Brexit and Anglo-Australian Defence Policy: Back to the future?

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He was then posted to the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters for Middle East operations, finishing his tour with a secondment to 3 Commando Brigade in Afghanistan. In 2009, he assumed command of the 2nd Battalion of The Parachute Regiment, which included service in Afghanistan. In 2011, he became military lead of the Ministry of Defence’s Afghanistan planning team. He was promoted Brigadier in 2013 and, until 2015, was the Brigade Commander in NATO’s UK-led Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which included deployment to the Baltics.

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Abstract

This paper analyses the politics and policy of the defence relationship between Australia and the UK in the context of Britain’s recent decision to leave the EU. It focuses on the political systems, interaction of political leaders, and narratives of Australia, the UK and nations of the Indo-Pacific region that relate to the defence and security relationship between the UK and Australia.

The paper argues that Brexit is not an opportunity to reverse history, and that the concept of an ‘Anglosphere’ has been consigned to the past and cannot be resurrected. Rather, the challenge will be to exploit the changes Brexit will bring in ways that are beneficial to the Anglo-Australian relationship, which potentially include a free-trade deal and enhanced support to the Five Power Defence Arrangements, as well as buttressing mutual interests in a range of other bilateral and multilateral issues.
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Introduction

On 23 June 2016, the population of the UK took part in the largest exercise of democracy in the country's history.¹ In an epochal decision, the UK voted to leave the European Union (EU). The unexpected result will be the catalyst for fundamental change in the UK's economic and foreign policy, the exact details of which have yet to become apparent. While ostensibly a decision relating to Europe, such a seismic shift in the UK's geo-political position will reverberate globally.

Britain’s decision to leave the EU has elicited a stream of commentary describing the decision primarily in the vocabulary of catastrophe.² But the decision could be beneficial to the Anglo-Australian relationship. It may pre-empt a British free-trade deal with Australia—currently impossible to negotiate independently of the EU³—the benefits of which would be considerable for Australian and British exporters alike. Furthermore, Brexit could restore for Australia an independent peer, sharing many of the same values and systems, including parliamentary democracy and classical liberal values, as well as buttressing Australia’s interests in a range of bilateral and multilateral issues, which would include defence and trade.⁴

This paper will analyse the politics and policy of the defence relationship between Australia and the UK under this rapidly-changing international context. It will assess the efficacy of the bilateral relationship at the political level of defence and security in the context of two key recently-published policies, the UK’s 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review and Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper.⁵ It will focus on the political systems, interaction of political leaders, and narratives of Australia, the UK and nations of the Indo-Pacific region that relate to the defence and security relationship between the UK and Australia.

Both countries see economics and commerce as vital for security and central to the defence relationship. The paper will therefore explore key economic trends and prospects in the context of the Indo-Pacific region as defined in Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper.⁶ Space precludes detailed analysis of many broader issues of security (such as terrorism, trans-national crime, cyber and climate change), as well as important scientific and defence industrial links. It will also be assumed that the recent referendum decision will result in the formal departure of the UK from some stage in the near future.

The first section will analyse the current bilateral defence relationship. Thereafter, the value of the relationship from the alternate perspectives of Australia and the UK will be examined in the context of each country’s recently-published national security and defence policy papers. It will seek to apportion respective values on the current relationship. The paper will then contextualise the described relationships in the shifting geostrategic context of the Indo-Pacific region. The final sections will examine prospects for the contemporary bilateral relationship within the framework of Britain’s decision to exit the EU, and assess where the relationship is heading.

Section 1: The Anglo-Australian relationship

According to the 2016 Defence White Paper:

> The relationship between Australia and the United Kingdom is based on deep historical and cultural ties, which have been reinforced over time, most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁷

The bilateral relationship between the UK and Australia has been historically significant. On occasion, it has also been highly vexed. The bond has developed around a unique framework of defence and security, trade and investment and a multitude of complex social and cultural connections.⁸ As the post-World War 2 links between the UK and Australia have declined, so the UK’s relationship with the EU has strengthened.
The defence relationship

The defence relationship between the UK and Australia is hugely complex. It is articulated through a treaty and an intricate amalgam of formal and informal bonds, including agreements, arrangements (including the central ‘Five-Eyes’ treaty and the Five Power Defence Arrangements [FPDA]), organisations, memoranda of understanding, operations, training, exchanges, traditions and inter-connected national and private defence industry.

Until 2013, there was no overarching strategic framework for defence and security relations between Australia and the UK. In January that year, Philip Hammond and Stephen Smith, Secretary of State for Defence in the UK and Minister for Defence in Australia respectively, signed a bilateral treaty. While absent of any formal commitment, this treaty was a tangible output from the Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN), the annual touchstone of Australian and UK foreign and defence policy. Instead of binding the two nations to mutual obligation, the treaty sought to promote cooperation in defence-related matters, the exchange of information, closer engagement on technology, value for money in defence and security, and consultation on threats to international peace and security.

The announcement of the treaty met a mixed response, exemplified by opposing views from within the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Andrew Davies and Benjamin Schreer highlighted that, unlike the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty, there was ‘no mention of any responsibility to act together to respond to an armed attack on the other’s territory or armed forces’. Davies and Schreer saw the Australia-UK treaty as an ‘exercise in industry economies of scale’ and that ‘defence cooperation with the UK can only indirectly support Australia’s strategy to focus on the region’.

Conversely Peter Jennings, ASPI’s executive director, highlighted the value of the personal engagement of ministers from both countries that had endured since AUKMIN’s inception in 2009, the enduring bilateral intelligence and operational partnership, and that the US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand remain ‘the most effective partnership in the world for their willingness to commit to real military operations’. Jennings went on to state that this ‘has value beyond many bilateral defence associations that operate under impressive-looking treaties but where practical cooperation is limited’.

Whichever view reveals itself to be more accurate will only be established as the bonds of the treaty are tested over time. What can be said with some certainty is that it is beneficial for both countries to have a capstone treaty in place.

The Multilateral UKUSA Agreement, widely known as the ‘Five Eyes’ treaty or agreement, is a jewel in the intelligence crown of both the UK and Australia. The full value of this treaty is impossible to judge given the restrictions of security. However, documents leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013 give a clue to its value, with Privacy International explaining the treaty as follows:

Under the agreement, interception, collection, acquisition, analysis, and decryption is conducted by each of the State parties in their respective parts of the globe, and all intelligence information is shared by default. The agreement is wide in scope and establishes jointly-run operations centres where operatives from multiple intelligence agencies of the Five Eyes States work alongside each other. Further, tasks are divided between SIGINT [signals intelligence] agencies, ensuring that the Five Eyes alliance is far more than a set of principles of collaboration. The level of cooperation under the agreement is so complete that the national product is often indistinguishable.

Political leadership

Since 23 June 2016, the UK has seen a new Prime Minister (Theresa May) elected by the ruling Conservative Party, while Malcolm Turnbull has been re-elected as Australia’s Prime Minister. Under these leaders, political changes have been instigated that will result in a changed defence and trade context. While both the Secretary of State for Defence in the UK (Michael Fallon) and
Australia’s Defence Minister (Marise Payne) remain unchanged, both countries have made important changes to their ruling front benches.

In July, Malcolm Turnbull split Marise Payne’s portfolio and appointed Christopher Pyne into the inaugural post of Defence Industry Minister. In the UK, Theresa May appointed the former Secretary of State for Defence (and pro-Brexit supporter) Liam Fox into a new front-bench portfolio as Minister for International Trade. As complex bilateral trade and defence negotiations unfold in the next few years, these two new ministers will bring added capacity and focus to bilateral trade. As such, they can only be viewed as beneficial additions to the bilateral relationship.

Overseeing the UK’s role in that relationship—in London and at AUKMIN—will be Boris Johnson, the new British Foreign Secretary. Johnson is a well-known advocate of closer bilateral ties with Australia and, as the ‘honorary Australian of the year’ in 2014, enjoys considerable popularity in Australia. Regardless of how bilateral foreign policy develops in the next few years, it will inevitably attract media interest with Johnson at the UK’s helm.

Section 2: How does the relationship matter to Australia?

Trade

One of the most vital aspects of Australia’s relationship with the UK lies in mutually-beneficial trade. Until June 2016, the future of that trade relationship lay primarily in the context of the EU. The EU is one of Australia’s primary trading partners. In 2014, EU foreign direct investment into Australia was worth A$169.6 billion, with reciprocal foreign direct investment into EU countries worth A$83.5 billion. In the same year, Australian bilateral merchandise and services trade was worth A$83.9 billion, with the EU being Australia’s largest services export market.

Hence, the EU is vital to Australia’s economic well-being. In November 2015, some six months before the UK’s referendum result was known, it was announced at the G20 summit in Ankara that Australia would commence negotiations in 2017 with the EU for a free-trade agreement. The ambition was to ensure that Australia’s EU-related trade and investment reached its full potential, that barriers to trade in goods were removed, service linkages and ties were expanded, and regulatory cooperation was increased.

Australia’s ambition makes eminent economic sense. However, the EU’s reputation for securing free-trade agreements is mixed. The EU-American Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has been floundering since its proposal in 1990. Likewise, Canada has been unsuccessfully attempting to secure the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the EU for the last ten years. Ratification for such agreements is needed from all 28 members of the European Union Council and thereafter from the European Parliament.

Additionally, as with the Canadian agreement, ratification may also be needed from a host of other parliaments, both national and provincial. Thus an intercontinental deal, such as the Canadian proposal that has been a decade in formulation, will have to be agreed by 36 parliaments, and could be defeated by the local parliament of the Belgian province of Flanders. Indeed, EU-Australia negotiations have already stalled in the face of Italian demands that Australia lift anti-dumping duties on canned tomatoes. The chances of a rapid free-trade agreement between Australia and the EU appear very slim, and bilateral barriers to trade with EU countries look set to remain for the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, when the Australian and EU trade figures are deconstructed, it becomes clear that the UK is of predominant importance in Australia’s European trade relationship. In 2014, 48 per cent of Australia’s exports in services to the EU were via the UK, 51 per cent of the A$169.6 billion of foreign direct investment into Australia was from the UK, and 66 per cent of Australian foreign direct investment into the EU was to the UK. The UK is Australia’s eighth largest export market and, in 2014, 37.4 per cent of all of Australia’s exports to the EU went to the UK, with ‘no other EU country featur[ing] in Australia’s top 15 export markets’.
These results reinforce the findings of Australia’s International Business Survey 2015 in which the UK listed in the top five markets for Australian businesses as a ‘key target market for the next two years,’ behind the US, China and Indonesia, and just ahead of India. Thus, by any measure, Australia’s economic relationship with the UK is important. In the near future, it seems likely that Australia will be negotiating free-trade agreements with the UK and the EU.

**Defence**

Australia’s 2016 *Defence White Paper* contains the most contemporary definition of its strategic defence interests. The paper describes three core interests: a secure resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication; a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and a stable Indo-Pacific region; and a rules-based global order. None was given priority. The 2016 *Defence White Paper* also articulated the strategic objectives of Australian defence as:

- To deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests and northern approaches;
- To make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and to support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island countries to build and strengthen their security; and
- To contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order.

Thus the Malcolm Turnbull government has broadly followed the strategic interests for Australian defence postulated in the 2013 *Defence White Paper* and, less the reference to rules-based global order, has constrained Australia’s defence ambition to the geographical vicinity of Australia and its region.

This desire to focus defence policy on Australia and its region is exemplified in a paucity of reference to the UK. Mention of the UK occurs within only four paragraphs of the 188-page 2016 *Defence White Paper*, hardly an unequivocal endorsement of the ‘significant relationship’ that the Australian Government describes being ‘underpinned by our shared heritage, common values, closely aligned strategic outlook and interests’ and the shared ‘distinguished record of active service and cooperation in conflict zones around the world’. Defence links between Australia and the UK, even without substantial reference, are clearly strong.

In the hard-nosed assessment of Australia’s 2016 *Defence White Paper*, the majority of references to the UK are set in the context of the FPDA. As the White Paper notes, the FPDA ‘is the longest standing regional security mechanism for Australia’ and ‘the only multilateral security agreement focused on practical cooperation of its kind in the Southeast Asian region’. It asserts that the FPDA is:

> [A]n enduring and important feature of Australia’s efforts to advance its interests by working with partners to promote security in Southeast Asia ... [and that] participation in the FPDA increases habits of cooperation and interoperability between its members and makes a practical contribution to regional security resilience.

It further contends that, through the FPDA, Australia will seek to promote military interoperability through complex, high-end combined exercises that have the ‘greatest benefit for Australia and the FPDA’s other members’.

There has been some criticism of the FPDA in recent years, and its importance in the changing global and political and defence scenarios has been questioned. However, the predominant analysis contained in the spate of articles written over the FPDA’s recent 40th anniversary overwhelmingly praises the value of the loose consultative agreements that complement the multitude of defence arrangements each member nation has with other forces outside the ambit of the FPDA.
The adaptable nature of these arrangements has seen growth ranging from air exercises to large-scale maritime and land exercises, involvement in a number of humanitarian and disaster relief operations (including Timor-Leste), and cooperation in Afghanistan. For Australia, the FPDA is a valuable, effective and worthwhile contemporary alliance—and the UK is an integral part of it. From the evidence of the 2016 Defence White Paper, this is a key link to the UK.

**Broader assistance**

As well as adding value in the Five-Eyes and FPDA alliances, the Australian Government ascribes implicit importance to the assistance that the UK could provide in global issues that are deeply important for Australian defence and foreign policy, asserting in the 2016 Defence White Paper that:

> We cooperate closely as members of the FPDA and the Five-Eyes intelligence community. The United Kingdom has global military reach and the capacity to help respond to global security challenges.

Given the Australian Government’s strategic interests—Australia within its region and the rules-based global order—it is wholly coherent that the 2016 Defence White Paper ties the defence relationship with the UK into the ‘global’ priority. The White Paper expands into some detail as to the mechanics of the future relationship and suggests three specific areas where continued defence alliance is likely, contending that:

> We share common interests in supporting and defending a stable rules-based global order and our approaches to global security issues are closely aligned.... Australia and the United Kingdom will continue to work together to address common threats to a peaceful, prosperous and rules-based global order, including terrorism, the instability in the Middle East and violent extremism.

The last reference to the UK notes the value of AUKMIN and ‘cooperation on intelligence, science and technology and high-end defence capabilities’.

Thus the 2016 Defence White Paper contains no surprises in its reference to the UK. It also contains little to indicate any planned invigoration of the defence relationship. In one of eight ‘strategic observations’ about the 2016 Defence White Paper, Crispin Rovere from the Lowy Institute postulates that a White Paper under Tony Abbott’s government would have been far more fulsome in its coverage of the UK. Written prior to the Brexit decision, his conclusion is blunt but fair, saying that:

> As it is, the Defence White Paper offers little more than a polite nod to Australia’s historical ties with the UK, and presents a factual account of ongoing security and intelligence linkages in a couple paragraphs. The same is true for Canada. In other words, the Defence White Paper gives attention to the UK commensurate with its influence in our strategic affairs: marginal.

**Section 3: How does the relationship matter to the UK?**

Approximately six months before Australia published its 2016 Defence White Paper, David Cameron’s government had released the UK’s National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. In doing so, the UK has now formalised the production of a defence-related review in conjunction with a ‘whole-of-government’ national security strategy, aiming to produce the two policy documents in tandem at the beginning of each five-year government cycle. The combined policy is agreed at the UK’s National Security Council and signed off by the Prime Minister, rather than the Secretary of State for Defence.

Incorporating all facets of national security in the policy delivers a much broader range of threats than Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper, with the economic dangers consistently paramount. Indeed, the very sub-title of the UK document—‘A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom’—signposts the breadth of the policy, with the opening line of the Prime Minister’s introduction making clear the imperative that:
Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa. So the first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and remains, strong.

The policy also highlights the significant economic opportunities that exist for the UK, which include Asia and the Pacific region.31 The economic prerogative is further reflected within its three national security objectives, namely:

- To protect our people—at home, in our Overseas Territories and abroad, and to protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life;
- To project our global influence—reducing the likelihood of threats materialising and affecting the UK, our interests, and those of our allies and partners; and
- To promote our prosperity—seizing opportunities, working innovatively and supporting UK industry.

The policy document also makes it makes clear that international partnering and defence engagement is a growing priority for the UK, asserting that:

We are making our defence policy and plans international by design. Our Armed Forces have always operated internationally, deterring major threats, responding to crises and conflicts, and exercising and building defence capabilities together with our allies and partners. We will place more emphasis on being able to operate alongside our allies.

Through defence engagement, our Armed Forces help build our understanding and increase our influence in regions that matter to us.... This contributes to our cross-government work overseas to build cooperation to tackle key challenges such as instability, terrorism and extremism, serious and organised crime, and threats to maritime security. Defence engagement also enables faster responses to crises, and promotes our prosperity through support to defence exports.

In its 2016 Defence White Paper, Australia announced a similarly-increased emphasis on defence engagement. For the UK, defence engagement would become a funded, core Ministry of Defence task for the first time, meaning that the Armed Forces will formally prioritise defence engagement—‘providing a defence contribution to UK influence’—alongside other core tasks.32

The UK also announced it would open a Defence Attaché and Loan Service Centre in its Defence Academy, establish an Armed Forces defence engagement career stream and establish British Defence staffs in the Middle East, Africa and, most importantly for Australia, in the Asia Pacific.

Finally, in a move that again foreshadowed Australian policy, the UK pledged to increase the training offered to international partners.

The policy document also committed the UK to ‘invest in alliances’, specifically naming Australia, New Zealand and Japan. It goes on to state that the UK’s ‘strong bilateral defence and security relationship with Australia reflects a modern partnership which addresses issues of common concern’. The Five-Eyes and FPDA are singled out, as are common interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the 2013 Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty, and AUKMIN.

Recent shared operational history with Australia is drawn out, including the two Malaysian airline incidents, the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone, disaster relief in Vanuatu and counter-ISIL operations in Iraq. In the same way that Australia highlights the rules-based global order in its 2016 Defence White Paper (56 times), the UK focuses on plans to work with allies to ‘address global challenges and strengthen the rules-based international order’. ‘Rules-based international order’ is cited 30 times. Rules-based order, whether international or global, is vital to both countries.

The UK policy document also highlights two further areas where the UK’s security and prosperity is underpinned by cooperation with Australia; the Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group, aimed at reducing the international threat and impact of organised crime, and the Consular Colloque, which allows the same five countries to support each other in protecting their respective nationals overseas.33 It goes on to state that cooperation will be ‘strengthened’ in these areas.
The analysis demonstrates huge areas of policy commonality between the UK and Australia’s recent overarching security policy. History and finance coalesce to make the UK’s perspective more global, although—probably for economic reasons—it eschews directly challenging China. Both nations see the great value of the Five-Eyes and FPDA alliances and both see value in increased defence engagement and the maintenance of rules-based global order.

Section 4: How does the relationship matter to the Indo-Pacific region?

To some observers, the UK’s relationship with Australia could appear a historical throwback of little obvious consequence to the geo-political balance in the Indo-Pacific region. It can be seen that the bilateral relationship between the UK and Australia retains importance to both parties and that both parties value the FPDA. That does not address the question of the value of the bilateral relationship—either together or in its constituent parts—to the region. This section will study the FPDA in that context.

There was considerable analysis of the FPDA following its 40th anniversary in 2013. The consensual view was that the Arrangements had proved a flexible and enduring source of stability in the region, with Gavin Keating asserting in 2006 that:

> Over the years many pundits have predicted the demise of the FPDA, as they perceived it as becoming less relevant to the security situation at the time. Not only have they been proven wrong but the FPDA has been transformed. For thirty years the FPDA has progressively evolved to form a key element of relations between the five members.34

It was in reference to the FPDA that the UK gave its clearest signal in its National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review that it will upscale activity in the Indo-Pacific region, contending that ‘the Five Power Defence Arrangements ... are an important part of our commitment to peace and security in the region’. Furthermore, it made an unambiguous commitment to increase the UK’s contribution, asserting that ‘in particular through exercises, including with our new aircraft carriers, and joint training ... [the UK will] continue to invest in our strong bilateral defence relationships’.

The FPDA provides the UK with political and economic links with its former colonies, a formal security agreement with Australia (the only one in existence until the Treaty was signed in 2013), bonding the UK with the region, and providing an opportunity to display its military equipment to encourage defence sales.35

Currently, the UK has little military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. But the recent capability enhancements confirmed in the policy document are not irrelevant in the context of the Indo-Pacific region, with the maritime capabilities being particularly important. Philip Radford notes that ‘it has been 40 years since a UK defence review meant much to Australia and the Asia-Pacific, but the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review... signals a sea change’.36

The review not only committed the UK to increasing its contribution to the FPDA but also made an explicit promise to use the new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers in forthcoming FPDA exercises. Both the Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales are colossal compared to their Invincible-class predecessors. Weighing 70,600 tonnes, they are 50 per cent larger than HMS Ark Royal, the largest warship previously operated by the Royal Navy. The decommissioning of the Ark Royal effectively ended independent Royal Navy operations in the Indo-Pacific region. However, when the new carriers are commissioned in 2018 and 2020 respectively, such operations will recommence.

For many years, the aircraft carrier project balanced on a knife-edge and the future of the second carrier was for years in serious doubt. The announcement at the NATO conference in Wales in 2014, confirming the build, was reinforced in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review by the announcement that the UK’s F-35B fleet would be increased from 12 per carrier to a national total of 138, allowing each carrier to operate up to 36 of the fifth-generation aircraft.37
Thus a future FPDA operation or exercise that incorporates a UK aircraft carrier could see a number of F-35B Lightning squadrons being deployed, rather than the ten Sea Harriers that could have previously been launched from an Invincible-class carrier. The UK now also has the ability to protect these high-value targets with a new fleet of Vanguard attack submarines, destroyers (equipped with state-of-the-art Sampson radars) and nine new P8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.

The new maritime capability gives the UK and its allies—for the first time since 1979—a viable independent, strike-carrier capability at the cutting edge of global maritime technology. The two aircraft carriers under construction are a globally rare and substantial modern capability. If deployed to the Indo-Pacific region, they would be able to influence or dominate significant areas of the vast maritime and littoral environment.

The UK’s maritime capability will be a noteworthy component in the global distribution of maritime power and a considerable addition to potential FPDA and Australian bilateral capabilities. For nations such as Australia and Singapore, that have invested heavily in developing coherent amphibious capabilities, the availability of organic air power increases the complexity and scale of the exercises that the FPDA will be able to execute. Consequentially, there arises greater future scope for the FPDA to continue to increase its role as a regional security actor.

As the recapitalisation of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) gathers pace, and in parallel Australia and Japan’s new F-35 Lightning fighters also take to the air, American military capability in the region will be reinforced by a growing number of allies armed with fifth-generation equipment.

It is not only in the maritime and air domains that recent changes will alter the ratio of forces available in the Indo-Pacific region. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review saw the expeditionary capability of the British Army doubled to 50,000 personnel, two rapid-strike brigades designated, and the Special Forces budget also doubled. This new force structure is designed to achieve (then) Prime Minister Cameron’s introductory ambition of ‘global reach and global influence’ and, as such, could become relevant to Australia and its near region for defence diplomacy, training, exercises and operations into the future.

The corollary is also obvious: the UK’s defence spending is no longer dominated by European security. The British government is reacting with economic realism that is woven through the national security strategy. But even if the UK wished to re-engage in the Indo-Pacific region, there are other geostrategic issues closer to home that may inhibit such a move. President Putin’s militaristic posturing on the eastern fringes of Europe has already pre-empted NATO force restructuring and led to an increase in British forces in the Baltics.

In parallel, there is currently an upsurge of IS-inspired violence across continental Europe. The UK’s security leadership judges such jihadist terrorism will impact on the UK in the near future. It is only the scale and ferocity of any such future terrorist violence that will determine the resource bill. However, the French-style deployment of troops into high-risk areas is already being contemplated. And a security shock in the UK could rapidly change the direction of new defence policy.

The re-emergence of the expeditionary capability presaged in the UK policy document, together with related equipment acquisition announcements, should provoke some forward thinking in Australia, FPDA countries and across the broader Indo-Pacific region. In a fast-changing regional context, the assumptions that underpin the ‘China rising’ narrative may not survive the vast macro-economic tensions that already challenge the rapidly-growing Chinese economy. For Australia and its regional allies, the return of expeditionary UK doctrines—backed by interest, not sentiment—offers opportunities. For the UK, it is clear that the Indo-Pacific is key to future prosperity and, if ‘prosperity is key to national security’, defence activity in the region will undoubtedly increase.

The Australian Department of Defence currently has two overseas offices responsible for export support, one in Washington and one in London. The Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group London Office is a focal point for acquisition and sustainment activity in the UK and
Europe, and provides related support to Defence and other Australian government agencies. As the largest procurement agency in the Commonwealth, the Department of Defence is responsible for some of Australia’s most complex procurement activities. Defence engages with industry to deliver value-for-money procurement outcomes in order to support departmental and ADF capability. If Australia and the UK could rapidly develop a free-trade agreement, the opportunities for bilateral defence trade would increase proportionally.

The UK’s decision to leave the EU will have a significant impact on the European defence market. Currently, the EU is attempting to reduce the duplication of defence programs and research, increase competition levels and foster innovation through attempts to apply single-market rules to the European defence industry. With the UK’s departure from the EU, Europe will lose the main proponent of applying free-market logic to defence procurement, and open the door to a more protectionist outlook.

The UK has historically balanced defence procurement decisions between European and American options on the basis of performance and price. Other European countries have a more protectionist perspective. Published contracts show that France awards 97 per cent of its contracts to domestic firms. Despite current high levels of Anglo-French defence cooperation, firms such as BAE systems may in the future find themselves facing higher trade barriers as they attempt to secure contracts with European countries. This will entice defence companies based in the UK to increase their efforts to seek markets outside Europe, suggesting the Indo-Pacific and Australia could well benefit.

South China Sea issues

With China’s regional aspirations rising in parallel with its military capability, what is the UK’s defence role in the region, and how does that link to Australia? The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review omitted any direct reference to the growing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, making only one oblique reference in noting that:

The rules-based international order also relies on enforcement of standards and laws covering a wide range of activities and behaviours, from the Geneva Conventions to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The document highlights the ‘significant economic opportunities for the UK’ that exist in the Asia-Pacific region and, in another indirect reference to the challenges of future security in the South China Sea, offers to deliver ‘considerable influence on the future integrity and credibility of the rules-based international order’ in the region. This is the prelude to the document’s only foray into the key strategic defence issue of the Indo-Pacific region, namely South China Sea sovereignty.

The UK’s relationship with China was badly damaged in 2012 when then Prime Minister Cameron met with the Dalai Lama in London. This led to a significant breakdown in Sino-British relations, and rapprochement only occurred with Cameron’s visit to China in December 2013. The British Government will have realised that overt criticism of China’s South China Sea policy in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review would have served little strategic value, and risk further Chinese recrimination. However, the document did make clear that it would support regional partners, including Australia, in trying to solve the complex issue, asserting that:

We will continue to work with like-minded partners in the region, including Japan, Australia, New Zealand and others to defend and protect our global shared interests, uphold the rules-based international order and to strengthen cooperation on settling international and regional disputes.

In the Indo-Pacific, the UK is walking the policy tightrope between avoiding and antagonising China, supporting regional allies and growing military expeditionary capability.
Trade

Even given the UK’s decision to leave the EU, trade with European countries remains vital for the UK’s economic security. In 2014, over 44 per cent of the UK’s exports of goods and services went to EU countries, and the UK imported 53 per cent of its goods and services from Europe. But it is trade with developing countries outside the EU that demonstrates the most advantageous economic path for the UK’s future.

Despite the value of trade between EU countries and the UK rising consistently in recent decades, it is being outstripped by the parallel rise in trade with developing countries. Between 1999 and 2013, UK exports to non-EU countries expanded at almost twice the speed of exports to EU countries. Many of these growing markets are in the Indo-Pacific region. Perhaps as important, the UK’s trade with EU countries is in chronic and deteriorating deficit, as trade outside the EU is in healthy surplus. Figure 1 shows the trend in exports of UK goods and services to European and non-European markets:

![Figure 1: The trend in UK exports of goods and services](source: Oxford Economics/Haver Analytics)

The City of London is also benefiting financially from an increasing global perspective as it vies with New York for the global lead in financial and professional services. The focus is switching to the Asian markets. London’s lead in joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (contrary to US Government wishes) allowed the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer to announce that ‘the City of London would become the base for the first clearing house for the [Chinese] Yuan outside Asia’.

The UK has a clear economic interest in the Indo-Pacific and Asian regions and is seizing every opportunity to improve its financial position. This policy is emphasised throughout the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, reiterating that ‘a secure and prosperous UK’ is a global issue.

Within Asia, Japan secures notable mention, with the policy stating that the UK will considerably strengthen its defence, political and diplomatic cooperation with its ‘closest security partner in Asia’. This incorporates deepening defence engagement with Japan through the development of joint counter-piracy operations and participating in joint deployments both globally and worldwide. Simultaneously, the policy highlights the opportunities for expanding both trade and investment with Japan. Aside from Japan, both Australia and New Zealand are highlighted as
countries that the UK will ‘seek to strengthen co-operation on settling international and regional disputes’.

The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review also commits to ‘developing new capabilities’ with Australia. This could well be a reference to the forthcoming British tender for the RAN’s replacement of the ANZAC class of frigate, given the burgeoning capability that the combination of Artisan Radar and Sea Ceptor missiles is bringing to the UK’s new Type 26 Global Combat Ship.\(^4^9\) As the UK’s wish to increase security engagement with Asia is repeated throughout the review, the defence capabilities being developed consistently add weight to the prose.

**Section 5: The future**

*The Strategic Defence and Security Review – time for an encore?*

In the build-up to the UK’s referendum, the ‘pro-Remain’ Chancellor George Osborne had threatened a two per cent cut to defence spending if Brexit occurred. It was only in April 2016 that the defence budget had been raised for the first time in six years. If the threatened cut were now implemented, it would be a significant challenge for the UK to retain defence spending above the NATO target of two per cent of GDP, which was the target that Prime Minister Cameron had committed to. Furthermore, both he and Osborne had also ‘ring-fenced’ the defence budget from the severe austerity measures that were being forced upon a raft of government departments.

With Cameron and Osborne now out of office, the future of defence spending is far from certain. The Royal United Services Institute’s Deputy Director General, Malcolm Chalmers, has suggested that in the event of Brexit the government would need to scrap last year’s National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review and conduct a new one.\(^5^0\) Chalmers opined that when this was done ‘it would probably resemble the cuts-heavy 2010 document, which is reviled in the military as having done nearly irreparable harm’. Others have asserted that any such move could ‘cast a shadow over an imminent political debate on the renewal of nuclear submarines’.\(^5^1\) It would also render much of the analysis in this paper redundant.

It is not yet clear whether Chalmers’ advice will eventually be followed, although it appears less likely than in the days following the referendum. Any reduction in defence spending in the short term would most likely be premised on an enduring and significant downturn in the UK’s economy, a scenario widely forecast by those who opposed the UK’s departure from the EU, including the British Treasury, which contended that:

> Two years after leaving the EU, output would be 3.6% lower and the pound 12% weaker than if Britain remained in. The widely respected Institute for Fiscal Studies has argued that ‘there is an overwhelming consensus … that (leaving) would reduce national income in both the short and long runs’, suggesting the net effect on public finances would be £20-40 billion.\(^5^2\)

In the near aftermath of the Brexit decision, no such down-turn has occurred. London and international markets plummeted initially but have recovered well. Both the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 are close to their highest value in a year and both have made up the losses they suffered. Furthermore, in July the House of Commons voted by an overwhelming majority of 355 to replace the UK’s Trident-armed nuclear submarines. For the moment, it is judged that defence planners can maintain the pre-Brexit assumptions on future UK defence spending. But they will always be conscious that global financial markets are notoriously fickle, and that the full ramifications of the UK’s departure from the EU have still to play out.

**Return to Commonwealth?**

In a 1992 House of Representatives debate, Australia’s then Prime Minister Paul Keating reminded his more pro-British political opponents that Britain ‘walked out on you and joined the Common Market’.\(^5^3\) *De facto* the UK has now walked out of the EU. Does this create an opportunity for Australia and the other 52 nations of the Commonwealth, 17 of which lie within the Indo-Pacific region?\(^5^4\)
Prior to the referendum, most Commonwealth leaders advocated that the UK should remain in the EU, an apparent paradox given the view of Commonwealth countries in 1973 when they opposed the UK’s entry into the EU (then titled the European Economic Community). From the outset of the negotiations in 1963, the UK’s membership of the European Economic Community was regarded as a threat to Australian export markets, Commonwealth cooperation and even bilateral political ties.

This reversal of view in 2016 is indicative of the fundamental changes in global trade conditions that have occurred in the intervening 43 years. The EU and the Commonwealth have grown into fundamentally different structures—the EU is a political construct based around supranational ambitions and intergovernmental cooperation; the Commonwealth is primarily organic and derives its benefits from close connectivity at numerous non-governmental levels. Within the Commonwealth, burgeoning business and professional links are propagated and reinforced by a common working language, legal procedures, accounting and commercial practices, and cultural links.

The Commonwealth has never aspired to be an old-style trading bloc but instead draws its strength from networking driven from within its constituent countries, a format that has proved successful in the digital network age where rapid data exchange is a requisite for success. Conversely, the EU hierarchy has focused on top-down centralisation, scale and integration. The result has been that Commonwealth trade and investment flows now account for 15 per cent of all world exports and are growing considerably faster than overall world trends.

In 1972, the UK’s exports to Commonwealth countries were 50 per cent of its total exports. Over the subsequent decades, that fell to 12 per cent. But that trend has now reversed and economic opportunity has moved from Europe to the growing global markets, including Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Following the Brexit referendum, a number of Commonwealth countries, including Australia, India and New Zealand in the Indo-Pacific region, have expressed interest in trade talks. According to media reports in the UK, 27 countries are now ‘queuing up to complete trade deals’. Once Article 50 of the Lisbon treaty has been triggered and the UK has negotiated its exit from the EU, it will be free to secure such bilateral trade deals. In a move that shows both mutual bonds of alliance and a strong desire to achieve rapid economic benefit, Australia and New Zealand have already offered trade negotiators to assist. Economic sharks are circling, hungry to secure trade agreements.

Annmarie Elijah, Associate Director of the Australian National University's Centre for European Studies, debunks ‘the oft-peddled notion that the UK could leave the EU and return to a golden era of trade cooperation with Commonwealth countries’. Her thesis is based on the difficulties of re-negotiating the UK-Australia Trade Agreement, which was suspended when the UK acceded in January 1973, and the time needed to secure such a deal.

In an article written prior to the referendum, Elijah also concluded that a British exit would be ‘at best a distraction’ to Australia’s relationship with the EU, and ‘at worst a serious impediment’. With the European project under strain in a number of areas (including the Euro-crisis, sluggish economic growth and mass immigration), her fear was that a British exit could trigger a contagion of departing European countries, leaving Europe terminally fractured and presenting a challenging new paradigm for Australian trade relationships with the EU.

These are two compelling points but entirely separate and as yet impossible to prove. In the new dawn of a post-Brexit Europe, it is possible the EU could survive in perpetuity and that free-trade agreements could be negotiated at pace. In the race for economic advantage, many governments across the globe will be competing to secure both. Australia and other Commonwealth countries should take advantage of their current links and make the most of their head start.
If Commonwealth connections could be advantageous, does it follow that a reinvigoration of the conceptual category of the Anglosphere could be equally beneficial? A number of supporters of the UK’s departure from the EU propose a reinvigoration of this abstract concept—a union of countries that share common language, history, law, democratic institutions and values.

Australia and the UK are two island nations, each historically ill-at-ease in their respective regions. The UK is sandwiched geographically between the continental powers of Europe and the hegemony of the US. It is precariously linked by shared history—cyclical enmity and alliances—across the channel to continental Europe and a special relationship across the Atlantic to the US. In parallel, it has been argued that Australia, a country still predominately Caucasian, with a pre-eminent Western culture but ensconced at the southern tip of East Asia, has struggled to establish itself as an authentic and effective member of an emerging region. Twenty years ago, Samuel Huntington described it thus:

For Australia, despite [its] economic connections, the Australian Asian ploy appears unlikely to meet any of the requirements for success for a civilisation shift by a torn country.

This is unsurprising. Although the scope and definition of regions is inherently artificial, some are more natural or likely than others. The nations that make up the ASEAN+3 forum, for example, reflect a number of common East Asian patterns of development and historical experiences. While these are still diverse, they display many more commonalities than the expansive Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific regions.

Australia’s ‘outsider’ status may be a consequence of brute geography but it is compounded by a number of political, strategic and historical factors that have made close ties with Indo-Pacific neighbours more challenging—indeed, generations of policymakers have tended to identify with, and align themselves to, extra-regional forces such as the UK. In these circumstances, Australia’s ties with Asia have often assumed a slightly awkward and instrumental quality.

As Australia’s so-called ‘Asian century’ unfolds, it remains counterintuitive that the UK is, by some margin, the leading country of birth for Australians born overseas, with an estimated 1.3 million Australians born in the UK. Conversely, data from the same census indicates that around 100,000 Australian-born citizens live in the UK. Given the vast distance between the two countries, people-to-people relationships remain remarkably close. Gladiatorial sporting challenges—predominately netball, rugby and cricket—ensure that respective national interest, and insult, rarely wanes.

When then Prime Minister Tony Abbott called for Australia’s foreign policy to contain ‘more Jakarta, less Geneva’, he was not only announcing a change in Australia’s priorities but, in parallel, commenting on European political values. While these views did not directly refer to the context of the UK leaving the EU, they reflected a form of broader cultural politics that exists in Eurosceptics throughout the UK. Ben Wellings, for example, believes that ‘in Australia, these arguments were driven by a rehabilitation of the British Empire as having been a force for good in the world, as a counter to the delegitimising versions of history brought up by the memory of settler-Indigenous relations’.

In spite of the distance to Europe and Prime Minister Turnbull’s view that the UK should have remained within the EU, Euroscepticism has been a regular facet of political debate in Australia. Successive right-wing governments in Canberra have viewed the EU as code for protectionism, bureaucracy, secularism and environmentalism, all with negative connotations.

Others, such as Georgina Downer, believe that as Australia ‘has inherited and developed the very best of Britain—the English language, British institutions, and the values of Western civilisation, including the rule of law, personal liberty and representative government, as well as the common law’, and that bilateral ties between the ‘odd couple’ should be strengthened. But is there a broader, multilateral opportunity that now exists to rejuvenate the Anglosphere?
The concept of the Anglosphere never found explicit currency in John Howard’s narrative during his nine years as Prime Minister; he carefully avoided placing ‘Australia into a particular sphere, Anglo or otherwise’. However, his endeavour to reshape Australia drew on an Anglospherist perspective and his project to reshape Australia was centered on two tenets of Anglosphereism: the rejection of multiculturalism and the alignment to countries with shared values in Australia’s external relations.

According to Stefano Gulmanelli, these two Anglospherist precepts found actual implementation in Howard’s re-framing of Australian multiculturalism and re-conceptualisation of Australia’s engagement with Asia and that, under his stewardship, the right wing of Australian politics rehabilitated the memory of Britain as a force for global good in a way similar to Anglosphere enthusiasts among British Eurosceptics.

The supporters of the Anglosphere are no longer predominant in Australia. For those wanting closer ties with the UK, the overthrow of Abbott as prime minister in 2015 was bad news. Abbott was a known Anglophile and became subject to public derision when he resurrected the award of knighthoods and immediately awarded one to the Duke of Edinburgh. This political faux pas demonstrated that there is little capital to be gained from championing some ties with the UK. Although Prime Minister Turnbull is more emollient than his predecessor, his history as chairman of the Australian Republican Movement during the Australian republican referendum in 1999 gives some clue to his views.

Notwithstanding the close cultural ties that survive between the two nations, the links that existed when Britain first applied to join the European Economic Community in 1963 have faded. At that time, Australia’s dependence on the UK market for mineral, dairy and meat exports was crucial. It has now changed and, as asserted by Philomena Murray et al:

Australians often perceive the EU as a monolithic, negative and obstructionist bloc, unleashing regulations and protectionism upon the world. Yet Australia’s engagement with the EU is well ahead of Australian public opinion about Europe. These changes spring not only from changes in Australia, but from Europe’s expanding role in trade and politics.

Geostrategically, the key regional challenge is based on geography and lies in the context of China. Any Anglosphere would exclude key countries vital in the growing challenge for global supremacy being waged between the US and China. Less importantly, the benefit that Australia and New Zealand could bring to the security challenge of Russia is small. As demonstrated in the 2016 Defence White Paper, Australia perceives that its economic and defence future is tied intractably to the Indo-Pacific region. And for many Australians, particularly those of a left-leaning persuasion, the memories of Gallipoli and Singapore are persistent reminders of a ‘mother-country’ that has had only marginal influence since 1942.

Economically, Australia’s future is highly dependent on the Trans Pacific Partnership (currently struggling to gain policy traction within the US election cycle) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership between ASEAN and Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. While there may be enough capacity in Canberra’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to negotiate a future free-trade agreement with the UK, any multilateral Anglosphere-based deal looks highly unlikely.

If Tony Abbott had still been Australia’s Prime Minister and Stephen Harper was still at the helm in Canada, the concept may have had the political impetus to reach the point of an American veto. With new administrations in both countries, it seems almost inconceivable that the concept will even be raised. The notion of a multilateral rebirth of a white, Western, ex-colonial alliance to create a new collaborative force for security and prosperity is an outdated and inconceivable dream by those—on both sides of the globe—who hark back to the past. There is little, if any, geostrategic, economic or political motivation to rekindle the Anglosphere concept by any of the Five-Eyes countries, perhaps less a few dewy-eyed right-wing politicians on both sides of the globe.
The UK in the region

The UK’s ability to thrive outside the EU—and its ability to succeed in the forthcoming exit and trade negotiations with the remaining 27 EU states—is likely to dominate the British government’s agenda for the next few years. In the short-term, the UK’s ability to seize global opportunities could be stymied by a lack of central capacity.

As Britain enacts Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, it will commence up to two years of intense negotiations to secure the most advantageous conditions to exit the EU. In parallel, it will be seeking to negotiate free-trade agreements with global partners, starting with the most potentially lucrative (likely to be America, China and India). The UK may not have the central policy resources to simultaneously focus on negotiations with Australia and other nations in the Indo-Pacific region.

Thereafter, however, the UK’s departure from the EU should allow central government to reduce the focus on Europe and be better able to balance its interests globally. This will include increasing activity in the burgeoning economic markets in Asia and the Indo-Pacific regions and improving (or re-establishing) defence links with Commonwealth allies. Following the establishment of free-trade agreements, closer economic ties are likely to follow, and bilateral links, including defence, could improve.

Bilateral trade agreements between nations are much simpler to ratify. Australia’s recent negotiations with Korea, Japan and China demonstrate that they can be an efficient route to deliver benefit for Australian exporters, as well as lowering tariff barriers. If the UK and Australia were to enter such negotiations, given the extensive history of Anglo-Australian trade, a deal could be rapidly agreed.

The risk of the UK fracturing and Scottish and Northern Irish secession will likewise consume the UK government’s policy priorities. With a politically-resurgent Scottish Nationalist Party and the majority of the Scottish voters electing to remain in the EU, Nicola Sturgeon (First Minister of Scotland and leader of the Scottish National Party) appears determined to secure a second referendum on Scottish independence.

If that were to succeed, a series of defence-related questions would arise, the most pressing of which would be the base location of the nuclear Trident missile-armed Vanguard submarines and their successors. Currently based in Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde in Faslane on Scotland’s west coast, the Scottish Nationalist Party has made it clear that in their first term they would require the nuclear deterrent to be moved.

The fracturing of the EU strengthens Russia’s revanchist agenda and President Putin will do all in his power to exploit the fissures in European solidarity. Russia, emboldened by success in Crimea, is likely to be a major geo-political focus for NATO in the next few years. There appears no end in sight to the war in eastern Ukraine, and the standoff along the Baltic border attracts growing military posturing. Therefore, even if the UK had aspirations to expand its defence connectivity globally, the Russian flank will remain a key threat that must be countered. This might well divert attention from links to the southern hemisphere.

It is too early to assess the impact of Brexit on the UK economy. Some signs are positive; financial markets have bounced back from their post-Brexit lows, uncertainty has been quelled as the ruling Conservative Party has rapidly elected a new leader, and many of the doomsday economic forecasts predicted in the run-up to Brexit have failed to materialise. Contrary to previous assessments, the IMF and Bank of England now forecast that the UK’s economy is unlikely to go into recession. Other signs are more ominous; sterling is at its lowest value for 30 years.

Early indications are that Prime Minister Theresa May will pursue a more interventionist economic policy than David Cameron and that she will attempt to inhabit a wide swathe of the political spectrum, taking in components of the centre-left as well as her Conservative Party’s traditional centre-right territory. If she succeeds, her grip on power will be difficult for the Labour Party—currently in the throes of a destructive internecine war over the leadership of
Political and economic stability in the UK will be vital if it is to effectively develop its relationships with Australia and the countries of the Indo-Pacific; there are myriad complexities.

**Conclusion**

It has been only a short time since the results of the UK's EU referendum sent shock waves around global political and economic circles. As Prime Minister May cogitates over the optimal time to invoke Article 50 and commence the formal process of separation from the EU, economists and politicians across the world watch and wait.

The UK must read the economic fallout and continually measure the requirement to re-evaluate its recent policy decisions to reinvest in the Indo-Pacific, support the FPDA and prepare for a resurgent China. Russia and terrorism will prove episodic distraction, and further unforeseen 'events' could easily override recently-published policy.

As the dust of recent political contests in Canberra and London settles, the search for prosperity retains political primacy. In parallel, both governments are reinvesting militarily and pondering their roles in the growing US-China standoff over the South China Sea.

Opportunities exist; almost a quarter of the world's population live in the Indo-Pacific region as members of the thriving Commonwealth. If inclined, Australia has the capability, capacity and credibility to fight its way to a mutually-beneficial free-trade agreement with the UK ahead of the vast majority of its competitors. But Brexit is not an opportunity to reverse history; the Anglosphere—an alliance more romantic than practical—has been consigned to the past and cannot be resurrected.

The challenge for the ruling elite of Australia, Indo-Pacific countries and the UK is now to exploit the changes Brexit will bring and avoid the temptation for destructive recrimination and reversal. In the words of Henry Kissinger, the most experienced of politicians and an acclaimed master of *realpolitik*, 'the coin of the realm for statesmen is not anguish or recrimination; it should be to transform setback into opportunity.'
Notes

1. 72.2 per cent of those eligible to vote took part, the highest number of people ever to have voted in a UK election or referendum.


3. Under the terms of the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1951 by the then member states (excluding the UK) and endorsed in subsequent treaties (that included the UK), nations within the EU are precluded from entering trade agreements independent of the Union.


6. The Indo-Pacific is defined as ‘the arc extending from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, including the sea lines of communication on which the region depends’: Australian Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper.


Alim, 'FPDA: countries over their approach to consular issues. each other and Strategic Defence and Security Review crisis, defending our interests by projecting power strategically and through expeditionary intelligence, providing nuclear deterrence, supporting civil emergency organisations in times of civil emergency organisations in times of

The other six core tasks are ‘defending the UK and its overseas territories, providing strategic intelligence, providing nuclear deterrence, supporting civil emergency organisations in times of crisis, defending our interests by projecting power strategically and through expeditionary interventions, providing security for stabilisation’: see HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.

The Consular Colloque is a forum, made up of the UK, US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. It meets annually at director level and runs a number of joint working groups, aimed at learning from each other’s policies, as well as sharing best practice and coordinating efforts in lobbying third countries over their approach to consular issues.


Alim, ‘FPDA: fitting into the changing strategic domain’, p. 11.
Philomena Murray, Alex Warleigh-Lack and Baogang He, 'Awkward states and regional organisations: the United Kingdom and Australia compared', Comparative European Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 279-300.


It is reputed that Harold Macmillan responded to the question as to what he feared most as Prime Minister with the comment 'Events, dear boy, events'.

Approximately 1.79 billion people live in the 17 Indo-Pacific countries of the Commonwealth. The global population is circa 7.4 billion people.


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