Causes and effects

By WGCDR Callum Brown

Air Power Development Centre

EFFECTS-based operations (EBO) is a term heard frequently in Defence these days, but what does it mean?

At the most basic level, it means doing something (an operation) that changes another party’s system, capability or thinking.

It is through our actions aimed at ultimately making a change in the mind of others – or a cognitive effect, as it is termed – that their actions can be shaped in a way that allows us to achieve our national objectives.

The actions that create effects can range from the extremely subtle to the outright destruction of property or ruling regime.

The ADF’s effects-based operations discussion paper defines effects-based operations as “the application of military and non-military capabilities to realise specific and desired strategic and operational outcomes in peace, tension, conflict and post-conflict situations”.

Effects can be created at all levels of war, from tactical to strategic, and an operation at the tactical level can have a strategic effect.

At the tactical level, one example of an effects-based operation would be a member of a special forces team requesting a fighter jet conduct a low-level pass over a Republican Guard position, leading to the position’s surrender.

Certainly in the instance of 9-11, Al-Queda terrorists understood the power of effects-based operations when they struck the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

They understood that particular actions taken at the tactical level can have significant strategic effects.

For the Air Force’s effects-based operations, an operation need not involve a single combat mission.

The mere pre-positioning of aircraft at a particular base may send a strong signal to an adversary that Australia’s Air Force is prepared to fight if required and the use of force would be ill advised.

The “operation” of pre-positioning aircraft creates an effect on a potential adversary to not consider the use of force.

A critical aspect of EBO is having the wherewithal to assess the effect that an action has created.

It is no use striking a target of strategic significance if, first, you cannot assess its level of destruction, and second, what effect this has had on the leadership and population of the adversary.

With the overall increase in the tempo of modern, networked operations, this assessment task has become even more challenging. Another element of EBO is that effects may be transitory.

For example, the effect of a shock and awe tactic needs to be exploited before the effect wears off. More subtle operations may take months or years to have the desired effect, for example the establishment of bare bases in the north of Australia.

Is EBO new? Many would argue that effects-based operations have been used since ancient times to undertake operations that change behaviour in others.

There are plenty of examples in history that demonstrate a sound understanding of the concept of effects-based operations. What is perhaps new is the reconsideration of the value that EBO can bring even to a technologicallysophisticated force.

It also challenges us to think more about the length of operations and the achievement of national goals. With more technology available to us, we seek quick and painless wars, however military action is only one element of national power.

Many would argue that governments constantly pursue effects-based operations at the strategic level. A national effects-based approach uses all elements of national power in the pursuit of national goals.

In the future, the Air Force may find itself working more often alongside other government and non-government agencies for the achievement of national goals.

In this regard, and bearing in mind the length of time that some effects-based operations may be conducted over, the Air Force may provide but one part of a number of actions taken by Government to pursue national objectives.

Where does this leave us in the Air Force? In our application of air power, particularly during the planning of operations at all levels, we must remain cognisant of the effect we are trying to achieve through our air operations and its ultimate impact in the mind of our adversary.

Most of this is already defined for us in our military objectives that are provided by government and form the start point for our planning.

We must also attempt to find ways to assess whether or not our air operations have been successful through short-term bomb damage assessment and through assessment of longer-term changes in the mindset of our adversary.

Wing Commander Callum Brown is the Deputy Director Future Concepts at the Air Power Development Centre.

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