

1
2 LCDR RENWICK: Thank you. No further questions, sir.
3
4 THE PRESIDENT: Anything arising?
5
6 CMDR RUSH: I have no re-examination.
7
8 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr Templeton. You've
9 been of great assistance to me. Thank you.
10
11 <THE WITNESS WITHDREW
12
13 CMDR RUSH: I call CDRE Dollard, sir.
14
15 <ALLEN DOLLARD, affirmed: [3.14pm]
16
17 <EXAMINATION BY CMDR RUSH:
18
19 CMDR RUSH: Q. CDRE Dollard, is your name Allen Dollard?
20 A. Yes.
21
22 Q. Could you state your address?
23 A. [REDACTED].
24
25 Q. And are you a retired naval officer?
26 A. Yes.
27
28 Q. CDRE Dollard, did you join the RAN in 1932?
29 A. Yes.
30
31 Q. How old were you?
32 A. Fifteen.
33
34 Q. Did you undertake initial training at the naval
35 college?
36 A. Yes.
37
38 Q. After initial training, were you sent to the United
39 Kingdom?
40 A. Yes.
41
42 Q. Was that for the purpose of undertaking midshipman
43 training at sea?
44 A. Yes.
45
46 Q. Do you recall what ships you served in during that
47 training?

1 A. I served in the destroyer Garland, Royal Navy
2 destroyer, and the Repulse, the battle cruiser.

3

4 Q. At the completion of that training, did you then
5 attend courses for the rank of sublieutenant in the United
6 Kingdom?

7 A. Yes.

8

9 Q. Were they specialist or non-specialist courses?

10 A. They were non-specialist courses in gunnery,
11 seamanship, navigation, communications, and that's about
12 it.

13

14 Q. Did you return to Australia in 1938?

15 A. Yes, the end of 1938.

16

17 Q. Did you join HMAS Sydney in March 1939?

18 A. Yes.

19

20 Q. And did you serve in HMAS Sydney for two and
21 a half years?

22 A. Just short of two and a half years, yes.

23

24 Q. And whilst serving in HMAS Sydney over that time, did
25 you serve under two captains?

26 A. Yes.

27

28 Q. Who were they?

29 A. I served under CAPT Collins for the Mediterranean
30 campaign, and my captain prior to him was CAPT JWM Waller.

31

32 Q. Was that the Royal Navy?

33 A. Royal Navy, not the Australian captain.

34

35 Q. After Sydney returned to Australia after its
36 Mediterranean campaign, did you remain on the ship for
37 a period of time?

38 A. Yes, I remained on board until April 1941.

39

40 Q. And were you thereafter posted to HMAS Australia?

41 A. Yes.

42

43 Q. What was your posting on HMAS Sydney?

44 A. On Sydney, I was the officer of quarters, that is, the
45 officer in charge of "X" turret.

46

47 Q. Was that an action stations --

1 A. That was my action station. My general duties - I was
2 officer in charge of the main top division, that is the
3 seamen's division, and I was of course a watch-keeper.

4
5 Q. What is the main top division

6 A. The ship is divided into four divisions. The main top
7 port side - correction - port top port side, main top
8 starboard side, forecandle and quarterdeck, four divisions
9 of the seamen. Each has an officer in charge and a number
10 of seamen to work the ship.

11
12 Q. Can I go back a step, CDRE Dollard, and finish - after
13 the war, did you take command of various Royal Australian
14 Navy ships and serving command of ships during the Korean
15 War?

16 A. I took command of the HMAS Murchison in the Korean
17 War, a frigate. That was my only seagoing command. I had
18 command of HMAS Penguin and HMAS Albatross, shore stations
19 in Australia.

20
21 Q. Could I ask a general question, sir. How does
22 a seaman officer get seamanship experience? What is the
23 learning for a seamanship officer, in those days?

24 A. Practical, on-the-job learning, as I've said, in
25 destroyers and the battle cruiser Repulse as a midshipman;
26 courses in navigation and communications, particularly in
27 the courses I referred to at Portsmouth; and, from then on,
28 posting to HMA ships and your seamanship training. Mark
29 you, you've already been trained in seamanship at the naval
30 college for four years, have undergone all facets of
31 seamanship training, including time in destroyers at sea,
32 just a short time in classes. I remember the
33 HMAS Vendetta, I believe, is a ship we trained in. So the
34 seamanship training from then on is on the job.

35
36 Q. As a consequence of your posting in HMAS Sydney, were
37 you aware of a ship's recognition procedure being
38 instituted in HMAS Sydney during your time on her?

39 A. Yes. We had recognition procedures promulgated by the
40 Royal Navy, which gave information such as light
41 combinations for varying different times of the day. You
42 would change probably twice a day, and they would be known
43 throughout the fleet, and also air recognition lights.
44 Also there was a system called IFF, interrogation friend
45 and foe, against aircraft. These types of recognition were
46 common within the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy.

1 Q. Were you aware of any set of challenges for
2 identification of ships?

3 A. I was aware that there were. The flag deck, that is
4 the communications officer and his crew on the flag deck,
5 would have the necessary knowledge of the flag signals
6 which are to challenge and the flag signals which should be
7 responded.

8
9 Q. Were flags the only mechanism for the relaying of
10 signals, or was light used as well?

11 A. Light could be used in confirmation, but the most
12 likely assertion of nationality or type of vessel -
13 correction, not the type of vessel, but friend or foe,
14 would be by flag hoist when you're referring to merchant
15 ships.

16
17 Q. Sir, during your time on Sydney, were you at times on
18 the bridge during the course of such challenges being made
19 to an unidentified ship?

20 A. I'm sure I was, but I can't specifically refer to
21 particular cases. I was on the bridge, three watches at
22 sea, for two years. And I'm sure in the course of that
23 time, we had plenty of challenges, but the answer to your
24 question is that I cannot specifically state.

25
26 Q. Sir, a general question, then. In relation to such
27 challenges, are you able to give the Commission an idea of
28 the officers that would be on the bridge when it came to
29 identifying such a ship?

30 A. The captain would certainly be on the bridge; the
31 officer of the watch; the principal control officer who
32 would be senior to the officer of the watch - he would be
33 in control of the armament and the general conduct of the
34 ship under the captain; the communications officer would
35 almost certainly be called when such a situation developed;
36 and of course chief yeoman and the signals crew, who were
37 very, very competent in that particular area.

38
39 Q. What about the navigator - where would the navigator
40 be?

41 A. The navigator would not be in any way responsible for
42 that area of operations.

43
44 Q. And the gunnery officer?

45 A. The gunnery officer likewise would not be responsible
46 for that area of operations, except that he would be very
47 interested in the outcome and prepared for the outcome.

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Q. And would those two officers be on the bridge in addition to the other personnel?

A. No, not in the ordinary course of just identifying a ship, unless there was reason for suspicion as to its character.

Q. What about at action stations?

A. At action stations, the gunnery officer would be on the bridge advising the captain and controlling the gunnery output of the ship.

Q. And the navigator?

A. The navigator certainly would be on the bridge. His action station on the bridge and his whole duty stations would have been on the bridge. He spends all his life at sea in his sea cabin right adjacent to the bridge, and, like the captain, he's on call right throughout the night and, of course, he's on the bridge by day.

Q. From your observations and your experience, does the captain call for assistance in situations such as are under discussion in ships recognition?

A. The captain and the navigator would already be on the bridge. If he wanted a gunnery officer for advice, although in this situation he perhaps would not need the gunnery officer - we're talking about recognition at this stage. He would call the communications officer to consult him regarding the types of challenges that have been mentioned. At that stage, so long as the captain remained without a higher degree of readiness being called, those would be the people on the bridge.

Q. And if the higher degree of readiness was called for action stations?

A. Well, if we go to action stations, I can describe the action stations - I think I have done. Gunnery officer on the bridge, navigator on the bridge, signal officer, communications officer on the bridge. On the flag deck, that is adjacent to the bridge, seamen officers in their gunnery duty, such as I was in the Sydney, at "X" turret, other seamen officers in "Y", "A" and "B" turrets; an officer in charge of the anti-aircraft weaponry on the gundeck; and the engineers of course in there. And the ship would be closed down, that is watertight doors would be shut, and the ship ready for action in the first degree of readiness, or otherwise called action stations.

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Q. I take it from what you've said that those officers, the senior officers on the ship, on the bridge, are there for consultation if the captain so choses?

A. They all have their own duties, specific duties, which they're getting on with. They're all available to the captain for consultation. I haven't mentioned - I should have done - the executive officer, that is, the commander. His action station would be in the after control to take over if the captain was killed or incapacitated. But in the meantime, his general duties would be ensuring that the ship was ready for action, moving around, if necessary consulting the captain, or if required by the captain to report to him. But the commander when the action started or action was imminent of course would get to his action station like everybody else.

Q. Sir, were you familiar with any books or literature or anything of that nature relating to the identification of merchant ships?

A. There would be constant publications by Admiralty - and we were working under the Admiralty, of course, in the Mediterranean and throughout the war. Admiralty provided us information - the codes for recognition, yes.

Q. What about in relation to silhouettes of ships and outlines of ships, familiarisation with merchant ships?

A. Yes, that was part of every ship's pack of information for the ship's company. We posted up identification of enemy ships and aircraft throughout the ship and particularly in the toilets where people, at their leisure, could examine them and commit them to memory.

Q. In your experience in relation to ships recognition, are you able to comment on the way in which merchant ships responded to the procedure for recognition?

A. There are various procedures, but the primary one would be a flag hoist, show your secret identification by flag, and if that was in accord with the expected reply as contained in the up-to-date procedures, which I can't say how frequently they are changed, but they are frequently changed by Admiralty - you would act accordingly. Merchant ships themselves have their identification signals, and they don't change. The ship's flag signals would remain. They don't get constant changes like we do in the navy.

Q. And, sir, from your seamanship experience, in a time

1 of war, up until there had been identification, what was
2 the position as far as the ship was concerned prior to
3 identification? How would you treat the merchant ship?

4 A. This would depend very much on the advice you had of
5 ships that may be found in the vicinity. Will you repeat
6 that question?

7

8 Q. Up until the time of identification of the ship that
9 was under challenge, in your experience how would that ship
10 be treated up until that time it had been identified?

11 A. Well, the ship would be kept at a distance while you
12 satisfied yourself as to its identification.

13

14 Q. Sir, in relation to the plot, a room called the plot,
15 are you familiar with that expression?

16 A. Yes.

17

18 Q. What is the plot?

19 A. The plot was adjacent in warships to the chart room
20 or, in smaller ships, part of the chart room, which would
21 contain your own course and speeds, enemy ships - rather,
22 not enemy - other consorts, your friendly ships with you,
23 their course and speed with you, any vessels on the horizon
24 that need to be watched. In other words, the plot would
25 contain a picture of the surface scene, and this is
26 a surface plot I refer to.

27

28 Q. Were you familiar with any system whereby ships on
29 Australia's station, or, indeed, with Sydney in the
30 Mediterranean were provided, by signal, with information
31 concerning the likelihood of merchant ships being in any
32 particular area of the ship's operations?

33 A. I can say that it was quite common for ships to be
34 provided with that information, but I'm not aware of any
35 specific cases that I could refer to now. But certainly
36 they have occurred frequently.

37

38 Q. Sir, what was the position in relation to radio
39 silence?

40 A. Once you went to sea, you established radio silence
41 until certain limits were reached. Obviously, if you go
42 into action, you immediately break radio silence to report
43 the action to your superiors, to your Admiralty or ACNB or
44 CNC or whoever it may be. So you do not break radio
45 silence until the enemy knows where you are, then you can
46 break radio silence. That's the principal of that.

47

1 Q. Going back to the seamanship aspect of warships, was
2 there any learning or experience that you picked up in
3 relation to the way in which a ship would be approached to
4 avoid attack by torpedo?

5 A. The principal is that you always, as far as possible,
6 comb the track and put yourself in a position to comb the
7 tracks of torpedoes, in other words, point into the area
8 you suspect a torpedo attack may come from. But of course
9 other considerations may not allow you to do that. Or you
10 can of course be stern on and comb the tracks in that way.
11 But you cannot be guided entirely by combing the tracks.
12 You have many other factors in action to consider, and that
13 is your gunnery, bring your arcs to bear so that your after
14 guns will bear, because they only have certain limits till
15 they come up to the stops. So the captain may wish to turn
16 the ship one way to bring his after guns to bear; he may
17 want to turn another way to guard against any suspected
18 torpedo attack. It would all depend on the circumstances
19 and the tactical situation at the time.

20
21 Q. Sir, you've indicated that you were the officer in
22 charge of "X" turret --

23 A. Yes.

24
25 Q. -- at your action stations position. If I could ask
26 about being called to action stations. As far as you were
27 concerned, if you were on the bridge, how would you get to
28 your position at action stations?

29 A. There would be an action officer of the watch who
30 would, on action stations being sounded, be up to the
31 bridge, take over from me and I would go off full speed to
32 my action station in the turret.

33
34 Q. Were the torpedoes manned at action stations?

35 A. Oh, yes.

36
37 Q. You've mentioned the turrets, "A" and "B", "X" and "Y"
38 turrets manned at action stations. The anti-aircraft guns
39 are manned at action stations?

40 A. Yes, the whole armament of the ship is - the ship's
41 complement in fact is dictated by the armament, largely, so
42 the whole of the armament is manned at action stations and
43 ready, fully manned.

44
45 Q. What about the aircraft?

46 A. The aircraft - obviously, at action stations, if it
47 hadn't already been launched, which may well have been done

1 for reconnaissance before you reached the stage we refer
2 to, but any imminent action or calling to action stations,
3 the aircraft would be manned, warmed up and waiting
4 captain's orders. The aircraft in the Sydney was not an
5 attack aircraft, the old Walrus, and it was basically for
6 reconnaissance.

7
8 Q. Would the engine be warmed up; would it be kept going
9 if it was a prolonged action station?

10 A. Oh, no. I think the crew would warm up the engine and
11 close down and wait for further orders.

12
13 Q. At action stations - I want to go to "X" turret -
14 would the guns be loaded?

15 A. Yes.

16
17 Q. Was there any exception to that "yes" that you've
18 indicated, or was that always the position?

19 A. You would go to action stations, if I may explain it
20 a little further?

21
22 Q. Please.

23 A. You would go to action stations. You would get
24 instructions from the bridge through the director control
25 system, the DCT, the director control tower, and depending
26 on the threat that caused you to go to action stations, the
27 type of ammunition would be determined by the gunnery
28 officer in consultation with the captain, and they would
29 order the ships to load with anti-aircraft or surface
30 ammunition, as required. Yes, on going to action stations
31 in wartime, you certainly would load the guns.

32
33 Q. How long would it take, generally speaking, from the
34 call to action stations for the guns to be loaded?

35 A. In wartime, you would already be at cruising stations.
36 If there was no immediate threat, you would be in three
37 watches. So the guns of at least two turrets would already
38 be loaded and manned. The other two turrets at action
39 stations would be closed up, manned and loaded.

40
41 Q. Was that your experience, sir, during the
42 Mediterranean campaign of Sydney?

43 A. Yes, indeed.

44
45 Q. Was it the same when Sydney was back on Australian
46 station?

47 A. We would always be at cruising stations at sea, and

1 more likely at action stations in the Mediterranean. As
2 soon as we left Alexandria harbour, we would go to action
3 stations and probably, or mostly, we would be prepared for
4 anti-aircraft defence, and we frequently would find that
5 was required. On the Australian station where action was
6 not considered so imminent, we would more likely go to
7 action stations, clear away everything, revert to cruising
8 stations in three watches.

9
10 Q. You've indicated the degree of readiness. Are you
11 familiar with the term "the fourth degree of readiness"?

12 A. I can imagine it, but I'm not familiar with it.
13 I never believe that I went to fourth degree of readiness.
14 It's just as it sounds. It's a matter of degree.

15
16 Q. In the fourth degree of readiness, is it your
17 understanding that the guns would not be manned, any of
18 them?

19 A. I don't think there was, in my experience, a fourth
20 degree of readiness. The ships would go to sea. The guns
21 obviously would be not loaded. You would go to sea. You
22 would immediately go to action stations. You would load
23 the guns. When the threat did not develop, assuming the
24 threat did not develop, you would revert to cruising
25 stations, and the guns would then still be loaded, if you
26 wished. But the captain would not wish - he would unload
27 the two guns, two turrets, that weren't closed up in the
28 cruising stations. So you would have the guns loaded
29 unless specifically you unloaded at the closing down of
30 cruising stations. But the answer to your question is,
31 yes, you go to sea, your guns are loaded in wartime.

32
33 THE PRESIDENT: Q. Can you unload the major guns, the
34 6-inch guns?

35 A. There are two ways, sir.

36
37 Q. Fire them off.

38 A. The first, in action, if you want to change your
39 ammunition, you simply clear the guns through the barrels,
40 fire them off, and then you're ready to load up the
41 required ammunition. For instance, if you are in surface
42 mode and you have an air attack, you would shoot off your
43 surface ammunition with which the guns were loaded, and you
44 would immediately load with anti-aircraft barrage.

45
46 CMDR RUSH: Q. And if you didn't discharge or unload
47 your guns by firing, was there any other mechanism of

1 unloading the guns?

2 A. Yes, but not one which would be used at sea, and that
3 is simply to push back. There are poles with rubber necks
4 on them which you push up the barrel and push back, and
5 that would be more like a peacetime operation when you
6 conserve your ammunition. But you would also do it in
7 wartime, when you went into harbour, it would be very
8 proper to push your ammunition back, push back, and, in
9 other words, unload. But that depends on the threat. You
10 still may be expecting air attack in Alexandria harbour,
11 for instance, and we always had guns loaded in Alexandria
12 harbour, night and day.

13
14 Q. I take it that you didn't have them loaded in
15 Fremantle harbour?

16 A. No.

17
18 Q. And, sir, was there that distinction between the sorts
19 of duties that may be encountered in and around Australian
20 waters and the nature of that convoy duty from the sort of
21 degree of readiness that there would be in the
22 Mediterranean?

23 A. There was a great difference. In the Mediterranean,
24 you were in action or the threat of action constantly,
25 particularly from the air, but also, on many occasions,
26 from the sea. And there were no occasions at sea in the
27 Mediterranean when you wouldn't be already guns loaded and
28 if you could stand down to cruising watches, you would.
29 But there's another in-between degree of readiness, action
30 stations relaxed, and that was used a lot. You would go to
31 action stations. If the immediate threat had passed, you
32 would have action stations relaxed. Troops could lie down
33 and rest on the deck or go to sleep, some of them, half the
34 crew, perhaps, but not leave the guns. Similarly with the
35 torpedoes and the rest of the ship; you would be at your
36 action stations, ready to close up at a moment's notice.
37 If you were not in that state, action stations would take
38 about 10 minutes for guns to be closed up and everything
39 reported and ready to proceed.

40
41 Q. And, sir, may I just ask from your recollection, how
42 long would it take the ship from the call to action
43 stations to be at action stations?

44 A. In the Mediterranean, a matter of minutes. The crew
45 knew where to go. They took their rest close to their
46 action stations. It was part of the whole crew's
47 determination to be at the ready, and I think in the

1 Mediterranean you would expect to be at action stations
2 within five minutes.

3
4 Q. Was it any different if there was a call to action
5 stations in Australian waters?

6 A. The crew would not be so keyed up and they wouldn't be
7 taking their recreation alongside the guns; they would be
8 down below playing cards, and it would take quite some time
9 longer, perhaps 10 minutes, before the ship was reported
10 ready, action stations reported to the captain.

11
12 THE PRESIDENT: Q. Commodore, do I understand what you
13 said correctly, that when in escort duty or returning from
14 escort duty around the Australian coast, you would expect
15 to have two of the major guns, two turrets, armed and ready
16 and two stood down?

17 A. Yes, that would be cruising watches, cruising
18 stations.

19
20 Q. And the 4-inch guns would not be manned?

21 A. Yes, half the 4-inch guns would be manned as well.
22 That is cruising stations - half the armament. The captain
23 could tell the torpedo crews they were not required. But
24 unless otherwise ordered, they would also be half manned.

25
26 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

27
28 CMDR RUSH: Q. Sir, may I ask you a couple of questions
29 about director control and the director control of gunnery.
30 Were bearings in relation to the fire from turrets provided
31 from director control to the turret?

32 A. Yes. The primary control - the main armament is
33 primarily designed for long-range surface action, and they
34 would be controlled by the DCT, the director control tower.

35
36 Q. For the bearing and range of the guns, was that
37 controlled in the turret or was it controlled through the
38 director?

39 A. No, by the director.

40
41 Q. So if there was a particular range and a particular
42 bearing, would the guns automatically go to that position
43 through director control?

44 A. They would follow director, yes.

45
46 Q. And would they follow director as a consequence of
47 someone following director in the turret or would it be

1 automatic from director?

2 A. No, it would be up to the director control officer,
3 main armament control officer, to order, "Follow director."
4 If I may say, the guns may well be on lookout bearings, the
5 two forward turrets, one starboard, one port, and likewise
6 the two after turrets, one starboard and one port, so you
7 were on lookout bearings, and if the director gets on to
8 a target, it will then order, "Follow director". All the
9 guns will then swing to that particular bearing and, from
10 then on, follow director for range and elevation, the gun
11 layers providing the range, the gun trainers providing the
12 direction.

13

14 Q. And in relation to the director giving the information
15 about bearing and range, how is that communicated into the
16 turret?

17 A. It's communicated electrically via what we call
18 telltales. The movements, the bearing and elevation of the
19 turret, are transmitted electrically to the telltales in
20 the turrets, and the turret trainer and director simply
21 follow their telltale and they are on the same bearing and
22 training and elevation as indicated by the DCT. They
23 follow the director.

24

25 Q. Is what they follow, in effect, a pointer?

26 A. Yes, it's a pointer.

27

28 Q. In the turret?

29 A. Yes, we call it a telltale.

30

31 Q. In relation to firing of the main armament, "X"
32 turret, how is it communicated from the turret to director
33 that you are on target, your guns are loaded, everything's
34 ready to go?

35 A. You have gone to action stations. You have
36 predetermined whether to load barrage for anti-aircraft or
37 surface. Having loaded, you report that position, you are
38 loaded. If you are told to follow director, stand by. The
39 turrets will then, when they are trained and the elevation
40 is on the director indicators, report ready. The captains
41 of guns will report ready. And the interceptor will be
42 closed, which completes the circuit. The captain of the
43 gun will close his interceptor, which is purely an
44 electrical switch, which completes the circuit. The light
45 will show up in the director control tower. And hopefully,
46 if all eight guns have moved quickly, the director control
47 officer will have eight lights, white lights, shining at

1 him. He then reports to the captain, "Ready to open fire."
2

3 Q. And firing is through director?

4 A. By the director layer, at the order of the director
5 control officer, who says, "Shoot", and it all happens.
6

7 Q. Is there a capacity of "X" turret to fire and to make
8 its own arrangements in relation to bearing and range
9 independently of director?

10 A. In my recollection, there is no set piece for
11 independent control within the turret. The turret has only
12 two viewing outlets: one for the trainer and one for the
13 layer. They are simply slats in the forward part of the
14 coating of the turret. The only people who can see out of
15 the turret are those two operators. It's a tunnel vision.
16 He can only see where the turret is pointing. He has no
17 peripheral vision whatsoever.
18

19 The turret officer has no fire control equipment. He
20 has not even binoculars. His job is, within the turret, to
21 organise, control and give the instructions for the
22 operation of the turret. But he has no outside visual. As
23 I say, the only people who have any outside visual is the
24 director layer and trainer, who have simply tunnel vision
25 straight out the barrel of the guns, or above the barrel of
26 the guns, in that direction.
27

28 The director officer himself - the only way he can see
29 what's going on if that is required is to unlock the hatch
30 cover above his head and stick his head out and have
31 a look. But there is no system designed for him to take
32 over fire control.
33

34 Q. If the sight layer or the turret trainer - you've
35 spoken of them being the only persons having a tunnel
36 vision - have a vision of a target, is the gun then capable
37 of firing at the target?

38 A. Yes, if the trainer in those circumstances is put on
39 to the target, he will then see the target; he can hold the
40 target. He can't search for another target, but he can
41 hold one that he has been put on to. In the case of
42 a surface target - of course, this wouldn't operate at all
43 against an aircraft - he can hold a surface target, having
44 been put on to it.
45

46 The elevation, which is in the control of the gun
47 layer, would be obviously, in a situation like this, almost

1 zero, so the officer of the turret could order zero or five
2 degrees of elevation, depending on the range which he
3 estimated, because he does not have any range-finding
4 equipment in the turret. But the officer - and this I'm
5 improvising and I would improvise in this way if I was in
6 the turret - having been given a target and conned by left,
7 right, train right, train left, the trainer on to the
8 target, told the gun layer elevation zero or 2 degrees or
9 5 degrees, he would be in a position to order, "Fire" and
10 the gun layer would press his trigger and the gun could
11 fire. That is an improvised way of operating a target
12 without any external control.

13

14 Q. Thank you. And, sir, do the gun layer and gun trainer
15 each have an individual slit out through the turret to
16 enable at least some vision?

17 A. Yes, that's what I referred to, the tunnel vision he
18 gets through there. He can't look right or left from that;
19 he's straight through that telescopic view he has.

20

21 Q. Are those two apertures, if you like, for vision open
22 at action stations?

23 A. I believe that I would have them closed, because
24 I would have greater security within the turret, and I say
25 that without serious thought. I'd have them closed.
26 I believe they are closed. This is 70 years ago I'm
27 talking about.

28

29 Q. Sir, and again going back 70 years, are you able to
30 say whether they're capable of being opened from the
31 inside?

32 A. From the inside?

33

34 Q. Yes.

35 A. I would say, yes, there would be a dog clamp to screw
36 down on the inside, unscrew and push them out, yes. I say
37 that being prepared to be contradicted.

38

39 Q. Thank you, sir.

40 A. I'm not certain of that point.

41

42 Q. Sir, may I very quickly run through personnel in the
43 turret. You have mentioned captain of the turret and
44 you've mentioned the sight layer and the turret trainer?

45 A. Gun layer and gun trainer.

46

47 Q. Is there a telephone operator?

1 A. The only telephone communication is the officer of the
2 quarters, who has earphones and he's in contact with the
3 DCT.

4
5 Q. For each of the guns, is there a guns crew?

6 A. The turret officer has communication, but the guns in
7 a turret have no operation other than to the turret
8 officer, who then communicates with the DCT, the director
9 control tower.

10
11 Q. For each of the guns in the turret, is there a crew,
12 a guns crew?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14
15 Q. Does that comprise approximately seven men?

16 A. Yes. Each gun.

17
18 Q. To support the turret, is there an ammunition lobby
19 crew?

20 A. Yes, a hoist ammunition supply comes from the magazine
21 and the shell-handling room up the hoist straight into the
22 loading trays in the turret in each gun, and the loading
23 trays, as soon as the ammunition arrives there, if you
24 intend to load, then the rams will be operated and will
25 load the guns and the chain of ammunition supply will
26 continue until stopped.

27
28 Q. To maintain the shell and cordite, is that the job of
29 the ammunition lobby crew?

30 A. Yes, the shell-handling room and the ammunition lobby.
31 The shell-handling room and the magazine crew handle the
32 shells and the cartridges, as we described, and they go
33 into their respective slots in the ammunition hoist and are
34 moved up to the turret where they will be transferred to
35 the loading by mechanical action operated by the crew, to
36 the loading trays, and the next movement is to ram, again
37 by mechanical action, the ammunition into the breeches or
38 through the breeches, then close the breech with a BM
39 lever, the breech mechanism lever. The guns captain
40 reports, "Gun loaded, BM lever closed", he closes his
41 interceptors and the officer of the turret reports to the
42 DCT that all guns are loaded and ready.

43
44 Q. In relation to the ammunition lobby crew, would that
45 be 10 men?

46 A. Are you speaking of the ammunition lobby crew? I'm
47 not certain that I know that particular expression. We

1 have the magazine crew and the shell-handling crew.

2
3 Q. And how many men are involved in that, sir,
4 approximately?

5 A. Approximately, I would say in each there would be
6 10 men.

7
8 Q. Sir, a final matter. What was the rate of fire?

9 A. I could only give you a guess from experience.

10 I suppose you would hopefully be firing - I have no
11 knowledge at this stage of what the anticipated or what the
12 planned rate is, but I would say you would be firing about
13 two rounds a minute from the 6-inch guns. From a 4-inch
14 gun, which is hand loaded, you would get hopefully up to
15 12 or 14 rounds per minute.

16
17 The other thing is, if I may say so, the rounds per
18 minute in the turrets depends entirely on the orders from
19 the director control, because the director control officer,
20 the main armament control officer, is personally
21 controlling each round or salvo. Perhaps he will order "A"
22 and "B" turrets salvos, and he will fire ranging salvos at
23 the target. He has it in his binoculars. He'll spot the
24 fall of shot. If the fall of shot is over the target, he
25 will come down intentionally to bring it short of the
26 target. In other words, he comes down 800.

27
28 And if that doesn't fall short of the target, down
29 another 800 until he falls short of the target. He has
30 then straddled the target. Then he goes up 400, and the
31 target should be in the middle, and then he can adjust
32 slightly.

33
34 But on every one of those orders, "Up 400, shoot", and
35 then he'll spot that fall of shot, see where it goes, down
36 200, bring it down to the target, "Shoot". So the fall of
37 shot depends entirely on the director control officer.

38
39 Then when he is satisfied he has the target, he will
40 say, "Broadsides". That brings all guns to bear and they
41 fire at maximum speed. But the firing is conducted by the
42 director layer, not the turret layer. So when he says,
43 "Broadsides, bring all the guns to ready", the gun layer,
44 on the order to shoot by the director control officer,
45 presses his trigger, and all eight guns should fire.

46
47 Q. One final matter, sir. Were the ammunition hoists in

1 the turret electrically controlled?

2 A. The hydraulic control, electrically powered hydraulic
3 control.

4
5 <EXAMINATION BY LCDR RENWICK:

6
7 LCDR RENWICK: Q. Sir, in 1941 on the Sydney at action
8 stations, is anyone meant to be still on the deck?

9 A. Still where?

10
11 Q. On the deck.

12 A. Well, all the gun crews are on the deck. I mean, the
13 4-inch guns are upper deck guns, and all the guns crews,
14 your machine-guns, pom-poms and other types of
15 anti-aircraft weapons in particular are exposed on the
16 deck. So the answer to that question is all your secondary
17 weaponry guns crews are. The 4-inch guns and the minor
18 weapons, as I suggested, machine-guns, are basically for
19 air defence, but they can also be used very effectively in
20 surface defence or action. But there are lots of crews -
21 all the guns crews are on the deck, and the torpedo crews
22 are all on the deck.

23
24 Q. Perhaps a follow-up question. In those circumstances,
25 action stations on the Sydney in 1941, are there any
26 circumstances in which the cooks should be standing in the
27 port waist or leaning on the guardrails?

28 A. There's no situation in which they should be, but
29 there are certainly situations where they would be
30 relaxing. From my memory, the bakery is on the starboard
31 waist, that is, the starboard side of the deck. Just
32 forward of that is the torpedo space, and there's no reason
33 why the crew, taking a breather, the cooks and bakers
34 taking a breather, shouldn't wander out the door through
35 the torpedo space and have a good look at what was
36 happening.

37
38 Q. Even at action stations?

39 A. Oh, no, at action stations they have duties not in the
40 galley, but all cooks, stewards, band and people are down
41 in places like the magazines, loading the magazine hoists.

42
43 Q. So to clarify, at action stations, they shouldn't be
44 on the deck at all?

45 A. No, action stations definitely not. The only people
46 on the deck have a gunnery position to fulfil.

1 LCDR RENWICK: Thank you, sir.

2

3 THE PRESIDENT: Q. Commodore, you said that ships keep
4 a distance until they're satisfied as to the identification
5 of a vessel they're trying to identify. That produces
6 a bit of a conundrum, it seems to me. If the
7 identification signalling is to take place by flags, at
8 what distance in 1941 could you read merchant vessels' flag
9 signals?

10 A. The flag deck staff, equipped with the best
11 binoculars, I would say could read a clear flag hoist,
12 clearly, 3 or 4 miles.

13

14 Q. So that necessarily means that the ships must come
15 within that distance to effectively communicate?

16 A. Communicate by flag, yes, yes.

17

18 Q. Flag was the preferred method of communication between
19 warships and merchant vessels, is that right, in 1941?

20 A. Yes, merchant ships would all have a secret flag hoist
21 to indicate their name, and that would be so.

22

23 Q. If the vessel that you're seeking to identify happened
24 to be an enemy raider with a 5.9 inch, 15cm gun capacity of
25 18,000 yards distance with director control, that
26 necessarily means that the warship must come within
27 a danger zone?

28 A. If he found it necessary, all other things being
29 considered, to approach to that range in order to identify
30 the flags, he would do so. On the other hand, the captain
31 may determine that the danger of such an operation was
32 excessive and would remain out of effective range of
33 a likely raider. He could do several things. One thing
34 would be to send off the aircraft to survey, on
35 reconnaissance. The aircraft could do its best to identify
36 the ship and report back.

37

38 He could require the ship to lower a boat with its
39 papers and the ship to steam off, and then the warship, his
40 own ship, to steam up to the boat and inspect papers.
41 There are various --

42

43 Q. But giving that order, if it was done by flag, would
44 mean that he was within range, anyway?

45 A. If he was out of visual range of the flags, he could
46 send off his aircraft. He could also, if he was doubtful
47 about approaching to within that range, instruct the ship

1 by light, by Morse code or by plain language - correction,
2 not Morse code, by plain language, to lower a boat with its
3 books and steam off, and he has control of the situation
4 then, and the boat and the books could be examined to
5 satisfy himself that the ship is what it says it is.
6

7 Q. There are two alternatives. One is to use your
8 aircraft. If you don't do that, then you must revert to
9 signalling by light, because you can read that at further
10 distance?

11 A. Oh, yes.
12

13 Q. Are they the two alternatives? I mean, are there any
14 more?

15 A. No. I think lower a boat, send your aircraft off.
16 You have suggested that they use a light, and that is quite
17 right. All sorts of communications can be completed at
18 range by light. We have a 10-inch signalling projector,
19 which has a range of well up to 8 to 10 miles.
20

21 Q. What about at night-time, where presumably you can't
22 use your aircraft --

23 A. That's right.
24

25 Q. -- because you couldn't recover it, apart from
26 anything else.

27 A. That's right.
28

29 Q. So you are left then just to signal by light because
30 flags can't be seen.

31 A. Correct.
32

33 Q. That gives you the same range that you've just
34 mentioned at night, but then if you want to confirm any
35 answer you've received from the vessel, you would have to
36 go in close and use your searchlight, would you not?

37 A. Well, I think the alternative, the most likely course
38 in that situation would be to shadow the vessel concerned
39 until daylight and use daylight procedure.
40

41 Q. And you shadow it in what way?

42 A. In gun range at 10 miles or - I mean, if the ship
43 being shadowed refuses to follow your directions, you can
44 open fire.
45

46 Q. Yes, I understand that. How did one find a ship at
47 8 miles distance at night without radio tracking

1 facilities?

2 A. Well, a merchant ship may well be showing its
3 navigation lights. It should. A raider obviously would
4 not. On the other hand, perhaps the raider would, just to
5 indicate that it was what it wasn't, or wasn't what it was
6 said to be. So I think that's the answer - the warship
7 would shadow the suspect at maybe 10 miles range, and the
8 suspect would conduct itself in accordance with the orders;
9 otherwise, it will be subject to attack.

10
11 THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything arising out of that?

12
13 CMDR RUSH: No, sir.

14
15 LCDR RENWICK: No, thank you, sir.

16
17 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Commodore. You've
18 been very helpful.

19
20 SHORT ADJOURNMENT

21
22 THE PRESIDENT: Q. CDRE Dollard, there is one other
23 matter that I would like your evidence about. I'm speaking
24 only of operations off the Australian coast, not in the
25 Mediterranean. An examination of the Sydney's log - and
26 I'll take this period as an example - when the ship was
27 under the command of CAPT Collins shows that she identified
28 vessels on 48 different occasions; on only two of those did
29 she go to action stations.

30
31 That seems to mean that the identification could be
32 made safely, or was made, in any event, on the great
33 majority of occasions, without going to action stations yet
34 in circumstances where the aircraft was not used, which
35 means that she went within a range of the guns of any of
36 those vessels, should they have happened to be an enemy
37 raider, because the identification process involved her
38 doing that.

39
40 Was there some factor operating that enabled ships'
41 captains to confidently go about their task of
42 identification without using the aircraft and without going
43 to action stations off the Australian coast in 1941?

44 A. May I refer to your remarks about the frequency of the
45 need for identification on many occasions? And I think
46 that was referring to a Mediterranean period under
47 CAPT Collins.

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47

Q. No.

A. No?

Q. The period from January after she arrived back in Australia until mid-May.

A. Many of those sightings would undoubtedly have been of small and recognisable ships, which would therefore eliminate them. Only in the case of ships of a size that makes them a possible raider or offensive target would you need to establish identity in the way we have described. But I think that the majority of ships down and down the coast of Australia or in the waters adjacent to Australia east or west, the sightings would be infrequent, other than coastal traffic which I've just referred to, and it would only be on the sightings of larger ships, perhaps you could say 15,000 tonnes or more, the captain would decide that he needed to have identification by the means of flags or other signal.

Q. There was intelligence available to commanding officers throughout 1941 which indicated that, such as was known of German merchant raiders, they had tonnages of somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 tonnes. So logic would suggest that you would have to examine carefully ships of that size.

A. With that information, yes, that would be so.

Q. Apart from size, is there any other factor that could have been operating?

A. Well, merchant ships in wartime would be showing lights, but then a raider, of course, would also be imitating a merchant ship, an innocent merchant ship, and showing lights. You can establish communication by light and require the ship to identify itself. But the difficulty would be, of course, of ascertaining the veracity of that identification.

Q. I had thought about size. There's nothing else that I can put into this mix?

A. No, I think size; obviously, any intelligence that you have of merchant shipping, which you get reports of, as much as they come to hand to the naval board or the commander-in-chief, firing station, where we are speaking of more or less in the Indian Ocean. Reports go out regularly from administrative authorities of shipping, shipping reports in the area that you are operating in, and

1 you may well have reason to accept certain vessels which
2 you know are expected to be in the area as such vessels.
3 But it's very much a matter of what you can determine from
4 the evidence that you have or have not.

5
6 THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything arising out of that?

7
8 LCDR RENWICK: No, sir.

9
10 CMDR RUSH: No, sir.

11
12 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Commodore.

13
14 <THE WITNESS WITHDREW

15
16 CMDR RUSH: Sir, I call Rear Admiral Reed, retired.

17
18 <MAX REED, sworn: [4.30pm]

19
20 <EXAMINATION BY CMDR RUSH:

21
22 CMDR RUSH: Q. Sir, could you state your full name to
23 the Commissioner, please?

24 A. My full name, sir, on my birth certificate, is
25 Max Reed. I was christened Maxwell Peter Reed and
26 confusion has arisen many times because my father inducted
27 me into the navy as Maxwell Peter Reed.

28
29 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

30
31 CMDR RUSH: Q. And your address?

32 A. My address is [REDACTED].

33
34 Q. You're a retired naval officer, sir?

35 A. Yes.

36
37 Q. You joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1936?

38 A. Yes.

39
40 Q. After naval college, were you posted to HMAS Canberra
41 for one week, and then did you serve on HMAS Australia?

42 A. That's correct.

43
44 Q. And did you serve on HMAS Australia on Australia
45 station until you went to undertake an engineering course
46 in the United Kingdom in 1943?

47 A. Yes, I left Australia in March 1940.