



EXH.245.0001

HMAS SYDNEY II Commission of Inquiry.

Dear Lieutenant Nottle

I would like to submit this to the COI as an addition to my submission, an exhibit or note to be published to correct and inform all concerned on matters raised in the submission by Mrs B Winter (Poniewierski).

I have seen that I reluctantly have to take time off supplying original interview material for the COI to correct the film, and other, errors that Barbara Winter (Poniewierski) has made in her submission. I should particularly address the taxation aspect because it relates to why the Australian Broadcasting Corporation avoided any input from me in its "closure documentary", The Hunt for HMAS Sydney. I point out association basically because of Winter's use of association to apportion blame. I also add material from the book by telegraphist Jack Harker of HMNZS Leander, who gives uncommon detail of radio work on a similar cruiser in the same time span.

WINTER:

4 THE CONSPIRACY THEORY TRAIL Barbara Poniewierski

Individuals on the Fringes

David Kennedy:

Kennedy is a journalist, believed to be currently a sub-editor on the Australian. He is one of the few Australians working on the topic who understand German, but perhaps not as well as he thinks. Kennedy tends to overestimate his abilities. When he tried to claim a video made in Europe as a business deduction, the Taxation Department rejected his claim on the grounds that it was only a home movie with no commercial potential. He was also planning a TV program on either Sydney-Kormoran alone, or on the raiders around Australia as a whole. Neither his equipment nor his knowledge of cinematography is up to the job.

(Neither is mine, but I know it.) While he properly rejects the 'Japanese submarine' claim and some other outlandish theories, he has been flogging two particular lame horses. 1: wireless messages. 2: the underwater torpedo claim. His contributions to these matters will be examined in the relevant sections. In the latter case, he relies for first-hand information on Hans Linke, a wireless operator taken over from the merchant navy. Linke had been in no position to see any part of the battle, but he pitched a yarn that Kennedy wanted to hear, so Kennedy believes him rather than all other Kormoran crew, who must have conspired to tell lies if their stories conflict with those of Linke. It is difficult to hold a discussion with Kennedy, for he quickly loses his temper and resorts to vulgarities with which a lady can hardly compete. He has submitted material to the throwaway free weekly in Geraldton (Western Australia) Sydney material that The Australian apparently declined to publish.

KENNEDY:

I have been a sub-editor on The Australian now for 20 years. If

Winter could not re-establish that, it shows her disregard for inquiring, and checking. Winter has not taken the opportunity to test my German. On the two occasions -- one more that a decade ago and the other on this December 11 -- that I went into German with her she did not take up the opportunity to speak with me in that language. Neither did Graham Anderson. I interviewed some Germans by pre-satellite telephone with 12-hour time differences, with one brain waking up and the other winding down, and differing states of health. There are a number of remarks from them on tape praising my German and background knowledge.

In 1996 I wrote and produced a three-hour documentary on the Australian horseman Edgar Britt, who lived near me. It is titled "Britt: Aces and Kings of The Turf" and included previous unseen footage of the great ANZAC convoy of 1940. Mr Britt had ridden the second-greatest number of English classic winners by an Australian, and was a jockey for George VI and the royal family and maharajahs. He had ridden in the US a year after Phar Lap died there. The camerawork was done by cinematographer Ray Henman, who had filmed some 10 Queen's Christmas messages for the BBC and worked on Australian series including Skippy, seen around the globe. Britt: Aces and Kings of the Turf was entered into the 1996 Walkley and Australian Film awards and is available on the internet through Amazon. I had gone originally to interview Mr Britt for a newspaper interview but he had a dozen rolls of film in his garage, some dating back to the early 1930s. Two, unfortunately, were nitrate and beyond saving. I had the rest transferred to video tape and the three-hour documentary contains all the usable footage, with copies with Film World and the Australian Racing Museum in Melbourne. Mr Britt is a member of the Racing Hall of Fame there. For my "European" and "Raider" projects I was also granted 10BA certification for production-funding assistance and operated as a sole trader. I had been in fact asked by the Department of the Arts to apply for larger budgets but by then I was editing on a Macintosh G4, with movie software, and did not need an editor. These skills were acquired from my time at TEN Network, ABC and SBS. The sample footage supplied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was copied in medium quality because I did not want my project plagiarised again.

As it was, Rob McAuley, director of The Hunt for HMAS Sydney, had earlier approached me for his project with Glenys McDonald and regarded my footage suitable for broadcast, and Alan Eason of the ABC made no negative comment when he viewed it. The fact is that in 1996 -- after trying to offer the film to a closed shop of producers -- I delivered completed copies of the Britt documentary to the ABC, because of its national interest, and SBS, because of its multicultural content. It disappeared into those walls. Andy Lloyd-James was founding General Manager of SBS Independent 1993-6 then ABC Head of Drama to ABC Head of National Networks 1996-2000. He was informed of the Britt documentary while at SBS and offered me payment (in writing, and the letter was supplied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal), if it was picked up by SBS. He later commissioned "The Track" series to Penny Chapman at the ABC when he was Head of National Networks there, and she was departing ABC Head of Television. This is recorded in Victorian Hansard in 1999 on the effects of public broadcasting.

<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/edic/inquiries/Broadcast/EDCMay99-91.htm>

"The Track" contains elements of "Britt: Aces and Kings of The Turf" not normally found in a Turf film: Racism in racing, jockeys at war, enduring The Depression; battery saddles, pacemakers, ring-ins and pulling horses. After Mr Britt and I contacted then managing director Jonathon Schier's office and later requested some \$14,000 in payment for material used -- followed by lawyers' letters -- I received a review of my tax for some \$16,000, although I had the Government 10BAs. Then-ABC chair Donald McDonald was a friend of prime minister John Howard, who was close to attorney-general Philip Ruddock, who appointed and reappointed Rodney Purvis



EXH.245.0003

as deputy president of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, who heard my case over three days. At times the Private Hearing sign mysteriously appeared on the door, stopping public access to the room, which I brought to the attention of the office at the breaks, before it was removed. In his finding, Mr Purvis said the Britt documentary had been offerered to a network. He pointedly did not name the Australian Broadcasting Corporation or SBS in this context.

Soon after Mr Purvis got an AO award.

To start an appeal against the AAT decision in the Federal Court would have cost some \$50,000, and transcripts of the three-day AAT hearings were quoted at \$6.50 a page. To take on the ABC/Production Cartel/Government with its stacked deck appeared not a good prospect, particularly after hearing a dignified female solicitor at Banki Haddock Fiora referring to the ABC, on receipt of a reply from its legal counsel, as "a bunch of shonks" and the mild-mannered representative of my Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance at a supposed "mediation" conference with the ABC, refer to the other side as "a pack of bastards". I had never even heard him say "darned" before. Penny Chapman's excuse for having made "The Track" was that she loved horses as a child. At the time she looked as though she would not see 50 again.

A point of this issue, raised I remind you by Winter, is that the ABC was never going to use me or my work in the documentary The Hunt for HMAS Sydney, with its basic impact on the whole story. The COI now has forty 3-4 hour DVDs from me of audio and video interviews since ca. 1995 of people who were there or thereabouts, many not contacted before by Winter et al, with more in train. My use of available technology at the time means that the COI now has the benefit of one-on-one interviews generally devoid of the problems observed in the inquiry interviews now, with translation problems, recorder or camera angst, crew or crowd shyness and another decade of infirmity.

I also contacted ABC Media Watch on two occasions. Then-researcher Nick Leys (later National News Editor at The Australian) told me, of the ABC's action and Media Watch's reaction, after my second call to Media Watch: "They did the wrong thing, but we are not going to do anything about it." Media Watch executive producer Peter McEvoy had ducked the subject in a direct call.

I referred in the DFATS submissions to the bid to interest the ABC in the Sydney story a dozen years ago. Then Head of Documentaries Mike Rubbo finished his breakfast and newspaper in view through his office glass while he kept me waiting, had to connect up his TV equipment, viewed a few minutes, muttered about "sinking ships" and extolled the virtues of the Race Around The World series that he brought from Canada.

The new official-version The Hunt for HMAS Sydney documentary ignored the underwater torpedo tube shot in reconstruction of the battle, despite the DFATS report finding: "The Committee believes a strong case can be made that the Kormoran's underwater torpedo capability played a major role in the defeat of the Sydney." (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report on the Loss of HMAS Sydney, March 1999, Page 47). None of the other TV networks provided a full-length documentary and the benchmark "60 Minutes" did a segment on HMAS Perth. Perhaps Winter could investigate some of that.

The implication is of course that after the plagiarism (the ABC's word in written exchanges) complaint in an internal deal, and the legal exchanges and association contacts, the ABC did not use my work in any capacity, work that the COI said would have been subpoenaed if not volunteered.

My work, Winter points out, has two main points of the underwater tube torpedo and wireless signals. Hence, what is the serious value of The Hunt



for HMAS Sydney? At the same time the rest of the media was encouraged to go easy or use "people" stories, as the Manly Daily's veteran reporter John Morecombe told me after a 40-minute interview after which he did not ask any questions about the action.

My interest in the raiders arose in about 1993 when former Komet crewman and neighbour Karl-Heinz (Charles) Noack brought back to Australia some footage of that raider's operations that he said was copied from on-board film that had later disappeared from a nursing home when the owner died. It had been copied many times and I felt that a reasonable way to present such footage was to use softer S-VHS so the viewers' eyes could get used to it. Notice today how scratches, lines and snow are introduced into vision to age it. Also, filming in those days usually required buying a \$50,000 camera and \$20,000 editing machine and hiring a crew that inhibited interviewees or could not be got together. There are cases of people who were to be interviewed dying just days before. There was also a technique of having the narrator on camera referring to material on a screen or chroma-key beside or behind him. Also, the production cartel held control of the industry by taping with big-camera higher definition Betacam SP (allowing the hoi polloi to have VHS) a situation only broken by digital. It may be worth following the production history of "Bondi Tsunami", shown on SBS recently after being given such a hard time that it was shown around Australia like a travelling picture show of the old days.

Apart from the Australian television stations mentioned above I also worked for The Sydney Morning Herald and Sun-Herald, both where I was trained; Melbourne Sun and Sporting Globe; South Pacific Post, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier; Reuters and The Daily Express in London; Radio Free Europe in Munich; Daily Mirror and The Australian in Sydney.

Apart from her own unchecked and misquoted efforts to discredit valid research, Winter has just revealed on the phone that she has been collaborating with Graham Anderson, whom she described as "doing good work" and "in need of our support". Lieutenant Josh Nottle will have copies of just some of the emails that Anderson rained on me, and also he will have contact details for Dr Zvonimir Freivogel, who was unaware that Anderson was using his name to assail me, and who offered to assist the Inquiry. For reasons that probably include their books, Winter and Anderson appear to have formed an alliance to blow out of the water anybody who does not back the German version of the action, despite that belief of the Australian parliamentary committee of 1999 that there was a strong case that the underwater torpedo tube had a major role in the defeat of the Sydney. I told that DFATS hearing in Sydney a decade ago that I could not raise my eyebrows at Detmers using a ruse de guerre in the position that he was in against a first-class cruiser. So I am bemused that Winter and Anderson appear to have formed this neo-something alliance to endorse the German version.

Anyway, for now, I would like to note that Hetty Hall stated that she believed that the signal she heard from the Sydney came on November 19 when she could have been working an extra watch. She has also told me that it may have been another time, suggesting that it may have been an information relay, but that the signal had immediacy (see DVD of edited work) and if a 16-year-old had entered her watch time in a diary as a reminder she may not have seen a need to amend it.

While on the subject of Mrs Hall and Singapore, "The Man Who Broke



Purple", by Ronald W. Clark on William Friedman, says on Page 121: "In mid-January (1941) a team of two army officers and two navy officers with two Purple machines, and a variety of other cryptographic equipment, crossed the Atlantic. This was only the first instalment. By the end of 1941 London had received two Red machines, copies of those used by Japanese naval attaches, and two J-19s, one of each later being forwarded by the British to Singapore. In due course -- although only after a delay which was politically ascribed to treachery but was largely the result of misunderstanding -- Washington received the results of the vital British work on Enigma." And on page 123, dealing with throughout 1941:

"The work of each partner this complemented the other, particularly as the British had by this time mastered most of the Germans' repertoire of Enigma and the Americans had achieved a comparable success with the Japanese ciphers." So one can see that Mrs Hall was at the centre of Enigma, Purple and Type-X traffic.

The constant reminders by Mr James Eagles of the activities of traitor Patrick Heenan in Singapore (Odd Man Out, Peter Elphick and Michael Smith, Hodder & Stoughton, 1993) show the need for the roles of families such as the Collings/Halls.

The following is roughly in the order addressed by Winter:

WINTER: "On John McArthur's PhD: I have not been able to ascertain whether his supervisor was Professor Bruce Horsfield, who endorsed John Samuels' reprehensible book and has been associated with Kennedy and Wittwer. Since his thesis is not available to me, I must assume that it contains the same sort of nonsense that he has espoused elsewhere, including possibly the involvement of a Japanese submarine, and the Abrolhos area as the site of the battle."

KENNEDY: I have been no more associated with Ivan Wittwer than an interview And requested remarks at the DFATS hearing in Sydney and in that inquiry's submissions. One of the oldest sayings in journalism is: Never assume, ask. Winter has put so many people offside she can not ask them.

On wireless messages: Interviewees presented me with accounts of wireless messages while other topics were being discussed, such as the Larsens whom I sought out for photographs of Norwegian ships. Despite what Winter says, the Larsens have confirmed several times that they indeed believe Heinz Herrmann conveyed to them that he was in actual radio contact with Kormoran at the time of the action. Both spoke with Herrmann. Winter has asked me if they are still alive, perhaps for a heavy interview a decade late. I phoned them and Fae, who lost an uncle on the Sydney, once again reaffirmed that Herrmann indeed said he had been in contact with Kormoran.

On Robert Mason: I interviewed that Harman writer (secretary to the base commander) on the advice of Dr Michael McCarthy, Curator of Maritime Archaeology at the West Australian Maritime Museum, who referred me to the reference to Mason in Winter's book "The Intrigue Master" (Page 117) , where she writes of stories about wireless signals that "a few have a ring of truth". Linke -- who along with communications officer Reinhold von Malapert, Adolf Marmann and other wireless operators were not interviewed post-war by Winter or others -- said that the wireless and torpedo issues

were discussed among the prisoners in the camp. Winter seems to forget that Detmers called his available officers and petty officers together after the action to tell them what they could and could not reveal. Germany still had its nose in front in the war. Why on earth reveal important wireless and armament matters to the enemy and certainly not after the war in such a controversial case? Linke's daughter Sigrid told me on the drive back to Hamburg airport that some Kormoran crew called him a traitor, but not a liar.

Winter says Kennedy "believes" Linke. What about presenting what he said. Was I supposed to bury it? She states that Linke said what I "wanted to hear".

Why? An underwater tube shot had been discussed by Montgomery and Frame (HMAS SYDNEY: Loss and Controversy, pages 103, 215 for Admiralty, under neutral flag) among others.

Reading "Well Done Leander" after having interviewed its RNZN wireless operator Jack Harker some years ago, I noticed on page 17 that he describes how the radiomen "carbon-copied all signals". The cipher staff "often crumpled the carbon paper into our confidential waste paper basket for burning". This information "presented very precise information about our future movements" and was "kept strictly to the few men on watch at that time since any leakage would be traced back to us immediately".

Linke was in a senior position. Kormoran radioman and later Association head Adolf Marmann said he was one of the two ex-merchant navy men who had roving commissions on the ship, were faster on their non-navy sideways keys and handled shipping news information.

Former HMAS Hobart wireless operator Alfred Johnson told the Commission in July on monitoring of the international merchant ship wavelength: "Now, it was a pretty lax monitoring of 500. We had a loudspeaker set up in the main wireless office only, connected to a receiver tuned to 500 kilocycles."

The older Jack Harker on Page 35 of "Well Done Leander" writes of a patrol near Massawa: "... searching silently for the many Italian ships we'd previously heard continuously and blissfully transmitting on the International Mercantile wavelength of 500 kilocycles". Lou Brown (Nelson, Bonaventure, Singapore, Hong Kong, PMG and OTC) told me he has heard US planes near Leyte Gulf while in Subic Bay. Brown said that power on a voice radio used for convoy work could be boosted by 20 per cent before any valve problems had to be considered. Harmonic and skip effects could make a low power normally line-of-sight signal be heard on several frequencies and "hundreds of miles away". From my reading, a truer picture of the 500kc monitoring.

During that day, Mr Johnson, who spoke to media outside, offered that he been looking at wireless issues for the inquiry. Winter appears to have assumed the same role over the years, in defence of the official version and her book. Will she be asked for whom?

Vulgarity: I have never had a heated or passionate discussion or argument with Winter. Presented with some extreme issues over the years I have sometimes gone for satire and earthiness. Remember Natsha Stott Despoja remembering Don Chipp for his bawdy humour, John Cleese for his farce, Kenneth Williams for his innuendo?

Winter proclaimed to the DFATS inquiry that she wanted to hold a lamp aloft and drive stakes into people. Very ordinary.

The Geraldton Guardian was a regional award-winning paper under editor

Charles Jenkinson, and the leading paper in that city, which had become the centre of all things HMAS Sydney with the construction of the Scott Hill monument.

If it were not for the Geraldton Guardian, the Mearns/Hore London and Detmers documents would not be on the Sea Power Centre and Hetty Hall's account would not have made it into print. News has been influenced to go easy on the Sydney story.

In "Well Done Leander", pages 35-36, Jack Harker writes that "signals were intercepted from routine transmissions at Bombay Naval Radio. Aden repeated the transmission back to Bombay who corrected any errors before Aden sent the same message to Colombo who repeated back to Aden. Finally Colombo transmitted to Mauritius in the South Indian ocean. Mauritius relayed back to Colombo and that message was considered delivered to a ship in any part of the East Indies Station." Was this the sort of repetition relay in which Hetty Hall became involved in Singapore, with any deciphered or enciphered code reaching her on an extended watch, or the next day or so?

WINTER: "Owing to his annoyance at Montgomery's book, I could get information from Malapert only through Ahl or Jürgensen; my book settled him down somewhat, and after that he gave a number of interviews, including to David Mearns and Peter Hore, and he corresponded with David Kennedy. Personally, I would have been put off anyway by his attitude towards women, but that did not bother 'the blokes', if they noticed it."

KENNEDY: I contacted von Malapert in 1997 after talking to Adolf Marmann, hearing that Malapert was in Chile, phoning Chile White Pages and asking if they had such a name in Santiago or Valparaiso. I got him to contact the West Australian Maritime Museum, from whence Mearns and Hore got his details years later. Winter did Buckleys in this respect and did not get to the wireless operators. Attitude towards women? I spoke over the years to two very charming women in his life and staff, in German, a dash of social Spanish and English.

The overall bureaucratic tactic has definitely been to get Mearns to produce the ship and tell the story, with Hore. Their snafus with "finding" already exposed documents and mis-naming of a cypher "cracked" by Hore, with a correction to the National Archives of Australia, show that too much was expected of them. Also, it had become obvious that the position of the ships had almost certainly been known all along.

WINTER: "David Kennedy lends support to the claim that an underwater Torpedo was fired before the flag was raised, basing his claim on a statement by Linke (a very long time after the war, not during interrogation), who allegedly said that an underwater torpedo hit Sydney 'at the same time' as the gunfire, and they had talked about this in captivity. As the torpedo was slower than the guns, it must have been fired earlier. [JPI Vol. 5, Submission 6, p. 966.] Let us throw some light on this claim as well. Linke is merely repeating his selection of camp gossip. He was in the reserve wireless room, below deck, on the port side. He saw little of the action at all, and none of the early part. That is something Kennedy should have checked. Kennedy makes a further attempt to prop up this claim by reference to a book by Zvonimir Freivogel, Deutsche Hilfskreuzer des Zweiten Weltkriegs. According to Kennedy, Freivogel wrote that the gunfire and torpedo hit Sydney 'at the same time'.



EXH.245.0008

What Freivogel actually wrote [p. 111] was this: 'HMAS SYDNEY wurde gleich zu Beginn des Gefechtes von Granaten und einen Torpedo im Vorschiff schwer getroffen.' (HMAS Sydney was severely hit by shells and a torpedo right at the beginning of the action.) Kennedy constructs a war crime on the basis of his failure to understand the difference between 'gleich zu Beginn' (right at the beginning) and 'gleichzeitig' (simultaneously). From what I hear, Freivogel is livid, not just because of the misinterpretation of his words, but because there does not seem to be any jurisdiction under which he could sue Kennedy."

KENNEDY: Lends support? That is what Linke told me. Again, am I supposed to suppress it? That is something Kennedy should have checked? I have hours of phone and personal interviews with the man in which he says where he was. I have also provided the COI with other grounds for the underwater tube being used?

The adverb "Gleich zu" in my 1970s Munich-bought 1.4kg Cassell's is given as "straightaway" or "without ceremony". Winter's "From what I hear, Freivogel is livid" and is wishing to "sue" are fabrications.

After obvious egging-on by Winter, Anderson swamped myself and some others with emails promoting German innocence and claiming so much that Dr Freivogel wanted to sue that I emailed the good doctor. Nothing of the kind, replied the doctor, and he said it was a shame that he and I had not met earlier and in different company. I arranged for Dr Freivogel and the COI legal team to get in touch and have withdrawn so they can get on with it. Sudden silence from Anderson. Conspiracy theories? Winter puts these into practice with the mere examples of John Doohan and Zvonimir Freivogel. For whom does she/did she work and what does/did she get in return? Anderson meanwhile produced extracts of what he says is the photographed text of a page of Kormoran torpedo officer Joachim Greter's unpublished book that states he went below to fire off the starboard underwater tube torpedo to prevent the fire reaching after the shooting stopped. That with a hold full of mines? Anderson also refused to supply the COI with documents and, unlike footballer Sonny-Bill Williams in Europe, apparently has not been subpoenaed. Winter has consistently contacted people interviewed by others to work them over, rather than allow their accounts to be examined normally

WINTER: "While Linke knew what had been sent, he was speculating when he said it was meant to be picked up in the Dutch East Indies. Detmers did not want any station apart from Sydney to pick up the messages, as they could have brought more warships out to look for him, and he did not confide his intentions to Linke. In the POW record cards, Linke's rank is given as 'Funkobergefreiter' and in English as AB; on 8 December 1944, he received a promotion at 'Funkhauptgefreiter', which would be about Leading Telegraphist. To call him 'the Kormoran wireless operator' or 'a senior Kormoran wireless operator', as Kennedy does, is to overstate his importance. Apart from the only Wireless Officer, Malapert, the wireless department consisted of seven telegraphists of higher rank than Linke, sixteen of equal rank though not necessarily equal seniority, and only one of a lower rank. It is obvious in the partial audio transcripts Kennedy provided in Vol. 9, Submission 66, for interviews with Linke and others, that he was often asking leading questions that required Linke only to say 'yes' or 'no', or to repeat back to him the words



suggested. This is an unsound practice in taking evidence. It is also obvious that, Being in the enclosed No. 2 wireless room on . . .

(DOWN TO)

Lane joined the Manchester Regiment as a 'boy soldier' at about fifteen, And was a drummer boy and bugler before becoming, apparently, a rifleman. It Has been stated that he was a signalman, but I can find no mention in this autobiography that he was trained in signals or telegraphy. The contradictory statements cannot all be true. Claims by Montgomery, Kennedy, Samuels and Christian that Lane has said or written this or that must be sorted out, especially the Statutory Declaration mentioned below. The task should not be left to me.'

KENNEDY: One always has to check the source when Winter puts words in quotation marks. The COI would have footage from me of the 1991 Geraldton seminar on the loss of the Sydney. In it, Michael McCarthy, the Curator of Maritime Archaeology at the West Australian Maritime Museum, holds up her writings on a quotation from Rupert Long on ministerial directives. Comparing the two. Doctor McCarthy points out her misquoting, which he refers to as a "heinous" offence for a scholar. Linke was on Kormoran because of his English, speed and experience.

With the utmost sympathy for Winter, the task of sorting out Should begin with her working out the difference between recording and reporting by me and claims by Lane.

WINTER: "David Kennedy reported that Hans Linke had said that Sydney was heading west after the battle, but later said it was heading north-west. [JPI, Vol. 9, Submission 66B, p. 2036.] In fact, Linke was not much of a navigator, and on a moonless light, with the smoke of his burning ship obscuring the stars, it would not have been easy to maintain a sense of direction. Kormoran had turned from a westerly course to a southerly course during the battle. When the engines failed, she was at the mercy of the wind and current, but was probably facing bow more or less to the west. Linke could not have judged in what direction Sydney was heading unless he knew which way his own vessel was pointing. Kennedy adds that a former RAN deputy hydrographer (to wit, Commander Reginald John Hardstaff) put Sydney 13 nautical miles north-west of Kormoran. We now have evidence that Linke was wrong, and so was Hardstaff, despite his rank and position. He gave the following positions:

26°42.30'S 111°46.8'E The action position.

26°28.28'S 111°32.6'E Sydney wreck.

26°38.7'S 111° 41.9'E Kormoran wreck.

These locations are not very far wrong, although there are several objections.

One is that he accepts somebody's claim - maybe the Kennedy-Linke claim - That Sydney was heading north-west after the battle. Another is that, Considering the many variables of wind and current, trying to attain such a degree precision was simply pointless.'

KENNEDY: I was reporting what Linke had said for the parliamentary Inquiry and public scrutiny. It would have been quite reasonable for Detmers to have headed away as quickly as he could and do turns in front of Sydney to avoid her after guns, with the forward guns out of commission. Hardstaff had been working on position on the basis of where the flotsam had been located and of the lifeboat notes. Again Winter could have asked but she did not.

WINTER: [Later on Whittaker] "He is a devoted supporter of the claims that wireless signals were sent by both Kormoran and Sydney The only link between Tokyo and either ship is what David Kennedy says that Larsen thinks that Herrmann meant to imply. (See section on wireless signals.)"

KENNEDY: Here again, would Winter have been happier if what Linke (interviewed for the first time since the war) and the Larsens said had been left out of the public gaze and scrutiny?

Winter's statements on the status of wireless operators such as Linke should be viewed in what is said in "The Battleship Scheer", William Kimber 1957, by its captain Theodor Krancke with H.J. Brennecke, on the stopping in the dark of what turned out to be the Tribesman (Pages 74-75).

"So far there was no report from the Wireless Interception Service of the Scheer that the other ship had in fact used her wireless. The ordinary W/T men were sitting at their apparatus with their headphones on and beside them were the specially-trained men of the interception service, who had been W/T men in the mercantile marine, controlling every wave-length and ready to report as soon as the British W/T man touched his keys and ready to operate the jamming mechanism in an effort to make any message unintelligible."

Tribesman fired her poop gun after a warning round from Scheer, then Scheer answered in earnest until resistance ceased.

"Fortunately the reply came that the enemy was not using his wireless, together with the rather surprising supplementary information that he had not used it to send out calls for assistance even during the firing, though, as subsequently revealed, one of the W/T men declared that the Britisher had in fact used his wireless."



EXH.245.0011

The German version, Koehler 1995, 2001 (Pages 136-146) goes much further, and longer into the rivalry between the navy radiomen and the merchant operators, in which the navy operators reported no signal but the merchant radiomen reported there was a message that the ship was being gunned by a submarine. On boarding the Tribesman a signal pad page showed: "S--S--S. We are gunned by German."

Being night, it was a given that the attacker with searchlights was thought to be a more common submarine .

Before this Inquiry is a statement by John Neal Brown, a wireless operator from HMAS Sydney, stating that the Sydney did have voice capacity and Jack Harker (Leander) says that ships had a voice capacity in 1940 (Your DVD reference). Atmospherics and power did interesting things. Alfred Johnson told this inquiry that he had heard voice traffic from Sydney airport while in Adelaide. Lou Brown (Nelson, Bonaventure , PMG and OTC) said he has heard US planes near Leyte Gulf while he was at Subic Bay.

I found Hans Linke, the Larsens and Hetty Hall, mentioned in her submission specifically by Winter, to be genuine people who told their stories in company with good intention and effort at accuracy, and saying so when they did not know something.

In contrast, I have found Winter to have asked if one could find "dirt" on somebody who expressed a difference to her, or her masters, and to apply the tactic that if you can discredit a person on one point the job is done.

I have also, unfortunately, seen tribunals work this way.

In "Well Done Leander", Collins Bros, Auckland, 1971, Jack Harker writes Page21 that in the Coburg-Ketty Broevig sighting with Canberra of "a strident call to 'ACTION STATIONS'".

"In our main W/T office a signal had already been drafted in self-evident code [relevant to Robert Mason at Harman], informing C-in-C East Indies that two enemy ships were in the position stated, and the twenty-kilowatt transmitter glowed and hummed in readiness for keying."

Later, as aircraft approached, Page 35: "In the main radio room our twenty kilowatt transmitter awaited notice from the bridge, but the order remained unspoken." The planes flew on to Eritrea.

Also Page 35, and perhaps assisting with the evidence of Hetty Hall, Ean McDonald, Gordon Laffer, Eric Cooper, David Griffiths et al: "Back in the Main Office we sweated watchabout as signals were intercepted from routine transmissions at Bombay Naval Radio. Aden repeated the transmission back to Bombay who corrected any errors before Aden sent the same message to Colombo who repeated back to Aden. Finally, Colombo transmitted to Mauritius in the South Indian Ocean. Mauritius relayed back to Colombo and that message was considered delivered to a ship in any part of the East Indies Station, Red Sea or Persian Gulf." If not indicating at what stage or time Hall etc handled/heard of signals believed actual, the preceding may support that they handled or heard of signals involving Sydney.



On Page 60: "Hobart again radioed Aden . . . GYZ v D5GS-O-A - 2PL237 etc., which meant she was being attacked by two enemy planes with their bearing and her position and all the extras, to tell the story quickly in case she might not be able to do so later."

On Page 64: "Alcantara signalled that her quarry was listing when last sighted. These several messages did the circuit from Mauritius to Colombo, to Bombay and finally to Aden, until a subsequent signal stated that no sign of the German raider had been seen for over three hours and night obviated all chances of continuing the action. Alcantara also stated in her last message that she had resumed radio silence."

And Page 70 on Sunday church divisions: "Captain Horan then harangued all And sundry for the week's mishaps, ending with a more friendly talk about the immediate position of the war as it affected Leander." This goes to the Raider warning by Burnett at divisions.

WINTER ON BONATZ:

Winter cites "Seekrieg in Aether" E.S. Mittler & Sohn 1981 as saying that: "Beide Schiffen hatten offenbar nicht mehr gefunkt oder funken koennen."

KENNEDY:

In stating that the ships evidently did not signal any more, or could not, Bonatz does not mention the Q signal. This was the most dramatic raider Action and he has omitted a major element.

Bonatz refers also to Pinguin, and records that it sent an R signal Before the action with Cornwall. He writes that before sinking a signal was Attempted but it could not be established if it got through or not. In a 376-page book the wartime chief of the German naval radio-intelligence monitoring service apparently chose not to look too deeply into these very significant actions, or could not.

In the dramatised but still regarded film Enigma, reference is made early to a voice, not keyed, signal from the submarine headquarters in Paris to the boats.



EXH.245.0013

Harman: As noted elsewhere, the Harman-Belconnen radio complex, which Marion Stevens states monitored over loudspeakers for the complement the hunt and sinking of the Bismarck, only got one mention in the index of Gill's official history (concerning WRAN establishment.) It gets no mention in Tom Frame's index for "No Pleasure Cruise: The Story of the Royal Australian Navy". Also, if one looks at the front gate of Harman now, the sign dates it as operational from 1943. Intentional or snafu? Nothing happened before US Intelligence arrived?

WINTER on audio: "It is obvious in the partial audio transcripts Kennedy provided in Vol. 9, Submission 66, for interviews with Linke and others, that he was often asking leading questions that required Linke only to say 'yes' or 'no', or to repeat back to him the words suggested. This is an unsound practice in taking evidence. It is also obvious that, being in the enclosed No. 2 wireless room on the port side, Linke saw none of the battle; at best, he was simply repeating crew gossip."

KENNEDY: DVDs of the tapes of the interviews have been/are being provided to the COI.
It will be up to the Inquiry to decide on such matters. I interviewed Linke, Winter did not.

Winter has not followed the Larsen story with me, or them. It was big Luck that Fae remembered the name of the Swedish ship and I found who Herrmann was with aid from the embassy and shipping lines. We pieced the story together. She had not. The COI has video of the Larsens confirming that Herrmann was talking contact. This is supported by the use of the word "horrified" . . . more an immediate, rather than historic, reaction.

Winter ignores the second message, encrypted by Hetty Hall for transmission, which said "do nothing" until the raider was caught.

Temper? The Commission has enough tapes of my interviews to judge for themselves. Perhaps the production company that reproduced the official story for the alleged documentary got short shrift, but losing tempers with "ladies"?

Mason-Linke: Winter also overlooks Alfons Schmitt, Alex Hagarty/Adolf Marmann, Reinhold von Malapert among others who support jamming of Sydney transmissions.

Deborah Hall stated that she worked for the DSD and she has a service



EXH 245.0014

record. It was not "according to me". The COI has the entire Deborah Hall interview to make up its own mind.

Winter overlooks that 10 of the original mid-1941 Harman WRANS went to Melbourne and only eight came back. It was a short drive between bases and there were other servicewomen in Melbourne unrecorded.

Arthur Lane and "claims" by me. I have recorded what the man said and put it forward with and for comment.

The Geraldton Guardian comment, which Winter does not source, explains why Graham Anderson was hounding me for a copy of that apparent story, which I did not have. Either it was a pointer story written in production or a rewrite by somebody else and/or one not sent to me. Winter and her axis should produce what they are apparently quoting. While on Anderson. He says he is a freelance journalist based in Berlin. Try to find him in telephone directories.

Linke thought Sydney continued west. It may have then turned south.

Winter writes of "Evidence of the connection between John Samuels and Pastor Ivan Wittwer, with David Kennedy and Bruce Horsfield on the fringes." What on earth is this supposed to mean? Two journalists from different backgrounds, a communications professor and a pastor looking at the same subject.

P77 of "Well Done Leander" recounts that on August 31 1940: "At 2000 one lad detected a darker patch than usual; perusal of the 'Ships in your vicinity' left her unacclaimed and 'Action Stations' closed Leander into a tight-fisted knot ready to be unleashed. Guns loaded with instant percussion shells swung to the target while telegraphed instructions were laid on respective dials and pointers. Quietly we increased speed as the distance decreased; men stood at the ready around our port searchlight platform, an operator sat in the Leander's Main W/T Office, our high-power transmitter running. On his desk lay a signal coded for transmission to C-in-C East Indies in India. It told of a night action and gave our position (but only when we received the order from our bridge). In an eerie split-second an eye-burning beam of illumination slashed across the narrowed space upon the target. 'Searchlights!' still echoed. Gunners tensed for the 'Open Fire'. Down below, the operator flexed his fingers as Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist Joe Crouch fingered the tumbler switch in readiness for transmission, and bridge signalmen flashed the Admiralty challenge. Back came a reply, swift and correct. We relaxed and regretted; too bloody many of these false alarms. The Britisher 'Westbury' wished us 'Good Hunting'. We wished her 'Bon Voyage'."

This shows the preparedness to transmit that would be expected to have been the same in the Sydney and the need for the Kormoran to nullify both the bridge and main W/T office below along with the most dangerous guns bearing. Hence an underwater torpedo shot.



EXH.245.0015

It continues: "H.M.S Auckland and another merchantman not listed in the area went through a similar performance as 'Gramatus' reported being chased by a raider. On another wavelength Auckland radioed that she was pursuing a raider and Leander prepared to launch her Walrus and hasten to the scene of the action, Further signals from both ships ended the excitement."

This, and many other encounters in the Indian Ocean alone, and 14 months Before Sydney-Kormoran.

On Page 79 re Aden and Atlantis: "Deserted. Not a single warship at anchor. They were all out hunting a raider which attacked and sank the Britisher 'Athelking', after 'Athelking' radioed she was being bombed by a small seaplane in mid-ocean. A subsequent signal from C-in-C East Indies surmised the raider carried torpedoes above and below her waterline, mounted concealed six-inch guns, shipped a plane in No. 1 hold and that her masts and funnels were telescopic for disguise." Page 81 tells of how Atlantis reopened fire on the subdued "Athelking" after the nearby SS "Benarty" "retransmitted" the Q signals. There were other ships in the eastern Indian Ocean at the time of the Sydney-Kormoran action, some close, like Uco.

On Page 83, Harker tells of a message for Leander that caused it to "alter course toward the Italian coast of East Africa. We were told we were expected to intercept a ship . . ." The French Esperance "was not the ship we were after" but Leander put an armed party aboard and sailed her to Aden as a prize of war. Chronologically, this would have been the Yugoslav Durmitor, captured by Atlantis to relieve her of prisoners. A signal would have been sent from Atlantis for Germany to notify the Italians that it was underway. There is no indication as to whether the Atlantis signal was deciphered (see my earlier work that the raider code was in fact broken) or an Italian message was read.

On Page 90, Harker illustrates an example of signals regarding a sighting: "0320 Kimberley radioed Leander direct.
5PS 5PS V 8BQ 8BQ - 0 = 2DR336 -7 -14 -287 -113ZZ19 = 0320
This in code said: "Leander from Kimberley. Emergency. Two enemy destroyers bearing 336 degrees seven miles distant, speed fourteen knots, course 287 degrees. My position 113 degrees nineteen miles from point ZZ on the square chart. Message timed 3.20a.m."

And: "With no steam, she again radioed in plain, 'Stopped in range of shore batteries for repairs, request assistance'."

Page 95 recounts: "Loudly on the International Wave Length of 500kc/s we morsed Banda Alula Marine Radio to evacuate a direction finder near the local hospital as we were about to demolish it with bombs."

On page 101: "Rummaging through the day's signals I sorted out one which read that H.M.A.S. Chantala was bombed at Perim. Another said Aden had brought down one of four bombers over the port; no bombs were dropped. In the Med. a destroyer entered Bardia during the night and silently overpowering a cargo ship's crew, put on board a crew of her own which steamed the ship to Alexandria. . ." This shows the access of operators to messages received.

On Page 102: "Whilst we were awaiting final messages, SNORS came aboard to farewell the ship's company . . . SNORS told us the Germans had some big stuff in the area and wished us 'Good hunting' being sure we would acquit ourselves worthily when the need came." This goes to the raider warning by Burnett at Divisions as described by Len Crabbe, Tom Fisher, Alastair Templeton et al and Hans Linke's statement that Sydney knew what Kormoran was and Kormoran knew what Sydney was.

And Page 103: At Colombo was the "veteran of the Blue Funnel Line, H.M.S. Hector" now an armed merchant cruiser which I have come to believe had an important radio intelligence role.

On Page 104: Near the Seychelles: "Three hundred miles north-east of this group, the British ship Mandasor radioed being bombed by a seaplane and later a different-tone transmission cancelled the message. This old trick often worked but now Canberra, Leander and Sydney sped towards the area."

And:

"At 0100 Seychelles Radio and Bombay Radio 'fixed' a German naval transmission several hundred miles north of Mauritius . . ."

On Page 105: " . . . we sent three wireless operators on draft to England, leaving us with only twelve . . ." indicating the radio manpower.

And:

"Any merchantman if approached by enemy armed merchant ships, prefixed its radio report of the occurrence with QQQQ, for an enemy warship RRRR, a submarine SSSS and an airplane AAAA, followed by its call-sign and position by longitude and latitude. One such Q signal resulted in

H.M.S. Capetown racing to the Seychelles area where she intercepted the 'enemy', only to find it a German-built Dutch ship who was interrogated and released. During our triangular search, Captain Bevan asked for more and more Damage Control Exercises. Closing all watertight compartments for hours sent us about our daily business through many varied ways. Abandoning Ship closed us up at our listed stations only to discover that in the event of such an occasion really being necessary, lots of men were expected to have already died. We also listened to many lectures, learning things passed on through Admiralty from survivors of ships previously sunk. A signal on the network directed Leander to steam south-south-east to the Cocos Islands but we found nothing and continued casting about the various approaches to Ceylon . . ."

The "lots of men were expected to have already died" speaks fathoms and goes to the removal of deck bench seats etcetera that had been on the Sydney in the Mediterranean as floats, but removed later.

And: "RRRR preceded a message from S.S. Tekoa, and several hours later another in the same area arrived through our aerials . . . RRRR de GSTL - S.S. Canadian Cruiser - Being chased by battlecruiser, 038E 009S."

Again, messages that would have been on 500kc.

On Page 106: "Bombay Radio sent its daily plot of 'fixes' on the network and on 25 February we were slightly north of the Equator, the nearest 'fix' being sixteen degrees due south estimated to be correct within a 200-mile radius. Two other fixes we ignored as being nearer someone else's net. The following day all obstructions were taken down, provisions placed in remote action stations, and the radio staff busied itself placing spare aerials handy to deck insulators."

And:

"Next morning, still rigging spare aerials in case of need, those occupied looked interestedly at a ship on the horizon from time to time."

With such standard preparations, a catastrophic opener, such as a submerged tube torpedo hit, would be the best tactic to do as much harm as possible to a cruiser's signalling, as well as fighting, capabilities.

Page 107: "Action Stations" as Leander closed on a ship that turned out to be the Italian disguised raider Ramb I, subdued only after firing on Leander when stopped, "to all appearances hove-to for our usual customary interrogation".

Would Sydney not have stopped Kormoran? Would Kormoran not have wanted to stop to exploit her underwater torpedo tube?

Leander's chief yeoman of signals had provisionally identified the ship as the former Italian fruit carrier. I recall Hans Linke's words that Sydney knew what Kormoran was.

With the firing at the enemy over, "Leander's motor boat and boarding party surged rapidly towards her."

Pages 110-111 deal with the action of Canberra and Leander against Coburg and Kitty Broevig, in which Harker notes every 15 minutes in the auxiliary radio room that the set is working.

On page 113: "One day a radioman in the Australian's direction finding office took a bearing on an Italian naval transmission and with guesswork for distance, both ships raced along the bearing for several hours until normal search routine resumed."

This is a classic earlier example of the possible situation of HMAS Sydney and the "send carrier" signal, meaning send a carrier, a bearing that the damaged Sydney could follow to try to get safely to a port.

On Page 113, Harker tells of entering Mauritius harbour and going alongside "fleet oiler Olcades". Also there were "H.M.S Port Durban [City of Durban?] and a still further fleet attendant Trocus". This was the tanker Trocas, which later would pick up survivors from Kormoran and, according to Singapore, wireless on November 24. Rather than the standard description of her as a "tanker", Trocas was a fleet oiler and would have had the appropriate wireless equipment and procedures, including direct and secure contact with, in the later case, Singapore.

So, the first two official contacts with survivors are by the giant troop transport Aquitania and the fleet oiler Trocas, both with secure wireless operations.

This would seem to be more than an accident.

On Page 114, Harker notes the very belated BBC announcement of the Ramb I action. Ashore, Leander wireless operators eat at a café with Port [City of] Durban radiomen: "The operators were 'Marconi Company men', trained by this international organisation and given British Naval Lieutenant rank during the war." She had nine concealed 4-inch guns, torpedoes, depth charges and asdic -- a Q ship -- and was "now decoying for Leander and Canberra". The Sydney used two merchant steamers in a Pacific decoy operation mid-1941, and, seemingly, Zealandia at least twice in 1941.

On Page 115-117: "Action Stations":



EXH.245.0018

"Gunfire broke out suddenly aboard Leander but we wondered at the lightness of it, even for 4-inch. Minutes later, two more single 4-inch rounds with a more solid recoil, and then a relaxation of action stations sounded. 'Guns' crew to remain closed-up' and the rest of us from down below again rushed up to see what was happening. Our launch lay alongside the ship, which displayed her name and a massive Vichy flag painted amidships, our armed boarding party had already gone up a lowered gangway and we made for the flag deck where we normally got the gen on such occasions. Signalled to 'heave to', the ship ignored the challenge and Leander fired some blank rounds of 4-inch which were also ignored. Two rounds of 4-inch projectiles subsequently hurtled into the sea and Charles L.D. took more notice."

And: "Searching by day with our Walrus, by night with binoculars and continually maintaining a Radio Direction Finding Watch on the International wave-band, Leander cruised in the area suggested. But there was no trace of German raiders or high-level politicians from Asian conferences, until the fifth day out from Port Louis when Walrus broke radio silence with an emergency signal at 1555. . . . just before 9pm we made our interception and raced to 'Action Stations' whilst signalmen flashed a challenge. Back came a fast reply indicating 'Fleet Auxiliary Trocus from Mauritius'."

Although there is a mention in a book on HMAS Sydney (Bitter Victory) that Uco had a "petty officer telegraphist" and another (Somewhere Below) that Uco was a service tug, there has not been the emphasis on the early role of the mobile forces.

Uco is listed as hearing a signal on November 19, Aquitania picking up survivors on November 23 but not trying to signal until the Bight, Rig Bourne writing of a Hudson flight from Pearce soon after the Aquitania sighting and Singapore radioing of the Trocas recovery on November 24. All military-connected craft.

On page 117, Harker writes: "So, Atlantis was the killer for whom we sped from Colombo without our-burned-out Walrus. With HMAS Canberra and Sydney we searched unsuccessfully for an elusive enemy . . ."

And

"Admiral Scheer was there right enough; we knew this in the radio department because we received our carbon copy reports, giving a daily fix by multiple radio bearing stations in England, India and South Africa, correct to a several hundred square miles triangle."

On Page 119: "Devonshire, however, earned Rogge's respectful comments by remaining at 16,000 yards range, manoeuvring at high speed continually, whilst she awaited a reply from Admiralty with whom she'd communicated direct. Back came confirmation of her suspicions and she opened fire."

On Page 122: "En route to Madras after recalibrating our Radio Direction Finder which was forty degrees out, we heard that our old escort Capetown had been torpedoed by Italian M.T.B.s in the Red Sea."



Page 123: "This time, using Colombo Navy Radio callsign GZH we transmitted almost continuously. High priority secret messages flashed across the ionosphere to Bombay for rerouting to Admiralty."

And Page 125: "They probably wondered why Colombo naval radio sounded so damned loud when we arrived and gradually became quieter as we moved south after oiling."

It should be drawn to attention that the previous Minister for Veterans Affairs told a gathering on the present HMAS Sydney that the Parliamentary Inquiry of 1997-99 dealt with supposition, implying that the then future COI would be the real deal. That statement overlooked the work and fact that went into the DFATS inquiry from a very wide church of military and civilians.

The importance of Hector as an AMC with a wireless role may be gauged with, on Page 126: ". . . Force 'V' comprising Glasgow, Liverpool, Cornwall, Ceres, Leander, Hector and several others again converged."

On Page 127: "Cornwall's aircraft picked up an unidentified vessel and directed her parent ship onto the scene in the early afternoon while we were still 500 miles away. The raider made one of our RRR messages on the International Band and gave all appearances of being the frightened Norwegian ship whose name she appended to her signal. Cornwall, still uncertain, approached closer; still frantic signs aboard the stranger, but now it was established that the Norwegian was not in the Indian Ocean and a more stringent challenge to stop was sent."

And:

"At sea our normal watches were organised into four hours on and eight off, this being restful in theory but it was seldom that the eight hours were unbroken by Dawn Action Stations (a daily feature where all closed-up from predawn to good visibility), or Action Stations while investigating a stray ship, Action Stations for exercise with another warship, or the activity resulting from some annoying ship reporting himself being sunk, in which case we manned our radios in an endeavour to intercept enemy signals and possibly D/F them. The latter might last two or three days."

On Page 131: After the sinking of the Fiji and its commanders work with the men: ". . . reaction was settling in. They were remembering their pals who would not come back. If handled unwisely, they would soon be in the grip of melancholy, and he was going to start seamanship classes, to drive them hard, to make them play sport hard, to make them forget." This goes to Hetty Hall in Singapore and her instruction in radio of the survivors of Prince of Wales and Repulse.

On Page 134: On low powered Auxiliary W/T communication between squadrons and flotillas: "Not much reliance had yet been placed on radio telephone, as a phonetic error could give an entirely different meaning to signals." In an emergency, there would not have been so much emphasis on phonetics.

On Page 135: "With the opposite watch operators handling things, we rushed to our torpedo-firing control deck outside the remote control radio room, gazing in awe."

This may explain how some wireless operators in Kormoran were able to view the action, as disputed by Winter.



Damage control for wireless aerials shows that teams were ready for repairs.

On Page 146: "... we radio operators shinned up the foremast ladder, worked our way swiftly along catlines stropped under the upper yard, and cleared a mess of tangled aerials observed to be showering sparks from our main radio transmitter. Hands bleeding from tears by rusted flexible stays, we rove new aerials and flew down again in record time."

And Page 147: "Hands to breakfast passed and we busied ourselves overhauling our aerials for shrapnel damage, spliced new heavy stranded copper wire onto weighty two foot long insulators and placed them handy to spare aerial halyards."

Page 149 shows that operators could be on hand to hear, if not on duty: ". . . and heading into the Auxiliary Office to dodge nine-o'clock divisions".

On Page 152, an example of specific secrecy instructions: "Captain Bevan cleared lower-deck and told the ship's company we were not to mention the event ashore or in our mail. Vichy France had not been declared an official enemy."

And on Page 159 after Germany invaded the Soviet Union: "Every news broadcast we listened to, droned setback after setback in disappointing sequence. Every operation in which we partook finished with depleted numbers returning to harbour. A mild form of Gestapo invaded the ship and men were questioned officially if they sounded too disparaging about British defeats."

Page 192 on ability to improvise in November 1941: ". . . the radio staff of all ships had done the operating and serviced all equipment to date".

Regarding trackless torpedoes that could have been sent to Kormoran in Kulmerland: ". . . in 1933 when Rear Admiral Kaneji Kishimoto and Captain Toshihide Asakuma of the Kure Torpedo Institute, perfected an oxygen propellant. Apart from leaving no trace . . ."

On Page 262 there are references to operators getting "the latest gen" from their mates and passing it on at changes of watch.

Page 263 refers to the excitement of young boys at seeing Achilles cap ribbons after the Battle of the River Plate. One can imagine the shock effect of the loss of the Sydney on the Australian population . . . and something of a Pearl Harbor, as alluded to by search supporters including actor Jack Thompson, resolve.

Barbara Winter (Poniewierski) is many things to many people. I will but make a response here to the unconsidered assumptions and unresearched charges she makes in her submission to the COI related to me personally. I am reluctant to look at the files of the West Australian Maritime Museum, where I was told by an archivist there is enough defamatory material to keep lawyers happy for decades and me distracted, which is probably the purpose of her operations.

David Kennedy
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