ADVISORY CIRCULAR 002/2017

Dated: 20 Jul 2017

FLIGHT IN AIRSPACE WITH VOLCANIC ASH CONTAMINATION (SUPERSEDING TAAC 02/2012)

References

B. DGTA - Technical Airworthiness Advisory Circular 02-2012 - Volcanic Ash Operations
D. ICAO Doc 9974 “Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash” – risk management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination
E. ASI-DGTA Record of Decision AH6344326, Review of DGTA AC 02/2012: Volcanic Ash Operations, dated 23 Mar 17

Purpose

1. As requested at reference A, this Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance on operating Australian Defence Force (ADF) aircraft in environments contaminated by volcanic ash.

2. This AC supersedes TAAC 02/2012: Volcanic Ash Operations (reference B) due to changes within the ADF regulatory framework and updates to foreign and local airworthiness bulletins (enclosure 1) relating to volcanic ash operations. Rationale supporting these changes is provided at Reference E.

Applicability

3. This AC applies to all persons involved in the management of aircraft covered under the requirements of the Defence Aviation Safety Framework (reference C). This AC is principally limited to technical aspects only, except where specific operational considerations are technically related.

4. This AC is guidance only. It is not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation or an acceptable means of compliance against a regulation.

Responsible Agencies or Individual

5. The individual aircraft Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisations (CAMO) are to assess and act upon, to the extent necessary, the advice contained in this AC.
Background

6. Volcanic ash consists of extremely fine particles of pulverised rock, comprised predominantly of silica together with smaller amounts of oxides. In pulverised form, silicates are extremely abrasive and cause significant damage to aircraft when exposed. The presence of volcanic ash can therefore present a serious safety hazard to aircraft. CASA AWB 02-038 issue 7 (enclosure 1) provides further detail on the impact exposure to volcanic ash has on the aircraft structure, aircraft systems and propulsion systems. Reference D details additional guidance on risk management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination.

INSTRUCTIONS

7. The level of risk for aircraft operating in, or near, airspace or aerodromes with known or forecast volcanic ash is not well understood. As such ICAO established an international volcanic ash task force to produce further guidance on operations in airspace contaminated with volcanic ash (reference D).

Recommendations

8. The individual aircraft platform CAMO should seek advice from the Military Type Certification Holder (MTCH) to determine whether or not corrective procedures exist for aircraft operating in, or near, airspace or aerodromes with known, or forecast, volcanic ash. In the absence of any precise direction, the MTCH or CAMO should seek MDOA or OEM advice.

9. The CAMO should ensure that the aircraft operators follow the necessary occurrence reporting procedures as per DASR M.A.202 to inform them immediately of suspected volcanic ash exposure.

10. A list of indicators and/or symptoms that indicate possible exposure as well as generic guidance on volcanic ash encounter is contained within enclosure 2.

Conclusion

11. Volcanic ash can cause significant damage to aircraft structures and windows, aircraft systems and propulsion systems and therefore presents a serious safety hazard to aircraft if not treated effectively.

12. In the first instance, OEM-endorsed manuals such as the AFM and AMM take primacy, but in the absence of this, this AC provides generic guidance on the impact of volcanic ash exposure and any corrective actions that should be considered. The individual aircraft platform MTCH and CAMO should assess and act upon, to the extent necessary, the advice contained within.

REPORTING / RECORDING ACTIONS

Reports Required

13. There are no mandatory reporting requirements for this AC.
Recording Action

14. A copy of this AC is to be retained in the applicable document management system in accordance with applicable internal procedures.

AC Currency

15. This AC will remain current until withdrawn by DASA.

Point of Contact

16. The point of contact for this AC are as follows:

a DAVENG-DASA: OIC ESI on 03 9622 2721.
b ACPA-DASA: ACPA.Regs@defence.gov.au

Original signed by
DG DASA

20 Jul 17

Enclosures

1. CASA AWB 02-038 ISSUE 7
2. Generic Guidance On Volcanic Ash Encounter
1. Effectivity

All Australian registered aeroplanes and helicopters, aircraft operators, owners and maintenance organisations involved with aircraft operating into, or near, areas of airspace, located in Australia or overseas, that are known or suspected of being contaminated with volcanic ash or at aerodromes with runway volcanic ash contamination.

2. Purpose

➢ To continue to provide aircraft operators, owners and maintenance organisations with an overview of CASA recommendations regarding operations into, or near, areas of airspace, located in Australia or overseas, that are known or suspected of being contaminated with volcanic ash or at aerodromes with runway volcanic ash contamination.

➢ To provide information and recommendations referenced in ICAO Doc 9974 “Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash – Risk Management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination or Forecast Volcanic Cloud Contamination”.


➢ A separate Civil Aviation Advisory Publication CAAP 215-1(2) “Guide to the preparation of operations manuals” – is now available from the CASA website. Annex B of this document contains specific guidance on Volcanic Ash. Its focus is on RPT operations, but the same basic risk management principles apply to non-RPT operations (i.e. private and GA operations). This revision to the AWB contains elements from this CAAP, including Hazard identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Management aspects.

3. Reason for revision

This minor revision to the Airworthiness Bulletin updates the revision status of the EASA SIB No. 2010-17 to Revision 7.

The previous issue of this AWB (Issue 6) was revised to update the revision status of the EASA SIB No. 2010-17 to Revision 6. It also included the latest EASA volcanic ash reporting form.
4. Background

Volcanic ash contains extremely fine particles of pulverized rock. It is comprised predominantly of silica (> 50 per cent), together with smaller amounts of the oxides of aluminium, iron, calcium and sodium. The glassy silicate material is very hard and, in pulverized form, extremely abrasive. The abrasive nature of volcanic ash can be very damaging for aircraft structures, cockpit windows and engines. In addition to the abrasive nature of volcanic ash, another important property is its melting point. Being made up predominantly of glassy silicates, whose melting temperature (~1 100°C) is below the temperature of jet engines operating at normal thrust (1 400°C), volcanic ash can melt and get deposited in the hot section of the jet engines. Furthermore, volcanic ash could clog the Pitot-static system, penetrate into air conditioning and equipment cooling systems and contaminate electrical and avionics units, fuel and hydraulic systems and cargo-hold smoke-detection systems.

Flying through an ash cloud must be avoided by all means due to the extreme hazard it presents. Volcanic ash can cause extreme abrasion to all forward facing parts of the aircraft, to the extent that visibility through the windshields may be totally impaired, aerofoil and control surface leading edges severely damaged, airspeed indications become unreliable through blocking of the Pitot heads/static ports, and engines may even shut-down rapidly or lose power gradually, often only being detected when catastrophic performance loss has occurred.

In addition to volcanic ash, volcanic eruption columns also contain many gases including water vapour, sulphur dioxide, chlorine, hydrogen sulphide and oxides of nitrogen. Following the eruption, oxidation and hydration, the sulphur dioxide forms sulphuric acid droplets. The resulting ash/acid mix is highly corrosive and can cause further damage to jet engines and pitting of windscreens.

The highest concentration of active volcanoes in the world lies around the rim of the Pacific Ocean, the so-called “ring of fire”, which stretches northwards along the western edge of South and North America, across the Aleutian and Kurile Island chains, down through Kamchatka, Japan and the Philippines and across Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand to the islands of the South Pacific. Volcanic ash from eruptions of these volcanoes could not only impact aircraft operations in the airspace located around these volcanoes but also, subject to the prevailing winds and jet streams, the operations in Australia.

Flight in airspace with a volcanic ash contamination can be hazardous to aviation. Even flights in airspace with a low volcanic ash contamination, where no immediate threat to the safety of the aircraft appears to exist, could have medium and long term consequences for the airworthiness of aircraft.
The IVATF has developed a globally applicable process to facilitate the management of flight operations into, or near, areas of known or forecast volcanic cloud through the provision of appropriate information to assist in minimising safety risk in such operations. The approach is based on a formalised risk assessment process for use by an operator wishing to conduct such an operation.

5. Recommendations

**Hazard identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Management**

Operations into areas of airspace with a visible volcanic ash cloud **should not be conducted**. It is highly probable that, within a short period of time, the ash could cause damage to the aircraft that would reduce the airworthiness of the aircraft below acceptable levels.

If operations into, or near, areas of airspace or aerodromes with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination, need to be conducted, it is essential that the airworthiness of the aircraft is maintained at all times to ensure the continuation of safe operations. It is essential that a Safety Risk Analysis (SRA) is carried out in accordance with the company Safety Management System (SMS), or as recommended by ICAO as referenced below:

1) The company is responsible for assessing the risk of operations into, or near, areas of airspace with known or forecast volcanic ash cloud contamination or at aerodromes with runway volcanic ash contamination, and for determining and implementing appropriate mitigation measures.

2) Before carrying out a SRA, use the Safety Risk assessment worksheet in Appendix 4 of ICAO Doc 9974, or the hazard identification/risk management template in the SMS.

3) The SRA analysis should address, but not be limited to, the following list of known hazards:

   - Higher concentrations of volcanic ash than reported;
   - Failure to obtain or update volcanic ash information, both pre-flight and en route
   - Inadvertent encounter with an area of volcanic ash, with potential loss of thrust on one or more engines.
   - Undetected damage or degradation of performance of airframe, engines and/or aircraft
AIRWORTHINESS BULLETIN
Flight in Airspace with Volcanic Ash Contamination

AWB 02-038 Issue: 7
Date: 13 July 2015

- Long-term detected or undetected cumulative effects which degrade the aircraft airworthiness and which require maintenance rectification/actions before further flight
- Catastrophic loss of aircraft performance
- Reduced visibility
- Incorrect forecast of ash cloud location or density
- Regulatory requirements concerning operations in volcanic regions not currently incorporated into the flight planning process;

4) Operations into areas of airspace with known or forecast volcanic ash cloud should only occur where contamination levels have been measured and the ash concentration and extent is known and where the location of the volcanic ash cloud and the level of contamination can be communicated to the crew at every stage of the operation. The outcomes of the SRA should be at acceptable levels. Acceptable levels are considered to be operations that remain within the accepted safety boundaries, as established within the operators SMS.

5) The SRA should be reviewed when changes that are material to the integrity of the SRA occur.

6) Every effort should be made to liaise with organisations such as Meteorological Watch Offices, Air Navigation Service Providers, including Aeronautical Information Services, Meteorological Service providers, Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres, Volcano Observatories and Original Equipment Manufacturers of aircraft and engines, and to use their information in the SRA process.

Airworthiness Considerations – Hazards and Risk Mitigation

1) Unless specific pre- and post-flight inspections have been defined by the aircraft and engine Type Certificate (TC) holders, it is essential to carry out thorough daily inspections to detect any erosion, ash accumulation, airframe, engine or system damage or degradation, including the following:

- Wing leading edges
- Navigation and landing lights, radomes
- Landing gear
- Horizontal stabiliser
- All extruding structure
- Pitot tubes and static ports
• Windows and windshields
• Engine inlets and nacelles
• Engine air inlet filters (for piston engines)
• Engine air intake filters (for turbine engines equipped with air intake filters)
• Engine compressors and turbines
• Engine oil systems
• Engine fuel systems
• Rotor blades
• Air conditioning and equipment cooling systems
• Electrical and avionics units

Based on the results of the above inspections, more detailed inspections may be necessary.

2) **After any encounter with volcanic ash**, and whenever the following phenomena are observed, detected or experienced during flight:

• Acrid odours similar to electrical smoke
• Rapid onset of engine problems
• St. Elmo’s fire
• Bright white/orange glow appearing at the engine inlets
• Dust in the cockpit or cabin
• Sudden (unexpected) outside darkness
• Airspeed fluctuations
• Landing lights casting sharp, distinctly visible beam

It is essential that the aircraft is inspected in line with the guidance in the previous section, after each flight.

3) Aircraft parked in areas that may be contaminated by the fall-out or settling of volcanic ash should be protected and covered in accordance with the aircraft and engine TC holders’ advice where possible. Any volcanic ash residue should be removed prior to operations, following the TC Holders’ recommendations where available.
Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Management – Non RPT Operations.

It is accepted that the requirement for an SMS based formal hazard identification and risk assessment is not a legislative requirement for these types of operations. In many cases no operations manual will exist, nor will there be a requirement to have a formal Safety Management System in place. The absence of these requirements does not negate the need for effective identification and management of the hazards and risks associated with flight near or within volcanic ash contaminated airspace.

The same physical hazards exist to non-RPT operations, often conducted in smaller general aviation aircraft or helicopters powered by internal combustion piston or smaller turbine engines. In these operations, advantage should be taken of existing resources available to aviators, such as:

- NOTAMS, SIGMETS and other advisory information issued by AirTraffic Services and Meteorological Services, including the VAAC.
- Pilot reports of volcanic ash events or aircraft performance degradation, particularly for their specific aircraft type.
- Manufacturers guidance and recommendations.
- The ICAO volcanic ash guidance material referenced in this AWB, particularly ICAO document 9974, as it relates to Risk Management of Flight Operations with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination.

Reporting of Ash Events

Operators should report encounters with volcanic ash which cause damage to aircraft through the normal Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) system. Encounters which cause an operational incident or accident should be reported through the Air Safety Incident Reporting System (ASIR) via the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Near Encounters or observations of volcanic ash cloud or activity should be reported via usual means to Airways Authorities and/or Meteorological Advisory Services, so other airspace users can be apprised of the presence of volcanic ash in the atmosphere. Volcanic ash related incidents are to be reported immediately to the nearest ATS unit, CASA and the ATSB as appropriate.
The following publications provide additional source of information for operations into, or near, areas of airspace with known or forecast volcanic ash cloud contamination or at aerodromes with runway volcanic ash contamination.

- ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (PANS)
- ICAO Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds (ICAO Doc 9691)
- ICAO International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) Handbook (ICAO Doc 9766)
- ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO Doc 9859)
- ICAO Regional ATM contingency plans such as the Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan – EUR and NAT regions
- EASA SIB No. 2010-17 (latest revision available from EASA website, currently at Rev 7 as of issue date of this AWB).

Links to documents referenced in this AWB are correct at the time of publication of this AWB, and are uncontrolled after this date. The responsibility to ensure the link provided is to the referenced document remains the responsibility of the document user.
6. **Reporting**

Australian operators should report encounters with volcanic ash through the normal Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) system and complete the attached notification form as an attachment to the SDR.

7. **Enquiries**

Enquiries with regard to the content of this Airworthiness Bulletin should be made via the direct link e-mail address:

AirworthinessBulletin@casa.gov.au

or in writing, to:

Airworthiness & Engineering Branch
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
GPO Box 2005, Canberra, ACT, 2601
ENCLOSURE 2 – GENERIC GUIDANCE ON VOLCANIC ASH ENCOUNTER

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. In the absence of Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) guidance, the MTCH and CAMO should consider the operational considerations detailed within enclosure 1 and ICAO Doc 9974. Specifically, the MTCH and CAMO should consider the following technical guidance where practical to do so:

   a. **Depart the affected airspace immediately.** Volcanic ash is a significant safety hazard and should be considered an emergency situation. Attempt to immediately leave the volcanic ash contaminated airspace.

   b. **Reduce Thrust to Flight Idle.** Reducing engine thrust to flight idle (altitude permitting) will reduce the engine core operating temperature. This will minimise the build-up of molten ash within the turbine area.

   c. **Disengage Auto Throttle (if installed).** Disengaging the auto-throttle will prevent it from increasing engine thrust (in the event of ash build-up in the turbine reducing mass flow) and subsequently the core operating temperature.

   d. **Start the Auxiliary Power Unit.** The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) can power systems and provide a restart capability in the event of a multi-engine power loss.

   e. **Increase Bleed Air Extraction.** Increasing the bleed air extraction from the engine (by selecting air-conditioning packs and nacelle/wing anti-ice) increases surge margins, reducing the likelihood of surge and flameout.

   f. **Monitor Engine Parameters.** Monitoring the Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) / Turbine Inlet Temperature (TIT) will prevent overtemp conditions. This can result from ash material build-up, reducing turbine mass flow and thus requiring greater fuel flow (hence increased temperature) to achieve the same thrust level.

MAINTENANCE CONSIDERATIONS

2. The Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) takes primacy in the first instance. In the absence of any precise direction, the MTCH or CAMO should seek OEM advice. If this is not forthcoming, the following should be considered in determining the appropriate maintenance actions.

3. If aircraft operate from an aerodrome with known or forecast volcanic ash, it is recommended inlet and exhaust covers are fitted to parked aircraft. For engine starts after aerodrome contamination, external pneumatic supply should be used and the engines should be dry cranked to remove ash deposits and taxied with minimum thrust. Post-volcanic ash procedures should also be followed upon reaching the destination aerodrome.

4. Generic maintenance inspections are contained within enclosure 1 and should be considered, with the addition of propeller blade damage inspections (if relevant). Indications may vary so all flight servicings (After Flights, Before Flights etc.) should be performed with
extra vigilance for operations in, or near, airspace or aerodromes with known or forecast volcanic ash.

5. The following additional maintenance inspections should also be considered:
   a  **Borescope Inspection.** Borescope inspection of the engine gas path (within the compressor, combustor and turbine in particular), noting any damage. Indications of volcanic ash deposits can range from actual ash deposits, glass-like material deposits on forward facing surfaces, component erosion and/or blockage of cooling holes. Refer Figure 1.

   ![Figure 1 - Volcanic Ash Build-Up](image)

   b  **Oil Filter Inspection.** Inspect the engine and accessory gearbox oil filters to detect any oil system contamination.

6. For aircraft that have operated in, or near, airspace or aerodromes with known or forecast volcanic ash, it is not recommended to perform the following maintenance actions:
   a  **Engine Ground Runs.** Engine ground runs should not be performed until appropriate ash exposure maintenance actions are performed, as this could result in the melting and deposition of residual volcanic ash deposits onto critical turbine components.
   b  **Compressor Washes.** Compressor washes should not be performed as they can solidify the ash material into the turbine cooling circuit, adversely affecting the critical component thermal gradients. It can also result in rotor imbalance and performance loss from the accumulation of material settling and drying in the rotor spools.