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Reminiscences - Part VII

Wind-down and evacuation

June, 2001

Editor's note: Our Reminiscences series continues with this article on the August Offensive wind-down and evacuation, and a summary of the failures of the Gallipoli campaign. Part of the information is drawn from the Gallipoli briefing material compiled by Ashley Ekins of the Australian War Memorial.

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Watson's Pier at ANZAC Cove showing the stores on the beach and the loaded barges crowded with swimming soldiers.

With no more major offensives, 'mining and tunnelling now characterised the fighting through autumn. However, wastage almost doubled from over five per cent in June to nine per cent through August and September.

'In November, the peninsula experienced a severe blizzard after two weeks of storms and 3000 Australians were evacuated, suffering from frostbite and exposure. Added to difficulties with the weather was the growing threat of German heavy artillery being diverted to the peninsula during the approaching winter; this would have made the ANZAC defences untenable. Hamilton's replacement, General Monro (took over on 27 October), recommended evacuation and, after some indecision, this was agreed.

'Preparations were made for a withdrawal and various ruses were practised to convince the Turks that the line was still occupied - 134,000 men, 300 guns and large quantities of materiel were to be withdrawn from positions that were in close contact with the enemy. The difficulties were acute; the potential for disaster high. As the winter storms had damaged ANZAC Cove piers, North Beach became the main evacuation area for ANZAC. The rusted remains of a landing craft are still embedded in the sands of this beach.

'The evacuation withdrew 90,000 men from ANZAC and Suvla over 11 nights from 8-20 December, with only a handful of casualties. The final evacuations from Helles were similarly successful on 8-9 January 1916. The evacuation was quickly proclaimed as a victory by the Allied politicians and press. But, although it was a masterpiece of planning, it seems unlikely that the ANZAC withdrawal totally deceived the Turks. There is some evidence that the Turks refrained from openly attacking an enemy who was departing, especially after the costly experience of 19 May.

'The departing ANZAC troops celebrated Christmas on Lemnos and on ships returning to Egypt.' 1 For the troops on Lemnos, it must have involved mixed emotions - out of the dangers that existed in every corner of ANZAC; but still able to gaze on ANZAC, reminding one of the galling defeat. My uncle was one of those men, disembarking at Alexandria from Lemnos on 27 December 1915. He was to sail later with his unit for Marseilles arriving 26 March 1916 for onmovement to northern France.

ANZAC Cove
'ANZAC Cove is only about 600 metres long and 20 metres wide. This constricted site was the vital base and lifeline for supplies, ammunition, reinforcements and the evacuation of the wounded for the 240 days of the campaign. The beach was shielded from direct Turkish observation by the two headlands, Hell Spit to the south and Ari Burnu to the north.

'It soon became a hive of ceaseless activity, crowded with stores and equipment; piers were built to assist the loading and unloading of boats. The Corps headquarters was located in dugouts in ANZAC Gully 100 metres from the beach and just 1000 metres from the front line. Men lived in dugouts and shelters cut into the seaward slopes of the ridges above the beach and gullies. Some of the terraces are still discernible although most of the dugouts have been eroded away. Troops regularly used the beach for swimming despite the hazards of constant shelling, especially from the concealed Turkish batteries near the olive grove some 500 metres south of the present Kabatepe museum and information centre.

'On the northern end of ANZAC Cove stands the Turkish Memorial to the ANZACs, unveiled in 1985 when the Turkish government officially renamed the area 'ANZAC Koyu' (ANZAC Cove). The magnanimous message of Ataturk in 1934 is carved on this monument.'2

Those heroes that shed their blood and
lost their lives...
You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country.
Therefore rest in peace.
There is no difference between the Johnnies
and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by
Side here in this country of ours...
You, the mothers who sent their sons from
far away countries,
Wipe away your tears,
Your sons are now lying in our bosom and
are in peace.
After having lost their lives on this land they
have become our sons as well.

What went wrong with our Gallipoli Campaign
After visiting the various battlefields and reflecting on the wealth of available material, the conclusion that I reached is that we were comprehensively out-commanded at the operational and higher tactical level. The strategic appreciation was flawed because we overestimated our capabilities and underestimated the enemy's.

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William's Pier, North Beach December 1915, with the Sphinx in the background. At this time the preparations for the evacuation of the Australian and New Zealand troops were well under way. (AWM)
This situation was exacerbated by the two leading navy and army figures of the time - Fisher and Kitchener - alternating between support and criticism of the project, eventually settling on opposition to it. The piecemeal development of operations, particularly the naval efforts to force the Dardanelles, reduced the effect of surprise, signalled our intentions, providing the Turks with time to organise and improve their defences. They used this time well, to later telling effect.

In regard to the landings of 25 April, the August offensive and landings at Suvla Bay, the Turks' speed of reaction was superior to our speed of exploitation of our opportunities. At a number of decisive times and places, we had a significant opportunity within our grasp. But, because of delays and procrastination in exploiting the situation, the Turks were able to scramble a defence more quickly, applying sufficient defensive power at the critical points of contact to see us off. The American phrase 'he who gets there fustest with the mostest' springs readily to mind. In current terminology, the Turks, particularly Kemal, were operating inside our decision time.

Further, the Turkish forces included local personnel who knew the quickest tracks and paths, and the locations for good water that was always in short supply throughout the Peninsula. Because the battlefield involved their region, they were committed in defence, particularly in the critical period of and just after the initial landing.

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Mustafa.jpg Colonel Mustafa Kemal at an observation post overlooking the Ariburnu front.
(AWM)
Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal
Kemal commanded the 19th Division, in reserve at Boghali, at the time of the 25 April landing at ANZAC. On being advised of the ANZAC landings, he countermanded an Army Commander order after vacillation by the German army commander, force marching two battalions to the ANZAC area. These battalions were in contact with the ANZACs by mid-morning on the 25th, vigorously checking our advance and forcing us off key ground. We never really recovered from these setbacks. His determined holding of ANZAC efforts to advance and later recapture of Chunuk Bair in August proved him to be the most outstanding commander of the Gallipoli campaign.

Born Mustafa Pasha, his brilliance and arrogance earned him the name Kemal (perfectionist). In 1923, he was elected the first president of Turkey at the establishment of the republic and held this position until his death in 1938. He dedicated himself to modernising his nation and he assumed the name Ataturk (father of Turkey) in 1934. The deep respect with which he is held is evident throughout Turkey and especially around the Gallipoli battlefields.

Casevac
As a result of Florence Nightingale's efforts in the Crimean campaign, casevac of wounded and sick personnel had been given increased importance. Twenty-five nurses, as part of the 3rd Australian General Hospital, had sailed with the 1st convoy - 126 nurses accompanied the 2nd convoy. Hospital ships had been assigned for the transfer of casevacs to Lemnos (3rd AGH), Egypt and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. This is a subject that one of the nurses might wish to take up in the future.

In the next edition, I will touch on some peripheral issues involving Turkey and Israel.
- Blak

REFERENCES
1-2 Ashley Ekins, Historical Guide to the Battlefields of the Gallipoli Campaign, Australian War Memorial, March 2000. (Published with permission.)