
From: Richard Arundel [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, 24 October 2008 8:46 PM
To: Katrina Radburn; stephen.harper@sydneyii.com.au
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: CLOSING DATE FOR SUBMISSIONS - HMAS SYDNEYII COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

For Leut Harper,

Have completed a full week at the TNA Kew with an independent file review and the following may be of interest:

1. Someone believed to be a journalist holds a number of files that were not released during this week!
2. Equal Speed Manoeuvres (ESM) and Manoeuvring Distances are described in ADM 186/786 (Conduct of Fleet, SP 02200, para 108) with numerous examples of formations, many with 1,000 yd distances between formations or columns. Column distances in line-abreast are at 4 cables minimum for cruisers. My comment would be that SYDNEY's Mediterranean experienced bridge staff, especially the Navigating Officer, could have been influenced by these procedures.
3. (a). ADM 1/11889 page 43 of P/G 14257 includes a comprehensive report by Dr Habben, presumably not detected when he was repatriated from the Victorian POW camp, to the German High Command in which he confirms SYDNEY was at 900 metres from KORMORAN when the final action began.
(b). A copy of a top secret report PG/11875/NID vide page 76 could not be located. This could be of interest since it probably summarises Admiralty comment of KORMORAN's actions.
4. ADM 1/12883 and 15037 disclose intense debates between naval staffs (pre 1943 missing) describing 3 cruiser/raider incidents where there is palpable disagreement about the confusing differences between the Naval Prize Manual (1923) para 80 and both Fighting Instructions (ADM 239/261, CB 04027(39) and Fighting Experience ADM 239/335, CB 04211, culminating in new guidance to deconfuse Commanding Officers but this only occurs in 1943! It would appear that early on in the war apprehension of enemy shipping and prevention from scuttling was then a major consideration.
5. The Mership Secret War Call Sign book could not be located anywhere at this time. I had hoped the Naval Records in Portsmouth may have given some leads.
6. (a). ADM 223/505 (NID 0201) concerns cipher security and reveals that 3 sets of warship secret war call signs were compromised from 3 RN submarines in the Heligoland Bight in 1940. It may be that Dr. John Chapman's "Price of Admiralty" translations refer to naval call signs alone rather than both naval and merchant ship secret call signs.
(b). ADM 239/335 (04211 (11) (C)) records the loss of a full set of HMS HARDY's Flotilla Leaders code material at Narvik in April 1940. Did this include the mership secret call sign book?
7. There appears to be a dearth of material concerning merchant ship code and call sign compromises and no record could be located of any subsequent releasable examination of the 1980's revelations in "Price of Admiralty". There is a post WWII report that German crypto staffs were ordered "to go to ground with the Armistice and to destroy all sensitive workings".
8. AMSI 320 (M.0934/41) describes the distribution of mership war W/T call signs in Admiralty Envelope "W" to all merships.
9. AMSI 415 (8 May 1941) describes Enemy Reporting including 'QQQQ' messages. AMSI's were easily compromised.
10. Para 123 Section II of ADM 239/261 (CB 04027 (39)) Fighting Instructions will be of interest.

Sincerely,
Richard Arundel