STORIES
of Air Force personnel and their personal papers held in the private
records collection of the Australian War Memorial have featured
in two recent public talks by the Memorial’s Research Centre staff.
Flying Officer Ralph James served in World War II and Flight
Lieutenant Margaret Larkin was involved in the First Gulf War.
FLGOFF James’ letters to his wife, Beryl, were highlighted in
a moving talk and letters by FLTLT Larkin during the Gulf War
were included in a presentation, Women and
War: Stories from the Collection.
FLGOFF Ralph James was posted to Darwin in August 1942 with No.
2 Squadron flying Hudson bombers. In 460 eventful operational
hours, he was involved in daring strikes on Japanese bases and
shipping in the Arafura Sea area and was Mentioned in Dispatches
following an attack on his Hudson by four Zeroes, two of which
he shot down.
In December 1942 he helped rescue survivors from HMAS Armidale
and on three occasions he made it back to base on only one engine.
He was killed on April 28, 1943, when his aircraft crashed into
the Arafura Sea after engine failure.
FLTLT Margaret Larkin experienced the terror of nightly Scud missile
attacks and the possibility of biological or chemical attacks
during her service as an intelligence officer in the First Gulf
War.
She deployed to Saudi Arabia in January 1991 with the US-led Joint
Imagery Production Complex at Riyadh International Air Base.
She was the only Australian woman in the team of five intelligence
personnel. While away, she wrote detailed and insightful letters
to her parents, particularly on her experiences in relation to
being a woman in the military and the strictures of serving in
a strongly Muslim country.
These are two examples of the Australian War Memorial’s ongoing
collecting that began just after World War I. The private records
collections consist mainly of donations of diaries and letters
written by service people and their families. It includes material
from 1832 through to the current conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan
and East Timor.
Most collections consist of only a few items, such as a diary,
some letters or emails to family, as well as miscellaneous items
such as service papers, certificates, photographs, postcards,
and scrapbooks.
Private records provide unique insights into an individual’s experiences
and emotions during war. They are an enduring part of Australia’s
military heritage and it is through these sorts of records future
generations will learn about the service of today’s men and women.
The Memorial is still actively acquiring diaries, letters, postcards,
emails and ephemera. As there are few collections relating to
the more recent conflicts and peacekeeping missions, the Memorial
strongly encourages current service members to contribute to this
legacy.
Anyone interested in making a donation should contact the Research
Centre on (02) 6243 4315. Further information about the private
records collections is available at www.awm.gov.au.
Crucial
beach battles
Air
power had a pivotal role in the Dunkirk evacuation and the D-Day
invasion,
David Wilson writes
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Spitfires
from No. 453 Squadron, painted in black and white stripes,
invasion markings, beside the airstrip from which they operated
over the Normandy battlefield.
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Photo
Australian War Memorial (100821)
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US
bombers fly over the invasion fleet on D-Day.
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IN
AUSTRALIA, the study of the influence of air power on amphibious
operations during World War II is usually confined to operations
in the Pacific. However, there are two operations in the north-western
European theatre that were influenced by the practical application
of air power. Both occurred during June, the first in 1940 and
the second in 1944.
Operation Dynamo, the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary
Force from France, was activated on May 26, 1940. From May 27
to June 4 the Royal Navy and civilian auxiliary extracted 338,
226 Allied soldiers from the Dunkirk beachhead.
Shipping losses were heavy and RAF Fighter Command was pilloried
for not preventing the Luftwaffe from interfering with the embarkation.
This was a natural reaction of troops who did not see the physical
presence of friendly aircraft, but does not reflect the role
of RAF Fighter Command over Dunkirk.
The effectiveness of the RAF can be seen in that, during Operation
Dynamo, the Luftwaffe was only able to seriously threaten the
evacuation on two and a half days – May 27, the afternoon of May
29 and June 1. Luftwaffe II Air Corps’ war diary described May
27 as a “bad day”, and reported the loss of 23 aircraft to RAF
fighters protecting the beachhead.
The Dunkirk evacuation route, the shortest distance across the
English Channel from Britain to Europe, had a psychological effect
on the German military mindset. The German assessment that the
invasion of Europe would be aimed at a lodgement in the Pas De
Calais may have had its roots in the successful embarkation of
the BEF in 1940.
Obviously, the RAF effort in denying the Luftwaffe complete freedom
of action over the Dunkirk beaches confirmed that air superiority
over any lodgement area was to be of vital importance to any Allied
invasion of Europe.
It is significant that the Luftwaffe could not even contest this
battle in 1944. The Allied air forces had the numerical strength
to fly a protective screen over the landing beaches on DDay as
well as the capability of isolating the Normandy beaches by interdicting
the enemy lines of communications.
During June 6 Allied fighters flew more than 5000 sorties; the
Luftwaffe was able to fly only 319 ineffectual sorties.
Australian pilots served in both Operation Dynamo and Operation
Overlord. At least three Australian fighter pilots serving in
RAF squadrons were lost during the withdrawal from Dunkirk: Flying
Officer I.B.
Russell on June 1 and Pilot Officers J.W. Stevenson and J.L.
Wilkie on June 2. All the Australian squadrons serving in Europe
at the time were involved with both amphibious operations.
On June 6, 1944, No. 453 Squadron Spitfires flew daylight patrols
over the Normandy beachheads after the Australian heavy bombers
from Nos 460, 463, and 467 Squadrons attacked enemy gun positions
that threatened the landing sites.
Transport and communications facilities were targets for Mosquitos
from No. 464 Squadron, and No. 456 Squadron Mosquito night fighters protected the invasion fleet from nocturnal Luftwaffe
operations.
In addition to anti-submarine patrols over the English Channel,
No. 10 Squadron escorted refugee ships and convoys from France
in 1940. Three years later it, with its sister squadron, No. 461,
was part of the anti-submarine screen protecting the approaches
to the Normandy beachhead.
There are some remarkable similarities between the two operations.
Firstly, Hitler ordered the German Panzer units halted as they
were a major threat to the BEF. Similarly, he would not release
the Panzer reserve to make a timely counterattack during the vital
first days of the Normandy invasion. Second was the weather,
which the Allies used to advantage. Third is the opposing commander’s
conception of air power.
Under Air Chief Marshal Tedder, a commander with a superior intellectual
command of his subject, the Allies had a balanced air force that
was capable of undertaking any operational role. Goering, in 1940,
was at the height of his influence, but this was political rather
than practical. The Luftwaffe operations over Dunkirk clearly
identify its operational and doctrinal weaknesses.
It was a superb tactical weapon, but its commanders did not, to
paraphrase Liddell Hart, see the “other side if the hill” – the
broad sweep of operations that ensured air superiority that Tedder
recognised.
In 1940 the Luftwaffe did not have the capability of destroying
the BEF and supporting the German Army drive through France.
There was no concept of attempting to drive the RAF from the skies
over Dunkirk by attacking RAF fighter bases and, despite the
shipping losses inflicted by it, the Luftwaffe units in France
were not trained or equipped to undertake maritime strike operations.
So the links are there between the two beaches in northern France.
The Luftwaffe failed to impose total air superiority over the
Dunkirk beaches in 1940. This was a lesson well learned by the
Allies.
Total air supremacy over the Normandy beaches and the surrounding
area was the single prerequisite that ensured the success of the
Allied landing in June 1944.
This was a result of the Allied air commanders’ operational experience,
their ability to understand and apply the many nuances and scope
of air power doctrine and the historic lessons of its application.
The Luftwaffe failed to grasp these realities.
David
Wilson is the Executive Officer, RAAF Historical, Air Power Development
Centre.
