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Workforce Defence Review Program Update

By Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Errol McCormack


February, 2001

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Forward

This text is a comprehensive explanation of the impact of the Defence Reform Program (DRP) on the RAAF workforce. Some of the explanation is difficult to convey in simple terms; however, Commanders should have a basic working knowledge of the issues, and be able to answer questions from those under command or seek explanation from specialist AFHQ staff, as appropriate. For the general workforce, those who wish to go beyond their immediate interests contained in the two enclosures are encouraged to gain an appreciation of the issues explained herein.

For those who prefer an abbreviated explanation, read the following red text as an introduction, and then read only the red portions of the main text:

The DRP has been a disruptive period where great demands have been made upon our people, but we are now emerging from this trying period with a new Air Force structure in place. Although some adjustments are yet to be made, all RAAF personnel are now able to focus on the 'new Air Force'. With the information provided herein, personnel will be able to discern for themselves the employment, career opportunities and challenges available in the post-DRP Air Force. This will provide a new level of certainty, not previously available. Accordingly, all Air Force personnel are encouraged to ascertain their own role and contribution in the 'new' Air Force.

Introduction

The new Air Force structure is emerging from the DRP which commenced in July 1998. Changing the Air Force has been a difficult task and I am acutely aware of the challenges every Air Force member has faced during this period. I acknowledge the efforts that all of you have made over an extended period.

As we are approaching the final phase of the DRP, I want to ensure that all Air Force members are provided with an update of how the Air Force is changing, particularly your personal career prospects. In December 1998, I issued a message that provided the predicted post-DRP structure of each mustering and specialisation. A further breakdown of that information was provided via a DGPERS-AF website. The primary purpose of this message is to provide all members with a more accurate, updated projection of posting and promotion prospects in the post-DRP Air Force.

Specific employment and posting prospects are provided at enclosure 1 (not reproduced here - included in Workforce Update Package to Commanders in December 2000 for dissemination). For each mustering and specialisation the projected post-DRP structure is provided as total numbers by rank. Also, the number of positions for each mustering and specialisation at individual rank levels is provided by location as an indicator of posting prospects. At enclosure 2 (not reproduced here - included in Workforce Update Package to Commanders in December 2000 for dissemination), a prediction of the number of promotions to each rank level is provided for every mustering and specialisation, for the next five years.

In addition to the information on workforce structure and posting and promotion prospects, this message provides background explanation of the direction and progress of the restructured Air Force that is emerging from the DRP. Although the DRP has not yet been finalised, I am very pleased with what is being achieved and assure you all that the Air Force is becoming a more effective war-fighting organisation as we draw closer to the DRP end-state.

The Defence Reform Program - Progress

The DRP required the Permanent Air Force (PAF) to reduce its uniformed strength from 16,700 to 13,000 by July 2001. The processes for achieving this are rationalisation of uniformed numbers, replacement of uniformed positions with Defence civilians, and commercialisation (outsourcing to industry). AFHQ has applied Members Required in Uniform (MRU) criteria alongside DRP drawdown requirements to reach the target of 13,000. The December 1998 predictions for post-DRP structure and composition across musterings and specialisations were provided to you, based on the best possible forecasting. As you will see with the tables at enclosure 1 (not reproduced here), some post-DRP numbers are about the same and some have changed. Changes and delays have generally occurred where civilianisation or outsourcing was unable to proceed as planned. Another large variation to workforce structure and composition was the augmentation of Combat Support Group (CSG) with 555 additional positions as a result of East Timor operations. Although this augmentation is not permanent, Air Force is arguing for it to be made permanent. The East Timor experience has shown that CSG requires this augmentation as permanent additional preparedness and sustainability for contingencies.

At 27 November 2000, there were 13,532 people in the PAF and there were 15,599 established posts, including positions yet to cease under DRP. There is still a requirement to drawdown about 2000 positions to reach the DRP target of 13,555 (13,000 plus 555 East Timor augmentation), and achieve the new Air Force structure. Most of these positions will be disestablished by 30 June 2001 (about 1500) and the remainder by 31 December 2002. (An illustration of the drawdown and reinvestment process is at Figure 1, and how we arrive at the final structure is shown in a diagram included in the Workforce Update Package provided to Commanders in December 2000 for dissemination.)

DRP Effects

Although Air Force has met its transition targets and provided its DRP savings, there are some difficult DRP transition side effects, all of which are being highlighted for resolution at the highest levels in the Defence Organisation and to Government. They are as follows:

  • Insufficient uniformed workforce exists to provide all Service functions, particularly in the Non-Service Groups (NSGs) such as Defence Corporate Services (Defence Corporate Support, Defence Information Systems and Defence Estate) and the Defence Personnel Executive - Health Service. Budget constraints have forced Air Force to adjust recruiting targets so they are aligned with the post-DRP structure, rather than the transitional structure. Consequently, delayed DRP contracting activities in the NSGs have created the workforce gap, i.e. vacancies and more work for fewer available people;
  • No funds are currently available to cover the Services with transition (non-uniformed) temporary labour; and
  • The NSGs are required to provide respective Services. Consequently, delayed DRP drawdown activities are consuming salary with uniformed personnel in non-MRU positions, where they are still available, in place of enduring MRU positions. This causes two things: staffing of the new Air Force structure is delayed, and the recruiting and training action for new Air Force members (with the skills required for new positions) is delayed. In particular, the build-up of numbers for Combat Support Group (CSG), via recruiting and training action for the skill groups needed, is delayed. This has a flow-on effect to the NSGs with vacancies, as a substantial number of CSG IDF positions are embedded in the NSGs when not required for deployment during contingencies.

These effects and their causes are complex, but Figure 2 shows the overall impact:
In amongst this difficult transition, challenging aircraft and ground systems upgrade programs have caused further pressure on the workforce. The management workload and the technical and other support workload associated with concurrent DRP transition and these upgrades have been especially demanding on some.

There are also some lasting effects on workforce. The most significant is that some musterings and specialisations have a post-DRP (enduring) establishment that is so small as to make them difficult to sustain. Consequently, examination of tri-Service rationalisation for these employment groups makes sense - to make these workforce elements large enough to be sustainable. This is still planning/work-in-progress and will involve negotiation between the Services.

One example so far, is the Defence Health Service study into Optimisation of the ADF Dental Workforce, with the outcome of allocating the dental technician function solely to Army. Air Force plans to examine other small employment groups (ie those with less than about 30 positions) and negotiate an apportionment of functions between the three Services. If agreed and implemented, some small Air Force employment groups will be disbanded (and the function performed by increased Army or Navy numbers), and some (small Air Force) groups will be expanded (above currently planned post-DRP numbers) to perform functions for all three Services. You will be updated on this initiative as planning outcomes emerge over the next 12 months.

Considerations for Workforce Structure and Composition

Workforce structure and composition ultimately determines the employment prospects of all Air Force members - i.e. opportunities for promotion, posting, and career and skills development. However, workforce structure has its basis in military capability. It is also constrained by budget limitations (about 40 per cent of Defence's budget is expended on personnel costs). The following aspects impact on workforce management:

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  • Capability: The generation of air power and provision of deployable support for air operations is what the Air Force is about. This is the driver of workforce structure and composition;

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  • Organisation: The Air Force cannot be ready to fight and win if its workforce is not organised for effective command and control and execution of its tasks. The way we are organised also determines how well each of us identifies and belongs with the fighting arm we chose to join. With its 14 (then 12) group structure, the DRP has complicated organisation and command and control arrangements beyond the Air Command and Training Command components. Those of you working in the NSGs know exactly what the problems are. I have recently taken a hard look at this DRP fallout, and steps are being taken to redress command and control deficiencies;

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  • Personnel establishment: The management of establishment during DRP drawdown has been a complicated and challenging task. To meet the budget driven DRP requirements, Air Force has intentionally chosen to adopt a consistently rigorous and tough approach to establishment. The basis of military establishment has been, and remains the strict application of Members Required in Uniform (MRU) tests, i.e. is the position required to deploy into an area where the person may come under deadly fire (IDF positions), or if not required for deployment, can the skills for the position only be sourced from the military (SMS positions)? Positions that do not meet either of these two tests are designated non-MRU and have DRP cease dates that coincide with DRP schedules for conversion to less expensive Defence Civilian positions, or even less expensive take-up by contractors. Whilst some DRP groups have planned and achieved the transition for non-MRU positions well, others are experiencing delays beyond their control, and others still, have only recently (this year) commenced the planning for DRP drawdown. Funding for DRP transition costs has also been a problem for some activities. These delays, combined with the necessary action to recruit to the emerging Air Force structure, have created the 'workforce gap' - staff vacancies. It is a serious problem and strategies are being developed (and funding sought) to reduce the severity of the gap for the remainder of DRP transition. The Air Force aim is to take all necessary action to get the remaining transition behind us as quickly as possible and achieve the post-DRP workforce structure;

    There are several significant DRP activities still to occur to enable the remaining DRP impact on workforce to be realised. However, for the majority of musterings and specialisations, the Air Force establishment record now reflects a more confident indication of future employment prospects. Considerable cleansing of the establishment record has occurred this year, including apportionment of the ANYO, ANYA and ANY-x positions to specific specialisations and musterings. Consequently, the updated tables provided with this message (not reproduced here) are a more reliable indication of the post-DRP establishment;

    This year some musterings have undergone, or are undergoing, review and refinement of post-DRP establishment to achieve optimal distribution of reduced numbers across the Defence Organisation. Reviews for ASURFIN, WOD, CREWATT and PTI musterings have been completed, and the same for ASTFITT (now completed), ADATECH[NDI] and MESSOPS are in the final stages of completion. (CREWATTs and MESSOPS are new musterings that will take 12-24 months to populate to establishment.) Also, 'gross-error' checks of FEG establishments have been performed this year, via visits by AFHQ staff, and some adjustments have been made. Reviews for ENGR, LOG, AFENG, ATC and PLT specialisations have been commenced;

  • Reinvestment: Of the original target of 13,000 positions, about 2100 are reinvestment (new) positions for CSG, AEW&C, SCG and the Flying FEGs. Whilst identified and established, these reinvestment (RI) positions cannot be activated for recruiting, posting and promotion purposes until corresponding DRP drawdown occurs. For this reason, and out of budgetary necessity, Air Force has embargoed any further extension of DRP cease dates for non-MRU positions subject to civilianisation or outsourcing delays. Wherever possible, Air Force will assist elements facing drawdown delays by keeping units overborne with personnel above establishment. Where people are simply not available, reductions in support Services are likely. This will probably force Air Force to reduce operational tempo, and may even cause some functions to be shut down - until the DRP transition is achieved;

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  • Structural sustainability: Most employment groups (musterings and specialisations), whilst smaller after the DRP, are still sustainable and provide good career progression opportunities. For some small groups however, as previously mentioned, tri-Service rationalisation is considered necessary to improve their viability, and will be investigated over the next 12 months;

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  • Promotion policies A smaller force that competes with industry for skilled people requires flexible promotion policies. Whilst minimum standards of demonstrated potential, and knowledge, skills and attitude will be enforced, I will be examining and directing changes to promotion policies that assist retention and progression of personnel to match the post-DRP structures. In essence, I anticipate that faster promotion rates in some specialisations and musterings may be required on occasions to meet Service requirements;

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  • Conditions of Service: Similarly, appropriately adjusted conditions of Service, including pay levels, are needed to retain good people. The DPE has made some progress with improved conditions of Service, some are still being developed, but more improvements are still needed. They cost money from the Defence budget and most have to be applied fairly across the three Services. Consequently, they can take some time to implement. However, AFHQ is monitoring DPE efforts to improve conditions of Service and actively promoting changes important to Air Force employment groups. Of significance is the recent agreement by Government for a comprehensive review of ADF pay, for consideration by November 2001;

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  • Recruiting, training and qualifying (RTQ) to reinvest, and replace attrition: Changes to capability, organisation and establishment, especially the extensive DRP driven changes, require time to allow personnel with new skills to be recruited, trained and qualified to match revised establishment. This RTQ time lag, when combined with the variability of discharge rates and budget constraints with recruiting targets, creates a transition period, and for the scale of the DRP, a complex and significant transition period;

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  • Post and promote: Similarly, where the existing workforce is available for re-assignment across revised establishments, there is a time lag for postings and promotions. In all but the most urgent circumstances of operational need, the effect of relocation on families must be considered and accommodated as best as possible;

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  • Adaptation and flexibility: The whole cycle of organisation and establishment change requires constant adjustment during implementation. This is why it is never possible to give you a 100 per cent guarantee with detailed employment prospects. The scale and complexity of the DRP drawdown and reinvestment process have provided more uncertainty with employment prospects for many musterings and specialisations than ever before (probably since the post-World War II drawdown). I know this level of uncertainty is one of, if not the foremost, concern of our members; and

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  • 'Crew duty', respite, and having a life and family: Greater efficiency typically means doing more with less - you have all felt this during the DRP transition. However, high workloads over an extended period may affect your health, that of your families, and that of the Air Force. Many of you have carried high workloads for an extended period since the DRP began. In particular, the recent high operational tempo and the significant DRP workforce gap have pushed some members beyond appropriate limits. Air Force will be taking steps to alleviate this transitional stress, such as reducing operational tempo and fighting for funding to be allocated to temporary civilian labour. You will hear more on this from your commanders over coming months.

    The Emerging Air Force Structure and Composition - Your Employment Prospects

    The current PAF structure baseline is 13,555 positions (13,000 DRP target plus 555 East Timor augmentation). However, current budget constraints limit our actual PAF numbers to about 13,200 across the next five years. We must optimise our workforce to do the best we can with allocated funding, whilst keeping the teeth and tail balanced. Regardless of funding levels, getting the best 'bang for buck' means that MRU tests for uniformed workforce must be upheld and applied with continued rigour. Also, future workforce planning now has an emphasis on the total available workforce for wartime and peacetime needs. This means that Reserves will be treated as an integral part of the total workforce, rather than separate to the PAF. The final rebuilding of the overall Wartime Establishment (WE) includes blending of the Reserve Establishment (RE) with the PAF Peacetime Establishment (PE), and will be completed during the first half of 2001.

    There are some unresolved or delayed drawdown activities scheduled within original DRP planning:
  • the SECPOL function and rear-area security requirements;
  • the Ground Electronic Maintenance Function (GEMF);
  • the non-deployable health functions;
  • finalised MRU numbers for Training Command;
  • JALO Explosive ordnance functions;
  • delayed outsourcing for 501WG and 503WG deeper maintenance and logistics support, and the Defence Integrated Distribution System (DIDS);
  • Defence Corporate Support (DCS) Clerical and Administration market testing; and
  • Non-MRU Defence Information Systems Group (DISG) functions.

    SECPOL: Post-DRP workforce numbers for the SECPOL function are under review as part of a capability review of rear-area security. DRP cease dates for most SECPOL and MWDS positions scheduled to cease have been extended to December 2002 to allow a thorough review of requirements and the most appropriate balance of MRU and non-MRU workforce. The results of that review should be known by mid-2001, and the workforce impact will be advised in the second half of 2001.

    GEMF: The GEMF activity review should be complete by February 2001, and market testing should take effect by about January 2002 (further slippage is possible). The original aim was to complete the DRP transition by March 2001 but uncertainty with appropriate organisation and MRU establishment for Ground Electronic Trades has delayed the DRP transition. Nonetheless, the likely outcome is a cadre IDF workforce within CSG and out-sourcing to industry for fixed base requirements where industry can provide those skills at the various base localities.

    AFHQ will advise the finalised workforce fallout as soon as it is known, during 2001. However, the workforce numbers provided with this message are indicative of final structure and composition as they are based on MRU tests. I would anticipate that any significant variation to the total numbers for the GEMF workforce segments would be caused by market testing failures where industry cannot provide the Service for non-deployable support, or cannot provide it more economically. Consequently, the current forecast of GEMF numbers should be regarded as a lowest predicted level.

    Health groups: Members of the health musterings and specialisations have experienced the most uncertainty with DRP drawdown. Relatively late planning and scheduling of outsourcing activities have prevented Air Force from finalising workforce numbers for health groups, and recently, deficiencies with the organisation and control of the health workforce have led Air Force to consider the formation of a new Health organisation within the Air Force Group. A proposal for the new organisation, including its relationship with the DPE Defence Health Service is being finalised for consideration by CAFAC early next year.

    For Dental musterings and officers, DGDHS has completed a study into optimal MRU workforce composition across the three Services, which has led to significant variation to post-DRP numbers. In particular, the DENTECH mustering will be disbanded for Air Force and Navy, and the function performed by Army only, (along with contract support for non-MRU requirements).

    Overall, some small health groups have forecast post-DRP numbers that make single-Service retention of the musterings unsustainable. Examination of tri-Service rationalisation for these groups is planned over the next 12 months, but management of the transition to revised arrangements (current posting tenures, re-muster, transfer between Services and redundancy administration - if appropriate) will take longer. Those affected by tri-Service rationalisation will be advised of the personnel management strategies to apply as soon as they are determined.

    Training Command: Final adjustment of the MRU numbers for Training Command are under review, and should be known by EOY 2000.

    JALO: The final DRP impact on the MRU workforce required for EO logistics is yet to be advised. Nonetheless, existing post-DRP establishment figures are based on MRU tests and are indicative of final structures, assuming DRP activities are successful.

    501WG and 503WG: These two significant DRP activities have a large impact on the technical workforce, and have undergone delays with contract implementation. The post-DRP impact for the employment groups with large numbers displaced by these outsourcing activities has been known with reasonable certainty for many months, but the timing has slipped considerably.

    The final mix of those currently serving members that will be employed by the contractors, those that will remain at Amberley and Richmond in MRU posts, and those that will be posted away from these bases to fill vacant posts at other bases, is a keenly awaited outcome for both the members, and the Air Force.

    The MRU drawdown of 501WG and 503WG is the most significant proportion of remaining drawdown for Air Force, and has the most influence on the timing of activation of new (DRP reinvestment) positions. (The most affected 'waiting agency' for DRP reinvestment is CSG. CSG cannot mature without recruitment to its post-DRP structure. Delays with filling CSG structure have a flow-on effect to the NSGs, as many CSG IDF positions have embedded peacetime working locations in the NSGs.)

    DIDS: Delays with the DIDS market testing activity, to December 2001, have been advised by the DMO. Whilst current forecasts for post-DRP numbers are based on MRU tests and are indicative of final numbers, until the market testing activity is complete, the preciseness of predicted employment prospects in detail (ie by rank and locality) is limited. This affects supply musterings the most.

    DCS Clerical and Administration: The market testing of DCS C&A functions has not changed in scope or slipped appreciably, but was programmed for completion during the very late part of the DRP drawdown period, and is in progress. The establishment figures provided in this message are a (relatively) firm indication of the final DRP effect on the clerical and administration employment groups. Some minor refinements may occur.

    DISG: Although AFHQ has assigned DRP cease dates to non-MRU DISG positions, late DRP drawdown planning and some unresolved issues between DISG and AFHQ mean that the post-DRP structure of DISG is still to be resolved. A priority on assisting DISG with DRP transition by keeping certain DISG functions overborne with MRU beyond DRP cease dates is likely.

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    General Effects of the DRP (see Table A)

    Specific notes are provided on the tables at enclosure 1 (not reproduced here) regarding the effect that the DRP has had, or will have, on each mustering and specialisation. The notes include comments on the various causes of possible variation with post-DRP numbers for those groups affected by remaining DRP activities. Table A is a broad summary of DRP effects for reference across the entire RAAF workforce:

    Specific notes are provided on the tables at enclosure 1 (not reproduced here) regarding the effect that the DRP has had, or will have, on each mustering and specialisation. The notes include comments on the various causes of possible variation with post-DRP numbers for those groups affected by remaining DRP activities. Table A is a broad summary of DRP effects for reference across the entire RAAF workforce:

    Detailed establishment tables for all musterings and specialisations are at enclosure 1 (not reproduced here). The tables provide a summary of forecast total numbers by rank for each mustering and specialisation at 1 July 01, and 1 January 03. The second time-slice at 1 January 03 is provided as some DRP activity is delayed beyond the originally scheduled DRP end-point of mid-2001, and affects about 500 positions. Most DRP cease dates take effect prior to 1 July 01, and all take effect by 1 January 03. Notes are annotated on levels of certainty with predictions and risks and possible causes for changes to numbers. Additional tables for each group are provided to indicate the broad geographic distribution by rank at 1 January 03 - i.e. the final post-DRP condition. The data provided is for official use only within the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO).

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    Promotion prospects

    Based on the currently forecast post-DRP establishment, Workforce Planning and DGPERS-AF staffs have calculated likely promotion rates over the next five years. This information is included at enclosure 2 (not reproduced here). Note the figures are estimates, but they provide a good indication of promotion prospects. Importantly, for most musterings and specialisations, healthy promotion rates can be seen to return after the DRP transition is completed, with some achieving increased promotion rates earlier. This data is also for official use only within the ADO.

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    Rate of organisational change - effect on accuracy of forecast employment prospects (see Table B)

    Organisational change normally includes establishment variation, and therefore changes to employment opportunities. A list of significant organisation changes for the Air Force since commencement of the DRP in mid-1998, along with planned or possible future changes, is at Table B. As you can see, the DRP and other capability developments have driven (and will continue to drive) very substantial changes to the Air Force organisation. This translates into changed employment locations and changes to workforce structure with an accumulated effect on employment prospects over months and years. The accuracy of detailed information on employment opportunities for all musterings and specialisations perishes quickly in the dynamic change environment driven by the DRP. Furthermore, with an evolving world security environment and changing Government priorities for Defence capability and funding, the environment in which the Air Force exists will remain dynamic after the completion of the DRP.

    Command and Control

    Underpinning command and control (C2) of Air Force members is the organisation and establishment framework. Air Force positions are classified into four types:

  • IDF positions All IDF positions are established within Air Force units and an Air Force CO commands occupants;
  • IDF positions, established within a CSG unit (eg ECSS or CSS), but with linked peacetime working locations under Base CDRs or NSG managers These are known as embedded IDF positions. Full military command is retained by the CSG unit CO, but the occupants are assigned to Base CDRs or NSG managers: (depending on the function) for functional supervision of trade employment during peacetime, ie when not deployed for contingency, exercise, or essential preparedness training for their wartime role;
  • SMS positions: SMS positions are established under Air Force units or HQs, or NSG agencies. Occupants are commanded by respective COs of those units, HQs or agencies and
  • Non-MRU positions with DRP cease dates Until the positions cease, these positions are treated the same as SMS positions for the purpose of C2.

    The fallout of the DRP has caused complexity, and therefore confusion, with C2 of Air Force members posted to NSG positions. Recently, the 12 Defence Corporate Support Centres (DCSCs) were established as joint units, and military commanders have been, or are being appointed. This arrangement introduces a third Commander for the Air Force population on an Air Base, in addition to the ECSS or CSS wartime COs, and Base CDRs. Although Air Force has welcomed the DCSC arrangement, it complicates the C2 arrangements of an Air Base population. For this reason, command arrangements at Air Bases are under review with the aim of making them simpler. You will be advised of changes via your commanders in 2001.

    Mustering and Specialisation sponsorship

    Another side effect of the DRP process is that the mustering and specialisation sponsorship scheme has fallen into disuse, with some serious implications. Some musterings have especially needed a dedicated and active sponsor during the DRP drawdown to act as the voice and ears for workforce groups. The policy and procedural framework for mustering/specialisation sponsorship has been reviewed will be re-issued early in 2001. The various appointments for each mustering/specialisation or grouping of like musterings will be promulgated concurrently. In the meantime, interim mustering sponsors for musterings faced with critical DRP issues have been, or are being, appointed until the revised policy and permanent appointments are made. I expect that the workforce will see an improvement in the communication of workforce issues via sponsors over the next six to 12 months, to be maintained thereafter.

    Reserves

    Events in East Timor have again demonstrated the value of Reserve personnel in generating capability, especially for the sustainment of operations.

    The Reserve establishment framework will remain, but aspects will be enhanced. There will be defined roles and functions for the Reserve expressed as organisation and establishment. Where possible, Reserves will be posted to a wartime position within PAF Units, and will be administered and mobilised by the Reserve Squadrons. The majority of Reserve positions will be in Combat Support Group to sustain deployed operations.

    DRES-AF is investigating new structures to make the Reserve more accessible and sustainable for both direct entrants and members leaving the Air Force. Additional specialisations and musterings may be formed, and members of the Reserve will generally be assigned a specific wartime skill and task for which they will be trained and kept current in peacetime.

    Conclusion

    The foregoing explanation has been intentionally detailed. Workforce issues are everyone's concern, but they are complex in their overall effect, over time. I have attempted to provide you, through your commander, with a 'warts and all' assessment of where we are at after 30 months of the DRP. Should you require clarification of the foregoing, you should seek explanation by your commander, who has access to specialist staff in AFHQ Workforce Structure, AFHQ DGPERS-AF, and the DPE for advice.

    I will be taking steps to 'ease the throttles' during the remaining DRP transition, and I am fighting hard for more funding to ease the transition pain and to ensure the emerging Air Force structure is achieved as quickly as possible. The mistakes that have fallen out of DRP, such as Command and Control deficiencies and disrupted use of mustering sponsors, will be fixed.

    There is still some pain to endure until the final washout of the DRP. However, we now have a more reliable forecast of future employment prospects for most of you, and the DRP reinvestment recovery has started. By January 2003, I expect that the Air Force will be better balanced in its structure, the workforce gap will be little, if any, and our workforce of 13,500-plus will be a hard working, but not stressed, and a happy force. We will be a fully deployable Air Force ready to fight and win.

    Thank you for your patience and loyalty during the DRP transition. You can be proud of your achievements in difficult circumstances.

    I would like to hear your views and encourage feedback. The AFHQ and DWPE points of contact are at Table C.

    E.J. McCormack
    AIRMSHL
    CAF
    30 November 2000

    Footnote: Since the original issue of this update, the White Paper has been released. The White Paper does not change the workforce structure detailed in this update. However, despite the promising budget implications, it will take some time for personnel funding to improve and take effect. Although Air Force is pressing for 13,555 funding, in the short to medium term, personnel funding may be less than 13,555.

    Points of Contact

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