Networked force in practise
How might a networked force operate?
This scenario of a deployment in 2015 gives an idea.

CPL David Thomas and CPL Craig Whiteman prepare Hornets for the final combat mission in Iraq. The Hornets were critical to the Air Force’s success in the MEAO, but we can still learn from how we used them.

IN RESPONSE to an emergency, the Government directs the ADF to respond in support of a host nation, who has asked for assistance.

Navy, Army and Air Force elements are individually deployed but, through NCW systems, link as a seamless force.

The force is designed, built, and skilled for integrated, networked operations that make today’s joint ops seem clumsy. All of the actors – air, land and sea – are using the same operational picture, with their view of the conflict-space customised to need.

Strategic, operational and tactical level data is fed into the information grid via a multi-level security system that ensures our decision makers, operators and support people get what they need.

Despite the seeming complexity of the net, command and control is simplified. All understand the intent of the operation as it unfolds, ensuring a focus on the objective, enhancing sustainment, and reducing the possibility of fratricide.

The Air Force deployment is carefully packaged. Our ISR assets have been building a physical and electronic picture of the battlespace.

A JSF package, Airborne Early Warning and Control and tankers go in next.

The initial action is removing the adversary’s command and control and ground-based air defence systems using on-board electronic warfare systems to jam and deceive, and air-launched, long-range stand-off weapons targeted through AEW&C and unmanned platforms to disable and destroy.

JSF continues on to control the air over the area of operations – able to switch from offensive to defensive ops.

Once an air perimeter is secured, an expeditionary combat support squadron moves to establish an operating base and forward force elements deploy.

The force has a small footprint in theatre.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, based to the rear, monitor the area of ops and report enemy moves while feeding the fused conflict-space picture.

The UAVs are backed up by multimission aircraft. With a pair of UAVs, we are able to loiter over the area of interest with a selected suite of sensors to give us continuous coverage.

JSF now maintains air superiority and switches modes quickly to attack ground targets when necessary, using stealth, EW and precision weapons.

Auto target cuing and prioritisation between platforms – air, ground and sea – is available for the area of ops, including for targets of opportunity.

The Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network, AEW&C, the multi-mission aircraft, UAVs, Special Forces, surface and sub-surface maritime platforms, and allied and commercial space assets link to provide seamless, continuous coverage of the operational environment and provide essential communications links to support command and control and force sustainment.

As well, vital support is provided by industry and embedded contractors.

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Lessons from Iraq
The experience in Iraq highlighted some important trends.

THE first trend to consider is the flexibility our air power brought to the battle, noting air superiority was established from the outset.

Our F/A-18s were dual use systems – they could be quickly switched from air-to-air roles to air-to-ground roles, sometimes in the same mission, to meet any immediate threat or provide a rapid response to meet the Joint Commander’s requirements.

Tankers were critical. Without them, none of the coalition could have operated over Iraq. Back home in Australia, we need tankers to overcome the tyranny of distance for transit and strike, and to increase on-station times for supported platforms.

We will need to continue to invest in flexible, high-end systems to allow Government a range of options. Examples are the procurement of systems such as Airborne Early Warning and Control and the Vigilaire command and control infrastructure which will allow us to network:

• our fighter and strike systems;
• our tankers;
• our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles;
• our surface assets such the Air Warfare Destroyers the Navy is acquiring;
• our Army ground and air elements, and so on.

Second, in the Gulf our fighters carried only precision weapons – no “dumb” bombs. In the latest Gulf War up to 70 per cent of the total munitions dropped were precision guided as opposed to only 8 per cent in the first Gulf War.

We have come a long way in 10 years. In addition, many of these modern weapons were not hampered by smoke, dust storms or cloud cover.

Nearly all tanks and artillery sitting in the open were destroyed from the air. In this vein, we look to further developing our precision and stand-off weapons for all our combat aircraft.

Ultimately, NCW will allow the near real-time target-selection and acquisition needed to deal with mobile threats.

I might add that dumb bombs are also operationally-and costeffective in particular scenarios, and should not be written out of the analysis yet, if ever.

Third, was the value of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that allowed the coalition to “see” the battlefield real-time, in all weather, night and day.

That meant that the Iraqi regime and their fielded forces were pinned down. Every time they made a move they were hit, even, for example, during a dust storm they were attempting to hide in.

All of this shows that we are on the right track in Australia with the further development of systems such as JORN and the AP-3Cs and investment in many new capabilities like Wedgetail, unmanned aerial vehicles and Vigilaire.

Again, we will network all these systems to gain even greater benefits.

Fourth, and finally, is the value of electronic warfare selfprotection equipment.

We have fitted such devices to our deployed C-130H and C-130J aircraft, which mitigates the risk of them operating in a high-threat environment rife with surface to air missiles and small arms fire.

Electronic warfare self-protection extended their operational envelope, and we are just not effective without it.

 

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