By
Sanu Kainikara
IT
took centuries of land warfare before philosopher warriors like
Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Clausewitz and Jomini expounded the basics
for success in war.
In contrast, it took only few decades for air power enthusiasts
to synthesise the essence of aerial combat and enumerate the basic
conditions for the optimum employment of air power in the pursuit
of overall victory.
While the principles of war remain universal in their application,
air power offers special advantages for the prosecution of a successful
campaign centred on its unique characteristics.
Since planning an air campaign is the art of distilling the necessary
from the superfluous, and the efficient allocation of priorities,
the air commander will have to be well versed with the choices
available.
But the basic dictum – that can only be ignored at the peril
of being defeated – is that no air campaign can succeed until
air superiority is achieved. It’s imperative that air superiority
be considered at the start of campaign planning as a prerequisite
to its eventual success.
Air superiority is defined in ADFP 101 as “that degree of
dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits
the conduct of operations by the former and its related land,
sea and air forces at a chosen time and place without prohibitive
interference by the opposing force”.
Since the German attack on Poland in 1939, no country has won
a war in the face of enemy air superiority, no major offensive
has succeeded against an opponent who controlled the air, and
no defence has sustained itself against an enemy who had air superiority.
Detractors of air power often point out the Vietnam War as a case
where overwhelming air superiority did not win a war. This example
is quoted out of context and without taking account of myriad
other factors, small and big, which affected the air campaign
and made it less than optimum from its planning to its implementation.
Although propounded as a cornerstone of air power doctrine, complete
and unopposed air superiority is seldom achieved in reality.
There are varying degrees and categories of control of the air
that would prevail in any war. As explained in AAP 1000, Fundamentals
of Australian Aerospace Power, they range from one of parity where
the ability to defend oneself is present, through superiority
where one possesses the ability to operate with complete freedom
limited by time and space, and finally to supremacy where the
limitations of time and space do not impinge on a campaign’s
prosecution.
An analysis of the last half-century of warfare would suggest
that surface forces cannot possibly succeed if they are constantly
under attack from the air. All other operations must be subordinated,
to the extent possible, to its
attainment.
This does not mean that no other air operation can be started
until air superiority is obtained, but that no other operation
should jeopardise the primary mission or use forces that should
be used to attain air superiority.
The exception to this basic rule would be when there is no other
option but to divert air assets from the air superiority campaign
to save a strategically important entity, brought on perhaps by
a surprise attack.
It has to be reiterated that under normal circumstances, the winning
and maintaining of air superiority remains the first and most
pervasive task of an air force.
