


harmless. Added to this was the consideration that a heavy-handed treatment of what might have been a genuine Dutch vessel would not have been acceptable both to the commander of the *Sydney* and the authorities ashore. Any nagging doubt about the safety of approaching the unidentified ship would have been dispelled by the sure belief in ones own superiority, after all, it was unheard of that a thin-skinned cargo vessel should engage a man-of-war.

It is unlikely too, that the commander of the *Sydney* had been properly briefed about the German naval policy, dictated in effect by the Versailles Treaty after WWI— that of focussing on armour-piercing weapons rather than on heavy armour as was the British (and consequently Australian) policy. He might otherwise have been less sure of the relative weakness of the raider. This policy difference was evidenced dramatically in the engagement between the *Bismarck* and the *Hood*, where the *Hood*'s armour was pierced so effectively as to explode her magazine.


As to the reason for the lack of survivors although the ship was still afloat and under way when last seen by German survivors from the raider. Eyewitness accounts indicate that the *Sydney* vanished from the surface of the sea rather than over the horizon. There are many accounts of sailing ships from the windjammer days being 'sailed under' when proceeding in heavy seas. I suggest, the *Sydney* being heavily down by her bows and under way, she 'sailed under' with most of her crew. Of the handful of survivors who might have been able to get off at the last moment, their chance of being recovered in that vast sea was indeed slim.

I have not seen or heard any of the above historical considerations in the debate over the loss of the *Sydney* and therefore draw them to your attention. As a historian, I do not blame the commander of the *Sydney* for losing his ship under the circumstances—any fault would lie with the officer training system (which appears not to have included naval history) and the lack of appropriate military intelligence provided to operational commanders.

Yours faithfully,



Bernard J. Arnold



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AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN
CANBERRA

SUBMISSION No 134


2 April, 1998

Dear Senator MacGibbon,

With regards to your letter of 21 October 1998, I am pleased to forward to you the following attachments provided by the Military History Department of the National Institute for Defence Studies in Tokyo.

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| Attachment A | General opinion |
| Attachment B | The Japanese submarine's deployment for the outbreak of war |
| Attachment C-1 | The approximately position of the Japanese submarines on 19 November 1941 |
| Attachment C-2 | Wartime Organisation on 1-November 1941 |

Yours sincerely,



Yukio Satoh
Ambassador of Japan

Senator D J MacGibbon
Chairman
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

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JP.
8/4/98.

Attachment A

General opinion about a Japanese submarine which allegedly supported the German raider Kormoran in the sinking of HMAS Sydney.

1 On 19th November 1941, Germany was at war with the United Kingdom (Australia). However, Japan was not at war with the United States, the United Kingdom (Australia), or the Netherlands. All Japanese Naval surface ships and submarines were ordered not to open hostilities with Australia prior to 8th December 1941 (JMT).

2 Japan's Naval Force launched a surprise attack against the United States' Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour and at the same time attempted to seize power in South-East Asia. Japan's Naval Force feared that the United States or the United Kingdom (Australia) might have suspected an attack which might have lead to open hostilities.

It is unthinkable for a nation to play for such high stakes, and to risk all for the sake of one cruiser.

3 On 19th November 1941, the Japanese Navy possessed 47 I-type submarines and 14 Ro-type submarines (under 1000 tons). These submarines were preparing and deploying for the operations in the Pacific and the South China Sea and were focused exclusively on the forthcoming strike against the United States Pacific Fleet. Their actions were strictly kept by the orders.

4 At that time, it was tactically impossible for a submerged submarine to carry out a torpedo attack with a surfaced ship. Such tactics have not been recorded in history.

The Japanese submarine's deployment for the outbreak of war1 Abbreviation and Description

- (1) Date : Date and Time were used JMT (GMT - 9H)
 (2) GF : Combined Fleet (聯合艦隊)
 6F : 6th Fleet (submarine's fleet) (第6艦隊)
 KF : South Sea Fleet (南遣艦隊)
 Kdf : Mobile Fleet (機動艦隊)
 Ss : Submarine Squadron (潜水戦隊)
 sg : Submarine Division (潜水隊)
 イ 10 : I-10 Submarine (伊 10号潜水艦)
 □ 60 : Ro-60 Submarine (under 1000tons) (呂 60号潜水艦)
 --- Task Unit --- (任務編制)
 MB : Main body KdB : Mobile Unit NB : Southern Area Force
 EB : Advanced Expeditionary Force (6F) SSB : Submarine Unit
 SAB : Special Attack Unit (Each Submarine has 2 Midget sub.)
 SRB : Submarine Reconnaissance Unit SPB : Submarine Patrol Unit
 Lv : Leave Av : Arrive Op.A : Operation Area
 [Navy Order No.] : From the Emperor to Commander-in-Chief of the
 (大海令第 号) Combined Fleet (Adm Yamamoto) etc.
 [Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operational Order No.] : From the
 (機密聯合艦隊命令作第 号) Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
 Fleet to his commander of fleets and
 forces.

2 Task organization at 1st November 1941 (submarine only)

--- Hawaii operation ---

- ◇ MB : 1F etc. (主隊)
 ◇ KdB : Aviation Fleets etc. (機動部隊)
 SPB : I-19 I-21 I-23
 ◇ EB : 6F (先遣部隊)
 1 SSB: 1Ss (I-9, I-15, I-17, I-25)
 2 SSB: 2Ss (I-7, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6)
 3 SSB: 3Ss (I-8, I-74, I-75, I-68, I-69, I-70, I-71, I-72, I-73)
 SAB : (I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, I-24)
 SRB : (I-10, I-26 {6 Nov. commission})

--- Philippines, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, Bruma operations ---

- ◇ NB : (南方部隊)
 ◇ Philippines and Netherlands, East Indies Force (比島、蘭印部隊)
 6 Ss : 9sg (I-123, I-124)
 ◇ Malay Force (マレー部隊)
 4 Ss : 18sg (I-53, I-54, I-55) 19sg (I-56, I-57, I-58)
 21sg (Ro-33, Ro-34)

6 Ss : 13sg (I-121, I-122)
 5 Ss : 28sg (I-59, I-60) 29sg (I-62, I-64) 30sg (I-65, I-66)

--- East of 136°02'E and South of 24°N operation ---

◇ South Seas Force (南洋部隊)
 7 Ss : 27sg (Ro-65, 66, 67) 26sg (Ro-60, 61, 62) 33sg (Ro-63, 64, 68)

--- Sea area north of 24°N and south of 29°N operation ---

◇ Northern Area Force
 --- All sectors of operation ---
 ◇ Other Operational Force (待機部隊)
 Kure Chinjifu (Kure Naval Station)
 6sg (Ro-57, 58, 59) I-52 (Stayed at Kure)

3 References

- (1) Senshisōsho: Sensuikan shi (Series of Military History of World War II: History of Submarines) edited by Military History Department of National Institute for Defense Studies, published by Asagumo-Shinbunsha, Jun. 20, 1979.
- (2) Nihon kaigun Sensuikan-shi (History of the Japanese Navy Submarines) edited by Nihon-kaigun-Sensuikan-shi Kankōkai, published by Shinkōsha, 25 Sept. 1979.

4 Navy Orders and the Japanese submarine's deployment for the outbreak of war

--- 5 November 1941 ---

- ◇ [Navy Order No.1] 5 Nov. 1941
 The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will make the necessary operational preparations.
- ◆ [Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order No 1] 5 Nov. 1941.
- (1) Outline of the Combined Fleet's Operations in case war with the U.S.A. Great Britain and the Netherlands.
 第一段作戦 Dai ichi dan sakusen ("Phase 1 Operations")
 第二段作戦 Dai ni dan sakusen ("Phase 2 Operations")
 第三段作戦 Dai san dan sakusen ("Phase 3 Operations")
 - (2) Preparations for war and the outbreak of war.
 a. 第一開戦準備 Dai-1 kaisen junbi (First Preparations for War)
 When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for of operations.
 All fleets and forces will organize and complete battle preparations in accordance with the allocation of forces for "Phase 1 Operation". When directed by the commanding officers, they will proceed at the proper time the pre-

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- operation rendezvous and wait in readiness.
- b. 第二開戦準備 Dai-2 Kaisen junbi (Second Preparations for War)
 On orders from the commanding officers of the various forces, will proceed at the proper time to the area of operations.

--- 7 November 1941 ---

- ◆ [Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order No.2] 7 Nov. 1941.
- (1) First Preparations for War
 - (2) Y-Day 8 December
- ※ See: Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order No 1 (2) a.
- 11 Nov. Lv. Saeki for Kwajalein. (23 Nov. Lv. for off Hawaii)
 3SSB: 3Ss (I-8, I-74, I-75, I-68, I-69, I-70, I-71, I-72, I-73)
- 16 Nov. Lv. Yokosuka for Kwajalein.
 2SSB: 2Ss (I-7, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6) and SRB (I-10)
- 18 Nov. Lv. Kure for off Hawaii
 SAB: (I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, I-24)
- 19 Nov. Lv. Kure for off Aleutian Islands.
 SRB: (I-26) left Kure
- 20 Nov. Lv. Yokosuka for off Hawaii.
 1SSB: 1Ss (I-9, I-15, I-17, I-25)
 SPB: 1Ss (I-19, I-21, I-23)
 Lv. Kure for Hai-nan
 4 Ss 18sg (I-53, I-54, I-55) 19sg (I-56, I-57, I-58)

--- 21 November 1941 ---

- ◇ [Navy Order No 5] 21 Nov. 1941.
 The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will dispatch at an appropriate time the necessary forces for the execution of operations to positions of readiness.
- ◆ [Combined Fleet Telegraph Operation Order No 5] 21 Nov. 1941
 (1) Second Preparations for War "Urgent"
 ※ See : Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order No 1. (2)
- 21 Nov. Lv. Kure for Hainan (27 Nov. Av. ~ 1 Dec. Lv. for off Manila)
 6 Ss 13sg (I-121, I-122) 9sg (I-123, I-124)
- 24 Nov. Lv. Sasebo for Hai-nan
 5Ss 29sg (I-62, I-64) 30sg (I-65, I-66)
- 1 December 1941 ---
- ◇ [Navy Order No.9] 1 Dec. 1941
 Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands early in December.
 The time of start of operations will be made known later.
- 1 Dec. Lv. San-ya ~ Op.A 4Ss 18sg (I-53, I-54, I-55)
 19sg (I-56, I-57, I-58)
 Lv. San-ya ~ Op.A 6Ss 13sg (I-121, I-122)

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--- 2 December 1941 ---


- ◇ [Navy Order No.12] 2 Dec.1941
As of 8 December the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will start military operation in accordance with Navy Order No 9.
- ◆ [Combined Fleet Telegraph Operation Order No.10] 2 Dec.1941
"Climb Mount Niitaka 1208" (新高山登れ1208) "Urgent"
* Abbreviated code.
Authorized the attack and ordered its date : December 8 0000 (I)

- 4 Dec.Lv.Kwajalein → Op.A 7Ss 33sg (Ro-64,68)
- 5 Dec.Lv.San-ya → Op.A 5Ss 29sg (I-62,I-64) 30sg (I-65,I-66)
5Ss 28sg (I-59,I-60) (Repairing at Yokosuka and Kure)
4Ss 21sg (Ro-33,Ro-34) (Repairing at Sasebo)
- 5 Dec.Lv.Kwajalein → Op.A 7Ss 27sg (Ro-65,66,67)
- 8 Dec.Lv Kwajalein → Op.A 7Ss 26sg (Ro-60,61,62) 33sg (Ro-63)

- ◇ Other Operational Force
Kure Chinjifu (Kure Naval Station)
6sg (Ro-57,58,59) I-52 (Stayed at Kure)

中部太平洋方面一般図

付図第一その一 (「中部太平洋方面海軍作戦」)



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SYDNEY/KORMORAN AFFAIR 19/11/41

SUBMISSION No 81

R.J. Hardstaff

14 April 1998

潜水部隊編制及び同改定

付録第一

区分	艦船部隊「特設艦船部隊」	編成	改定
G	16.11.1 現在	16.11.1 ~ 17.3.10	
	6Ss 大鯨, 9Sg (1123, 1124), 13Sg (1121, 1122)		11.6 ○イ26を4Sgに編入。 12.15 ○大鯨を3Ssから除く。○靖国丸を1Ssから除き3Ssに編入。○平安丸を1Ssに編入。
	7Ss 大鯨, 26Sg (1160, 1161, 1162) 27Sg (1165, 1166, 1167) 33Sg (1163, 1164, 1168)		17.1.9 ○1Sg, 3Sg (1Ss) 及びイ10 (2Ss) を6F前平。 1.15 ○沈没除信 (170, 1160, 1165)。 2.1 ○1Sg (116, 118, 120), 2Sg (115, 117, 119), 3Sg (121, 122, 124), 4Sg (123, 125, 126) に改編。 2.6 ○イ28を6Fに編入。
	香取 1Ss 1114, 1Sg (115, 116, 117), 2Sg (118, 119, 120), 3Sg (121, 122, 123), 4Sg (124, 125), 「靖国丸」 2Ss 17, 110, 7Sg (11, 12, 13), 8Sg (14, 15, 16), 「さんとす丸」 3Ss 大鯨, 18, 11Sg (174, 175); 12Sg (168, 169, 170), 20Sg (171, 172, 173)		2.9 ○イ31を呉島に編入。 2.10 ○27Sgを解隊, 1165, 1167を26Sgに編入。 2.24 ○14Sg (127, 128) を編成, 6F前平。 2.25 ○イ124沈没除信, 9Sgを解隊, 1123を13Sgに編入。
F	5Ss 山嵐, 28Sg (159, 160), 29Sg (162, 164), 30Sg (165, 166), 「りせでじやかい丸」 4Ss 鬼怒, 18Sg (153, 154, 155), 19Sg (156, 157, 158), 21Sg (133, 134), 「名古屋丸」		2.27 ○イ29を14Sgに編入。 3.10 ○8Ss (110, 1Sg, 3Sg, 14Sg, 111及112) を編成, 6F前平。○イ30を14Sgに編入。○イ73沈没除信。○4Ssを解隊 (18Sg→呉島, 19Sg→5Ss, 21Sg→6Ss, 鬼怒→16S)。 ○イ60沈没除信。○29Sgを解隊 (イ62, 28Sg, 164→30Sg)。○3Ssを3Fから5Fへ。
	呉島部隊 152, 6Sg (157, 158, 159)		

The attached of the Senshuisho: Sensuikan shi (Series of Military History of World War II: History of Submarines) edited by Military History Department of National Institute for Defense Studies, published by Asagumo-Shinbunsha, Jun.20, 1979.

Secretary
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade
Defence Sub-Committee
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Madam,

INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SINKING OF HMAS SYDNEY

Further to my letter dated 2 April 1998 with enclosure, a sketch plan of the SYDNEY-KORMORAN Battle Action is enclosed.

A proposed speed of 14 Knots for SYDNEY seems excessive in view of the reputed bow damage, but to catch up with KORMORAN as claimed and cross her wake at close quarters, there doesn't appear to be much choice.

KORMORAN is reputed to have altered course to starboard after opening fire with main armament, initially 260 Degs to open up the 5.9 inch gun firing arcs, but it was also necessary to have SYDNEY's X & Y turrets "wooded" to escape further 6 inch shell damage, by increasing this course alteration. A speed of 14 Knots by KORMORAN would require a much higher speed from SYDNEY to overtake, but by transferring KORMORAN's track to fit a probable course of 269 Degs, a speed of 11 Knots is indicated.

It is assumed that with reputed damage to SYDNEY's bridge and personnel after KORMORAN's initial shell bursts, that course and speed ordered would be maintained by those remaining in the secondary control or steering positions. Having crossed KORMORAN's wake, a change of course to the West before firing the starboard torpedoes on a beam bearing would be most likely. SYDNEY would then possibly reduce to "Slow Speed" (about 5 Knots), either resulting from further gun damage or having overtaken KORMORAN which now appeared to be broken down and having its own problems.

Yours faithfully,

R.J. Hardstaff
R.J. Hardstaff.

