CAMO to 21 relationship:
Why you **cannot afford** **not** to have one!

WGCDR Ash Howell
17 November 2016
Indicative responsibilities of CAMO, 21J Design and 145 AMO against TAREG AEO and AMO

Accomplishment of maintenance
Management of defects
Coordinate scheduled maintenance
Aircraft continuing airworthiness record system
Weight and balance and symmetry
Occurrence reporting
Pre-flight inspection (maintenance pers component)
Aircraft technical log
Maintenance check flights

Aircraft Maintenance Programme
Analysis of AMP
Reliability Programme
Accomplishment of maintenance (contracting)
Airworthiness Directives
Occurrence reporting (analyse defect reporting)
Weight and balance and symmetry
Under the old regulations
An unsafe condition...
...is reported to the CENGR (Defect report, ASOR etc)...
...who decides on the design/engineering action (mod/substitution/deviation)...

TRUST ME
I'M AN ENGINEER
...and also releases the appropriate embodiment instruction (STI, mod order etc)
Under DASR, an unsafe condition...
...is reported to the Authority by the 145 AMO, CAMO and MDOA holder.
The DoSA for the AMTCH function coordinates *type design* aspects...

**Engineering Flowchart**

**DOES IT MOVE?**

- No
  - Should it?
    - No
      - No
        - No Problem
    - Yes
      - Yes
        - No Problem
  - Yes
    - Should it?
      - Yes
        - No
      - No
        - No
...and any mod/repair data is forwarded to the CAMO for embodiment...
...if warranted, an Airworthiness Directive is issued...

**Airworthiness Directive**

**AD No.:** 2016-001  
**Issued:** 17 October 2016

This AD is issued in accordance with DASR, 21.A.38. In accordance with DASR M.A.301, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the DASA, or in exercising the flexibility provisions afforded by DASR BR.080.

**Design Approval Holder’s Name:** Bell Textron Canada Ltd  
**Type/Model designation(s):** 429

**OEM:** Bell Textron Canada Ltd  
**AMTC Holder:** DASA

**Effective Date:** 18 October 2016

**AMTC Number(s):** AMTC 0032 Issue 2 dated 12 Dec 2012

**TCDS Number(s):** TCDS 004 dated 13 Nov 2015

**Foreign AD:** N/A

**Supersedure:** First Issue

**Subject:** MAIN ROTOR MAST POLE LOWER DRIVE SPINE INSPECTION

**Manufacturer(s):** Bell Textron Canada Ltd (BHTC)

**Applicability:**  
This AD applies to ADF N49 BHTC 429 helicopters, all serial numbers (s/n) when a Main Rotor Mast Part Number (P/N) 429-040-040-101 is installed.

**Reasons:**
...and any need to operate an unairworthy aircraft is coordinated between DoSA and CAM...

**Military Permit to Fly**

**MILITARY PERMIT TO FLY NO:** AASB-MPlF-001

This military permit to fly is issued pursuant to DASR 21 Subpart P and certifies that the aircraft is capable of safe flight for the purpose and within the conditions listed below. This permit is also valid for flight to and within other States provided separate approval is obtained from the Authorities of such States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AASPO-DO E2 IRN:</th>
<th>1241/2016-002</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of Risk for One Time Flight</td>
<td>1. Registration marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A25-109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Aircraft manufacturer / Type</td>
<td>3. Manufacturer Serial number/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIKORSKY A25 S-70A-9 Black Hawk</td>
<td>701446</td>
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</tbody>
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4. **The permit covers:**

   DASR 21.A.701(a)(vi)k.(i) to “Fly the aircraft to a location where maintenance or airworthiness review are to be performed, or to a place of storage”

5. **Holder**

   MAO in the State of Registry (for information: Defence Aviation Safety Authority)

6. **Conditions / Remarks**

   This Military Permit to Fly (MPlF) is issued by the AASPO-DO Part 21J Head of Design under MDOA Certificate AUS.DASA.21J.0005 Privileges 6 and 7, IAW DASR Part M and 21.A.711(b) for Sikorsky S-70A-9 Black Hawk A25-109 to complete a one time ferry flight from RAAF.
...with any residual risk communicated through the CAM to the MAO.
Summary

• CAMO(MAO) is central to DASR
• DAR role split between DoSA and CAM
• DoSA (AMTCH) unique solution
• Coordination of other MDOA holders
• Type design risks communicated to operator through CAM
Questions/Discussion?