

APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF AUSTRALIA (1946)

Editor's Introduction

The 1946 Appreciation was endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee within months after Japan's capitulation, and sent to the Prime Minister before the 1946 Commonwealth Conference. It pre-dated the rapid deterioration of relations with Russia and the communist victory in China, and did not yet discuss the implications of decolonisation, or of the atomic bomb (paras 59, 60, 103, 122). The basic tenets of post-war defence strategy it developed thus bore strong resemblance to Australia's pre-war policy, adapted to the new world situation.

Australia was protected by its geographic situation and the collective security system of the UN (paras 9, 32). However, it was 'unable to defend herself unaided against a major power', and should the UN become dysfunctional, its security was intrinsically linked to that of the Empire as a whole (paras 1, 3, 20, 35). Given the experience of the world wars, explicitly no reliance was placed on assistance forthcoming from the US, although it was 'essential' (paras 23, 24, 46, 77, 89). The USSR was identified as the only major power that 'is a potential enemy of the future', which could pose threats to the Empire 'in Europe, the Middle East, India and, if Russia develops sea power, in the South Pacific' (paras 45, 53). This required 'Australia to throw her maximum effort into the area in which her forces are most required' in accordance with a co-ordinated and prepared plan for Empire defence, even taking risks, if necessary, 'to the security of the homeland' (paras 3, 4, 19-21, 28, 29, 64). In the Pacific, Commonwealth strategy would be based on the maintenance of Empire lines of communication, initial offensive action from forward bases in the Formosa-Shanghai area, and mobilisation of the Empire's war potential (paras 66, 87). It was recognised that '[d]ominance of China by Russia would constitute a grave danger to the Empire' (para 94). This would make French Indochina 'of great strategic importance in preventing a serious threat to Malaya (and ultimately to Australia) from developing' (para 87).

Australian forces should be developed for their contribution to the wider strategic plan, with standardisation of organisation, equipment, and training throughout the Empire, and would then be adaptable to home defence 'without material re-organisation' should the need arise (paras 30, 108, 109). They should be either permanent forces, or be able to mobilise 'within the time limit which the International situation permits', without the need to re-organise or raise a special force for overseas duties (paras 48, 110). The force structure recommendations were ambitious compared to the forces Australia had maintained before the war. The Navy should provide aircraft carriers with escorts and fleet train, vessels for the protection of shipping, and amphibious transports. Army formations should be capable of operations in 'normal terrain' and amphibious operations, and be able to re-configure for jungle warfare. The Air Force should comprise a 'Mobile Task Force, including units for long range missions and transportation, ready to move wherever required', as well as defence of 'bases and focal areas against sporadic air raids' (paras 126-128).

AN APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF AUSTRALIA FEBRUARY 1946

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APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF AUSTRALIA FEBRUARY, 1946

OBJECT

The object of this paper is to examine Australia's Strategic Position, taking into consideration relevant political factors.

THE NEED FOR REVIEW

This paper has been prepared in the light of the situation as seen in February, 1946. In order that it should be kept up to date, it is intended that the paper should be reviewed in February of each year or whenever any change in the International Situation, or in scientific development, renders this necessary.

COMPOSITION OF THE PAPER

The paper is prepared in twelve parts as follows:-

PART I — Introduction.

PART II — The United Nations Organisation.

PART III — Empire Security.

PART IV — Regional Security with New Zealand.

PART V — Potential Enemies.

PART VI — The Time Factor.

PART VII — Australia's Strategic Interests.

PART VIII — Bases.

PART IX — Co-operation with Foreign Powers.

PART X — Local Defence.

PART XI — Scientific Development.

PART XII — Australian Forces to be maintained in Peace.

A Summary of Conclusions is included before Part I.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

General

1. The concept of strategical isolation is irreconcilable with the realities of modern war.
2. As long as the United Nations remains in being, the problem of local defence is virtually non-existent. Should the United Nations break down, the security of every nation of the British Commonwealth will depend on the effectiveness of a plan of Empire Defence and on co-operation with the U.S.A.
3. Provided we have in peace a firm plan of Empire defence and arrangements for co-operation with the U.S.A., the possibility of invasion in the foreseeable future can be excluded.
4. The role of the armed forces in the next war should be the fulfilment of Australia's obligations in a wide strategical plan, and, consequently, any organisation on the basis of home defence would necessitate reorganisation and inevitable dislocation in the face of an emergency, as overseas commitments may be necessary and unavoidable in the initial stages of the war.
5. If the forces are organised with a view to playing their part in the overall strategical plan contemplated, they would, if circumstances so required, be adaptable to the home needs without material re-organisation.
6. The primary considerations in the organisation and training of the armed forces should be the provision of a balanced Task Force of the three Services, and the avoidance of any system which will require reorganisation or the raising of a special force on the outbreak of war.

The United Nations Charter

7. A study of the United Nations Charter leads to the following conclusions:-
 - a. the only war in which Australia could be involved while the United Nations remains in being would be with a minor power; further, it would be a war in which she would have major allies;
 - b. armed forces to be maintained by Australia for the fulfilment of obligations under the Charter will be small but will need to be Permanent Forces;
 - c. the facilities which Australia is under an obligation to provide, may include the use of bases at Darwin, the north-west coast, and Fremantle. There is no legitimate reason under the Charter for granting base facilities elsewhere on the Australian mainland or in any of her external territories. Reference should, however, be made to paragraph 85, in which it is stressed that the U.S.A. should be afforded facilities at Manus on the understanding that we have the clear right to their joint use at all times, in peace and war, whether or not the U.S.A. is a belligerent.

- d. Australia does not require bases in any foreign territory for the purposes of the Charter;
- e. a breakdown of the United Nations would almost certainly result from an irreconcilable difference among the Big Three, and, in such an event, a resultant war might commence immediately.

Empire Defence

8. Empire co-ordination (which is referred to later) need not conflict with our obligations under the United Nations Charter, but, on the contrary, would make it possible for the British Commonwealth to contribute in a more effective manner to the needs of the Security Council.

9. No nation of the British Commonwealth is comparable as a great power, with either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., but, taken as a whole, with adequate co-ordination, the Empire is in a strong position.

10. If the Empire can be assured of the active co-operation of the United States of America in an emergency, her position is immeasurably strengthened. On the other hand, history has shown quite clearly that International agreements entered into with all sincerity may be evaded, if subsequently, such a course is advantageous. The strategy of the British Commonwealth therefore must make provision for the less favourable conditions under which the assistance of the United States cannot be guaranteed from the outset, and in these circumstances a co-ordinated Empire plan becomes of added importance.

11. All nations of the British Empire owe their individual security to the combined action of the Empire as a whole: they have a vital interest in the maintenance of Empire communications and their responsibilities towards Empire security must accordingly extend beyond the defence of their own territories. It is essential therefore, that Australia, in common with other nations of the Commonwealth, should, when necessary, throw her maximum effort into the area in which her forces are most required: it is in Australia's interests that agreement be reached with other nations of the Empire on a reciprocal basis, that her forces will be employed in accordance with an agreed over-all plan in an emergency, or when the international situation requires such action as a precautionary measure.

12. Economy of force requires that the initial responsibility for securing Empire interests should be borne, as far as is practicable, by the nation nearest to, or most immediately affected by, events in any particular area.

13. Standardisation of organisation, equipment, and training of the armed forces within the Empire, should be affected throughout the Commonwealth, and the revival of the Committee of Imperial Defence, in the organisation of which the Dominions should be permanently represented, is an urgent necessity for planning purposes.

Regional Security

14. Arrangements for Regional Security, to be effective, must be made in relation to a wider plan and not solely on local considerations.

15. The establishment of a regional zone of defence with New Zealand is without reason while the United Nations remains effective, and, unless it forms part of a wider plan, would invite disaster if the United Nations should break down. The Military Clauses of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement, 1944, therefore, require revision.

The Potential Enemy and the Time Factor

16. The U.S.S.R. is a potential enemy of the future, and it is at least prudent to plan our National Insurance Policy accordingly.

17. The provision of adequate forces might postpone resort to combat indefinitely. On the other hand, weak forces will result in war being a very high probability.

18. To ensure the protection of our vital interests against an aggressive U.S.S.R., not only will the united efforts of the nations of the British Empire in a co-ordinated plan be required, but the assistance of the U.S.A. will be essential.

19. A war against the U.S.S.R. will not be confined to any one area, but whatever course it may take there will always be a major threat to the Empire's interests in Europe, the Middle East, India, and if Russia develops sea power, in the Pacific. Australia is directly concerned with the main strategic interests of the Empire in each of the areas mentioned.

Strategic Interests

20. The strategic interests of the Empire in the areas of most immediate concern to Australia are as follows:-

a. *Middle East and Indian Ocean*

- (i) The integrity of British Territories which border on the Indian Ocean;
- (ii) Oil resources;
- (iii) The sea route debouching from the Red Sea;
- (iv) The air route through the Middle East;
- (v) The Middle East Base for an Imperial Reserve.

- b. *South East Asia and the Pacific:*
- (i) The security of Australia, New Zealand and Western Canada, and of their sea and air communications;
 - (ii) The defence of possessions and dependencies, viz., Hong Kong, Malaya, North Borneo, New Guinea and the smaller islands in the Pacific. These territories apart from their political and economic significance, have a role in a strategical plan to ensure the security of the Dominions;
 - (iii) The supplies of raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies. In the event of our Persian oil fields being lost, the Empire's capacity to wage war would be seriously jeopardised, should we be denied supplies of oil from the Netherlands East Indies.

Essential Requirements in the Indian Ocean

21. The following are the essential requirements in the Indian Ocean area:-
- a. Ceylon as the main operational base for controlling sea routes;
 - b. Maintenance of Addu Atoll as an alternative operational base;
 - c. A naval supply and repair base remote from Soviet air attack. Kilindini is suggested;
 - d. A naval escort base at Fremantle;
 - e. The development and maintenance in peace of the alternative air route through the Middle East, namely, Australia – Cocos Islands – Diego Garcia – Seychelles – East Africa.

Strategy in the Pacific

22. In South East Asia and the Pacific, our basic strategy should be to control the sea and air communications leading southward from Japan and North China, and to take such offensive action as is practicable against the enemy's communications, industrial areas, ports and bases, until such time as ultimate offensive action can be launched. In order to implement this basic strategy operational bases should be established in the vicinity of the following lines:-

- a. Advanced operational bases on the line Shanghai – Okinawa – Iwo Jima – Wake – Midway;
- b. Intermediate operational bases on the line Formosa – Philippines – Carolines – Marshalls – Midway – Dutch Harbour;
- c. Rear operational bases on the line Hainan – North Borneo – Admiralties – Solomons – Fiji – Pearl Harbour. Although Singapore is in rear of this line, its advantages from an Empire point of view demand its inclusion as a rear operational base.

23. Whatever agreements may be entered into in peace, the active co-operation of the United States of America from the outset in an emergency, cannot be guaranteed. Failing her immediate and full co-operation, the importance of the line of bases under 22 (c) is greatly enhanced.

24. The south-east of Australia should be developed as an arsenal in the Pacific, analogous in function to that which the United Kingdom fulfils in the Atlantic.

25. The existing air bases at Moresby, Nadzab, the Admiralties, Rabaul, and in the Solomons, should be maintained by Australia.

Security of Bases

26. Reliance should be placed mainly on the Navy and the Air for the security of our operational bases in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

Co-operation with Foreign Powers

27. Co-operation of the Empire with the United States of America is of paramount importance. Australia should also encourage the closest co-operation with China, France, Siam, the Netherlands Indies and Portugal, with particular reference to their possessions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Scientific Development

28. Scientific developments may necessitate revolutionary changes in the organisation, equipment, and employment of the armed forces, but, in the existing state of our knowledge, it would be premature to make any major changes.

29. Many of the conclusions in this paper may require radical revision in the light of further knowledge.

30. There is a pressing need for the closest association between the services and scientific research on the highest plane, but, notwithstanding this need, the continuance of existing links between the individual services and science is necessary. Collaboration with other nations of the British Commonwealth and especially with the United Kingdom is essential.

Australian Forces to be Maintained in Peace

31. Australian forces for operations in the strategic concept envisaged in this appreciation should be organised to fulfil the requirements of –

- a. A Naval mobile Task Unit consisting of aircraft carriers with their escorts, capable of forming part of an Empire Task Force and co-operating with the United States Navy;
- b. A Fleet Train for the maintenance of our mobile Task Unit;
- c. A Sea Frontier Force consisting of escorts for our shipping, and for the seaward defence of our bases;
- d. Amphibious craft for combined operations;

- e. Standard Army formations designed for operations on normal terrain, and for amphibious operations, but capable of conversion to meet the conditions of jungle warfare;
- f. Army Garrison Forces for the protection of our bases against sea and air raids and for internal security;
- g. Adequate maintenance provision for the Forces under (e) and (f);
- h. An Air mobile Task Force, including units for long range missions and transportation, ready to move wherever required for strategic purposes or in support of the other Services;
- i. Air units for the protection of our bases and focal areas against sporadic raids.

PART I — INTRODUCTION

ISOLATION OR CO-OPERATION

1. Australia, being an isolated continent with a small population and limited resources, is unable to defend herself unaided against a major power.
2. It follows that a policy of isolation can only lead to disaster, and that her security must be based upon co-operation with other nations.
3. It further follows that: -
 - a. her preparations for war must be such that her forces can co-operate with those of other nations,

and
 - b. her dependence on outside assistance, compels her to accept that the strategic employment of her forces will be governed by considerations wider than those of a purely regional nature.

The Fallacy of Isolation

4. Sound strategy frequently requires that risks be taken, at times with respect even to the security of the homeland, in order to secure strategical necessities elsewhere. Recent examples of this were the denuding of the United Kingdom of troops and material, while the risk of invasion was still present, in order to secure the Middle East, and the temporary diversion of the 6th Australian Division to Ceylon, in order to secure our communications in the Indian Ocean, at a time when the division was urgently required in Australia. In either case neglect of the measures taken could have resulted in a major disaster.
5. Dispositions of this nature may be required in the initial stages of a future war. Preparations for local defence, if carried out at the expense of the security of strategical focal points (which may be far distant), may not only defeat their object by permitting the enemy to carry the campaign to the homeland, but may well place him in such an advantageous position as to cause the loss of the war.

CONCLUSIONS

6. [In conclusion:]
 - a. The concept of strategical isolation is irreconcilable with the realities of modern war.
 - b. Overseas commitments may be necessary and in fact unavoidable in the initial stages of a future war.

PART II — THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION

CONSEQUENCES OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS

7. As Australia is a member of the United Nations her service commitments are affected by the following provisions of, or obligations under, the Charter:

- a. The Security Council, in carrying out its duties for the maintenance of international peace and security, acts on her behalf (Art. 24).
- b. She is bound to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council (Art. 25).
- c. Decisions of the Security Council may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of sea, air, postal, telegraphic, and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations (Art. 41).
- d. The Security Council may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by the air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations (Art. 42).
- e. Australia has undertaken to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements (not yet negotiated), armed forces, assistance, and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Such agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided (Art. 43).
- f. An agreement under (e) may require Australia to hold immediately available an air force contingent for combined international enforcement action (Art. 45).
- g. Plans for the application of armed forces will be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (Art. 46).
- h. Australia is not directly represented on the Military Staff Committee but will be invited to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires her participation in its work (Art. 47(2)).
- i. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees (Art. 47(4)).

- j. Nothing in the Charter impairs our inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against us (Art. 51).

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

8. The Security Council cannot invoke the use of armed force without agreement by all the Great Powers. If, therefore, one of the Great Powers should contemplate aggression the organization would automatically break down.

9. It is accordingly concluded that the only war in which Australia can be involved while the United Nations remains in being will be with a minor power, and, as she shall have major allies, her military commitment is unlikely to be heavy.

10. The forces required to fulfil such an obligation under the Charter will presumably be small, but will need to be Permanent Forces in order to be immediately available.

BASES

11. The facilities which Australia is under an obligation to make available may include the use of bases.

12. The only territories of minor powers against whom operations could be conducted from bases in Australian territory are the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and Portuguese Timor. For the purposes of some of these operations it is conceivable that a member of the United Nations may require facilities at Darwin, the North-west Coast, or Fremantle. It is considered, however, that no legitimate claim can be advanced under the United Nations charter for facilities elsewhere on the Australian mainland.

Manus

13. The U.S.A. is showing continued interest in the base which she has developed at Manus and it is thus necessary that special consideration be given to the question whether the U.S.A. has any legitimate claim under the United Nations Charter for facilities in the Admiralties or in any other Australian external territory.

14. On the assumption that the U.S.A. will control the Carolines there is no military reason for her requiring base facilities in the Admiralties or in any other Australian external territory for operations against any small power except Australia. Further reference is made to Manus in Part VIII in which the question of the United States requiring the joint use of base facilities for reasons which are irrelevant to the United Nations Charter, are discussed.

Australian Requirements

15. Similarly, Australia does not require bases in any foreign territory for purposes of the United Nations Charter.

CONCLUSIONS

- 16.** It is concluded, therefore, that –
- a. The only war in which Australia can be involved while the United Nations remains in being will be with a minor power and with the assistance of major allies.
 - b. Armed forces to be maintained by Australia for the fulfilment of obligations under the Charter will be small but will need to be raised as Permanent Forces.
 - c. Australia is under an obligation to provide facilities for United Nations forces, which may include the use of bases and it is conceivable that these may include Darwin, the North-west Coast, and Fremantle.
 - d. There is no legitimate reason under the United Nations Charter for granting the U.S.A. base facilities at Manus or elsewhere in Australian external territory (see also Part VIII).
 - e. Australia does not require bases in any foreign territory for purposes of the United Nations Charter.
 - f. Australia's defence problem is of a comparatively minor nature under an effective United Nations Organisation.

PART III — EMPIRE SECURITY

INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

17. The U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. are the world's most powerful nations—militarily, economically, industrially, and as regards manpower: they owe this position largely to the fact that they are united. The United Kingdom alone is not comparable as a Great Power with either. The Dominions are small powers.

18. No nation of the British Commonwealth is powerful enough to stand alone in the face of either the U.S.A. or U.S.S.R., but, taken as a whole, with adequate co-ordination, the British Commonwealth is in a strong position from the points of view of population, resources and strategical disposition.

THE FRAGILE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

19. A breakdown of the United Nations, as contemplated in paragraph 8, would almost certainly result from an irreconcilable difference among the Big Three, and, in such an event, the resultant war might commence immediately. Under such circumstances, it would be too late to commence planning Imperial security on a new basis.

20. There is thus a pressing need to ensure Empire security by planning an alternative system to the United Nations and this is considered in the ensuing paragraphs.

EMPIRE UNITY

21. For the reasons given in paragraphs 17 and 18, it is of paramount importance that the nations of the British Commonwealth should appreciate fully that in the first instance, their individual security depends upon the combined action of the whole, and therefore that the closest co-ordination must be achieved both in foreign affairs and Empire defence. To be effective, this must be a continuing process and not a mere ad hoc arrangement in the face of a desperate situation.

22. Such co-ordination need not conflict in any way with our obligations under the United Nations Charter (Part II), but on the contrary, would make it possible for the British Commonwealth to contribute in a more effective manner to the needs of the Security Council.

23. If, however, the co-operation of the United States of America can be assured, the Empire's position is immeasurably strengthened. On the other hand, history has shown quite clearly that International agreements entered into with all sincerity, may subsequently be evaded, if, as the result of changed circumstances, this proves to be advantageous.

24. It may be a common belief that the two great English speaking nations will stand together in an emergency: nevertheless, history dictates that we should not place implicit reliance on the automatic assistance of the United States of America, and that our strategy must make full provision for the less favourable conditions in which her assistance cannot be guaranteed from the outset. A co-ordinated Empire plan therefore becomes of added importance.

PRINCIPLES OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

25. The principles of Imperial defence as accepted at Imperial Conferences, may be summarised as follows:-

- a. Each Nation of the British Commonwealth is primarily responsible for its own local defence.
- b. Adequate sea power is essential to safeguard the sea communications of the Empire.
- c. Bases for supply and repair are necessary throughout the British Commonwealth to ensure the mobility of its armed forces, and render possible the protection of its communications.
- d. There must be consultation between the respective General Staffs on all matters of mutual defence.
- e. An adequate chain of air bases and refuelling stations to ensure the fullest mobility of air power, should be created and maintained.
- f. Interchanges of individual officers and complete units of the Royal Air Force and the air forces of the Dominions should be carried out. (It is assumed that this principle applies equally to the other two Services).
- g. Resources should be developed in time of peace in different parts of the Empire for the manufacture of munitions, as well as for the supply of raw materials, with the objects of reducing the dependence of the Commonwealth on the United Kingdom, and of dispersing resources for manufacture and supply from areas vulnerable to attack.
- h. Each Nation should aim at becoming self-supporting in the matter of armaments and munitions (including aircraft).
- i. It is of vital importance that concerted arrangements for adequate supplies of raw materials be made.
- j. Further steps should be taken to ensure the supply of all important food stuffs, including food stuffs for animals, in the event of a major emergency.
- k. Standardisation of organisation, equipment, and training of the armed forces should be effected throughout the Commonwealth to the greatest extent possible.

26. All nations of the Commonwealth have a vital interest in the maintenance of Empire communications. Their responsibilities towards Empire security must accordingly extend beyond the defence of their own territories.

27. Economy of force requires that the initial responsibility for securing Empire interests should be borne, so far as is practicable, by the nation nearest to, or most immediately affected by events in any particular area.

PLANNING FOR EMPIRE DEFENCE

28. Inadequate, and to a degree, unco-ordinated planning, in the past together with the maintenance of insufficient forces to ensure the security of the Empire, has led in desperate circumstances, to fundamental decisions being made with a reliance on powers of improvisation rather than upon a well found plan. Planning omissions and the failure to provide sufficient forces adequately trained and equipped, have contributed largely to such disasters as the loss of Burma and Singapore, and to the direct threat of invasion to Australia.

29. The reconstitution of the Committee of Imperial Defence in the organisation of which the Dominions should be permanently represented, is an urgent necessity for planning purposes.

CONCLUSIONS

30. [In conclusion:]

- a. No Nation of the British Commonwealth is comparable as a great power, with either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., but, taken as a whole, with adequate co-ordination, the British Commonwealth is in a strong position.
- b. The fragile structure of the United Nations demands a co-ordinated plan of Imperial defence, which is vital to Australia's survival. If the United Nations fails as a result of an irreconcilable difference among the Big Three, a resultant war might commence immediately.
- c. The security of individual Nations of the British Empire is dependent upon the combined action of the whole.
- d. Empire co-ordination need not conflict with our obligations under the United Nations Charter, but on the contrary, would make it possible for the British Commonwealth to contribute in a more effective manner to the needs of the Security Council.
- e. All Nations of the Commonwealth have a vital interest in the maintenance of Empire communications. Their responsibilities towards Empire security must accordingly extend beyond the defence of their own territories.

- f. Economy of force requires that the initial responsibility for securing Empire interests should be borne, as far as is practicable, by the Nation nearest to, or most immediately affected by, events in any particular area.
- g. The revival of the Committee of Imperial Defence, in the organisation of which the Dominions should be permanently represented, is an urgent necessity for planning purposes.
- h. Standardisation of organisation, equipment, and training of the armed forces within the Empire, should be affected throughout the Empire.

PART IV — REGIONAL SECURITY WITH NEW ZEALAND

31. By the Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 1944, a system of Regional Defence is envisaged. The clause of this Agreement relevant to this paper is as follows:-

“13. The two Governments agree that, within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence comprising the ~~zone of defence comprising the~~ South West and South Pacific areas shall be established and that this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand, stretching through the arc of islands North and North-West of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.”

32. It has been concluded (paragraph 9) that the only war in which Australia can be involved while the United Nations remains in being will be with a minor power. That conclusion applies equally to New Zealand. As there is no minor power in a position to threaten the security of either Dominion there is no longer any object in establishing the zone of defence contemplated in the Agreement which, it is noted, was concluded before the establishment of the United Nations.

33. It is in the event of war with a major power that we shall be concerned with the zone referred to in the Agreement, but the assistance New Zealand can give Australia is still small in relation to the forces required for an independent regional defence policy. Paragraph 1 of this paper could therefore be expanded to read – “Australia and New Zealand combined are unable to defend themselves unaided against a major power.” In a war with a major power, Australia and New Zealand require not only assistance from beyond the South and South West Pacific, but also the application of a world-wide strategical plan.

CONCLUSION

34. It is concluded that:-

- a. Arrangements for Regional Security, to be effective, must be made in relation to a wider plan and not solely on local considerations;
- b. The establishment of a regional zone of defence with New Zealand is without reason while the United Nations remains effective, and unless it forms part of a wider plan, would invite disaster if the United Nations should break down;
- c. The Military clauses of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 1944, require revision.

PART V — POTENTIAL ENEMIES

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

35. It has been explained (paragraph 9), that the only threat to Australia's security is by a major power. Furthermore, in the event of the United Nations breaking down and any nation of the British Commonwealth being threatened by a great power, the co-ordinated effort of the Empire as a whole is necessary to safeguard our security (paragraph 21). For this reason, our potential enemies, and the strategical considerations arising therefrom (Part VII) are examined generally from the view point of the Empire, but with particular reference to Australia.

36. Our closest co-operation with the U.S.A. in two world wars, our similar peaceful outlook, and our common beliefs regarding the rights of man, overshadow potential differences in political and economic matters, and war, as an instrument to settle differences between the two nations can be ruled out.

Germany

37. The total defeat of Germany has eliminated her as a threat to our interests in the foreseeable future, and it is a matter of necessity that this naturally aggressive nation should be suppressed for all time.

38. Should Great Britain and the United States of America fail to ensure this, we may safely assume that the U.S.S.R. and France will prevent the resurrection of Germany to the extent that unaided, she can again threaten major powers (see also paragraph 43).

Japan

39. Similarly, Japan, being a naturally aggressive nation, must be subjected for all time. Apart from any measures that may be taken by the U.S.A., it is in the interests of Russia to eliminate Japan's power of aggression and she can be relied upon to remain strong enough to do so. (see also paragraph 43 et seq).

France and China

40. Neither France nor China can be regarded as first class powers, nor, owing to their economic position, are they likely to become so in the foreseeable future.

U.S.S.R.

41. With the U.S.S.R. we lack the bonds of friendship, and to a large extent, the common ideals which make war with the U.S.A. unthinkable. Her recent attitude in South-East Europe and the Middle East has not been reassuring.

42. The U.S.S.R. is a land power of great significance, with an air force capable of rapid expansion.

43. Should she exercise an undue influence in Europe, especially in Germany, the threat to the Empire's main base in the United Kingdom would be considerable, whereas the threat to our interests in the Middle East and India can always be exercised irrespective of Russia's influence in Europe.

44. Russia can not exert a direct threat on Australia on a scale larger than a raid, unless she succeeds in her apparent determination to build up her naval strength. If, as appears possible, Russia is to become the dominant factor in the rejuvenation and rebuilding of Japan, especially in relation to the shipbuilding industry, the imminence of her becoming a potential aggressor in the Pacific would be advanced. Further if she were to dominate China (and the trend is in that direction) the situation as regards the interest of the British Commonwealth would be grave.

CONCLUSIONS

45. The U.S.S.R. is a potential enemy of the future, and it is at least prudent to plan our national insurance policy accordingly.

46. To ensure the protection of our vital interests against an aggressive U.S.S.R., not only will the united efforts of the nations of the British Commonwealth in a co-ordinated plan be required, but the assistance of the U.S.A. will be essential.

PART VI — THE TIME FACTOR

47. The International situation can deteriorate more quickly than armed forces can be built up, therefore military preparedness is essential however re-assuring the International outlook may be.

48. As it is not economically possible for the Empire to remain fully mobilised for war, the armed forces maintained should be those which the country can afford as a normal peacetime commitment and which can be built up to the maximum when the occasion demands, within the time limit which the International situation permits.

49. A well co-ordinated Empire plan, backed by adequate forces, would discourage an aggressor from employing armed force as a final instrument of policy. This is a fundamental principle, and if implemented, resort to combat to settle International problems might be postponed indefinitely.

50. On the other hand, failure to give full effect to this principle would encourage an aggressor and make war a very high probability.

CONCLUSIONS

51. It is concluded, therefore, that the provision of adequate forces might postpone resort to combat indefinitely, but that weak forces will result in a war being a very high probability.

PART VII — AUSTRALIA'S MAIN STRATEGIC INTERESTS

52. It has been stated (paragraph 21), that Australia's security, like that of other Nations of the Empire, is dependent upon the employment of the forces of the Empire being co-ordinated into an overall plan, and that Australia has an equal interest with other members of the British Commonwealth in the maintenance of Empire Communications (paragraph 26). In a study of Australia's strategic position, it is, therefore, necessary to take into account strategical considerations affecting the Empire as a whole.

53. A war against the U.S.S.R., confined to any one particular area, can not be visualised. Moreover, whatever course such a war may take, a major threat to Empire interests in Europe, the Middle East, India, and if Russia develops sea power, in the South Pacific, will always be present.

EUROPE

54. Broadly, the Empire's interests to be safeguarded in the European theatre, are the security of our main base, the United Kingdom, and the sea and air communications which are vital to her existence.

MIDDLE EAST AND INDIAN OCEAN

55. In the Middle East and India we are concerned mainly with –

- a. The integrity of British Territories which border on the Indian Ocean;
- b. Oil resources;
- c. The sea route debouching from the Red Sea;
- d. The air route through the Middle East which constitutes the shortest and best route for air supply and reinforcement from the United Kingdom to East Africa, India, Australia and the Far East;
- e. The Middle East base for an Imperial Reserve.

56. The whole of India and the Middle East, including Egypt, and the oil fields in the Persian Gulf area, are within bombing range of Russian territory, and both are open to attack by the land forces of this greatest of the world's military powers.

57. It is possible that with a full scale attack in this area, Russia could deny to us our sea route through the Suez Canal, the air route, via the Middle East, and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf area. A campaign could then develop through Persia or Afghanistan into India, although the way is open for an attack on India irrespective of an initial thrust into the Middle East.

- 58.** India is of great strategic importance owing to the following considerations:-
- a. Its value as a base. British Commonwealth forces located there would be suitably placed for deployment either for the protection of India or the Middle or Far East.
 - b. Its position in relation to Empire sea and air communications.
 - c. Its manpower.
- 59.** It is important that every endeavour be made to retain the right to station British Commonwealth Forces in India after she is granted Dominion status.
- 60.** The possibility of wide spread civil unrest in India is always present. If the situation should so develop as to prevent the basing of British Commonwealth Forces in India, our strategical position, in respect of the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and the Far East, would be immeasurably weakened. Any strengthening of the British military position in India would, therefore, be a direct contribution to the defence of Australia.

SOUTH EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

- 61.** The strategic interests of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific and South East Asia are:-
- a. The security of Australia, New Zealand and Western Canada, and of their sea and air communications.
 - b. The defence of possessions and dependencies, viz., Hong Kong, Malaya, North Borneo, New Guinea and the smaller islands in the Pacific. These territories apart from their political and economic significance, have a role in a strategical plan to ensure the security of the Dominions.
 - c. The supplies of raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies. In the event of our Persian oil fields being lost, the Empire's capacity to wage war would be seriously jeopardised should it be denied supplies of oil from the Netherlands East Indies.
- 62.** In each case the main strategic interests referred to in the foregoing paragraphs are of direct concern to Australia.
- 63.** Although the threat in the Pacific is less at this stage, than in other theatres, failure of the Empire to provide adequate forces now, may encourage Russia to extend her influence in the Far East to an extent that our subsequent efforts will of necessity have to be greater.

THE EMPIRE'S BASIC STRATEGY

64. The basic strategy in terms of theatres other than South East Asia and the Pacific, is not included in this paper, except to reiterate that it will be essential for Australia to throw her maximum effort into the area in which her forces are most required, and that the maintenance of Empire sea and air lines of communication is vital. It is to Australia's interest, that agreement be reached with other Nations of the Empire on a reciprocal basis, that her forces will be employed in accordance with an agreed over-all plan in an emergency, or when the international situation requires such action as a precautionary measure.

South East Asia and Pacific

65. In South East Asia and the Pacific the problems involved in the protection of our interests are mainly concerned with wide oceans and great distances where sea and air power are dominating factors: Army Forces are required in co-operation with the other Services for offensive and defensive roles.

66. The basic strategy to meet a threat from the U.S.S.R., whether Japan or China were participating or not, should be as follows:-

- a. To control the sea and air communications leading southward from Japan and North China by means of naval and air forces operating from advanced bases. Bases are discussed in Part VIII.
- b. To take such offensive action as is possible against the enemy's communications, industrial areas, ports and bases.
- c. Ultimate offensive action, which would probably require considerable military forces, would be mounted from the system of bases referred to in (a).

CONCLUSIONS

67. It is concluded that:-

- a. A war against the U.S.S.R. will not be confined to any one area, but that whatever course it may take there will always be a major threat to Empire interests in Europe, the Middle East, India, and if Russia develops sea power, in the Pacific. Australia is directly concerned with the main strategic interests of the Empire in each of the areas mentioned.
- b. India is of great strategic importance, particularly as a base. Any strengthening of the military position there would be a direct contribution to Australian defence.
- c. The threat in South East Asia and the Pacific is less at present, than in any other area, but the Empire's failure to provide adequate forces now, may encourage Russia to extend her influence in the Far East.

- d. It is essential that Australia, in common with other Nations of the Commonwealth, should, when necessary, throw her maximum effort into the area in which her forces are most required. It is to her interest that agreement be reached with other nations of the Empire on a reciprocal basis, that her forces will be employed in accordance with an agreed overall plan in an emergency, or when the international situation requires such action as a precautionary measure.

- e. In South East Asia and the Pacific, the Empire's basic strategy should be to control the sea and air communications leading southward from Japan and North China, and to take such offensive action as is practicable against the enemy's communications, industrial areas, ports and bases, until such time as ultimate offensive action can be launched.

PART VIII — BASES

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Areas under Review

68. The consideration of bases required has been confined in this paper to the Indian and Pacific theatres, as it is assumed that other nations of the British Commonwealth will examine in detail, the requirements in the areas with which they are immediately concerned in accordance with the approved Empire plan.

The Need for Bases

69. Naval and Air Forces cannot function unless suitable bases in the area are available, although in the case of the Navy, the provision of a Fleet Train reduces the facilities required in advanced areas, virtually to that of a safe anchorage. Thus assuming the necessary forces can be provided, the problems are mainly those of:-

- a. Establishing bases from which offensive action can be taken to prevent enemy penetration to areas vital to the security of Empire interests, of which the security of our lines of communication is foremost; and
- b. Securing such bases, and our lines of communication and to supply them.

Forces for Defence of Bases

70. In the defence of Indian and Pacific Ocean bases, reliance should be placed mainly on the Navy and Air. Army Garrison forces will be required, but these should be restricted to those necessary to counter minor raids, and for internal security.

INDIAN OCEAN

71. The Empire's main interests in the Indian Ocean are stated in Part VII in which the importance of India is stressed. Other requirements in the Indian Ocean are as in the following paragraphs.

Ceylon

72. Ceylon is well placed for controlling the main sea routes through the Indian Ocean and is essential as the main operational base for the forces allotted to this role.

Addu Atoll

73. If India were overrun, Ceylon would be untenable as a naval and air operational base and the importance of Addu Atoll would be increased. The latter base should, therefore, be maintained.

Kilindini

74. It will also be necessary to make provision for a naval supply and repair base remote from Soviet air attack. It would be required if a serious naval threat developed in the Indian Ocean or in the Middle East. Kilindini is suitable for this purpose and should be developed.

Fremantle

75. A naval escort base with fuelling facilities will be required in Western Australia; Fremantle is suitable.

Alternative Air Route

76. If the air route through the Middle East should be cut, the route Australia – Cocos Islands – Diego Garcia – Seychelles – East Africa, would have to be used. It is important that this alternative route should be developed and maintained in peace.

SOUTH EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

77. Any strategical plan for safeguarding the interests of the Empire in the Pacific must take into account the predominant position of the United States in that ocean, and, therefore, it is of the utmost importance that every effort should be made to ensure her co-operation from the outset. It is to be remembered, however, that in two world wars the United States, though generally in sympathy with her eventual Allies, became a belligerent two to three years late, and then only as the result of a direct attack upon her interests.

78. In the ensuing paragraphs, a plan of operational bases is outlined which can be fully effective only if the United States co-operates from the outset, but which provides also for a British Commonwealth line which would operate with or without United States co-operation. Throughout the system the establishment of joint bases to which the British Commonwealth would have access at all times should be aimed at.

79. In amplification of the principles set out in paragraph 66 the requirements of bases in South East Asia and the Pacific consist of a line of:-

- a. Advanced bases from which Naval and Air Forces can operate to control the sea and air communications leading south-wards from Russia, Japan and North China.
- b. Intermediate operational bases to support our advanced bases.
- c. Rear operational bases.
- d. Main supply and repair bases.

Advanced Bases

80. Advanced bases are required in the vicinity of the line Shanghai – Okinawa – Iwo Jima – Wake – Midway.

Intermediate Operational Bases

81. To support the advanced bases, intermediate operational bases are required in the vicinity of the line Formosa – Philippines – Carolines – Marshalls – Midway – Dutch Harbour.

Rear Operational Bases

82. Similarly, rear operational bases should be provided in the vicinity of the line Hainan – North Borneo – Admiralties – Solomons – Fiji – Pearl Harbour.

83. *Singapore:* Hitherto, Singapore has been regarded as a main supply and repair base, as well as an operational base. Primarily because of its lack of industrial backing, it must be ruled out of the former category. Its geographical position in relation to the concept of operational bases in the Pacific is a disadvantage, but its assets from the Empire point of view, however, outweigh this, and demand its inclusion as a rear operational base – the category to which it properly belongs.

84. *Manus:* Manus is the pre-dominant interest of Australia in the chain of Empire bases, but owing to the extensive naval and air facilities established by the United States there, for which provision will be necessary in the future, Australia could not shoulder the expense of the maintenance of this main rear operational base, without serious detriment to the provision of mobile fighting forces.

85. It is of importance, therefore, that the U.S.A. be given facilities at Manus, so long as it can be established that we have a clear right to the joint use of the base, and United States facilities at all times, in peace or war, whether or not the U.S.A. is a belligerent.

Air Bases

86. There exists in the islands to the north of Australia, a very adequate chain of air bases: many lie in Australian territories or Mandates. The essential bases at Moresby, Nadzab, the Admiralties, Rabaul, and in the Solomons, could be kept in good order with little effort, and should be maintained by Australia.

KEY AREA OF SYSTEM

87. The key area in the system of bases would be a naval and air operational base in Formosa – Pescadores, with advanced air and naval operational bases in the Shanghai area so long as the military situation permits. Operational control of this key area pre-supposes the co-operation of China and if this were not forthcoming, or if China were overrun, the left flank of our defences would have to fall back on Indo-China which would become the pivot of the chain of rear bases and, therefore, be of great strategic importance in preventing a serious threat to Malaya (and ultimately to Australia) from developing.

Arsenals in the Pacific

88. Empire forces operating from the bases described in paragraphs 80-82 would require an arsenal or arsenals in the Pacific, analogous in function to that which the United Kingdom fulfils in the Atlantic. The south-east coast of Australia possesses outstanding advantages for development as such for British Commonwealth forces in the Pacific. It is best situated with respect to the system of operational bases, is immune from land attack, has no internal security problem, and is the main industrial area of the Empire in the Pacific. The North Island, New Zealand, though not possessing the industrial potential of south-east Australia, would also be required as an auxiliary base for supplies, especially foodstuffs, and for limited repairs.

CONCLUSIONS

89. [In conclusion:]

- a. Naval and Air forces cannot function unless suitable bases in the operational area are available. In the case of the Navy the provision of a Fleet Train reduces the facilities required virtually to that of a safe anchorage.
- b. For the security of operational bases in the Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, reliance should be placed mainly on the Navy and Air for their defences. Army garrison forces should be restricted to those necessary to counter minor raids, and for internal security.
- c. Ceylon is essential as the main operational base for controlling the sea routes of the Indian Ocean.
- d. If India were overrun, Ceylon would be untenable, and Addu Atoll should therefore be maintained.
- e. A naval supply and repair base will be required at Kilindini, and an escort base at Fremantle.
- f. It is important that the alternative air route to that through the Middle East, namely, Australia – Cocos Islands – Diego Garcia – Seychelles – East Africa, should be developed in peace.
- g. Advanced operational bases are required in the vicinity of the line Shanghai – Okinawa – Iwo Jima – Wake – Midway, supported by intermediate operational bases in the vicinity of the line Formosa – Philippines – Carolines – Marshalls – Midway – Dutch Harbour.
- h. Rear operational bases should be provided in the vicinity of the line Hainan – North Borneo – Admiralties – Solomons – Fiji – Pearl Harbour. Although Singapore is in rear of this line, its advantages from an Empire point of view demand its inclusion in this category.

- i. Australia could not shoulder the expense of the maintenance of the main rear operational base at Manus without serious detriment to the provision of mobile fighting forces. It is essential therefore, that the U.S.A. be afforded facilities there on the understanding that we have the clear right to their joint use at all times, in peace and in war, whether or not the U.S.A. is a belligerent. America's lag in entering two world wars appears to be a constant factor which should be taken into account in this regard.
- j. Our strategy in the Pacific pre-supposes the cooperation of the United States of America from the outset. In the absence of such co-operation, the importance of the rear line of bases would be greatly enhanced.
- k. Without the co-operation of China, we would be denied the key area in the system of bases in Formosa and Pescadores, this would necessitate our left flank falling back on Indo-China which would then become the pivot of the chain of rear bases.
- l. Empire Forces in the Pacific require an arsenal or arsenals, analogous in function to that which the United Kingdom fulfils in the Atlantic: South East Australia possesses outstanding advantages in this regard, and should be developed as such. The North Island, New Zealand, is necessary as an auxiliary base for supplies, especially foodstuffs, and for limited repairs.
- m. The existing air bases at Moresby, Nadzab, the Admiralties, Rabaul and in the Solomons, could be kept in good order with little effort, and should be maintained by Australia.

PART IX — CO-OPERATION WITH FOREIGN POWERS

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

90. The question of co-operating with foreign powers is considered in relation to war with the U.S.S.R. – the only power which, it has been concluded, could threaten the security of the British Commonwealth, and therefore, of Australia. Such a war would extend through Europe and Asia and, if the U.S.S.R. had developed sea power, into the adjoining seas.

91. Any arrangement made by Australia with a foreign power could not, therefore, be divorced from the general world situation. In the light of this over-riding consideration, the position in the Australian sphere, vis-a-vis the several powers whose interests extend there, is here examined.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

92. The U.S.A. is the predominant power in the Pacific and her immediate assistance to the British Empire in the event of war with Russia as a naval power, is of paramount importance. It is further essential to the complete execution of the strategical plan contemplated in Parts VII and VIII, which, if it is to be effective, must be arranged in peace.

CHINA

94. It is important that the potential resources of China should be available to the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A. rather than to the U.S.S.R., and that the latter should be prevented from gaining an undue influence in China. Dominance of China by Russia would constitute a grave danger to the Empire.

SIAM

95. Siam is strategically important, especially in its relationship to Burma and Malaya, and should be encouraged to co-operate with us.

FRANCE

96. A powerful and friendly France remains a matter of immense importance to the Empire in the European zone.

Indo China

97. In the event of Russia becoming predominant in China, French Indo-China will be essential to our concept of completing a line of bases. Similarly, Indo-China is of the greatest strategic importance in the event of us temporarily losing control of the waters north of the Philippines.

New Caledonia

98. New Caledonia, which is within foreseeable rocket range of Australia's industrial area, may be of great consequence, and constant surveillance by the Intelligence Service is essential. An agreement to permit the stationing of Australian forces in New Caledonia in war time is desirable.

New Hebrides

99. The New Hebrides must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy, and, as in the case of New Caledonia, constant intelligence surveillance is necessary in peace.

French Indian Ocean Possessions

100. Co-ordination of Empire Policy with reference to French possessions in the Indian Ocean is strategically important in relation to our Indian Ocean communications.

THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

101. The Netherlands East Indies flank our communications with India and the Middle East. Hostile naval or air forces based on the Netherlands East Indies would be a constant threat to those communications. The islands are also interposed between Australia and Singapore, and could afford us valuable facilities in war. Further, in the hands of a major power they could be a jumping-off place for an attack on the Australian mainland.

102. Oil from the Netherlands East Indies will be of great importance to the Empire war effort, especially if the resources of the Persian Gulf Area be denied us.

103. It is thus of great strategical importance that the Netherlands East Indies should be in the hands of a strong and stable government with which Australia should maintain friendly relations. An agreement to permit the stationing of Empire forces in the Netherlands East Indies in war, and for the free use of the passages between the islands to enable direct contact by sea between our forces in South East Asia and the Indian Ocean is most desirable.

PORTUGAL

104. Timor is the only Portuguese territory in the south-west Pacific area, but is too far south to be of any strategic value in the concept of bases set out in paragraphs 80-82. With Timor in the hands of an enemy, however, Darwin would be seriously threatened, but this potentiality can be discarded at this stage. Surveillance by the Intelligence Service is all that is required.

CONCLUSIONS

105. [In conclusion:]

- a. Any arrangement made by Australia with a foreign power must be related to the general world situation.
- b. Co-operation of the Empire with the U.S.A. is of paramount importance. Australia should also encourage the closest co-operation with China, Siam, France, the Netherlands Indies, and Portugal, with particular reference to their Indian and Pacific Ocean possessions.

PART X — LOCAL DEFENCE

106. It is clear from paragraph 9 that as long as the United Nations remains in being the problem of local defence is virtually non-existent, and further, that if the United Nations should break down, the security of Australia will depend, first, on the effectiveness of the plan of Empire Defence, and secondly on co-operation with the United States.

107. Further, it has been stated that a firm plan of Empire Defence and arrangements for co-operation with the United States should be made in time of peace. If these can be achieved the possibility of invasion in the foreseeable future can be excluded.

108. Under this concept the role of the armed forces in the next war will be the fulfilment of Australia's obligations in a wide strategical plan, and, therefore, they should be organised and trained with that end in view. Any organisation on the basis of home defence would necessitate re-organisation and inevitable dislocation in the face of an emergency requiring overseas operations.

109. If, on the other hand, arrangements embodying a firm plan of Empire Defence with U.S.A. co-operation should fail, and Australia be faced with the necessity for the local defence of her own territory, the situation would be desperate owing to the inadequacy of her resources and the extent of her territory. Her forces, however, if organised and trained to meet the more likely contingency of overseas service, would be adaptable to the home need without material re-organisation.

110. The primary considerations in the organisation and training of the armed forces should therefore be the provision of a balanced Task Force of the three Services, and the avoidance of any system which will require re-organisation or the raising of a special force on the outbreak of war. Further, in order that Australia should be able promptly to undertake commitments commensurate with her status, as large a proportion of the Forces as is economically possible should be permanent forces.

111. A scheme of local defence based upon the islands to the north of Australia would dissipate our limited resources and invite defeat in detail. Moreover, if faced with the problem of local defence of Australia, complete withdrawal to the mainland may be necessary.

112. As the circumstances which could render local defence necessary would almost certainly include the severance of our overseas communications, the importance of rendering our essential industries as self-sufficient as possible is apparent.

CONCLUSIONS

113. [In conclusion:]

- a. The possibility of invasion in the foreseeable future can be excluded if there exists a firm plan of Imperial Defence and co-operation with the United States is arranged.

- b. The primary considerations in the organisation and training of the armed forces should be the provision of a balanced Task Force of the three Services, and the avoidance of any system which will require material re-organisation or the raising of a special force on the outbreak of war.
- c. If faced with the problem of local defence, a complete withdrawal to the mainland may be necessary.
- d. Our essential industries should be rendered as self-sufficient as possible.

PART XI — SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT

114. Scientific developments in the last war, particularly in the fields of electronics and rocketry, exercised a profound effect on the design of service equipments and the tactics of their employment, whilst, in the closing stages of the war, the advent of the atomic bomb demonstrated that the results of research in nuclear physics may revolutionize the organization, equipment and employment of armed forces and, indeed, strategical theory generally.

115. One of the lessons of the war is that science can exercise a preponderant influence in the face of otherwise superior power – a fact that was demonstrated by the decisive effect of radar in the Battle of Britain. Superior scientific development can, if secrecy be preserved, redress the balance between a weak nation and a strong one and this is of profound significance to Australia.

116. It may well be that many of the conclusions recorded in earlier parts of this paper, which are based upon the practice of warfare at the present time, may require radical revision; but it is already clear that the range of modern weapons and the advent of the atomic bomb reinforce the arguments, in Part I of this paper, against the concept of strategical isolation.

117. There is thus a pressing need for the closest association between the Services and scientific research on the highest plane. Active collaboration with other nations of the British Commonwealth and especially with the United Kingdom is essential. It is considered that this is a joint-service matter and that it should not in any way affect the continuance of existing links between the individual services and science; these are, however, mainly in the field of technology and do not meet the fundamental requirements of a new scientific era.

118. In the existing state of our knowledge, it would be premature to make any major change in the organisation or equipment of the armed forces. In this regard, science in the past has resulted in marked changes in the organisation and equipment of the Services and will continue to do so: the change from sail to steam, the adaption of the internal combustion engine to armoured cars and tanks, and the advent of wireless telegraphy and the aeroplane are examples.

119. The resultant changes have been gradual, and while the increased development of science to-day can be expected to result in more revolutionary and rapid changes in the future, these must still be of a gradual nature.

120. The atomic bomb has been dropped in war from a conventional aeroplane. The atomic substance produced disruptive and incendiary effects many times greater than the conventional high explosive. The full implications of this innovation have not yet been assessed, but it is not as yet a practical proposition for general use.

121. Development of the use of atomic energy for war purposes may give rise to other applications. This cannot, however, be foreseen and it is therefore not taken into account in our consideration of this problem. Economic and financial implications of the use of atomic energy are not known.

CONCLUSIONS

122. [In conclusion:]

- a. Scientific developments, particularly in the field of nuclear physics, may necessitate revolutionary changes in the organisation, equipment and employment of the armed forces, but, in the existing state of our knowledge, it would be premature to make any major changes.
- b. Superior scientific development can, if secrecy be preserved, redress the balance between a weak nation and a strong one.
- c. Many of the conclusions recorded in earlier parts of this paper may require radical revision in the light of further knowledge, but it is already clear that the range of modern weapons and the advent of the atomic bomb reinforce the arguments, in Part I of this paper, against the concept of strategical isolation.
- d. There is a pressing need for the closest association between the services and scientific research on the highest plane, but, notwithstanding this need, the continuance of existing links between the individual services and science is necessary. Collaboration with other nations of the British Commonwealth and especially with the United Kingdom is essential.
- e. The full implications, including economic and financial, of atomic energy are not yet known. Scientific development in the past has led to revolutionary changes which, however, have been gradual. While recent atomic developments may result in more rapid changes, these cannot be foreseen and have not been taken into account at this stage.

PART XII — AUSTRALIA'S FORCES TO BE MAINTAINED IN PEACE

123. In previous Parts of this paper, a review of Australia's position in the future has been made. Her potential enemy has been assessed and the strategical considerations examined. Reference has been made to the necessity for bases to enable the strategical concept to be applied, and it has been made clear that Australia alone can neither provide the bases nor the forces required to ensure her security.

124. It has been stressed, that it is necessary to depend upon a co-ordinated Empire plan employing Empire forces as a whole, and in certain circumstances, also those of the U.S.A.

125. Australian forces for operations in the strategical concept in this paper should be organised to fulfil requirements as in the following paragraphs.

126. *Navy:*

- a. A mobile Task Unit consisting of aircraft carriers with their escorts, capable of forming part of an Empire Task Force and of co-operating with the United States Navy.
- b. A Fleet Train for the maintenance of our mobile Task Unit.
- c. A Sea Frontier Force consisting of escorts for our shipping, and for the seaward defence of our bases.
- d. Amphibious craft for combined operations.

127. *Army:*

- a. Standard formations designed for operations on normal terrain, and for amphibious operations, but capable of conversion to meet the conditions of jungle warfare.
- b. Garrison forces for the protection of our bases against raids, and for internal security.
- c. Adequate maintenance provision for the forces under (a) and (b).

128. *Air Force:*

- a. Mobile Task Force, including units for long range missions and transportation, ready to move wherever required for strategic purposes or in support of the other services.
- b. Forces for the protection of our bases and focal areas against sporadic raids.

