CA targets small wars at history conference
Volume 11, No. 54, October 19, 2006
By Cpl Andrew Hetherington

SMALL wars and insurgencies were a hot topic at this year’s Chief of Army’s history conference.

Held at the National Convention Centre in Canberra, the annual event has again proven to be popular with more than 150 delegates attending.

In his opening address CA Lt-Gen Peter Leahy described insurgency as being historically one of the most common forms of conflict.

“Countering insurgency also has an equally long, though often not especially distinguished, history,” he said.

“As T.E. Lawrence justly observed, ‘making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife’.

“The nub of the problem, demonstrated repeatedly throughout history, is that it is never sufficient to fight an insurgency – one must counter it.”

Lt-Gen Leahy then went on to briefly describe Australia’s role in past small wars and insurgencies.

“The Australian Army has considerable experience of its own in the conduct of small wars and the countering of insurgency,” he said.

“Much of the history and many of the traditions of the Australian Regular Army was forged in the succession of conflicts to which Australian soldiers were committed in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s.

“From the Malayan Emergency to the protracted campaign in Phuoc Tuy province, Australian soldiers learnt, refined and frequently excelled at the low-intensity operations, integrated with population security and nation-building measures that, taken together, are the characteristics of success in meeting and defeating the challenge posed by an insurgent force.”

The conference keynote address was presented by Professor Brian McAllister Linn from the Agricultural and Mechanical University Texas.

In his address US Army and Small Wars: An Uncomfortable Reality, Professor Linn focused on the US military’s roles in small wars and insurgencies and in particular the current war in Iraq.

“One of the big long-term questions is why the US Army, which only a few years ago was boasting it was the most dominant and effective land force ever, was so unprepared, and so slow to adapt to the insurgency in Iraq,” he said.

“This is a question not only of significance to scholars, but to military organisations that are considering the implications of the so-called revolution in military affairs, or which seek to understand the dangers inherent in an army that becomes too enamoured of one concept of war.

“The US Army that entered Iraq in 2003 was well prepared to fight the Soviet Union, or at least a demoralised, ineptly led, and deteriorating Soviet surrogate.”

Professor McAllister Linn said the US Army might even have been prepared, 10 years hence, to battle in a high-technological star wars scenario.

“But it was not prepared for [war in] Iraq,” he said.