Air
power crucial in Kokoda campaign
The Australian Army is, deservedly, renowned
for its feats on the Kokoda Track, but Allied air forces also
had a decisive role, David Wilson reports
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The
destroyed Wairopi Bridge as seen from the air on October
21, 1942.
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A
JAPANESE force of 2100 troops was landed at Gona and Buna on the
north coast of Papua New Guinea between November 19-22, 1942,
despite valiant opposition from Australian and American air units.
By
November 29 the Japanese captured the village of Kokoda and started
the advance along the Kokoda Track, aiming to capture Port Moresby.
The air campaign during the 1942 South West Pacific operations
was complex and issues of air superiority, close air support,
aerial interdiction, aerial resupply and medical evacuations remained
in a state of flux.
No. 75 Squadron’s epic defence of Port Moresby from March
to May, and the subsequent operations by relieving US Army Air
Force fighter squadrons, enabled a modicum of airfield development
to take place in the Port Moresby area.
Although the Japanese carried out numerous air raids on Port Moresby,
they were unable to prevent Allied air operations or effectively
interfere with the aerial resupply of the fighting troops.
The limitations on Allied transport operations were more because
of the lack of suitable aircraft and experienced crews since there
were only 16 transport aircraft available in the theatre in September.
Further dilution of the efforts to support the Australian troops
fighting on the Kokoda Track was brought about by the insertion
of US Army infantry regiments in the Wanigela Mission area during
October and the responsibility to supply them.
Lieutenant General Sydney Rowell, commander of the Australian
Army force in New Guinea, was aware that the major problem of
logistics had to be solved. It is to the credit of the Allied
air forces that despite adverse flying conditions, and terrain
that made identification of drop zones almost impossible, they
met the basic logistic requirements of the Australian forces through
improvisation and plain hard work.
The terrain and weather conditions prevalent along the Kokoda
Track made close air support difficult and ineffective. Even then
Allied air power managed to interdict the Japanese supply routes
and logistic supply dumps at Buna and Gona.
Allied fighter and medium bombers also harried the Japanese interior
lines of communications to the forward troops. The Allied aircraft
kept the troops adequately supplied while the constant harassment
brought the Japanese Army to the brink of starvation.
A classic example of this was the destruction of the choke point
created at the Wairopi suspension bridge over the Kumusi River,
which was a difficult target, located deep in the valley. Beginning
on August 1, Airacobra fighters and medium bombers subjected the
bridge to low-level bombing and strafing attacks while B-17 aircraft
subjected it to high-level bombing, until it was finally destroyed
on October 18.
The aerial attack on this bridge had another salutary effect;
unable to cross the Kumusi, the Japanese commander, Major General
Hori, and members of his staff were drowned while attempting to
raft down the raging river to the sea.
On November 14 steel wire and tools were air-dropped at Wairopi
to the Allied construction troops to rebuild the bridge. Air power
had destroyed the bridge, air power facilitated its reconstruction.
There is no doubt that the battles on the Kokoda Track were an
infantryman’s war. However, the ultimate success of the Australian
Army depended on Allied air support. The Kokoda campaign was conducted
in a zone of uncertainty, with the Japanese and Allied forces
finely balanced. Undeniably it was Allied air power that made
the decisive difference.
By the end of 1942, although it may not have been obvious at that
time, the pendulum had definitely swung in the favour of Allied
forces.
The mutual understanding that developed between the Army and air
commanders of the vital role of air power in facilitating victory
in a predominantly ground campaign in the prevailing terrain and
climatic conditions in New Guinea, set the foundations for success
in future campaigns, and final victory.
David Wilson is the Executive Director, RAAF Historical Records,
Aerospace Centre.
Video
award
A
DOCUMENTARY on the siege of Tobruk has won the prestigious Australian
Video Producer’s Association award for best documentary production.
Defence Values: The Siege of Tobruk traces the brave stance taken
by Australian and Allied forces to hold the strategically important
Port of Tobruk in North Africa in 1941.
The documentary illustrates the harsh conditions the Allied forces
endured, and the huge odds they confronted.
The documentary was produced by the Department of Defence’s
Inspector General Division in cooperation with Defence Public
Affairs and Corporate Communication and the Rats of Tobruk Association.
It will be used to introduce and promote Defence values to Defence
personnel
