Aviators’courage triumphs

Smoke billows from the USS Yorktown shortly after it was hit by three Japanese bombs on June 4, 1942.

Dauntless dive bombers from the USS Hornet attack the Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma, on fire from earlier strikes.

The most decisive engagement in the Pacific War occurred at Midway 61 years ago, writes WGCDR Geoff Willans.

AS with the initial Japanese onslaught at Pearl Harbour during World War II, carrier-based aircraft played a crucial role in the Battle of Midway in early June 1942 – although this time US forces inflicted the most damaging blows.

From January to March that year, US Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had initiated a number of pinprick carrier raids against Japanese positions in the Marshalls, Gilbert Archipelago, Wake and Marcus Islands, Rabaul and Lae. These raids reinforced Japanese Combined Fleet commander Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s unwavering position that the US fleet had to be crushed. In early April, Yamamoto submitted a well-conceived plan to attack the US base on the mid-Pacific atoll of Midway – but his real objective was to draw the US fleet into an ambush. His plan included some key assumptions:

• A diversionary attack on the Aleutian Islands would draw some of the American naval forces, leaving a smaller force to be drawn into the Midway ambush.
  
  
• The intended bombardment of Midway on June 4 would achieve surprise and draw out and commit the US forces to a major sea battle on June 7 or 8, giving Yamamoto the time to concentrate his battleship, cruiser and carrier force off Midway.
  
  
• A submarine screening force would detect all US warship movements from Honolulu into the Midway area.
  While the carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku were not available for this operation following the Coral Sea clash, Yamamoto decided that the other four carriers would suffice. Japanese intelligence had also erroneously advised that Yorktown and Lexington had been sunk in the Coral Sea action. Yorktown, although damaged, would be sufficiently repaired to take a major part in the Midway engagement.
  
  As time was short and many ships were at sea, the entire Japanese operations order was transmitted by radio on unchanged codes. From communication intercepts Nimitz had virtually all the detail of the operation by the last week of May.
  
  He was not deceived by the diversionary raid on the Aleutians. The US fleet put to sea before the Japanese submarines took up station and Nimitz held his carriers (Enterprise, Hornet and the repaired Yorktown) unobserved to the northeast of Midway.
  
  A US Catalina located the Japanese transports on June 3. Early on June 4 US aircraft from Midway located the Japanese carriers as they were launching a strike on Midway. Midway-based aircraft counter-attacked. A Marine dive bomber squadron suffered many losses but achieved no results. The CO, Major Lofton Henderson, was killed and the airfield on Guadalcanal would subsequently be named Henderson Field after him.
  
  Once the Japanese carriers were located, the US carriers positioned to attack. Japanese scouts had been launched before dawn but one was late and the US carriers were only sighted as the Japanese strike aircraft were returning to the carriers from Midway. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo decided not to send a limited, unescorted strike against the US carriers, but to rearm the returning aircraft and launch a maximum strike.
  
  Meanwhile, the US carriers attacked with their aircraft. The US torpedo bombers pulled the Zeros covering the Japanese carriers down to sea level. The torpedo bombers were almost wiped out but they cleared the way for US dive bombers to attack.
  
  Akagi, Kaga and Soryu were heavily hit and all three sank in the afternoon. The Hiryu was missed because of a rainstorm and launched a counter-strike against Yorktown, sinking her in the afternoon. In turn, a second strike from Enterprise, also involving aircraft from the sinking Yorktown, left Hiryu sinking.
  
  Although the Japanese had superiority in forces, the forewarning provided by intelligence from intercepts, Japanese tactical errors of judgement, and the endeavour and valour of the US aviators resulted in the loss of all four Japanese carriers, 3500 men including experienced aircrew, and 332 aircraft. The Japanese carriers had taken part in the Pearl Harbour attack, so the Americans considered they had gained some revenge.
  
  On the US side, the Yorktown had been sunk, and 307 men and 147 aircraft lost.
  The carrier losses from the Coral Sea and Midway engagements forced the Japanese on the defensive. They never regained the initiative.
• WGCDR Geoff Willans is a member of the Aerospace Centre.

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