Defence White Paper - Public Discussion Paper (HTML)

‘KEY QUESTIONS FOR DEFENCE
IN THE 21ST CENTURY’
A DEFENCE POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER

Indigenous Australian readers are advised that this publication may contain images or names of persons who are now deceased, which may cause offence.
The White Paper Team would like to thank and acknowledge all those who contributed to this publication. Further thanks also to the Joint Public Affairs Unit and Directorate of Digital Media for their assistance in producing and providing many of the images.
ISBN: 978-0-642-29683-2
Defence Publishing Service: DPSAPR016/08

CONTENTS

Foreword

Defence White Papers are a rare event. The forthcoming Defence White Paper will be only the fifth since the end of the Vietnam War. A Defence White Paper and the strategic guidance it provides are critical to success in developing Defence policy. In the absence of an up-to-date strategic plan, aligned to the strategic environment in which this plan will be pursued, government decisions on Defence could become ad hoc and misdirected.

In the past, White Papers have rightly had a major focus on strategy, force structure and capital investment in major military platforms. The current White Paper project will do that and more. Through the White Paper process, the Australian Government will develop a comprehensive picture across a range of Defence issues. The crucial starting point for the White Paper process will be a wide-ranging review of our security environment and our strategic interests, and subsequent determinations of the future tasks and roles for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Unless we start from this base, future decisions about the ADF’s force structure and key defence capabilities will be neither rigorous nor disciplined. The White Paper will look to address the following questions:

To support Defence’s work on the White Paper, I established a community consultation panel to provide Australians with an opportunity to have a say on the new White Paper. Building stronger community interest in the future of Defence is an important priority for the Government. This Defence Policy Discussion Paper marks the first step in that process. In this paper are some of the key issues to consider. This is not a statement of government policy. Rather it is a starting place.

We encourage all Australians to express their views on these critical defence issues.

[signed]

Joel Fitzgibbon

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CHAPTER 1
A NEW WHITE PAPER

Defence’s Mission Is To Defend Australia And Its National Interests

The last Defence White Paper was released almost a decade ago, in 2000. In Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, the previous Government laid out its defence policy to keep the country safe from possible threats. As previous White Papers had done, the 2000 Defence White Paper described the need to maintain a capable defence force, primarily trained and equipped to meet the demands of conventional wars between states.

The 2000 Defence White Paper did not exclude other forms of military operations, such as humanitarian relief, evacuations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Indeed, it noted that these types of operations represented an important and enduring trend with significant implications for the ADF. However, for the purposes of structuring our forces, the 2000 Defence White Paper sought to ensure that Australia could ‘draw on the expertise of the ADF where it is most appropriate to do so, but not to allow these [other] roles – important as they are – to detract from the ADF’s core function of defending Australia from armed attack’.

In the past eight years, the trends noted in the 2000 Defence White Paper have continued to see the ADF deployed for a range of tasks, such as:

As the demands on Australia’s armed forces have grown, some have argued that Defence’s mission should also be broadened. This is a legitimate topic for discussion. Should the focus remain on conventional wars between states? What types of security challenges might the future hold? Are armed forces the best way to manage such challenges? Can we afford such armed forces? Are we prepared to pay to keep our capability and technology edge?

The new White Paper must have regard to these critical questions.

A New Defence White Paper

The Government commissioned a new Defence White Paper on 22 February 2008. To ensure that the new White Paper is as comprehensive as possible, it is being developed through four parallel activities.

Firstly, Defence, in close consultation with other relevant agencies, is conducting a comprehensive strategic assessment of the security environment relevant to defence policy. This assessment will form the context for a disciplined analysis of the cost-effective choices to be made about Defence business and investment.

Secondly, Defence will undertake a Force Structure Review to develop options to deliver a capable, sustainable joint force. This Review will develop costed force structure and capability options for Government to consider, based on an analysis of the capabilities the ADF will need to undertake joint, interagency and combined operations over the coming decades.

Thirdly, Defence will undertake a series of reviews focused on core Defence business processes. These Companion Reviews will examine the infrastructure, workforce, industry, information technology, expenditure and other internal processes critical to Defence business. This will ensure that the supporting activities of Defence are aligned to the military tasks performed by our armed forces.

And finally, the Government has commissioned a community consultation process. The Minister for Defence has appointed Mr Stephen Loosley to lead the consultation effort, supported by Mr Arthur Sinodinos as the Deputy Chair, with Rear Admiral Simon Harrington (Ret’d), Professor Tanya Monro and Mr Peter Collins as members.

This Community Consultation Panel will draw together the views and opinions of the Australian community on defence issues. The Minister for Defence has asked the panel to prepare a written report on the outcomes of the consultations they conduct. This report will be released publicly and will inform the White Paper’s development.

The Minister has also appointed an advisory panel to provide him with expert, independent advice on key strategic issues that will arise during the White Paper’s development. Professor Ross Babbage, Major General Peter Abigail (Ret’d), and Dr Mark Thomson form this advisory panel.

This Defence Policy Discussion Paper has been prepared as part of the community consultation process. It sets out some of the issues and options that will need to be considered before the finalisation of the White Paper. It is not intended to be definitive or complete. The issues raised within this Discussion Paper are not government policy and do not reflect a final position on any of the strategic issues under consideration. Rather, they are starting points for the analysis and consultation that will be undertaken over the coming months.

What We Have Learned From Past Community Consultations

A community consultation process was undertaken as part of the development of the 2000 Defence White Paper. The key findings of that process were released in September 2000 in a report titled Australian Perspectives on Defence: Report of the Community Consultation Team.

The 2000 community consultation showed that the Australian people attach considerable importance to the ADF and to defence issues. In a world in which new security challenges were arising almost daily, there was a widespread view that it was vital for Australia to get defence decisions right. At that time, the majority of those who participated viewed increased funding of our military capabilities as a prudent investment. They also believed that our military capabilities needed to be adequately resourced and capable of responding quickly and effectively to a wide range of circumstances. Consistent with this community view, the 2000 Defence White Paper provided a long-term commitment to real growth in the Defence budget, and additional scrutiny and accountability for investment in future capability.

More specifically, the 2000 community consultation process found that there was basic agreement about the fundamental principles that should underpin our strategic policy. Most participants believed that the first and foremost task for the ADF should be the defence of Australia. An integral part of this belief was the expectation that the ADF, alone or with coalition partners, should be able to undertake operations within the region, particularly in our nearer region.

In 2000, the Australian community also sought reassurance that the premiums it paid for defence would be used to build a force that could operate effectively in a wide range of possible circumstances. There was strong support for a properly equipped, well-balanced force able to undertake combat operations at short notice. Specifically, there was notable support for:

The first Defence Capability Plan released with the 2000 Defence White Paper provided a 10-year investment plan that set the structure and timing for the development of the ADF in line with these community expectations.

Notably, the 2000 community consultation process highlighted some concern that the Defence organisation was not giving sufficient attention to personnel, reserves and industry issues. Specific proposals raised during consultations have been incorporated into Defence initiatives ever since.

Finally, an overwhelming majority within the community called for more efficient management of resources for which Defence has stewardship. Undoubtedly, this was the most challenging assessment provided by the consultation process. The 2000 Defence White Paper provided the benchmarks for change in this area, and the subsequent reviews of Defence procurement and Defence management did much to address the outcomes of the 2000 Community Consultation Team’s report.

How You Can Contribute In 2008

The Government is seeking the Australian community’s views on three key questions:

You can contribute in a number of ways. The Community Consultation Panel intends to visit all capital cities and some major regional centres, hosting an open, public forum in each location, at which Australians will be invited to express their views on defence policy and the role of our defence force.

The panel will also host a series of special defence policy seminars at which Australian defence policy can be discussed in greater depth. These seminars will enable distinguished figures from the academic community, public policy think-tanks and other knowledgeable individuals to discuss and contribute to future defence policy. The panel will also meet separately with State and Territory Government representatives and representatives of Australian industry.

Written submissions are also invited as are emails to the Community Consultation Panel. Details for the public forums will be announced on the Defence website (www.defence.gov.au) and in regional newspapers.

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CHAPTER 2
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE

Defence policy is primarily concerned with the key question of how Australia approaches the use of force and how it might employ that force in the national interest. In order to know where we are going in defence policy terms, it is useful to know where we have come from.

Pre-Federation

Throughout the 19th Century, the Australian colonies created and maintained volunteer corps and militia, with the first military unit established in September 1800. These forces acted primarily in local defence, to maintain law and order, protect the colonies, and act against convict rebellions, ‘insurgent’ miners and other worker strikes. But events beyond our borders were always in mind.

Australian colonial volunteers served overseas in the Anglo-Maori wars of the 1840s and 1860s, in the Sudan in the 1880s and in the Crimea, though not as formed units under Australian command. From the 1870s the organisation of these volunteer corps was professionalised, with regular soldiers on hand to provide instruction to untrained volunteers. Australia sent forces to the Boer War (1899-1901) and colonial forces were also deployed to the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900.

As Federation approached, a considerable debate emerged on the issue of the ‘common defence’ of the colonies. In October 1889, Sir Henry Parkes proposed Federation in order to ‘preserve the security and integrity of the colonies’. On 1 March 1901 Parkes’ proposal became a reality when the administration of colonial military forces passed from the colonies to the Commonwealth Government.

The Imperial Defence Era

The early years of Federation were chaotic for both the Government and the Defence Department, with few resources and a small Commonwealth budget. Defence policy debates of the day were influenced by the size and complexity of Australia’s strategic geography, the financial limitations of a new and developing nation, growing Australian nationalism and the recognition that British foreign policy could diverge from the interests of Australia. Consequently, Australia’s defence policy relied on imperial defence, in which Australia was a junior partner in Empire defence strategies managed from London. Given that Australia’s economy was still tied fundamentally to that of Great Britain, and Australia had very limited military capability, this reflected a pragmatic appreciation of Australia’s strategic situation.

1914 - 1918

Australia came of age in the First World War. Gallipoli, the Western Front, Beersheba and many other battlefields established and sustained the legend of our first Anzacs. Unique among the allied nations, Australia’s contribution to the First World War was all volunteer. By the war’s end, the Australian Imperial Forces had won a worldwide reputation for innovation, audacity and courage. Over those four intense years, more than 416,000 Australian men enlisted – over 50 percent of the eligible male population of Australia. Of those who served, 80 percent served overseas, with nearly 20 percent (almost 60,000 servicemen) killed and a further 45 percent wounded.

The Inter-War Years

With the end of the ‘war to end all wars’, Australia’s military was largely demobilised and the Defence establishment allowed to run down. Defence policy remained squarely within the imperial defence framework of the pre-war period. Imperial strategies for defence of the Far East focused mainly on the development of a naval base at Singapore, with the Royal Australian Navy expected to take its place within the resultant ‘Singapore strategy’. The role of the army was confined to local defence against small raids, despite the Army’s own strategic appreciations for the defence of the Australian mainland against invasion. A need to economise and a reliance on the Singapore strategy led to the limited development of Australia’s own armed forces, and overdependence on a flawed British strategy for defence of the Pacific. This was to have serious and expensive consequences as the hurried rearmament of the mid to late 1930s was to demonstrate.

1939 - 1945

Australia was not prepared, or structured, for the Second World War. While all three Services were unprepared when the war began, arguably the Royal Australian Air Force was in the least capable state. Air defences in Australia were poor and, as a consequence of the Empire Air Training Scheme, thousands of Australians served as part of the Royal Air Force in the strategic air offensive in Europe rather than as part of Australian forces. It was not until the start of the war in the Pacific that Australia’s air capabilities improved.

The war itself transformed the Australian nation and society. While Australia suffered fewer casualties than in the Great War (some 34,000 killed in action), the flow of the war and the events that marked it shaped Australia’s political leaders and their subsequent views of defence policy for the post-war period. The threat of invasion by Japan, the shocks of early defeats, and the victories at places like Kokoda and Milne Bay, changed the way in which Australia’s armed forces were developed and managed. The turning over of the Australian economy to war industries, the participation of women in that economy, and a greater maturity in Australia’s dealings with the rest of the world – not least the forceful demands of Prime Minister Curtin for Australian soldiers to serve Australian interests rather than British strategy – all contributed to Australia’s increasingly independent voice in world affairs. The role played by the United States, both in the defence of Australia and the South West Pacific Area, and in the introduction of US servicemen into the Australian community, fundamentally changed the nature of the relationship between Australia and the great powers.

However, despite all this, by the end of the Second World War, Australia remained a relatively minor world player, with a small population and distant friends with global and regional concerns of their own. Learning the lessons of the two world wars, Australian governments recognised that our security interests would be best served by a collective approach to security in the Pacific, backed by alliance relationships with major powers with whom we shared common values and interests.

Korea To The Forward Defence Era

To pursue this concept of collective security in the Pacific, Australia initially sought to bind both Britain and the United States to enduring commitments in the region, and to bolster the power and purpose of the United Nations. Post-war governments acknowledged that Australia’s geographic and strategic position was very different from those of the United Kingdom and the United States. It also recognised that unaided, Australia could not ensure its own security. It was therefore in Australia’s strategic interest to support any measures – including the deployment of Australian forces as part of US, UK or UN coalitions – designed to eliminate any risk of conflict or war well before such conflict reached Australia’s shores.

To provide Australia with the necessary forces to sustain its commitments to collective security in the Pacific, in 1947, the Government announced a series of measures designed to develop and maintain permanent military forces that could deploy overseas in partnership with principal allies.

The Korean War started in 1950. Australia was one of the first nations to make a commitment to the United Nations Command. Over the course of the Korean War, Australia sent two battalions, which, at that time was the limit of the Australian Army’s capacity. The Royal Australian Navy kept two ships on station during the war, and the Royal Australian Air Force deployed No. 77 Fighter Squadron, which provided support to ground forces and escort duties. Some 10,000 Australians served with distinction in Korea over the course of the war.

Arguably, the most strategically important and far reaching development in Australia’s security occurred in 1951 with the signing of the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). When ANZUS was originally established, it reflected a mutual awareness of the challenges that the three nations faced in the Asia Pacific region, and the benefits all three stood to gain by cooperation.

For Australia, the Australia-United States Alliance has been one of the central elements of our security. It has enhanced our defence capabilities and played a critical role in maintaining strategic stability in the Asia Pacific region. The Alliance has given us access to important strategic capabilities that we would simply not otherwise have in our national armoury without substantially greater cost to the nation, as well as the extended deterrence provided by United States nuclear forces, deterring the remote possibility of any nuclear attack on Australia.

In the period from the mid-1950s through to the early 1970s, Australia’s strategic policy focused primarily, though not exclusively, on the South-East Asian region. Australia contributed forces to the Malayan Emergency (Australia’s contribution commenced in 1950 and continued until 1963), Indonesian Confrontation (1963-1966) and the Vietnam War (1962-1975). Some have labelled this period as comprising the ‘wars of diplomacy’.

By 1964, the government’s classified Strategic Basis Paper expressed the view that ‘Australia must rely on her own independent military capability and collective security arrangements for her defence and the maintenance of stability in the area’. This proved to be true, as evidenced by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s 1967 announcement that British troops would be withdrawn from major military bases ‘east of Suez’, and President Nixon’s 1969 statement that the United States expected its allies to take care of their own military defence. This so-called ‘Guam doctrine’ argued that the United States would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened the freedom of an allied nation whose survival the United States considered vital to its security, provided that the threatened ally assumed primary responsibility for its defence.

The Defence Of Australia Era

In response to the ‘East of Suez’ and ‘Guam doctrine’ policies, the government moved to assume primary responsibility for Australia’s defence against any neighbourhood or regional threats. The 1972 Australian Defence Review argued for a more independent national defence capability and for self-reliance as ‘a central feature in the future development of Australia’s defence policy’. But it was not until the 1976 Defence White Paper that defence policy was officially changed from the expectation that Australia’s Navy, Army or Air Force would be sent abroad to fight as part of another nation’s force, but rather should aim for the self-reliant defence of Australian territory.

The 1987 Defence White Paper added substance to this policy of defence self-reliance by stating that priority would be given to the ability to defend ourselves with our own resources. Australia, the White Paper declared, must have the military capability to prevent an enemy from attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on our territory, or extracting political concessions from us through the use of military power. The White Paper noted that this policy was pursued within a framework of alliances and agreements with friends and allies in the region and beyond, notably with the United States.

Defence self-reliance and the ‘defence of Australia’ doctrine did not mean that Australia became isolationist though. Our contributions to peacekeeping missions such as Somalia and Rwanda, as well as Cambodia (which we led), to the First Gulf War, Bougainville and to Timor Leste, continued to demonstrate Australia’s commitment to the international rule of law, collective security and the notion that the defence of Australia does not start and end at our borders.

But defence of Australia did mean that – for force structure purposes – the primary determinant remained focused on the ability to defend Australia and its approaches. This construct was continued into the 2000 White Paper, with a decision to develop a force structure with a focus on:

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CHAPTER 3
WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE THE LAST WHITE PAPER

The 2000 Defence White Paper noted the environment of uncertainty in which defence decisions must be made. It stated that ‘we cannot predict with certainty when or where Australia might need to use its armed forces’. In terms of geography, previous White Papers and other Australian Government documents have usually defined Australia’s strategic region of interest as comprising South-East Asia, the South Pacific and parts of the Indian Ocean (although some have extended this area to include North Asia and, on occasion, South Asia and the Middle East).

However the government chooses to define our strategic region of interest for the purposes of the new White Paper, few would argue that ensuring the stability of South-East Asia, the South Pacific and the nearer parts of the Indian Ocean are not enduring Australian interests. Today, this region is relatively stable in strategic terms, although not without its challenges in terms of political instability and the like. However, defence policy is about managing future risks, and the new White Paper will need to take account of the possibility that changes in the international situation, especially in the dynamic part of the world in which we live, could produce a more unstable strategic environment.

What Has Caused A Change In Our Strategic Environment?

Much has happened in the world since the release of the 2000 Defence White Paper. New nations have been born and old nations have re-emerged on the world stage, with the relative status between nations slowly changing. What it means to have power, and how that power is used, have taken on new meaning – we have seen citizen action groups having a global impact (such as the de-mining coalition), the ‘colour revolutions’ in some of the republics of the former Soviet Union, and non-state actors gaining access to the tools of violence that were once the sole preserve of states.

The last decade has also seen the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid, London, Jakarta, Bali and elsewhere. We have also seen protracted conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, involving multinational coalitions of forces operating in both urban and rural environments. Issues such as climate change, resource and energy security, emerging infectious diseases, and the impacts of global demographic changes have gained greater attention in the security debate. Security challenges in cyberspace, on the high seas, and in the militarisation of outer space are also becoming more relevant.

Globalisation continues to be a very positive and integrative factor in world affairs. Increasing economic interdependence can, and does, provide an added incentive for peaceful relations and a reduction in armed conflict, as the United Nation’s Human Development Reports highlight. Australia has benefited from an increasingly globalised economic environment and it will likely remain in Australia’s interests to continue to support these positive developments.

However, societies that benefit from globalisation can also become more vulnerable. The information systems that bind global economies together can be subject to deliberate attack or accidental failure that can cause considerable disruption or damage. Globalisation has allowed factors such as religion, ethnicity and other forms of identity to gain global expression. In some cases, these factors draw communities together; in others, they are being used to reject the established international order. Globalising forces can also feed the proliferation of weapons technologies, expertise and knowledge. In some cases, this could include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The pressures associated with changing global demographics can also have strategic effects. Economic forces are driving large numbers of people out of the countryside to coastal and industrial centres, resulting in mega-cities, many along the coastlines of countries. By the end of the decade, over 90 per cent of the world’s population will be living in these littoral zones. Such overcrowding can contribute to the emergence of virulent diseases, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or the further spread of existing diseases such as cholera, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. It can also make such mega-cities more vulnerable to the consequences of natural disasters, such as hurricanes, cyclones and floods. Such urbanisation may also see future conflicts increasingly fought in urban environments, with all the political and military complications that such ‘complex’ environments bring.

Increasingly, the gap between developing countries and developed states could see tensions between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots.’ Desperation, and a desire for a better life, can also encourage the movement of people, seeking to migrate to more affluent countries, often with little education or savings. People smugglers, who are known to take advantage of such desperation, can and do target more prosperous countries – especially those with weak border controls and poor maritime security.

Why are these things important? Tensions can and do develop between and within countries, and for at least some countries, resort to armed force will continue to be relied upon as an ultimate arbiter of international disputes. For defence policy considerations, there are three main impacts.

Firstly, the causes of conflict have broadened considerably.

This is not to say that nations do not continue to play the ‘great game’ of international relations or to seek power within the international system. Indeed, over the last decade we have seen many manifestations of power politics between nations, often associated with increased levels of tension and occasional conflict. At the level of the great powers, we are slowly moving into a multipolar order. The United States continues to be the most powerful state on the planet, particularly in military power terms. The economic, and hence strategic, power of China and India is growing.

How the major powers engage each other, and how the middle and small powers of the Asia Pacific region engage them, or are engaged by them, will be a critical determinant of regional, and therefore Australian future security.

Other powers are also competing more aggressively for power and influence. A small number of these states have rejected the international order and have chosen instead to gain strategic leverage through the development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile systems. Some of these states have chosen to use their natural resources to coerce others or impose their will on their neighbours. Others have elected to sponsor terrorism and other forms of violence in order to destabilise the global order. Inter-state rivalry remains an important element of the international system, and the resort to inter-state conflict remains a possibility.

However, some small nations are losing the ability to compete at all. These countries, often as a consequence of considerable population growth, poor infrastructure, inefficient means of production, corruption or bad governance, are becoming less able to meet the needs of their citizens. This often results in internal tensions, and occasionally intra-state conflict, that can spill beyond the borders of an individual country.

Other forms of power politics, often not involving states at all, are also becoming more prevalent. Non-state actors can have strategic effects. Some of these non-state actors are very beneficial to the international order, changing international law and convention, assisting at-risk populations and internally displaced persons, and providing humanitarian responses in the aftermath of disaster or international crisis.

But some of these new actors have also been the cause of conflict. These include extremist ideologies, terrorist groups, and others that refuse to be bound by, or that challenge the existing basis of, international order and the rule of law. It is this latter form of non-state actor that can cause security challenges for states. Using crime and terror as their tools, these actors seek to take political or economic power away from citizens and states. They can create instability within countries, through such methods as insurgency and sectarian violence. Should they gain access to military capabilities or weapons of mass destruction, they could challenge traditional military capability advantages and commit substantially greater mass violence than has already occurred. The recent conflict between Hezbollah and the state of Israel provides an example of conflict between a state and a non-state actor.

And, finally, there are some global forces that are affecting all of us. The impacts of changes in the global climate and the scarcity of some resources – particularly cheap food staples, potable water, arable land, fish stocks and even clean air – have the potential to change the dynamics of global politics in ways that can create new sources of conflict or exacerbate old tensions.

Secondly, the means of conflict have broadened beyond traditional methods.

The technological revolution has expanded the means by which conflict can occur. New technologies offer new ways to contest power at all levels, state and non-state. Traditional tools of war are being challenged by commercially available, unconventional and asymmetric capabilities that seek to counter our military advantages.

The once-unrivalled access that the United States and its allies had to the products of space, and to intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance technologies, is now available to other nations and to non-state actors as well. What was once an unmatched military capability advantage is now a contested ‘battleground’, in which potential adversaries could make the cost of engaging in conflict very high and could potentially constrain our freedom of action. The ability to evade, disrupt, attack and, occasionally, defeat conventional state power has emboldened many, including some states, to use violence more readily and more often.

The increasingly pervasive nature of the global information environment, encompassing a twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week news cycle, the emergence of new media, and advancements in global communication technologies have all influenced the use of armed force. We have seen violence and terror displayed on the internet, strategic messages sent to and from terrorist groups via chat sites and blogs, and cyber attacks against national infrastructure and international business activities. We are fighting not just a battle of ideas and information using these means, but also a battle for information security, infrastructure assurance and uninterrupted business services.

And, finally, the warning time for some forms of conflict has declined.

The proliferation of technologies, the increasing armament of nations, including in our own region, the uncertain strategic effects of internal instability, and the lifting of some of the impediments and deterrents to tension and conflict discussed above, mean that crises can emerge much faster and more unpredictably. Some security threats can emerge with no, or very little notice, such as the September 11 attacks and the Bali bombings.

Some security threats build up over time as tensions develop between or within states. The boundary between a relatively benign situation and a conflict situation can be very blurred, and the events and issues that might cause a situation to change from peace to conflict can be very difficult to identify and predict.

The White Paper process will need to be aware of the changing nature and context of conflict. It will need to assess whether inter-state, intra-state or non-state conflict represents the most likely and most consequential threat facing Australia. It will also need to assess whether other, non-conflict related but nevertheless destabilising influences pose challenges best met through the use of armed force. It will need to determine how ready the ADF should be to respond to threats or to forestall such threats emerging in the first place. It will also need to examine the balance between armed forces and other elements of national power in providing national security responses. Finally, it will need to make judgments about the most effective and cost-efficient balance of capability within the armed forces, noting the other demands on the national security system, and the rest of the Australian nation.

The Cost of Defence

In the 2008-09 Budget, the government committed to providing 3 percent real growth per year on average in Defence’s underlying funding base to 2017-18. This followed the commitment made in the 2000 Defence White Paper to 3 percent annual real growth (on average) for the decade to 2010-11, which was extended in the 2006-07 Budget to 2015-16.

Over most of the past four decades, while defence spending has grown in real terms it has fallen gradually as a proportion of GDP. While the future quantum of funding available to Defence is difficult to determine, predictions can be made about the broader economic environment that Australia will face. The Intergenerational Report 2007 sets out economic projections for the next 40 years. It projects the economy to grow at a rate of around 2 to 2.5 percent over the next 40 years, which is significantly less than the average over the last 40 years of 3.5 percent.

line graph showing % of GDP each year from 1965 to present

Figure 1: Defence spending as a proportion of GDP

If growth in defence spending were to be maintained in coming decades at current levels, the projected fall in GDP growth would mean that the share of economic resources devoted to funding defence will be put on an ever-increasing path. This would be at the same time as government budgets are confronting increasing demographic-related pressures in rising health and pension costs. As a consequence, future governments may face significant challenges in their ability to fund defence.

line graph showing Defence spending in $million each year from 1965 to present

Figure 2: Real Defence Spending

Governments’ ability to fund defence over the medium to longer term will be determined by the overall level of revenue government is able to raise and its views about the relative priority of defence compared to competing demands on the government budget. In developing the White Paper, the Government will need to be mindful of the need to prioritise spending to meet strategic defence requirements while considering other important programs.

The Costs of Capability

Defence is a costly undertaking. The cost of high technology and complex weapon systems is rising at a real rate of about 3-4 percent each year, according to figures from the Defence Materiel Organisation. This means that each generation of military equipment, though often providing a more capable and technologically sophisticated weapon system, typically costs about two and a half to three times as much as the one before. Similarly, the cost of personnel is rising. And in recent years, the cost of operating military equipment has also risen. This will also affect decisions about capability affordability.

In 2004, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, in its report A Trillion Dollars and Counting: Paying for defence to 2050, noted:

‘The government paid around $105 million for each of the Oberon Class submarines it bought in the late 1960s and early 1970s as measured in 2003-04 dollars. In comparison, a single Collins Class submarine costs over $850 million, not counting the cost of remedial work. In 1966 a naval destroyer cost $350 million (again in 2003-04 dollars), whereas the Navy’s planned Air Warfare Destroyer is slated to cost between $1.5 billion and $2 billion’.

This remains true today, and will continue to reflect a key planning constraint for Defence.

The White Paper process will need to be aware of the complex interplay between capability and cost. It will need to identify the challenges associated with investing in new capability, the growing cost of that capability in relative terms, and the long term budgetary implications of its investment strategies. More importantly, it will need to align Defence’s strategies, capabilities and resources.

To do this, the White Paper process will need to define:

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CHAPTER 4
KEY TASKS FOR DEFENCE

Defence And National Security

Defence policy fits within the broader national security policy of a nation. When armed force was the principal and most significant tool of national security, armed forces were typically the lead agency for national security issues. This is no longer the case. Today we recognise the need to draw different agencies together in more sophisticated ways. National security has broadened and deepened to encompass issues of human, domestic, and international security. Australian statecraft, the foreign and defence policy activities that provide the foundation of Australia’s international relations, has been joined by law enforcement and emergency management that provide domestic security, and by nation building, international aid and humanitarian assistance that provide human security.

Defence is one of many responsibilities of government. Allocating resources to Defence, like all government outlays, imposes a burden on taxpayers and requires a trade-off between different expenditures. Choices will be necessary. How much should be spent on Defence? What is a prudent level of investment in new capability? Which priorities should be considered non-discretionary, and which discretionary?

To assist in reaching answers to these questions, the White Paper process will need to consider, prioritise and evaluate the relative importance of the generic types of tasks that the ADF might be required to perform into the future, either as a lead agency or in support of other elements of the national security system. This section presents some potential tasks that will be investigated in the White Paper process. Their inclusion here does not imply that these are the only tasks the ADF could perform, nor that specific future operations will always fall within these categories. Rather, these task descriptions can help us to think about the types of forces Australia might need, and the choices that might be required if we are to build an effective defence force within the future resource parameters of the nation.

Deterring and Defeating Attacks on Australian Sovereignty

The protection of Australian sovereignty is the core Defence mission. Today, we have no indication that any state has the intent to attack Australia or to engage in inter-state conflict in Australia’s region. The ability to defend Australian territory, however, remains the foundation of our security policy – as the consequences of being unprepared for conflict could be catastrophic.

The military capabilities of countries in the Asia Pacific region are growing. While specifics vary greatly from nation to nation, many are looking to strengthen their capabilities to defend territory, including in the maritime environment, and to control their air space. More prosperous nations seek to enhance their capability to project power and to gain military advantage from enhanced command and control systems and the integration of their conventional capabilities. They may also seek to acquire more capable submarines, combat aircraft, missiles and ground forces. Less technologically advanced nations will struggle to maintain their current levels of capability.

While we have seen no evidence of this, there remains the possibility that some actors in our region may attempt to acquire strategic weapons (such as weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles) or employ asymmetric methods or tools, such as Improvised Explosive Devices. Even within otherwise well governed nations, there is a small possibility that disaffected groups may seek to obtain access to such strategic or asymmetric weapons.

Seeking to attack Australian sovereign territory is not the only way in which a potential aggressor might threaten Australia. An adversary could possibly seek to coerce us or to gain political concessions by means of intimidation; limited lodgement on an Australian offshore territory or attack on Australian critical infrastructure (such as an oil and gas platform); restricting our access to lines of communication; disrupting Australia’s electronic or communications networks; or threatening to employ strategic weapons.

None of the foregoing considerations imply that we foresee any intent to attack Australia, but they may mean a reduction in the regional capability edge that Australia has traditionally maintained in some conventional military capabilities. They may also mean a more complex operating environment where even our military advantage can be degraded through the use of asymmetric tactics and techniques.

The White Paper process will address the choices Australia might face if it wishes to deter and potentially defeat any credible threat to Australian sovereignty. Questions worthy of attention include:

Fighting Terrorism

Terrorism will remain a destabilising force globally for the foreseeable future. It will be a danger to Australia and its allies, challenging the authority of many governments, and undermining the patterns of trust and openness necessary in today’s globalised world.

There are limitations on the extent to which terrorism presents a strategic threat to Australia. It is unlikely to threaten Australia’s fundamental freedom of action to the extent that an economically or militarily powerful state might. But it can cause mass casualties and economic loss, or create fear and discord within the community.

Military action cannot address the underlying political, religious or ideological causes of terrorism. Defence’s role in fighting terrorism currently revolves around its unique capabilities to identify and defeat known terrorist groups, networks and attack plans. Defence also acts to reduce the ‘permissiveness’ of the environments in which terrorist groups and networks recruit, resource, plan and conduct operations, by retarding their ability to move or operate freely. This primarily involves working with friends and neighbours in the region to build regional capacity to counter terrorism. It also involves the contribution of military forces to the preparation of the nation for terrorist attacks, and developing the nation’s resilience to withstand such attacks.

The White Paper process will need to address the degree to which our armed forces are developed and prepared to deal with terrorist threats. Consideration might include questions such as:

Providing Military Support To Australian National Security Responses

Defence plays a key supporting role in the national response to security challenges facing Australia. This includes:

The importance and sophistication of such military support services, as contributions to national responses, will continue to increase.

The White Paper process will need to account for the government’s review of domestic security matters currently underway. The White Paper process will also need to assess if there is scope to enhance the capability of Defence, federal and state agencies to respond in an integrated manner to extreme situations, such as mass casualty attack. This issue is worthy of careful examination.

Providing Military Support To Australian Statecraft And In Support Of The International Rule of Law

Defence supports Australian statecraft in numerous ways. This includes:

Australian statecraft will increasingly require both diplomacy and armed forces to act in concert to project as well as protect Australian interests and values. We have seen the value of integrated diplomacy and armed force, notably with respect to our counter-and non-proliferation initiatives; in demonstrating Australian resolve in places like Fiji, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands; and in contributing to regional counter-terrorism activities within the Asia Pacific region.

The White Paper process will address the degree to which resources are devoted to this task, and its relative priority against other tasks undertaken by Defence. It will need to specifically examine the Defence Cooperation Program, its resourcing, and potential alternative methods for providing such support.

Providing Security In Stabilisation Operations

Stabilisation operations frequently require an ability to rapidly deploy forces that can restore civil authority, protect ‘at risk’ populations, bring serious offenders to justice and, in extreme situations, evacuate Australian citizens and other foreign nationals from danger and violence. In these operations, it is vital that restoration, reconstruction and stabilisation efforts, as well as humanitarian assistance, can occur free from violence or interference to ensure the continued maintenance of a secure environment. In the majority of circumstances, Defence will be deployed within the nearer region on these types of missions, given our responsibilities within the South West Pacific, and our desire for a secure and stable neighbourhood.

Defence provides a rapidly deployable, scalable force that can operate in austere and remote environments. Over recent years, Defence has developed considerable expertise in the conduct of large-scale stabilisation operations and in the employment of military force to restore civil authority. It has the ability to protect its own forces and to provide ‘force protection’ to other Australian forces, agencies and actors.

The White Paper process will consider the challenge of capability building, including the degree to which Defence specifically develops capability or devotes resource to these tasks.

Providing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief have been prominent features of recent Defence activities. Domestically, Defence has supported disaster relief efforts, particularly in response to cyclones (such as Tropical Cyclone Larry in 2006), floods and bushfires. In our nearer region, Defence has responded to crises such as the tsunamis in Papua New Guinea and in the Indian Ocean, and has contributed to famine and drought relief in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere, and assistance to the victims of cyclones throughout the Pacific. We have also contributed further afield, as our responses to earthquakes in Iran and Pakistan demonstrate. Frequently, the ADF is first on the scene, forming the critical capability that ensures relief supplies are distributed, civilians are evacuated and much-needed medical assistance is provided. Earlier this year, Australia and the United States agreed to establish a joint investment program to develop a combined humanitarian assistance/disaster relief capability. The program will also assist in enhancing both nations’ capacities to respond to contingencies in their own regions and, as such, we should expect that this task will remain a core element of defence planning.

The White Paper process will consider the degree to which unique or specialist capabilities for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief should be developed.

Providing a Military Contribution to Coalition Operations in High-Intensity Wars

Australia cannot be secure in an insecure region or in an unstable global security environment where the rule of law is not maintained. Australia will likely continue to be a significant contributor to multinational security arrangements. Both regionally and globally, Defence works with friends and allies to improve strategic stability, enhance confidence and develop transparency and trust.

On occasions when our national interests are engaged, the Government may also choose to contribute military forces in support of high-intensity wars. These contributions are likely to be undertaken by forces tailored to suit our preferences for scale, location and roles. Force protection and interoperability with coalition partners are among the considerations that will inform the nature of any contribution. Such contributions may involve US-led coalition operations, and therefore have consequences for interoperability planning and preparedness.

Making the choice to provide military contributions to coalition operations in these circumstances can have a significant impact on the development of the ADF and the capabilities within it. In the past, a choice to engage in multinational operations in a high-intensity warfighting environment has often required the ADF to rapidly acquire additional capability, such as those associated with protecting Australian forces from a higher level of threat than they face regionally. The new White Paper will need to be conscious of such capability ‘enhancements’. It will need to address the priority to be afforded to fitting such enhancements to the capability baseline or adapting capability to install such enhancements when they are needed.

Managing Defence Core Business

Along with all these ‘operational’ requirements to conduct missions on the nation’s behalf, Defence is responsible for managing its core business effectively and efficiently. This includes making effective use of its financial and human resources; investing in capability that provides a properly equipped and balanced force structure; working cooperatively with industry and the Australian community in ways that protect and grow the skills, capacity and support of Australia over the long term; and maintaining the professional reputation of the ADF and the Department of Defence.

The White Paper process will address the manner in which Defence deals with the increasingly complex environment we expect in the future. This will need to include consideration of the key challenges of effective and efficient issues management, military and bureaucratic professionalism, and industrial and community support for Defence.

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CHAPTER 5
CHOICES FOR DEFENCE

What Strategies Do We Need?

The changes in Australia’s security environment have significant consequences for Defence and the nation. The challenges for the new White Paper revolve around the degree to which challenges in the security environment might necessitate a change in defence policy, capability investment and operational activity.

The new Defence White Paper will need to consider questions such as:

What Capabilities Might We Want?

In Defence terms, capability means the capacity or ability of the ADF to achieve a particular operational effect. That operational effect may be defined or described in terms of the nature of the effect and of how, when, where, and for how long it is produced. In the Defence context, capability is the combined effect of multiple inputs. It is not the sum of those inputs, but the synergy that arises from the way those inputs are combined and applied. In Defence, the ‘fundamental inputs to capability’ are categorised and broadly defined as including personnel, organisation, collective training, major systems, supplies, facilities, support, and command and management.

Historically, Defence’s core capability choices have been concerned with finding a balance that ensures the ADF has the ability to:

The new White Paper will need to determine if these goals are still relevant for the future. What might this mean in capability terms? The choices capability planners face revolve around the concepts and qualities of combat weight, precision firepower, mobility, reach, sustainability, responsiveness and survivability.

More significantly, though, Defence planners will need to identify whether, and how, Australia maintains a regional capability edge. Critical to answering this question, the White Paper process must determine whether we should:

The new White Paper will need to address these challenges as it develops a future model for defence capability that identifies strategic tasks and capability goals for the years ahead.

What Budget Do We Need?

Defence spending is difficult to project, as it depends largely on a range of variables such as the strategic environment, changing operational requirements and the challenges of maintaining capability relative to other countries.

The new Defence White Paper will need to consider questions such as:

How Might We Meet The Workforce Challenge?

Management of the Defence workforce, both military and civilian, requires special consideration, above and beyond any other capability dimension. Due to its specific demands for a youthful workforce, the ADF is particularly vulnerable to demographic challenges. A national economy of low unemployment creates both a disincentive for service in the military and a shortage of highly skilled and capable military and civilian professionals. This can create unique challenges for Defence, particularly with respect to recruitment and retention of personnel, the role and capability of the Reserves, and the operational demands on serving personnel and their families.

It is important that Defence continues to reflect the community it serves. As the Australian community changes, so too must Defence, particularly in its workforce diversity, its management of sensitive community issues and its attitude to social values. As a nation with a relatively small population, we should do all we can to attract the right people from every part of the Australian community.

Significant personnel policy changes may need to be made in the ways in which Defence recruits, develops, sustains, retains and transitions its military and civilian workforce. To sustain tomorrow’s workforce, strategies that address individual lifestyles, community and social responsibilities might need to be developed. Initiatives such as the gap year program and a series of recruitment and retention measures have already commenced. What else might be required? The new White Paper will need to address these challenges if we are to ensure the continued strong support of the Australian community for Defence service and activities.

How Might We Better Integrate Industry?

Australia’s defence industry is a fundamental element of our national security – often referred to as the ‘fourth arm of Defence’. Over many years, governments of all persuasions have developed defence industry policies that acknowledge this fundamental relationship.

The challenge for the future is equally fundamental. In recent years we have seen a substantial rationalisation of the defence industry sector. We may need to consider the capacity of Australia’s defence industry sector (less than 1 percent of total Australian industry), and its reliance upon overseas sources of innovation and technology. We also need to recognise industry’s need for greater clarity and certainty in planning timely delivery of equipment and support.

New challenges are emerging for both bureaucracies and companies in building a defence industry base capable of supporting and sustaining Defence’s activities in both peace and conflict. These challenges have included the decline in Australia’s manufacturing capability, the deskilling of Australia’s workforce – including within Defence itself – and industry’s capacity to surge beyond peacetime limits to support and sustain ADF on operations.

As a consequence, choices may need to be made about the ways in which we develop and maintain a sustainable and skilled workforce that can adapt international best practice to Australian needs. The new White Paper will need to address these issues.

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ANNEX
DEFENCE FACTS & FIGURES

Total Defence Workforce

Strength - The total Defence workforce, is forecast to be 96,211 in 2008-09, comprising:

Total Defence Resourcing

In the 2008-09 Budget, Defence’s departmental appropriations will be $21,757.8m. The addition of the drawdown of appropriations carried forward, net capital receipts and own source revenue, provides total departmental funding in 2008-09 of $22,690.3m.

This represents 1.8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Navy Capability

Fast Facts     Royal Australian Navy 2
Personnel (permanent) 13,230
Principal Equipment
Submarines
Collins Class 6  
Surface Combatants
Adelaide Class Guided Missile Frigate 4  
Anzac Class Frigate 8  
Amphibious
Kanimbla Class Landing Ship 2  
Tobruk Class Landing Ship 1  
Landing Craft 6  
Logistics & Support
Replenishment Underway / Oiler 2  
Minor War Vessels
Armidale Class Offshore Patrol Boat 14  
Minehunter 6  
Auxiliary 10  
Helicopters
Anti-Submarine Warfare 16 (S-70B-2)
Maritime Support 6 (Sea King MK50A)
Support 13 (AS-350BA)

Army Capability

Fast Facts     Australian Army 2
Personnel (permanent) 27,461
Formations
Mechanised
1 Brigade HQ (1st Brigade)
1 Armoured Regiment
1 Reconnaissance Regiment
1 Mechanised Infantry Battalion
1 Light Infantry Battalion
1 Medium Artillery Regiment
1 Combat Engineer Regiment
1 Combat Support Regiment
1 Combat Service Support Battalion
Motorised Infantry
1 Brigade HQ (7th Brigade)
1 Reconnaissance Regiment
2 Motorised Infantry Battalions
1 Infantry Battalion
1 Field Artillery Regiment
1 Combat Engineer Regiment
1 Combat Support Regiment
1 Combat Service Support Battalion
Light Infantry
1 Brigade HQ (3rd Brigade)
3 Infantry Battalions
1 APC Squadron
1 Field Artillery Regiment
1 Combat Engineer Regiment
1 Combat Support Regiment
1 Combat Service Support Battalion
Aviation
1 Brigade HQ
3 Aviation Regiments
Special Forces
1 Special Air Services Regiment
2 Commando Battalions
Surveillance
3 Regional Force Surveillance Units
Incident Response
1 Regiment
Electronic Warfare
1 Regiment
Force Support
3 Battalions
Air Defence
1 Regiment
Construction
2 Squadrons
 
Principal Equipment
Vehicles
Main Battle Tanks 59 (59 M1-A1 Abrams + 7 recovery vehicles)
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles 257 (ASLAV-25)
Armoured Personnel Carriers 766 (M-113)
Light Forces Vehicles 289 (Bushmaster IMV)
Aircraft
Fixed Wing 3 (Beech 350 B300)
Attack Helicopter 22 (AS-665 Tiger)
Support Helicopters 43 (6 CH-47D, 33 S-70A-9, 4 NH-90 TTH)
Utility Helicopters 66 (41 Bell 206B-1, 25 UH-1H)
Amphibious
Amphibious 21 (6 LCM-2000, 15 LCM-8)
Artillery
Towed 145 (109 105mm, 36 155mm)
Mortar 296 (81mm)
Air Defence
Surface to Air 30 (RBS-70)
Radar
Land 21 (7 AN/TPQ-36, 14 RASIT)

Air Force Capability

Fast Facts     Royal Australian Air Force 2
Personnel (permanent) 14,056
Formations
Air Combat & Strike
1 Group
1 Tactical Fighter Wing
1 Reconnaissance Strike Wing
Surveillance & Response
1 Group
1 Squadron of AP-3C Orion
1 Squadron of AEW&C
1 Control & Reporting Wing
1 Radar Surveillance Unit (JORN)
2 Air Defence Command & Control Centres
Airlift
1 Group
1 Strategic Transport Squadron
1 Special Purpose / VIP Transport Squadron
2 Medium Transport Squadron
1 Light Tactical Transport Squadron
Combat Support
2 Combat Support Wings
1 Expeditionary Combat Support Wing
1 Airfield Defence Wing
1 Health Services Wing
 
Principal Equipment
Combat Aircraft
F-111 15 3  
F/A-18A/B 71  
Hawk Mk127 Lead-in Fighter Trainer 33  
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
P-3 Orion 19  
Airborne Early Warning & Control Aircraft
B-737 Wedgetail 1 4  
Lift Aircraft
C-17 Globemaster 4  
B-737 BBJ 2  
C-130H 12  
C-130J 12  
CL-604 3  
DHC-4 14  
Training and Support Aircraft
PC-9/A 64  
Beech 300 8  
Radar
Over the Horizon Radar Network 1  
Tactical 4  

Current Operations 5

Operation Resolute (Maritime Enforcement and Border Protection):

Defence contributes approximately 450 personnel to the whole–of–government operation protecting our borders. Under Operation Resolute the ADF supports the Government’s civil maritime surveillance and response program, which protects Australian fisheries (including in the Southern Ocean) and provides quarantine, customs and environmental security. This effort aims to deter and prevent unauthorised boat arrivals and provides an offshore maritime security response against maritime terrorism.

Operation Resolute is controlled by the Border Protection Command (BPC), which has assumed responsibility for operational coordination and control of both civil and military maritime enforcement activities within Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The BPC is staffed by military and civilian officials from Defence, Customs, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority and the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service. Significant ADF resources add weight to the Government’s coordinated effort to protect our offshore assets and deter and respond to illegal immigration, smuggling, fishing and other threats.

Our assets in Operation Resolute now include a standing maritime force comprising a major naval vessel, five (increasing to seven) patrol boats, a coastal minehunter, a heavy landing craft, elements from Army regional force surveillance units and a PC–3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft.

Operation Astute and Operation Tower (Timor-Leste)

Operation Astute is the ADF’s stabilisation operation supporting the Government of Timor-Leste and the UN Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT). Police from Australia and 20 other nations provide security as part of the UN Police Force. Under Operation Astute, Defence provides support to these police operations as required. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is working alongside the ADF to assist with this mission. Together, ADF and NZDF personnel form the International Security Force, which supported the UN Police and the Timor-Leste Government during the May 2007 presidential election period, and the June 2007 parliamentary elections. There are currently about 750 ADF personnel and 170 NZDF personnel deployed in Timor-Leste.

At its peak in June 2006, the Australian contingent numbered some 3,200 personnel. Since first deploying in 1999 as part of the International Force in East Timor, the ADF has maintained a strong commitment to the government and people of Timor-Leste. Operation Tower comprises the ADF’s support to the current UN mission, UNMIT. The ADF has three personnel deployed as part of the Military Liaison Group and the Joint Military Analysis Cell in the UNMIT Headquarters.

Operation Anode (Solomon Islands)

Operation Anode is the ADF’s contribution to the Australian–led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). RAMSI is a multilateral grouping, which includes military, police and civilian advisers working on initiatives to restore security, law and justice, provide better economic management, and improve the machinery of government. The initial 2003 deployment was at the request of the Solomon Islands Government.

The military component of RAMSI comprises personnel from four nations: Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. The military component’s main task is to provide security for RAMSI’s multinational Participating Police Force. Approximately 140 ADF troops are now deployed in Solomon Islands. Deployments reached a high in April 2006, following riots in Honiara, when almost 400 ADF personnel deployed, including two infantry companies, two Iroquois helicopters, two patrol boats, logistics and headquarters staff.

Operation Catalyst (Iraq)

Operation Catalyst, the successor to Operations Falconer and Bastille, began in July 2003. It is the ADF’s contribution to the international efforts to reconstruct and rehabilitate Iraq. Operation Catalyst includes a number of elements, some of which are assigned to both Operation Catalyst and Operation Slipper in Afghanistan. The dual assignments include a major fleet unit, the AP–3C Orion Detachment, the C–130 Hercules Detachment and various elements of the National Headquarters. Australia also has an ADF officer assigned to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), whose primary responsibilities include providing security advice to the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General and co–ordination of Multi National Force Iraq support to UNAMI.

The Overwatch Battle Group-West (OBG-W) based in the southern Iraqi province of Dhi Qar comprises approximately 515 personnel and consists of a headquarters, a cavalry squadron, an infantry company, ASLAVs and Bushmaster vehicles. The Australian Army Training Team-Iraq contributes to training the Iraqi Army with a team of up to 100 trainers working at various locations throughout Iraq. The training conducted by the Australian Army Training Team Iraq has yielded excellent results with approximately 16,500 Iraqi Army personnel benefitting from the Australian contribution including: 11,500 Iraqi Army recruits, 400 non-commissioned officers, 330 officers and 4,200 specialists.

The Battle Group is due to be withdrawn in mid-2008. This will reduce the personnel footprint in Iraq by approximately 550. The coincident withdrawal of the Australian Army Training Team will involve the removal of approximately 60 personnel, for a total reduction of 610 ADF personnel from Southern Iraq.

The Australian Security Detachment-Baghdad (SECDET) is a Combat Team of about 110 personnel. The Combat Team comprises two infantry Platoons, one Cavalry Troop, a Military Police Detachment and a Combat Service Support Element. The SECDET provides support to the Australian Embassy in Baghdad in order to facilitate the conduct of the Australian Diplomatic Mission. SECDET utilises ASLAVs and armoured Landcruisers to provide protected mobility for Australian Government personnel working at the Australian Embassy. The Military Police Detachment provides close personal protection for key personnel.

Operation Slipper and Operation Palate II (Afghanistan)

Operation Slipper is the ADF’s contribution to the international coalition against terrorism, with a focus in Afghanistan. The ADF operates as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In February 2008, the Government announced an adjustment to its military contribution to Afghanistan to enable a greater focus on enhancing the capability of the Afghan National Army through training and mentoring.

A Reconstruction Task Force, of approximately 400 engineers, support and force protection personnel operating in Tarin Kowt, is engaged in construction works and improvement of local infrastructure (hospitals, schools, bridges, culverts etc) and community-based projects.

The Australian Government has decided to adjust its military contribution to Afghanistan to enable a greater focus on enhancing the capability of the Afghan National Army through an Operational Mentoring, Liaison and Training Team (OMLT). An OMLT will be deployed later this year, and will form part of a Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force which will replace the current Reconstruction Task Force.

In February 2008, the Government redeployed two CH47 Chinook Helicopters to Afghanistan to provide a medium lift helicopter capability to the ADF and coalition forces. Australia also has an ADF officer deployed to Afghanistan under Operation Palate II, supporting the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

The total Australian commitment in Afghanistan is about 1,080 personnel.

Operation Paladin (Israel/Lebanon)

Operation Paladin is Australia’s contribution to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), established in 1948 to supervise the truce agreed at the conclusion of the first Arab–Israeli War. Australia has supported this operation since 1956, with people working in Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Members of the Australian contingent – currently 12 personnel – may be employed as staff officers in the UNTSO Headquarters in Jerusalem and as military observers.

Operation Mazurka (Sinai)

Operation Mazurka is Australia’s contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. The MFO is a non–UN organisation established in 1981 to oversee the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. Today, the MFO is maintained by 11 participating nations including Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Fiji and France. ADF members support the peace process by monitoring the border between Egypt and Israel and supporting the MFO headquarters. 25 personnel are deployed on the operation.

Operation Azure (Sudan)

Under Operation Azure, the Government has deployed 15 ADF personnel to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Sudan (UNMIS). Of the Australian contribution, six are military observers and nine support the Headquarters of the Peacekeeping Force as specialists in operations, aviation and logistics. UNMIS was established in March 2005 under UN Security Council Resolution 1590, after the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement agreed to end a civil war that had lasted for more than 20 years. Australia has recently agreed to commit up to 9 personnel to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Operation Outreach (Northern Territory)

Operation Outreach is the Defence support to the whole-of-government intervention into Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. Defence support to the intervention began in March 2007 and involves the provision of logistic and movement support to the other government agencies involved in the intervention. Defence has provided support to the conduct of initial surveys of all communities, the deployment of Child Health Care Check Teams, and the delivery of temporary and semi-permanent accommodation for police, medical staff and government business managers. Approximately 105 personnel are engaged in this activity.

Notes:

  1. All figures are accurate as of the date of publication
  2. Capability numbers may include assets transitioning into or out of service as of the date of publication.
  3. An additional 12 F-111G aircraft are in storage awaiting disposal action and a further two F-111G have been broken down for spares.
  4. Subject to expected delivery schedule.
  5. Information on troop strengths and operational activities are accurate as of the date of publication.