Air power’s striking aims

By Sanu Kainikara

AIR power was first employed in the reconnaissance role, but its inherent speed and reach brought on the realisation that it was capable of striking deep into the enemy’s homeland irrespective of the outcome of the land battle where troops were in contact.

The strategic aim of strike is to effectively deprive the enemy of the capability to employ military forces in the pursuit of their aim. Disrupting the identified centres of gravity can degrade the enemy’s capacity and will to fight. The ability to successfully prosecute the strike campaign will depend heavily on the campaign to win control of the air and invariably both these will be closely integrated.

Primarily because of the geographical context of our nation, the Air Force recognises land strike and maritime strike as the two major functions that fall under the broader strike role.

Land Strike: The AAP 1000 defines land strike as “the application of air power against land targets not directly involved with enemy forces in contact”. These operations are designed to strike at the enemy centres of gravity and would generally show results in the long term and are sometimes referred to as “strategic strike”.

The classification of an offensive strike operation as strategic is determined not as a function of range, platform or weaponry but by the target selection and the objectives. The distinction between strategic and tactical levels of war is no longer clearly demarcated and only the intended objective indicates the nature of strike being carried out.

Maritime Strike: The Air Force specifically complements the overall ADF capability to detect, locate, track and ultimately destroy any surface or sub-surface threats in the maritime environment.

The characteristics of range, speed, flexibility and responsiveness enhances air power’s capacity to be effective in the maritime strike role and enables it to engage hostile maritime targets far from the nation’s borders.

Maritime strike is also carried out to neutralise an adversary’s naval capability to interfere with sea-lanes that are required to sustain one’s own operations and the nation.

A number of doctrinal principles emerge from a study of the history of strike operations. First is that air strike can be used to supplement or replace surface-force actions and is particularly effective in responding to surface-force operational emergencies and dominating the sea-space.

Second is the absolute necessity to have joint plans and the need to have constant coordination between the services as the operation progresses.

Third, air attacks are particularly effective when the enemy is forced to operate within geographical and terrain constraints that limit manoeuvres and its psychological impact is often out of proportion to the physical damage and destruction caused.

A few prerequisites can also be observed by reviewing successful strike operations. Some degree of control of the air is necessary for the success of any strike operations or surface offensive.

Organic air defence weapons of ground forces must be integrated into the overall air defence network to minimise the risk of fratricide.

Except under crisis situations, strike operations should be aimed at long-term degradation of the enemy warfighting capability rather than in support of tactical objectives.

Lack of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability adversely affects conduct of strike operations.

Air power in support of national security imperatives is best used when its characteristics of concentration and shock are optimally exploited.

When employing air power it has to be remembered that there is not one particular application or role that represents air power’s primary strength.

It is the application of the appropriate capability or element of air power in view of the objective sought that defines its use in a decisive manner.

Sanu Kainikara is Deputy Director - Historical Analysis, AeC

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