Captain Burnett was a tyro in the art of naval warfare. He had never seen an angry shot fired. He lacked experience. He knew that he had never commanded a ship in action, therefore he should have been cautious; perhaps during his wartime appointment in Navy Office, he had not been taught to be cautious.

At the time of sighting the Kormoran Captain Burnett held all the trumps. He could have used his aircraft to examine the ship. He could have stood off while he sought advice and identification of the ship from Naval Authorities.

For example according to G. Herman Gill, Page 457, Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942: "Three days after the Sydney was lost, but before her loss became known, HMS Devonshire met the raider Atlantis in the South Atlantic. Atlantis, whose actions caused the deepest suspicions, claimed to be the Dutch Polyphemus and the possibility, said the report of the encounter, of suspicious movements and and incoherent signals being due to our language and procedure had to be taken into account. From the little that was known of the movements of Polyphemus it was not impossible for her to be in the area. In this doubt Devonshire kept her distance at high speed and wirelessed the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, asking if Polyphemus could be genuine. She had to wait for nearly an hour for a reply which came with dramatic suddenness: 'No. Repition No'.

"Devonshire at once opened fire at 15,000 yards, and Atlantis was destroyed helpless, outranged and outgunned so far as Devonshire was concerned."

The Devonshire's captain was cautious and his ship and crew lived to fight another day.

But not the Sydney's.

I suggest, that unless there is solid evidence to the contrary, the Committee ought to condemn Captain Burnett for his lack of skill and caution which led to the loss of his ship and its entire crew.

I have considered it his duty to condemn and punish any sailor under his command for any dereliction of duty, however small. That was the custom of the Navy.

Why should it be different for him?

I further suggest that Committee members read Pages 448 to 460 of Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942 by G. Hermon Gill.

I thank you for reading this document. I do not envy the Committee's difficult task.

Yours faithfully,

Geoff Willson.
Supplementary Submission to "The Circumstances of the Sinking of the HMAS Sydney" Inquiry Sub-Committee.

1. Background.

When hostilities between Great Britain and its Empire and Nazi Germany began on September 3, 1939, Australia was a self-governing Dominion and an integral part of that Empire. The attitudes and loyalties of the majority of the Australian population was determined largely by that attachment and the joint influences of the experiences of the Great War, 1914-1918, and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The effects of the latter still very much in evidence. Internationally, events were unsettling, too. For several years war had been generally considered inevitable. The impact of the outbreak of war was predictable - the Royal Australian Navy, already well into the process of mobilisation, was for all intents and purposes absorbed as an arm of the Royal Navy - albeit with an Australian identity but with a consequence probably not really appreciated or foreseen at the time.

A communication network essential to the prosecution of the war and an integral part for the necessary planning involved in the process was based in London and, in naval matters, determined and controlled by the British Admiralty. Naturally the connection incurred vital security considerations by no means apparent to Australia - an outpost of Empire half an world away - its government and a small navy which had both its policy and operational function greatly influenced by Royal Navy flag officers primarily answerable to the London based Admiralty. Basically Australia's own national security concerns in a regional Indian Ocean / Pacific Ocean naval sense were subordinated to the United Kingdom and its Empire perceptions of needs and priorities. A flawed reliance to be proven in 1941.

Australia and its People had in those early war years yet to learn the price of admiralty is exacted in flesh and blood, ship loss and heart break. To some
By the time of the HMAS Sydney / HSK Kormoran action, Nazi Germany was at the zenith of its power. Most of Continental Europe was either directly under its control or hegemony – from the Arctic to the North African littoral and from the Atlantic seaboard to the outskirts of Moscow and the banks of the Volga River. 1941 was the year of seemingly endless media announcements of "Strategic Withdrawals". At sea, in the Atlantic Ocean the U-boat offensive had developed an ominous threat to the seat of Empire along with an incipient raider activity in the Indian Ocean. In the Far East - significantly Australia's Near North - an increasingly belligerent Japan was just cause for concern. However regardless of those immediate regional threats a steady leakage of Australia's potential defence capacity in human, equipment, materiel and financial resources continued to augment overseas commitment in Europe and the Middle East in all three military services.

It was against that background that the HMAS Sydney / HSK Kormoran battle took place almost in sight of the West Australian coastline and only 200 to 300 nautical miles from the WA capital, Perth and the major port of Fremantle and even closer to the near Northern Ports of Geraldton and Carnarvon. The encounter gave good grounds for local and national concern and questioning. It also brought serious pressure upon a Commonwealth Government barely two months in office and depending on two independent members of parliament for support. The first Curtin government came to office lacking practical ministerial experience as the ALP had only been in office once during the years immediately after World War One i.e., 1929 - 1931 - the beginning of the Great Depression. Indeed one would be hard pressed to imagine a more daunting scenario for any government than the circumstances of that tragic naval loss - the complete disappearance of a light six-inch gunned cruiser and its entire crew; no survivors, negligible debris. An enigma further compounded by having to rely largely upon the enemy version to construct the sequence of events and the immediate aftermath. From the beginning there was destined to be doubt and controversy.

2 ... Professional qualifications:-

Left with only the German and now official accounts of that fateful encounter, Captain Burnett's act in placing HMAS Sydney in the extremely vulnerable position vis-à-vis HSK Kormoran inevitably invites a questioning of his professional competency while neglecting possible reasons for so doing and the mandatory identification procedures in force at the time. Burnett was no fool, his suspicions would have been present from the moment of first sighting "Kormoran" and further heightened by its alleged reactions as recounted by its commanding officer, Korvettenkapitan Theodor Detmers. This is the critically significant period during which something could have happened to explain Burnett's subsequent behaviour. Sadly, on present evidence - this will remain conjecture. However it could be postulated either the prospect was of a high seas arrest of an enemy vessel possibly mistaken as a raider supply ship and certainly not the raider itself or if the latter, a proven enemy already in a damaged condition and even surrendered, as was suggested during the Perth hearings. Either possibility is creditable. Captain Burnett made a wrong decision - a fatal decision BUT that does not justify a questioning of his competence as a professional. Wisdom gained from hindsight but lacking full facts of the circumstances, is a flawed quality. See Attachment 1.

The opposing commanders obviously had differing agendas, Burnett's being destruction/capture and possibly rescue: Detmers, deception and destruction. The latter knew his singular objective whereas Burnett had two options, capture or destroy and in the latter option risk killing possible Allied and Australian prisoners of war held on "Kormoran", a distasteful prospect although one which in wartime was always a possibility. Risk is an ever present element in any professional following - it cannot be eliminated. The HMAS Sydney / HSK action was one of many played out on the chessboard of the war on the high seas. Bit players in a
war of global proportions but significantly operatives of their own individual command hierarchies and answerable to those hierarchies.

The fickleness of Fate is exemplified in that action off the WA coast, had Burnett and HMAS Sydney succeeded the reputation of the redoubtable cruiser, its captain and ship's company would have been hailed nationally and victoriously in the annals of Australia’s naval history. The latter was not to be so - but rather in the opposite and present tragic sense.

Captain Joseph Burnett was the product of a rigorous training and development programme designed toward one end - a naval career - based on all the values, traditions and professional competency learned over centuries of British naval history. It would have been ingrained in his every fibre. A process beginning in his early teen years as a naval cadet, staged through sea-going experience under various ships' commanders and types of ships, progressive technical courses - Burnett's being gunnery - and eventual promotion to full captain’s rank with that distinguished first graduate group of Australian naval officers to attain such promotion. Captain Joseph Burnett did not lack professional standard or acumen and neither would Korvettenkapitan Theodor Detmers who would have advanced to his command under much a similar career development.

By all means question, speculate motives and tactics and theorise on any number of the perplexing issues of this specific incident but do not be judgmental. War is a bloody, brutal occupation - an exceptional and testing time for all involved but none more so than action commanders.

Rear Admiral (retired) G J B Crabb, R AN - Volume 3, pps 508-511 - raises pertinent points about Captain Burnett’s action. I acknowledge Crabb's expertise and opinion, however, with all due respect, I disagree that boredom was a contributing factor in the "Sydney" disaster. I suggest boredom was no more or less present in the "Sydney" case than elsewhere where naval units operated seemingly distant from where the action was taking place. Boredom was a fact of service life - coursing adrenaline accompanying the prospect of action or any perceived potential threat quickly wiped that. My contention relating to HMAS Sydney’s readiness " to engage the enemy " seems borne out by the few latteres contained in other submissions. An interesting aside regarding HMAS Adelaide which spent an extended time on the West Australian station after the "Sydney" was widely termed the "AIF ship i.e., 'Always in Fremantle'. Did HMAS Sydney prompt the term from before and again after her Mediterranean tour of duty?

3 Communications:

The global naval communication network established by the British Admiralty over decades to service Imperial and Empire strategic demands was primarily dependent upon powerful wireless stations located in the respective fleet command regions. A constant concern in that communication field was the security and integrity of the cryptographic system vital to the effective transmission of intelligence and command. All cryptography being considered as top priority to undetected enemy code/cypher breakers.

From my recollection all British naval cryptography used during 1939-1942 was four figure groups with encoding/encyphering tables which were in force for specific time/date intervals, set use and circumstance. That system superseded the pre-war alphabetical structured administrative code only to be itself largely replaced from 1942 onward by the machine type Ultra systems - Typex and CCM. One further security factor complementing cryptographic worries related to the policy of W/T silence whilst at sea - a precaution only to be broken in emergency circumstances such as would have realistically been expected to have happened in the HMAS Sydney case. Wireless Direction-Finding operations and the physical ability of experienced wireless operators to identify the "hand" of other wireless operators and trace the source or geographical position of the transmissions were further communication impediments. Therefore, bearing in mind such considerations it is relevant to question the content and reliability of the intelligence available to Burnett on that fateful occasion. Although it could be argued on reasonable grounds in addition to a "first sighting report" on sighting an unidentified suspicious vessel HMAS Sydney would have transmitted at least one
further message probably in cypher during the subsequent chase - that message being addressed to ACNB and repeated to C-in-C China Station. Had Kormoran tried to jam any such "Sydney" transmissions, Burnett would have had all suspicions confirmed of a hostile presence. In the apparent absence of any existing copies of those signals - signals which it is hard to believe weren't sent - the assumption becomes purely hypothetical but with substantial grounds for doubt.

Another puzzling factor has been Captain Detmers' assertion of a "QQQQ" transmission. Should that not have been the authentic raider warning signal "QQQQ"? If the former was it then an indicator to German bases "Kormoran" was in trouble - a possibility mentioned at the Perth hearing - as well as alerting Burnett; or was it a tactic to lure HMAS Sydney to the enemy's advantage? In either case the Australian cruiser would have been at action stations and had the pursuit continued and the unacceptable recognition / identification procedures been persisted "Sydney" would have opened fire. One cannot dismiss the possibility Burnett weighed the prospects of arresting an enemy supply ship - the "Kulmerland" resulting both in "windfall" intelligence material together with the release of British and Allied prisoners of war, which indeed there were in the persons of the four Chinese.

Detmers' version of the recognition tactics he employed have never been convincing to anyone conversant with the procedures then applying. This immediately casts doubt upon whatever else he had subsequently said or written. It would have been naive to place reliance on an enemy's account in the circumstances. International Convention did not require Detmers to be forthcoming in any other matters than his own personal identification details and certainly not at that particular time when the Nazi juggernaut seemed invincible - at least to them.

While I do not wish to labour the point, I return to the existing recognition / identification procedure of the era. Detmers' version, had it been a reality, would have inevitably invited shots across "Kormoran's" bow and as already stated, if the evasive behaviour had been continued, brought in salvoes of 6 inch shells. Detmers was too clever a tactician and experienced raider captain to allow that to occur. His option was to enact a very clever deception - ruse de guerre - the actual nature of which remains uncertain but of which we know the result.

Both ships were lost: HMAS Sydney without trace. But I maintain that is no fair ground to question professional competency if one considers all the other strands to Australia's worst maritime disaster and ship disappearance mystery. It is well to bear in mind the adage "All is fair in Love and War" and 20th Century warfare is cruel and full of deception in which "Truth" is the first casualty regardless of the practitioners. The HMAS Sydney / Kormoran encounter was only one of numerous examples of those factors. What made it more poignant was it happened in Australian Waters apparently almost within sight of the West Australian coastline.

4 ... Action:-

The details of the actual engagement, the sequence of the stages from first sightings to the joint sinkings, others have postulated and I'm not prepared to add further to the controversy. Having experienced the sharp, tearing, ripping sound of a six inch projectile upon steel and wooden decking close above my head - a resemblance to a giant can opener scoring across metal, I can only imagine the feelings, senses and thoughts of HMAS Sydney's ship's company when Kormoran's storm of steel and high explosive hit her and the spirit of those that "fought the ship" in those unexpected conditions. A magnificent example of fighting spirit and possibly even greater than that if one speculates that following the battle those members of the crew still alive and able, while attending to the carnage including makeshift damage-control, could also have been attempting to nurse the mortally wounded cruiser back nearer to land and even Geraldton when the magazines exploded in a massive fireball.

A lasting impression of that battle is of an 18th Century naval action fought at close quarters with mid 20th Century weaponry: a ferocious engagement with devastating effects.
There are as many factors about the delayed implementation of search operations for possible "Sydney" survivors and the pattern of those searches once initiated, as there are questions about the battle itself. The official version and that which is perpetuated for all time in Hermon Gill's First Volume of the Royal Australian Navy during the Second World War has never been without question particularly by ex-service people from all the armed services as well as families, relatives and friends of HMAS Sydney's crew members. There are manifest gaps and inconsistencies in the sequence of existing documentation which one would have expected to have been vital for organising search operations as well as reporting to Government and ultimately the Australian People. Given the significance of the incident it tests credibility that such documents would not - even allowing for the wartime requirements of security and censorship - been classified "Never to be Destroyed". And yet this is what seems to have happened. If so from what authority was the destruction order issued?

A major question in the search conundrum involved the fast troop transport "Aquitania", specifically its role in the rescue of 26 German naval personnel in the circumstances in which it did and allegedly continued on her voyage to Sydney before reporting the rescue to the War Watching Station on Wilson's Promontory, Victoria, by visual means three days later. That was an incredible act if it did in fact happen. "Aquitania's" reporting put the HMAS Sydney search operation under way according to the official record. However, there is increasing evidence that "Aquitania" did break "WT" silence but for reasons not known that signal and the identities of the addressees have never been divulged nor explanations offered, the immediate effect being that a chance to save any possible "Sydney" survivors was lost forever while - of secondary importance - the finding of wreckage and the site of the sinking located more precisely rendered more difficult and problematical.

The explanations given for "Aquitania's" behaviour were and continue to justify doubt. The circumstances were too unusual, too important not to have an exhaustive search for acceptable reasons supported by documentation probably lodged in overseas official or company archives. Either way that material remains a vital part of the HMAS Sydney saga and the explanation for the delayed search for survivors. This stated - the response of the Australian government, its bureaucracy and armed services hierarchy left much to be desired and displayed little understanding of public disquiet and questioning.

John Curtin's Labor Government came to power in anything but auspicious times and circumstances. A government with a dearth of ministerial experience and strengths and faced facing all the daunting prospects of imminent hostilities in South-East Asia and Pacific Regions. While a steep learning curve was necessary great dependence had to be placed on the advice forthcoming from its own Public Service and Defence hierarchies. Barely eight weeks into government came the HMAS Sydney disaster sending shock waves through the Curtin Ministry and the Nation. The difficulty posed to first assess and then determine the effect the announcement would have on public morale and spirit, particularly in the absence of factual information, other than minimal evidence produced from the sea and air search was further tested by the degree of reliance placed on interrogation of the "Kormoran" survivors. A prime ministerial dilemma! What long term impact that dilemma had on policy formulation for the dealing with the HMAS Sydney / HSK Kormoran over the ensuing half century is conjecture but it has not yet quietened persistent public unease of the veracity of the official version at least from among those of that wartime generation and their parents still living. Given the extenuating circumstances could any government done better? Probably not! Post WW11 governments, however, could have been more responsive over the intervening years and initiated an overdue Parliamentary Inquiry much as the present Inquiry long before death and the "Mists of Time" reduced the readily available supply of relevant information and expertise. It is a changed world we live in in the 1990s producing its own variant social, economic, industrial, technological and global challenges with accompanying domestic and international demands upon all governments, that should not have influenced any Australian government from being proactive in
an attempt to resolve some degree of the HMAS Sydney tragedy. By not doing so those governments have reduced by that much this Nation's history and heritage.

7 History

The official history of any country is the framework for only a part understanding of that country or nation itself. The essential, indeed, inseparable component providing "the fleshing out" must come from the broad social and cultural spectrum of its people individually and collectively. In short, comprehensive history is a total "warts and all" composite. How else can the future understand the past? Researchers can only interpret the past from the material records before them. Speculation, interpretation, theory and postulation are core factors contributing to the research process. Archival policies and managing the administrative functions of those policies are critical considerations. If a young nation such as Australia with a Non-Aboriginal history of little more than 200 years does not value its history, implement policies and procedures to ensure the completeness of vital documentary material, records and related matter, the Nation diminishes its identity and stature. It erects insuperable barriers to a better appreciation by its future generations of their Past. Regrettably it would appear this will be the case relating to the loss of the HMAS Sydney. Vital documentation has been lost or destroyed for reasons unclear but with the end result of depriving Australians of a knowledge rightfully and spiritually theirs - in this instance the need to know the circumstances of this country's greatest naval disaster. The remaining opportunity to redress that loss appears to rely largely on advanced technologies associated with ocean resource search methodology in locating the "Sydney" and "Kormoran" wrecks and forensic science with regard to the Christmas Island remains of the unknown sailor. Regardless of the methods employed the gap in factual knowledge will only be narrowed to a probability range, whereas had those missing documents been available the degree of certainty would be enhanced and the years of individual anguish and national doubt reduced accordingly.

As for an appropriate Commemoration Planning Policy in the event of the discovery of the wrecks, location and identification of the Christmas Island remains should this happen, I strongly support the essential and necessary requirement both wrecks be accorded War Grave Status and protection while the human remains be given all due reverence, dignity and protection throughout the necessary search and exhumation procedures during the projected identification processes prior to and after being given War Grave Certification. Other than these qualifications I leave the planning of the Commemorative function and structure to others though suggest Attachment 2 as a possible precedent.

Summary

In presenting the Inquiry with this supplementary submission, I freely acknowledge a liberal interpretation of the word "Circumstances" as it could be understood from the Sub-Committee's "Terms of Reference".

From the outset I've tried to put the incident into a context of the prevailing wartime scene as I recall it, while admitting other influences owed to hindsight, subsequent readings, opinions and several of the recent Submissions to the Inquiry.

The salient points of this supplementary are:

- obviously I hold very strong opinions about the professional competency of higher ranked naval career officers and totally reject the questioning of Captain Burnett's qualifications in this respect.
- The role of chance, circumstance and risk are ever part of the decision making equation.
- having some background experience and understanding of the communications systems, cryptography and transmission methods of that era, I'm not convinced that some ulterior and more sensitive national and cryptographic considerations were absent from the HMAS Sydney tragedy. That period was undoubtedly the darkest hour for the then British Empire and its Allies. The battle was for national survival. Great dependency was placed on the
lines of communication - cryptographic security as a crucial part of that could - though not necessarily - impact on operational matters.

- while accepting there is little likelihood of evidence contrary to Detmers' broad account - the interval between the sightings of both ships and the action itself remains very much conjecture.

- one will never be convinced that the search operation and the apparent discrepancies and gaps in the official version did not stem from initial disbelief followed in turn by panic and later cover-up coinciding with the nature of Japan's entry into the war. Though an immediate search effort might have saved possible "Sydney" survivors, later events overtook the requirement for a more thorough inquiry over why the delay.

Australia, as an island continent, has a rich maritime heritage and history of which HMAS Sydney 1 and 2 have honoured places in the annals of this Nation's short naval history. A full appreciation of the second HMAS Sydney's tragic loss is denied future generations of Australians because of missing records. That loss highlights the important role of having a comprehensive national archival programme in place to ensure a dependable source of historical matter is available for future research. The lack of important material relating to the HMAS Sydney disappearance in 1941 demonstrates this archival criticality.

- the contribution made by the then wartime national government to what continues to cloud the "Sydney" loss remains open to question as much as the inaction by subsequent post war governments to take reasonable steps to allay some of the public concerns persisting all these years.

Governments must have an unquestioned commitment to a "Duty of Care" toward the use and welfare of Australia's Defence Forces at all times and in every circumstance concurrent with an obligatory commitment of open accountability to the Australian People. These are fundamentals for all future governments to be aware of, and pursue actively.

Since the establishment of this Inquiry, my opinion regarding the search for HMAS Sydney and the location and identification of the Christmas Island remains has changed. I now give unqualified support to both objectives. Likewise I support the formulation of a Commemorative Policy in anticipation of confirmed results. A policy under the aegis of the Commonwealth War Graves criteria with the WA Maritime Museum the custodian and with a design goal to enshrine Australian values and a respect for the sacrifices of all lost on HMAS Sydney. To this end Attachment 2 may offer some guidance.

Submitted with all respect for consideration by the Inquiry Sub-Committee.

J N Anderson,
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The following account is of an incident off the French West African coast during September, 1940 and is as I remember it and without readily available references. It is, however, referred to in H Gill's first history volume of the RAN during the Second World War but only in very general terms. HMAS Australia's log for that period and Captain Ross Stewart, Royal Navy's report - presumably to the Admiralty - would be enlightening. I present the following account to illustrate how quickly tactical situations can change dramatically to expose an unexpected degree of vulnerability.

Prior to the failed Dakar operation in September, 1940, three fast modern French six inch gunned cruisers of the Montcalm class were dispatched by the French Vichy Government naval command to reinforce the French forces at Dakar. On the 18th or 19th of September - I don't remember the actual date - HMAS Australia relieved a Royal Navy cruiser of the same class as "Australia" on a patrol to intercept the French ships. Shortly after the changeover masthead sightings were made of the French group - the departing RN cruiser was recalled, i.e., W/T silence was broken and for the remainder of the day the French ships were shadowed from ahead of the line of advance. The interception tactic changed with nightfall. HMAS Australia was not fitted with R.D/F (radar) at that time - I'm not sure of the RN cruiser. For some time - hours perhaps - highspeed chase manoeuvres ensued for both groups in the pitch darkness of a tropical night - A hairy experience! That all ended abruptly when one of the opposing cruisers, FNS Gloire, had engine breakdown, emitted funnel sparks and HMAS Australia illuminated her close to starboard both ships broadside to. It was a moment of high tension. Adverting to the Detmers version of HMAS Sydney's movements there are parallels, even though one incident was a night encounter while the other allegedly late afternoon. The point I make is the dramatic turn of events in the space of minutes if not seconds. Had the Frenchman been an alert committed hostile and quick to open fire with all armaments including torpedoes at the moment of illumination, even though "Australia" was closed up to Action Stations she was in an extremely vulnerable position - unintended, Yes! but owed to a quick change of circumstances. No authority could validly argued that
A DECENT BURIAL...

I DON'T quite know why I am so moved by it, but I was 839 years after they died, the crew of the Mary Rose are being given a decent burial. And what seems especially right to me—though it is not religious man—that people have taken the trouble to find the dead sailors of long ago the last rites they would have expected.

The Mary Rose was the English warship that sank just off Portsmouth in a battle with the French fleet on July 18, 1545. Of her crew of perhaps 400 men, only 26 were saved. The admiral's court martial, conducted within the turret of the warship's gunport, found the body and raised her two years ago.

Her hull was almost totally preserved by the salt and snails of the peabed, which made her one of the most archaeologi­cal finds of all time. She was the first of the big warships, carrying two tiers of massive cannon laid down near the waterline.

‘Noblest ship'

In her first battle in 1543, the Mary Rose shored the French flagship, Grande Louise with the devastating broadsides that were to dominate naval warfare for the next 350 years. Her first commander wrote that she was “the noblest ship of sail and as great a ship at this hour as I know to be in Christ-­endom.”

Nobody really knows why Mary Rose sank in her last battle, a couple of years after she launched in the French guerre. The earliest explanation is that she was the remains of several thousand sailors aboard. It had been new.

A hot Sunday afternoon at Portsmouth Cathedral. The ceremony, held yesterday, was conducted mainly in 16th-century Latin. The hull of the ship was recovered in 1982. —AP picture

A sailor is laid to rest — Weekend Page 8

THE Mary Rose project is blazoned all over Portsmouth this summer. There is the unfortified pub, restaurant and antique shop, the new exhibition hall, and the ves­sel, herself, in deep dock, doused daily to delay drying out. And now a sailor part of the re­covery is visible in the nave able at Portsmouth Cathedral.

On Thursday — the 439th an­iversary of the ship sinking — the city, the Rose Trust and the cathedral interested, the bones of one sample Tudor sailor. He now lies under a slab of Welsh slate, hard by the World War I plaque to the line of mari­ners who stood here in the stormy weather.

The coffin was made at a cathedral workbench by an ex­perienced oak carver. The base is inlaid with moss and oak leaves.

The coffin is made of oak. The coffin is made of oak. The coffin is made of oak. The coffin is made of oak. The coffin is made of oak.

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