


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LEADERSHIP IN
THE CANADIAN MILITARY CONTEXT

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ABSTRACT

Leadership is an essential facet of the military thus is given prominence in what individuals do on a daily basis, as well as in the professional development, assessment and advancement of military members. Canadian Forces (CF) leadership doctrine, published in four volumes in 2005-2007, provides clarity and direction with regards to the leadership that is expected to be practiced across the CF. Importantly, while drawing on the theories and practices of leadership in the business world and in bureaucratic organizations, this doctrine recognizes unique aspects in the military context and presents context-specific, value-laden, military-relevant understandings, since how military leadership is understood relates profoundly to how military leadership is practiced. Further, while also informed by leadership theories and practices in other militaries, these manuals incorporate the perspective that there are differences even with Canada's closest allies such as the United States and United Kingdom resulting in unique aspects to leadership in the Canadian military context.

There also are significant differences in how leadership is practiced within the CF. Obvious differences exist across the Navy, Army, Air Force and Special Forces contexts; between operational missions and operational support situations, and among staff functions in higher headquarters and other non-operational circumstances like human resources, finance, scientific research. Equally challenging and significant differences exist in "what leaders do" - their roles and responsibilities across specialist capacities, rank levels, group member dynamics - and "how the leaders choose to do it" - leader influence, styles, goals, cognitive capacities, command and / or management approaches. While aspects of these differences are clear to those who move from one context to the other, the current doctrine presents a unitary and fairly generic understanding of Canadian military leadership with only passing references to the differences that can and do exist from one setting to the next.

This monograph is intended to extend the present understandings of CF leadership by providing more comprehensive consideration of the current practices of leadership in the CF. It will provide perspectives on alternative approaches to understanding leadership in the military, including: an exploration of current effective military leadership; the purpose of military leadership; the nature of that military leadership, the development of institutional leaders, and the measurement of leadership. Conclusions are put forward but with emphasis that the ideas herein presented should be read as exploratory and descriptive, and not as authoritative or proven. Additional and relevant research including validation by CF leaders at all levels is needed, as well as well founded critiques, alternative perspectives, informed debates and experience-related opinions that will guide intellectual inquiry and create new knowledge.

RÉSUMÉ

Le leadership est une facette fondamentale du milieu militaire, et se voit donc accorder une importance cruciale dans ce que font les personnes quotidiennement, ainsi que dans le perfectionnement professionnel, l'évaluation et l'avancement des militaires. La doctrine de leadership des Forces canadiennes (FC), publiée en quatre volumes en 2005-2007, donne des directives claires quant au leadership qui doit être pratiqué par l'ensemble des FC. Fait important à souligner, cette doctrine, qui se fonde sur les théories et pratiques du leadership du monde des affaires et des organisations bureaucratiques, reconnaît les aspects uniques du contexte militaire et présente des explications propres au contexte, aux valeurs et au contexte militaire, étant donné que la compréhension du leadership militaire est profondément liée à la pratique qui en est faite. De plus, ces volumes, bien qu'ils s'inspirent des théories et pratiques de leadership d'autres forces armées, tiennent compte des différences qui existent entre le Canada et ses plus proches alliés, comme les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni, ce qui se traduit par la présentation d'aspects du leadership uniques au contexte militaire canadien.

Il existe également des différences importantes dans la pratique du leadership au sein des FC. On constate des différences évidentes entre la marine, l'armée de terre, la force aérienne et les forces spéciales; entre les missions opérationnelles et les situations de soutien opérationnel, et entre les fonctions d'état-major dans les quartiers généraux supérieurs et d'autres circonstances non opérationnelles, comme les ressources humaines, les finances, la recherche scientifique. On remarque des différences tout aussi considérables entre « ce que font les leaders » – soit leur rôle et leurs responsabilités selon leur spécialité, leur grade, la dynamique du groupe – et « la façon dont les leaders choisissent de le faire » – soit l'influence du leader, son style, ses objectifs, ses capacités cognitives, son commandement et/ou ses approches de gestion. Bien que les aspects de ces différences soient clairs pour ceux qui sont passés d'un contexte à l'autre, la doctrine actuelle présente une explication monolithique et plutôt générale du leadership militaire canadien, en mentionnant au passage les différences qui peuvent exister et qui existent entre les contextes.

Cette monographie vise à élargir la compréhension actuelle du leadership des FC en offrant un examen complet des pratiques de leadership actuelles dans les FC. Elle fournit des perspectives à l'égard d'autres façons de comprendre le leadership dans le contexte militaire, notamment : une exploration du leadership militaire efficace actuel; la raison d'être du leadership militaire; la nature de ce leadership militaire; le développement des leaders institutionnels, et la mesure du leadership. Des conclusions sont présentées, mais il est souligné que les idées proposées le sont à titre exploratoire et descriptif; elles ne font pas autorité ni n'ont été prouvées. D'autres recherches pertinentes seraient nécessaires, notamment la validation par les leaders des FC de tous les niveaux, ainsi que des critiques bien fondées, différentes perspectives, des débats éclairés et des opinions basées sur l'expérience qui guideront le questionnement intellectuel et créeront de nouvelles connaissances.

1. INTRODUCTION

Leadership is an essential facet of the military, thus it is given prominence in developing, assessing and advancing individuals. Unfortunately, leadership also tends to be a complex topic with frequent commentary in the academic literature on the lack of coherence in defining or operationalizing the construct.¹ A key point underlying the writing of current CF leadership doctrine is that, while it is useful to develop an academically-grounded, generic description of leadership, it is more important to develop context-specific, value-laden understandings. How leadership is understood depends heavily on how leadership is practiced. As well, the practice of leadership is significantly different in the military context than in the business world upon which most leadership models are based. It is also different in the Canadian Forces (CF) than in allied militaries such as the United States of America (US), United Kingdom (UK) or Australia (Aust).

Further, although not clarified in current doctrine, there are real differences within the military in how leadership is practiced. Anyone who has served across Army, Navy, Air or Special Forces units or has shifted from an operational setting to staff headquarters knows that there are tangible differences in what leaders do and how they do it. This paper is intended to provide a more comprehensive consideration of the practice of leadership in the CF, and it will provide perspectives on alternative approaches to understanding leadership in the military. Of importance, the ideas presented should be read as exploratory and descriptive, and should not be taken as authoritative or tested; appropriate research is needed to examine certain ideas presented.

Canadian Forces Doctrine

In 2003, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) presented a major update to CF leadership doctrine. This revised doctrine replaced manuals that had been published in 1973 and which had become badly out of date when compared to either the academic literature on leadership or practice on the ground within the CF. The 1973 work had been published in two volumes: one for Junior Officers and one for Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs). The first obvious deficiency was that the planned third volume for Senior Officers had never been produced, thus the CF lacked any formal guidance for those at these ranks and, in particular, failed to address any aspects of leadership at the strategic level such as initiating change, boundary spanning with other agencies, aligning the institution to external realities or exercising stewardship of the profession of arms.²

The second deficiency became evident during the development of the CF doctrine manual *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* as this manual, along with the preceding work on the future of the Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Corps, indicated that the CF had adopted a more egalitarian approach to the Officer and NCM Corps and, in particular, sought consistency in the leadership philosophy and approaches by both groups. The third major deficiency with the 1973 manuals was the inappropriate underlying assumptions about human nature and the role/purpose of leadership. Reflected in statements such as 'Commanding Officers should closely monitor the work their men will do as the men will do the least amount

¹ All sources / references are listed collectively at the end of this monograph.

² See Stephen Zaccaro's excellent analysis of the dimensions of executive leadership in the military.

possible', the 1973 manuals reflected a rather harsh interpretation of the 1960s' McGregor Theory X that managers need to use threats and coercion to ensure employees met minimal productivity goals. Internal CF research during the 1980s and 1990s, along with a series of strategic change initiatives that included the 1997 Defence Minister Doug Young's Report to the Prime Minister and the publication of *Defense Strategy 2020*, made it clear that this leadership style was neither effective nor desired, thus leading to the understanding that a wholesale rewriting of CF leadership doctrine was required.³

The comprehensive work that was conducted to assess the prior deficiencies, examine future requirements and articulate a coherent, inclusive leadership model for the CF is presented in a number of documents including: the preliminary academic reports prepared by Karol Wenek, the primary author of *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*; the other three doctrinal publications *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People* and *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*; and the subsequent exploratory and explanatory papers published under CDA Press.⁴ The initial works drew on the basic leadership literature and, in particular, articulated the rationale for the specific, value-laden understanding of leadership as it is to be practiced in the CF. In presenting a conceptual and doctrinal basis for leadership in the CF, *Conceptual Foundations* integrated the relevant academic literature on leadership models and leader effectiveness with an integration of leadership in the military and the value sets presented in the earlier CFLI doctrine manual *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (2003).

While *Conceptual Foundations* acknowledged that many core principles of effective military leadership have remained unchanged over decades and millennia of experience, the understanding of leadership was expanded through the introduction of several new concepts and the explicit rejection of certain ideas that had been reflected in the 1973 publications. Four specific evolutions are of note. The first is the shift away from the earlier perspective that, as the military is organized to function at the three levels of strategic, operational and tactical, there should, therefore, be three corresponding levels of strategic, operational and tactical leadership. The consideration of both academic research and military practice led to the conclusion that the critical differentiation was between the focus on developing and employing small groups and teams so as to achieve assigned objectives versus the focus on adjusting broad institutional dimensions so as to align the institution with the external environment and, in doing so, setting the conditions for small team success. Thus, *Conceptual Foundations* highlighted the differentiation between 'Leading People' and 'Leading the Institution'.

The focus of Leading People is on developing individuals as members of teams and ensuring that they accomplish assigned tasks while the focus of Leading the Institution is attending to broader, system-wide responsibilities so as to set the conditions for small team success. Most leaders will initially concentrate on Leading People by providing direction, inspiration, correction and clarity to individuals or small groups, and subsequently expand their leadership to address the broader responsibilities of adapting the institutions to fit the external environment by ensuring requisite

³ See Wenek's *Looking Back* (2002a) for a comprehensive review of the deficiencies in CF leadership philosophy and practice, and his subsequent *Looking Ahead* (2002b) for the assessment of emerging leadership requirements.

⁴ The interested reader is referred to the CDA / CFLI web site for the latest information <<http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/cfli-ilfc/index-eng.asp>>.

system-wide changes in areas such as policy, doctrine, regulations and resources with their leader influence occurring through secondary or tertiary means rather than the direct style that is the norm when engaged in Leading People. In contrast to previous CF doctrine, this differentiation expanded leadership perspectives to place a greater emphasis on the facets of longer range, more macro institutional leadership with, importantly, the understanding that the Leading the Institution function is not restricted solely to the purview of the most senior General and Flag Officers (GO/FO). Key facets of how Leading the Institution is understood include that it should be: the dominant focus of all of those employed in higher/strategic headquarters; a common activity for those employed in operational headquarters and supporting units; and, can be an element of leadership for those employed in tactical roles.

As indicated, the second evolution drew on the philosophy incorporated into *Duty with Honour* that all members of the Regular and Reserve components of the CF are members of the profession of arms. This approach reflected a more egalitarian perspective than the 1950s Huntingtonian view that only officers and, to some extent, only senior officers in combatant occupations were considered members of the profession with others relegated to the role of technicians. The implication for CF leadership was to reject the previous organization of three manuals with differing approaches to leadership for non-commissioned members (NCMs), for junior officers and for senior officers. Thus, *Conceptual Foundations* presents a single approach to leadership for all of those appointed to leadership roles, however as illustrated in the differentiation between Leading People and Leading the Institution, does recognize that those advanced to more senior ranks will likely encounter a parallel shift in focus from Leading People to Leading the Institution. Although not directly stated in the manual, there was an understanding from the background academic work supporting this articulation that the Leading the Institution function was more complex and took longer to master than the Leading People role. As will be developed in this paper, ongoing work on GO/FO professional development suggests that this final stage of full professional master remains problematic.

The third facet reflected in the development of both *Duty with Honour* and *Conceptual Foundations* was the generalized endorsement of a single approach to leadership and professionalism across the CF and, in particular, the conclusion that there should be commonality in how both are articulated in the land, sea and air environments and subordinate doctrinal publications promulgated by those responsible for force generation in these environments.⁵ As will be developed in this paper, while a common approach is seen to be of value particularly as the military operates more in joint, coalition and multi-agency contexts the reality of practice on the ground is that there are differences across environments and across services⁶ which are neither described nor explained in *Conceptual Foundations*.

The final idea incorporated was to integrate Robert Quinn's organizational behaviour research on competing (outcome) values⁷ and the *Duty with Honour* framework of professional and ethical (conduct) values to produce a *Canadian Forces Effectiveness* framework (Figure 1).

⁵ This is not to suggest that the means through which leadership in the army, navy and air force domains is articulated, developed or measured must necessarily be identical, however the decision was taken that each 'service' should draw on a common leadership doctrine rather than seeking to develop unique models or definitions.

⁶ The differentiation between environments and services will be presented in subsequent discussion.

⁷ See Quinn and Rohrbaugh for the original work.




Figure 1: Canadian Forces Effectiveness Framework (*Conceptual Foundations*, Figure 2-1)

This framework challenges the taken-for-granted assumption in much of the leadership literature that ‘good’ leaders automatically know what to do or when to do it by acknowledging the likelihood of continuing tensions amongst competing outcome (what should we focus on doing) and conduct (how should we do it) values. Common examples of competing values include the conflict between the outcomes of mission accomplishment and force protection (in the framework, the mission success quadrant vs that of member well being and commitment); between the outcomes of innovation, agility and creativity versus consistency, coordination and control (the external adaptability vs internal integration quadrants); or between the basis for conduct of displaying martial values (discipline, teamwork, warrior spirit, etc.) vs projecting fundamental Canadian values (dignity and respect for all, support for democratic ideals and institutions, etc.). Further, this framework also extends the consequences of leader influence beyond the confines of the military to recognizing that leaders at all levels can influence second order outcomes such as public and political confidence, trust and support for the institution.⁸

This short summary of current CF leadership doctrine is intended to provide a basis for the subsequent consideration of how the understanding of leadership in the CF can be extended. While acknowledging the basics of leadership as a process of social influence to achieve an intended purpose, and recognizing that certain facets of effective military leadership have endured for millennia, the body of work underlying *Conceptual Foundations* served to expand the view of effective leadership as well as to provide a common approach for all levels of military leaders across all environments. As with most major updates to military doctrine, the implications of applying *Conceptual Foundations* have been considered, debated and argued over in a number of professional development settings, particularly those offered to the most senior officers and non-commissioned members as well as in the occasional professional article.

⁸ While the link between actions on the ground and public perceptions are often referred to as the ‘strategic corporal’, these second order outcomes are better viewed in the sociological sense of support for the military as a social institution. See James Burk’s considerations of the military as having material and/or moral salience for the nation. General Krulak originally presented the concept of the strategic corporal in his 1997 speech to the National Press Club and subsequently published his ideas in a 1999 *Marines Magazine* article.

The primary intent of this paper is to provide some additional perspectives and views to extend beyond the details presented in *Conceptual Foundations* and related publications. Discussion will commence with further considerations of effective military leadership and, in particular, perspectives on the inter-relationships amongst command, leadership and management. It will then turn to the idea of leadership as unbounded power to influence and provide a framework for understanding how and why leaders are seen to use their influence in the way they do. The subsequent section will return to the recognition that the practice of leadership appears to differ in important ways across the land, sea, air and special forces environments with an integration of differing views to present a description of Army, Naval, Air and Special Forces leadership. The following component will examine the strategic domain and the challenges of the military in transforming effective (operational) force commanders into institutional leaders. The final portion will turn to a current CF consideration in operationalizing *Conceptual Foundations* by addressing issues related to the measurement of leadership.

2. UNDERSTANDING EFFECTIVE MILITARY LEADERSHIP

A key points in the introductory comments are that leadership is a complex construct made even more complicated in the military, and that the approaches taken to defining military leadership are likely insufficient to represent a comprehensive or effective understanding of leader capacity or leader effectiveness. There are two specific reasons behind the assertion that there is more to leadership than has been understood to date. The first requires an expansion of the limited discussion in *Conceptual Foundations* regarding what is meant by effective leadership in the Canadian Forces. The second requires better conceptual clarification of the conflated concepts of command, leadership and management. Together, these two considerations will provide a more comprehensive understanding of military leadership which will then be drawn into the subsequent sections.

The Complexity of Military Leadership

At one level, the purpose of military leadership appears clear. As stated by retired US Army General Walter Ulmer:

“In any Army, in any time, the purpose of ‘leadership’ is to get the job done. Competent military leaders develop trust, focus effort, clarify objectives, inspire confidence, build teams, set the example, keep hope alive, rationalize sacrifice. For this century or the next, there is little mystery about requisite leader competencies or behaviors. Desirable qualities and skills may vary a bit, but the basic formula for leader success has changed little in 2,000 years.”⁹

Yet, as Karol Wenek pointed out in developing *Conceptual Foundations*, this narrow focus on leadership outcomes is severely lacking in two ways.¹⁰ The first is that these outcomes are

⁹ Incorporated into *Conceptual Foundations*, the quotation is from Ulmer’s chapter in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, editors Rosenback & Taylor.

¹⁰ For a complete discussion, see Wenek’s four background papers.

merely enablers to achieving the real purpose so are insufficient to describe what the leader must concentrate on and ensure occurs. As stated above, CF doctrine now provides additional clarity by incorporating and integrating Quinn's Competing Values Model along with the concept of effective professional socialization to present a set of outcome and conduct values that provide a better framework for leaders to understand the 5Ws of who, what, when, where and why in focusing effort, inspiring confidence, etc.

The second is that the 'job' that must get done has evolved significantly from the days of classic state-on-state warfare. Not only have the characteristics of contemporary missions grown to encompass a wider range of activities involving a large number of non-military partners with a greater focus on achieving social rather than martial objectives but militaries' leaders have to pay increased attention to aligning their internal practices and cultures with the expectations of the citizenry.¹¹ This expansion of the leadership domain to include influencing external audiences is based on the understanding that leadership can be multi-directional: the core of leadership is the capacity to influence others; while commonly assumed to be focused on subordinates, this influence can be directed at colleagues/peers, at one's superiors or externally to audiences of specific interest such as host nation communities in deployed operations or the public at home. Implicit in the Ulmer quote is the assumption that the focus of military leadership will be 'down and in' with leaders attending to influencing their subordinates, while the realities of comprehensive, human security missions and earning the trust and respect of civilians at home and in theatre suggests that far more effort is going to be spent influencing 'up and out'.

As described in *Duty with Honour*, the military, hence military leaders, must attend to both functional and societal imperatives: simply stated, leaders must achieve the objectives assigned by the government of the day but in a manner that retains public confidence and support. As a result, not only must military leaders exert influence out and up but, and noticeably missing from the Ulmer quote, they must facilitate deep-rooted professional socialization specifically by assisting their subordinates to internalize the value set incorporated in the military ethos such that each individual can exercise independent moral and ethical judgment.

Another omission in the Ulmer quote is that military leaders must integrate this professional focus within the dominant bureaucratic ideology of the Canadian government.¹² Returning to the comment that much of what is 'known' about leadership currently comes from the business world, there are significant differences between the private and public sectors and between the civilian public service and the military. Particularly in the context of the macro, Leading Institution domain, some of these factors are of importance when military leaders need to determine what they are to achieve when influencing others. To return to Ulmer's emphasis on getting the job done, the military must, in fact, have the potential to get a number of very different jobs done, occasionally with limited advanced warning from government and often at a high degree of risk. This requires that leaders generate flexibility, adaptability and resilience. Additionally, as the government is the guardian of the social good and, in particular, must answer to the people for the use of public resources, there is a greater emphasis placed on accountability. Due to this emphasis, the bureaucratic ideology values efficiency over effectiveness while the

¹¹ The expanded nature of military missions and aligning culture to societal trends are presented and integrated in Okros 2009b.

¹² See Freidson for the original work and Bentley for discussion in the Canadian military context.

professional ideology does the reverse. Further, the Federal Government has undertaken to ensure that the government workforce proportionately represents key Canadian demographics and that workplace practices be aligned with certain social values. This philosophy is illustrated in the concept that the military must reflect the society it serves. The net result is that the demands of military leadership are more than just getting the job done, or, more accurately, the 'job' is more than mission accomplishment which is the other taken-for-granted assumption in Ulmer's statement.¹³ As articulated in the Canadian Forces Effectiveness Framework (Figure 1), the key function of leadership, hence of the leaders, is to achieve an appropriate balance across a range of competing outcome and conduct values.

Overall, Ulmer's traditional view of the purpose of military leadership can be considered accurate and complete only when there is complete alignment amongst the Clausewitzian trinity of the State, the nation and the profession (or the government, the people and the military).¹⁴ Unfortunately, the reality is that there are two significant potential disconnects. As illustrated in the 50+ year Huntingtonian - Janowitzian discourse, the first is the degree to which the military should be kept apart from society in order to create a unique culture versus being a part of society in order to evolve and reflect broader changes in the nation. The second comes from Friedson's discussion of the market, bureaucratic and professional ideologies and illustrated in the Snider and Watkins work on how to maintain a values-based profession when constrained by an efficiency-focused bureaucracy. The net result is that those charged with exercising leadership in the military have a much more complex challenge than is acknowledged by the traditional view. Clearly, definitions of both leader capacity and leader effectiveness need to be based on a broad rather than narrow understanding of the full dimensions of effective military leadership. The three key facets presented here that extend the traditional view pertain to: expanding mission to success beyond ensuring state security; facilitating the development of 'slow growth attributes' and alignment of internal culture with societal norms through professional socialization; and, ensuring professional effectiveness while achieving bureaucratic efficiencies.

The Conflated Trinity: Command, Leadership and Management

As indicated in the introductory comments, the three constructs of command, leadership and management are necessarily interconnected but, unfortunately often confused. In fact, portions of what have been discussed above are really about effective command and not just effective leadership. *Conceptual Foundations* touches on some of the inter-relationships, however does not provide sufficient discussion to understanding each. An integration of the literatures on public administration, socio-technical systems and Friedson's bureaucratic vs professional ideologies provides a means to understand the three concepts. This approach suggests that the functioning of any organization can be represented by an integration of structural systems (bureaucracy) and social systems (the human dimensions). The structural systems represent those elements that are intentionally created and assumed to operate on a linear, rational basis to achieve efficiency. These elements include rules sets, standard operating procedures, job

¹³ For a more complete discussion of the factors that differentiate the public from private sectors, and the military from the public service, see Okros' (2009a) application to the domain of human resources.

¹⁴ There is continuing debate regarding the interpretations given to Clausewitz' unfinished treaty *On War*. For a discussion of the meaning currently ascribed to the Clausewitzian trinity, see Villacres & Bassford.

descriptions, work plans and, in the military, doctrine and training. The function used to regulate the structural systems in order to achieve efficiency is management thus covers standard activities of planning, organizing, controlling all resources including capital, equipment, information and the competencies resident in the workforce.¹⁵ The social systems represent those elements that are emergent and operate on a combination of cognitive and affective bases to achieve those outcomes (ends) using those processes (means) that are valued by the individuals and groups that belong to the social system(s). This description of social systems is often referred to as culture and is presented to clearly indicate that it is the members of the social system or sub-system (e.g., in the military, a team or unit) who will collectively decide what the culture will be. As a result, organizations can only influence social systems, not control them, thus the function used to do so is leadership.

While some disagree with aspects of ‘people’ being included under the purview of management, the differentiation here is that there are certain personal facets that are generated through structural systems and controlled through management (job-specific knowledges and skills) while there are others that are generated through social systems thus can only be ‘shaped’ through leadership (such as motivation, conduct values and organizational citizenship behaviours).¹⁶ Conceptually, the products of the structural systems in the military are defined capabilities represented by what functional units (a ship, a battle group or even a headquarters directorate) are intended to achieve while the products of social systems are latent capacities represented by teams that have the potential to achieve more than the unit is designed for.¹⁷ Thus, the human elements of the world of work are incorporated (but differentiated) within the structural and social systems of an organization.

Of importance for understanding leadership, the primary basis for the exercise of management is formal authority, while the primary basis for leadership is social influence derived from a combination of position power and personal power. Both authority and social influence are much more effective when seen as legitimate, noting that legitimate authority (the strongest basis for effective management) is a component of position power (one of the two components of effective leadership). Among many key principles of efficient management are the ideas of division of labour and span of control. The first suggests that individuals or teams should be given specific, often formally proscribed, job duties thus allowing them to develop high levels of expertise in carrying out these duties. Span of control suggests that managers should be limited in both their number of direct reports and the scope of activities that they must control thus allowing them to focus their attention on a specific domain of work. Together, these create the ‘stovepipes of excellence’ that characterize many organizations including government bureaucracy. While bureaucratic management can work well in contexts of predictability and

¹⁵ The reference to the competencies resident in the workforce is usually labeled human resources.

¹⁶ To extend the differentiation, one could argue that the person-related facets generated through the structural systems can be referred to as Human Resources while those shaped through the social systems are Human Capital. See Meyer et al for additional discussion.

¹⁷ The reference to latent capacities is directly related to the earlier comment of the need for flexibility, adaptability and resilience so that the military can be able to execute a range of predictable but not planned activities. To some extent, capabilities describe what a unit is designed to be able to do, capacities refer to what it can actually do. Morale, cohesion, flexibility and adaptability are all seen as ‘force multiplier’ capacities that, when high, enable a unit to achieve more than it was designed for, when low, prohibit the unit from being unable to do perform as expected.

stability, this approach becomes less and less effective in more dynamic situations. In contrast to the rise of scientific management over the last 100 years, the military has drawn on centuries of experience to create the concept of command which is seen as a concentration of powers and authorities in one individual that is deemed as required under certain circumstances usually characterized by high risk, a complex environment and significant time pressures.¹⁸ Thus, it is presented that aspects of both management and leadership are subsumed under the function of command. As will be explained, the reference to ‘aspects of’ management and leadership means that these are not complete overlaps.¹⁹

As the construct is central to military leadership, it is beneficial to expand on the nature of command. In the discussion that follows, command in the CF is considered to be specific to the context of conducting military operations; the so called ‘pointy end’, boots on the ground context where risks are extreme.²⁰ In this context, the purpose of command is to apply a high degree of independence to ensure necessary action within (generally) predefined parameters to achieve (broadly) proscribed objectives under dynamic conditions involving significant numbers of interdependent teams and high consequences of failure. Thus, the focus of command is on:

- rapid assimilation of factual information
- risk assessment
- initiating action
- directing and controlling multiple concurrent, interrelated activities
- anticipating, assessing and responding to actions of others and changes in context
- generating and sustaining effort under duress
- creating the conditions for subordinates to exercise discretion

As primarily a decision making function (with requisite supporting managerial and leadership requirements), command emphasizes:

- rational, logical deductive reasoning
- rapid processing of fragmented data and information
- compartmentalization
- short time horizons
- accuracy, brevity and clarity (plus speed, violence and simplicity)
- constant reassessment of risk and opportunity
- (relatively) rapid, objective feedback on the consequences of decisions

Based on these considerations, it is proposed that, conceptually, command is the authority to *initiate* action; management is the authority to *amend* action; and leadership is the capacity to *influence* action. To expand, command involves the principle-based initiation of action through control networks; management involves the rules-based amendment of action through

¹⁸ Without going into the literature on complexity science and Complex Adaptive Systems, a simple way of differentiating complicated vs complex environments is that complicated ones contain many variables, complex ones contain many unknowns.

¹⁹ The recognition that there was some overlap but also some differentiation was incorporated into *Conceptual Foundations*, however this chapter will suggest a more nuanced view.

²⁰ Amongst other difficulties in defining command as specific to the context of conducting military operations, it is complicated by the reference to three levels of warfighting as strategic, operational and tactical. Command in this chapter does exist at all three levels but only in the context of actual military operations not in supporting ‘staff’ roles.

bureaucratic networks, and leadership involves values-based sense-making through social networks. Of importance, those exercising command, leadership or management are aided by supporting mechanisms (both social and structural) with: command enablers designed to restrict command effort to only what is essential; leadership enablers designed to amplify the effects of leader influence; and management enablers designed to optimize managerial effort. To help illustrate the inter-relationship yet attempt to differentiate the three, these are summarized as:

Command decision enablers (central to command but not leadership or management)

- clear boundaries for field of action (left and right of arc)
- formal statements of mission objectives as effects to be created (that can be altered by the Commander based on available resources)²¹
- structured approach to planning and options analysis
- integrated systems for data collection, integration, storage and retrieval
- detailed preparatory learning by Commander and staff on how to link end, ways and means
- lessons learned systems that contribute to the transfer of knowledge from one context to another
- a philosophical framework (Just War) to base decisions to apply lethal force
- a moral code (unlimited liability) to justify serious injury or death to own troops

Leadership enablers (central to command and leadership but not management)

- cohesive groups with shared norms
- compelling overarching goals
- experienced subordinate leaders
- skilled teams with significant anticipatory development
- responsive reward and punishment system
- an effective leader socialization model emphasizing selfless service
- a values framework to base decisions on the purpose of leader influence

Culture enablers (also central to command and leadership but not management)

- significant position power including high status/social distance
- strong system of professional socialization
- a shared moral code with accompanying rationalization for actions
- clearly defined and broadly understood role requirements
- a broadly shared 'tight' culture that emphasizes obedience to authority
- shared experiences, stories, myths and beliefs
- reinforcing symbols, traditions and oral history
- an integrated ethos to shape how groups enact culture

²¹ Of importance in differentiating the goals of command and management, management is usually based on a formal statement of work outputs or work outcomes (as in most business plans) while command is based on much broader statements of generalized effects to be created as a result of 'work activities'. As an extension, it should be noted that a core element of business plans is to ensure the manager has sufficient allocated resources to achieve mandated outputs or outcomes. This is not a 'given' for Commanders, they are usually expected to improvise and may, on occasion, have to independently amend actions, outputs, outcomes or even the effects created.

Management enablers (central to all three)

- formal authorities, structures and bureaucratic controls
- strong reliance on principles of administrative/management effectiveness
 - o span of control
 - o division of labour and clear understanding of duties
 - o coordinating mechanisms
 - o personal staff
 - o formal system for approvals
 - o standard operating procedures (doctrine)
- clear rules and regulations
- responsive system for resource allocation and management
- effective communications and reporting systems
- processes to ensure that allocated resources match assigned tasks²²
 - o financial systems (business plans) to link allocated resources to assigned work
 - o human resource systems (job analysis, staffing, training) to ensure individual competencies match required duties

Based on these supporting mechanisms, the Commander can concentrate on a narrow(er) domain of key activities and rely on the four broad sets of enablers to act as substitutes for command attention or multipliers of command effect. In particular, these are intended to reduce or eliminate:

- conceptual complexity
- role ambiguity
- contradictory goals
- conflicts among ends, ways and means
- conflicts among conduct values (intended to reduce the need for ethical and moral reasoning)
- uncertainty or self-doubt (for Commander or subordinates)
- time delays in collecting, assessing or reacting to new information

Using Quinn and the CF Effectiveness framework, command gives priority to mission accomplishment with both leadership and cultural enablers that concurrently attend to individual commitment and member well-being. As much as possible, command conditions are intended to minimize the requirements for Internal Integration (most of this is already done through structure, doctrine, SOPs, tight culture, etc) or External Adaptability (again, most of the requirements for broad adaptation is filtered out through the process of strategic political decision making and military systems for adaptation such as futures analyses, concept development, experimentation, pre-action exercises, etc). *When incorporated within command*, management gives priority to internal integration and the focus on efficiency through bureaucratic control while leadership gives priority to member well-being and the focus on generated effort to achieve (command-directed) mission objectives. Thus, one can talk about command-related management and command-related leadership as specific forms of management and leadership that are used when command is also being exercised.

²² With a greater emphasis on fiscal prudence than operational effects. See Okros' (2009a) discussion in Stone's *Public Management of Defence*.

Of importance, command can function the way it does (and Commanders can concentrate on developing specific competencies to a very high level of effectiveness) precisely because command is embedded within the broader context of institutional effectiveness. It is because others outside the command domain (strategic (military) staff in higher headquarters and strategic (political) decision makers) attend to the other two Quinn quadrants (balancing requisite consistency, bureaucracy and standardization under Internal Integration with requisite flexibility, creativity and disruption to the status quo under External Adaptability). Thus, it must be understood that the nature of leadership and management outside the command domain is different (more expansive) than within.

Leadership in the Absence of Operational Command

The preceding discussion illustrates how closely command and leadership are intertwined, however it suggests important differentiations especially when those in positions of responsibility are not exercising command. The military does recognize that command is restricted to only a certain type of positions, not all of those who are referred to a “Commanders” actually are.²³ To draw the parallel to the typical business differentiation between line and staff, command as described above is exercised only in high risk, dynamic situations which exist in the ‘front line’ operational environment or in those headquarters that specifically control front line ops.²⁴ Those who hold positions of authority in staff headquarters or in second or third line support units are exercising administration (as traditionally defined) which incorporates both management and leadership but not command per se. While those in senior staff roles are definitely engaged in important business, making tough choices and managing risks, they are not exercising command as described above. The litmus test pertains to conceptual differentiation made earlier between command as the authority to initiate action and management as the authority to amend action. Individuals who are in positions where the vast majority of their activities involve either following a ‘business plan’ or submitting requests or recommendations to higher authorities or multi-member committees for approval are engaged in bureaucratic administration, not command in operations.²⁵

Of importance for considering leadership, those in positions of responsibility holding “staff” roles versus operational “line” roles do not have the benefits of most of the command enablers listed earlier. One of the significant challenges for those who have exercised command in operations who subsequently are employed in higher headquarters senior ‘staff’ functions such as found in Chief of Military Personnel (CMP) or the Material or Finance Groups is that very little of the enablers exist. In part, this difference is the result of the unique nature of command in the military whereby a significant amount of power and authority is vested in a single person. The norm in the private sector and in government is to build in some degree of ‘checks and balances’ thus reducing the power of any one individual. The challenge is that those military leaders who

²³ A clear illustration is the reference at the Royal Military College of Canada to ‘Squadron Commanders’. While clearly in a leadership role, these Captains are employed in a staff function responsible for the professional development of Officer Cadets, they do not exercise command.

²⁴ In the US parlance, those who control operations are referred to as the Combatant Commanders, in the CF case these would include Commander (but not staff) of Canada Command and Canadian Expeditionary Command and their subordinate tactical commanders.

²⁵ The reference to governance and the use of ‘governance structures’ in the Federal Government provides an excellent illustration of bureaucratic administration.

have been predominantly employed in operational roles may not realize that the concentration of power and the presence of key command enablers is, in fact, an anomaly when viewed in the context of how most organizations function.

To expand slightly, most who have exercised command will notice quickly that virtually none of the decision making enablers are prominent in strategic headquarters. There tend to be significantly overlapping fields of action which require significant horizontal coordination with others. There tends to be a frequent use of business terminology leading to vague statements of objectives to be attained and virtually no articulation of the effects to be generated. In contrast to the standardized use of the Operational Planning Process (OPP), there is little apparent coherence to the methods used to engage in planning or options analyses and there is very limited preparatory learning by staff to enable them to carry out their specific duties. Similarly, the leadership enablers are generally quite weak as the 'team' tends to be made up of a combination of short term military members rotating through; others who have not served in operational contexts for many years, some civilians who have only ever worked in headquarters, some others with different perspectives based on employment in other departments and, finally, a reliance on contractors for specific expertise or even 'corporate memory'. Given the resultant fragmentation, there are often conflicting goals being advanced by different work groups.

Additionally, supervisors frequently have inexperienced subordinates with no previous experience in their areas of responsibility or lack subject matter expertise themselves, thus often have unqualified teams who are tackling projects for the first time. The cultural enablers are also absent as those in supervisory positions generally have less position power and the operant culture tends to be loose not tight. Further, team members have limited (relevant) shared experience, there are gaps in the wisdom passed from one generation to the next (i.e., corporate memory) and there are no mechanisms of story telling or enculturation. Returning to the earlier comments on the conflicts between the bureaucratic and professional ideologies, the net result is that the one domain which is the strongest contains the bureaucratic, efficiency focused, management enablers. It should be noted, however, that even these are not ideal as NDHQ, in particular, tends to blend the classic division of labour (which is premised on expert employees) with a revolving door of new staff who have limited job-specific competencies. The net result is that there is a weak system of 'matrix management' with limited capacity to ensure coherence and integration across the 'silos of mediocrity' that are created.²⁶

These comments are, in no way, intended to criticize the individuals trying to fulfill headquarters roles, but it does help illustrate how and why leadership is different in this context compared to when exercised as part of operationally-focused command. The challenge in NDHQ is that the CF continues to post people into headquarters positions for which they are not appropriately prepared. While organizations can function effectively with a number of 'enthusiastic amateurs', these individuals require significant support from both the structural systems (rule, SOPs, experienced bosses and, most of all, documentation on 'how we did it the last time this issue reared its ugly head') and the social systems (effective leadership to shape how these individuals make sense of their new environment). There are two, related challenges here. The first is that the natural tendency for any bureaucratic organization is to focus on

²⁶ The best single indicator of the problems of this environment are committee meetings which are generally seen in higher headquarters as occupying an extraordinary amount of time and generating surprisingly little in results.

generating rules (the structural approach) to ensure the right work gets done the right way. Returning to Freidson's work, governments, in particular, generate multiple and often conflicting rule sets which actually create confusion and inefficiency as the bureaucratic focus is not balanced by either the market ideology (that keeps the private sector functioning) or the professional ideology that the military brings to the operational domain. In the case of the Canadian government, this issue has become so problematic that there is now a formal initiative labeled the "Web of Rules" to consider how to address it.²⁷

The second is to recall the earlier assertion that it is the members of the social systems (the work team) who will decide what the culture will be and, in particular, will determine how the rule sets will actually apply to them. Thus, as with all facets of culture, the rules actually being applied are rarely those promulgated. A major role of leadership in this context is in trying to narrow the gap between espoused and practiced by either changing the formal rule set(s) or working to adapt the culture. Both are problematic when the leader of the team is the one who is the least familiar with the environment, the stated rule set or the existing culture.

The net result is that leadership in a headquarters staff role is significantly different than when incorporated into an operational role. In rather stark contrast to the operational domain, leadership in a supporting function has to shift the focus of the decision making enablers from rapid, fact-based decisions to open, intellectual inquiry; to shift the leadership enablers from ensuring responsive, cohesive groups to creating an environment of 'confrontational collaboration'; to change from relying on the military ethos to produce a tight culture to using principle-based reasoning to assist in sense-making within a loose culture; and, to overcome weak, rules-constrained managerial enablers by tailoring assigned work to meet individuals' position-specific competencies as well as engaging in more extensive communications and boundary spanning functions. The full implications of these requirements will be considered in a latter section examining institutional leadership.

Summary: Understanding Effective Military Leadership

This section has discussed effective leadership in the Canadian Forces by presenting perspectives on the complexity of military leadership and addressing the interrelationships amongst command, leadership and management. The first key conclusion is that the dominant view of military leadership (get the job done while looking after your troops) is too narrow. Even at the most junior leader level, there are significant tensions in doing so while also ensuring that processes fit within an efficiency-focused government bureaucracy and, concurrently, adapting the professional culture to align with evolving societal expectations. The second key conclusion is that the focus of leadership when exercised as part of operational command is significantly different than when exercised in a staff role either at a higher headquarters or in a rear supporting unit. Together, these expand the domain of leadership and, in particular, make it much more likely that leaders may be conflicted or confused in determining exactly what they need to do when and in determining how to achieve what is really needed. The next section will expand on the concept of the purpose of leadership to present a framework to understand why different individuals are perceived to use different leadership approaches.

²⁷ See <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/reports-rapports/wr-lr/index-eng.asp>

3. THE PURPOSE OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The central idea being pursued in this section is to examine more clearly the understanding of how leaders choose to use their leader influence. The dominant literature presents the leader as a rational decision maker who serves collective effectiveness through deliberate actions to influence others to achieve organizationally desired goals. This perspective, however, is problematic in two ways. The first pertains to the core of leader capacity which is social power. While the literature and *Conceptual Foundations* suggest that individuals work to increase both their position and personal power, there is relatively little available to understand the implications of not having significant levels of power or having one but not the other.²⁸ Further, particularly in the military, the bases of position power are often indistinguishable from the authorities that underpin command which is part of the reason why these two constructs are typically conflated.

The second issue is that the taken-for-granted assumption that leaders will use their power to influence for good not evil is challenged by the literature on toxic or destructive leadership.²⁹ As will be developed, the difficulty here is that organizations actually possess limited means to constrain those who have the capacity to influence others. Thus, the issue of the use of one's leader influence or the purpose of leadership will be examined by considering leadership as unbounded power. To set the stage, the initial discussions will consider the concept of power and the referents that leaders may turn to when deciding what to do.

Understanding Power

As articulated in *Conceptual Foundations*, a central concept incorporated in the understanding of leadership is that one draws on a combination of position and personal power as the basis upon which to influence others. Position power is formally conferred by the organization thus is job-specific and temporary. To return to the previous discussion, one of the challenges of those moving from operational positions (especially as Commander or Commanding Officer) is dealing with the loss of position power when becoming a senior staff officer. The five common types of position power are: legitimate, reward, coercive, information and ecological. Each of these makes the office holder with these powers key to the success or failure of those who report to this person. The capacity to provide a sense of duty or obligation; to offer tangible, symbolic or social rewards; to administer sanctions; to share valued information or to adjust the work environment can all be effective means to convince subordinates to be responsive to the expectations of the boss. Conversely, personal power is earned over time by the individual thus is portable from one job to the next. The three common types of personal power are: referent, expert and connection. With these powers, others value facets of the individual and seek to draw on the sense of approval, their expert knowledge or their capacity to access useful networks, thus, again, are susceptible to leader influence.

²⁸ One model which does so indirectly is Fiedler's Contingency Model, if one reads Leader-Member Relations to refer to relative Personal Power and if his discussion of Position Power was extended beyond Reward and Coercive Power.

²⁹ Both Reed and Conger have examined aspects of the 'dark side' of leadership including in the military.

To extend the consideration of power in the military context, it is suggested that one could consider a third type of power which will be referred to as professional power. Like position power, professional power is conferred by the military through a series of symbolic means including awarding rank, medals, formal qualifications and appointing individuals to high status positions particularly command in operations. Conversely, like personal power, professional power is portable; one takes it from position to position. In fact, a significant purpose of military regalia is to communicate professional power. It is well understood that military members in full dress uniform ‘wear’ their CV. Those who know the codes embedded in cap badge, rank insignia, medal ribbons and special commendation symbols can quickly assess the individual’s professional status and professional power.³⁰ To draw on the literature of ‘swift trust’, it is considered that all professions seek to create ‘swift power’ through symbolic means to signal the status that the individual has earned and carries with them from one job to the next.³¹

It is considered that this professional power is of particular importance in the context of those moving from operational roles to staff positions. Many of those who do so will find a significant decrement in both position and personal power. As already stated, the assumed decision, leadership, culture and even management enablers that supported them as commanders are absent; the legitimate, information and ecological facets of position power can easily be eroded and many will find their subordinates possess greater expertise and more connection power than the incoming boss. Transferable professional power can serve as a temporary bridge while the incumbent acquires or re-builds essential elements of position and personal power. The central message is ‘the profession has deemed this person to be highly capable therefore we’ll trust the new boss (for now)’. The leadership challenge however is that some leaders will continue to rely on professional power and elements of position power to influence others. If they are not successful in expanding their bases of power, their professional power will be eroded (I don’t know what they saw in this person to promote them) and the individual will be forced to rely solely on a narrow range of position power to influence others. Particularly as this can occur post-command, it is easy to see how the ‘command and control’ model of leadership emerges and generates the “Nike®” leadership style (JUST DO IT!).³²

As an extension, the second understanding of power that is of importance is that one cannot or should not draw on any one type of power too much or too often. The amount of influence that can be generated from each of the types of power can diminish if used inappropriately or excessively. Praise from one’s boss, for example, can serve to motivate individuals by giving them a sense of accomplishment, however the boss who praises everybody for everything every time will quickly find that this has less and less effect on others. Thus, the most effective leaders not only possess high levels of position, personal and professional power but are adept in knowing when and how to draw on these so as to maintain optimum effect over time.

³⁰ Noting that those in the Public Service may not have the knowledge needed to decode these signals, hence the incoming senior leaders may not have as much professional power with civilians as they do with their military subordinates.

³¹ For discussion of swift trust, see http://changingminds.org/explanations/trust/swift_trust.htm. For application in the military context, see Ben-Shalom et al (2005).

³² As discussed in *Conceptual Foundations*, this approach can only generate minimal compliance, however it is still evident in the behaviours of weak leaders who insist that command confers the power to impose their wills on their subordinates.

Finally, to integrate the ideas of professional power and the capacity to draw on the right power at the right time, it is considered that, particularly in the military, leader effectiveness does not come from the classic Organizational Psychology concept of Person-Job Fit but from the idea of Image-Role Match.³³ To return to the introductory statement that leadership can be seen as a function, a purpose, a role or a constructed artifact, it is considered that, particularly in the military, leadership is best seen as a role to be played. Those who are the most effective leaders do so because they display an image that is congruent with the role they occupy. Again, of importance, the role to be played is dynamic and, as with all theatre, must be tailored to the audience to whom it is projected. Unfortunately, the dominant North American literature does not incorporate this perspective. It is more apparent in the European literature, in part as leadership is seen more through a sociological lens than as a psychological construct.

The Referents for Leaders

Beyond presenting a plausible third type of power, the primary reason for the preceding discussion of power is that, once the organization has conferred position power and bestowed professional power and the individual has earned personal power, that person has a significant capacity to then influence others. While, like formal authority, position power tends to be focused down and in with one's subordinates, professional and personal power can be extended out and up to more senior levels, across other work teams and external to the organization. As stated, the key issue to be addressed in this section is to consider how the individual decides what to do with their power and how the organization will have an assurance that the chosen purpose will be positive not negative.

The central idea to be presented is that leaders develop over time with the potential for a gradual evolution in how they see themselves, how they understand the nature of their role as leaders and, most importantly, where they turn to for reference in determining what to do. As summarized in the slogan "Managers do things the right way, leaders do the right thing", a key facet of leadership is that the leader must engage in a degree of independent, moral reasoning.³⁴ Thus, it should be understood that a key part of the development of leader capacity and leader insight can be drawn from the literature on the stages of moral development.

Simplistically, Kohlberg suggests that people develop through the stages of pre-conventional, conventional and post conventional.³⁵ The first emphasizes obedience and self-interest thus, as a parallel for leader development, this would suggest that the referents to aid the junior or apprentice leader in deciding what to do are a combination of asking 'what is expected of me' and 'what's in it for me'. This will be referred to as the personal stage. The conventional stage emphasizes conformity and social order thus the referent for the mid-level, journeyman leader is likely based on what other 'good' leaders do, and a focus on what Kohlberg calls law and order morality. While the references used at this stage do include a heavy reliance on rules and rule

³³ Amongst many others, see Holland for P-E Fit and to support the second idea, see the CFLI paper by Hodgkinson et al.

³⁴ This, of course, was a key facet in Burns' original writing on transformational leadership and, in particular, his reference to transformational leaders as moral agents.

³⁵ One can also draw on Kegan's work. For an integration into the military context, see Lagacé-Roy's work on identity.

sets, this will be referred to as the normative stage as the purpose of rules along with the purpose of exemplary leadership is to create and convey norms. The final stage evolves to the use of universal principles thus the senior, mastery-level leader has developed a 'principled conscience' which allows them to step outside of the rules and norms to exercise very independent reasoning to determine the right thing to do. The evolution to this final stage (should it occur) is reflected in the call for a shift from rules-based to principle-based leadership.

Also drawing on the broader literature, it is important to recognize that not all military leaders will display all three stages. If the military engages in appropriate selection, many of those enrolled may have moved through the 'pre-conventional' stage of personal referents when developing initial leadership capacities as adolescents or young adults. Conversely, many may not achieve the levels of wisdom and self-insight required to move fully into the post-conventional, principle-based stage. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, the limited research conducted in the (US) military context suggests that the officers assessed were working at levels of moral development below what the institution assumed or required.³⁶

The key implication is that leadership intentions will be dependent on the referent used by the leader to determine what is appropriate (intent, priorities, actions, etc) with differentiation based on use of individual/personal-referenced, normative-based or principle-based reasoning. The recognition that it is the leader who will select the referent and not the organization results in the idea of leadership as 'unbounded' power to influence.

Leadership as Unbounded Power

This section will draw on the ideas of differing amounts of power, leadership as an image to be projected or role to be played and the concept of personal growth or evolution through three stages to present an integrated framework of leadership as unbounded power. The framework presented is intended, in some ways, to draw on the Pigeau-McCann Command (CAR) model. This model suggests that an individual can be on the 'balanced command envelope' if there is an appropriate alignment of competencies (C), authorities (A) and responsibilities (R).³⁷ As some leader power is generated without formal authority and leader influence can be extended beyond one's responsibilities, the parallel to the Pigeau-McCann CAR model proposed here is to suggest that one can be on the "balanced leader effectiveness" envelope based on consideration of how differing leader power produces different roles (R), the stage in developing leader referents (S) and the degree to which the focus of leader intent is aligned with organizational goals (A).

Role. The first facet of the framework being presented is based on the understanding that different levels of power will result in different roles for the leader. Although the previous discussion introduced the notion of professional power as a third dimension, the following is based on the more simple use of either position or personal power. Further, although these are best understood as continuous, they have been dichotomized as either low or high. This allows for a simple 2 X 2 depiction but with the recognition that these are (1) relative and (2) fluctuate slightly as described in the situational leadership literature. Thus, four cells are created to

³⁶ Paul Bartone has conducted some work in this area; for an exploration in the US military context, see Forsythe et al.

³⁷ For a short overview of the CAR model, see their *Canadian Military Journal* article.

represent the conditions of high versus low, personal and/or position power and, for each cell, a category label has been assigned to describe the general type of leadership or the role which can be exercised in each of the conditions.

Low Position Power and Low Personal Power: The Figurehead Leader. This condition is best exemplified by new 2Lts joining units. Until such time as they gain practical experience to exercise authorized position power and, importantly, have opportunities to interact with subordinates to earn personal power, they will occupy figurehead roles (often with an assigned NCO babysitter) and will have limited opportunities to exercise actual leadership. It is in this domain that the leadership substitutes theories come into play³⁸ (these represent the *ab initio* leader's training wheels) thus, leadership is far more related to organizational factors (SOPs, routine tasks, well motivated followers etc.) than the actual behaviours of the leader.

High Position Power & Low Personal Power: The Transactional Leader. This case concerns the individual who has been promoted and given a position with considerable power yet has not acquired significant expert and/or referent power (low expert possibly due to being posted into a job for which they are not prepared, low referent through poor personal actions and/or reputation). In order to exercise influence, they will frequently have to resort to the position power levers of rewards/punishments and legitimate authorities thus will be restricted to using transactional approaches.

High Personal Power & Low Position Power: The Emergent Leader. As is increasingly illustrated in the literature (including the human security environment), this represents the individual who possesses valuable expertise and/or has earned referent status yet has not been formally given high position power – not yet promoted or given command authority (hence both inter-rank and line versus staff differences come in play here). Of importance, it is considered that one can exercise emergent leadership but not emergent command (short of mutiny) as one can only command within given authorities. In contrast to the transactional domain above, the emergent leader must rely on their expert and/or referent power to influence others.

High Personal Power & High Position Power: The Transformational Leader. The combination of both effective personal and position power allows the individual to engage in this more influential leadership approach and is seen as the objective to which leader development should be focused. As with Bass' full range model, a key implication here is that this leader may apply a range of leadership approaches including transactional leadership when deemed appropriate.

Stage. The second facet to be incorporated is to draw on the idea of developmental stages with the notion that, when determining what to do (or more where to direct their leader influence), leaders move from initially using a personal perspective to relying on normative comparisons and, potentially, to applying an independent principle-based view. The net results are illustrated in Table 1 with labels for each level under the four broad leadership roles (Figurehead, Transactional, Emergent and Transformational) from the power discussion above.

³⁸ See Kerr & Jermier for the original conceptualization of leadership substitutes theory.

Stage\Role	FIGUREHEAD	TRANSACTIONAL	EMERGENT	TRANSFORMATIONAL
PERSONAL	INGRATIATOR	NEGOTIATOR	POLITICIAN	MAVERICK
NORMATIVE	BUREAUCRAT	REGULATOR	REFEREE	STANDARD BEARER
PRINCIPLED	MORALIST	DIPLOMAT	ADVOCATE	INNOVATOR

Table 1: Leadership Roles and Developmental Stages

Of importance when interpreting the labels assigned to each of the twelve cells: these refer to the perceptions of those being influenced and not necessarily how leaders see themselves.

Alignment. The third component is based on the understanding that each of the twelve leadership approaches can be either effective or ineffective. The final consideration is that, for each of the three referents (personal, normative or principled), there is a sub-dimension which will ultimately determine whether the leadership is effective or not. Again, whether the leader is effective will depend on how those being influenced assess the person and, in particular, the motives that they attribute to the actions they see.

Personal. For those relying on personal referents, the central issue is the recognition that leaders may be acting to satisfy their own objectives as well as, or, instead of, organizational goals – noting the difference between using a personal reference (vice rule or principle) versus putting self interest ahead of the organization’s requirements. It should also be recalled that an objective of transformational leadership is to have the individual internalize super-ordinate organizational goals so that their personal objectives are always aligned with the organization’s. The primary concern (the dark side of leadership) is when the personal objectives are counter to and, given supremacy over, the organization’s (self, troops, mission rather than mission, troops, self).

Normative. For those relying on normative referents, the primary issue is whether the norms that influence the leader are interpreted in a holistic/integrated or fragmented/ disconnected manner. To a large extent, the key differentiation is whether the leader is ‘rigid’ or ‘adaptive’. This aspect becomes particularly difficult if the individual is only attending to a narrow range of rules and regulations or following a single exemplar of the ideal leader.

Principled. For those relying on principle-based reasoning, the key factor is seen to be whether these are followed in an idealistic or relativistic fashion – or absolute versus utilitarian. As discussed in philosophy, the extreme case of highly idealistic or absolute adherence to principles can produce very dysfunctional outcomes especially when those others being influenced do not share the same philosophical understanding.

	FIGUREHEAD	TRANSACTIONAL	EMERGENT	TRANSFORMATIONAL
PERSONAL + Org interest - Self interest	INGRATIATOR + Substitute leader - Pariah	NEGOTIATOR + Achiever - Manipulator	POLITICIAN + Careerist - Machiavellian	MAVERICK + Change Catalyst - Rogue leader
NORMS + Holistic - Rigid	BUREAUCRAT + Administrator - Obstructionist	REGULATOR + Efficiency expert - Enforcer	REFEREE + Consistency - Shop Steward	STANDARD BEARER + Heroic leader - Blind obedience
PRINCIPLE + Relativist - Idealistic	MORALIST + Voice of conscience - Whistle blower	DIPLOMAT + Extrinsic motivator - Benevolent dictator	ADVOCATE + Sage - Agitator	INNOVATOR + Champion - Loose cannon

Table 2: Types and Styles of Leadership

Although significant research is required to examine the differing roles presented within this framework, a few speculations are offered (Table 2). The first is that there are three concurrent evolutions that likely occur for a military leader. The first is growing power by being awarded greater position (and professional) power while also developing increasing personal power. The second is the evolution through the stages of personal, normative and principle-based referents. The third is moving from engaging mainly in the Leading People function at the tactical level to eventually focusing on Leading the Institution at the strategic level. Integrating all three, it is suggested that the most common effective leader roles seen in the CF would be: the (tactical) Substitute Leader or Achiever, the (operational) Efficiency Expert or Heroic Leader and the (strategic) Champion. As the military does award those placed in leadership positions with significant position power, it is likely that the most common ineffective leaders would be the Transactional Manipulator, Enforcer, and Benevolent Dictator, and the Transformational leader who expects Blind Obedience.

This framework suggests that there are four broad types of leadership based on the amounts of personal and position power (what type of leadership) which then are applied using three different referents (within the what, how the ‘right’ style is determined) and finally, for each, the degree to which the type and style of leadership will meet organizational objectives (the why). To link to the core Human Resources processes related to leader effectiveness (selection, development and measurement), it is suggested that more comprehensive assessments can be generated by examining the amounts of power the individual has accrued, considering which referents the leader draws on hence, their stage in leader development, and, within each stage, the degree of alignment with institutional goals in how the leader uses the most salient referents. It is considered that these facets would produce a much better appreciation of an individual’s true leadership capacity, would generate a clearer understanding of needed leader development and would yield much better predictions of future leader effectiveness.

4. THE NATURE OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The second discussion of understanding effective leadership in the CF will consider environmental or services differences³⁹ by drawing on works such as Carl Builder’s sociological

³⁹ It is fully recognized that, formally, there is only one Canadian Armed Forces and that the previous Services of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and Royal Canadian Air Force do not exist. The reference will, however, be made to ‘services’ as, culturally, these are still very much in evidence. Environment is used in the

analyses of the US Services and Al English's differentiation between heroic and technical leadership. As stated in the introduction, there are significant differences across the operational environments in the nature of leadership: what leaders focus on, how they exert influence and what they are attempting to achieve.⁴⁰ The initial discussion will present some of the general factors that explain how and why the land, sea, air and special forces (SOF)⁴¹ environments are differentiated followed by a short application of House's GLOBE cultural models to understand service differences to then lead to explanatory models of the resultant different leadership approaches.

As brief background, Builder presented what he saw as the differences across the US Army, Navy and Air Force in their core principles or cherished ideal which serve as inspiration for the service. He described the US Air Force as worshipping at the alter of technology with an implicit faith that newer technology will assure the future of the Air Force. He saw the US Navy as worshipping at the alter of tradition with the responsibilities of independent command at sea as a core ideal. For Builder, the US Army was more complex, however he distilled it down to worshipping at the alter of service to the country with patriotism as the core principle. Although he did not address the US Marine Corps, one could easily extend his analogies to the USMC as worshipping at the alter of unity with a single identifier of 'Marine' as core to their identity.

English's work drew on historical analyses of Royal Canadian Air Force leadership, however he subsequently extended his analogies across the three services. He differentiated between heroic leadership which he defined as "the conspicuous sharing of risk with subordinates" and technical leadership which is "the ability to influence others to achieve a goal based on the specialized knowledge or skill of the leader."⁴² He subsequently suggested that the Army tends to focus on heroic leadership, the Air Force on technical leadership and the Navy blends both. Echoing a main thrust of the 'Rowley' report, English acknowledges that the nature of leadership, and the ways in which leaders demonstrate their skills, change as one assumes more senior rank.

Operational Differences

To understand how and why leadership is practiced differently across the CF environments, it is necessary to understand how and why operations are different. The key point here is that there are very real differences in the nature of the operational environment on land, at sea and in the air that help explain why leadership must be practiced in a different way in order to be maximally effective.

physical sense of being at sea, in the air or on the battle field; service is used in the sociological sense of belonging to the Navy, Army, Air Force or SOF communities.

⁴⁰ Noting that the focus here is on leadership in operations, however these differences are still evident in the CF environmental headquarters.

⁴¹ Although the combined Canadian-American 1st Special Service Force was created in 1942, the more recent emphases on joint operations and flexible responses to global networks have resulted in the emergence of Special Forces as a distinct component within many NATO militaries and, particularly in the CF, the development of a unique SOF 'community'.

⁴² To link back to the earlier discussion of power, both are forms of personal power with heroic leadership one type of referent power and technical leadership as one type of expert power.

Lethal Force. The first perspective pertains to the core distinguishing factor of an armed forces, the application of lethal force. While it is acknowledged that intelligence-enabled operations and targeting boards have taken a larger role in the identification of valid targets, for many in the Army and SOF, the decision to actually engage is at the level of the individual soldier with a personal weapon. Conversely, the Air and Naval environments are characterized by increasing centralization with only one or two individuals controlling the decision to engage entire weapons systems. There is no equivalent in the Air Force or Navy to the amount of independence of action that exists at the lowest level in the other two.⁴³ Thus, while independent reasoning is of importance for all, the requirement for personal decision making regarding the application of lethal force is critical in the Army and SOF environments. This explains why doctrine is so important in the Army: training teaching troops how to pull the trigger, doctrine tells them when.

Interdependencies. There is a wide range in the types of missions characteristic to each environment however, in terms of scale, the Army has to draw on a significantly greater number of different components or capabilities to achieve maximum effect across the range of missions that they encounter. Further, the disparate nature of the missions (from classic warfare through enforcing peace and monitoring disengagements to delivering aid or engaging in constabulary policing functions) means that the Army has to rely on task-tailored teams more than the others. Thus, the Army has the largest number of semi-independent teams with specific roles to fulfill (medical, military police, aviation, combat engineers, logistics, etc, etc). Importantly, each must be given significant latitude in how they carry out assigned functions. It is for this reason that the Army needs to sort out ‘left and right of arc’ as the concept is that each team should be given maximum flexibility within their ‘arcs of fire’ but cannot stray beyond these limits as they will then interfere with others. The Navy and Air Force tend to have fewer numbers of independent teams and a greater reliance on interdependence thus there is more of a concern for constant, mutual self-adjustment and correction as the differing components or individuals adapt to what others are doing. SOF is the ‘tightest’ environment where the objective is to actually operate as a single, fully integrated team. Thus, the Army tends to be the one that emphasizes mission command; the Navy and Air Force tend to emphasize the common operating picture, and SOF focuses most on self-synchronization.⁴⁴

Teeth and Tail. As an extension, the third perspective is the amount of supporting elements that each needs to take into the field of operations. The Army is based on the concept of campaigning and expeditionary operations which means that they have to be able to self-sustain for months if not years, hence need to take a lot of supporting ‘tail’ to go with the ‘teeth’. The Navy works more around deployments in weeks to months thus takes a small amount of logistics, medical or maintenance capacity to sea, while the Air Force operates in days to weeks thus tends to leave most support ‘at home’. SOF is based on the concepts of rapid insertion and rapid withdrawal along with a high degree of self-sufficiency in theatre hence is intended to be “max teeth, min tail”. Thus, while jointness is leading to greater integration across the services, there are still important differences in how land, sea and air power are generated, employed and sustained. Particularly due to sustainment, the Army has to take a lot of second and even third

⁴³ Perhaps with the emerging exception of Naval boarding parties conducting interdiction, however those involved still do not have the degree of individual discretion of dismounted troops.

⁴⁴ For an extended discussion of how the military has blurred emerging concepts like common operating picture, self-synchronization and net-centric/net-enabled operations, see the DRDC paper by English et al.

line supporting elements into the field while the Air Force is trying to get to the stage where the only thing sent into the killing zone is munitions, and no people. The net result is that the size and composition of deployed units are quite different across the services.

Generating Capacities. The fourth factor is an extension of the earlier discussion of capabilities and capacities. Capabilities are seen as those facets of units that are generated through the structural systems and are referred to as what the unit is *designed* to achieve. Capacities are the additional facets of what units *might* achieve that are generated through the social systems and the human aspects of force multipliers. As an extension, these differences are reflected in the perspective of the degree to which unit effectiveness is based on the nature of equipment employed or the creativity of people. To a large extent, the characteristics of the equipment define the maximum potential unit effectiveness in the Air Force and the Navy; there is no amount of creativity, willpower or determination that is going to turn a fighter into a helicopter so the performance characteristics of the 'kit' define the envelope of what can be done with it. Conversely, it is the characteristics of the people that do so in the Army and SOF contexts.⁴⁵

To differentiate even further, it was observed earlier that certain job-specific competencies (thus personal attributes) were seen as being generated through the structural systems (thus are part of capacities, not capabilities). These capacities are represented by part-task drills or procedural skills. All services rely on part-task training and drilling people to perform specific tasks to a high standard but the rationale is different. Particularly in the Air Force and to some extent the Navy, this is done to ensure specific levels of predictable performance as each person must be able to perform assigned tasks to expected standards so that the unit can perform as designed. However, in the Army and especially SOF, these skills along with the structure provided by doctrine allows the 'ad hoc' team that gets thrown together in order to achieve a very specific objective to be able to determine what each member 'brings to the fight'. Thus, the real key to success in the Army is through the flexibility and adaptability of small teams, not their specific trained skill sets.

Task vs Social Cohesion. The fifth perspective pertains to the issue of cohesion and small group dynamics. Without going into the evolving literature on the nature of cohesion in the military,⁴⁶ for understanding service differences, the concepts of task versus social cohesion are useful. Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment amongst the team in achieving collective goals while social cohesion refers to the sense of belonging shared amongst all members of the group. Task cohesion is more than simply ensuring that all members of a team are working towards common, overarching goals as it involves a deeper level of personal commitment to coordinate effort and 'sharing the load' in getting the job done. Similarly, social cohesion is more than merely identifying with the group but extends to a strong preference to spend social time

⁴⁵ As illustrated in the long standing observation, the Air Force and the Navy 'man' the equipment, the Army equips the 'man'.

⁴⁶ In his most recent commentary on cohesion, Siebold provides an integrative summary of both the differing facets of cohesion as well as the different foci of psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science. He presents four structural relationships: peer, leader, organizational and institutional with the first two seen as primary group cohesion and the latter two as secondary. He also points out that cohesion has both an affective and an instrumental aspect.

together and a sense of ‘family’ amongst the team members.⁴⁷ It is considered that the relative importance of either task or social cohesion and the nature of how each are created differs across the environments. To draw on the previous points, the greater emphasis on interdependencies rather than independence across sub-units and within teams leads to a stronger emphasis on task cohesion in the Air Force and, to a degree, the Navy than in the Army. Conversely, the large numbers of those who deploy together and the restrictive nature of the environment in which individuals have to live for prolonged periods in the Army and especially the Navy lead to a greater emphasis on social cohesion. Finally, the rather unique nature of SOF employment with extremely strong interdependencies along with the need for very high levels of mutual trust, create a requirement for very high levels of both task and social cohesion.

The Fog of War. The final perspective offered pertains to the degree of noise, confusion, and uncertainty versus the amount of clarity, predictability and comprehension that exists concerning the mission environment and the key factors that will influence mission success. The modern Army and Navy both evolved from an era when the ‘fog of war’ was a dominant element in how they conducted operations. The role of chance along with the need for caution so as not to be caught by surprise has been a significant factor in how both have operated and, as reflected in the Army slogan ‘no plan survives first contact with the enemy’, remains part of both services today. The Air Force, conversely, was created in and due to the scientific age. As reflected in Builder’s assertion of the role of technology, the Air Force operates on the assumption of the perfect operating picture in which all important elements are known or, at a minimum, predictable. As illustrated in the SOF world, the ideal that all services strive for is to have their own forces operating with clarity while ensuring that opponents are mired in confusion. The lessons learned over centuries, however, are still evident when encountering unexpected events: the response by the Air Force is to review and reprogram the solution, by the Army and Navy it is to rethink and adjust the plan, and by SOF it is to innovate and exploit the opportunity.

Summary of Service Differences

The six factors presented are intended to provide some rational explanations for how and why operations are different across the Army, Navy, Air and SOF environments, thus how and why leadership in these operations needs to be different. This discussion has suggested that, while there are commonalities across specific services on one or more factors, the overall profile for each of the four is unique. The focus here is clearly on the nature of the operational environment therefore the implications drawn concern what has been presented earlier as command-related leadership and not leadership in supporting or staff headquarters roles. The primary rationale for this emphasis is that the vast majority of military leaders initially develop their leadership style in the operational environment. A better understand of how and why leadership differs across the service environments is needed in order to then understand how leadership must morph when individuals move to more senior, less operations focused employment. Further, while beyond the scope of this paper, the combination of new approaches to integrated military and multi-agency activities along with emergent technology particularly related to remote sensors suggests that some of what is presented in this section will change. The challenge is that there is little to explain the current dominant approaches, thus there is no basis upon which to predict or assess

⁴⁷ See Anne Irwin’s description of a CF Rifle Company in Afghanistan for an excellent picture of strong social cohesion.

future evolutions. The following provides a short summary of one approach that is also of assistance in understanding service differences.

GLOBE Leadership Dimensions⁴⁸

The *Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness* (GLOBE) research project was a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary, multi-national research effort to examine how business leadership varies across different nations. As with Hofstede's highly influential work, GLOBE is focused on business management, however the depth and breadth of the work conducted is illustrative for considering the nature of leadership in the military and examining service differences.⁴⁹

Expanding on Hofstede's cultural dimensions, GLOBE presents nine factors that are considered to be of importance in understanding differences from one work environment to another:

1. Performance orientation reflects the extent to which a community encourages and rewards innovation, high standards, excellence, and performance improvement.
2. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which a society, organization, or group relies on social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate the unpredictability of future events.
3. Power distance is the extent to which a community accepts and endorses authority, power differences, and status privileges.
4. Gender egalitarianism is the degree to which a collective minimizes gender inequality.
5. Humane orientation is the degree to which an organization or society encourages and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others.
6. In-group collectivism is the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families.
7. Institutional collectivism is the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action.
8. Future orientation is the degree to which a collectivity encourages and rewards future-oriented behaviours such as planning and delaying gratification.
9. Assertiveness is the degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their relationships with others.

As an overall observation, it is suggested that the military tends to place a high emphasis on: performance orientation, power distance, in-group and institutional collectivism and assertiveness with moderate levels of uncertainty avoidance and future orientation and lower gender egalitarianism⁵⁰ and humane orientation. Virtually all of these facets are visible in the Ulmer quote and are best summed up in the literature on the 'combat male warrior' identity: the

⁴⁸ House et al have presented the GLOBE project in many fora, all material presented in this section is from the 2004 comprehensive volume.

⁴⁹ The author discussed these implications with Dr House in June 2002.

⁵⁰ It should be noted that efforts to increase the number of women in the military should not be confused with gender egalitarianism. The key here pertains to the extent to which individuals feel able to display a wide range of behaviours versus the degree to which one feels compelled to restrict behaviours to what are seen as gender appropriate roles. As described by Davis & McKee, the military has been critiqued as a hyper-masculine environment in which, in order to be successful, women are required to adopt more masculine behaviours and men are prevented from displaying feminine behaviours.

tough, fit, action-oriented individual committed to the team and focused on success no matter what.⁵¹ Of importance, however, it is considered that there are some (relatively) significant differences on certain dimensions across services which help explain why the nature of leadership also differs. The GLOBE dimensions along with the earlier discussion of the factors that serve to make the operational context different will be integrated to present a perspective on leadership in each environment.

Air Force: Optimizing Systems Performance

The key characteristic for the Air Force is the view that the world is knowable, definable and programmable. Thus, the emphasis is on using logical reasoning to assess factual information to make the right decision and is best described by the academic discipline of engineering. It is because the scientific model dominates how the world is seen that the Air Force puts such high emphasis on equipment, especially sensors and computers to collect and assess data to aid decision making. Thus, it was the adoption of the scientific model as the accepted world view that led to Builder's description of the Air Force as worshipping at the altar of technology. The Air Force was the only service created during 'modernity' and is reflective of the scientific management models that emerged when powered flight was developed and incorporated into the military. In fact, starting with the solo pilot in the cockpit during the First World War and then moving to the bomber crew in the Second, the Air Force produced the first times where it was possible to assign one person to do one job, the others still requiring multi-skilled individuals who can fill many different roles. The ability to create single focus jobs and apply all of the principles of Taylorism⁵² explains the Air Force approach to job analysis, proficiency training, and structuring of work, and is evident in the USAF and the CF with the use of task-based job analysis, the way the General Specifications are written, and the resultant focus on just-in-time performance oriented training.⁵³

The blend of the scientific model with the reliance on technology produces a very complicated system (or system of systems) to generate and apply air power. It is designed around the concept of aligning a large number of components that each performs a pre-determined, pre-programmed function thus is a large machine with many component parts (human and physical). The key job of commanders is to use the structural systems to keep the overall system working efficiently (thus the Air Force buys into the cult of efficiency) while the role of leadership is to influence the social systems to ensure each person performs their assigned function the right way. Of key importance, the best way to optimize systems performance is to make sure the component parts

⁵¹ This prototype 'ideal' soldier is clearly expressed in the US Army "Soldier's Creed". For consideration of the implications of this prototype including extension of the previous footnote comments, see Davis & McKee.

⁵² A century ago, Frederick Taylor developed the principles of scientific management to ensure the most efficient methods were used to produce goods. The development of structured methods to organize and conduct work was in stark contrast to the previous artisan model whereby individuals mastered their trade through apprenticeships and worked independently using their own preferred methods to produce quality goods. This paper argues, in part, that there are principles from the artisan model that should be reintroduced.

⁵³ It also helps to explain why the Army, in particular, has continued to struggle under the implicit Taylorism philosophy embedded in CFITES as they require just-in-case development and broad socialization which would be evident if the CF used a worker-based approach. As an extension, another example of the Army struggling with something that works well for the Air Force is the base concept which is ideal when virtually all the supporting 'tail' can remain at home but not when engaging in expeditionary operations.

are as well synchronized as possible thus it is important to measure (using the scientific model) each person to make sure their performance is within the tolerances to allow their work to mesh with all others. This is what Standards Officers, check rides etc are all about and why there is a high reliance on check lists.⁵⁴

This overall approach generates a 'blinking light' monitoring model of leadership. Part of running complicated systems is to have indicators that tell the operator when the component parts are not functioning within prescribed tolerances. When the oil pressure falls, the red light starts blinking to alert the pilot to pay attention to that part of the system. Importantly, if the light is not blinking, pilots can assume that everything is functioning the way it is supposed to - provided they ran through the check list to make sure everything was ready to go before they applied power (or exerted leader influence). This gets applied to leadership with a (generally) similar set of assumptions: (1) I've run through the check list and know all my people are appropriately trained to do their job within standards; (2) everybody knows how to push the appropriate button to turn on the blinking light when there is a problem; and, (3) in the absence of any blinking lights, I can continue to fine-tune the performance of the system (so concentrate on work to be done rather than people to be motivated). One of the key requirements to make sure that folks push the panic button when things are not going well is an open culture, which is why the Air Force tends to reduce hierarchy, social distance and position power and explains the more casual 'first name basis' interactions that tend to strike the Army as "inappropriate".⁵⁵ Thus, to return to the GLOBE dimensions, in relative terms, the Air Force is seen as higher on uncertainty avoidance and lower on power distance than the other three.

Army: Improvising in Chaos

In rather stark contrast to the Air Force, the Army view of the world is framed by a blend of the fog of war and a Hobbesian perspective that life can be nasty, brutish and short. The first leads to the emphasis on adaptation and improvisation in the face of confusing and often contradictory indicators of what is going on. All services share an interest in collecting and assessing factual information but the Army believes that the 'facts' will never tell you all you need to know; you also need to rely on intuition/gut feel to really make sense of what is going on around you. That's why the Army stresses that leaders have to walk the ground; why time on recce is never wasted etc. The second factor is also reflected in Huntington's description of the military (really the Army) as conservative, realistic and pessimistic about human nature. The realities of land warfare, especially the prolonged hardships of expeditionary operations and the personal nature of killing and death, lead to a recognition of the importance of individual psychological state and group social climate, as these are key to supporting sustained effort in arduous conditions and, especially, to motivating the rifleman to pull the trigger when needed.

Given the emphasis on small teams and on improvisation plus the requirements to sustain effort over long periods of time, the focus of Army leadership is on understanding individual and collective capacities and then drawing on these the right way, at the right time, for the

⁵⁴ To move into service sub-tribes, there is a bit of the same approach in the world of gunnery in both the Navy and Army.

⁵⁵ Some in the Army or SOF might select alternative words to comment on the dominant Air Force leadership style but this description indicates why the Air Force leadership approach is needed in the Air Force context.

circumstance. Of importance, the Army emphasizes a preparatory leadership approach. While many have been drawn to the romance of Army leadership through what English called heroic leadership, the focus of Army leadership is more on creating the conditions in advance rather than having to rely on inspiration to motivate troops in the heat of action. To draw on a contrast in literature, it is closer to Henry V's pre-battle evocation of the "band of brothers" than his mid-battle rallying cry "once more unto the breach".⁵⁶ Thus, in contrast to the Navy and Air Force, Army leadership places an increased emphasis on anticipatory socialization and is evident in the focus on 'know your troops' as well as the reliance on history, customs and traditions to build and sustain morale and cohesion. Part of this emphasis on socialization is visible in the use of myth making, story telling and oral history as important ways to pass on lessons learned to future generations. Again, to return to GLOBE, the Army is seen as higher on several dimensions including: power distance, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism and assertiveness, and lower on gender egalitarianism and humane orientation.

Navy: Signaling Shifting Identities

In some regards, the Navy can be seen as a blend of the Air Force and Army approaches described above and more in the middle ground between the extremes of the other two on several of the factors presented. As with the Air Force, the Navy seeks to operate based on a clear picture of the operational environment yet shares the Army concern for unknowns and surprises. While the ability to generate naval power is limited by the characteristics of the equipment, the Navy also draws on a degree of improvisation especially during crises such as fires, floods, rescue at sea and, these days, boarding parties. Further, while like the Air Force, the Navy does rely on individuals and small teams to be trained and drilled so as to optimize performance, ships' companies also live in a confined social environment thus the Navy also needs to tend to the issues of individual psychological state and small group (mess) social climate. Finally, like the Army, the Navy also has roots in pre-modern times with elements of superstition still evident today.⁵⁷

When integrated across all of the characteristics presented, it is considered that the concept of the Navy as having a 'foot in both camps' on several dimensions leads to an understanding of the Navy as continually shifting and refocusing. Rather than applying one approach based on the Army realities of lengthy expeditionary operations or another based on Air Force 'home base' short missions, the Navy has to adopt one approach at sea and another alongside, with a requirement for further differentiation when in home versus a foreign port. When on watch, Naval leaders tend to adopt the Air Force approach of closely integrated technical teams yet, when shifting to Divisional Officer duties, adopt the Army philosophy of knowing each individual and attending to small group dynamics.

While the sharpest differentiation between the Air Force and Army leadership models may be related to the core conceptual differentiation between the task-focused and relations-focused leadership, the Navy stands out as the only one that engages in leadership as a social process focused on identity construction. Now emerging in several literatures outside of North America, a central idea is that individuals can assume multiple identities (shifting from 'mother' to 'Leafs')

⁵⁶ The two references are from Shakespeare's *Henry V*, Act 4 Scene 3 and Act 3 Scene 1, respectively.

⁵⁷ Why is it bad luck to whistle on a ship?

fan’ to ‘environmental activist’ to ‘defence lawyer’, etc) and, importantly, that each identity carries slightly different sets of values and norms. Much of culture competence is learning to read the nuances of different social settings to determine which behaviours are acceptable, which norms to follow and how to understand one’s role. Influenced by the strong, single identity socialization approach of the US Marine Corps, in the CF the Army, in particular, tends to believe that each soldier has only one identity with one set of values, beliefs and expectations that hold true in all places at all times. The Navy however recognizes that this assumption does not hold true thus a primary role of naval leaders is to signal when identities need to shift.⁵⁸

The Navy, when at sea, invokes the identity of the ‘professional sailor’. Because ships at sea are in a high risk environment, there is a clear understanding that safety depends on mutually dependent individuals and teams within the ship, thus the role (professional sailor at sea) carries with it a set of behavioural standards involving self regulation (eat right, sleep right, don’t abuse alcohol, don’t create social friction) which, in turn, reflect an underlying set of values given high priority (mission before self, teamwork, vigilance, punctuality, etc). However, Navy ships commonly go into foreign ports where this high degree of self regulation is no longer considered as critical and where it is recognized that the associated high behavioural standards and self-control are unlikely to be followed. The Navy, therefore, engages in symbolically shifting the sailor’s identity by invoking the ‘Ambassador of Canada’.⁵⁹ Thus, this shift in identity brings with it a new role (representing the nation) with associated behavioural standards and a realigned value set with some values given greater priority (those related to projecting a national and professional image) while others are given lower priority (those related to vigilance and the capacity to respond in crisis).

There are also important nuances in both these roles as well as the “Sailor home from the sea’ identity which are also signaled: variations of the professional sailor at sea when moving to action stations, closing up for special evolutions, responding to emergencies or shifting to a social role off watch in the mess; or the Ambassador in foreign ports heading off for a ‘run’ ashore vs engaging in a sporting event for a local charity vs hosting a cocktail party. In all cases, the Navy uses a series of (anthropological) cues and (sociological) processes to evoke the appropriate identity to be assumed. Thus, while customs and traditions are used in the Army as part of the socialization process of linking soldiers to the past, in the Navy, these are more closely woven into daily life (pipes, Colours ceremony, etc) and serve to signal identities to be assumed. Of note, the Navy is not seen as either significantly higher or lower than the others on the GLOBE dimensions.

Special Operations: Focusing Creative Excellence

Noting that the concept of special operations and elite or specialized units have a long history in the Canadian military, SOF is, realistically, just emerging in the CF as a potential fourth service.

⁵⁸ The word ‘signal’ carries specific meaning in the Naval context which can be traced to Builder’s comments on the sanctity of independent command at sea. To preserve independence yet remain obedient to higher authority, one ‘signals’ their intentions with the understanding that silence is assent. The other services do not operate the same way leading to common miscommunications when operating in joint contexts or staff headquarters.

⁵⁹ The Ambassador identity is usually communicated as “The CO doesn’t want to read a headline that starts with ‘Drunken Canadian sailor’.”

While many serving in the SOF community come from an Army background and most missions occur in and around the land environment, the earlier discussion suggested that SOF is rather different than the traditional Army in several ways. The most obvious is that, while the Army has to deal with large numbers of semi-independent units and sub-units, SOF is characterized by the creation of a single, highly integrated team that, ideally, operates in total unison. A key implication of the Army environment is that commander and leaders have to balance initiative with control; too much of one creates problems in facilitating the other. The SOF approach however is designed to take full advantage of chance events and the chaos of the battle space, thus (to draw on an Air Force concept), SOF is much more prepared to push the envelope, seeing controlled chaos as presenting the opportunity for creativity.⁶⁰

The leadership model practiced in the SOF community is seen as collaborative leadership.⁶¹ As illustrated in the Pigeau-McCann work on command and, particularly, their redefinitions of the core constructs, SOF leadership is very much seen as intended to facilitate the creative expression of human will. Thus, one key facet of SOF collaborative leadership is enabling innovation and creativity. As indicated in the label assigned, however, a central facet of SOF leadership is focus. The underlying approach is that SOF is not only about operating at the business end of the spear but about creating a very sharp point: it is intended to achieve maximum effects with limited resources. While SOF leadership shares commonalities with the Army 'preparatory' model described earlier, it is more focused on adaptability in the midst of action. A key element that distinguishes SOF leadership is the capacity to 'pass the leadership baton' to the individual who is in the best position to ensure mission success. Although this does not involve passing command authority, part of creativity is allowing those with the most relevant expertise, best on-site appreciation of the conditions, and greatest capacity to set the conditions for team success, to exert the greatest amount of influence. Finally, as with all elite units, SOF places a greater emphasis on excellence than is found elsewhere. To some extent, the excellence facet of the SOF ethos is a key element of pre-mission preparation and creates the shared belief that leaders can then draw on to generate motivation and ensure creativity in action. Thus, SOF tends to share a similar profile on the GLOBE dimensions as the Army with even higher emphasis on performance orientation and in-group collectivism but a slightly lower emphasis on power distance.

Summary: Service Leadership Models

This section has drawn on a number of key factors that serve to explain why and how operations in the air, land, sea and SOF environments are necessarily different hence why leadership in these environments is differentiated. While there are certainly commonalities in military leadership across all operational contexts and even across the entire CF when compared to the public service or private sectors, this discussion has focused in on key facets to explain the very real differences that are evident when one moves from one environment to another. For each service, a phrase has been provided to capture what is distinctive in the purpose and the nature of leadership. The Air Force is seen as focused on optimizing systems performance using a

⁶⁰ And, of course, create a bit of the chaos in the first place. For a literary treatment of the subject, see Robinson's "Masters of Chaos".

⁶¹ For more on SOF leadership aspects, see Cohen's perspectives; for more on collaborative leadership and the need to extend this elsewhere in the military see Wong's work.

monitoring leadership approach to ensure that leaders know when things are not going well. The Army is focused on improvising in chaos using a preparatory leadership approach to ensure that individuals and teams maintain effort and use appropriate independent reasoning particularly regarding use of lethal force. The Navy is focused on signaling shifting identities using a social leadership approach to invoke the most salient identity for the circumstances. SOF is seen as focusing creative excellence through a collaborative leadership approach that facilitates innovation and forges a single, maximally effective team.

The key final comment on services differences is that each has developed over decades or centuries due to the unique crucible of being tested in battle. As a result, while they can appear to be rather different, one is not seen as better than the others; each has a role and place in the modern military. However, to return to a point made in the introductions, each is also reflective of the more traditional view of the military as illustrated in the Ulmer quote. While beyond the scope of this paper, none of the four models as presented appears to be optimally suited to either the emerging 'all one team' philosophy of melding military, public service, contractors, and even NGOs, under emerging comprehensive approaches, nor does it fit the evolution from imposing physical security to setting the conditions for human security.

5. DEVELOPING INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP

The initial discussion in this paper sought to expand on the existing CF approach to leadership by examining effective military leadership and, in particular, considering the interrelationships amongst command, leadership and management. The subsequent section discussed differences in the *purpose* of military leadership and proposed a framework of leadership as unbounded power to understand how leaders choose to apply their influence and to help explain why they may be seen as projecting a certain leadership style. The following section considered the differences in the *nature* of military leadership across environments and provided descriptors of the dominant approach evident in the Army, Navy, Air and SOF contexts. This section will now turn to the issue of the highest level of leader responsibility in the CF, exercising institutional leadership. As with much of what has been presented earlier, this discussion of developing effective institutional leaders is intended to extend current approaches and challenge some of the assumptions made.

A key idea incorporated in the *Conceptual Foundations* differentiation between Leading People and Leading the Institution is that leaders will progress from a focus on the first to a greater focus on the second as they assume higher rank. As a corollary, part of the reason for this differentiation is based on the understanding that the latter function requires the development of new perspectives and new capacities, in other words, that there is some form of mid-career development necessary in order to ensure that those who assume higher ranks are effective when they must shift their dominant focus from Leading People to Leading the Institution. The consideration of what must be developed and how to do so has been the focus of both formal studies and changes to senior level Professional Military Education (PME) particularly related to preparing selected Chief Warrant Officers/C1s for Formation and Command Chief Warrant Officer positions and selected Colonel/Captain (N) for General/Flag Officer (GO/FO) responsibilities or what is referred to in the CF as Development Period 5 (DP5). While

acknowledging the responsibilities to address the development of Command CWOs, this section will focus on the development of GO/FOs as Institutional Leaders.

The focus of recent senior officer (DP 5) studies⁶² has been on the preparation required to be fully effective at the Major-General or Lieutenant-General levels in exercising the full range of Institutional Leadership.⁶³ Work conducted has identified the developmental gaps that can occur when those who have been focused on the Force Generation or Force Employment roles move into breadth areas such as Security and Defence Policy, Force Development, Personnel or several of the Resource Management functions (material, financial, or information in particular). Recommendations to address the gaps that arise when senior officers move into breadth employment areas have focused on a combination of creating employment paths to provide experience at an earlier stage and focused developmental activities including mentoring. While these are seen as very valuable initiatives, they may be incomplete as this approach may incorporate two assumptions which may not hold true.

The first is that development follows a logical, linear, building block approach such that individuals can draw on previous experience or courses to prepare for the next stage. The reality is that some major facets of employment success in 'breadth' institutional leadership roles require completely new domains of capacities and competencies that individuals are unlikely to acquire through either previous experience or current professional development. While the current recommendations for better succession management and, in particular, the notion of ensuring earlier employment at the Maj to Col ranks in 'breadth' domains is of value, there are two additional facets needed to allow individuals to draw on this experience in preparation for more senior roles. The first is to provide better (or some) job-specific knowledge so that individuals do not encounter a 30-month learning curve for a 24-month posting.⁶⁴ The second, and deeper, level of preparatory development is to provide individuals with alternative models, frames of reference or decision making approaches that are better suited to the nature of the work they will do. As expanded below, the approaching of senior level staff jobs in higher headquarters with the same command decision making approach and the same command-related leadership style does not work, thus individuals require additional development to be successful in these roles. Together, better provision of job-specific knowledge and preparatory development would allow individuals to actually learn from their experiences.

As an extension to this discussion, the other taken for granted assumption that does not hold true is that all that has been acquired earlier is relevant and useful at the more senior level. As will be presented below, it is likely that some facets have to be unlearned in order to be optimally effective. The key reason for suggesting that institutional leadership requires not only new

⁶² The issues of improving senior officer development in the CF have been the subject of numerous studies since unification starting with the 1969 Rowley Report. See Wakelam for a summary.

⁶³ In addition to the implementation of the Colonel (Development Period 4) National Security Programme in 2008, the GO/FO Development Period 5 has been the subject of two recent reports, an initial definitional study by LGen (ret'd) M. Jeffery and a follow-on implementation proposal by LGens (ret'd) Jeffery & F. Sutherland.

⁶⁴ Having worked closely with a number of individuals posted into breadth jobs, many have subsequently commented that they finally understood the purpose of the job and the consequences of their decisions about 6 months to a year after they left the position. As this insight occurs when they are drinking from a new fire hose, the chances of deep learning occurring are not great. Again, see Simons' thesis for a pedagogical discussion of deep learning.

learning but unlearning pertains to the earlier presentation of command-related leadership versus leadership in senior staff roles. In that discussion, it was noted that command is a very specific function that confers on commanders extraordinary powers to make critical decisions and independently initiate action in the face of complex, dynamic, high risk situations. To do so, these individuals are supported by command enablers in the four domains of decision making, leadership, culture and management that allow those in command to narrow their focus in assessing, deciding, initiating, controlling and adjusting the action they deem necessary for the circumstances. As already discussed, many facets of these command enablers are not as strong (or even present) in the staff positions in higher headquarters thus leaders in staff roles must shift their approach in order to be effective in this environment. However, to do so, it is necessary that individuals cease engaging in activities or behaviours which, while successful in other contexts, would be seen as unproductive in the new environment.

To appreciate what must be ‘unlearned’, it is necessary to consider some key facets of what successful leaders actually acquire through exercising command. Success in command can generate:

- individual self worth (and self importance)
- confidence and (perceived) self efficacy in exercising independent command
- the ability to take calculated risks under specific conditions
- reputation and symbolic recognition
- a particular professional worldview and accompanying set of assumptions including an uncritical acceptance of those factors beyond the realm of command
- a dominant or preferred approach to:
 - o planning and analysis
 - o decision making
 - o leadership
 - o communications
 - o interactions with staff

While these characteristics are extremely important in exercising command, each can become a detriment when shifting to the domain of Institutional Leadership. These will be discussed under two broad categories: the first pertaining to the acquired ‘command and control’ leadership style and the second pertaining to the implicit academic discipline that frames leader decision making.

Personal Style and Career Derailers

Over the last 25 years, the US Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) has engaged in extensive research to understand why some of those who while highly successful at the mid-career levels failed so spectacularly at the most senior levels. A key finding is that some competencies and/or behaviours which were useful for success at earlier stages in a career can become ‘derailers’ that cause people to be less effective or fail when appointed to more senior levels.⁶⁵ Several of the

⁶⁵ A discussion of career derailers is contained in Barrett & Beeson’s comprehensive report on emerging leadership requirements and these facets are incorporated in the CCL Benchmarks® 360° assessment instrument. Similar dimensions are included in the US Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) Senior Leader Development Inventory (SLDI) which has also been used at Canadian Forces College. See Jacobs and Jaques for their extensive research in the military context.

career derailers identified can be linked to an inability of individuals to recognize that they needed to adopt new styles and, often, to the fact that they not only continued to use inappropriate approaches but expanded these further. A key facet pertains to personal arrogance and insensitivity to others which, to link to the previous list of what success in command can generate, can develop in those with very high opinions of themselves coupled with an overwhelming focus on getting the job done and a misplaced confidence that the leader really knows their troops.⁶⁶ A second common derailer pertains to acting independently (often referred as being a ‘Lone Ranger’) when the issues being addressed impact on the responsibilities of others. To a large extent, the shift from command in operational to senior staff in headquarters requires that C² also shifts from command and control to consultation and compromise. Unfortunately, some see this as a sign of weakness and retain a more confrontational approach when working horizontally in headquarters. The requirement for greater collegiality is a recurring theme in assessments of GO/FO effectiveness in NDHQ.

The third factor often identified as a career derailer is the use of a controlling leadership style. As illustrated in *Conceptual Foundations*⁶⁷, a useful means to differentiate leadership styles pertains to the degree of control the leader attempts to exercise over others. While a more directive (and transactional) style is appropriate in some circumstances, *Conceptual Foundations* points out that inappropriate use of control leads to resistance or, at best, minimal compliance. The entire literature on transformational approaches consistently demonstrates the benefits of more open, participatory approaches particularly at the senior leader level. As suggested in the earlier presentation of leadership as unbounded power, those who rely heavily on control techniques can often earn the labels of manipulator, enforcer or benevolent dictator. Together, the three factors of arrogance, independence and control can easily arise when those seen as hard charging, dynamic, results-focused tactical or operational leaders are advanced to higher ranks without recognizing where, how and why their leadership style must change. This domain of derailers alone has given rise to the entire business of 360° assessments and executive coaching.

The fourth potential derailer which is somewhat counter-intuitive in the military context is the perception of a failure to take necessary risks and what is occasionally referred to as the ‘paralysis of analysis’ that strikes some in senior roles. While often attributed to uncertainty, there are two related factors that can create this derailer which arise from the previous observation that the command decision enablers tend to be weak or confounded in higher headquarters. The first is the difficulty in assuming a portfolio without previous in-depth knowledge and experience. Some of those who have (correctly) advanced on the basis of their personal technical expertise in their own occupation will attempt to replicate being more knowledgeable than their subordinate staff in breadth roles hence will spend extraordinary effort (and time) ‘reading in’ on new topics. The second factor is that the speed with which issues, ideas and perspectives evolve is such that, by the time they are ‘up to speed’, the issue has either been ‘overtaken by events’ or has morphed into a different problem set. To paraphrase, the senior staff officers’ conceptual “OODA Loop”⁶⁸ is too slow for the dynamic cycle time of

⁶⁶ Facets of this concern are illustrated in the CF research on the overconfidence some Commanders have in estimating subordinates’ morale, cohesion and confidence in leaders. See Brown’s work for details.

⁶⁷ See the discussion on pages 63-73.

⁶⁸ Refers to John Boyd’s model of operational decision making: Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA). Again, the absence of the Command decision enablers requires that the individual develop their own approach to

learning to master complex issues. An important implication here is that the excellent administrative principle of span of control needs to be redefined for senior leaders in breadth roles, from a focus on the number of direct reports to the number of new portfolios the leader must address, thus the key here is conceptual span of control, not personnel.

The fifth derailer which is also counter-intuitive pertains to a reluctance to tackle difficult people issues. While those in command have often had to address individuals with shortcomings, problems doing so in senior staff roles can arise from a number of factors. One is that a common command remedy is to use the disciplinary system with those in higher headquarters discovering a surprising lack of relevant regulations, vague performance standards and limited disciplinary powers. A second is that commanders have relied on both leadership and cultural enablers, which serve to pinpoint exactly who is not performing to the requisite standard and to identify the corrective action needed. Again, many of these supports are not evident in higher headquarters (cohesive groups, experienced subordinate leaders, skilled teams, strong socialization, tight culture, etc) thus, while the leader is aware that something is amiss, it can be very difficult to identify exactly who or what is in need of correction. This facet can be particularly troublesome for the most professional of leaders who may (incorrectly) assume that all subordinates share the leader's value set when, in fact, these individuals are pursuing their own agendas and engaging in 'managing the boss'.⁶⁹ The third contributor is that some commanders have dealt with poor performers in operations by sending them elsewhere, a prerogative that is implicitly authorized given the primacy of operations. The two issues that result are that, on occasion, these poor performers end up in lower priority staff jobs (in higher headquarters) and the senior leader quickly learns there is nowhere else to which they can now be shuffled.

This discussion of leadership style and career derailers is in no way intended to suggest that those appointed to the most senior responsibilities in the CF are not striving to perform to a very high standard. It is intended, however, to highlight that these individuals very likely have to undergo some evolution in their leadership approach and that most are left to sort this out on their own. The obvious recommendation is that efforts to strengthen DP 5 development would be well served by considering ways to help those who were successful operational commanders to unlearn or relearn aspects of their leadership behaviours so as to optimize their effectiveness.

Intellectual Discipline and the Desperate Search for Certainty

The other major dimension that highlights both what is to be learned and what must be unlearned arises from the deeper issue of the "particular world view" and "preferred approaches to planning, analysis and decision making" which are also highlighted in the summary of what

identifying what is important and determining how to analyze options and implications as neither staff nor supporting mechanisms do so. Boyd's concepts were not formally published but are presented in several reviews and biographies; see in particular the presentation by Hammond.

⁶⁹ The likelihood of staff 'managing the boss' is significant when they perceive that: they know more of the file than the boss; they will be around after the boss has left (when the consequences of decisions become visible); and, when the boss has a reputation for making rapid decisions with little consultation. The net result is that staff can engage in 'shirking' by trying to delay acting on the superior's direction or amended the actions to suit what they believe is best/needed/easiest. A constant source of frustration for the most senior leaders (especially members of Armed Forces Council) is when they hear how staff members have chosen to re-interpret executive direction.

success in command can generate. These refer, of course, to how leaders make sense of the world around them which is generally related to how the profession functions. Although the military is referred to as a profession, there is surprisingly little information on key facets of this profession as compared to other well established ones such as medicine or law. Four key factors will be addressed in this discussion.

Professional Schools and Research. As highlighted in *Duty with Honour*, a key facet of a profession is that it applies a theory-based body of knowledge to resolve a particular social issue using specific practices that are regulated by the profession. The usual model for developing the expertise to do so is through a combination of formal education, supervised practice and certification of competence with the general rule of thumb that it can normally take 10 to 15 years to move from novice learner to mastery of the profession. In other professions, a central focus for this development is in specialized schools at major universities that provide initial certification education (leading to the ability to be licensed to practice) and subsequent graduate education (for those who assume responsibility for generating, evaluating and updating the theory-based body of knowledge and accepted professional practice. While there is a generalized comparison on the function of teaching between schools of medicine, dentistry, law etc and the CF PD system (particularly at Canadian Forces College), it is noteworthy that there is no analog for the equally important function of research within the professional school.⁷⁰ This omission is of importance for two reasons as research serves to both refresh the body of knowledge and also to develop the intellectual skills of inquiry. The fact that the profession of arms does not formally and visibly do so sends a signal to senior leaders that this function, thus this facet of thinking, is not needed or not valued.⁷¹

Preparatory General Education. A second factor of importance is that individuals entering the other professions most often start with a related general undergraduate education: in the natural sciences for those entering medicine; in politics or related social sciences for law; or, in philosophy or related humanities for theology/ministry. Thus, an additional factor highlighted for the profession of arms is the lack of information as to the related, initial general undergraduate education that would form the basis for subsequent professional development. A review of the history of the Royal Military College and sister academies in the United States would suggest that the implicit alignment is from the domain of engineering however the implementation of 'core curriculum' at RMC suggests that a broader basis covering the arts and sciences is preferred.⁷²

⁷⁰ This comment is, in no way, intended to minimize the considerable academic research conducted by University Teachers (UT) across RMC, CFC and CMR, however it is to note that this work is conducted to inform the UTs' academic discipline (history, mathematics, chemical engineering, etc) and not the 'professional' school of military thinking.

⁷¹ A portion of those who complete the two major programmes at CFC do undertake some form of directed research however this is almost universally seen as being driven by degree requirements rather than professional needs. As cogently presented in his PhD thesis, Simons' clearly illustrates the problems created when senior PME programmes give greater emphasis to the exchange value of earning a degree (the tick in the box) at the expense of the practical value of enhancing one's professional expertise.

⁷² In comparison to civilian university programmes, the core curriculum at RMC requires that Arts students take a significant number of courses in the maths and sciences and that Science and Engineering students take a significant number of courses across the Arts. See the Board of Governors (Withers) Report for the origins of the curriculum changes.

Demonstrating Professional Competence. The third facet of moving from the practitioner to mastery of other professions is one similar to all other graduate degrees, specifically demonstrating a comprehensive understanding of the professional domain. The purpose of academic graduate education is to achieve three, inter-related objectives. The first is to acquire sufficient depth knowledge of the factual information that is considered to represent the core content of the particular discipline. The second is to understand the combination of ontology, epistemology and methodology that, together, define how knowledge is generated and integrated into the discipline.⁷³ The third is to demonstrate the capacity to draw on both content and methods to either critique or expand existing knowledge (at the Master's level) or to independently create new knowledge (at the PhD level). A review of the CF Professional Development System (CFPDS) and, in particular, the Officer and NCM General Specifications (OGS, NCMGS) which guide PD programmes reveals extensive listings of specific topics to be addressed but surprisingly little integrated theory or models even at the level of senior undergraduate courses and virtually no articulation of the profession's methods for framing problems nor any specification as to the means to be used to assess the capacities to critique existing knowledge or create new understandings. Thus, this factor highlights the lack of information for the profession of arms as to the discipline to be mastered.

Wicked Problems. A partial answer as to what the profession's discipline might be (hence what institutional leaders need to master) comes from the idea that a key facet of a profession is that it holds special responsibilities to society to provide a valued social good or to resolve a particular social issue. Although the CF prefers the US Services mantra of fighting and winning the nation's wars, the reality is that Canada (and the US) will continue to use military capacities to address and resolve a range of issues under the broad umbrella of physical and human security.⁷⁴ As highlighted in the seminal work by Rittel and Webber, the entire domain of resolving complex social problems should be viewed as 'wicked' rather than 'tame' problems which can not be addressed through traditional, linear analyses.⁷⁵ Noting that achieving security in Afghanistan represents a classic example,⁷⁶ key characteristics of wicked problems include that they are difficult to define, have many inter-dependencies and causes, have neither pre-determined solution sets nor clear stopping rules, involve changing social behaviour, that solving one wicked problem requires addressing other wicked problems, and that solutions often lead to unforeseen consequences. Thus, the perspectives on how one addresses wicked problems, or even seeks to understand what the problems are, suggests a plausible explanation of the domains

⁷³ To briefly summarize the key ideas: ontology has to do with assumptions about how the world and knowledge is organized and informs what questions researcher think can be researched; epistemology has to do with assumptions and beliefs about how one can understand the world and the nature of human knowledge and informs what researchers believe they can know about the world; and methodology pertains to the tools and techniques used to examine the world hence is derived from particular ontological and epistemological positions to inform how researcher to go about acquiring knowledge. A challenge is that many will apply a set of methods (the Operational Planning Process or Systemic Operational Design as two military examples) to answer 'real world' questions without realizing that they are working from a particular set of assumptions about how the 'world' works or how one understands 'this' world.

⁷⁴ See Christie's integrated review of how the concept of human security has informed academic and policy communities.

⁷⁵ Rittel and Webber's original 1973 work is still relevant today; for a recent comprehensive treatment for public policy, see the Australian Public Service Commission report.

⁷⁶ To understand the complexities of the issues to be resolved, see the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

of knowledge that senior leaders must master (the content), the types of analytical skills and reasoning they must engage in (the methods) and the ways in which they critique or create the profession's body of knowledge.

Based on these four factors, a review of the foci of DP 1 through DP 5 PD reveals that the implicit model is actually one of continued shifting across disciplines. Entry level formation⁷⁷ (DP 1 & 2 for Officers, DPs 1-3 for NCMs) is based on engineering and the assumptions that one is to focus on learning how to apply known procedures to address the profession's (tactical) issues. Mid-level Officer (DP 3) and senior NCM (DP 4 & 5) formation is based on the natural sciences and the assumption that, at this level, one must learn how to develop general (operational) plans of action and update existing (tactical) procedures through some form of structured analysis (the Operational Planning Process dominates). Senior level Officer (DP 4 & 5) and the current Executive Leader Programme for appointed CWOs are based on the liberal arts with the assumption that, at the most senior level, one must learn how to analyze complex issues to establish (strategic) guidance which, in turn, informs operational planning. Thus, Arts teaches one how to ask the right questions (the strategic focus), the Natural Sciences teaches one how to answer these questions the right way (the operational focus) and Engineering teaches one how to apply the answers the right way (the tactical focus).

This simplified presentation suggests that the challenge for the military is that those who reach the highest levels of professional functioning must, in fact, transition across three fundamentally different academic disciplines. Particularly for the development of Institutional Leaders as 'Strategic Artists'⁷⁸, the fact that they (intellectually) start in the domain of engineering means that they must necessarily shift disciplines twice; once when achieving the de facto Masters in Military Science and again when achieving the profession's equivalent of a PhD in Military Philosophy. To return to the idea of a discipline as comprised of content courses, acquired methodologies and the capacity to critique (at the Master's level) or create (at PhD), the absence of either methods courses or integrative research that tests theory through approved methods leads to significant challenges for many undergoing senior level PME.⁷⁹ The dichotomy between what is expected and what individuals are able to achieve is illustrated by the continued calls in PD guidance for the development of creativity, agility, and strategic thinking, on the one hand, and the cries from students for certainty, clarity and predictability, on the other.

A further complication in addressing this challenge is that the profession of arms is, first, subdivided into different foci as reflected in the structure of individual occupations (MOCs) and environments and, second, is nested within a larger set of domains as a sub-set of government. Thus, officers have to constantly expand the scope of their knowledge from own occupation to own environment to CF to defence to security to government, and concurrently have to develop the deeper insights and understandings to move from applying answers the right way to asking

⁷⁷ The reference to formation is best understood in the meaning of the word in French and is intended to suggest the forming of the whole person thus goes beyond the current CF focus of training and education to include socialization.

⁷⁸ As per the title of Murray Simons' doctoral analysis of senior officer PME in New Zealand.

⁷⁹ A process I have referred to on occasion as resulting in the sound of individuals shifting mental gears without the aid of a clutch.

the relevant complex questions. Together, these suggest a significant, incremental step in learning for each rank for OCdt to LGen as depicted below.

Level	Focus	Purpose	MOC	ENV	CF	Def	Sec	Gov't
Novice	Facts	Orientation	OCdt	Lt	Capt	Maj	LCol	Col
Apprentice	Models	Application	Lt	Capt	Maj	LCol	Col	BGen
Journeyman	Theories	Integrating	Capt	Maj	LCol	Col	BGen	MGen
Mastery	Epistemology	Creating	Maj	LCol	Col	BGen	MGen	LGen

Table 3: Military Rank and the Requisite Scope of Learning

Hidden Curriculum and Socialization. The final comment on the development of effective institutional leaders is drawn from Simons' doctoral study of the NZ Command and Staff Course, referred to earlier. He points out that a key concept in the academic literature for education is the recognition that students who attend intensive, lengthy courses acquire far more knowledge, insights and understandings than are described in the formal syllabus and official curriculum. One part of this hidden learning is called the curriculum shadow, referring to the unintended learning that occurs as a result of what the curriculum does or does not cover and how it is taught and assessed. In the first instance, the subjects not covered send a signal that these ideas (cross-cultural competence, social causes of unrest in developing nations, etc) are not important. The methods of instruction and assessment create the implicit philosophy of what is to be achieved; as I have suggested, the message communicated around JCSP is to get the tick in the box (hence the constant search for the DS solution) while the philosophy around NSP is to avoid embarrassing anybody (hence the reluctance to ask penetrating questions).

Beyond this shadow, the other facets of the hidden curriculum include learning how to learn (back to acquiring the discipline's methods), learning the game (how to succeed in the course thus determining the path of least resistance to success), learning to be an expert (specifically developing confidence in one's own ability to sift through contradictory information) and learning the profession (fundamentally knitting together the intellectual learning objectives - what one knows; the normative, conduct objectives - how one behaves; and the socialization objectives - how one sees themselves and their roles in the profession). The key point illustrated in the Simons study is that more learning occurred outside of the formal curriculum than through it, yet the College was not aware of this learning and makes little effort to 'shape' what occurs.

In summary, the primary implication of this discussion is to suggest that, despite decades of studies on senior officer professional development and extensive work on the design and delivery of programmes, the CF has yet to define the discipline that underpins professional knowledge or, to be more precise, the intellectual foundation that is required to identify and address the unique social problems that the profession is charged with addressing. The significant challenge identified is that individuals have to transit across all three major faculties of engineering, sciences and the arts while also expanding their focus from mastery of the military arena (at Col) to defence (BGen) to the broader domains of security (MGen) and the full spectrum of government objectives (LGen). These concurrent intellectual expansions make it

even more important that they be provided with the requisite transitional education on the new methods to be adopted in framing and answering key questions.

To return to the notion of unlearning and the complexities of wicked problems, the key conclusion is that those moving to the most senior staff roles need to also move away from predominant reliance on engineering models based on the assumptions of a knowable, definable, programmable world to adopting philosophical models that acknowledge that one rarely gets the question right, let alone determines the answers with absolute certainty.⁸⁰ The final commentary presented suggests that, in assisting senior leaders to develop these capacities, it is insufficient to rely only on the intended produce of structured learning and the accidents of experience with the need to also ‘shape’ understanding by attending to hidden curricula and socialization.

Identifying Institutional Leader Competencies

The final topic to be presented under the development of effective institutional leaders pertains to the identification of leader competencies. Previous work by CFLI has led to the development of a broad framework of five capacities (expertise, cognitive, social, change and professional ideology). This framework was used in the recent Jeffery DP 5 studies with generalized competency gaps identified at the GO/FO DP5 level. As already indicated, this study also identified six broad streams of employment: the two primary ones of Force Generation and Force Employment and the four secondary/breadth streams of: Policy, Force Development, Personnel, and Resource Management and Acquisition. A key recommendation was that the CF should develop a statement of requirement for GO/FO competencies.

This discussion will provide some initial ideas on these competencies and, in particular, will suggest a set of broadly differentiated roles with certain specific areas of competence required. Thus, in comparison to virtually all CF analyses of senior level PME prior to the Jeffery study, the approach presented builds on the notion of ‘streams’ to suggest that there are significant differences across various roles hence that the CF model of ‘generalist’ development for DP 5 should be amended to focus on development of domain-specific, requisite competence.⁸¹

While the identification of four secondary streams for senior officers based on the type of employment is of value, it is considered that a slightly different model can be developed by returning to the CF Effectiveness framework and the underlying work by Quinn on Competing Values. Quinn identifies four quadrants using the two vectors of: internal vs external focus and flexibility vs control. Thus, the Mission Success quadrant foci are external and control, Internal Integration quadrant foci are internal and control, Member Well-being are internal and flexibility; and External Adaptability are external and flexible. Each quadrant can be used to identify different responsibilities of institutional leaders and, importantly, different jobs in higher/strategic headquarters. Expanded below, the Mission Success role is the Force

⁸⁰ Interestingly, this was a point made by LGen (ret’d) Kinsman in the Sharpe and English ‘Decade of Darkness’ report.

⁸¹ The key differentiation inferred is that development of generalists leads to identification of the common knowledge shared across the range of employment while the domain specific approach would identify significantly different sets of competencies. Thus, one approach looks for commonalities, the other for divergences with significant differences in what is then taught or assessed in PD programmes.

Commander; the Internal Integration role is the Systems Manager; the Member Well-Being role is the Steward of the Profession; and, the External Adaptability role is the National Security Professional.

Force Commander. The focus of this role is achieving assigned military (or defence or security) objectives on the ground and it is the default role for which any military will prepare its senior officers. To be effective, the Force Commander must make sense of the broader environment in which the military is operating (the external focus) but then translate this into structure (commander's guidance) so that subordinates can achieve the mission (the control focus). As already indicated, the Force Commander can concentrate on the mission as others (the Systems Managers and National Security Professionals) can attend to their domains of responsibility. The earlier discussion of command highlighted the core competencies that are required including rational decision making, rapid data processing, compartmentalization, and short time horizons. To a large extent, Force Commanders deal with complicated problems (involving multiple variables) rather than complex ones (involving multiple unknowns)⁸² with the implication that the Force Commander can continue to relying on either the science or engineering models, as the task here is primarily focused on answering strategic questions the right way and ensuring subordinates apply these answers the right way.

Systems Manager. In this role, senior leaders are charged with ensuring that complex components of the defence infrastructure (people, equipment, finance, infrastructure, etc) are working in a coordinated manner to ensure efficient generation of supporting defence capabilities. Of importance, given the current organization of DND and the CF, it is considered that there are two groups of Systems Managers: function specific (most of the Associate Deputy Ministers and CMP) and environment specific (the Environmental Chiefs of Staff).⁸³ To carry out this function, leaders must align the specific system (or system of systems) to set the conditions for the Force Commander to achieve mission success by monitoring systems requirements and outcomes in the context of government regulations (the internal focus) and adjusting system's parameters such as governing policies, approved processes, allocated resources, etc. (the control focus).

It should be noted that the internal focus includes the Federal Government thus amongst other competencies, this domain gives an emphasis to not only understanding the machinery of government but the challenge identified in the introduction of maintaining a values-based profession when constrained by an efficiency-focused bureaucracy. This, in turn, leads to the requirement to ask the kinds of questions that will illuminate the tensions between public policy, bureaucratic efficiency and professional effectiveness with a keen appreciation of how government decisions are perceived by the third and fourth estates (citizens and the mass communication media). Thus, in addition to the earlier comment that Systems Managers need systems-specific knowledge (e.g., Human Resource Management for CMP), they require a broader intellectual basis than the Force Commander which should be drawn from the liberal arts and public administration to understand the questions that they will be asked by government and

⁸² Although not always recognized by senior military officers, it is actually political leaders who deal with the unknowns when engaging in the process of setting the grand strategy.

⁸³ Noting that the 'super' systems manager is the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.

the strategic questions that they should be asking along with the leader preparation of implementing strategic change as illustrated in the work of Kotter et al.

National Security Professional. As best characterized by the Director General International Security Policy (DGISP) but also the Chief of the Defence Staff, Chief of Defence Intelligence and the senior officers employed in multi-national strategic headquarters such as NATO or in Defence Liaison roles such as CDLS Washington, this role is focused on positioning defence to contribute to broad government objectives by understanding the expectations and perspectives of governments and international bodies such as the UN, NATO, OAS etc (the external focus) and presenting defence capabilities, military capacities and professional views in terms that other will understand (the focus on flexibility).

As highlighted in DGISP's duties to manage bilateral and multi-lateral defence and international security relations, this role generates a strong requirement for competence in networking, collaboration and the capacity to understanding another's point of view without taking their point of view. As with the overlap in international diplomacy and the requirement for Foreign Service Officers to be experts in 'interpretive dance', the key intellectual framework required here is to be able to decipher complex coded language and signals and postures, to effectively communicate multiple messages to multiple audiences, to find common ground amongst competing agendas, and to avoid being manoeuvred into uncomfortable or untenable positions.⁸⁴ Again, in addition to portfolio specific knowledge, the intellectual basis for this role is found in the liberal arts including the domains of international relations and, increasingly, anthropology particularly given that disciplines take care not to impose their own cultural frame of reference on others.

Steward of the Profession. A component of this function is a generalized role with all senior leaders responsible for some aspects of the effective functioning of the profession, including aligning culture to ethos and maintaining the prestige and status of the profession. There is, however, one senior role that is considered to be primarily focused in this domain which is Chief of Force Development. To return to the earlier discussion of the profession's theory-based body of knowledge and how this evolves over time, CFD has the de facto responsibility for leading this function. Although currently presented in the business-speak terms, intellectually, the concepts of knowledge management, visioning, futures analysis, concept development and blessing of doctrine are all central components of the academic processes found in other professions' schools and associated academic fora, such as thesis defences, professional journals and conferences where the profession/discipline debates and accepts new ideas and banishes those deemed to be outdated or incorrect.

This is the core function of stewarding the profession's body of knowledge which is supposed to underpin all aspects of professional effectiveness. Given current organizational structures, there are, again, elements of the (intellectual) Steward of the Profession functions (futures, concepts, doctrine) found in the three Environmental Chiefs of Staff and the CMP where key subsets of the profession's body of knowledge related to generating land, sea and air power as well as effective military personnel are embedded. Of importance, this role requires the greatest level of abstract

⁸⁴ To use a gaming analogy that is incorporated into Political Science discourse, it is about learning how to play the game of Go, not how to play Chess.

thinking and capacity to step outside of the existing structures (concepts, doctrine, established ‘truths’) to critically analyze the professional body of knowledge and to ensure that the fundamental key questions are raised. Thus, the intellectual basis for this role is found in philosophy.

In summary, this discussion of the differing roles of institutional leaders and the requisite intellectual competencies has highlighted the range of domain-specific knowledge across the span of GO/FO employment as well as the differing academic disciplines which provide the most relevant frameworks for both the sense making and decision making functions within each role. Beyond illustrating some important differences, a key implication of this presentation is the suggestion that the one role for which the military will automatically ensure senior leaders are prepared, that of achieving mission success as a Force Commander, is the sole one in which the dominant intellectual model of the (operational level) sciences (answering complicated questions) still applies. The remaining roles all require a significant intellectual shift to the arts-based methodologies of learning to ask the right questions in order to understand complex contexts.

The earlier suggestion that the CF adopt a domain-specific approach to developing Institutional Leaders is illustrated through the presentation of three different intellectual foci for the other roles: Public Administration for the Systems Managers, International Relations and Anthropology for the National Security Professionals, and Philosophy for the Stewards of the Profession. The processes to grow ‘strategic security artists’ from ‘operational military scientists’ should be understood to be a significant undertaking and, as stated earlier, while employment in breadth domains at earlier ranks, as well as traditional transitional PD activities such as symposia and mentoring, are valuable expansions to the existing approach, this discussion would suggest that much more is needed to ensure that those appointed to the most senior ranks can and will optimize their effectiveness in their assigned roles.

6. THE MEASUREMENT OF LEADERSHIP

While much of the previous discussion has focused on defining and developing effective leaders, the final topic to be addressed in this consideration of understanding leadership in the Canadian military context pertains to the issue of measuring leadership. As will be developed, there are several important reasons to consider how leadership is measured including that this, in turn, informs how leadership is understood. As with the previous sections, this portion is also based on the perspective that, while the existing approaches to measurement have validity, there likely is more to leadership, hence, more to leadership measurement than has been identified previously.

Critiquing Leadership Measurement

A central issue of the critique offered is that, as with the broader academic and business literatures, leadership is a complex construct. Particularly in the CF, it can refer to a function (part of one’s job duties), a process (what one does), a role (being a leader) or even an institutional artifact (the invisible hand of indirect leadership). Further, leadership can be

exercised by an individual (often through dyadic or small group exchanges), by a small leadership team (the joint efforts of several direct leaders and their supervisors)⁸⁵ or by an entire cadre (often the collective activities of all of the most senior leaders across an organization).

Additionally, the function of leadership is often conflated with other responsibilities. Particularly in the military context, leadership is seen as subsuming management and, in turn, is often subsumed under command: all good commanders have to exercise effective leadership; all good military leaders must attend to managerial functions. Finally, to really make things convoluted, some would argue that leadership is actually a ‘characteristics of followers’, not the individual in the supervisory position.⁸⁶ As illustrated in many Aboriginal / indigenous cultures, leadership can be seen as conferred on one by others, thus it is meaningless to measure a ‘leader’s’ capacities, rather, it is more important to measure how and why the group chose to anoint someone as a leader.

The key implication is that what one measures depends entirely on how one views the construct. Most of the literature and existing measures ascribe leadership to the individual not the small team or larger cadre let alone considering that it might reside solely in the eyes of those who chose to follow. Further, most measures are based on the view of leadership as either a job function or a process but ignore the concept of leader as a role to be played or as an artifact that is constructed through institutional processes. Finally, very few have attempted to address the overlaps between how leadership, management and command are either defined or measured.

As an extension and to move into another of the confounds, the reference to measurement per se is problematic as it (typically) reflects both an organization-centric and psychometric view. The first key assumption here is that it is the organization that will define, assess and act on measures of leadership with two key foci. One focus is on the direct uses of leadership measures by the organization, thus referring to the decisions taken by those in authority based on assessments of a candidate’s leadership. The four key domains in most organizations are related to placement, development, succession management and employment termination. In the military context, these measures and the resultant decisions are visible in: assessments at recruiting centres, professional development course reports, annual performance appraisals and supervisors’ corrective feedback or, when needed, career actions.

The second focus is on the indirect use of leadership measures which are predominantly seen as generated for use by the individual in self-growth or self-development. As represented by 360° (also identified as 360-degree, or just 360) assessments and the broader set of counseling functions embedded in mentoring and coaching, these assessments are not usually seen as formal measures per se nor is their use seen as being for organizational decision making. Yet they really are, in both cases. Again, it is the organization or those in supervisory positions acting on behalf of the organization who typically decide what types of 360° measures to use or which sets of behaviours to focus on when engaged in mentoring or coaching and, although not stated, the

⁸⁵ The small unit-level leadership team is clearly illustrated in the Navy context with CO, XO & Coxn and in the Army context with CO, DCO & RSM.

⁸⁶ There is a growing body of critical literature on leadership particularly in Europe. For various perspectives, amongst others, see Alvesson & Sveningon; Chemers; and Rost.

purpose is still to serve organizational goals – assisting the individual to enhance their leadership capacity and leader performance for the benefit of the organization.

The other critique mentioned is that the approach taken to assessing leadership is almost exclusively defined within the psychometric methodologies of Industrial Psychology or Organizational Behaviour.⁸⁷ Reflective of their origin in the natural sciences, the focus of these measures is to ensure that the results generated are consistent, objective and reliable. A key underlying assumption here is that there is a factual and verifiable ‘object’ to be measured. The logic is that a ‘true’ measure is possible; the challenge is just to figure out how to correct for all the ‘error’ that is introduced when trying to measure facets of human beings. The related corollary is that the best measurement devices will be those that will generate the same readings regardless of who uses them. In both cases, the general approach is to first break the complex construct (leadership) down into component parts that can be measured as variables and then to ‘isolate’ each of the variables to measure them independently.

To extend the previous comments that what one measures depends on how the construct of leadership is understood,⁸⁸ recognition that it is also done through an organization-centric, psychometric approach leads to further confounds. Of importance, although it is rarely acknowledged, the taken-for-granted assumptions of this approach serve to actually define the construct rather than the other way round. The assumption that there is a ‘real measure’ of leadership significantly pre-determines what is or can be measured which, in turn, significantly defines how we understand the construct.⁸⁹ Additionally, the legal context in which organizations make career decisions has led to a further restriction in how leadership is understood and measured. In order to be legally defensible, organizations have had to parse out what is accepted as job-related from what is not and, of those that are deemed *bone fide* occupational requirements, to use only those measures that meet the scientific criteria of reliability and validity (thus gone are the good old days of phrenology).

The key conclusion from this critique of leader measurement is that we have very likely adopted a narrow perspective that is: overly focused on the individual as leader; defined by the organization; related solely to work performance; and heavily constrained due to a person-specific psychometric approach. The net result is that leader measurement is almost exclusively seen as fitting into an input-process-output model. The typical inputs that are measured tend to be the individual prerequisites of job-specific expertise and general competencies that meet the criteria of legal defensibility. The process components are those skills needed to draw on these prerequisites to affect leadership, thus tend to cover internal capacities (decision making, emotional sensitivity, etc) and external behaviours (communication skills, interpersonal skills, etc). Finally the output measures (when used) can cover both primary and secondary consequences of effective leadership, thus ranging from level and focus of effort, workplace norms and compliance with rules to the social environment (morale and cohesion) and

⁸⁷ Noting that this discussion is based on the academic literature and practices in the North American context. In Europe, leadership is based more on sociological than psychological approaches.

⁸⁸ Or more correctly, to use the sociological perspective, how leadership is constructed. See Ford et al for a thorough presentation.

⁸⁹ Thus, suggesting a disconnect amongst the epistemology, ontology and methodology as commonly applied to leadership. See Carroll et al for a discussion.

professional climate (ethics, moral decision making, military ethos) to generalized subordinate/worker productivity, satisfaction, retention and enhanced job-related capacities.

There are two major shortcomings of this overall approach to understanding and measuring leadership. The first is that, although it is fully recognized that leadership is, conceptually, a subset of social influence, thus best viewed as an artifact of dynamic social exchanges, this input-process-output model tends to minimize these social aspects and presents an unbalanced perspective that, quite likely, serves to incorrectly define leadership and inappropriately attribute social outcomes to the individual as leader.⁹⁰ The second is that this focus on the processes of leadership (what one does) is at the expense of considering the purpose of leadership (how one knows they are doing the right thing or, more specifically, how a leader sorts through the fog and confusion of military life to decide what to focus on when). It is interesting that the literature on leadership consistently incorporates a taken-for-granted assumption that the leaders will always know the purpose of leadership and really only have to learn the processes needed to enact intended effects. As will be developed, this general approach is inappropriate and inadequate if we want to say that we have truly measured military leadership.

An excellent illustration of the overall approach to measuring military leadership is the US Army Research Institute (ARI) research note by Zaccaro, Klimoski et al entitled “Developing a Tool Kit for the Assessment of Army Leadership Processes and Outcomes”. As with much of the ARI work on leadership, it is detailed, academically rigorous and directly relevant to the military. Yet, as indicated in the title reference to Processes and Outcomes, it serves as a clear illustration of the narrow perspective taken in understanding and measuring leadership.

This critique of measuring leadership is not to say that what has been done in the past has been wrong. The constructs and measures incorporated in military selection, training, performance appraisal and promotion systems do have merit and utility. However, as was conveyed to CF members when *Conceptual Foundations* and related documents were released, there is likely more to measuring leadership in the military than has been understood to date. The first general comment offered is that it is crucial that measures be aligned with the reason for collecting the assessment: measures need to be differentiated when used for *ab initio* selection and initial development⁹¹ versus for subsequent job placement or advanced development versus for predicting team effectiveness versus conducting succession management. The second comment is based on the notion that what gets measured does matter.⁹² What an organization chooses to measure – and, importantly, what is not measured - sends very strong signals to all about what is valued. Significant disconnects arise when the company slogan trumpets one value but then does not measure whether or not it is practiced.

⁹⁰ For a recent discussion, see Karp & Helgo.

⁹¹ Noting that the military is one of the very few organizations that does *ab initio* (from the beginning) leader selection and development. The vast majority of organizations, hence the vast majority of leadership measures assume that the individual has demonstrated a threshold level of leadership capacity and that the focus is to build on what they already have. The Israel Defense Forces stand out as one of the few militaries that apply the latter model by insisting that all leaders start as followers and by incorporating peer assessments in selecting those from the ranks to become officers.

⁹² The business world axiom is actually ‘what gets measured gets done’ but the connotation here is deeper.

Further, it must be taken as a given that the vast majority of those in, or aspiring to, leadership positions will seek to present to the organization those facets that are deemed of importance. As the literature on hidden learning illuminates, in addition to acquiring the job knowledges and job skills that the organization has decided are important, people also learn other, often unintended, lessons as they are also engaged in learning the rules, learning the profession, learning the game and learning to learn.⁹³ Especially in the military, the measures per se (not the results or decisions taken) regarding leader capacity and leadership effects should be recognized as having a strong influence on how individuals understand and practice leadership. Particular consideration should be given to the unintended consequences of concentrating on certain facets or omitting others.

Expanding the Measurement Framework

It was stated in the introduction that the common approach to leadership measurement uses the input-process-output format with a strong emphasis on standardized psychometric tools. The types of measures currently used (often self-report questionnaires) are primarily based on the taken-for-granted assumption that leadership is a job function thus, as with all other job duties, is best assessed by determining the prerequisite job-relevant knowledges, skills, abilities and other attributes (KSAOs) which the organization has determined are needed to perform the leadership function (the P-E Fit approach). One of the key implications of the preceding discussions particularly embedded within the two frameworks of unbounded power and service differences is that leadership is best seen as a role to be played, not a task to be performed. To extend the analogy of theatre and the previous reference to Image-Role Match, the key implication is that, to assess the degree of match (or mismatch), it is necessary to assess how leaders see their role and what image they are seeking to project, as well as how those influenced (the audience) perceive both the role and the image.

As clearly illustrated in the GLOBE research, the primary reason why leaders are not able to influence others exists when there is a perceived gap by those influenced between the role they expect of the leader and the image they see presented. For example, those who expect their leaders to be confident, decisive and directive will perceive a leader as weak if that individual engages in participative approaches, or those who expect leaders to engage in self-protective leadership (face-saving to avoid embarrassing self or others) will perceive leaders to be insensitive if they apply 'continuous learning' principles and engage in open discussion of own or team weaknesses or areas for improvement.

This consideration of image and role is central to the growing literature on leadership as identity.⁹⁴ Recognizing that leadership is a role to be assumed and an identity to be developed leads to two primary implications for measurement. The first is that measurement must capture how the individual sees themselves as a leader. The measurement of distal or even proximal

⁹³ See Simons' thesis for an excellent analysis of hidden learning in the context military professional development.

⁹⁴ Again see British authors such as Ford et al, New Zealand scholars such as Carroll et al, and Swedish writers such as Alvesson & Sveningsson.

dimensions⁹⁵ is only useful to assess latent leadership capacity. The key recommendation made is that the critical facet pertains to the self-insight and personal understanding that the individuals have of themselves as leader. Thus, rather than using standardized state or trait measures or assessments of individual competencies, the most important measures pertain to capturing leader identity. As suggested in the presentation of unbounded power, the key issues to be assessed pertain to: the role the individual sees themselves playing; their understanding of their sources of influence power along with their knowledge of when and how to draw on different types of power; their stage in developing leader referents; and, the degree to which their intentions are aligned with institutional goals. The facet of the role to be played is further illustrated in the discussion of service differences as well as the earlier discussion of the differences when leadership is embedded with the exercise of command and when it is not.

The second implication is that to predict leader effectiveness rather than assess leader capacity, it is necessary to also assess how the leader is perceived by those to be influenced. Importantly, as leadership can be omni-directional (up, out and across as well as down and in), it is critical that these assessments incorporate the multiple views of all of those subject to leader influence, not just those who report to the leader.⁹⁶ This concept is incorporated in the 360° assessment process through ratings by superiors, peers and subordinates, as well as inferred in the balanced scorecard philosophy which expands the inputs to include external perspectives.

Thus, the two primary recommendations for expanding the measurement of leader capacity and leader effectiveness are to incorporate assessments of self-insight and to examine the degree of Identity-Role Match between the identity that the leader has assumed and the role expected to be displayed by others. There are many methods to access self-insight and, while standardized measures of facets such as mindfulness may be of use, the most fruitful will be those that are based on ethnography to develop a ‘thick description’ of how individuals see themselves. Beyond the perspectives on power, stages, referents and alignment and the view of the role to be played, it is considered that these types of measures should seek to tap into the conflicting dualities that the most effective leaders must grapple with, including being supremely confident in decisions while always doubting that they have made the right choice and knowing one’s subordinates extremely well while acknowledging that the leader will never know the subordinates.

While it is acknowledged that engaging in full ethnography may be a step too far for the military, there are some interim measures that can be taken to enhance self-insight and facilitate comparisons of own image versus expected role. To a large extent, the growing emphasis on mentoring and coaching as long-term processes for facilitating leader development provide an excellent methodology. These can be augmented through the use of personal sources of reflection such as journaling and writing statements of leadership (not command) philosophy which are used at some military Command and Staff colleges.

⁹⁵ As indicated in the introduction, the distal variables tend to cover generalized individual facets in the cognitive and affective domains along with broad developmental indicators such as education and experience; proximal variables tend to cover job specific knowledges and leader-specific skills.

⁹⁶ Noting, of course, that the CF does not even include subordinate assessments of leader effect, but rather privileges a leader’s superiors as those who can best assess leader effectiveness.

The most direct application of the ideas presented would be to draw on the 360° assessment process currently being used at the Canadian Forces College. It should be noted, however, that the standard approach to 360°s is really a one-dimensional measurement. It does incorporate multiple raters but the focus is almost always on leader behaviours or the inferences made from leader actions. Further, while *Conceptual Foundations* does provide a context-specific, value-laden understanding of effective leadership in the Canadian Forces, it is still a generalized approach with limited differentiation between operational and support roles or across operational environments. Thus, while it is proposed that the first layer or level of leader assessment should be at level of “CF Common” based on general leader responsibilities, a more complete, multi-dimensional perspective could be developed by creating two additional 360° instruments. The first would capture the facets of leadership as unbounded power to tap into the purpose of leadership with the intent to develop an assessment of ‘balanced leader effectiveness’ to parallel the CAR Model balanced command envelope. The second would draw on the nature of leadership as presented in the discussion of service differences.

Thus, it is proposed that three different instruments should be created: one based on leader responsibilities, a second to assess leader roles and a third to examine leader foci.

Leader Responsibilities. The following Table provides a summary of potential scales that could be generated based on the framework of leader responsibilities contained in *Conceptual Foundations*⁹⁷ by using the broad differentiation between Leading People and Leading the Institution, and the five Leader Effectiveness categories of: Mission Success, Internal Integration, Member Well-being, External Adaptability, and Military Ethos, along with a sixth facet for Future Leadership.

For each of the six overall dimensions, this table provides a label for the required leadership approach (assertive leadership for mission success, accountable leadership for internal integration, etc) and further subdivides these into a focus for Leading People and Leading the Institution (assertive leadership under Leading People is results-focused while under Leading the Institution is strategic direction).

The two proposed scales under Future Leadership are intended to tap into the central concepts presented earlier that leader development is best seen as related to developing a leader identity through self insight and long term growth. Self insight is key for developing the flexibility to shift leader role from one context to the next, growth is key for increasing one’s sources of power and, in particular, ‘unlearning’ some of the facets of effective leadership at the tactical level when moving to the strategic domain. As is typical of a 360° debrief, discussion of these items would likely revolve around assisting the individual to understand why and how certain behaviours are interpreted by others.

⁹⁷ Specifically, Table 4.1.

Leading People	Leading the Institution
Assertive leadership	
Results focus	Strategic direction
Accountable leadership	
Structure and accountability	Systems alignment
Supportive leadership	
Member motivation	Workplace practices
Adaptive leadership	
Creativity and innovation	Implementing Change
Professional leadership	
Ethics and values	Aligning Culture
Future leadership	
Self insight	Self growth

Table 4: Leading People & Leading the Institution: Leader Responsibilities & Approaches

Leader Roles. The second 360° proposed would draw on the labels presented in the discussion of leadership as unbounded power to compare how the individual, superiors, peers and subordinates see the role that the individual is projecting. Rather than following the standard practice of averaging all scores from each group of raters, this instrument would provide a classification from each rater under one of the 24 labels assigned thus providing comparisons of the general levels of perceived power, the assumed stage of development and the inferred degree of alignment. Discussion of these results would likely involve an understanding of the range of roles being perceived by others and the degree of similarity with the role that the leader believes is being enacted.

Leader Foci. The third 360° instrument would tap into the four operational service environments plus the earlier discussion the differentiation between leadership in operations versus leadership in supporting, staff roles in order to assess both the focus of leadership and the approach used. The five foci would be: systems performance, improvisation, shifting identities, excellence, and

integrative with the five approaches as: monitoring, preparatory, social, adaptive and open.⁹⁸ As illustrated in the discussion of service (culture) differences, the nine GLOBE dimensions could be incorporated to provide useful nuance in comparing the style displayed by the leader and that expected by others.

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction, leadership is an essential facet of the military, thus leader assessment and development is given significant attention. This paper has suggested, however, that the current approach to understanding leadership is too narrow, hence current efforts to measure leadership in order to strengthen leader capacity or assess leader effectiveness are also too narrow. A central message throughout has been that, while existing frameworks, measurement models and instruments are likely of use in specific contexts for specific purposes, there is more to effective military leadership than is currently being assessed.

To be able to fully understand leadership, the starting point should be a critical assessment of how the military constructs leadership which in turn would lead to better appreciations of what is being measured and what needs to be added. Through the discussion presented, it has been suggested that the CF would benefit by expanding the understanding of effective military leadership and, in particular, should consider both the purpose of leadership in the military and the nature of differences across the operational environments and in staff roles. Two exploratory frameworks have been presented to illustrate these facets.

Fully recognizing that the perspectives offered required examination and validation prior to being put into use, the paper has concluded with suggestions for: the expansion of leader measurement with commentary on the use of ethnography to assess leader identity; expanded mentoring and coaching approaches augmented to vehicles for self-reflection to improve self-understanding and: the development of multiple 360° instruments to assist in self-insight.

The introduction to this paper indicated that the 2005 publication of *Conceptual Foundations* served to provide the CF with a significant update to the previous leadership doctrine manuals published in 1973. The reality is that the thirty-year gap was clearly far too long and reflected inattention by the institution to a core element that is critical to the profession and the capacity of the military to discharge its responsibilities effectively. The update, when published, did acknowledge that certain aspects of military leadership had not and would not change but, while recognizing these enduring facets, a key message to the CF was that what they had known and practiced was all true and relevant; it is just that there is more to effective military leadership than on what they previously had focused.

This paper retains and extends this philosophy by seeking to expand and extend the work done in the 2002-2005 period by continuing to suggest 'there is more to it' than that in 2010. The ideas presented are intended to critique and challenge current thinking in order for the CF to know that

⁹⁸ Although not drawn into the Service Differences discussion, the integrative focus and open approach would represent the nature of leadership in higher headquarters where, as previously stated, many of the command enablers are weak or conflicted. See Walker for further discussion.

it has 'got it right' by asking whether, if, they may have it wrong. Failure to question the current doctrine or practices on the ground can lead to the complacency that allowed the previous manuals to become so significantly out of date.

The first step in extending the current doctrinal approach has been to extend Wenek's work and the content of *Conceptual Foundations* by examining the increasing complexity of military leadership. The three key factors identified were: the requirement to expand the understanding of mission success by adopting a human security vice physical security framework; to understand the role of socialization in shaping culture and 'slow growth' attributes; and, to recognize the challenges of ensuring a military professional ideology while being constrained by an overarching government bureaucratic ideology.

A further step was to more closely examine the inter-relations and differentiations amongst command, leadership and management. A core idea presented is that command in operations represents an extreme concentration of authority and responsibility in one person including the rare instance where that person can independently *initiate* action. To enable this person to do so, it is proposed that Commanders are provided four sets of 'enablers': decision, leadership, culture and management. As extended in subsequent sections, a key idea is that the combination of these four enablers is unique to the domain of command in operations, and that most do not exist when leading in a supporting role or serving as staff in higher headquarters.

The second major extension of current CF approaches was to consider the purpose of military leadership and, in particular, to address the deficiencies in the academic literature that there are virtually no frameworks to assist the leader to decide what to do with leader power to influence, or to assure, the organization that leaders will use this power for good not evil. In the discussion of power, it was suggested that the traditional view of two types of social power, position and personal, should be expanded to include a third type, professional, that is conferred by the organization but is portable. The central model presented in the section integrated three dimensions to explain leadership as unbounded power to influence. Consideration of the leader's relative power, stage of development, and source of referents were used to present a matrix of labels for the type of leader behaviours seen by others. It is suggested that this framework could be useful in providing some fidelity to core HR processes such as selection, professional development and measurement.

The third extension was to delve into the differences in the nature of leadership across the military. In particular, while CF doctrine is intended to ensure a high degree of consistency in leadership approaches throughout the military, the reality is that there are very real differences experienced from one context to another. Six operational differences across the air, land, sea and special forces environments were used to present a brief description of the dominant leadership approach that has evolved to best fit the unique demands of each environment. While the Air Force 'optimizing systems performance', Army 'improving in chaos', Navy 'signaling shifting identities' and SOF 'focusing creative excellence' share many commonalities, the descriptions provided are intended to address those debates about why leadership looks, sounds and tastes different across the CF. The section concluded that further work is needed to address the emerging requirement for comprehensive or whole of government approaches.

The next major section of the paper examined a topic currently under consideration - developing institutional leaders or, more accurately, transforming effective Force Commanders into Institutional Leaders. While recognizing the utility of recent analyses of General Officer requirements (as well as pointing out that the CF has articulated much of this, repeated since the 1969 Rowley Report), this section challenges some of the taken-for-granted assumptions which may continue to hinder the ability to actually generate Institutional Leaders. The dominant acceptance of leader development following a linear, building-block approach was critiqued with the indication that there are both entirely new domains of competency to be mastered and also certain facets of leadership that must be 'unlearned'. The literature on career derailers was integrated to illustrate how some leader characteristics can evolve from being effective to being very ineffective as one assumes greater responsibilities.

This section also examined the dominant discipline or intellectual approach that informs how the profession questions, updates and applies its unique understanding of the world in which it functions. The idea of evolution from a Bachelor in Military Engineering to a Masters in Military Science to a PhD in Military Philosophy was used to illustrate the shift in intellectual frameworks required as one transits from the tactical to operational to strategic domains. The shift from the 'desperate search for certainty' to the capacity to deal with 'wicked' problems is seen as key in developing more senior leaders' intellectual capacities. To illustrate the requirement, the CF Effectiveness framework was used to present four different senior leader roles: Force Commander, Systems Manager, National Security Professional and Steward of the Profession. One implication of moving from the current 'generalist' model, with the assumption that all Generals can do all senior jobs (hence should all receive the same professional development), is that it would make much more sense to recognize individual strengths and weaknesses along with likely career paths in order to stream both formal development and experiential learning.

The final section considered issues related to the effective measurement of leadership with a critique of the current approaches in both the military and the academic literature. It was concluded that the military has adopted a narrow perspective in defining and measuring leadership that does not fully recognize the social dynamics of how leadership is constructed or perceived. It is suggested that the expanded perspectives presented in the discussions of both the purpose and the nature of military leadership could assist in expanding the measurement framework. An illustration was provided by drawing on the *Conceptual Foundations* framework of leader responsibilities to present labels for 12 dimensions that could be used in 360° assessments.

As stated in the introduction, many of the ideas presented in this paper should be read as exploratory and descriptive, with appropriate research still required to test and examine each. It is hoped that the concepts provided will stimulate further research, critiques and alternative opinions. As clearly articulated in *Duty with Honour*, healthy vigorous debate is essential to ensure that any profession remains current and effective.

One of the key commentaries provided is that there is no apparent professional 'school', academic faculty, network or intellectual home devoted to the examination and updating of the theories that underpin professional knowledge, nor is there a clear office or senior officer seen to

be responsible for the creation of new knowledge and/or guiding intellectual inquiry. This role should be seen as central to the ‘Steward of the Profession’ leadership function; as an important facet across the other three facets of Institutional Leadership; and, as a key objective to be facilitated in senior level PME. Doing so will assist the CF to remain relevant and responsive into the future which is, after all, a primary responsibility of those exercising institutional leadership.

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