Unconventional challenge

Air Power Development Centre

By SQNLDR John Davidson

After the war, an American colonel told his North Vietnamese counterpart, “You know, you never beat us on the battlefield.”

“That’s true,” his one-time opponent said, “but it’s also irrelevant.”

TO JUSTIFY the pre-eminence of air power, members of “the air school of strategic thought” will highlight the invincibility that conventional forces enjoy through dominance of the air. While this is true, it is also increasingly irrelevant.

The nature of warfare has changed. It is no longer simply a struggle of state against state in which air power can be unleashed to level infrastructure, decimate military and bring the enemy to its knees.

The enemy recognises the dominance of air power in the conventional spectrum, so it abandons the conventional field and seeks asymmetric strategies. As a result, air power has become a finely-honed conventional weapon that is often thrust into a void.

Against an unconventional enemy, strategic strike is unlikely to change the will of the population. Indeed, martyring its leaders and destroying infrastructure may only strengthen the enemy’s cause.

The enemy can also use collateral damage incidents to influence key audiences within the conflict and around the world.

A change of direction is in the air: conventional aircraft roles are being challenged because the nature of warfare is no longer state against state.

Photo by SGT Brent Tero

Air power is therefore a two-edged sword capable of cutting its wielder as viciously as its adversary.

Asymmetric strategy, however, is a two-way street and air power represents the asymmetric advantage of advanced Western forces.

Changes to the security environment do not mean air power should be curtailed, merely that it should be employed differently. This requires an alteration in mindset as well as an appreciation of technology.

The probable lack of an enemy state and the concomitant absence of “strategic” targets means the future employment of air power may not merge strategic and tactical actions.

Legal constraints and the fear of collateral damage make the application of air power in urban terrain extremely problematic.

The presence of people domiciled in three dimensions, the presence of essential infrastructure and the intermingling of combatants and non-combatants make it difficult to satisfy the cardinal principles of targeting, humanity and proportionality.

The enemy will attempt to use international law to nullify air power by shielding military targets with civilians and protected objects.

Air power must be able to circumvent these unlawful acts if it is to be a potent tool for the prosecution of urban conflict.

It can never be forgotten that the ceasing of hostilities will only come when the enemy wills it – either because they fear continuing the fight or see the advantage of peace. Actions that inflame hatred or demonstrate ill will are likely to prolong the conflict or place the nation’s strategic objectives out of reach.

Either way, the campaign is aimed at changing the will of the enemy. Air power must be able to not just destroy, but to positively influence target audiences.

This is emerging as one of the major challenges for future air power practitioners.

SQNLDR John Davidson is completing a Chief of Air Force Fellowship at the Air Power Development Centre.

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