Air Power Development Centre

Rocket program blasted
Nazi Germany’s emphasis on the production of V-1 and V-2 weapons is a lesson in how not to develop capability, writes SQNLDR Alex Post.

THE Germans began development work on the V-1 and V-2 weapon systems in 1936.

Eventually, about 33,000 V-1 flyingbombs and about 6000 V-2 missiles were produced. By 1942 priority effort was being given to these programs even though it was clearly understood that decisive victories could not be achieved with these weapons, mainly due to their inaccuracy.

However, Hitler’s desire for vengeance ensured the programs proceeded. Owing to the time taken to complete the necessary developmental work, the V-1 campaign against Britain did not start in earnest until June 1944 while the V-2 campaign began in September that year.

In the course of the campaigns only 4000 V-1s and 3000 V-2s landed in Britain. To produce even these limited results, a considerable effort was required of Germany.

The combined cost of these two programs is estimated to be equal to one quarter of the cost of the Manhattan Project that produced the first atomic bombs.

Although both weapons were feared, the combined destruction they caused amounted to no more than two nights’ work by the Lancasters of Bomber Command.

A production line of V-1 weapons

A V-2 rocket being readied for launch

All of Germany’s top scientists were committed to these projects along with a further 10,000 workers who were involved in the production.

In 1944 alone, the resources consumed by the V weapons programs could, alternatively, have been used to produce an additional 24,000 fighter aircraft.

The effects generated by the vengeance weapons were comparatively minor and completely disproportionate to the large costs incurred in developing these experimental capabilities.

A great number of the weapons produced – 8000 V-1s (or 24 per cent of total production) and 3000 V-2s (or 50 per cent of total production) – were used in experiments to further design and development.

Each of the weapons carried a 2000-pound warhead, or roughly one-fifth of the bombload of a single Lancaster bomber. At this stage in the war, the Allied Bomber Command was regularly mounting raids involving 800 aircraft simultaneously.

The entire V-1 contribution therefore, equated to a single night’s effort by Bomber Command, while the V-2 contribution could be equated to another night’s raid.

For the quantity of national wealth and resources expended on these capabilities, this return was insignificant.

The case study of the V weapons’ development reveals a situation where the concepts behind their employment and predicted effect were so promising that the detail of the prohibitive costs, and their limited effectiveness, were both overlooked.

Not only were the financial costs and human resources necessary overlooked, but it is also apparent that no consideration was given to the counter- measures that might be constructed to defend against the V-1, which would in turn further degrade its effectiveness.

Over the course of the V-1 campaign these defences were able to destroy about 50 per cent of all V-1s launched against Britain.

Had Germany employed an appropriate capability development process in evaluating these projects it would have highlighted the problems of cost, production, ineffectiveness, effect on other weapons programs, and the lopsided overall force mix that would develop should production priority be given to these weapons.

But with Hitler at the helm it was impossible to implement such a process. Even if a proper capability development process was instituted, it could never have restrained Hitler’s insistent demands for weapons of retaliation.

The history of the development and employment of the V weapons is a classic example of how capability management should never be done.

SQNLDR Alex Post is undertaking a 2004 Chief of Air Force Fellowship at the Air Power Development Centre.

Focus on Power

REGISTRATIONS for the 2004 Air Power Conference close on September 10. The conference will be held in Canberra from September 16-17. Inquiries: (02) 6266 1355 or airpower@defence.gov.au.

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