGOPS (Chair), Component Commanders</td>
<td>CGOPS Chair as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) COA DevAnalysis</td>
<td>JFG</td>
<td>J6 (Chair), Component Commissions, COS, J5 and J2</td>
<td>J6 (Secretary) as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>CGOPS Chair, CGOPS J5</td>
<td>CGOPS Chair, CGOPS J5 as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) CJOPS CONOPS DEV</td>
<td>JFG</td>
<td>J5 (Chair), Component Commanders, COS, J5 and J2</td>
<td>J5 (Secretary) as required</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>CGOPS (Chair), Component Commanders</td>
<td>CGOPS Chair as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Execution</td>
<td>SGG</td>
<td>CGOPS Chair, CGOPS J5 and J2</td>
<td>CGOPS Chair, CGOPS J5 and J2 as required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- CGOPS Chair: Chair of CJOOPS (Concurrent Joint Operations Planning System). CGOPS Chair reports to J5 and J2 for coordination of planning and execution.
- CGOPS J5 and J2: Members of CGOPS (Concurrent Joint Operations Planning System) who are responsible for planning and execution.
- J5 (Chair, Secretary, etc.): Chairperson of the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG). J5 is responsible for overseeing the entire planning process and is the leader of the scheme of maneuver and planning group in HJDC.
- J6 (Chair, Secretary, etc.): Chairperson of the Joint Group (JG). J6 is responsible for controlling the planning process and is the leader of the scheme of maneuver and planning group in HJDC.
GLOSSARY

The source for approved Australian Defence Force (ADF) terms, definitions, acronyms and abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), available on the Defence Restricted Network at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/. Note: The ADG is updated periodically and should be consulted to review any amendments to the data in this glossary.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

actor
A person or group involved in the crisis environment whose presence requires consideration.

adversary
An actor acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly actor and against which the use of force may be envisaged.

assumption
A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.

branch
An option for a particular phase within a line of operation, designed to anticipate decisive points and provide the commander with the flexibility to maintain the initiative.

Note:
A branch is a deviation from, and then return to, the same line of operation.

campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic end state or objective within a given time and geographical area.

capture
To seize and hold an objective and/or gain possession of specified adversary personnel, materiel or information.

centre of gravity (COG)
A dynamic and powerful physical or moral agent of action or influence with certain qualities and capabilities that derive their benefit from a given location or terrain.

commander’s intent
A formal statement, usually in the concept of operations or general outline of orders, given to provide clear direction of the commander’s intentions.
comprehensive approach

A multinational approach that responds effectively to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating and de-conflicting military and non-military activities.

critical capabilities (CC)

What the centre of gravity does; its affect on something (verb). The centre of gravity is the source of power to effect its critical capabilities.

critical factor (CF)

A critical capability, critical requirement or critical vulnerability.

Note:
Critical factors are identified during centre of gravity analysis.

critical requirements (CR)

Those things (which may be conditions, resources or means) that are essential for the centre of gravity to achieve its critical capabilities.

Note:
The key term is ‘critical’. A system may consist of many things, but few are likely to be critical.

critical vulnerabilities (CV)

Those critical requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralisation, defeat or destruction in a way that will contribute to a COG failing to achieve its critical capabilities.

culminating point

The point in time and location where a force will no longer be stronger than the adversary and risks losing the initiative.

Notes:
1. This may be due to reduced combat power, attrition, logistics, dwindling national will or other factors.
2. To be successful, the operation must achieve its objectives before reaching its culminating point.

decisive point (DP)

A geographic place, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.

Note:
This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.

destroy

To physically render a group or organisation ineffective unless it is reconstituted.

disrupt

To neutralise or selectively destroy key elements of the enemy's capabilities by means of a direct attack.

Note:
The aim of disruption is to reduce the enemy's cohesion and will to fight by neutralising or destroying parts of his force in a manner that prevents the force from acting as a coordinated whole.

**end state**

The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of a campaign or operation, which indicates that the strategic objective(s) has been achieved.

**joint**

Activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate.

**levels of conflict**

The recognised levels of conflict from which the levels for the planning and command of operations are derived.

Note: The levels of conflict are strategic, operational and tactical.

**line of operation (LOO)**

A line linking decisive points to allow sequential progression towards an operational objective(s) or to the end state.

**main effort (ME)**

A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area and time, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. It is linked to reaching the desired end state or to achieving an objective.

**multinational operation (MNO)**

A military action conducted by forces of two or more nations, undertaken within the structure of a coalition, an alliance or under the supervision of an international organisation such as the United Nations.

Note: It is used to encompass all related terms such as allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, or multilateral.

**neutralise**

To degrade or negate an adversary's capabilities to such an extent that it is rendered ineffective.

**operation**

A series of tactical actions with a common unifying purpose, planned and conducted to achieve a strategic or campaign end state or objective within a given time and geographical area.

**operational art**

The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions. It requires a commander to:

(a) identify the military conditions or end state that constitute the strategic objective
(b) decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state
(c) order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives
(d) apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions.

**operational design**
A schematic that articulates the contemporary application of operational art.

**operational level of conflict**
The level of conflict concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns and operations.

Note: It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical level force elements.

**operational objective**
An objective that needs to be achieved during a campaign or operation to enable the end state to be reached.

Note: Correct assessment of operational objectives is crucial to success at the operational level.

**operational reach**
The distance and duration across which a force element can successfully employ its military capabilities.

**phase**
A specific part of a campaign or operation that is different from those that precede or follow.

**seize**
To take possession of a designated area by force.

**sequel**
A significant shift in focus and identifies a different line of operation in a campaign or operation plan, which may or may not develop into a different course of action.

**sequencing**
The ordering of decisive points into lines of operation, and the subsequent ordering of lines of operation into a logical progression in time, space and purpose.

**strategic level of conflict**
The level of conflict which is concerned with the art and science of employing national power.

**synchronisation**
The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.
tactical level of conflict

The level of conflict concerned with the planning and conduct of tactical activities and is characterised by the application of concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives.

whole-of-government

Denotes government departments and agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACBPS</td>
<td>Australian Customs and Border Protection Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADDP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Doctrine Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADDP-D</td>
<td>Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-Doctrine</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADFP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force Publication</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
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<td>AGD</td>
<td>Attorney-Generals Department</td>
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<td>ALERTO</td>
<td>alert order</td>
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<td>ANMEF</td>
<td>Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>AOC</td>
<td>Australian Operational Concept</td>
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<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service</td>
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<td>ASIO</td>
<td>Australian Security Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<td>ASIS</td>
<td>Australian Secret Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>Border Protection Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>critical capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEASEO</td>
<td>cease order</td>
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<td>CJOPS</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>centre of gravity</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Commander’s Planning Group</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>critical requirement</td>
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<td>CV</td>
<td>critical vulnerability</td>
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<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>DIAC</td>
<td>Department of Immigration and Citizenship</td>
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<td>DJFHQ</td>
<td>Deployable Joint Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>decisive point</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defence Planning Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXECUTO</td>
<td>execute order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>force element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIC</td>
<td>fundamental inputs to capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>HQJOC</td>
<td>Headquarters Joint Operations Command</td>
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<td>IDC</td>
<td>interdepartmental committee</td>
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<td>IDETF</td>
<td>interdepartmental emergency task force</td>
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<td>JDN</td>
<td>joint doctrine note</td>
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<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>JMAP</td>
<td>Joint Military Appreciation Process</td>
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<td>Joint Planning Group</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>lead nation</td>
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<td>LOO</td>
<td>line of operation</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>mission analysis</td>
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<td>main effort</td>
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<td>Minister for Defence</td>
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<td>MN</td>
<td>multinational</td>
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<td>MNO</td>
<td>multinational operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measures of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>measures of performance</td>
</tr>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Strategic Commitments (Division)</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Adviser</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
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