26 March 2008

Navy has not developed or submitted any document to Government proposing the acquisition of future capability as indicated in a Daily Telegraph article titled “Aircraft carrier on $4b navy wish list” (25 March 08, page 2).

The Defence White Paper process will assist Government make fully informed and cost-effective decisions about the military capabilities needed to defend Australia and its interests.

"The White Paper process provides a structured and robust way for all relevant capability options to be considered against Australia’s strategic circumstances and the tasks Government expects the ADF to carry out. The Force Structure Review is part of this process and will provide Government a range of options to consider," Rear Admiral Crane said.

Navy is contributing fully to the development of the White Paper.

Russell Crane
Rear Admiral
Deputy Chief of Navy

22 February 2008

The Crikey website yesterday published the following on its 'tips and rumours' section: "Which high paid, senior federal public servant travels each week between Canberra, where he works, and his home and family interstate? He clocks up a lot of airfares, FFs and taxi fares. Who foots the bill? Would he be defensive about answering such questions?" Oh, that's easy. That would be Dr Steven Gumley of the DMO whose salary is higher than even the Secretary of Defence."

• The segment published on the Crickey website's 'tips and rumours' section relating to the head of DMO, Dr Gumley, is a spurious misrepresentation of the facts relating to Dr Gumley's appointment.
• Dr Gumley's salary and the requirement for him to pay his own travel expenses between Canberra and Melbourne are a matter of public record.
• Dr Gumley pays for all his travel between his Canberra workplace and his Melbourne residence out of his own after-tax salary. He does not claim a travel allowance from the Commonwealth for travel between Canberra and his Melbourne residence. There is no benefit to him in respect of tax deductions.
• Dr Gumley's name is Stephen, not Steven, as in the published segment on Crikey.

21 February 2008

Dear Sir,  

In his article "Army censors news as tensions rise" (p34, 21/2) your reporter Paul Toohey only presents Time journalist Rory Callinan's account of his conduct around Dare on 14 February 2008.  

The fact is that Mr Callinan placed himself, his photographer and two Timorese civilians in danger, by twice attempting to breach a security perimeter around Dare via a small foot track.  He did this despite warnings from International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and United Nations (UN) personnel in the area.  In attempting to breach the security perimeter on a second occasion after 8pm (local time), Mr Callinan and Mr Wilson also breached the curfew imposed by the Timor-Leste National Parliament, which exposed themselves and the two Timorese civilians accompanying them to serious charges under Timor-Leste law.  As a consequence of Mr Callinan's actions, valuable military resources had to be diverted from an ongoing operation in order to ensure his group was safely returned to their accommodation in Dili.  

Mr Callinan needs to reflect on the methods he employs in covering events in Timor-Leste.  Mr Toohey should ensure his reporting is balanced

A.A. NIKOLIĆ, CSC
Brigadier
Director General Public Affairs

19 February 2008

Steve Waterson
Editor, South Pacific
Time Australia Magazine Pty Ltd
GPO Box 3873
Sydney NSW 2001

Dear Mr Waterson,

Rory Callinan’s 17 February article ‘A Frustrating Manhunt in Timor’ refers to his walking around a military checkpoint in order to speak to villagers from Dare.  What he fails to mention, however, is that on at least two occasions he attempted to penetrate a military cordon via a minor foot track despite clear warnings from International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and United Nations (UN) personnel not to do so.  His conduct during the afternoon and evening of 14 February 2008 was both dangerous and reckless.  It endangered himself, his cameraman John Wilson, and two Timorese civilians accompanying them as interpreter / guide.

In attempting to breach the security perimeter on a second occasion after 8pm (local time), Mr Callinan and Mr Wilson also breached the curfew imposed by the Timor-Leste National Parliament, which exposed themselves and the two Timorese civilians accompanying them to serious charges under Timor-Leste law.  In order to ensure the safe transport of Mr Callinan’s group to their accommodation in Dili after the commencement of the curfew, it was necessary to allocate scarce UN security vehicles involved in an ongoing operation.

Mr Callinan should reflect more carefully on the methods he employs in covering events in Timor and the potential consequences that may result from his actions.

A.A. NIKOLIĆ, CSC
Brigadier
Director General Public Affairs

30 January 2008

Correction to Bloomberg news service article

Your article (by Ed Johnson) "Australia to Meet Election Pledge on Troop Withdrawal from Iraq" contains inaccurate information regarding Australia’s troop commitment in Iraq.

The Australian Government has announced the withdrawal of approximately 550 troops from southern Iraq to commence by the middle of 2008. This follows the generation of capable Iraq security forces (ISF) and the transfer of provincial security control to ISF in Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar Provinces.

Importantly, the Australian Defence Force remains committed to Operation Catalyst, which is the name given to Australia's commitment to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq. An Australian Headquarters will remain in Baghdad to command Australian troops in the Middle East Area of Operations, and an Army Security Detachment in Baghdad will provide protection to Australian Embassy staff.

Australia will also maintain the following security forces in the Arabian Gulf region:

• A Royal Australian Air Force Maritime Air Patrol Group to provide surveillance support;
• An AC-130 Air Transport Detachment to provide logistics support to Iraq and Afghanistan;
• A Maritime Group to protect Iraq’s oil platforms and associated command and logistics support elements; and
• A logistic element to support ADF forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Comprehensive and accurate information on all Australia's operations around the world is only a click away on the Department of Defence website at: http://www.defence.gov.au/globalops.htm.

16 January 2008

Correction to Daily Telegraph Article

The Daily Telegraph article of 16 January titled ‘Aussies face accuser – League v gridiron fight’ incorrectly states that the Royal Australian Navy paid $50,000 bail for two of its sailors after their first court appearance in the United States. Defence can confirm that bail was arranged by the sailors at their expense.

Fiona McNaught
Commander RAN
DGNCC

10 January 2008

The Editor, Sydney Morning Herald

In response to the article ‘Father accuses army of cover up’ (January 10), I write to clarify issues relating to Australian Defence Force Commissions of Inquiry in general, and specifically the Inquiry into the tragic death of Captain Andrew Paljakka.

Defence practice in the past was to conduct private inquiries into ADF deaths involving suspected suicide.  This was primarily due to the intensely personal nature of evidence presented, which family members and friends of the deceased often found distressing. 

When the Inquiry into the death of Captain Paljakka was established, Defence understood that his next of kin was content with the decision to conduct the proceedings in private - the intent being to spare the family unnecessary stress and grief.  Following consideration of the recent wishes of Captain Paljakka’s family, however, the Chief of Defence Force has determined that the remainder of the Inquiry will be held in public. 

The issue of private vs. public inquiries has been under consideration for some time.  As a result, Air Chief Marshal Houston has directed that future Commissions of Inquiry be held in public, subject to considerations of security.  Families may apply to the Inquiry President to request that parts of the inquiry be closed to the public.

It would be inappropriate to comment further on matters before the Commission of Inquiry into Captain Paljakka’s death.  It is important that the Inquiry be allowed to complete its work, so that the ADF can better understand the circumstances surrounding Captain Paljakka’s death and consider what more can be done to prevent such a tragedy from occurring again.

Brigadier Andrew Nikolic
Director General Public Affairs
Department of Defence

03 January 2008

Letter to the Editor, Daily Examiner (Grafton) - Re Abrams Tank acquisistion

Your reference to the Abrams Tank acquisition in the Daily Examiner on 3 Jan 08 as an "apparent failure" is misleading and deserves correction.  I draw your attention to the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) July 2007 report on this project, which stated it was "being effectively managed by the Defence Materiel Organisation to deliver an improved, replacement capability".  No recommendations were made by the ANAO in relation to the project.  It is also notable that the tank was declared operationally ready in Darwin on 7 July 2007.  

Contrary to the assertion in your article that the tank can't be loaded onto heavy landing craft or transport planes, it can be transported by: the 14 Heavy Tank Transporters being acquired by the Project; current Navy Landing Platform Amphibious and Landing Craft Heavy vessels; C-17 aircraft, and various commercial ships and aircraft.  Defence is also in the process of acquiring rolling stock for the transportation of the tank via the national rail system. In essence, infrastructure exists throughout Australia to allow the tanks to be transported where they need to go.  It is also wrong to suggest that the tanks "have a life expectancy of only 10 years".  The US expects the M1A1 to operate until 2030.   We expect the same.

Sufficient Australian Defence contractors and ADF tradesmen have been trained in the maintenance of the Abrams to ensure that Army's training and operational requirements are met.  In summary, the Land 907 Tank Replacement Project is delivering a world class capability, which results from the close cooperation displayed between the Defence Materiel Organisation and a range of Australian defence and government agencies, the US Government, and the key US and Australian industry partners.

Andrew Nikolic
Brigadier
Director General Public Affairs

18 December 2007

Defence response to an article by Mark Dunn and Mark Buttler 'Sailors go overboard' in the Herald Sun on 18 Dec 07

Navy strenuously refutes the claim that it is not taking seriously the possible excessive consumption of alcohol by its members.  Further, Navy is most concerned about any of its personnel driving a motor vehicle when potentially in excess of the legal Blood Alcohol Limit (BAL).

Navy has long been committed to addressing the issue of health risks as a result of unsafe or problematic alcohol consumption by its members.  Indeed, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a whole, with strong support by the Australian Defence Organisation, is active in discouraging these practices.

To achieve this, the ADF Medical Health Service conducts education and information programs, and where appropriate, personal medical intervention programs.  This is delivered under the ADF Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drugs Service (ADF ATODS). This key initiative deals specifically with the health response to Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) use by ADF members.

In addition to those personnel working on the ATODS initiative, Navy employs an Alcohol and Drug Program Coordinator, which is a permanent position staffed by a Lieutenant Commander, together with Alcohol and Drug Program Advisers (ADPA) who are positioned nationally.  Trained to Cert IV level in Alcohol and Other Drug Work, most spend around one day per week conducting assessments, interviews and education programs.

To ensure new recruits are aware of the policy on alcohol and drug consumption, Navy conducts a focussed four session education program their initial RAN entry training. This education program covers alcohol and illicit substances and provides information on low risk drinking levels, alternatives to alcohol, social and health ramifications of binge drinking, to name but a few.  In addition, continuing education is provided throughout a person’s career as they undertake leadership and promotion courses.

Navy, through the Alcohol and Drug Program Advisers, conducts briefings annually on the dangers associated with excessive alcohol consumption. This brief informs personnel of the effects of alcohol while also reinforcing their responsibilities with regards to Breath Alcohol Testing and Prohibited Substance Testing This brief is a mandatory activity for all Naval personnel.   It also reminds personnel that fitness to drive is an individual responsibility.

Navy does not just use the ATODS initiative and its own targeted programs to address the issue. Overarching policy is provided in relation to the consumption of alcohol within Navy.

The Commanding Officer at HMAS CERBERUS has been proactive in implementing Navy policy and other measures to minimise potential harm to personnel.  

All staff at the Anchorage Bar have been trained in the Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA).  Furthermore, whenever the bar is open, there is at least one Duty Committee Representative (of Leading Seaman rank) supervising the behaviour of patrons.  They are authorised to evict any patrons who are clearly intoxicated or behaving badly.

Where Navy personnel have been found in breach of the Defence Force Discipline Act with regard to alcohol and drug related matters, they have been dealt with as appropriate. Additionally, personnel have been disciplined for negligence in the performance of their duty for not appropriately intervening in alcohol related issues. These actions send a clear message that Navy is serious about these issues.

The Commanding Officer is very keen to ensure the safety and welfare of all personnel in HMAS CERBERUS and prepared to follow up on the matter.  However, despite the invitation for Mr Sinclair to present his concerns directly to the Commanding Officer, there is no record of Mr Sinclair responding by either in writing or by phone.  The invitation to meet with the Commanding Officer remains open.

Mr Sinclair may be unaware of many of the initiatives being implemented at HMAS CERBERUS or the findings of the investigations into the August 2007 Motor Vehicle Accident (MVA) to which you refer.  They found that the driver of the vehicle did not consume alcohol within HMAS CERBERUS before driving ashore that evening. 

Personnel at all levels in HMAS CERBERUS have been energetic in implementing programs to maximise the safety of personnel at the base, both on and off-duty.  In addition to the alcohol and drug education programs and policies mentioned previously, a driving safety educational and testing program targeted to initial recruits has recently been instigated.

Other education initiatives include large ‘anti drink driving’ signs and a wrecked motor car placed near the main entrance to the base as a visual ‘reminder’ of the potential outcomes of drink driving.  Breath Alcohol Tests  are regularly conducted on base, near the main exit/entrance, during most popular departure times. Personnel who are detected via this means are managed under occupational health and safety guidelines; they have their keys withheld and are returned to their onboard accommodation.

Police regularly conduct Operation 'Safe Haven' which combines the resources of the Victorian Police traffic management unit, drug squad (including sniffer dogs), local police resources and HMAS CERBERUS' Naval Police Coxswain staff with the purpose of conducting on base :

• searches for prohibitive substances,
• breath testing, and
• motor vehicle roadworthiness inspections,

The last operation occurred 29 Nov 07.

Twenty nine personnel have been dealt with under the Defence Force Discipline Act for alcohol related offences at HMAS CERBERUS in the past two years.  This is less than 1% of ADF personnel who have been posted to the base over this time.  These offences mainly relate to unauthorised storage and the consumption of any alcohol by junior sailors in accommodation blocks and other prohibited areas on base.

Two personnel in HMAS CERBERUS have been the subject of disciplinary action due to negligence in the performance of their duty for not intervening appropriately in an alcohol related issue.  

Commanding Officer HMAS CERBERUS understands that that the local office of the Victorian Police does not believe that the number of local MVA incidents involving personnel from this establishment is out of the ordinary noting the age group and concentration of the trainees at the base, the state of the road systems in this region and the distances that personnel need to drive to popular social, sporting and entertainment venues.  Annually, less than 1% of all the ADF personnel at HMAS CERBERUS have been dealt with by the Victorian Police in relation to ‘drink driving’ offences.  

Through extant policies and continuing education programs, Navy takes proactive action to reduce the occurrence of unsafe or problematic alcohol consumption and illicit drug taking by its members.

Regards,
Richard Hawke
CAPT RAN
DGNCC

5 December 2007

Defence response to article by Cameron Stewart “Defence systems to get a rocketing”

An article written by Mr Cameron Stewart and published in The Australian on 22 November 2007, on the review of the Defence Security Authority’s (DSA’s) roles and responsibilities, is a good example of how considerable journalistic license can be applied despite Defence providing clear, concise answers in response to a journalist’s questions.

In September 2007, the Secretary of Defence agreed to a review of DSA recommended by the Head of DSA (HDSA). HDSA recommended the review be conducted to determine whether DSA’s roles and functions need to be modified in response to changed circumstances, and whether they are being delivered in the most cost-effective manner.

In recognition of the unprecedented level of Defence activity and operational tempo over the past few years, the position of HDSA was elevated to the Senior Executive Service Band Two level in February this year.

Having been in the position in seven months, HDSA has commissioned the review as a normal business process to ensure DSA’s activities continue to meet the security requirements of Defence and defence industry.

The review was not commissioned due to the theft of M72 rocket launchers last year. Nevertheless, DSA will take into account the outcomes of the recent weapons, munitions and explosives audit to ensure those assets are appropriately protected.

21 November 2007

The Editor, The Australian

Sean Parnell’s 20 November article ‘Diggers sent to Iraq are getting younger’ does not entirely reflect the range of information provided to him and erroneously suggests that there is a deliberate plan to send young soldiers on operations.

Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel deploy on operations according to the tasks that need to be done, which determines the composition of the force required to achieve them. Participation is founded on skills, knowledge and readiness rather than age. The nature of military rank structures, however, results in a higher percentage of junior ranked soldiers and officers being represented on operations. This is an inevitable outcome of the fact that about 30 per cent of the ADF is aged under 25.

Mr Parnell reports statistics obtained under Freedom of Information that compare the percentage of soldiers deployed to Iraq by age groupings in 2003 and 2006. Notably, he was also given information that shows 1.7 per cent of soldiers aged between 18 and 19 deployed on operations in 2007 along with 18.6 per cent in the 20-24 year age group. These statistics equate to those of 2003 and highlight that there is no significant trend towards younger troops deploying on operations.

Yours faithfully,

Brigadier Andrew Nikolic
Director General Public Affairs

13 November 2007

Media reporting on the promotion of Major General Elizabeth Cosson CSC and her report into the repatriation of Private Jake Kovco

Some media reports about Major General Liz Cosson’s promotion and appointment as Head, National Operations suggest that she was responsible for investigations into Private Jake Kovco’s death. This is incorrect.

As a brigadier at the time, Major General Cosson was appointed to inquire into circumstances surrounding the failure to repatriate the body of Private Jacob Kovco to Australia on 25 April 2006.

Brigadier Cosson’s report was submitted to the Board of Inquiry into the death and repatriation of Private Jacob Kovco for its consideration. 

The 28 recommendations contained in the “Cosson” report have been implemented within Defence.

9 November 2007

The Editor Courier Mail

I write to express my concerns at Mr Ian McPhedran’s criticism of Defence last Wednesday in the Courier Mail.  His use of the word ‘manifesto’ in describing Defence policy relating to public comment is pejorative and conveys an image of our approach to public comment that is inconsistent with the facts.

Mr McPhedran also claims (in error) that senior Defence leaders had signed a directive telling “staff how to hide information from the media and the public,” that Defence denies “taxpayers even basic information they have a right to know” and that the “entire document is a push…by Brigadier Nikolic to control every piece of information.” 

Importantly, this baseless and quite personal criticism was published without reference to Defence and without acknowledgement that our policy in this area is entirely consistent with Australian Public Service Commission standards.  These are available on line at: apsc.gov.au 

Mr McPhedran's implied suggestion that Defence personnel should be free to talk to the media without the constraints of Departmental policy is interesting, given that it comes from someone subjected to strict editorial processes.  I look forward to reading Ian’s unedited articles on the internal business affairs of News Limited in the near future.

Brigadier Andrew Nikolic
Director General, Public Affairs
Department of Defence

9 November 2007

Re: Sailors escape putrid gassing

The Editors, Herald Sun and NT News

I strongly reject the inaccurate reporting in Ian McPhedran’s article ‘Sailors escape putrid gassing’ (Herald Sun and NT News, 7 November 2007).  The Navy takes exception to the false claims made by Mr McPhedran and the lack of balance and factual accuracy in his reporting.

The assertion that Navy has covered up the toxic hazard incident on HMAS Maitland involving four sailors is unsubstantiated and simply untrue.  This incident was fully reported within the Defence chain of command, and on the same day a media release was issued nationally.  (‘HMAS Maitland Toxic Hazard Incident’ Departmental Media Release 225/06, 30 August 2006).  The obvious transparency of the reporting of this incident demonstrates the lack of research undertaken by Mr McPhedran.

The Navy has been completely open about the repairs undertaken to improve the operability of Armidale Class Patrol Boats (ACPBs).  As with most new designs, teething problems are encountered and have to be overcome.   Through a determined and concerted effort many of these issues are now well behind the Armidale Class.  

Far from creating a morale matter, ACPB crews are reaping the benefits of the new multi-crewing initiative.  While still in its infancy, multi-crewing provides personnel with predictable respite periods, reduced duties in harbour and greater family life stability during the 16 weeks they are not assigned to a Patrol Boat.  More importantly, this means crews have scheduled respite periods while ensuring a vessel can maintain a high operational capability.

The assertion that morale is at “rock bottom” is inaccurate and is not representative of the opinions held by those currently serving in the Armidale Fleet.  There are hundreds of hardworking, diligent and committed sailors and officers that deserve better than this shallow and superficial reporting. 

Yours sincerely,

N.S. COATES, AM, RAN
Rear Admiral
Commander Australian Fleet

9 November 2007

Re: BOWSER HITCH FOR RAAF REFUELLING

The Editor Australian

The article by Geoffrey Thomas in the Aviation section on Friday (“Bowser hitch for RAAF refuelling”, Aviation, 9/11) correctly outlined that there are risks being managed in the KC-30B tanker project, and also that the project is on track for first aircraft delivery early 2009, followed by achievement of Initial Operating Capability by the end of 2009.

Unfortunately, the article incorrectly stated that the first aircraft was to be delivered early next year, giving the impression that the project was late. The original contracted date for first aircraft delivery, as signed in 2004, was December 2008, and this date has since moved to February 2009 to accommodate cockpit design changes.

Although the design is built on a foundation of a commercial aircraft platform, the development and certification of the refuelling modification is a technically complex project and Australia is the lead customer.

At the time of contract signature, there were no off-the-shelf options available and other nations were also examining options for new refuelling tankers.  This situation has not significantly changed today as both the UK and US tanker programs have been delayed and have yet to sign contracts.

Risk is being prudently managed and Australia will be introducing this important capability into service well in advance of these other programs.

Sincerely,

Clive Rossiter
Air Vice-Marshal
Head Aerospace Systems Division

7 November 2007        

STATUS OF ARMIDALE CLASS PATROL BOATS

Recent media reporting of the serviceability of the Armidale Class Patrol Boat (ACPB) fleet focuses on both selective and dated information.  This year the fleet has performed consistently in meeting all Government directed tasking off Northern Australia and in the South West Pacific. Currently, all thirteen ACPBs accepted into service by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) are operational.
 
The introduction into service of the ACPB has represented a quantum leap over the former Fremantle Class Patrol Boats (FCPB).  Aside from being at least 40 per cent larger, there are numerous areas where capability has been significantly improved including enhanced operational performance, use of state of the art technology and most importantly, improved habitability conditions for personnel.  Accommodation for junior sailors represents some of the best living quarters in the RAN fleet today.   For example, compared with the FCPB, junior sailors now live in four-berth cabins with ensuites, rather than in a messdeck of 20 personnel sharing only two toilets and showers.  They have access to e-mail and satellite television at sea and enjoy meals from a well equipped galley.

Further advantages for the crews of the ACPB are being realised in the new multi-crewing regime.    This manning initiative was introduced following the delivery of the fourth vessel and formation of the sixth crew. Under the regime, crews rotate between the ships within a generic cycle.  While still in its infancy, the multi-crewing concept provides personnel with predictable respite periods, reduced duties in harbour and greater family life stability during the 16 weeks they are not assigned to a Patrol Boat.  More importantly, it ensures the ship is available for tasking almost immediately following a crew rotation, rather than having to stay alongside while shore respite is taken by the crew.

Claims that the entire fleet was tied up last year due to water and fuel contamination problems are inaccurate.  Two ACPBs suffered engine defects earlier this year that were detected early by Navy technicians.  As a precautionary measure, an operational restriction was placed on ACPB operations to permit corrective maintenance and allow fuel system checks to be conducted.  There have been no engines suffering fuel contamination issues in recent months. The final five vessels of the class have been delivered with the full fuel treatment and transfer system modifications incorporated into their build to address the defects.

The RAN has been completely open about the repairs undertaken to improve the operability of ACPBs.  As with most new designs, teething problems are encountered and have to be overcome.  Many of the suggested solutions have been recommended by the crews themselves.  Through a determined and concerted effort between the RAN, Defence Materiel Organisation and the support contractor, many of these issues are now well behind the Armidale Class.  

ARMIDALE CLASS PATROL BOAT FACTS

• Allegation #1: The 14 Armidale Class Patrol Boats (ACPB) are spending more time under repair than on patrol.

Fact: At the time that this article was published, all 12 of the currently commissioned ACPBs were at sea, being employed in various tasks across Northern Australian and in the South-West Pacific.

• Allegation #2: Sailors claim that conditions on the boats are so bad that the navy is losing people because of them.

Fact: ACPB’s are 40% larger than the Fremantle Class Patrol Boats (FCPB) with significantly enhanced habitability. Junior sailors live in 4-berth accommodation with an ensuite and generous amounts of hanging and drawer space. Sailors in the Armidale Class also have access to e-mail and satellite television at sea, and enjoy meals from a well equipped Galley, all improvements on the FCPBs.

• Allegation #3: The entire fleet was tied up last year due to a water/fuel contamination problem.

Fact: Two ACPBs suffered engine defects earlier this year requiring corrective maintenance as a result of fuel contamination.  The fleet of ACPBs were put on an operational restriction to allow fuel system checks to be conducted on the remaining ACPBs to determine the existence of any water contamination. No ACPBs have suffered fuel contamination problems in recent months.

• Allegation #4: Constantly blocked toilets.

Fact: Toilets in crew accommodation areas are all of the vacuum suction type and have operated reliably.  One common use toilet is a standard gravity type that has performed less than optimally.  It has not posed a safety hazard. The ship’s builder has reviewed the design and is trialling a modification.  There have been some intermittent problems with a toilet blockage in the Austere Accommodation Compartment.  This compartment is not in regular use and is separate from crew accommodation so the system has been isolated while the ship builder develops and implements design changes.

• Allegation #5: Unsecured anchors.

Fact: One vessel was involved in a minor incident involving its anchor; however, the damage was not considered attributable to any design issue. It did not affect the vessel’s operational service. The matter is subject to further investigation.

• Allegation #6: American style power points that require adaptors to be fitted for Australian electrical equipment.

Fact: 115V 60Hz outlets are in the communications room to enable operation of some specific, specialised US-made equipment only.  240V 3 phase power outlets with RCD protection are fitted throughout the ship for all domestic and personal equipment.

• Allegation #7: Inadequate lighting.

Fact: All RAN ships are fitted with red lighting in compartments above the waterline. This ensures that white light does not affect the identification and aspect of a vessel at night. This requirement complies with ‘Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972)’ (COLREGS).

• Allegation #8: A lack of training specific to the boat.

Fact: Every new Crew completed a comprehensive 3-month training continuum that included platform specific training delivered by the In-Service Support Contractor, onboard pre-Workup training and familiarisation, and an at-sea mariner skills and mission readiness Workup and evaluation.  All new members subsequently joining a Crew are provided with the platform specific training, and all Crews are routinely re-evaluated.  Confidence and knowledge with onboard systems will steadily grow as operational experience with these technologically advanced new Patrol Boats is gained.  The performance of ACPB Crews on operations to date has not indicated any significant flaws in the training continuum.

• Allegation #9: Over-crowded shore establishments.

Fact: All RAN personnel posted to vessels home-ported in Cairns and Darwin live in off-Base accommodation.  Base re-developments at HMAS Cairns and HMAS Coonawarra are underway, and while short-term disruption and inconvenience is acknowledged, the benefits gained will be substantial.

• Allegation #10: The 21-person crews rotate between the boats after a nine-week assignment followed by four weeks’ respite, rather than being posted to a vessel for a two-year billet. This means there is no attachment to any boat.

Fact: Personnel are posted to a crew for an expected duration of between 18 months and three years.  Under the Armidale Class multi-crewing regime six Crews rotate between four Boats within a generic Crew duty cycle comprising nine weeks assigned to a Patrol Boat, four weeks unassigned for operational respite, and so on.

Multi-crewing is in its infancy but is already delivering benefits: predictable respite periods; reduced duties in harbour; reduced leave liability; reduced training shortfalls; improved levels of individual readiness; and the opening up of new opportunities for respite such as adventure training, vocational training, and familiarisation with other ADF units such as NORFORCE. 

The days of single-crewing Patrol Boats are over; the benefits of multi-crewing far outweigh the perception of a loss of attachment to a particular Boat.  In the Fremantle Class, attachment to one Boat meant unpredictable programs all-year round, involvement in all maintenance activity, and keeping harbour duties whenever in port. These issues collectively manifested themselves as severely curtailed leave opportunities and no stable family life.  In the Armidale Class all sailors have 16 weeks per annum unassigned to a boat and rigidly programmed for respite.

• Allegation #11 – Fitted Plastic Blinds vice Tinted Windows on the Bridge

Fact: Tinted windows would contravene the International COLREGS as they would restrict visibility at night and thereby cause safety issues.  Blinds similar to other classes of RAN ships are fitted to minimize glare by day.

• Allegation #12: ‘The fault has not been fully rectified and the accommodation areas on the Armidales remain off limits.’

Fact:  The investigation into the HMAS Maitland toxic hazard incident determined that improper operation of the Sewage Treatment Plant, not any technical fault, was the most likely cause.  Subsequently, revised operating procedures and training were immediately implemented along with a range of restrictions on entry and use of the austere accommodation compartment.  The compartment is completely isolated from normal crew working, accommodation, and recreation areas and this limitation has only a minor impact on capability.  Continuous monitoring and weekly reporting of compartment air quality across the fleet since the incident has confirmed the effectiveness of the revised procedures and the probable elimination of the hazard.  Earlier this year restrictions were relaxed to allow entry and use of the compartment except as an ‘overflow’ sleeping space.  These restrictions and monitoring remain in place until technical feasibility studies into possible design changes are completed and any subsequent configuration changes can be implemented.

• Allegation #13: ‘Despite the seriousness of the incident, it was kept a secret by the Navy.’

Fact: A departmental media release was issued nationally on 30 August 2006 which addressed the incident on HMAS Maitland. The RAN maintains its transparency in reporting incidents as they occur.

• Allegation #14: ‘Both the Navy and COMCARE investigated the gassing incident and recommended ‘configuration’ changes’.

Fact:  COMCARE made no such recommendations.  The Fleet Commander initiated a separate Inquiry after the initial investigation; that report was consistent with the initial findings but also made further recommendations regarding investigating the technical feasibility of possible configuration changes.  Results are awaited. 

• Allegation #15: ‘According to the 2007 defence annual report the Armidale boats, which are designed and built to commercial rather than naval operating standards, achieved just 60 per cent of their performance targets for the year.’

Fact:  That is correct.  Regardless of operating standards these vessels are ‘state-of-the-art’ technology and involve a new operating and support concept which made the task of introducing them into service very complex and demanding.  Like any new capability, technical issues associated with their introduction into service arose and are being methodically overcome.  Performance targets for this current financial year continue to trend upwards and the Patrol Boat force has been consistently meeting its operational commitments for several months. 

• Allegation #16: ‘Sailors serving on the $40 million boats say they are riddled with faults and morale is at rock bottom.’

Fact: The builder and support contractor have a successful program in place to address any latent design and build defects.  Defects outstanding have no detrimental impact on capability or safety and are in the process of rectification on a priority basis.  Any defect arising that may have a significant impact on capability or safety is immediately addressed.  Personnel in the Patrol Boat Force have been working hard for over two years introducing this new capability.  It has not been easy but the vast majority of men and women are now realising the benefits of the improved capability, habitability, and predictable respite offered by the Armidale Class and are proud of the successes they are now having on operations.       

• Allegation #17: ‘The entire Armidale fleet was tied up last year due to a water/fuel contamination problem.’

Fact: Two ACPBs suffered engine defects earlier this year requiring corrective maintenance as a result of fuel contamination. The fleet of ACPBs were put on an operational restriction to allow fuel system checks to be conducted on the remaining ACPBs to determine the existence of any water contamination. No ACPBs have suffered fuel contamination problems in recent months.

• Allegation #18: ‘The navy defended the Armidales, saying that just one of the 12 now in service was tied up with problems’

Fact: All 13 vessels so far accepted by the Navy are operational.  Navy will soon be increasing its level of Patrol Boat commitment to Border Protection Command because of recent force structure and operational training milestones successfully achieved. 

• Allegation #19: American style power points that require adaptors to be fitted for Australian electrical equipment.

Fact: 115V 60Hz outlets are in the Communications Room to enable operation of some specific, specialised US-made equipment only.  240V 3 phase power outlets with RCD protection are fitted throughout the ship for all domestic and personal equipment.  

• Allegation #20: Constantly blocked toilets.

6 November 2007

DEFENCE RESPONSE TO ARTICLE BY MARK DODD “CANBERRA CANCELLED ROBOT UNIT FOR BOMBS”

Today’s Australian reports that a cancelled project in 2004 (Land 133) “could have saved Sergeant Michael Lyddiard from the severe injuries he suffered”. At best, this misrepresents the intent of the project and misunderstands the ADF’s comprehensive approach to countering the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).

Land 133 was a capability technology demonstration focussed on the detection of land mines and route clearance against traditional minefields. It was not intended to be a specific countermeasure against IEDs.

Land 133 was replaced by Land 144, which is also focussed on defeating mines and is not intended to deliver specific countermeasures against IEDs. Land 144 achieved 2nd pass approval just before the caretaker period commenced and will mature into an effective counter-mine capability. Other systems are in place and under development to counter IEDs.

Land 133 is therefore irrelevant to the incident involving SGT Lyddiard, given that the IED which wounded him had already been discovered and he was in the process of trying to render it safe.

Australian Defence Force Spokesman, Brigadier Andrew Nikolic said that the ADF takes a comprehensive approach to countering the IED threat.

“We provide individual and collective pre-deployment training, including improved tactics, techniques and procedures to assist with mitigating the threat posed by IEDs Notably, Army's Explosive Hazards Centre conducts an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Mission Rehearsal Exercise for all EOD Teams deploying on operations. This has occurred for all rotations and the training is theatre specific.

“Deliberate planning using surveillance and intelligence is also undertaken to ensure our people understand the threat and can adapt to it as it changes. A range of technical and non-technical systems and measures are available to increase the levels of force protection for our deployed troops. For operational security reasons the specifics of these systems will not be disclosed, because doing so would allow our adversaries to develop effective counter-measures of their own,” Brigadier Nikolic said

The ADFs Counter-IED Task Force and Headquarters Joint Operations Command continue to work hard to ensure our troops have the most up-to-date threat information as well as the equipment and counter-measures that are able to neutralise or mitigate the threat. For our EOD operators, this includes a range of mechanical and non-mechanical methods that provide the capacity to approach and neutralise IEDs remotely.

Brigadier Nikolic said that ultimately, a decision on which method to employ is a matter for EOD Operators.

“Their decision is founded on many factors, including the nature of the threat, the terrain and other tactical circumstances. If the EOD operator requires additional guidance or support, this is available from EOD supervisors.

“It is notable that the ADF inventory includes EOD remote positioning vehicles (RPV) heavy and light. Both heavy and light robots are in service with the Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) in Afghanistan.

“Importantly, the protection of our troops against IED threats is provided through comprehensive systems and procedures. There is no ‘silver bullet’ solution,” Brigadier Nikolic said.

5 November 2007 – The Editor, Sydney Morning Herald

The suggestion that the Australian Defence Force is trying ‘to cover up its own neglect (“Delayed-action casualties,” November 5) is offensive.  I take issue with a number of assertions made in this article.

Firstly, the comment that “this cries out for an independent inquiry” demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of the ADF’s inquiry process.  The decision to conduct a Commission of Inquiry is based on a number of factors, including the circumstances of the death and the wishes of the family.  Importantly, the Commission of Inquiry into Captain Andrew Paljakka’s death will be presided over by Mr. Frank Cullen - an independent civilian with extensive judicial experience, including as a Coroner and a Western Australian magistrate.  The inquiry will be thorough, impartial and fair.

Secondly, inquiring into incidents of this nature can be very traumatic for those involved.  In the event that a member is suspected of taking their own life, Defence will always consider the wishes of the family and assist them through an incredibly difficult time. In the case of Captain Paljakka, his nominated next of kin have requested that the inquiry be closed to the public. We are respecting this request in an effort to avoid unnecessary stress and grief.

Defence has conducted a number of Commissions of Inquiry that have been presided over by independent civilians and each has provided us with valuable lessons.  These hard won lessons enable us to further develop our processes and mechanisms and apply them to our mental health strategy in support of ADF personnel.

In Defence we take the mental health of our personnel very seriously. We have a comprehensive mental health strategy that has an integrated, multi-disciplinary focus for the delivery of services, including mental health promotion, prevention, early identification, treatment and rehabilitation. Unfortunately, there continue to be instances when Defence people take their own lives. When this happens we want to know the exact circumstances surrounding the death, not only to provide answers to the family and to Defence, but also to ensure we are doing everything we can to assist others in the ADF who may be experiencing similar problems.  Just because an inquiry is not public does not mean Defence is not taking it seriously nor learning from it.

Brigadier Andrew Nikolic
Director General, Public Affairs
Department of Defence

29 October 2007

THE ADF AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY

In response to the Four Corners story on 29 October 2007, the ADF corrects the record on a number of issues raised during the program.

SUPER HORNET
In keeping with the 2000 Defence White Paper, the ADF is committed to maintaining an edge in regional air combat capability.

The Super Hornet is the best aircraft to meet Australia’s bridging air combat requirements as we prepare for a JSF-based future, subject to government decision.

The Super Hornet is a battle-proven, multi-role aircraft that is clearly the only capable, available system which meets Defence’s requirements in the next 8-10 years.

The Super Hornet is the clear choice as a bridging air combat capability for three reasons:

• First because of its excellent capability to meet Australia’s requirements;
• Second because of its availability and supportability; and
• Third because Air Force has the capacity to make this transition more easily than with any other aircraft.

The Super Hornet is in service with the United States Navy through to 2030 and will continue to be upgraded, keeping it relevant through until 2020.

It will ensure our air combat capability edge is maintained through the transition to F-35 over the next decade.

The Block II Super Hornet will be on the ground in Australia in a little over two years.

The Super Hornet acquisition will allow us to retire the F-111 at a time of our choosing.

Regarding claims the Super Hornet is not sufficiently stealthy
The Super Hornet is a low-observable (LO) aircraft, orders of magnitude more 'stealthy' than F-111 or Su-30s.

The F-35 JSF is a Very Low Observable (VLO) aircraft and true 5th generation.

Regarding Super Hornet not being 5th generation
The ADF has never said that the Super Hornet is '5th generation' - a term referring to the combination of stealth and sensor integration.

The only two true 5th generation aircraft are F-22 Raptor and the F-35 JSF.

Super Hornet vs Su-30 series aircraft
If a Super Hornet was to meet a Su-30 in the coming 8 years, ADF pilots would want to be in the F-18F cockpit every time. Any pilot who has flown the new Block II F-18F with AESA radar would feel the same way.

The Super Hornet is a true multi-role aircraft that spans the air combat spectrum, including maritime strike, which is so vital for Australia.

The Block II airframe is redesigned for signature reduction and the aircraft is built around the most advanced radar in any non-fifth generation aircraft in the world.

Modern lethal weapons render any aircraft performance measure irrelevant if it does not enable first shot. First shot is achieved long range through:

• modern networking;
• survivability – (through signature reduction and integrated electronic counter-measures that deny opponents the ability to shoot);
• advanced radars to cue weapons early; and
• lethal missiles – (with long range and protection against countermeasures).

In its air superiority roles, the F/A-18F possesses all these attributes and will test any modern air defence system.

Air combat capability is about far more than the aircraft specifications. Reliable, sustainable logistics support, the best training and a full air combat system of command and control is required to match modern threats.

No other aircraft can meet this requirement in the bridging timeframe better than F-18F Super Hornet.

Was DSTO’s F-111 wing testing flawed?
There were no errors in the set-up of DSTO’s F-111C wing fatigue test. The wing fatigue test was developed to simulate the loads on the aircraft in-flight.

The F-111C wing fatigue test was initiated by Air Force and conducted by DSTO to manage and address fatigue cracking problems identified in the mid-1990s.

The Wing Fatigue test article failed unexpectedly during testing. All F-111C wings were subsequently replaced with later model wings which passed the wing fatigue test.

Defence evaluation of various capability options:
It is a normal part of prudent military planning to develop fallback options for Government consideration.

The bridging capability option leveraged off several years of on-going analysis through Air 6000.

Preliminary DSTO studies were carried out on both the technical risk and operational analysis of Block II Super Hornet as a bridging air combat capability prior to Government decision.

The F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet is clearly the most capable aircraft across all air combat roles that Air Force have the capacity to introduce in the bridging timeframe.

The option of the F/A-18F Super Hornet builds on our understanding of the current F/A-18 fleet. This option is least risk to ensure that Australia’s capability edge is maintained at a time of major equipment renewal and change for Air Force

F-111
The F-111 is a great strike aircraft, professionally operated and maintained by RAAF personnel.

The F-111 has been the stalwart of Australia's air strike power for last 30 years but will not continue to meet Australia's strategic needs.

Australia aims to retire the F-111 at a time of our choosing, noting the F-111 was planned to retire well before Super Hornet was considered as a bridging capability.

The F-111 would operate at increasing operational risk with emerging threats in the coming decade beyond 2010. It would also operate at increasing safety risk beyond 2010 with the ageing airframe issues highlighted by wing fatigue, well publicized fuel tank issues and wiring looms.

The F-111's effective range is increasingly reduced as it needs to avoid air and surface threats rather than having the ability to penetrate them as can a modern multi-role fighter such as the F-18F Block II Super Hornet.

The F-111 needs a fighter escort with any air threat, is not networked and doesn't fit into Australia's networked Defence architecture for the coming decade.

The decision to join the JSF Program
Australia joined the JSF Program in October 2002 to obtain access to F-35 Air System information, as well as capability and industry outcomes, recognising that gaining these benefits did not commit Australia to acquire the JSF aircraft.

The decision also recognised the clear benefits that a stealthy, multi-role, 5th generation JSF offered over the full range of contender aircraft based on Defence analysis undertaken on contenders to replace the air combat capability provided by the F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft.

For a minimal outlay of only around 0.3% of the JSF’s development budget, benefits from joining the Program included:

• The opportunity to participate in a developmental program largely funded by the US Government;
• Privileged access to JSF Program information;
• The opportunity for very detailed technical risk analysis by Defence of all JSF systems years before any contractual commitment;
• Constant engagement with the JSF Program Office on JSF cost analysis.
  Unprecedented ability for early development of our concept of operations and tactics;
• Enhanced opportunities for interoperability and commonality to support future coalition operations;
• Delivery of the required air combat capability ahead of non-Partner customers.
  The unprecedented opportunity for Australia to participate in, and influence, the design and capability of an advanced fighter aircraft;
• The opportunity to take part in the JSF test program (the most comprehensive flight test program ever);
• Australia is already involved in defining what will be included in the first upgrades to the aircraft after the current development phase is complete; and
• The opportunity for Australian industry to be part of the global supply chain of the world’s largest defence project.

17 October 2007

BULLETIN REPORTING ON SUSPENSION OF SEA KING FLYING OPERATIONS

Commander of the Australian Naval Aviation Group, Commodore Tim Barrett, said "Sea King helicopter crew are confident in the safety of the aircraft and are preparing to resume flying operations as soon as possible. We reject reporting in the Bulletin magazine today that aircrew at HMAS Albatross fear for their safety when flying the Sea King.

Any safety or maintenance-related concerns expressed by our people are treated seriously. All credible claims will be investigated and should be reported to commanding officers or supervisors," he said.

Defence has been completely open about Sea King safety and maintenance matters, from the exhaustive Board of Inquiry (BOI) into the Nias crash, to more recent public announcements on 28 September and 3 October on the reasons for the current suspension of flying operations.

Navy and Defence don't underestimate the considerable challenges that remain to address the issues that were raised in the BOI. Acting Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral Russ Crane said "we are determined to do everything necessary to bring Sea King systems and processes to the necessary standard. Substantial progress has been made since the Sea King BOI, but it is true that we still have some way to go. The Chief of the Defence Force and the Chief of Navy are fully engaged on this task and are determined to bring about the necessary changes," he said.

The current suspension of Sea King flying operations results from a fault in the tail rotor control assembly of a single aircraft shortly after take off at HMAS Albatross on 27 September 2007. The aircraft conducted a controlled landing as soon as the crew became aware of the fault and they landed the aircraft without further incident.

As Defence announced on 28 September, the aircraft was undertaking a routine maintenance test flight as part of a scheduled testing program. Importantly, the fault was identified during testing after maintenance and before the aircraft had been cleared for training or operational use.

As with all incidents of this nature, technical and safety investigations were implemented immediately. Process improvements were identified, have been fully accepted, and will be implemented.

The precautionary suspension of flying underscores Navy‘s ongoing commitment to the safety of our people. The suspension will be lifted only when it is appropriate for flying to resume.

11 October 2007

PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION BY THE ADF
BY BRIGADIER ANDREW NIKOLIC, DIRECTOR GENERAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Trooper David Pearce’s tragic death in Afghanistan from a Taliban roadside bomb rightly raises questions about the flow of information to the Australian public from Defence. 

It is often said that there is a tension between the interests of military forces to control information and the desire of the media to publish or broadcast.  Balancing these interests is difficult but neither the media nor the military are helped by absurd claims in some newspapers this week that Defence kept David Pearce’s death a “secret” for eight to ten hours before releasing detailed information.

The Australian Defence Force has an absolute commitment to be open about its activities, but this must be balanced against the safety of our people on dangerous operations and the rights of their families to be informed first about personal events.

Defence is also committed to ensuring that the efforts of our people are publicly recognised.  They are deployed all over the world undertaking difficult missions in dangerous and demanding environments.  They are wonderful ambassadors and in a direct and practical Australian way are helping to bring stability in some very troubled parts of the world. 

Defence works hard to bring these stories to Australia’s attention by being as open as we can about our military operations.  But we cannot forget that our forces are on dangerous missions and in the case of Afghanistan, they are fighting a determined and capable opponent in the Taliban. 

The Taliban is a ruthless exploiter of the media, using it as a source of intelligence about Australian and NATO activities and as a platform for its own propaganda.  For example, Radio Netherlands on 10 October reported that the Taliban closely monitor Dutch news reports relating to Oruzgan Province, where our forces and the Dutch work closely together.  An hour after Netherlands radio broadcast an interview with the commander of Dutch forces in Oruzgan Province, Taliban militants were reportedly discussing the interview on their walkie-talkies.

When Defence releases information about an incident like the roadside bomb attack that killed David Pearce, we must do so in a way that doesn’t help those who seek to harm our people.  Although tactical details may add ‘colour’ and news interest, they might also help the Taliban make their own attacks more lethal.

Before any Defence information is released to the public, it is rigorously reviewed to ensure that it is correct; protects the privacy and security of Defence personnel; does not compromise our mission; and will not help our enemy.

In the past three months Defence has released 29 statements relating to ADF operations. Of these, 15 related to incidents where Australians were wounded or attacked. In addition, hundreds of photographs and combat footage from several engagements were also released.  This hardly amounts to an information blackout or an attempt to conceal the dangers that Defence personnel are exposed to, as some have suggested. 

In modern media reporting, speed is all.  It is often the case that news of an event such as the recent roadside bomb will be publicly reported at the same time as our forces are still dealing with the attack.

In a tragic situation such as David Pearce’s death, our first priority is to make sure the family is fully informed and supported before personal information is publicly released.

Defence has a very deliberate process in place to inform families that their loved one has been killed.  Every detail has to be confirmed so that families can be provided with as much reliable information as possible. Support mechanisms are also quickly activated to ensure we do our best to help them through an incredibly difficult and painful time.

Once the family has been informed and supported, we seek their agreement to release information to the public.  If the family does not wish personal details to be released, we will inform the Australian public of the situation more broadly. 

Were we to rush this process before informing the next of kin, potentially thousands of Australian families could be subjected to unnecessary worry and stress, wondering if it was their loved one that was killed or wounded.

For Defence, the safety of our people and the wellbeing of their families come first.  We balance that against the priority of being open about what we do.  Getting this balance right is challenging but we try to meet that demand every day.  The level of public support for our forces suggests that more often than not we get this balance right.

04 October 2007 - The Editor, The Cairns Post

RESPONSE TO LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF 4 OCT 07 “COVER BLOWN”

Justin Blakeney’s concerns about work at the HMAS Cairns fuel facility (4-10-07) included a reference to “asbestos dust”.  This is incorrect - there is no asbestos present at the site.

Before work began, environmental consultants conducted a survey and found no evidence of asbestos and no evidence of lead in the paint being removed. 

Every measure is taken to ensure the work adheres to strict health and safety standards.  The tanks are encapsulated, with the interior kept at negative pressure to ensure dust and paint over-spray do not escape the site during blasting and painting.  All blasting work had been completed before high winds tore the encapsulation material.

Gerald Griffin
Regional Manager
Defence Support – North Queensland

25 September 2007 - The Editor, Sunday Telegraph

Dear Sir,

The articles “A culture of abuse” and “$1.1m cosmetic surgery bill” (Page 7, Sunday Telegraph, 23 September 2007) are misleading, sensationalist and do nothing for the journalistic credibility of the Sunday Telegraph.

The Sunday Telegraph has misled its readers with the headline “$1.1 million cosmetic surgery bill” which contradicts the information supplied to your reporter.

The vast majority of this money is spent on surgeries to remove skin cancers and moles, as well as the treatment of burns and scars. These procedures are not cosmetic surgeries and it is wrong to present them as such.

Looking after the physical and mental health of Defence Force personnel is no trivial matter. The Sunday Telegraph’s coverage demeans the seriousness of some of the medical and psychological issues involved.

The Australian Defence Force also takes allegations of assault or unacceptable behaviour seriously.

In the interests of balance, the Sunday Telegraph should have reported that the number of sexual assault complaints within the ADF is less than half the Australian average. This clearly demonstrates that there is not a ‘culture of abuse’ within Defence.

The Sunday Telegraph should report on Defence medical and personnel issues more compassionately and accurately.

Brigadier Andrew Nikolic
Director General, Public Affairs
Department of Defence

The Story: Defence would like to correct the record, in response to errors made in the 'Labor takes aim at DMO' article which appeared in the Australian Financial Review on Friday 21 September.

The Facts: In his article, the journalist misinterprets comments made by Mr Kinnaird, Chairman of the 2003 Defence Procurement Review, who said a benefit of DMO reform would include the "establishment of clear separation between capability development and delivery and maintenance of equipment". In his article the journalist paraphrases Mr Kinnaird incorrectly, stating instead, that a benefit of DMO reform would be to separate capability development and maintenance arms of the DMO.

This is incorrect - Kinnaird was talking about the separation of capability development, now led by Lt Gen Hurley and Defence procurement, now led by DMO CEO Dr Stephen Gumley - this separation occurred in 2004. Kinnaird did not intend that the acquisition and maintenance functions within DMO should be separated. Click here to read the full version of the 2003 Defence Procurement Review http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dpr180903.pdf

The article also uses out of date information - DMO's annual budget is $9.6 billion (roughly half of which is acquisition and half is sustainment) and DMO's current staff level is approximately 7,000 - not 6,000 as reported.

Mr McKinnon's letter is the second occasion that Channel 7 has commented publicly on this issue without using corrective and balanced information provided by Defence. The families of our personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan don’t deserve to be alarmed by this type of unbalanced and misleading coverage.

His suggestion that diggers carry “faulty weapons in combat” is more of the same sensationalised misleading information that informed Mark Riley's initial story on this issue on 27 August. Channel 7's reporting of this issue misrepresents the comprehensive approach to weapon safety and quality within Defence. It fails to acknowledge that there are a very small number of faults reported in comparison to a substantial inventory of weapons and equipment.

Twice prior to the initial story, Channel 7 was provided with answers to questions about the quality of Steyr rifles. This information indicated that a small number of fault reports were addressed by a team within the Defence Materiel Organisation. All F88 Steyr rifles in the Middle East Area of Operations were assessed and less than 2.5% required replacement of the “faulty springs” that Mr McKinnon refers to in his letter. This is not considered excessive to maintenance requirements in a harsh, dry, dusty environment.

There is no systemic failure in relation to weapons in the Middle East and the results achieved by our people in harsh operational environments like Iraq and Afghanistan bears testimony to their training, leadership, commitment and equipment.

I again call on Channel 7 to review its coverage of this story and to present a more accurate reporting of the facts.

Yours sincerely,

P. LEAHY
Lieutenant General
Chief of Army

24 August 2007 - Defence rejects allegations reported by Rory Callinan in the online version of Time Australia magazine, relating to an incident in the village of Same (Timor Leste) on 4 March 2007.

The allegations are made by Alfredo Reinado, who is a fugitive from the Timorese criminal justice system and who has threatened the safety of Australian troops.

Defence spokesman, Brigadier Andrew Nikolic said Renaido’s allegations do not accurately reflect the events of 4 March 2007.

Brigadier Nikolic said the ADF has conducted a post operation investigation and it is clear that Australian personnel acted to defend themselves when shot at by armed members of Reinado’s group.

“In the early hours of 4 March 2007 during a confrontation with armed supporters of Alfredo Renaido, Australian soldiers acted in self defence and returned fire resulting in the deaths of five of Reinado’s men.”

Brigadier Nikolic said the Australian soldiers were operating under the lawful direction of the Timor-Leste Government in attempting to apprehend Reinado and his armed associates.

“In a second incident on 4 March 2007, Defence can confirm that a Timorese man, detained on suspicion of association with the Reinado group, escaped. Neither this man, nor any detainee, Timorese national, unidentified civilian or ADF person was injured or killed as a result of this incident.”

The Timor-Leste authorities, including the Public Prosecutions Service, have also reviewed the circumstances of these incidents and decided not to conduct further investigations.

Read media release: Defence rejects unfounded Timor allegations

24 August 2007 - The Editor, The Northern Star

Dear Sir,

I write to express concern at the alarmist portrayal of military compensation provisions for ADF Gap Year participants (Gap year soldiers urged to read the fine print, 24 August).

ADF Gap Year participants receive the same range of military conditions of service as full-time ADF members. This extends to free medical and dental care while undertaking the Gap Year program and comprehensive cover under the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Scheme (MRCS).

The Scheme is world-class and provides a range of treatment, rehabilitation and compensation options should an ADF member suffer a physical or mental injury or contract an illness as a result of their military service. It also provides substantial benefits for death as a result of military service.

There is no fine print. Military compensation is enshrined in legislation and an independent Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission regulates and administers the scheme. Information about the MRCS, including a plain English guide, may be found at www.mrcs.gov.au

Your correspondent Mr A.W. White is not a Defence-endorsed compensation advocate. Readers with any concerns about military compensation for Gap Year participants or who require further information are invited to call the MRCS infoline on 1300 550 461.

The ADF Gap Year program has proven to be very popular with young Australians and positions for the upcoming intakes are filling fast. Information about the ADF Gap Year is available at www.defencejobs.gov.au or by sending ‘GAP’ by text to 131901.

Yours faithfully,

Andrew Nikolic
Brigadier
Department of Defence

23 August 2007 - The Australian article re JSF

Your article of 23 August 2007 headed 'Cosgrove steps back into defence breach' incorrectly states the estimated cost of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as '...about $130 million a plane'. This figure is not the cost of the aircraft, but rather the cost of the total air combat system, which also includes training and support equipment, spares, facilities and weapons. The cost for the aircraft themselves will be closer to two-thirds of this cost. It is a combination of the sheer scale of the JSF project – with more than 3000 aircraft expected to be built – and affordability initiatives that have been built in from the design stage, that make the Joint Strike Fighter such a cost-effective combat aircraft.

John Harvey
Air Vice-Marshal
Project Manager, New Air Combat Capability
Department of Defence, Canberra

Correction to incorrect 14 Aug 07 AAP report.

A 14 August AAP report headed "Government intervenes in secret documents case" incorrectly stated that the barrister Mr Bruce Levet is acting for the Chief Judge Advocate of the Australian Defence Force, Brigadier Ian Westwood, in a case before the Federal Court. The case is related to a charge under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 against an Australian Defence Force officer.

The Chief Judge Advocate has entered a submitting appearance before the court and therefore is not represented by counsel in the proceedings. Mr Levet does not act for Brigadier Westwood. Mr Levet, in fact, acts for the Australian Defence Force officer who has been charged under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982.

Brigadier Westwood is the judge advocate in the court martial proceedings under the Defence Force Discipline Act. Consistent with the judicial nature of that role, he has taken no part in the proceedings in the Federal Court challenging his ruling in the Court Martial other than to formally submit to the Court's jurisdiction.

26 July 2007 — The Editor, Herald Sun

Dear Sir,
Your article (‘Failure to communicate’, Thursday 26 July, p15) unfairly criticises Australia's Abrams main battle tank.

Australian Abrams tanks can operate safely with and communicate effectively with US and other coalition forces.

The vehicle is fitted with two voice radios that are capable of communicating with any coalition radio operating in the same mode and on the same wavelength.

Whilst the Battle Management System provides increased situational awareness for commanders, standing rules of engagement require all coalition forces to positively identify a target before engaging. Therefore vehicles not fitted with Blue Force Tracker will not be at “grave risk of being destroyed by other fighting vehicles or coalition aircraft” as suggested by your article.

The Battle Management System requires either satellite, combined with a data fusion centre, or radio based (terrestrial) carrier signals to enable a network to be established.

Defence is negotiating the provision of satellite services which is expected to be established by the end of 2007. In the meantime an interim solution is being investigated.

It is disappointing that reporting on such important matters glosses over the actual facts and details.

Brigadier Mike Phelps
Department of Defence

24 July 2007 - The Editor, Daily Telegraph

I write in response to Ian McPhedran’s article on the ADF Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drugs Services (ATODS) program (‘Drug defence slips’, Monday 23 July 2007).

Mr McPhedran’s article contains a number of inaccuracies. The review of ATODS he refers to is not a secret document; it was in fact part of an internal review of health care delivery in the ADF. It is also wrong to say that there are no alcohol and other drugs professionals in Defence Health. The Defence Director of Mental Health is a senior specialist psychiatrist with experience in drug and alcohol programs. He is assisted by a Nurse Practitioner with a Masters degree in the same field, and trained counsellors and staff with the Alcohol Rehabilitation and Education Program (AREP). Specialists at the Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health provide expert advice. In addition to this a consultant psychiatrist, who has a PhD in the field, has conducted sessions at AREP. Input is also obtained when required from experts at the Alcohol and Other Drugs Council of Australia.

There is no higher priority for Defence than the safety and wellbeing of our people. ADF health care is continually being reviewed and updated to meet national and international standards. Our ATODS program is highly regarded, is among the best in the country, and commended by many of those who participate in it. The program leads to better communication and working relationships between our people, and its success within the ADF demonstrates a clear willingness to address alcohol and drug abuse issues responsibly.

Defence is not alone in facing the challenge of overcoming alcohol and drug abuse. I am proud of the way that Defence addresses this issue openly and I am confident that we will continue to provide best practice health care to our personnel.

Yours sincerely

A.G.HOUSTON, AO, AFC
Air Chief Marshal
Chief of the Defence Force