HMAS WESTRALIA centre of media attention

Many of you would have read articles in recent Bulletin magazines and in other media outlets accusing the Navy of a cover-up of the circumstances surrounding the tragic fire onboard HMAS WESTRALIA on May 5 1998 that claimed the lives of four of our shipmates.

Not once was Navy consulted in the preparation of these pieces and thus there was no chance to put some balance into the article. I thought it important that I provide you with some material on these issues so that we can deal with facts rather than unsubstantiated assertions. I hope you find these Q & As useful when talking to friends, families and other interested parties.

Firstly, I am very concerned that this type of journalism only serves to lessen the respect for the memories of our four shipmates who perished and also undermines the "sterling performance" of WESTRALIA's crew in fighting the fire and saving the ship. It also does nothing for the morale of those of us who are working so hard to present Navy as a professional and committed organisation of which the Australian community should be proud.

Secondly, I am concerned that in our responses to such allegations that we do not make it any harder for the families of our four shipmates, or the ship's company of WESTRALIA both then and now, to reconcile the issues that are concerning them and will continue to be cause for concern for a long time. Thus there are times when, although I would like to present the facts in all media outlets possible, a more measured and perhaps quieter response is more appropriate, lest we make the grieving process even harder than it already is. I know there are many within the Navy community that would like Navy to be more forceful in its responses than it currently appears, and I understand that, but it is also about those who feel hurt when any of this is played out in public. We have to respect their needs.

Thirdly, we understand there is a book going to be published on the WESTRALIA fire and that there will be more stories published in journals prior to the release of that book. This will result in higher levels of publicity and could also result in more unsubstantiated assertions by certain authors. Whenever such articles appear I will seek to respond in an appropriate forum to ensure that the information passed is balanced, rather than the one-sided pieces we have seen to date.

Fourthly, and this is the bottom line, if there is new evidence presented which if it had been known at the time of the Board of Inquiry would have made a material difference to the outcome or any recommendation, I will have it investigated. Thus far there has been no new evidence presented.

The issues.

The BOI -Open or Closed. It is important for people to understand that the BOI was an open public inquiry and included, for the first time, civilian subject matter experts from outside Defence on the board. The Terms of reference for the BOI provided guidance to the board members to permit them to fully establish the facts surrounding the tragic events of May 5 1998. In no way were they restricted to specific issues. In addition the BOI was open to the public, the families and the media. All of its findings were available to the public with the exception of those relating to pathological and medical evidence of the deceased, personal/medical information of other victims and Navy's recommendations on honours and awards. This information was withheld because its release would have been in breach of privacy requirements. Also, it would have been most improper of us to make these open and expose the families to further grief.

The BOI - TOR. The Terms of reference, issued by the Maritime Commander, were not restricted to particular issues. The fact that the BOI was not specifically tasked to make recommendations about disciplinary outcomes is consistent with the objectives of all military inquiries conducted under Defence (Inquiry) Regulations and outlined in the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Report on Military Justice Procedures in the ADF. This report also explains that the appointing authority may, after considering the report of the inquiry, decide that a separate investigation under the DFDA is necessary. Therefore the fact that the TOR for the WESTRALIA BOI did not include reference to disciplinary action did not preclude the initiating of proceedings against any personnel.

WA Coroner. We are awaiting the decision on whether or not the WA Coroner will conduct a coronial inquiry. If he decides to do so Navy will provide all appropriate support to the inquiry.

The Peer Report. The national president of the RSL has denied that it prepared its own "Peer Report" report into the fire. What is referred to in fact is the personal opinion of a long since retired naval officer expressed in a letter. What is important is that it contained no new evidence.

Attribution of Blame. The Bulletin's claims that no one had been held accountable for the incident is also untrue. My predecessor VADM Don Chalmers publicly accepted accountability for the problems within the system that led to the fuel hoses which caused the fire being fitted inappropriately. These problems are being systematically addressed by Navy. Legal advice on whether proceedings should have been initiated against other personnel was that even if charges might have been framed convictions were not likely to result.

Honours and Awards for Bravery. Navy submitted recommendations for a number of honours and awards as a result of the fire. 1 am not at liberty to reveal this information nor is the independent body which makes the decisions - The Australian Bravery and Decorations Council- at liberty to advise why it made the recommendations that it did. Indeed their deliberations and reasoning is not revealed, and nor should it be, to the Navy. This ensures complete impartiality and propriety of the honours and awards system. I think it an abhorrent claim that the honours and awards' process was manipulated to provide some sort of cover up. I would also stress that Navy has no evidence the families have asked for the confiscation of medals.

Honours and Awards for Conspicuous Service. The nominations for Conspicuous Service Awards are subject to a different process in that the nominations are passed to the Minister for Defence after endorsement by the department and then are passed to the Governor General. The process is completely independent of Navy and it is a nonsense to suggest that Navy could in any way circumvent or impose on it in any way to pursue some internal agenda.

Fact versus Fiction.

HMAS WESTRALIA refuelling an FFG

Assertion. "Evidence suggests that the four sailors may not have been killed by the fire but died because of poor leadership and inadequate management."

Fact. Medical evidence found the sailors died from carbon monoxide poisoning and smoke inhalation. Nowhere is it suggested "the fire" killed them. Also, the BOI, which was established to look at facts, found no evidence of poor leadership.

Assertion. The fire "may have been only a fierce and brief fireball that consumed as little as 30 litres of fuel."

Fact. All evidence found that the fire(s) lasted considerably longer. The fire(s) started at about 1034 and was/were not reported as out until 1232.

Assertion."If the ventilator flaps had not been closed five minutes after the fire started ... may not have perished."

Fact. This is supposition. The BOI found the flap closure was not relevant to their deaths. Also, medical evidence indicated they were probably unconscious within the first five minutes.

Assertion. "The decision to close the ventilator flaps and not to commence exhaust fan activity (if possible) meant that heat, smoke and carbon monoxide were retained from five minutes after the fire started..."

Fact. No exhaust fans were fitted in the Main Machinery Space in WESTRALIA.

Assertion. "Once the error in closing the ventilator flaps was realised the funnel door on the other side of the ship could have provided an alternative opening to release heat and smoke. It was not opened."

Fact. The closure of the flaps was not an error that was "realised"; it was Standard Operating Procedure. The funnel door was opened to permit the spraying of AFF into the space. However, because the way the ship lay-to after losing power the prevailing wind prevented the escape of hot gases and smoke from the space. This allegation has no bearing on the outcomes.

Assertion. "The fundamental and continuing scandal is the outmoded naval concept that it need not comply with conventions relating to safety at sea in the outmoded belief that the demands of war make those treaties an impediment."

Fact. WESTRALIA is classed as a "tanker under survey" by Lloyds Register of Shipping. Class certificates were held at the time of the fire for:

• the International Load Line Convention 1966;

• the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974; and

• the 1978 as it relates to construction and machinery.

By Chief of Navy
VADM David Shackleton