

Appendix B Part One of the report: executive summary

Executive summary

HMAS *Success* is an auxiliary oiler replenishment vessel used for supplying fuel, ammunition, food and stores to naval combat units at sea. The ship's company is divided into four departments—Executive, Technical, Supply and Aviation (when embarked).

On 27 March 2009 *Success* left Sydney for a deployment to Southeast Asia and China. The deployment entailed visits to a number of ports—Darwin for replenishment of stores; Manila, the Philippines, for a port visit; Qingdao, China, to participate in a fleet review; Hong Kong, China, for crew rest and replenishment; and Singapore for a multinational exercise. The crew numbered some 220 members, including 30 females. *Success* was under the command of CMDR Simon Brown. Second-in-command of the ship was LCDR Donna Muller, the Executive Officer and head of the Executive Department. CMDR Brett Everitt was the Marine Engineering Officer and head of the Technical Department.

There are two categories of technical (or engineering) sailors—Electronic Technicians and Marine Technical. The MT sailors are grouped into various sub-departments, among them the Propulsion Sub-Department, which is responsible for maintenance operations, propulsion, steering and power distribution.

On the evening of 26 April 2009, after leaving Qingdao, the senior Petty Officer (Electronic Technician) met with the Executive Officer, having previously approached the Ship's Warrant Officer, to express concerns shared by the Petty Officer Electronic Technicians. The gist of the matter was [REDACTED] had overheard [REDACTED] discussing an incident that had occurred in a bar in Qingdao the previous day. The incident involved [REDACTED] having sexual

Note: This executive summary does not expand, contract, vary or modify any part of the report and does not purport to be comprehensive. It should be read only in conjunction with the report. Terms are used in the same sense as in the report.

relations in public with a junior female sailor; the two were observed by [REDACTED] who had encouraged others to come and watch. The [REDACTED] were sick and tired of [REDACTED] behaving poorly with impunity and had decided to bypass [REDACTED] because they believed he would do nothing about it.

This approach to the Executive Officer led her to speak with [REDACTED] the two female senior sailors onboard. The conversation led the Executive Officer, [REDACTED] to approach CDR Brown late in the evening of 26 April to report their concerns about the behaviour of and culture among Marine Technical sailors on *Success*. The complaints covered predatory sexual conduct towards female crew members (including the existence of bounties on the heads of females) and abuse and intimidation of female crew members ashore. [REDACTED] were said to be involved, and it was said the behaviour was condoned by [REDACTED]. Complainants were reluctant to come forward for fear of repercussions

After that meeting the Executive Officer and the Commanding Officer discussed options and concluded that the ship could not investigate the situation and take action without further assistance. As a result, the Commanding Officer telephoned CDRE Simon Cullen at Fleet Command to report on the meeting. Discussions followed until 30 April, when, as a result of a request by CDRE Cullen, CDR Brown reported his concerns by email.

CDR Brown's email dealt with two subjects—first, another serious situation that had been reported to him on 22 April and to Fleet Command on 23 April, concerning an allegation that [REDACTED] had had sexual intercourse with a female junior sailor onboard while the ship was in port in Qingdao and, second, what was described as a significant cultural problem in *Success*, particularly within the [REDACTED]—and took up the concerns raised by the POETs and the female senior sailors.

In response, Fleet Command dispatched an equity and diversity team to join the vessel in Hong Kong on 4 May for the voyage to Singapore. The team's task was to assess the situation and provide support to the Commanding Officer. On 8 May the team gave to the Commanding Officer a damning written report on the culture and behaviour of *Success*'s crew—particularly MT sailors, several of whom were named. The result was that on 9 May 2009 the Commanding Officer (having consulted Fleet Command) landed four MT sailors—[REDACTED]—on arrival in Singapore. The sailors were returned to Sydney [REDACTED] without a reason for the landing being given to any of them. There ensued a series of events that ultimately led to this Commission of Inquiry. This first report is not concerned with those events.

I came to the conclusion that there was a culture of silence and mutual protection among the MT sailors onboard *Success* after having examined a number of matters.

One such matter concerned the existence of a warning system to shield MT engine room sailors from random alcohol breath testing. [REDACTED] directly implicated in this, and the system's existence was known to other members of the crew.

Another matter concerned civilian criminal charges being laid against [REDACTED] on 18 October 2008, when *Success* was on a port visit in Cairns. Both sailors pleaded guilty to the charges on 4 November 2008 without appearing in court, but no conviction was recorded. All the relevant members of command on *Success*, including CMDR Brown, [REDACTED] were aware of those events. It was not until 9 April 2009 that a notice to show cause was issued to [REDACTED] notice to show cause was not issued to [REDACTED] 22 May 2009. Responsibility for failing to deal appropriately with the matter lies with the [REDACTED]. The lack of action was known to other members of the crew and added to the perception that the MT sailors, [REDACTED], were a protected species.

In another instance a junior MT sailor failed to appear promptly in response to an alarm and when he did appear was insubordinate to a Lieutenant from the Supply Department, who proposed to take him to the Coxswain and have him charged. The Lieutenant reported the incident to [REDACTED] the officer in charge of the MT sailor, but [REDACTED] dissuaded her from doing anything on the basis that the MT Department would deal with it. It was not dealt with.

On the evening of 10 April and the morning of 11 April 2009, while *Success* was in Manila, [REDACTED] some hours in a bedroom at the Manila Hotel with a female junior sailor who was heavily intoxicated. At the same time, in another room [REDACTED] shared a bed with another female junior sailor; two other female junior sailors were in the room as well. The room occupied by [REDACTED] had been booked by three male sailors, among them [REDACTED]. All the alcohol in the mini-bar in that room had been consumed [REDACTED] had to pay the bill.

[REDACTED] deflected all inquiries about what had occurred—in relation to both the fraternisation and the alcohol bill—with evasive denials. [REDACTED] were well aware of the allegations but chose to accept the denials without any probing. [REDACTED] evasion continued in the evidence he gave in an inquiry that followed the deployment. The evidence presented to this Commission by a number of female sailors was false or misleading when it came to the events of that night and the involvement of [REDACTED].

In the early hours of the morning of 21 April, while the vessel was moored in the harbour at Qingdao, a female [REDACTED] had sexual intercourse onboard with one of three MT sailors. The three sailors remained solid in not implicating each other. In the Petty Officers' Mess [REDACTED] statements suggesting that he knew what had occurred, but he did not come forward and when giving evidence before this Commission denied that he had made such statements.

On the evening of 25 April, in a public bar known as the LPG Bar in Qingdao, [REDACTED] engaged in sexual activity, including intercourse and oral sex. Many of the crew were present in different areas of the bar on that evening, among them [REDACTED] who observed the event and—far from stepping in to correct and direct [REDACTED]—encouraged others to watch.

[REDACTED] returned to the ship that evening he spoke [REDACTED] and was quite detailed in his description of what had happened. [REDACTED] thought it was clear from what he had been told [REDACTED] had been present when the act occurred and had seen it. Notwithstanding, when [REDACTED] denied the event on the following day [REDACTED] took no action. [REDACTED] have maintained their denials to the present day, including in their evidence before this Commission [REDACTED] has also denied any knowledge of or participation in encouragement of the event—despite the fact that the female in question was charged, pleaded guilty and gave evidence before the Commission admitting to the event and the direct observation by a close eyewitness, together with a good deal of other corroborating information.

The significance of that event does not end with the MT senior sailors and the [REDACTED]. There was no serious investigation between the time the event became known about on 26 April, when *Success* left Qingdao for Hong Kong, and the ship's arrival in Singapore. Indeed, nothing was done for some weeks after that. The event turned out to be pivotal because it was this that provoked the POETs to bypass the engineering chain of command and directly approach command through the Ship's Warrant Officer, who redirected them to the Executive Officer. The lack of adverse consequences for those involved in such a public and widely known incident could have led only to a feeling of immunity on the part [REDACTED] a perception among the rest of the crew that misbehaviour by MT sailors would be condoned. [REDACTED] might well feel emboldened to run amok in Hong Kong, and that is precisely what occurred.

During the visit to Hong Kong a number of MT sailors, [REDACTED] stayed ashore in the Renaissance Hotel. Other crew members were also staying at the hotel. In a contemporaneous email one of the crew members, [REDACTED] described the visit as 'the biggest piss up I've ever

done. 3 days of constant pub and club hopping'. On three evenings groups— [REDACTED]—visited the bars of Hong Kong in fancy dress. One of those occasions was what was described as a 'robe run', in which participants were dressed in hotel bathrobes and at least one of them had no clothing underneath the bathrobe.

On the third night the group consisted of [REDACTED]. The junior sailors wore Lycra suits and frilly dresses, making them look like Snow White; the senior sailors wore schoolgirl outfits consisting of a red skirt, white shoes and a tie. The group visited a bar at which a number of other personnel from *Success* and from other vessels were present, including several senior sailors from the MT Department. One of the junior sailors dressed as Snow White removed his clothing except for some underpants while on the dance floor. [REDACTED] tried to intervene but was ignored by the junior sailor. [REDACTED] took the matter up with [REDACTED] was the superior of the junior sailor, [REDACTED] rebuffed him and threatened him with violence.

The conduct of the sailors in Hong Kong was in breach of the ship's standing orders and the Navy's *Australian Book of Reference* as to dress standards and was in breach of specific port directives in relation to dress and behaviour ashore. Furthermore, the Commanding Officer had addressed the Petty Officers' Mess before arrival in Qingdao (after the poor behaviour in Manila) and demanded that the Petty Officers exercise proper discipline while ashore, correct and direct behaviour by junior sailors, and avoid undue fraternisation with junior sailors.

[REDACTED] proposed to take action in relation to the events at the bar in Hong Kong, and both his superior [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were informed at an early stage. [REDACTED] said he proposed to take the matter to the Ship's Warrant Officer—which amounted to taking the matter to command of the vessel—a concerted effort to silence him or neutralise any complaint he made followed.

[REDACTED] all played a role in this. In another pivotal moment in the saga, [REDACTED] threatened [REDACTED] violence and with being posted off the vessel.

The complaints to CMDR Brown, as reflected in his 30 April 2009 email to Fleet Command, squarely raised intimidation and fear of repercussions against those who complained about MT sailors. This is well illustrated by the experience of two crew members, [REDACTED].

As noted, [REDACTED] threatened by [REDACTED]. He reported the threats [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] leader of the equity and diversity team that was onboard between Hong Kong and Singapore, and then made a formal complaint [REDACTED].

That action was taken on the basis that [REDACTED] would be landed from the ship and returned to Sydney on arrival in Singapore. [REDACTED] genuinely fearful of repercussions—physical and otherwise—if his part in the landing of the sailors became known, particularly after he learnt that [REDACTED] for some days after the landing. Abusive messages [REDACTED] written in a bar in Singapore, and his request for recreational leave so that he could avoid facing MT sailors at work was dealt with [REDACTED] in a fashion that appears to reflect ill-will towards him because of his part in the landing of the senior MT sailors.

It became widely known [REDACTED] allegations about the behaviour of MT sailors—including an allegation that they kept a sex ledger or something like it—[REDACTED] and then to the equity and diversity team. She was threatened verbally and physically in an endeavour to silence her. MT sailors ostracised her when she went ahead and made a complaint [REDACTED] for physical assaults. There was evidence of threats by MT sailors to silence those who had made complaints.

A combination of the culture of silence and mutual protection among MT sailors and intimidation and fear of repercussions on the part of those contemplating complaints against MT sailors provided a powerful cover against exposure of poor behaviour. Complainants were reluctant to use the normal channels for making complaints. On this deployment the Executive Officer had appointed [REDACTED] an informal mentor to the female sailors. In that role [REDACTED] received a number of complaints about the behaviour of MT sailors from female sailors who were not prepared to make a formal complaint. The complaints fell into two broad categories—what could be described as predatory sexual behaviour and physical and verbal abuse. [REDACTED] attempts to do something about the situation with [REDACTED] and at a meeting of regulators drew a blank in the absence of a formal complaint until [REDACTED] approach to the Executive Officer caused her to take the complaints to the Commanding Officer.

There was evidence of predatory sexual behaviour. The existence of competitions to have sex with nominated females, as organised in the engine room, had been part of the folklore on *Success* since at least 2004, when an inquiry had been conducted into an allegation of that kind. For present purposes it is to be noted that [REDACTED] accepted responsibility as one of the organisers, [REDACTED] was involved, and [REDACTED] a member of the Routine Inquiry team led by CMDR Kenyon that looked into the matter.

On the March–May 2009 deployment MT sailors placed a bounty on the head of a young female [REDACTED] That female had intercourse

onboard the vessel on 21 April 2009, and [REDACTED] was landed by way of administrative action following the event, having been identified by the female as the party responsible. [REDACTED] denied being the person involved, and the landing was not based on a finding of guilt. It is not possible to say whether there were bounties on other females, or whether there existed anything that could be described as a sex ledger maintained by the MT sailors [REDACTED]. There was never any investigation of the matter and, in particular, there was never any search of the engine room and other spaces [REDACTED]. There was evidence of sexual relations between MT sailors and female sailors that might or might not have been the result of an organised competition because the targeted female would not know of the existence of the competition.

Save for the possibility of one incident [REDACTED] there was no evidence of physical threats or coercion by MT sailors seeking sexual relations with junior female sailors.

Complaints were made about MT sailors targeting, or 'hitting on', females, particularly by plying them with alcohol, and it was said that ultimately the females would give in to the advances in order to end the pressure. The Commission obtained little evidence to back this up. Reluctance to give evidence against MT sailors might have been a factor in this; further, giving such evidence could involve a female sailor in confessing to behaviour she might not want exposed in public. Another possible explanation is that the complaints [REDACTED] were exaggerated in order to explain and justify behaviour ashore on the part of some of the females. There was plenty of evidence of binge drinking by female junior sailors, but there was no evidence that this was forced on them by the males. There was, in fact, little evidence of sexual activity on the part of young female sailors; what was said to have occurred seemed to have been consensual—albeit on occasion with the female's ability to make an informed decision clouded by alcohol. I would be surprised if there were not more consensual sexual activity while on leave ashore than was revealed by the evidence before the Commission.

There was, however, a good deal of evidence to back up the allegations of verbal abuse by a small number of MT sailors. There was also evidence of some physical abuse [REDACTED] in a series of strange incidents in Hong Kong involving three female junior sailors. A point of concern is the lack of correction and direction of the junior MT sailors responsible by the senior sailors who were aware of it or were in a position to find out about it—among them [REDACTED]

The overwhelming impression I gained from the evidence about the behaviour of MT sailors on HMAS *Success* was that of a fiercely tribal culture. As noted, the culture of silence and mutual protection backed up by intimidation of those who might implicate MT sailors, leading to fear of repercussions, was powerful and it gave cover to MT sailors who were involved in unacceptable behaviour.

As a consequence, it is most unlikely that the whole truth emerged during this Commission of Inquiry.

The culture—[REDACTED]—encompassed all the MT sailors.

[REDACTED] The protection he afforded [REDACTED] led to a series of serious breaches of discipline on this deployment, both by them and by junior MT sailors in their company

The tribal culture was entrenched on *Success*. The 2004 inquiry is a pointer in that direction. It is highly unlikely that [REDACTED] could develop this culture on the March–May 2009 deployment alone or during their relatively brief period in their respective positions. It is much more likely [REDACTED] assumed the role that had been played [REDACTED] Under his control the culture got out of hand on this deployment. Those senior to him—[REDACTED]—all bear some responsibility because of their action and inaction in the face of misbehaviour

I note the possibility that a tribal culture could exist in the Marine Engineering Departments of other vessels, particularly those with little rotation among the engineering crew.

The 'one-off', or 'orphan', nature of *Success*, being a specialised vessel, led to engineering personnel being posted to the vessel for long periods and remaining on the vessel or being posted back to her within a short time after promotion. This contributed to an 'us versus them' environment so far as the remainder of the crew were concerned and to a perception that the longstanding residents ran the vessel. Furthermore, it led to difficulties on promotion to senior sailor and in maintaining respect for rank. The problem of lack of rotation in postings for MT sailors on *Success* and on other specialised vessels—particularly but not only on promotion—must be tackled.

Command on *Success* should adopt a zero-tolerance attitude to potentially unacceptable behaviour by MT sailors on the vessel and ashore. Prompt investigation should take place and proper records should be kept, and disciplinary or administrative action should be taken as necessary.

Fleet Command should recognise that there is a cultural problem and that something must be done about it. Remedies are needed. Fleet Command should ensure that Marine Engineering Officers understand it is their duty to effectively administer and control their department and not to protect members of their department. They should be supported in this by the upper echelons of Engineering at Fleet Headquarters. Commanding Officers of vessels should be vigilant to ensure that the Marine Engineering Officer cooperates as part of the

ship's command team; in this, the Commanding Officers should receive every support from Fleet Command.

The progress of the campaign to break the culture of silence and mutual protection among MT sailors on *Success* should be monitored from time to time. This will necessitate the adoption of methods that are effective and that recognise the barriers to obtaining genuine information.

The behaviour of MT sailors is the focus of this Commission of Inquiry. That behaviour cannot, however, be considered in isolation from the behaviour of other crew members. There was evidence of inappropriate conduct toward females—including sexual advances (physical and verbal), insulting remarks and workplace bullying. There were serious alcohol-related incidents in Hong Kong, and there were alcohol-related problems concerning one of the medical officers onboard.

There were two instances of property damage caused by sailors from *Success* when they were ashore in Manila. It is not contended that MT sailors were involved in either instance.

No administrative or disciplinary action followed. In one case the amount of the damage was repaid to the bar out of the ship's welfare fund, which in turn was reimbursed by anonymous contributions from the crew. In the other case the sailors involved directly paid the amount demanded. The lack of consequences for the personnel involved in those incidents could only have sent a message that drunken behaviour ashore leading to damage to the property of third parties would be condoned. This was a serious failure of command. Firm and decisive action at that stage might have put a brake on later excesses.

Allegations of other inappropriate conduct and relationships [REDACTED] [REDACTED] are also examined, although they are of no great consequence so far as this Commission is concerned. Alleged bullying, intimidation and workplace harassment of some females in the Supply Department did not have sufficient relevance to warrant closer examination.

Command's management of the allegations and the misbehaviour, both on the vessel and ashore, is examined. CMDR Brown's decision to refer matters to Fleet Headquarters was not inappropriate. The decision by Fleet Commander RADM Nigel Coates and the Chief of the Combat Support Group, CDRE Daryl Bates, to despatch an equity and diversity team consisting of the senior Equity Advisor—Fleet Command (LEUT McArthur) and her assistant WO Melville Harker to join the vessel in Hong Kong is controversial. The main purpose of the team was to help the Commanding Officer determine whether there was in fact a significant cultural problem in *Success* and, if necessary, recommend remedial action. This, however, was to be allied with a comprehensive equity and diversity education program for the entire ship's company. The team was said not to be onboard to conduct a formal quick assessment or an inquiry pursuant to any administrative procedures, as would have been the usual

response. There is some doubt about the precise sequence of events that led to that decision and about the precise reasoning for it. No Regulations or Instructions covered such a course, and there was no precedent for it. CDRE Bates's instructions were brief. There was an ambiguity about the task. It was essentially an investigation, albeit informal, but it was not described as such. It was to be combined with, or conducted under the guise of, a so-called equity and diversity health check. The nature of the matter to be dealt with was unusual and did not fit neatly into the usual procedure. The previous service of [REDACTED] on *Success* and [REDACTED] involvement in the Kenyon inquiry were complicating factors.

There is a question about whether the real purpose was to enable the Commanding Officer to act decisively if the allegations were taken seriously by identifying and temporarily landing the ringleaders of the misbehaviour, without the constraints imposed by formal disciplinary or administrative action.

The equity and diversity team carried out its task between 5 and 8 May 2009. LEUT McArthur's report was prepared and delivered to the Commanding Officer late on 8 May. The equity and diversity team held with various groups of the crew a series of sessions that, generally speaking, included some equity and diversity training, together with discussions aimed at eliciting any complaints about misbehaviour, particularly by the MT sailors. The team saw the female junior sailors before its session with the MT sailors. [REDACTED] part of the session with Chief Petty Officers. The POMTs were seen separately from the POETs. The junior MT sailors were seen after the senior MT sailors. There were also individual sessions with some of the crew—[REDACTED]

By the time of the sessions with the various MT sailors, those sailors knew that their conduct was the focus of the 'health check' and that allegations of misbehaviour had been made against some of them by some of the females. The sessions were adversarial, and both WO Harker and LEUT McArthur (to a lesser extent) referred to the possibility of MT sailors being sent home from Singapore.

[REDACTED] made formal complaints [REDACTED] LEUT McArthur had three conversations with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] made it plain to him that the objective was to remove the ringleaders of the MT culture—namely, [REDACTED] LEUT McArthur told [REDACTED] enough material to justify the removal of [REDACTED] that something more was needed to justify the landing [REDACTED] In her view, the threats [REDACTED] made to [REDACTED] sufficient for that purpose if [REDACTED] come forward and make the complaint. He was persuaded to do so.

The equity and diversity team's report was damning of the conduct of the ship's crew, particularly the MT sailors [REDACTED] as being involved in misbehaviour of one sort or another

The report was reasonably based on complaints made to and information received by the team, save [REDACTED] accused of threatening two members of the crew, whereas the only evidence was that he had threatened [REDACTED] the report was framed as if it were the result of an investigation into or the substantiation of allegations: conclusions were expressed, particular incidents were reported, and particular individuals were identified by name or description as guilty. The form of the report was not appropriate for an informal sounding exercise.

CMDR Brown proposed to land [REDACTED] temporarily and return them to Sydney and sought and received the approval of Fleet Headquarters to do so. No reasons were given to the sailors, since it was contended that such a landing fell within the exceptions to the necessity to afford procedural fairness.

[REDACTED] had made [REDACTED] complaint against [REDACTED] decision to land him temporarily while the matter was investigated was justified. The decision to land the senior sailors was not justified. The real reason for landing them was that they were identified as the ringleaders of the undesirable culture and behaviour of the MT sailors. The process for arriving at that decision was flawed in various respects.

The four sailors were peremptorily ordered to pack their belongings and were marched off the vessel in a humiliating fashion. They were placed in a taxi—in [REDACTED] in the case of the others, to Changi Airport to wait for several hours for a flight to Sydney, where they had to make their own way home before reporting for duty on the following Monday. Liaison about the manner in which they should be treated in Sydney was less than ideal, and they were effectively in limbo for some time. Even if a proper case for temporarily removing the sailors from the ship had been made, there was no urgency that justified the manner in which the removal was effected.

Australian Defence Force Investigative Service investigators were urgently flown to Singapore to begin an investigation. Some aspects of the early stage of that investigation are considered.

I conclude that the behaviour of the crew of HMAS *Success* while on leave ashore during the March–May 2009 deployment was out of control and discipline had broken down. No doubt, the considerable volume of alcohol that was consumed by many members of the crew—male and female—was a factor contributing to virtually every untoward incident. It is doubtful, however, whether the consumption of alcohol on this deployment was very different in that respect

from behaviour occurring on other deployments and other naval vessels or, indeed, among other groups of young people on holiday. There is a limit to what the Navy can or should do about alcohol consumption on leave ashore: alcohol consumption is not unlawful. The best response is that anti-social behaviour caused by drinking should not be tolerated.

Effective onboard testing of those on duty coupled with a genuinely random program including, where appropriate, all-of-ship testing is necessary. Testing for those on duty on *Success* was reasonable save for the system of protection of MT sailors. Personnel rostered on for duty seemed by and large to adjust their social activities accordingly. But the random testing program was not effective as far as conduct ashore is concerned.

Senior sailors and junior officers play an important role in connection with anti-social behaviour. Leadership in relation to conduct ashore should be provided by senior sailors and junior officers, and this should be backed up and reinforced by command on the vessel. The leadership and management training of senior sailors should be reviewed to ensure that it is adequate and relevant to current needs, including dealing with conduct on leave ashore in foreign ports. The same should apply to promotion from the ranks to junior officer.

The Navy's Safe Spirit Program should be reviewed to ensure that it gives sufficient emphasis to behaviour while on leave ashore in foreign ports. Particular attention should be paid to organising activities on foreign port visits, so as to provide an appealing alternative to meeting in the nearest or most popular bar. The policy of no consequences for a sailor who returns to the ship completely inebriated and in need of help and supervision should be reviewed.

On *Success's* March–May 2009 deployment the lack of disciplinary or administrative action following misbehaviour ashore reinforced the view that 'what happens ashore stays ashore', in contrast with discipline onboard the vessel. That must change. There should be zero tolerance of unacceptable behaviour while on leave ashore until the message that such behaviour is not tolerated gets through. Command on *Success* should insist on the maintenance of discipline and due respect for rank ashore. Prompt Defence Force disciplinary action should be taken or prompt administrative action considered when unacceptable conduct occurs.

The equity and diversity system should be reviewed, as should the interplay between it and the disciplinary system, administrative action and the divisional system.

The divisional system should be independently reviewed bearing the needs of female sailors in mind.

All naval disciplinary and personnel systems should recognise the reluctance of crew members to come forward and complain about grievances for fear of repercussions, and procedures should be devised to alleviate that concern.