

## APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF AUSTRALIA (1947)

### Editor's Introduction

The 1947 Appreciation discussed in greater detail the threat posed by the USSR, and Australia's role in Empire defence. It noted the precarious situation in China, finding that '[a] danger to South East Asia and, therefore, to Australia, will arise from the Far East if the U.S.S.R should dominate, or be allied with, China', in which case 'she would derive substantial assistance from the large groups of Chinese who honeycomb' South East Asia (paras 21-37, 52). Due to the limits of the Soviet economy and the time required for it to develop an atomic capability, 'the probability of a war before 1950/51 appears remote' (paras 34-36, 73).

Australia was 'isolated from the remainder of the British Commonwealth' by the effects of decolonisation, and 'separated by the great expanse of the Pacific from North America', creating a need for 'greater efforts for self-sufficiency' (paras 3, 4). 'By virtue of her geographical position, Australia should assume increased responsibilities in British Commonwealth matters in the Indian Ocean, South East Asia and the Pacific', and the Appreciation developed a framework for defining a zone of Australian strategic responsibility (para 4). With forces based in Malaya and North Borneo, it was aimed at preventing the establishment of hostile bases within the range of long-range bombers from Australia's industrial centres (paras 68, 87-93). In this context, it was 'most desirable' that Indonesia 'should be administered by strong and stable governments with whom Australia could establish friendly relations' (para 81).

But the zone of strategic responsibility would only be the focus of Australia's contribution to major war 'should hostilities occur before agreed overall plans have been formulated', as Australia's 'dependence on co-operation with other nations for her security will compel her to accept the fact that the strategic employment of her forces will be governed by considerations wider than those of a purely regional nature' (para 86). Since the USSR 'would probably first seek to overrun Western Europe', a direct threat to Australia would be unlikely before subsequent successful attacks in the Middle or Far East, and Australia should 'envisage provision of forces to operate in the Middle and/or Far East, in accordance with an overall plan' (para 85). The 'early assistance of the United States of America would be essential' in a war with the USSR, although 'history dictates that reliance' should not be placed on 'automatic assistance' of what was recognised as the 'predominant Power in the Pacific' (paras 12, 51, 81).

The Appreciation discussed technological developments in atomic and biological weapons, rockets, long-range bombers and submarines, and it found it 'premature to make, at this stage, any major change in the organisation and normal equipment of armed forces' (paras 59-66). While it acknowledged that 'the size of forces in peace and war will be dictated by the extent of resources which will be made available', the paper repeated the ambitious force structure recommendations of the previous year's version (paras 100-101).



# AN APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF AUSTRALIA SEPTEMBER 1947

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*This paper was endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 28 October 1947*



# **APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF AUSTRALIA SEPTEMBER, 1947**

## **THE OBJECT**

The object of this Paper is to examine Australia's Strategical Position, taking into consideration relevant political factors.

## **THE NEED FOR REVIEW**

This paper has been prepared in the light of the situation as it existed in September 1947. In order that it may be kept up to date, it is intended that the paper be reviewed annually or whenever any change in the International Situation, or in Scientific Development, renders this necessary.

## **ARRANGEMENT OF CONTENTS.**

- |              |   |
|--------------|---|
| PART I       | Introduction  |
| PART II      | An Examination of the Factors affecting Australia's Strategic Position.   |
| PART III     | Conclusions relative to Australia's Strategic Position.   |
| PART IV      | Measures to achieve Security.   |
| PART V       | Summary of Measures to achieve Security.  |
| APPENDIX 'A' | A Chart on which is shown-  |
| (a)          | The danger line for hostile penetration, and suggested minimum Northern limit of the Australian Zone of Strategic Responsibility. |
| (b)          | A line drawn at a distance of 1500 miles from the Australian coastline.   |
| (c)          | A line of bases.  |
| (d)          | Area containing the majority of the important and vital targets.  |



## **PART I — INTRODUCTION**

### **AUSTRALIA IN RELATION TO WORLD AFFAIRS**

- 1.** Australia emerged from the war of 1939-1945 with a greater consciousness of world affairs and their impact on her political and economic structure, and a realisation that her own domestic affairs cannot remain unaffected by events overseas. The two years which have elapsed since then, have intensified this consciousness, which is reflected in the part played by Australia in peace treaty negotiations and other international problems.
- 2.** As the United Nations arrangements for world security have not been completed, this examination of Australia's strategic position has been related to the situation as it now exists. It is considered however, from indications to date, that even when the United Nations arrangements for world security have been established, they may be effective in dealing with minor powers only, whilst the powers of VETO exist. In such circumstances, Australia's dependence on close British Commonwealth co-operation for her security becomes more clearly evident.
- 3.** Growing Nationalist Movements, accelerated by the War of 1939-45, have caused inevitable and definite grouping of political sympathies throughout the world, with consequent repercussions on the balance of power by which Australia's security was formerly achieved, and on world crude. The effects of the partitioning of India, and of the imminent withdrawal of Burma from the Empire, are uncertain. The possible split in China, with Northern China under Communist control, and Southern China divided within itself, will have an effect on security in the Pacific. In South East Asia – of particular concern to Australia – the Indonesian Movement creates a security problem as well as an economic problem. Similarly, the unrest in Malaya will have an impact on Australia's security problem.
- 4.** The recent war has reduced the military and economic strength of the United Kingdom considerably, with the result that Australia can no longer rely, to the same extent, on the assistance previously provided by the United Kingdom in both these aspects. Furthermore, the unsettled state of the world in general, and the increase in nationalistic movements in Asia in particular, finds Australia isolated from the remainder of the British Commonwealth and separated by the great expanse of the Pacific from North America. It is necessary, therefore, that Australia should make greater efforts for self-sufficiency and also contribute to the military and economic strength of the British Commonwealth to a greater extent than in the past. By virtue of her geographical position, Australia should assume increased responsibilities in British Commonwealth matters in the Indian Ocean, South East Asia and the Pacific. Australia is interested in events in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, since these will affect events in South East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

5. Australia's industrial potential depends, to a considerable extent, on access to raw materials in which she is not self-sufficient. The maintenance of friendly relationships with foreign countries, particularly those from which these materials are procured, is of obvious importance in this regard.

6. Military appreciations and plans will depend upon the potential enemy and likely theatres of operations. Different plans would be required to meet different circumstances, and those necessary to deal with a minor aggressor would be inadequate in the event of Australia's security being threatened by a major power. It would be prudent, therefore, in order that preparations for defence might be basically suitable to meet any emergency, to plan for the worst possible contingency, which would consist of a threat by a major Power, or combination of Powers, before the United Nations becomes fully effective.

### **THE EFFECT OF SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT**

7. The effect of scientific and mass destruction weapons will be discussed later in this paper. However, it is important to stress here that the conclusions reached in this appreciation will be based upon the practice of warfare at the present, taking into account the lessons of the recent war and the probable effect of new scientific and mass destruction weapons at their present stage of development. As developments which are of practical application occur, it will be necessary to review this appreciation in the light of their probable effect. In this connection, it is probable that, except in Russia, the rate of development of scientific weapons in peace will be slow compared with that during war. Present evidence indicates that the Russian effort in this regard is being accelerated in an endeavour quickly to reach parity with the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

## **PART II — AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTORS AFFECTING AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC POSITION**

8. The following are the major factors to be taken into account in considering the Strategic Position of Australia:

- (a) THE UNITED NATIONS.
- (b) BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECURITY.
- (c) POTENTIAL ENEMIES.
- (d) THE TIME FACTOR.
- (e) BRITISH AREAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.
- (f) FOREIGN AREAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.
- (g) SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT.
- (h) AUSTRALIA'S VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK.
- (i) AUSTRALIA'S RESOURCES.

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### **(a) THE UNITED NATIONS**

#### **Consequences of Membership of the United Nations**

9. As Australia is a member of the United Nations, her military commitments are affected by the following provisions of, or obligations under, the Charter:

- a. The Security Council, in carrying out its duties for the maintenance of international peace and security, acts on her behalf (Art. 24).
- b. She is bound to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council (Art. 25).
- c. Decisions of the Security Council may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of sea, air, postal, telegraphic, and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations (Art. 41).

- d. The Security Council may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by the air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations (Art. 42).
- e. Australia has undertaken to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements (not yet negotiated), armed forces, assistance, and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided (Art. 43).
- f. An agreement under (e) may require Australia to hold immediately available, an air force contingent for combined international enforcement action (Art. 45).
- g. Plans for the application of armed forces will be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (Art. 46).
- h. Australia is not directly represented on the Military Staff Committee but will be invited to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the committee's responsibilities requires her participation in its work (Art. 47(2)).
- i. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorisation of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees (Art. 47(4)).
- j. Nothing in the Charter impairs Australia's inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against us (Art. 51).

### **Military Implications**

**10.** From the foregoing paragraph, it will be seen that the forces which Australia requires to fulfil her obligations under the Charter, must be permanent forces in order that they may be immediately available to the United Nations. Australia may also be required to make available facilities, including bases, from which United Nations forces would operate in the event of action being taken in the vicinity of Australia.

### **Present Effectiveness of United Nations**

**11.** Any action by the Security Council is subject, at present, however, to the power of "VETO" by any one of the permanent members. While the power of "VETO" continues to exist, the Security Council is unable to invoke the use of armed force against a major Power, since all the major Powers are represented on the Council. If then, one of the Great Powers contemplates aggression, United Nations will break down. It is unlikely that the United Nations, charged with a task of such magnitude as the preservation of world peace, will function efficiently from its inception. Such an organisation requires an initial testing period before it is reasonable to expect

effective results. It appears, therefore, that no great reliance can be placed on the United Nations until it is proved to be an effective organisation.

## **(b) BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECURITY**

### **International Status of Members of the British Commonwealth**

**12.** The United Kingdom alone is not comparable as a great Power with either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. which are the world's most powerful nations, militarily, economically, industrially, and in manpower. The Dominions are small Powers, but the British Commonwealth taken as a whole with adequate co-ordination, is a major Power.

Co-ordinated action by the British Commonwealth, which need not conflict in any way with British Commonwealth obligations under the United Nations Charter, would make it possible for the British Commonwealth to contribute in a more effective manner to the requirements of the Security Council.

The only specific agreement among British Countries to provide for co-ordinated defence action is included in the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 1944, of which the clause relevant to this paper, is as follows:-

“The two Governments agree that within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence, comprising the South West and South Pacific areas shall be established, and that this zone shall be based on Australia and New Zealand stretching through the arc of islands North and North East of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.”

If it can be assured that in any major war the British Commonwealth will have the U.S.A. as an ally, the former's position is immeasurably improved. Nevertheless, history dictates that reliance should not be placed on the automatic assistance of the U.S.A. and British Commonwealth strategy must make full provision for conditions in which in the opening stages of a war, the British Commonwealth may stand alone.

### **Principles of British Commonwealth Defence**

**13.** Proposals made by the United Kingdom at the Prime Ministers' Conference in 1946 with reference to British Commonwealth Defence, are set out below:-

“Each member of the Commonwealth should –

- (i) Accept responsibility for the development and defence of their Main Support Area<sup>1</sup> and the strategic zone around it.

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<sup>1</sup> The term “Main Support Area” as used in this paper, means an Area in which the following facilities are available – Industrial Facilities, Manpower, Materials and Supplies, Training Facilities, Capacity for Research and Development, and an Intelligence Organisation. Such areas within the British Commonwealth are – The United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa, and Australia and New Zealand.

- (ii) Accept the principle of joint responsibility between members of the Commonwealth concerned for the protection of lines of communication between main Support Areas.
- (iii) Agree that it is in their strategic interest to assist both politically and militarily in maintaining our position in those protective areas which directly affect the security of their territory and communications.”

It is observed, however, that no complete and final agreement has yet been reached with regard to these or any other governing principles.

### **Machinery for Co-Ordination**

14. Inadequate, and to a degree, un-co-ordinated planning in the past, together with the provision of insufficient forces to ensure the security of the British Commonwealth, has led, in desperate circumstances, to fundamental decisions being made, with a reliance on powers of improvisation, rather than upon a well found plan. These have contributed largely to such disasters as the loss of Burma and Singapore, and to the direct threat of invasion to Australia. The question of the institution of machinery, to enable planning to take place on a British Commonwealth basis, was discussed at the Prime Ministers' Conference in London in 1946, but as yet, no machinery is in existence.

## **(c) POTENTIAL ENEMIES**

15. For the purpose of this Appreciation, and with a view to determining which, if any, nations may be classed within the category of “potential enemy”, all nations have been included in the examination hereunder –

### **Minor Powers**

16. Any attack by a minor Power on an individual member of the British Commonwealth, would probably involve the aggressor in war with the other members of the British Commonwealth. Therefore, a war between Australia and any minor Power is highly improbable, unless the minor Power be guaranteed the assistance of a major Power.

### **United States of America**

17. The close co-operation between the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A. in two world wars, their similar peaceful aspirations and their common language and customs, outweigh potential differences in political and economic matters, and the idea of war as an instrument to settle disagreements between them can be discarded.

### **France and China**

18. Owing to their unstable political and economic position neither France nor China can, at present, be regarded as first-class powers, nor are they likely to become, by themselves, a threat to the British Commonwealth.

## Germany

19. The total defeat of Germany has eliminated her as a threat to the interests of the British Commonwealth in the immediate future. There is an increasing tendency for Europe to become split into two groups, one with Western democratic ideas, the other with the totalitarian ideas of Communism. Should Germany be allowed to join with the latter, her great industrial capacity and technical ability, combined with her considerable manpower, would form a very considerable threat to the security of the British Commonwealth.

## Japan

20. Japan has been an aggressive nation but, at present, is militarily impotent as the result of the recent war. Unless she is subjected to effective control, she may again become an aggressor, or ally herself with some potential enemy of the British Commonwealth.

## Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

21. The U.S.S.R. is a first-class Power with large manpower and economic resources. Though she lacks sea power, she has more men under arms than any other nation, and shows little indication that she proposes to disarm to the same extent as other major Powers.

22. The U.S.S.R.'s recent attitude, in international conferences and in the deliberations of the United Nations, does not appear reassuring to the peace of the world. Her actions in countries on her borders do not inspire international confidence, and her general lack of co-operation, in world affairs, points to her as the only major Power which is likely to resort to military action to obtain her objectives.

23. Such threats to Australian security by the U.S.S.R., as here require consideration, will be those in consequence of hostile or unfriendly action in the Middle East or Far East. This does not disregard Europe as a possible theatre of war, or the possibility that initial moves by the U.S.S.R. will be made in Europe. Inevitably, hostile action in any one of the three major theatres, whether Europe, the Middle East or the Far East, will quickly react in the other two, thus establishing in the case of Australia, a necessity to include the Middle East and the Far East in her defence planning.

24. Each of these two areas, particularly the former, is capable of producing a situation which threatens some vital British Commonwealth interest. This situation could result in Australia becoming involved, either because of her ties with the United Kingdom, or because it was felt that Australian participation was essential in order to protect her own ultimate position.

25. It is not suggested that the U.S.S.R. is committed to aggression, or that diplomacy is incapable of adjusting current or future differences, but, in estimating the military contingencies that can arise in the near future, special consideration must be given to the factor of the U.S.S.R.

26. *The U.S.S.R. in the Far East:* From the economic point of view, the Far East is important to the Soviet because of the great potential resources of her own eastern territories and those of Manchuria and the potentialities of the Chinese market.

**27.** The U.S.S.R. also has a definite political interest in the Far East. Her frontiers with China are largely protected by a chain of buffer states and provinces in which Soviet influence predominates, but her Pacific seaboard provides a back door through which Russian security can be seriously threatened. In the face of the growing influence of the United States, which now confronts her in Asia as well as in Europe, it has become essential that she establish for herself a strong position on the Pacific coast. The Eastward movement of Soviet industry will be of assistance in achieving this objective. The Soviet position is further strengthened by her occupation of Northern Korea, by the acquisition of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, and by the activity of Chinese Communists in Manchuria and elsewhere in Northern China.

**28.** *The U.S.S.R. and Japan:* The U.S.S.R. is unlikely to regard her position in the Far East as consolidated while United States' influence is predominant in Japan. Withdrawal of United States' influence would leave the way open for a Russian influx, possibly resulting in Japan being quickly brought, for all practical purposes, under Soviet direction. If, on the other hand, United States' influence remains predominant, the prospects are that Japan will establish a stable democratic government and maintain a sound economy. These characteristics may, nevertheless, be insufficient, after the period of occupation, to keep her out of the Russian camp. Whatever the nature of their government, the Japanese may be prompted by expediency to turn to any nation whose support might facilitate the re-establishment of Japan as a first-class Power. This urge might orientate Japan towards the U.S.S.R.

**29.** *The U.S.S.R., China and South East Asia:* With United States' influence predominant in Japan, and China hostile to the U.S.S.R., Russia would face the unfavourable prospect of China becoming a base for military operations against her. The reappearance of Japan as a strong economic unit, especially if this results from the policy of the Western Powers, may cause a reorientation of Chinese sympathy towards the U.S.S.R.

**30.** A danger to South East Asia and, therefore, to Australia, will arise from the Far East if the U.S.S.R. should dominate, or be allied with, China. Under these circumstances, the U.S.S.R. forces would be well placed to embark on operations in Indo-China, Burma, Siam, Malaya or elsewhere in the region. In such an event, she would derive substantial assistance from the large groups of Chinese who honeycomb these countries. These Chinese must be considered a potential source of trouble in South East Asia, because incidents, between them and indigenous peoples of the area, would be capable of provoking demands or providing the excuse for intervention in South East Asia. Furthermore, in the event of such intervention, they could facilitate the entry of Soviet or Chinese forces and, in some regions, cause widespread paralysis of public services.

**31.** South East Asia is important in Soviet strategy, in that it plays a part in the economy as well as in the strategic dispositions of the Western Powers, and unrest there could have a prejudicial effect on their military capacity in Europe, in the Middle East, and in the Far East. The U.S.S.R. by propaganda and disruptive tactics in this area, could curtail the resources of the Western Powers and hold down some of their forces. Direct U.S.S.R. intervention in South East Asia is most improbable, as she would hardly risk the danger of extending her forces into South East Asia, while the United States remained unchallenged on her Eastern flank.

**32.** *The U.S.S.R. in the Middle East:* The Middle East area is of particular strategic concern to the Soviet. Even if the U.S.S.R. merely aims at self-protection, there will still be some appreciable measure of Soviet activity in the Middle East. She must be conscious of her great weakness in this region in two important respects. Firstly, while the industrialisation of her eastern areas – an essential feature of her planning – has reduced the vulnerability of Soviet industry to attack from the West, that industry has now become vulnerable to attack from the South. Secondly, the main oil supplies of the U.S.S.R. are in the Caucasian area. These oil fields are within easy air striking distance of an attack from the south.

The Middle East is believed to contain one-third of the oil resources of the world. The oil supplies of the U.S.S.R. are not inexhaustible and for her long-term requirements, she must therefore, at some stage, look beyond her Southern borders to increase them. This requirement indicates the reason for Russia's present attitude in Persian affairs. Conversely, the Soviet's own position is strengthened, not only in the Middle East, but in every other theatre, if by political or other measures, she can deny the Middle East oil to Britain and the United States of America. Since approximately seventy percent of British requirements are drawn from this region, the implications of any serious curtailment of this supply are obvious.

#### **(d) THE TIME FACTOR**

**33.** While there is no evidence to show that war between the British Commonwealth of Nations and the U.S.S.R. is inevitable, the possibility cannot be ignored that such a conflict might occur. Therefore, in planning, consideration must be given, not only to the possibility of a clash with the U.S.S.R., but also to the future time at which such a clash could most likely occur. This would be governed primarily by the following factors:-

- a. The future foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.
- b. The ability of the economy of the U.S.S.R. to support an aggressive foreign policy.
- c. The possession by the U.S.S.R. of atomic and biological weapons.
- d. The military strength of possible opponents of the U.S.S.R.

**34.** Probably the largest single factor in determining the future time, at which a war with the U.S.S.R. might take place, is the ability of the Soviet economy to support a major war. At present, Soviet economy is not in a position to do this, as it is engaged in the process of rehabilitating itself after the exhausting struggle of World War II. The overall economic objective has been officially stated as being, to increase its military economic potential to such a degree that the country will be safe in the future against any contingencies. All efforts under the present five-year plan are being directed towards this end, with special emphasis on heavy industry. In this sphere the U.S.S.R. hopes to reach, by 1960, the U.S.A. output level of 1939. At the present rate of progress, there appears to be little chance of the Soviet economy being able to achieve its ultimate aim until 1955 at the very earliest. There is a possibility however, that, at the end of the current five-year plan, in 1950, it may be sufficiently far advanced for the Soviet Government to become somewhat bolder in its foreign policy. In addition, the U.S.S.R. is having its own share of internal

problems, the cumulative effect of which may be to retard production and so lengthen the period required to reach the ultimate economic goal.

**35.** While it is impossible to judge, accurately, to what extent the development of atomic and biological weapons has progressed in the U.S.S.R., her espionage activities, and her endeavour to have control of atomic energy included in disarmament, lead to the inference that she has not yet developed these weapons. The Soviet Government is however, expending considerable money and energy on atomic research, and it appears to be a reasonable assumption that, by 1951, she will be in a position to produce atomic weapons.

**36.** Observing that the possibility of war with U.S.S.R. does exist, particularly if that country continues an expansionist foreign policy, the probability of a war before 1950/51 appears remote. Thereafter, however, the possibility will increase until 1960, when, if her economic plans are successful, U.S.S.R. may consider herself in a position to support, economically, an aggressive foreign policy, backed by military force.

**37.** The International situation can deteriorate more rapidly than armed forces can be built up. The relative strengths of the armed forces of Russia and those of her potential opponents, will be a factor in determining whether Russia will resort to war, as an instrument of policy, and the time at which this will occur. Already the armed forces, excepting naval forces, of Russia are numerically greater and at a higher state of readiness for war than the combined forces of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and the balance in favour of Russia increases rapidly with the passage of time. In this respect, it is well to remember the economic plight of the United Kingdom which may continue for some years. British forces have been withdrawn from Egypt, India, and Burma, and shortly will be withdrawn from Palestine. The fighting services are undergoing drastic cuts. It is true that the United States of America is taking an interest in the Mediterranean Area, in particular in Greece and Turkey, which can be regarded as bastions to the Suez Canal and the Middle East oil fields. However, United States foreign policy has invariably been somewhat volatile and her armed forces have already been drastically reduced. It may, therefore, be premature to rely on her maintaining her Mediterranean forces in sufficient strength to counter balance United Kingdom weakness vis-à-vis Russia. If this balance of power at any time becomes marked, Russia's foreign policy will probably be developed accordingly even going so far as to risk war, although her economic situation may not yet be sufficiently improved to warrant this step. Until 1950 however, this possibility is remote.

## **(e) BRITISH AREAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE**

### **Europe**

**38.** Broadly, the interests of the British Commonwealth to be safeguarded in the European theatre are – the security of the United Kingdom base, and the sea and air communications vital to her existence. Of particular importance to Australia, are the communications which link the United Kingdom to Australia, through the Middle East.

The United Kingdom, due to her proximity to the European mainland, coupled with the development of scientific weapons of mass destruction, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack from that quarter.

## **The Middle East**

**39.** In the Middle East, the main considerations are – the preservation of our sea and air communications and the maintenance of access to oil resources in the Persian Gulf area. The Middle East, including Egypt, and the oil fields in the Persian Gulf area, is within bombing range of Russian territory, and is also open to land attack by Russia.

## **The Continent of India**

**40.** The Continent of India is of great strategic importance owing to the following considerations –

- a. It dominates British Commonwealth sea and air communications through the Indian Ocean.
- b. It is of great value as a base. British Commonwealth forces, located there, would be suitably placed for deployment, either for the protection of India, the Middle East, or South East Asia.
- c. It has great manpower and economic resources.

**41.** Whether India as two separate Dominions, will continue to participate in the overall security of the British Commonwealth, will depend on the degree of their co-operation in British Commonwealth defence matters. The withdrawal of the British Army from India, and the division of the Indian Army into separate forces, each under the control of its own Dominion, will weaken the strength of reserves which may be available to the British Commonwealth in any future emergency. These armies, backed by the great manpower of India, have, in the past, been a major source of supply of military forces. Without them the ability of the British Commonwealth, to carry out military operations of any magnitude, in the Middle or Far East, would be reduced in the future.

## **Ceylon**

**42.** Ceylon occupies a commanding position in relation to British Commonwealth sea and air communications in the Indian Ocean. The maintenance of these is one of the basic requirements of British Commonwealth strategy. In any future war, Ceylon would be required as a base for defence of these communications. The island is also an essential link in the cable and wireless network to Australia and the Far East, and is the centre of naval intelligence organisations for countries bordering on the Indian Ocean.

Inability to use Ceylon, which contains the only existing fleet base between Malta and Singapore, would seriously weaken British Commonwealth control in the Indian Ocean. If, in addition, the British Commonwealth were unable to use ports and air fields in India, sea communications and air routes, to Australia and the Far East, would be seriously endangered.

## The Indian Ocean

**43.** The Indian Ocean, flanking the Middle East, India, Ceylon and South East Asia, contains lines of sea and air communications from Australia to these areas, to the Middle East, to East Africa and to England via the Cape. The air route through Australia-Cocos Islands-Diego Garcia-Seychelles-East Africa is an important alternative to the Middle East Air Route.

*Addu Atoll and Diego Garcia* – In the event of war in the Indian Ocean, Addu Atoll and Diego Garcia would be useful supplementary bases to Ceylon. Should Ceylon become untenable, these islands would assume increased importance.

*Andamans and Nicobars* – The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are well placed for use as bases for the defence of sea and air communications in the Bay of Bengal, particularly between Ceylon and Singapore.

*Cocos Islands* – Cocos Islands have a potential value as an air base, for the protection of communications through the Indian Ocean.

*Burma* – Burma flanks British Commonwealth lines of communication through the Indian Ocean, and particularly those from India, through the Bay of Bengal, to the Far East.

## South East Asia and the Pacific

- 44.** The strategic interests of Australia in the Pacific and South East Asia are –
- a. The security of Australia and New Zealand and of their sea and air communications within this area, and to the Middle East, South Africa and North America;
  - b. The security of British territories and dependencies, viz., Malaya, North Borneo, New Guinea Mandated Territories, Hong Kong, and Islands in the Pacific; and
  - c. The continuity of supplies of raw materials from Malaya and the East Indies (e.g., in the event of failure to secure supplies of oil from Persian oil fields, the capacity of the British Commonwealth to wage war would be seriously jeopardized unless supplies of oil could be assured from the East Indies.)

**45.** *Malaya and Singapore* – Malaya lies at the heart of South East Asia, and Singapore is the focal point of communications in that area. Singapore is either directly on, or is near, the main sea routes between South East Asia and Australia, and between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is also an essential link on the air route from Australia to India, to the Middle East, to the Eastern seaboard of Asia, and to Japan. It flanks the sea and air communications from Australia to the Middle East through the Indian Ocean.

**46.** *British North Borneo* – This area flanks the North-Eastern approaches to Singapore, through the China Sea, and also the North-Western approaches to Australia through Indonesia.

**47.** *Hong Kong* – Hong Kong is at present a base of the British Pacific Fleet, and is also the focal point of air and sea communications to South China and Japan. It is important for the protection of lines of communication of British Commonwealth forces, which may be in Japan or elsewhere in this area. Should China be in the hands of hostile forces, Hong Kong is vulnerable to attack, particularly from the mainland.

**48.** *New Guinea and Mandated Territories* – New Guinea and Territories at present under mandate to Australia, are of particular importance to Australia. They cover the approaches from the Northwards to the East coast of Australia, and contain potential naval and air bases at Manus, Rabaul and Port Moresby, and a potential air base at Nadzab.

### **The Australian Mainland**

**49.** *North West Australia* – North West Australia is the nearest Australian territory to South East Asia. Darwin, the focal point of sea and air communications, possesses the main developed port and air facilities in this area.

*South West Australia* – Sea communications, passing through the Indian Ocean to the Southern portion of Australia, converge in the vicinity of South Western Australia, in which Fremantle is the focal point and main port. Naval and air facilities are maintained in this area.

*South East Australia* – South East Australia possesses outstanding advantages for development as the main support area for British Commonwealth Forces in the Pacific. Remote from attack, it has considerable economic resources capable of development, and is the main industrial area in the South West Pacific. It contains the necessary facilities for the maintenance of large forces of all three Services.

## **(f) FOREIGN AREAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE**

**50.** Australia's strategic position is affected by the geographical proximity of the territory of the undermentioned foreign Powers, also by our relations with these Powers and the inhabitants of the territories concerned:-

### **United States of America**

**51.** The United States of America maintains strong forces and bases in the Pacific, and her war potential exceeds that of any other major Power in this region. She is, consequently, the predominant Power in the Pacific and Australia's security will be vitally affected by U.S.A. policy in this ocean.

The American major base at Guam is of particular interest, in view of its position vis-à-vis potential Australian bases in the New Guinea Area, e.g., Manus. The base at Pearl Harbour is of importance, since it covers the Ocean and Air Routes, between Australia and North America.

### **China**

**52.** The possibility of strong European influence remaining in China is extremely remote. Soviet influence in Northern China is extending and further southward penetration would bring Russia, nearer to South East Asia, and thus, nearer to the vital interests of Australia.

**53. France:**

- (i) *French Indo-China* – Should a major Power dominate China, that Power would then have a land route through Indo China to areas from which the vital interests of Australia in Indonesia could be threatened.
- (ii) *New Caledonia and New Hebrides* – Should New Caledonia and the New Hebrides fall into the hands of an enemy, they would provide bases from which the East Coast of Australia and lines of communication, between Australia and America, could be threatened.
- (iii) *French Indian Ocean Possessions* – The main French possessions in the Indian Ocean – Madagascar, Reunion and Kerguelen, are important, in that they flank British communications in that Ocean.

**Siam**

**54.** Siam, as in the case of Indo-China, is strategically important, when considered in relation to a possible land route for an enemy thrust to South-East Asia, from China.

**The Philippine Islands**

**55.** In the event of China being dominated by a major Power, hostile to the British Commonwealth, the Philippines would be of increased strategic value as a base, from which counter measures could be taken against enemy activities in the South East Asia area.

**Portugal**

**56.** Portuguese Timor is the nearest foreign territory to Australia, and, in the hands of a hostile Power, would be strategically placed to threaten Australia and her communications to South East Asia through Indonesia.

**Indonesia**

**57.** Indonesia, which includes the territories formerly known as the Netherlands East Indies, is the only practicable route from Asia to Australia, for an aggressor strong in land and air power, but comparatively weak in sea power. Indonesia flanks Australia's communications with India and the Middle East, and is astride her communications with Singapore. Hostile naval or air forces, based on these islands, would be a constant threat to those communications. Oil and other raw materials from Indonesia would be of great importance to Australia's war effort, especially if the oil resources of the Persian Gulf area were denied to her.

**The Antarctic**

**58.** The Antarctic contains the nearest land mass to the Australian centres of population. In the hands of a hostile power, it might possibly provide the launching sites from which the weapons of the future could be directed at these centres of population.

## **(g) SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT**

**59.** A major lesson of the recent war is that science can exercise a preponderant influence in the face of an otherwise superior power – a notable example of this was the decisive effect of radar in the Battle of Britain. Superior scientific development may, if secrecy be preserved, redress the balance between a weak nation and a strong one and this is of profound significance to Australia.

### **Atomic Weapons**

**60.** In the final stage of the war, the use of the atomic bomb demonstrated that research in nuclear physics has resulted in the production of the most devastating weapon of mass destruction known to mankind. Although the destructive effect of atomic bombs, when they have been carried to the target, has been demonstrated, they were used too late in the war for their effect on the organisation, equipment and strategical employment of armed forces to be tested. It is apparent, however, that dispersion and concealment of the armed forces and measures for deception, will be of great importance in future warfare.

### **Biological Weapons**

**61.** Although biological weapons have not yet been used in war, research, indicates that when the complex and difficult problems relating to their production, storage, and dissemination have been solved, biological weapons may prove even more effective than atomic weapons.

### **Long Range Weapons**

**62.** The two essential elements of a long range weapon are the agent used to achieve the destructive effect at the target, and the carrier in which the destructive agent is transported to the target. The capabilities and limitations of these carriers are discussed in paragraphs 63 and 64.

**63.** Rockets and pilotless aircraft may be fitted with guiding and/or homing devices by which they can be directed to the target. At long ranges, i.e., over 400 miles, it has yet to be demonstrated that a guided weapon can be directed to its target with any degree of accuracy. There are many practical difficulties to be overcome in solving the technical problems involved in developing and perfecting the necessary control equipment and automatic navigation devices. Radio, and other counter measures, to jam or interfere with the guiding and homing devices used with guided weapons, may also be developed concurrently with these devices, but there are existing weapons which are not subject to interference by Radio Counter Measures, and it must be assumed that some future weapons will be immune from such interference.

The limitations of rockets and pilotless aircraft, for long range attack, focus attention on the conventional heavy bomber which, by virtue of its human control, can find its target and deliver an accurate attack at extreme ranges. Lacking the impetus of war, there is unlikely to be any considerable increase, until about 1955, in the present performance of the heavy bomber, which is powered both with conventional reciprocating engines and jet turbine engines. The present heavy bomber powered with conventional reciprocating engines has a maximum speed in the order of 350 miles per hour and an operational radius of action of 5,000 miles with a 10,000 lb.

bomb load. The present heavy bomber powered with jet turbine engines has a maximum speed in the order of 550 miles per hour and a radius of action of 3,000 miles with a 10,000 lb. bomb load. However, under the stimulus of a war emergency declared at any time after 1950, it is probable that a manned jet bomber would be produced, within two years, having a maximum speed of 550-600 miles per hour and an operational radius of action of 5,000 miles with a bomb load of 10,000 lbs.

Thus, it appears that, although the rocket may supersede the conventional heavy bomber at ranges up to 400 miles, the long range heavy bomber may well continue to be the best method of long range attack for some time to come.

**64.** The evolution of the submarine has been such that it must be assumed that the true submersible will come. An interim stage is the present schnorkel submarine, the range of which is of the order of 7,000 miles and its maximum submerged speed is 25 knots for up to 250 miles. Within the foreseeable future, there is no effective counter to the true submarine. The development of these types of submarine renders the sea lines of communication to and from Australia more vulnerable than before. Additionally, important targets near the Australian coast line are open to attack by such submarines.

**65.** The weapons with the greatest potential for mass destruction, and which are likely to have the greatest effect in the course of a future war, are the missile, aircraft, or submarine, carrying atomic or biological war heads, bombs or rocket projectiles.

### **Changes in the Armed Forces**

**66.** During the recent war, scientific development of weapons and war equipment was greatly accelerated and was most evident in the fields of electronics and rocketry.

In the light of the lessons of the recent war and based on our present knowledge of scientific development and the probable effect of its application to war, it would be premature to make, at this stage, any major change in the organisation and normal equipment of armed forces. We consider that changes in the armed forces should keep pace with scientific development and that these will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

### **Civil Defence**

**67.** It is clear that the use of scientific weapons of mass destruction would have a great effect on the civil population and on the measures which should be taken for civil defence, and dispersal of population, industry, and resources. This is of particular significance to a nation, which is situated adjacent to the territory of a potential enemy, but is not so in the case of Australia.

## **(h) AUSTRALIA'S VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK**

**68.** Australia is situated at the end of a series of Islands extending from South East Asia. Except for these Islands to the North and North West, she is surrounded by vast oceans. Her geographical position, therefore, is such that no hostile Power, without possessing command of the sea and local air superiority, could successfully invade Australia, nor could she launch an effective major air attack on the vital areas of Australia, without possessing suitable bases for launching long-range weapons. At present, no potential enemy possesses such bases, which are within range of the vital areas of Australia.

The possibility will always exist of attacks by mass destruction agents launched from long-range aircraft, ship-borne aircraft, long-range submarines, or by missiles launched from ships or submarines. Such attacks would be in the form of raids on important localities and shipping lanes, with results equally serious to those to be expected from attacks from bases established in the course of sustained operations. Sabotage of vital and important industries and installations would also be a possibility.

## **(i) AUSTRALIA'S RESOURCES**

**69.** In the present state of world shortage of essential commodities, which may continue for some time Australia is obliged to rely to the maximum extent on her own resources. Furthermore, Australia, as a main support area in the Pacific, must strive towards self-sufficiency, for the twofold purpose of providing for her own security and of implementing the Government's policy of making a larger contribution to British Commonwealth defence. Under the impetus of the recent war, Australia's industrial capacity was increased. This capacity is capable of further extension to reduce reliance on overseas sources. Continued access to essential raw materials, or stock piling of items in which she is deficient, is necessary to maintain or expand her capacity. Australia's war potential is restricted by her limited manpower.

A further restriction is found in the limited trained scientific research staff available in this country. Only in countries where the scientific potential is developed to the highest practicable degree will the "scientific health" be sound at all levels, enabling basic research and development to proceed without interruption.



## **PART III — CONCLUSIONS RELATIVE TO AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC POSITION**

**70.** Australia is an isolated small Power with limited manpower and resources. She is not able to defend herself unaided against a major Power. While the United Nations remains in being, there is no threat from a minor Power to Australia's security, but whilst the power of the Veto exists, it would appear that the United Nations does not offer security against aggression by a major Power.

**71.** Australia is unlikely to become a primary objective of any major Power, determined on aggression, until after the defeat of the major Powers with whom Australia may be allied. She may, however, become involved in war, as a member of the British Commonwealth, in order to protect her ultimate position, or as a member of the United Nations, in enforcing the decisions of the United Nations Security Council.

**72.** The security of the British Commonwealth, and therefore of Australia, requires the safeguarding of the Main Support Areas from which war potential can be developed, and the maintenance of sea and air communications between them. These areas, of which the United Kingdom is the most important, are the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

**73.** The U.S.S.R. is the only major Power with which the British Commonwealth might become involved in a war. The possibility of the U.S.S.R. precipitating a war before 1951 appears remote, although her war potential will increase as time elapses. By 1960 her economic development could be sufficiently advanced to support an aggressive foreign policy, backed by military force, including scientific weapons. She would, however, probably still lack sea power.

**74.** War against the U.S.S.R. would not be confined to any one area, but whatever course it might take, there would always be a major threat to British Commonwealth interests in Europe, the Middle East, India and South East Asia. If Russia develops sea power, there may also be a threat in the Pacific.

In relation to the protection of her ultimate position, Australia is concerned with events in Europe, the Middle East, India and the Far East. She is directly concerned with events in South East Asia and with the security of sea and air communications in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and through South East Asia.

**75.** It is unthinkable that the British Commonwealth would embark upon a war of aggression. Her action, therefore, in the first phase of a future major war, would be largely defensive in character, followed by an offensive phase to achieve victory. The action to be taken in the defensive phase by each nation of the British Commonwealth will depend on its geographical position and vulnerability to attack.

**76.** Because of her geographical position, the United Kingdom is very vulnerable to attack from the mainland of Europe. Scientific development, particularly of long range weapons, will make it possible for an attack on the United Kingdom to be so effective as to necessitate the United Kingdom devoting all her resources to her own self-preservation. It is, therefore, possible that, in the first phase of a future war, she would be unable to provide assistance to the Dominions, increase her overseas garrisons, or send expeditionary forces abroad. The other members of the British Commonwealth may, in this case have to rely entirely upon their own resources, for the provision of the forces and war material necessary for British Commonwealth security. The central co-ordination and direction of British Commonwealth defence in these circumstances, may be located in one of the Dominions.

**77.** Australia's geographic and strategic position is very different from that of the United Kingdom. Australia is remote from Asia, hence, no major hostile Power could launch a sustained and effective air attack against her, even with the use of new long range weapons, until that Power has first established bases within range of vital objectives in Australia. At present, no potentially hostile Power possesses such bases. Australia could not be successfully invaded except by a strong naval Power which had established command of the sea and air, but the possibility of sporadic raids on communications and vital areas exists.

**78.** For her own security, and to fulfil the functions of a main support area, it is necessary that Australia should further develop her industrial capacity and resources. Continued access to essential raw materials or stock piling of items in which she is deficient, is necessary to maintain or expand her capacity.

## PART IV — MEASURES TO ACHIEVE SECURITY

79. An examination of Australia's strategic position indicates that the following measures are necessary to ensure Australia's security. These will involve closely co-ordinated political and military action:-

### Collective Security

80. Australia unaided, cannot ensure her own security, nor can she rely upon the United Nations for security, until such time as international confidence is achieved and the United Nations organisation becomes fully effective. In the meantime, it is necessary to rely upon a system of British Commonwealth co-operation and upon such security arrangements as are practicable with foreign nations. Individual security of each of its components will depend on concerted action by the British Commonwealth as a whole.

### Co-Operation with Foreign Powers

81. It is essential to Australia's security that a situation favourable to Australia should be assured in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and in South East Asia. For this purpose, friendly relations are desirable with foreign Powers, particularly with the undermentioned:-

- a. *United States of America* – In the event of U.S.S.R. becoming the aggressor, not only would a concerted effort be required by the nations of the British Commonwealth to ensure their security, but the early assistance of the United States of America would be essential. The United States of America is unquestionably the predominant Power in the Pacific and accordingly, the security of Australia will depend upon close co-operation with the United States of America. It is, therefore, in Australia's strategic interest to support any measures designed to perpetuate the United States of America's influence in the Western Pacific.
- b. *China* – The possibility of China entering the U.S.S.R. sphere of influence is very real, and this fact should be borne in mind in guiding our relations with China.
- c. *France* – Relations with France should be designed to ensure that her possessions in French Indo China, New Caledonia, New Hebrides or the Indian Ocean, are not available to a potential aggressor as bases from which to menace British Commonwealth lines of communication or the Australian mainland.

- d. *Siam* – It is desirable that a stable government should be established in Siam, with which Australia could maintain friendly relations, with the object of ensuring that Siamese territory is not used by a potential enemy as a means of threatening Australia's security.
- e. *Philippines Republic* – The promotion of friendly relations with the Republic is important in view of the position the Philippine Islands occupy in relation to the Northern approaches to Australia. The continued right of the United States of America to bases in the Philippines is of great importance to Australia's security.
- f. *Indonesia* – This region, which includes the territories formerly known as the Netherland East Indies, is of great strategic importance. It is most desirable that this region should be administered by strong and stable governments with whom Australia could establish friendly relations, since the only route by which an aggressor weak in sea power could approach Australia, is through this region.

Indonesia is astride the line of communications between Australia and Singapore and must be denied to potential enemies who, once established there, could threaten Australia's supplies of raw materials, her lines of communication, and ultimately, the mainland.

- g. *Portugal* – It is strategically important that Australia should foster friendly relations with Portugal, to ensure the denial of facilities, in Portuguese Timor, to other Powers whose motives might conflict with Australian interests.

### **The Necessity for an Intelligence Organisation**

**82.** An effective intelligence organisation is a basic requirement in war, and is also essential in peace to provide the information necessary for strategic planning. The Australian intelligence organisation should, therefore, be an integral part of the world-wide British system, and permit of affiliation with those of the United States of America and other likely Allies. The organisation should be firmly established and functioning in peace if it is to be of real value in war.

### **The Necessity for Co-Ordinated Planning**

**83.** An aggressor could deliver a crippling blow against one or more of the nations of the British Commonwealth, if they were unprepared. Scientific development accentuates this possibility. Should aggressive action eventuate, it will occur with great rapidity, and the success of the defence will depend upon the extent and speed with which counter measures are taken. To ensure that each member of the British Commonwealth can, without delay, take that action which will be most effective in meeting a threat, it is essential that the joint strategic plans for the defence of the British Commonwealth should be formulated and co-ordinated in time of peace. In such plans, provision should also be made for probable participation by the United States of America, in particular, and by any other prospective Allies. An overall strategic plan cannot be developed, however, until political arrangements between the nations concerned have been made and effective machinery for the co-ordination of British Commonwealth defence measures has been introduced.

## **A Basis for Overall Plans**

**84.** Prior to the preparation of overall strategic plans, it is necessary to forecast the broad situations with which the plans would probably have to deal, in the event of war with U.S.S.R. Based on this forecast, it would be possible to consider the part which Australia might play, in such plans, to protect her ultimate position.

**85.** U.S.S.R. would probably first seek to overrun Western Europe, before embarking on large scale operations in the Middle East or Far East. Australia is unlikely to be directly threatened, except as the result of successful action by the U.S.S.R. in one, or both of these two areas. In such a situation, Australia's interests might best be served by making a contribution either in the Far East or Middle East. If the United States of America were involved in the war prior to, or at the same time as the British Commonwealth, her forces would probably be employed in both Europe and the Far East. Since it might be difficult for the United Kingdom to reinforce the Middle East, Australia's most effective contribution in this case, might best be made in that region. If, as in the past, a period elapses after the commencement of hostilities, before the United States of America becomes involved, then it might be preferable for Australia's contribution to be made in the Far East, to stabilise the situation until aid is forthcoming from the United States of America.

**86.** A plan will be required to deal with each of the varying situations which might occur on the outbreak of war. This should provide both for action by the British Commonwealth alone, and for action in conjunction with United States forces. Essential pre-requisites to the formulation of any plans are the knowledge of the forces which each nation might be prepared to provide, and the alternative tasks each nation might be prepared to undertake. It is evident, however, that in the event of war with U.S.S.R., Australia should be prepared to make a contribution in either the Far East or the Middle East. Her dependence on co-operation with other nations, for her security, will compel her to accept the fact that the strategic employment of her forces will be governed by considerations wider than those of a purely regional nature. Her strategic plan for defence should, therefore, envisage provision of forces to operate in the Middle and/or Far East, in accordance with an overall plan. However, should hostilities occur before agreed overall plans have been formulated, then each nation of the British Commonwealth would be primarily concerned with the defence of its own zone of strategic responsibility and its vital communications. Plans made for this purpose would have to form the basis for the subsequent preparation of hastily improvised overall plans with other nations of the British Commonwealth and the United States of America.

## **Australia's Zone of Strategic Responsibility**

**87.** Economy of force, and the great distances between the components of the British Commonwealth, require that the initial responsibility for defence of its vital interests, should be borne, as far as practicable, by the nation nearest to, or most immediately affected by, events in any particular area. This factor, coupled with the knowledge that Australia must make a greater contribution to the security of the British Commonwealth than in the past, establishes the need for defining the zone in which Australia should formulate and control strategic policy, and accept the responsibilities involved in the formulation and control of such policy. This strategic policy should conform, in general, with overall British Commonwealth policy, but it will be difficult to define Australian policy unless agreement is reached as to the zone with which Australian planning should primarily be concerned.

**88.** From the defence aspect, the extent of the Australian Zone of Strategic Responsibility should be based on the following factors:-

- a. The likely aggressor;
- b. The important and vital areas to be protected;
- c. The protection of essential lines of communication;
- d. The need to exclude an enemy from areas from which he could attack these important and vital areas and lines of communication;
- e. The availability of suitable existing or potential bases from which forces could operate.

**89.** The view has been expressed in this paper that the U.S.S.R. is at present the only major nation which is likely to resort to armed force in order to achieve her ends. In the event of the British Commonwealth becoming involved in war with Russia, Australia is unlikely to be directly attacked until Russia has attained her objectives in the Far East, and her attack in the Far East may either be concurrent with, or follow the securing of her position in Europe and the Middle East. The U.S.S.R. is at present weak in sea power, and her line of approach towards Australia would, therefore, be through South East Asia and Indonesia. Having established herself in Indonesia, Russia could attack the mainland of Australia under cover of land based aircraft. Hence, it follows that Australia is vitally interested in this line of approach.

**90.** The greatest threat would occur if the enemy were able to bring its long range weapons within range of the important or vital areas of Australia. In the present stage of development the weapon with the longest range is the heavy bomber powered with reciprocating engines, which armed with an atomic bomb, has an operational radius of action of 5,000 miles. However, from the present information available, it is unlikely that the U.S.S.R. possesses a heavy bomber which armed with an atomic bomb or equivalent bomb load could exceed an operational radius of action of about 3,500 miles.

**91.** The most profitable and likely targets for long range attack are important centres of population, industry and communications. The majority of such centres in Australia, are located in the vital area to the South East of a line drawn from immediately North of Brisbane to Spencer Gulf in South Australia. From bases in Malaya and the Philippines, an attack could be made on vital targets in any portion of the Australian mainland. Should an enemy attacking from south East Asia, succeed in establishing himself within 3,500 miles of the Australian mainland, the Perth-Fremantle Area and Darwin would be vulnerable to sustained air attack, and a grave threat to Australia's security would exist. The enemy would then be in a position from which to make an invasion of the North West coast of Australia. Such an invasion could be a prelude to a further Southward advance, or have as its object, the establishment of a base from which sustained air attacks could be launched on the vital South East area of Australia.

**92.** Singapore is the key to the approaches to Indonesia from South East Asia. Forces based on Singapore and British North Borneo, would command the North Western approaches to Australia through Indonesia, and those based on Manus would dominate the sea approaches from the North. Adequate forces operating in these areas should be able to deny to an enemy, positions from which he could launch sustained air attacks with long range weapons against vital targets in Australia. Consequently, it is essential that the areas containing Singapore, North Borneo and Manus should be included in Australia's zone of Strategic Responsibility. Since attacks could be launched on the vital area of South East Australia from bases in the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines, hostile penetration South of a line including these areas, would be dangerous. The Australian Zone of Strategic Responsibility should, therefore, extend at least, as far as this line.

**93.** The chart attached as Appendix 'A' indicates –

- a. The danger line for hostile penetration and suggested minimum Northern limit of the Australian Zone of Strategic Responsibility.
- b. A line drawn 1500 miles from the coast of the Australian mainland.
- c. The line of bases described in para. 92 above.
- d. The area containing the majority of important and vital targets.

### **Regional Security with New Zealand**

**94.** The Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 1944 would require review in the light of the proposals made in paragraphs 92 and 93 relating to the Australian strategic zone. The Northern limit of the Australian zone has been suggested in paragraph 92 above. Before an Eastern limit can be established, it will be necessary to consult with the New Zealand Government, in order to decide whether there will be a separate New Zealand zone abutting on the Eastern limit of the Australian zone, or whether the two zones will be a joint Australian-New Zealand responsibility. In the former case, a dividing line between the two zones must be determined, and in the latter, it will be necessary to seek agreement with the New Zealand Government concerning the Northern limit of the joint zone. Until these matters have been resolved, the military plan for the defence of the Australian area of strategic responsibility cannot be formulated.

## **Local Defence**

**95.** Provided an enemy can be prevented from establishing himself in the Australian zone of strategic responsibility – and this can be prevented only by the successful implementation of an agreed overall plan – there is no danger to Australian territory except from raids. Such raids are likely to be directed mainly at vital areas and at focal or terminal points of lines of communication. To counter such threats, it will be necessary to provide operational bases and local air and seaward defences, so disposed as to provide the necessary degree of protection commensurate with the scale and type of attack. It must be accepted that even in minor attacks, some missiles will reach their target, and in this age of long range weapons, such missiles will be directed against important centres of industry, population and communication. Although their accuracy may not be great, it would be manifestly unwise to risk the loss of a vital establishment through too great a concentration of industry. To minimise the effect of raids, a civil defence organisation, dispersion of resources, and duplication of vital industries to the economic limit, are necessary.

**96.** It is important, however, to maintain a proper balance between the effort devoted to local defence against raids, and that devoted to the security of distant strategic areas. Undue emphasis on the former, at the expense of the latter, might permit the enemy to reach positions from which he could launch major attacks on the mainland.

**97.** In planning defence measures, it must be assumed that the main overseas sources of supply may be interrupted, and therefore, to maintain Australia's war effort, essential industries should be rendered as self-sufficient as possible and stock piles accumulated.

## **Development of Australia as a Main Support Area**

**98.** If Australia is to become an effective Main Support Area for the forces of the British Commonwealth engaged in hostilities in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and in South East Asia, it will be essential to –

- a. establish potential for the production of equipment, supplies, etc., essential to the prosecution of a war. This potential includes shipbuilding, ship repair and aircraft production;
- b. make concerted arrangements for adequate supplies of raw materials;
- c. provide the manpower essential to give effect to (a) and (b) above;
- d. establish capacity for scientific research and development;
- e. establish an organisation responsible for the survey of national resources, and for the planning, in peace, of the allocation and development of the industrial economic and manpower resources of the country, to meet the requirements of war conditions;
- f. make provision for training and maintenance facilities required both by Australian Forces and any other British Commonwealth Forces which may be based on this country.

## Scientific Development

**99.** Australia is relatively weak in conventional war potential, and it is therefore important that she should seek to gain every advantage which the possession of scientific weapons would bestow. Just as co-ordination of British Commonwealth strategic effort will be necessary in future wars, it is equally important that the British Commonwealth's scientific effort in the research and development necessary for the production of such weapons, should be co-ordinated in peace and war.

## Composition of Australia's Armed Forces

**100.** At the outbreak of future war Australia, in accordance with an agreed British Commonwealth plan, should be prepared to deploy her maximum available effort, at home or abroad, without delay. The armed forces should therefore be organised and trained in peace, with this end in view. Furthermore, the peace time organisation should provide for rapid expansion. The size of forces in peace and war will be dictated by the extent of resources which will be made available, but their composition should be of the following nature:-

### *Navy*

- a. A mobile Task Unit consisting of aircraft carriers with their escorts, capable of forming part of an Empire Task Force.
- b. A Fleet Train for the maintenance of our mobile Task Unit.
- c. A Sea Frontier Force consisting of escorts for our shipping, and for the seaward defence of our bases.
- d. Amphibious vessels for combined operations.
- e. A training and maintenance organisation for the support of the above forces, and for expansion in war.
- f. A reserve of ships, equipment, and trained personnel for expansion in war.

### *Army*

- a. Standard formations designed for mobile operations on normal terrain, and for amphibious operations, but capable of conversion to meet the conditions of jungle warfare.
- b. Garrison forces for the protection of our bases against raids, and for internal security.
- c. A training and maintenance Organisation for the support of the above forces, and for expansion in war.
- d. A reserve of equipment and trained personnel to facilitate expansion in war.

### *Air Force*

- a. A mobile Task Force, including units for long range missions and transportation, ready to move wherever required for strategic purposes or in support of the other services.
- b. Forces for the protection of our bases and focal areas against sporadic raids.
- c. A training and maintenance organisation for the support of the foregoing forces, and for expansion in war.
- d. Reserves of equipment and trained personnel for expansion in war.

### **Standardisation**

**101.** The Australian Forces should be standardised in their organisation, equipment and training with those of other nations of the British Commonwealth and, as far as possible, with those of allies with whom a permanent association is likely to be achieved. This would permit flexibility of employment in accordance with a co-ordinated plan, and facilitate co-operation with the forces of those nations and allies.

## **PART V — A SUMMARY OF THE MEASURES TO ACHIEVE SECURITY**

1. Until the United Nations becomes fully effective, Australia should rely for her security on a system of British Commonwealth co-operation, and upon such security arrangements as are practicable with foreign nations, particularly with the United States of America.
2. Friendly relations should be maintained with all countries having territories in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, in South East Asia, and above all, with the United States of America, which is the predominant Power in the Pacific.
3. It is essential that overall strategic plans for the defence of the British Commonwealth should be formulated and co-ordinated in time of peace. In such plans, provision should also be made for probable participation by the United States of America in particular, and by any other prospective allies. Strategic plans cannot be developed, however, until political arrangements between the nations concerned, have been made, and effective machinery for the co-ordination of British Commonwealth defence measures has been introduced.
4. Should hostilities occur before agreed overall plans have been formulated, then each nation of the British Commonwealth would be primarily concerned with the defence of its own zone of strategic responsibility and its vital communications. Plans made for this purpose would have to form the basis for the subsequent preparation of hastily improvised overall plans with other nations of the British Commonwealth and the United States of America.
5. Australia should accept responsibility for a strategic zone, the suggested minimum limits of which, are shown in Appendix 'A'.
6. The Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 1944 requires review, in order to establish whether there is to be a joint Australian-New Zealand Strategic Zone, or whether there should be two separate zones.
7. To guard against raids on the Australian mainland, it is necessary to provide operational bases, and local air and seaward defences. To minimise the effect of raids, a Civil Defence Organisation, dispersal of resources and duplication of vital industries to the economic limit, are necessary. It is important, however, to maintain a proper balance between the effort devoted to local defence against raids, and that devoted to the security of distant strategic areas. Undue emphasis on the former, at the expense of the latter, might permit the enemy to reach positions from which he could launch major attacks on the mainland.
8. Australia should develop the essentials of a Main Support Area.
9. Every possible advantage should be sought from the application of scientific development to the defence of Australia.
10. Australia's armed forces should be organised and trained so that they would be available without delay, for mobile operations at home or abroad, as required. Their organisation should permit of rapid expansion in war, and for this purpose, reserves of equipment and trained personnel are essential.

- 11.** Australian forces should be standardised in their organisation, equipment and training with those of other nations of the British Commonwealth, and, as far as possible, with those of allies with whom a permanent association is likely to be achieved.
  
- 12.** An intelligence organisation is essential to provide the information necessary for strategic planning, and for the security of the nation both in peace and war.