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Regimes and Treaties

Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies was established in 1995 to control transfers of conventional weapons and defence and dual-use goods and technologies. The Arrangement aims to promote transparency, exchange of information, and greater responsibility in preventing destabilising accumulations of advanced conventional weapons and dual-use technologies. Since December 2001, the WA has pursued as one of its purposes the prevention of weapons proliferation to terrorist groups.

The Zangger Committee

This Committee was established in 1971 when major nuclear suppliers, including Australia, came together to reach a common understanding on how to implement their obligation under the NPT not to supply nuclear material and equipment to non-nuclear weapon states outside the NPT unless IAEA safeguards were in place. In 1974, the Committee published a list of items – known as the ’Trigger List’ – that could be transferred to non-nuclear-weapon states outside the NPT only on condition of certain safeguards and assurances. The Committee established three conditions for supply; an assurance of non-explosive use, a requirement that the item be placed under IAEA safeguards, and an assurance that the receiving state would apply the same conditions when transferring the items to other states. The Committee currently has 35 members.

Australia Group (AG)

The Australia Group (AG) is an informal arrangement of 40 participating states and was formed in 1985 in response to evidence that Western countries had inadvertently supplied Iraq with dual-use chemicals which Iraq had diverted to its chemical weapons program.

In 1990, the Group expanded its scrutiny to biological materials as information revealed that Iraq had also been pursuing a biological weapons program. The AG aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to minimise the diversion risk of dual-use chemicals and equipment that could be used in chemical and biological weapon (CBW) proliferation. Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfill their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention to the maximum extent possible. Indeed, in the absence of a verification body for the Biological Weapons Convention, the AG’s development of control lists covering biological materials and technologies is the only form of internationally harmonised control over such items. All states participating in the Australia Group are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, and strongly support efforts under those Conventions to rid the world of CBW.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The NSG, created in 1974, aims to prevent civilian nuclear trade from contributing to nuclear weapons programs in non-nuclear weapon states. Whereas the Zangger Committee focuses on controlling transfers to states outside the non-proliferation treaty, the NSG’s guidelines deal with the transfer of nuclear-related items to all non-nuclear weapon states regardless of their non-proliferation treaty status. These guidelines require recipient governments to provide formal assurances that transferred items will not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or nuclear explosive activities. The guidelines also set out strengthened re-transfer provisions and requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. They require particular restraint with respect to trade in facilities, technology or equipment that may be used for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing – the two key paths to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 1992 additional guidelines were established for transfers of nuclear equipment, material and technology with both civil and military applications. The NSG also amended its guidelines to require non-nuclear weapon states to accept the application of IAEA safeguards on all their current and future nuclear activities as a condition of nuclear supply.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The seven major Western suppliers of missile technology (United States, Japan, United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, France and Canada) established the MTCR in 1987. Since that time membership has increased to 34 participants. The MTCR aims to limit nuclear weapons proliferation by controlling the transfer of missile equipment, complete rocket systems, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometres, as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 1992 the MTCR was extended to cover missile or related systems capable of carrying smaller chemical and biological payloads. MTCR controls are not intended to hinder cooperation in civil space projects.

United Nations Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR)

The UN Register of Conventional Arms is a voluntary arrangement established in 1992 under General Assembly resolution 46/36L titled ‘Transparency in Armaments.’ The resolution called upon all member states to provide to the Secretary-General annually relevant data on imports and exports of conventional arms as a measure designed to prevent the excessive and destabilising accumulation of arms. Under UNCAR, states, including Australia, report on seven major weapons categories: Australia supports the Register as part of its transparency in export controls.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted unanimously in 2004. The purpose of UNSCR 1540 is to require states to criminalise the proliferation of WMD, enact strict export controls and secure sensitive materials. Importantly, UNSCR 1540 applies to all UN member states thereby bringing into the non-proliferation regime states which have remained outside the WMD treaties and other instruments. Specifically the resolution requires all states to (UN 2004, pp 2/3):

• refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
• adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities;
• take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:
  • Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
  • Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
  • Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;
  • Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations.

United Nations Security Resolution 1673

UN Security Council Resolution 1673 (2006), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5429th meeting, on 17 April 2006, extends the mandate of the 1540 Committee, which was established by Resolution 1540 on non-state actors and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which was adopted in April 2004.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. A total of 187 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.  The aim of the NPT is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states other than the five recognised as nuclear weapons states in 1968, that is the United States, USSR (Russia succeeded to these obligations), United Kingdom, France and China.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The Convention prohibits all development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It requires each State Party to destroy chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities it possesses, as well as any chemical weapons it may have abandoned on the territory of another State Party. The verification provisions of the CWC not only affect the military sector but also the civilian chemical industry, world-wide, through certain restrictions and obligations regarding the production, processing and consumption of chemicals that are considered relevant to the objectives of the Convention. They will be verified through a combination of reporting requirements, routine on-site inspections of declared sites and short-notice challenge inspections. The Convention also contains provisions on assistance in case a State Party is attacked or threatened with attack by chemical weapons and on promoting the trade in chemicals and related equipment among States Parties.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

The BWC was the first major multilateral treaty to outlaw an entire class of weapons, prohibiting parties developing, producing, stockpiling or otherwise acquiring or retaining biological weapons and their means of delivery.

The BWC does not explicitly ban the use of biological weapons, which are already banned by the Geneva Protocol, but the prohibitions it contains and the requirement that states parties destroy any stockpiles accumulated before accession, amount to an effective ban on use. The BWC also prohibits states parties from assisting other countries to acquire biological weapons, directly or indirectly. Further, it requires states parties to facilitate technical and scientific cooperation in the use of biotechnology for peaceful purposes.