 |
Reminiscences - Part VII
Wind-down and evacuation
June, 2001
| Editor's note: Our
Reminiscences series continues with this article on the August Offensive
wind-down and evacuation, and a summary of the failures of the Gallipoli
campaign. Part of the information is drawn from the Gallipoli briefing
material compiled by Ashley Ekins of the Australian War Memorial. |
 |
|
Watson's Pier at ANZAC Cove showing the stores
on the beach and the loaded barges crowded with swimming soldiers.
|
With no more major offensives, 'mining and tunnelling now characterised
the fighting through autumn. However, wastage almost doubled from over
five per cent in June to nine per cent through August and September.
'In November, the peninsula experienced a severe blizzard after two weeks
of storms and 3000 Australians were evacuated, suffering from frostbite
and exposure. Added to difficulties with the weather was the growing threat
of German heavy artillery being diverted to the peninsula during the approaching
winter; this would have made the ANZAC defences untenable. Hamilton's
replacement, General Monro (took over on 27 October), recommended evacuation
and, after some indecision, this was agreed.
'Preparations were made for a withdrawal and various ruses were practised
to convince the Turks that the line was still occupied - 134,000 men,
300 guns and large quantities of materiel were to be withdrawn from positions
that were in close contact with the enemy. The difficulties were acute;
the potential for disaster high. As the winter storms had damaged ANZAC
Cove piers, North Beach became the main evacuation area for ANZAC. The
rusted remains of a landing craft are still embedded in the sands of this
beach.
'The evacuation withdrew 90,000 men from ANZAC and Suvla over 11 nights
from 8-20 December, with only a handful of casualties. The final evacuations
from Helles were similarly successful on 8-9 January 1916. The evacuation
was quickly proclaimed as a victory by the Allied politicians and press.
But, although it was a masterpiece of planning, it seems unlikely that
the ANZAC withdrawal totally deceived the Turks. There is some evidence
that the Turks refrained from openly attacking an enemy who was departing,
especially after the costly experience of 19 May.
'The departing ANZAC troops celebrated Christmas on Lemnos and on ships
returning to Egypt.' 1 For the troops on Lemnos,
it must have involved mixed emotions - out of the dangers that existed
in every corner of ANZAC; but still able to gaze on ANZAC, reminding one
of the galling defeat. My uncle was one of those men, disembarking at
Alexandria from Lemnos on 27 December 1915. He was to sail later with
his unit for Marseilles arriving 26 March 1916 for onmovement to northern
France.
ANZAC Cove
'ANZAC Cove is only about 600 metres long and 20 metres wide. This constricted
site was the vital base and lifeline for supplies, ammunition, reinforcements
and the evacuation of the wounded for the 240 days of the campaign. The
beach was shielded from direct Turkish observation by the two headlands,
Hell Spit to the south and Ari Burnu to the north.
'It soon became a hive of ceaseless activity, crowded with stores and
equipment; piers were built to assist the loading and unloading of boats.
The Corps headquarters was located in dugouts in ANZAC Gully 100 metres
from the beach and just 1000 metres from the front line. Men lived in
dugouts and shelters cut into the seaward slopes of the ridges above the
beach and gullies. Some of the terraces are still discernible although
most of the dugouts have been eroded away. Troops regularly used the beach
for swimming despite the hazards of constant shelling, especially from
the concealed Turkish batteries near the olive grove some 500 metres south
of the present Kabatepe museum and information centre.
'On the northern end of ANZAC Cove stands the Turkish Memorial to the
ANZACs, unveiled in 1985 when the Turkish government officially renamed
the area 'ANZAC Koyu' (ANZAC Cove). The magnanimous message of Ataturk
in 1934 is carved on this monument.'2
Those heroes that shed their blood and
lost their lives...
You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country.
Therefore rest in peace.
There is no difference between the Johnnies
and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by
Side here in this country of ours...
You, the mothers who sent their sons from
far away countries,
Wipe away your tears,
Your sons are now lying in our bosom and
are in peace.
After having lost their lives on this land they
have become our sons as well.
What went wrong with our Gallipoli Campaign
After visiting the various battlefields and reflecting on the wealth of
available material, the conclusion that I reached is that we were comprehensively
out-commanded at the operational and higher tactical level. The strategic
appreciation was flawed because we overestimated our capabilities and
underestimated the enemy's.
 |
|
William's Pier, North Beach December 1915, with
the Sphinx in the background. At this time the preparations for
the evacuation of the Australian and New Zealand troops were well
under way. (AWM)
|
This situation was exacerbated by the two leading navy and army figures
of the time - Fisher and Kitchener - alternating between support and criticism
of the project, eventually settling on opposition to it. The piecemeal
development of operations, particularly the naval efforts to force the
Dardanelles, reduced the effect of surprise, signalled our intentions,
providing the Turks with time to organise and improve their defences.
They used this time well, to later telling effect.
In regard to the landings of 25 April, the August offensive and landings
at Suvla Bay, the Turks' speed of reaction was superior to our speed of
exploitation of our opportunities. At a number of decisive times and places,
we had a significant opportunity within our grasp. But, because of delays
and procrastination in exploiting the situation, the Turks were able to
scramble a defence more quickly, applying sufficient defensive power at
the critical points of contact to see us off. The American phrase 'he
who gets there fustest with the mostest' springs readily to mind. In current
terminology, the Turks, particularly Kemal, were operating inside our
decision time.
Further, the Turkish forces included local personnel who knew the quickest
tracks and paths, and the locations for good water that was always in
short supply throughout the Peninsula. Because the battlefield involved
their region, they were committed in defence, particularly in the critical
period of and just after the initial landing.
 |
Mustafa.jpg Colonel Mustafa Kemal at an observation
post overlooking the Ariburnu front.
(AWM)
|
Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal
Kemal commanded the 19th Division, in reserve at Boghali, at the time
of the 25 April landing at ANZAC. On being advised of the ANZAC landings,
he countermanded an Army Commander order after vacillation by the German
army commander, force marching two battalions to the ANZAC area. These
battalions were in contact with the ANZACs by mid-morning on the 25th,
vigorously checking our advance and forcing us off key ground. We never
really recovered from these setbacks. His determined holding of ANZAC
efforts to advance and later recapture of Chunuk Bair in August proved
him to be the most outstanding commander of the Gallipoli campaign.
Born Mustafa Pasha, his brilliance and arrogance earned him the name Kemal
(perfectionist). In 1923, he was elected the first president of Turkey
at the establishment of the republic and held this position until his
death in 1938. He dedicated himself to modernising his nation and he assumed
the name Ataturk (father of Turkey) in 1934. The deep respect with which
he is held is evident throughout Turkey and especially around the Gallipoli
battlefields.
Casevac
As a result of Florence Nightingale's efforts in the Crimean campaign,
casevac of wounded and sick personnel had been given increased importance.
Twenty-five nurses, as part of the 3rd Australian General Hospital, had
sailed with the 1st convoy - 126 nurses accompanied the 2nd convoy. Hospital
ships had been assigned for the transfer of casevacs to Lemnos (3rd AGH),
Egypt and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. This is a subject that one of
the nurses might wish to take up in the future.
In the next edition, I will touch on some peripheral issues involving
Turkey and Israel.
- Blak
REFERENCES
1-2 Ashley Ekins, Historical Guide to the Battlefields
of the Gallipoli Campaign, Australian War Memorial, March 2000. (Published
with permission.)
|